The ANNAPOLIS PROCESS (2007-2008) NEGOTIATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS Omer Zanany The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research Translation: Michelle Bubis Design: Yosef Bercovich ISBN: 978-965-555-926-2 Printed in Jerusalem ©2015 - The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv & Molad - the Center for the Renewal of Israeli Democracy. All rights reserved. The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research The ANNAPOLIS PROCESS (2007-2008) Negotiation and its Discontents Omer Zanany The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research THE TAMI STEINMETZ CENTER FOR PEACE RESEARCH The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research which was established in 1992 is an interdisciplinary academic unit at Tel Aviv University. Its mandate is to promote academic activity related to conflict resolution and peace-making, with special reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within this framework, the center: • Initiates, encourages and supports research projects on subjects related to its mandate both in the Middle East and in other regions of the world. • Holds research workshops and local and international conferences dealing with relevant subjects. • Fosters academic collaboration with similarly oriented institutions in Israel and abroad. Molad is an independent, non-partisan Israeli think tank that works to reinvigorate Israeli society by injecting new ideas into all spheres of public discourse. Our vision combines progressive values with a realistic approach to the political and geopolitical challenges of Israeli reality. We inform public debate with responsible content that meets the highest possible standards of research and analysis – the dearth of which has played a crucial role in Israel’s ongoing state of crisis. Molad’s rigorous multi-disciplinary research offers fresh alternatives to stagnant political discourse in and about Israel. While we guard our intellectual independence and reject affiliation with any political party, person, or movement, Molad does not present itself as a-political. We believe that the solutions to Israel’s security threats and social and economic ills lie in a democratic system that will embody the interests and true ambitions of its citizens. Table of Contents Contents 6 Introduction 9 Summary 15 Chapter 1: Background and opening conditions 28 s Time for a Historical Agreement„ 34׳s Play Peace Talks„ or „It׳Let„ The Annapolis Declaration: „Walking on Eggshells„ 39 Chapter 2: Management of the Annapolis process 43 Guiding principles 43 The aim of the Annapolis process: Principles? Framework agreement? 52 Permanent-status agreement? One process - two tracks 53 track 53 ׳The Livni-Abu Alaa The Olmert-Abbas track 67 Chapter 3: Basic concepts and positions in the 73 Annapolis process Terms of Reference (TOR) 73 What is a viable Palestinian state? 75 Demand to recognize Israel as a Jewish state 80 Analysis of the differences over the four core issues 84 Territory and borders 85 Security 110 Jerusalem 132 Refugees 143 s proposal and the 156׳Chapter 4: Comparison of Olmert Taba talks Foreword 156 Progress on secondary points, differences over core issues 157 s proposal 161׳Conclusion: Olmert Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations 166 s proposal 182׳Appendix A - Olmert Appendix B - Summary of positions presented in the 185 professional committees Bibliography 207 Acknowledgements 220 About the author 224 9 INTRODUCTION Israeli author Amos Oz once explained his view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by comparing its possible ending to that of a play: “There’s the Shakespeare tradition of resolving a tragedy with the stage hewed with dead bodies and justice of sorts prevails; but there is also the Chekhov tradition. In the conclusion of the tragedy by Chekhov, everyone is disappointed, disillusioned, embittered, heartbroken, but alive. And my colleagues and I have been working, trying… not to find the sentimental happy ending, a brotherly love, a sudden honeymoon to the Israeli-Palestinian tragedy, but a Chekhovian ending, which means clenched teeth compromise” (PBS 2002). Could the Annapolis talks have truly resolved the Israeli-Palestinian tragedy, in one way or another, or were they yet another chapter in a never-ending story? To quote New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (2007), was the Annapolis process an oasis or a mirage? The dual-track Israeli-Palestinian negotiations held in 2007 and 2008, later dubbed “the Annapolis process”, were only the second time (after the Camp David and Taba talks in 2000-2001) that both sides made an official attempt, with close US assistance, to finalize a permanent-status agreement and promote the two-state solution.1 Aims This study offers a comprehensive examination of what actually took place in Annapolis process, and of the extent to which the talks furthered Israeli-Palestinian dialogue over 1. Between these two official rounds, several unofficial attempts were made that significantly impacted both public and governmental opinion. Most prominent among these were the 2002 Ayalon-Nusseibeh Agreement and the 2003 Geneva Accord. For details on all peace process initiatives, cf. Henry Fishman & Ephraim Lavie (2010), The Peace Process: Seventeen Plans in Ten Years – An Assessment of the Initiatives to Resolve the Israeli Palestinian Conflict Over the Past Decade. Tel Aviv: The Palestine Center for Strategic Studies and the Peres Center for Peace. 10 The ANNAPOLIS PROCESS (2007-2008) core issues with an end to reaching a permanent-status agreement. The analysis yields several recommendations for future negotiations, which would require adaptation to the strategic context at the time. Methodology The study used net assessment to analyze both content matter and strategic management issues concerning the main actors in the Annapolis process – a systemic approach that goes beyond examination of their positions on certain issues. This integrative approach crosscuts all major issues to examine how the process itself was managed and what differences between the parties emerged. In addition to providing historical details of what actually occurred both in and around the talks, the study aims to deepen comprehension of the conceptual gaps that dogged the parties over years of negotiation, illuminating the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The study is based on unique primary sources, including hundreds of summaries of negotiation sessions and work meetings, and position papers prepared by the Palestinians throughout the process.2 The author also interviewed key Israeli and Palestinian officials, both governmental and professional, who participated in the Annapolis talks. Other sources used are academic studies and journalistic information and analysis concerning the peace process over the years. 2. The papers were leaked by a member of the Palestinian Negotiation Support Unit (NSU) to Qatari network Al Jazeera and British newspaper The Guardian. They now appear online under the title “The Palestine Papers” – cf. details in the following chapters. INTRODUCTION 11 The takeaway message Although some progress was made in the Annapolis talks towards a permanent-status agreement, the process was marked by faulty preparation, inadequate management, and problematic guidelines, all of which ultimately hampered both parties’ ability to take significant steps forward. This was the case despite the unusual degree of trust achieved between former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, both of whom declared their willingness to make historical strategic decisions in order to promote a final agreement. For example, the study demonstrates how the conceptual confusion, primarily on the Israeli side – between the different approaches of graded interim agreements (influenced by the Road Map), unilateral separation, and negotiating a permanent-status agreement – heightened the mutual mistrust, dragging the parties into futile, unfocused negotiations and generating broad conceptual differences on various issues. Another drawback was the choice to hold talks in separate tracks and adopt inhibitive guiding principles (e.g. “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”). Together with the marked absence of clear political guidelines over the core issues, the result was that both teams remained entrenched in their respective positions. These procedural faults were exacerbated by the deep mistrust between the Israeli and Palestinian establishments, which was fuelled by political constraints on either side. Hesitant and purportedly balanced involvement on the part of the US did not help to mitigate these difficulties. The first chapter provides a brief overview of both the strategic context and the political and security challenges that informed the talks, highlighting the convergence of the main actors’ interests and the mistrust between Israel and the Palestinians. Also addressed is the central role played by the U.S, which initiated and facilitated exposure of the process largely to serve its own image, without formulating an effective strategy for furthering a peace agreement. The two world-views that guided the parties are also examined: the “process for process” approach – primarily a conflict management tool – on one hand, and genuine motivation to achieve a permanent-status agreement on the other. 12 The ANNAPOLIS PROCESS (2007-2008) The second chapter examines how the process was managed and the guiding principles established: “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” and simultaneous “top- down”