Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Withdrawal from Gaza A Step towards Peace or the End of the Two-state Solution?

Muriel Asseburg SWP Comments

In December 2003, Israel’s prime minister, , announced his intention of unilaterally disengaging from the Palestinians. Meanwhile Sharon has elaborated that the disengagement will not only include the construction of a separation barrier in the West Bank, but also the withdrawal from those areas in which no Israelis will be living anyhow after a final status agreement has been reached: the and some isolated settlements in the northern West Bank. In April 2004, US president George W. Bush commended Sharon’s plan as historic and courageous and pledged American assistance. Indeed there is hope that a withdrawal will create renewed momentum in the current Middle Eastern deadlock. Such momentum, however, is not inherent in Sharon’s plan. It will only come about if the international community is willing to heavily involve itself. Otherwise, violence is likely to escalate further – the May 2004 confrontations in Gaza might be considered a prelude – and measures will be taken that will ultimately prevent, rather than lead to, a two-state solution.

According to the disengagement plan customs, as well as postal and telecommu- attached to Prime Minister Sharon’s letter nications arrangements, will in principle of 16 April 2004 to President Bush, Israel: remain in place. Israel will also continue to ! will continue construction of the supply electricity and water. At the same separation barrier in the West Bank; time, Israel will keep control of all land and ! will evacuate all settlements and maritime borders as well as the airspace military installations in the Gaza Strip above the Strip, and asserts its right to take probably by the end of 2005; preventive measures and to carry out mili- ! will evacuate four settlements (Ganim, tary retaliation operations in all evacuated Kadim, Sa-Nur, Homesh) as well as areas. Israel intends to initially keep control military installations located in the of the border between the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank. (the “Philadelphi Route”) and to Existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements widen the border strip if deemed necessary. pertaining to, amongst other things, the Neither the Gaza seaport nor the airport freedom of movement of goods and per- will be reopened in the short term. The sons, the monetary regime, taxes and Gaza Strip is to be a demilitarised area, and

SWP Comments 13 June 2004

1 an international presence can only be Egypt; in reforming, training and oversee- deployed with Israeli consent. After the ing Palestinian security services, as well as withdrawal, Israel will regard its occupa- in coordinating the withdrawal with the tion of the Gaza Strip to be over and will Palestinians. Immediately, first steps were reject any further responsibility for the taken to begin preparations for the plan’s local population. In return for these with- implementation. The Disengagement Plan drawals, as it were, the disengagement plan Steering Committee, under the lead of announces Israel’s intention of holding on National Security Council Chairman Giora to certain areas in the West Bank even after Eiland, has been established to coordinate a final agreement has been signed. These the different ministries’ tasks with regards areas include large settlement blocs and to the economic, diplomatic, security and security zones as well as areas of particular civilian issues related to the disengage- interest to Israel. ment. A preliminary working plan prepared by the committee has been leaked to the press. It foresees, amongst other things, Will the Sharon Plan four cabinet votes on the withdrawals Be Implemented? between February and July 2005 as well as It is not yet certain whether or not Israel a voluntary evacuation of Jewish settlers will actually implement the disengagement from August 2004 to mid-August 2005. In plan. On 2 May 2004, it was submitted for a September 2005, the army would forcefully vote to Likud’s roughly 200,000 members, evacuate the remaining settlers and com- about half of whom participated in the refe- plete the military withdrawal except in rendum. In the end, 60 percent of those the Philadelphi Route. Compensation for voting – equalling less than 1 percent of the settlers should serve as an incentive for total population – rejected the plan. Con- voluntary withdrawal and would therefore sequently, the prime minister announced not only depend on their assets, family size, that he does not regard his party’s vote as etc., but also on if and when they evacuate binding and that he is determined to imple- their settlements. Furthermore, a commit- ment the plan notwithstanding, albeit with tee to coordinate the disengagement with slight modifications. In this, he can count the Egyptians has been established by the on a comfortable majority of the popula- Defense Ministry. Another committee that tion backing his plan: current polls show will oversee the evacuation of, compen- approval ratings between 60 and 70 per- sation of and negotiations with the settlers cent. Following fierce controversies and and prepare the necessary legislation for the dismissal of the National Union’s two compensating evacuated settlers has been cabinet ministers in order to ensure a established by the Justice Ministry. cabinet majority, the Israeli government However, all these activities are by no adopted a modified version of the disen- means a guarantee that actual withdrawals gagement plan on 6 June 2004 and agreed will take place, partially or fully. In the to start preparations for its implement- months to come, we should expect more tation. controversies in the cabinet over each of According to the modified plan, settle- the withdrawals as well as further resigna- ments in Gaza and the northern West Bank tions from the cabinet and a series of no- will be evacuated (and housing conse- confidence votes in the government. Fol- quently destroyed) in four phases – if and lowing the resignations of two of the only if the cabinet votes in favour of each of National Religious Party’s ministers from the withdrawals. Furthermore, implemen- the government, Prime Minister Sharon tation of the plan will no longer be com- is no longer backed by a Knesset majority. pletely unilateral: Egypt is to assume a role The Labor Party has pledged to provide the in securing the border between Gaza and government with a safety net for the with-

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2 drawal. Thus, coalition talks with Labor Salfit city, contradicting the assurances seem likely to take place, but even early given by the Israeli government to US Presi- elections are a possibility. dent Bush. After completion of the separ- ation barrier’s western part, Israel will have annexed de facto around 20 percent of Reviving the Peace Process? West Bank territory. If the Jordan valley as The question as to whether Sharon’s plan foreseen also remains under Israeli control, will be a step towards reviving the Middle all in all around 45 percent of the West East peace process and solving the Israeli- Bank will de facto be annexed. In addition, Palestinian conflict has to be answered in East Jerusalem as an important social, the negative. Unilateral measures, such as cultural-religious, economic, and servicing those envisaged by the plan, along with centre, as well as the traffic junction Sharon’s statements that its implementa- between the north and south of the West tion would definitely stifle Palestinian Bank, will be completely isolated from aspirations to statehood, do little to build its surroundings once construction of the confidence. They also run counter to the separation barrier is completed. Thus, road map’s approach, which requires both the Sharon plan is diametrically opposed parties to carry out their obligations paral- to the establishment of a viable Palestinian lel and simultaneously. Moreover, the plan state and therefore to the realisation of a does not aim for a negotiated, mutually durable two-state solution. accepted conflict settlement, nor for the More immediate, however, the main establishment of a viable Palestinian state. problem with the disengagement plan Even basic co-ordination with the Pales- will be its likely failure in substantially im- tinians is not provided for. The disengage- proving living conditions for the Palestin- ment will not even end the occupation of ian population in the Gaza Strip. Of course, the evacuated territories, despite Israeli it will come as a relief for Palestinians withdrawals of its settler population and living in the Strip to no longer have to face military personnel from these areas, for checkpoints and roadblocks and to enjoy Israel still retains all essential prerogatives. free movement within the 365 sq km. Of Of particular concern is the issue of ter- much greater importance to the 1.3 million ritorial contiguity. While a withdrawal inhabitants, however, is an improvement of from settlements and military installations their socio-economic situation. Presently, in the northern West Bank will ease the 30 to 50 percent of the population is un- situation somewhat on a local level, employed, around three-quarters live below the construction of the separation barrier the poverty line and a large proportion is (albeit declared as temporary), with its deep dependent on international aid shipments. incursions into the West Bank, carves up This is largely a consequence of Israeli the Palestinian territories in a much more closure policy as Gaza inhabitants depend dramatic fashion. Large sections of farm- on employment in Israel and on foreign land and water resources are already, or trade in commodities. Open access to world will become, inaccessible to the local markets is essential, especially for perish- Palestinian population. Preparations for able agricultural exports, and open borders construction have now begun to include to neighbouring countries and – at least the settlements of Ariel, Qedumim, Im- as long as no peace agreement has been manuel and the Shomron block on the signed – a proper seaport and airport are western side of the wall. The construction needed. The disengagement plan, however, of the wall, as far as 20 km inside the Green does not foresee any of this. On the con- Line, will involve the creation of several trary, the Israeli minister of industry and Palestinian enclaves and cantons isolating trade, Ehud Olmert, has decided to close village communities and cutting access to the Erez Industrial Zone until it might be

SWP Comments 13 June 2004

3 handed over to an international body – stick to a ceasefire and to find a power- eliminating another four thousand jobs sharing arrangement which would involve for Gaza residents. them in governmental responsibilities as But in spite of all these reservations, the well as possibly integrating them into the evacuation of settlements, particularly in security apparatus. representatives the West Bank, as strategically and demo- at least have signaled a strong interest graphically insignificant as they might be, in converting their street popularity into is a positive step. It might also be an op- political power. portunity for demonstrating to the Israeli Israel’s policy of liquidating members public that settlements in “Judea and of the Hamas leadership, however, Samaria” can be evacuated without causing undermines these efforts. Not only does it a civil war within Israel. And it might lead deprive the PA of any legitimacy in the eyes to growing pressure from the Israeli public of the Palestinian population to act against to withdraw from further areas; that would armed groups. It also further radicalises the depend a lot, of course, on the behaviour population and strengthens support for of the Palestinian militants, i.e., an end of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as recent polls armed operations in the evacuated areas demonstrate. Crucially, it leads to an inter- leading to an improvement in the security nal loss of control over individual cells and situation within Israel, combined with on- activists by causing a fragmentation of going pressure on the still-occupied areas. the movements. This will exacerbate the These developments will make it easier for already substantial difficulty of enforcing any future Israeli government to evacuate a durable ceasefire in the future. settlements on a larger scale, and to ulti- Egypt already mediates in the national mately put an end to the occupation. dialogue and ceasefire talks between the Palestinian factions, and acts as a go- between in the withdrawal preparations of The Palestinian Authority, Israelis and Palestinians. Israel now wants Hamas and the Egyptian Role Egypt to play a larger role in implementing The Palestinian Authority (PA) has ex- the withdrawal with regards to Palestinian pressed its rejection of the unilateral security sector reform, training and over- nature of the Israeli plan as well as of sight as well as controlling the Gaza-Egypt the erection of the separation barrier on border. Already by late June 2004, the Palestinian territory. At the same time, it first Egyptian security advisors should be has established a working group to assess arriving in Gaza, with training personnel the existing capacities and needs of the following in the fall. From what has trans- PA in order to prepare for an eventual pired in the media, Egypt has made its Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as involvement conditional: It expects Israel to well as to prepare for the taking over of withdraw completely from the Gaza Strip, responsibilities. In particular, Palestinian i.e., including withdrawal from the Phil- protagonists are aware of the dangers of adelphi Route, to give guarantees that it violent power struggles in the wake of an will abstain from military operations in Israeli withdrawal. Armed confrontations the evacuated territories, and to finally with Israel have weakened the PA and establish safe passages between Gaza and have caused a groundswell of support for the West Bank. It also expects the PA to Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic restructure its complex security apparatus Jihad. Consequently, the PA has set up a into three services under the interior minis- national dialogue aimed at preventing civil ter’s authority and to empower the Pales- strife or a takeover of power by Hamas. In tinian prime minister substantially. And it these talks, PA and Fatah representatives expects both sides to refrain from violence. are trying to convince opposition groups to Considering the Egyptian interests in de-

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4 escalating the situation, in preventing a tarian regime in the Gaza Strip to emerge takeover by Islamist forces in Gaza, in under Egyptian surveillance. And, above all, securing the border as well as in relieving we should not have illusions that the Egyp- American pressures for reform, it is none- tian government have the capacity and theless quite unclear whether Egypt will power to create the complex conditions indeed insist on these conditions to be necessary for a successful withdrawal and fulfilled before getting substantially in- a resumption of the peace process. volved and assuming responsibility. Primarily, the EU will therefore have to Egyptian involvement in Gaza involves work towards getting US policy to make considerable risks. First, it is very doubtful good in a responsible manner on its sup- as to whether the Egyptian security forces port for the disengagement plan pledged are the most suitable for training in anti- by George W. Bush. Initially, this entails in- terrorism measures which are not only sisting on immediate preparation and effective, but also compatible with inter- execution of the withdrawal to be carried national human rights standards. Second, out as speedily as is possible. The cabinet’s an Egyptian security role holds the danger plan with a fall 2005 deadline leaves a of escalating Palestinian-Egyptian tensions, period of more than a year in which both Israeli-Egyptian tensions and, last but not Palestinian militant groups and the Israeli least, a regional escalation. While the Pales- government will try to claim victory with tinian leadership has welcomed an Egyp- the withdrawal and thus continue esca- tian security role in the Strip, Palestinian lating the violence. The deadly confron- factions have already clearly voiced their tations and house demolitions in the Gaza opposition as they are afraid of Egyptian Strip witnessed in May 2004 have served as (and in the West Bank: Jordanian) involve- a foreshadowing of escalations to come. ment in the security sector which will ef- Also, the more radical settlers will use the fectively limit the PA’s competencies and time to organise and to lobby massively endanger the sovereignty of a future Pales- against withdrawal. tinian state. Support for the withdrawal also entails creating a conducive context. The large- scale demolition of houses begun in “Oper- Challenges for European Policy ation Rainbow” in order to enlarge the The European Union (EU) should definitely border strip between Gaza and Egypt, the support Sharon’s plan to evacuate settle- newly enhanced settlement effort in ments and troops from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and Jerusalem, the ongoing parts of the West Bank. It should also take military operations and targeted killings, as advantage of this opportunity for bringing well as the closing of the Erez Industrial new momentum to the deadlocked road Zone do not support such an environment. map process, instead of merely continuing The Quartet should exert pressure in order to insist on the relevance of the Quartet’s that Israel’s actions be swiftly stopped and (US, EU, UN, Russia) plan as the sole means replaced by confidence-building measures. for solving the conflict. This will require, The challenge will then be to spell out in however, that we not only demand that the detail the arrangements for the withdrawal parties to the conflict deliver on their com- and the handover of security and infra- mitments, but that we also assess how far structure control to the PA. To this end, we are ready to contribute beyond dec- Israel and the PA will have to work out a laratory politics in transforming the uni- plan that sets a timetable for withdrawal lateral approach into a success story. Egypt and transfer of power, clarifying which surely can provide a coordinating body capacities can reasonably be assumed by between Israel and the PA. But we should the PA itself after a handover, and what not support another repressive and authori- kind of support needs to be provided by

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5 the international community. Coordination presence would be to – together with the with the PA is paramount in this regard in PA – disarm the population and act against order to prevent chaos and to keep self- groups that continue to engage in attacks declared victors from rising to power. The against Israel. Only if this is done success- Quartet should oversee the drawing up of fully will Israel cease to carry out preven- this plan and monitor its implementation. tive or retaliatory military operations. Such Moreover, the EU can contribute to a presence would be welcomed by a ma- making the withdrawal a tangible success jority of the Palestinians provided it is for the local population by generously sup- perceived as a means to ending the occu- porting reconstruction of the evacuated pation and not as a tool for its continua- areas, and kicking off economic develop- tion. This, however, will not be the case as ment by way of substantial investments. long as a permanent interim situation is This, however, can only succeed if the Gaza on the horizon. Strip is no longer economically isolated. Within the framework of the Quartet,

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und Therefore the Israeli government will need Europeans should therefore capitalise on Politik, 2004 to assume its responsibility to create the the opportunity and build on the commit- All rights reserved necessary conditions: above all, access to ments made by the US president which

SWP international markets overland as well as have put final-status issues on the agenda. Stiftung Wissenschaft und via port and airport must be assured, and This involves integrating the Gaza with- Politik German Institute for work permits for Gaza residents in Israel – drawal into the road map process, i.e., a International and at least in the short to medium term – first step to be followed by further steps Security Affairs need to be dramatically increased. In the towards a two-state solution. These steps Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 medium to long term, jobs could also be need to be plotted down with a serious 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 created by setting up joint ventures in the timetable. It also involves spelling out the Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Gaza Strip or on the Egyptian border. road map’s third phase in order to give www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] In order to ensure law and order in the clear direction to this process. Europe Gaza Strip as well as security in Israel, the should urge the Quartet to lay down the international community’s involvement is principles for a solution to the conflict crucial – as is broad support by the local which would then serve as the basis for population. Involving moderate Islamist as negotiations between Israel and the PA well as other opposition groups in the on the details of a two-state arrangement. political process and in sharing political Without such active international involve- responsibilities is essential for giving the ment aimed at reviving the road map, the PA the legitimacy it needs to enforce law implementation of the disengagement plan and order and to prevent attacks against will not lead closer to peace, but rather con- Israel wherever possible. The international tribute to the prevention of a durable and community should therefore support the acceptable two-state solution. national dialogue and the holding of elec- tions, particularly on the local level, in the near future. At the same time, international support for the Palestinian security apparatus is crucial for breaking out of the cycle of violence. The training of security forces already underway is not sufficient. There is also need for an international presence on the ground. Israel has signaled earlier that it would not necessarily oppose such a presence, provided it be under American command. A key task for such a military

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