Egypt and Israel: Tunnel Neutralization Efforts in Gaza
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WL KNO EDGE NCE ISM SA ER IS E A TE N K N O K C E N N T N I S E S J E N A 3 V H A A N H Z И O E P W O I T E D N E Z I A M I C O N O C C I O T N S H O E L C A I N M Z E N O T Egypt and Israel: Tunnel Neutralization Efforts in Gaza LUCAS WINTER Open Source, Foreign Perspective, Underconsidered/Understudied Topics The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an open source research organization of the U.S. Army. It was founded in 1986 as an innovative program that brought together military specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived from unclassified, foreign media. Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly collaborative work by conducting unclassified research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered. Author Background Mr. Winter is a Middle East analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office. He holds a master’s degree in international relations from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and was an Arabic Language Flagship Fellow in Damascus, Syria, in 2006–2007. Previous Publication This paper was originally published in the September-December 2017 issue of Engineer: the Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers. It is being posted on the Foreign Military Studies Office website with permission from the publisher. FMSO has provided some editing, format, and graphics to this paper to conform to organizational standards. Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation style are those of the author. The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. ByBM Mr. LLucas WitWinter ver the past 15 years, the Egyptian Armed Forces tunnels below a depth of about 10 meters means that neu- (EAF) and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have tralization attempts usually begin at tunnel entrances. Ohad limited success in interdicting movement across Some entrance shafts lead nowhere; others are one of many smuggling tunnels in Rafah, which is located between the replaceable access points to a tunnel network. Caving or Palestinian Gaza Strip and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. These cementing a tunnel shaft might block a particular tunnel tunnels, many of which are rudimentary, are of various branch, but it does not usually render an entire tunnel net- shapes and sizes and are used to transport small items. They work inoperable. are hard to detect from above ground, as they are often small enough or deep enough to neutralize detection methods. Gaza Under Israeli Occupation The simplest tunnels are big enough for a person to crawl he modern history of the Rafah tunnels began in through; many are big enough for two people to walk along 1982, when Israel ceded control of the Sinai Penin- side-by-side. Most are shored up with wooden supports; Tsula to Egypt, as stipulated by the 1978 Camp David some are lined with wooden panels or even concrete. Goods Accord. Israeli forces remained in the Gaza Strip, which are shuttled using mechanized pulley systems attached to had previously been occupied by Egypt. The border sepa- canoe-shaped containers made from scrap metal. In larger rating Egyptian-controlled Sinai from Israeli-controlled tunnels, mining carts on rails are used for transport. Some Gaza was demarcated by a 100-meter wide buffer zone run- of the Rafah tunnels are large enough for vehicles and live- ning through the town of Rafah. Extended families owning stock. The largest among them has been reported to be land on either side of the new border were divided. Early 30 meters deep and 3 kilometers long. smuggling was done through irrigation pipes linking the ter- The most common access points to these tunnels are ver- ritory that was divided into Sinai (where the fields were) tical shafts or egresses. When there is enough space, tun- and Gaza (where the irrigation pumps were); restrictions nels may also have larger, slanted entrances. The absence on movement made the irrigation system obsolete, and the of technology to accurately identify or map rudimentary pipes were repurposed to smuggle lightweight, expensive goodsg such as gold, drugs, and spares parts for light weapons. The 1993 Oslo Accords grantedg the Palestinians par- tialt self-governance, but Israel retainedr full control over Gaza borderb crossings, airspace, anda maritime routes. Israel claimedc that shortly after the OsloO Accords, Gaza’s Palestin- iani factions intensified their useu of subterranean conduits tot arm themselves. In 1994, IsraelI erected a security bar- rierr around the Gaza Strip. The IDFI monitored the Rafah border fromf atop a concrete wall some 303 meters behind the security barrier.b After 2000, Israel launched a campaign to demolish Rafah 3KRWRVE\WKH,VUDHOL'HIHQVH)RUFH homesh near the border and IDF paratroopers operate within Gaza. 30 Engineer September–December 2017 establish a buffer zone. In May 2004, the IDF launched Operation Rainbow to destroy smuggling tunnels and to expand the buffer zone dividing Gaza from Egypt to about 300 meters. Operation Rainbow was triggered by an attack that killed five IDF soldiers along the border. The IDF sealed Rafah and deployed helicopter gunships, tanks, and infantry troops to various neighborhoods of Rafah. Armored bulldoz- ers demolished homes in two Rafah refugee camps, amidst international criticism. Israeli leaders had floated a plan to withdraw from Gaza several months before the launch of Operation Rainbow. In 2005, Israel withdrew all of its settlers and military posi- tions from Gaza. The last Israeli forces withdrew from Gaza in September 2005, handing control of the Gaza side to the Palestinian Authority. The Egyptian side of Rafah was closed, allegedly for renovations. In coordination with the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Egypt and Israel signed the Philadelphi Accord, named after the 13 kilometers of shared border between Egypt and Gaza in Rafah (the Philadelphi Route). The accord allowed Egypt to deploy a 750-man contingent of guards along the border in a part of Sinai that was to remain demilitarized. Israel retained full control over Gaza’s seacoast and airspace, and cross-border traffic at the Rafah crossing was limited to people and that year’s export harvest from Gaza. European observers monitored the crossing, and Israel had access to ,VUDHOL'HIHQVH)RUFHV¿QGDWXQQHOQHDUWKH(UH] a live video feed. Materials entering Gaza from Egypt had crossing. to pass through the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom border Gaza’s residents could afford a variety of products from crossing to the south, on the border between Egypt, Gaza, Egypt, and smuggling became a multimillion dollar indus- and Israel. try. The buffer zone Israel had created in 2004 turned into The Rafah crossing reopened in November 2005, with a warren of tarp-covered tunnel shafts. According to one the Palestinian Authority in control on the Gaza side. Two calculation, there were nearly 2,500 tunnels beneath the months later, Hamas soundly defeated the Palestinian Rafah border crossing, although that number likely refers Authority party (Fatah) in the legislative elections. Low- to entrances or tunnel segments rather than actual cross- level conflict for control over Gaza broke out between the border passageways. An entire economy developed around two factions, and the Europeans tasked with monitoring the the tunnel-smuggling business servicing the Gaza market. Rafah crossing fled due to safety concerns. They also left the In Egypt, it extended well into the North Sinai capital of Kerem Shalom crossing. Israel began implementing quotas al-Arish, nearly 60 kilometers west of Rafah. on goods entering the Gaza Strip. Egyptian Tunnel Neutralization Efforts The Hamas tunnels came to the attention of global media in the summer of 2006, when Gaza gunmen used them to n December 2008, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead infiltrate an IDF position near Kerem Shalom. Two Israeli in Gaza. The offensive was largely aerial, and its tar- soldiers were killed, and one was captured. In response, Igets included parts of Rafah. During this operation, the Egypt indefinitely closed the Rafah border crossing. From EAF took the lead in tunnel neutralization efforts, launch- that point forward, Hamas became inexorably linked to ing a campaign on its side of Rafah by plugging entrances tunnels, whether they were tunnels used for smuggling in with solid waste, sand, or explosives and flooding passages Rafah, military assault tunnels leading into Israel from with sewage. The Egyptian government also committed to Gaza, or defensive structures built beneath Gaza. building a 25-meter-deep underground steel barrier to halt Once Hamas achieved full control over Gaza, they began cross-border tunneling traffic. Even if it had been feasible, “a program of industrial-scale burrowing underground” the project was ineffective. As one report notes, “Egypt cited along the Rafah border.1 Between 2008 and 2013, considered logistical problems such as difficulties hammering steel the “Golden Era of Tunneling,” merchants and laborers in plates more than four meters deep in stony ground. Tun- Gaza and Egypt became wealthy from cross-border smug- nel operators cut through completed segments with blow gling. Local production limitations, combined with Israeli torches, nullifying the multimillion dollar project for the prohibitions, created high demand for items smuggled into cost of a few thousand dollars.”2 The plan was abandoned Gaza. Disparities in prices and currency values meant that by 2012. September–December 2017 Engineer 31 “Israeli and Egyptian forces have used similar methods to interdict Gaza’s smuggling tunnels: installing underground barriers, digging YCVGTſNNGFOQCVUUGCNKPIVWnnel shafts, and creating buffer zones.” EAF maneuvering space in North Sinai was constrained near the border in May 2013, Egyptian media clamored for by the Camp David Accords and by the government’s stronger measures than the government was providing.