MOW NOT TO DEFEND THE INNER ARC

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2000 www.n*up*cejieuu/-nivyleig VOLUME 62 NO. 3

Maritime Airpower for Australia, Part 2

Submarines in Britain's Defence DIVI 2A4 THE NAVY IIk N.i\> I ol \iMt;ili:i FKDKRAL COUNCIL Volume 62 No. 3 Patron in Chief: His Excellency. The Governor General President: Graham M Hams. RFD. Vice-Presidents: RADM A J Robctts,*i. AO. DSC. RAN (Rid): John Binl. Contents CDREHJ.P Adams. AM. RAN (Rid) CAPT H.A Jovphv AM. RAN (Rid) Acting Hon. Secretary: Ray Coctwy. PO Box 309. Ml Wavtrlcy. Vic 3149. HOW NOT TO DEFEND THE INNER ARC Telephone: (03)9888 1977. Fax: (03)9888 10X3 By Dr John Reeve Page 3 NEW SOUTH WALKS DIVISION Patron: I lis Excellency. The Governor of New South Wiles. TBMD AND THE RAN President: R <) Albert. AM. RFD. RD. Hon. Secretary: J C J Jcppoot OAM. RFD. GPO Box 1719. S>dney. NSW 1013 By Mark Schweikerl Page 7 Telephone: (02)9132 2144. Fax: (02)9132 8383. SUBMARINES IN BRITAIN'S DEFENCE MISSION V ICTORIAN DIVISION By Dr Lee Willel Page 20 Patron: His Excellency. The Govemi* of Victoria. President: J M Wilkirts. RFD-. MARITIME AIRPOWER FOR AUSTRALIA, PAR I 2 Hon. Secretary: Gavan Bum. PO Box 1303. Box Hill Vic 3128 Telephone: <03)9841 8570. Fax: (03)9X41 8107 THE SMALL AIRCRAFT CARRIER MARKET Email: qircso/email.conuiu By George Kaplan Page 25 Membership Secretary: LCDR Tom Kilhum MBE. VRD Telephone: «)3)95«>9927. PO Box 1303 Box Hill VIC 3128 QUEENSLAND DIVISION Patron: His Excelkucy. The Gov err* r of Queensland gome m wkm Kovy's From ihe Crow's Nesl Page 2 President: I M Eraser. OAM. Hon. Secretary : Adnan B«rwvk. PO Box 402. Roma Street Bnshane. Qkl 4003 From Our readers Page 2 tend Telephone: (07)3263 1319 Burt'i nly m Flash Traffic Page 12 State Branches: Observations Page 19 ( aims: A Cummeea PO Box 1009. Caims. Qld 4870. aTXTTJIj; Telephone: ((17)4054 1195 Hatch. Match and Dispatch Page 30 Towmxille: I McDnugall. It) Box l478.Townsxillc.Qkl 4810. Mkgrfmsiain *mmN i proviui Product Review Page 31 Telephone: (07) 4772 4588 Mackay: K Millward. P() Box 5527. Qkl 4741 ftnjiIhn' i M»lly an do League Policy Statement Page 32 irffahm. Telephone: (07)4942 2965 Bundaherg: I Lohse. PO Box 5141. Bundahcig West. Qld-1670 The opinions or assertions expressed in THE NAVY are those or Telephone: (07)4151 2210. Southport: IV Fix*. PO Box 946 S.wtl^»t Qkl 4215. Tdcphnc: (07) 5532 2447 the authors and not necessarily those of Ihe Federal Council of the SOUTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION Navy League of Australia, the Editor of THE NAVY, the RAN Patron: His Excelkucy. The Govern* t>t South Australia. or the Department of Defence. The Kditor welcomes correspondence, {'resident: Alan Pteskett RID. 15 Sleeps Hill Drixe. Pamrama SA 5 7250 Telephoneand Fax: (03)6344 1531. Front cover: (From right lo left) HMAS ARIJNTA leads Stale Branches: Devon port: P O'Leary, 11 lasman llace. I)cvonpi*t HMNZS TE MANNA. HMAS HOBART. DARWIN and Tas 7310. Telephone: (03) 6124 5064. MANOORA from Sydney Harbour for exercises off Burnie: (i Davis. 40 Chary Stavt. Bumic. Tas 7320. Telephxie: (03) 6431 4013 I jiunct-aon: LL Shea. 15 Pinen Chief. Riverside. Tas. 71V) Nowra during a recent work up period. WESTERN AUSTRALIAN DIVISION (RAN. AB Damien Pawlenko) Patron: I lis lixccllency. The (joven** of Western Australia. President: A H Hewitt. JP. Hon.Secretary: MrsGHewitt.23l-awfcrRixid Attadak-.WA6I56 The Navy Telephone: (06)9330 3600. All letters and contributions lo: State Branches: (kraldton: I Bcvkwith. 2 Pttchdl Stavt Rangeway. WA 6530. Mark Schweikert Telephone (08)9921 3768 Frederick Street Gk-dhow. via Alhuny. WA 6330. PO Box 832 Telephone: (08)9X41 6542. FEDERAL ADV ISORY COUNCTI. F. Geoffrey Evans. OBE. VRD. Chaiiman E-mail to: [email protected] Neil Baird. Chairman Bainl Publications Subscriptions and Membership enquiries to: Win, Bolitho. AM A.W. (TonylGraabronk. Editor The Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter The II.>n Secretary. Admiral Michael W. Hudson. AC. RAN (Rid) Navy League of Australia. NSW Division Vice Admiral David Ixach. AC CBE. LVO. RAN (Rid) I -achlari Payne. CEO Australian .Shipowners' Aw viation GPO Box 1719. Vice Admiral Sir Richard I\vk. KBE. CB. DSC. RAN (Rid) John Strang. Chairman Strang Interna!*wul Ply Lid

Advertising enquiries to: Peter Jordan. Baird Publications Corporate Members Telephone: (03)9645 0411 The Australian Shipowners' Association Fax: (03) 9645 0475 Hawker De Haviland Limited Deadline for next edition 5 August, 2(MM) Computer Science of Australia Pty Ltd Strang International Pty Ltd 1' .-T -.--a! - U — : 46 THE NAVY VOL. ft2 NO. 3 Whot the "White Paper will say about the SAN s plans to replace the DDCs is still somewhat up in the air. Here the recently decommissioned HO&ART prepares for seo. (Brian Morrison, Warships and Marine Corps Museum Int) I K< >M IIII ( ROW s \l M

Many of the editorials and articles that I have written in the acknowledged by NATO command was that military power past have warned about the growing anti-surface ship cannot be exercised in isolation from other services. The community within Defence. This offensive has now taken Serbs were quite willing and able to ride out the air on allies. A growing number of articles in the mainstream campaign but were not so keen about the threat of NATO print media are supporting the anti-surface community by ground and the sea blockade being undertaken. making sensational, unsubstantiated and subjective claims One of the reasons for the Serb's confidence was the about surface ship vulnerability and cost whilst peddling way NATO air power was so easily fooled by Serb decoys the barrow of air power. The claims made by these articles, and camouflage, simple to do when air power won't risk whilst being false and lacking insight, have unfortunately going below I5.()00ft. It wasn't until the KLA (Kosovo created their own inertia, or to put it another way. 'one dog Liberation Army), realising NATO was unable to target barks at something, the rest bark at him". Serb ground forces, deliberately engaged the Serbs to draw The only saving grace is that none of the writers, who them out for waiting A-10 tank buster aircraft. side with air power at the expense of sea power, are 'Operation Allied ' was not the first war won by recognised by defence media specialists or academics as air power alone. No war can be won by the application of having any military substance or relevance. a single point on a single front. Unfortunately. The problem though, is that many of our politicians Australia's air power lobby cannot see our future security tend to place an over reliance on Australia's media for for the clouds and are in danger of giving themselves a defence information. An example of which was seen during pyrrhic victory. a recent SLC (Senate Legislative Committee) hearing in The growing debate over air power versus sea power May. The Chief of Navy

VOL. 62 NO. 3 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 3 3 use of sea control it was a particularly dangerous position. of three factors: the leapfrogging strategy, the submarine The withdrawal from Guadalcanal in 1943 thus war cn shipping, and US carrier air power."" In maritime precipitated the collapse of the outer perimeter. The strategic terms, he was concluding that Japan lost its Japanese strategic problem became not knowing when and perimeter and the war because it lost control and use of the where the Allies would use the sea to strike next. Seeing sea. Yamamoto knew that the sea must be utilised fully if their defence in territorial as opposed to maritime terms Japan were to establish a credible defence or a negotiable meant in effect that the Japanese took their sea position. He knew that the region is oceanic in scale and communications - and hence logistics and reinforcements that the sea makes it indivisible: that within this - for granted. The Allied submarine campaign inside and environment maritime strategy is necessarily offensive (at beyond the defensive perimeter devastated Japan's sea least in the sense of achieving initiative, mobility, and transport in the most successful blockade in naval history. reach), otherwise sea control will be lost; that the land-sea This blockade, like the amphibious power projection which interface of Southeast Asia cannot be defended without that defeated the perimeter, depended upon sea control and was control; that Australia is a natural springboard into this The Japanese cruiser MIKl'MA heavily damaged during the Battle of Midway interface (hence his desire to take Australia before Yamamoto realised that sea control was the vital element of a war in the Pacific. The battle signified a shift in sea control to the allied forces. Japan never tried to a war-winning weapon. George Baer, one of the world's This was demonstrated with a massive surprise attack on the US's ability to regain sea control and adopted a perimeter defence mentality with devastating most distinguished naval-strategic writers, has observed: MacArthur and the Australian command - similarly aware exercise sea control throughout the Asia-Pacific, its ships in Pearl Harbor. consequences. There was no systematic effort until too late to protect - seized the opportunity to go forward); and that Australia within these zones the sea lanes over which the vital is dependent upon its sea communications (hence his desire This progressively left the Japanese floundering in a carriers PRINCETON and SARATOGA.) Whether or not cargo ships passed, to meet and match the American to cut them off). Yamamoto's defeats and death left manner which has critical lessons for any Australian this is taken as an argument for Australian carrier submarines, to mount a guerre de course, or. after Japanese Pacific strategy to the continentally-minded defensive concept based on comparable ideas. This is not procurement today, it is certainly part of a case for control Midway, to make another try for offensive sea control. Army, who saw the perimeter as a fortified extension of to suggest that Australian planning necessarily of the maritime environment and for an air warfare Each of these omissions was an astonishing strategic their war on the Asian mainland. This is a lesson against makes the mistakes made by the Japanese. It is. however, capability within it. lapse... Pinning all their hopes on the battles expected any tendency to superimpose ideas of continental defence to suggest that a concept for defending the inner arc must It was sea control which allowed power projection in under their strategy of zone defence. Japan's leaders upon the different circumstances of the maritime pay attention to controlling the sea or risk failure. For the inner arc in the Pacific War. This is demonstrated by the left exposed all other dimensions of the country's environment. Australia's recent mission within the arc in Timor, the fact that MacArthur's reconquest of New Guinea was a maritime position, failing in every other way to protect All military operations in the area of the inner arc must deterrent effect of naval cover for the task force - based strategic mirror image of the Japanese taking of Southeast the empire's vital access to the sea... The offensive be conceived of within the context of true maritime upon sea control - was a given, and Major-General Asia - employing amphibious landings supplied by strategy of the United Slates exposed the weakness of strategy. There can be no battlespace dominance involving Cosgrove has staled publicly how essential it was. calling merchant shipping while covered by naval and air forces. Japan's perimeter defence. Static island fortresses, the arc without sea control. During the Pacific War the this a "blindingly obvious lesson" in the value of sea (MacArthur. a remarkably maritime-minded general, had 4 even with air bases, did not constitute an impenetrable fighting around Guadalcanal. New Guinea, the Philippines, as a major grievance the fact that he was short of shipping). power.' " As the Japanese learnt to their cost, how much palisade unless a Navy held local command of the sea. and the Central Pacific was inextricably linked to the issue In this littoral warfare, sea control gave cover against more relevant is this lesson to high intensity operations in That command Japan never attained. Its Navy simply of who controlled the local seas and used them. Defence of enemy naval forces and gunfire support for landings. which sea control may be contested, and in which our lacked the force and range. The United States, with its the inner arc against Japan did not succeed until the Coral MacArthur's land-based air operations (like Nimitz's) national interests may be threatened more seriously? dual advance and very flexible Naval strategy, kept the Sea and Midway battles afforded the Allies sea control."4' relied on sea power for forward base acquisition and The Japanese Pacific offensive was a classic case of initiative. It dispersed its fleet into task forces that kept MacArthur and Nimitz. could then take the offensive. supply. Above all. sea control gave the initiative and the starting a war without knowing how to end it. Japanese the enemy off balance. The Americans could assault, or Operations within the arc were very much influenced by its choice of when and where to strike. This distracted the strategy was short-term, and plagued by lack of inter- simply bypass and isolate, the Japanese barrier's geography of isolated locations and rugged terrain. These enemy, enhanced the element of surprise, and allowed service co-operation and understanding. In 1941 the strongpoints. attacking as they chose and wearing the created difficulties for land transport and air basing. strongpoints to be bypassed and Allied lives to be saved. Japanese Army was preoccupied with the Asian mainland empire down... The Americans used time and space as Operational mobility and logistics were greatly facilitated The initiative granted by sea control also gave options at and its war in China, where forty-four of its fifty-five the Japanese could not.'"" by use of the sea in littoral areas (as recently in Timor). the wider strategic level. The central Pacific advance divisions were deployed. It saw Southeast Asia as a Having lost sea control the Japanese were vulnerable in covered the flank of the Allied front moving up through territorial resource basket to be seized and held. The Army Arrived at by default, the perimeter concept tended to this situation. Sea power was a requirement to drive an Southeast Asia. Later the U.S. command could consider assumed that the Navy would conduct a defensive war in compound defeat with defeat, as withdrawal was the only invader out of his lodgement in the inner arc. clearly taking either the Philippines or Formosa. the Pacific. Ultimately the Army saw itself as fighting the option in the face of penetration and out-manoeuvre. In evident at Guadalcanal in 1942-43. Air cover, both land Sea communications, and the ability to interdict them Sov iet Union. There was thus a lack of forward planning war it is the winners who usually fail to learn the lessons and carrier-based, was utilised in successful operations by blockade, were and are critical in the area of the inner for the Pacific, especially on the part of the Army who were and to think outside the established frame. We should listen within the arc and for power projection beyond it. (Darwin arc as in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Without sea control, politically dominant. There was a working assumption that to the losers in the last major war to be fought in the was bombed partly by aircraft based on Nagumo's four which enables their protection or attack, operations to take Japan should reach a negotiated settlement with the Allies maritime environment of the Asia-Pacific. Tojo told MacArthur that the Allies defeated Japan by a combination carriers. The Allied attack on Rabaul in 1943 involved the or defend the arc are not strategically feasible. No army who would respect the Pacific conquests. This fallacious can reach the arc in force to occupy or defend it. or be assumption undermined efforts to analyse the problem of sustained and reinforced, save by sea. This was as true defence. The concept of an outer perimeter - which during the Pacific War as it has been in the case of Timor. represented a failure to create a general maritime strategy Japanese sea control in early 1942 meant that the - emerged during 1942. with the Army's dominance at southward advance could not be stopped. Once the Imperial General HQ. its winning of the political battle Japanese were lodged in the arc. the Allies required a against the Navy's view of a wider Pacific war. the defeats build-up and deployment of resources to take it. both of at Coral Sea and Midway which led to loss of sea control, which occurred by sea. Above all. the future sea denial and that at Guadalcanal which led to progressive rolling operation which could be required to defend Australia back of the defensive perimeter. The death of Japan's naval would only succeed as a dimension of sea control. This is commander Yamamoto in 1943 ended the likelihood of one of the most salutary deductions from the Pacific War wider strategic use of the maritime environment by the for Australian defence thinking. In a sense it was proven Navy. The reactive concept of the defence of a territorial twice, by the Japanese in 1941-42 and by the Allies from perimeter was thus established, creating the opportunity for 1942 onwards. Frank Uhlig. a leading U.S. naval Allied exploitation. commentator, writes of the Japanese conquest of Southeast Without sea control such reactive defence meant lack of Asia in terms which should sound alarm bells for Australian strategic policy: manoeuvre, vulnerability and lack of options, despite the Major General Peter Cosgrove returning from a visit to the FFG HMAS possession of land-based air power. The perimeter was The defenses: American. British and Dutch, were... General Douglas MacArthur wades ashore in the Philippines. A surprisingly sea MELBOURNE during the Timor crisis. General Cosgrove later described the liable to penetration and outflanking like any defensive minded General he often complained about not having enough ships. The value value of sea power as "blindingly obvious". Hopefully it will continue to be carried out by soldiers and shore-based aviation... and line. But situated in the maritime environment and without of sea control was pivotal in 'his return' "blindingly obvious" to the authors of the new 'White' Paper. (RAN) by submarines. Theirs was a dismal record of failure.'" 48 || VOL. 62 NO. 2 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 most to threaten this country after 1788. understood this well. The inner arc as a concept lends to neglect the Indian and Pacific Oceans and their intrinsic relevance to our national security. Thus any credible threat implies a wide strategic context. Mahan did not live to see the Japanese defeat in (he Pacific War. He did. however, write specifically of Australia's need to view its defence in wide and maritime terms: "by contemplating the whole, and recognising that local safety is not always best found in local precaution"."' The current concept of defending the inner arc can be compared w ith the Japanese view of the same geography as a Pacific perimeter. That view was shown to be defective in

A Japanese destroyer is seen sinking from the periscope of the submarine thai terms of strategic viability and scope, and we should take delivered ihe laial blow Without a concerted maritime strategv Japan was open care to absorb the lesson. Defensive strategy involving a to exploitation hv submarines as part of the Allied strategy of sea control form of the arc concept may well be viable, but it must be formulated w ithin the context of a fully maritime strategy U.S. submarines failed dramatically to halt the into which sea control principles are built. This article is Japanese advance. Twenty-nine submarines in Philippine written in a co-operative spirit, and with respect for the waters made virtually no impression on Japanese qualities and complementary expertise of the various amphibious assaults. The submarines retreated to Java, elements of the Australian Defence Force. The failed again, and retreated to Western Australia. We can fundamental point about the Japanese defeat in the Pacific compare the obstacle presented by the 's (beyond the question of whether the war could ever have surface warships to invasion in 1940 - the reason for the been considered feasible) is the fatal nature of lack of inter- Luftwaffe's strategic mission to achieve command of the service understanding. air.'4" During the Allied counter-offensive in the Pacific, the Bad strategy kills, and bad strategy brings defeat. The U.S. submarine campaign - aided by sea control and islands and waters of our region are haunted by the ghosts A Chinese M-9 ballistic missile during a parade in Beijing. In 1998 four of these missiles were fired into the Taiwan Strait to intimidate the Taiwanese. The Japanese neglect of convoys and anti-submarine warfare - USN cruiser USS BUNKER HILL successfully detected and tracked each missile prov iding valuable intelligence for future TBMD systems. of fallen empires and defeated forces - some of them our was a powerful factor in the erosion of Japanese defences own. and all of them were initially (but not of course fully) and winning the war. This is not surprising. The classical defeated at sea. The conventional strategic wisdom which By Mark Schweikert maritime strategists Mahan and Corbett analysed centuries sees the inner arc as a defensive barrier should pay more of naval history, concluding that commerce war is not attention to its maritime setting. Otherwise that As the 21st century dawns the world consists of a volatile mixture of alarming trends and growing challenges. Amongst v iable strategically without control of the sea. conventional wisdom risks leaving a significant gap in these is a concern in the West of the increasing numbers i»nd effectiveness of Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) and the The arc concept risks becoming a victim of the fortress Australia's defences and being a danger to national associated worldwide proliferation of Weapoas of Mass Destruction (WMD). As the RAN's proposed SKA 4000 destroyer fallacy: ihe assumption that the strategic context can be security. The Defence White Paper debate is an opportunity will be Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) capable, and given TBM proliferation in our region, some information safely surrendered by default because one guards against to ponder the expensive lessons of the past and their on what the RAN may be able to acquire is warranted particularly leading up to the 'White' Paper. the one way the enemy will come. History is full of the continuing relevance, for our geography has not changed. victims of this approach, for it is a rare luxury to get (like The need for a TBMD capability in Australia and the RAN The rapid rate of TBM development and proliferation Yamamoto) the war one expects. As well as the Japanese, Australia's Strategic /Wit v (Canberra. 1997). p. 10 is compelling. Many regional neighbours either have, continued into 1999. In February. China deployed more "" Sec for example M.Evans. The Role of the Army in a Maritime one thinks (in maritime terms) of Singapore in 1942 and of make, sell or intend to acquire TBMs. TBMD is currently than 100 TBMs along its coastline adjacent to Taiwan. In the Soviet Union attempting to deal with the U.S. Maritime Concept of Strategy. I .and Warfare Studies Centre. Working Paper 101 (Canberra. 1998). I am indebted to Dr Evans' excellent work, especially outside the capability of the ADF. thus TBMs cannot be April, both India and Pakistan launched extended range, Strategy in the 1980s. There may also be a conceptual his advocacy of joint and amphibious concepts of operations. Ii is countered. Although many resigned themselves to this fact nuclear capable TBMs. Agni II and Ghauri-II respectively, problem in planning to use manoeuvre in the littorals as a important however, mil lo see sea control and power projection as distinct during the Cold War when Soviet missiles threatened the with ranges in excess of 3.000 kms. tool of barrier defence, however geographically deep one issues. Sea control is ihe pre-requisiie for joint operations and power West a counter now exists. This is timely given world-wide sees ihe inner arc as being. The essential strategic point projection ashore in a maritime environment. There is a determined and deliberate pattern to procure about amphibious power projection is of course that it is The classic text is J.S.Corhctt. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy TBM proliferation with more than 30 nations possessing or develop longer range TBMs by countries whose political 11911, repr. ed. E.Grove. London. 1988) TBMs and more than 25 having or developing nuclear, aims and activities arc potentially hostile to those of the offensive, combining the mobility of Navies with the 1 ,v 1 An accessible study is C.S.Gray. The Leverage of Sea Power. The striking power of armies. This has been true from the fall Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York. I992» chemical and biological weapons. West including Australia. When North Korea finally test of Quebec in 1759 to the Falklands in 1982. In defence, G.W.Baer. One Hundred Years of Sea Power The U.S.Navy. 1X90- conducting unprecedented rounds of nuclear tests. In June, international supplier of TBMs. TBM technology and view power projection in highly flexible fashion, rather 1990 (Stanford. 1994). pp.231-2 ,v the press reported that the North Korean No Dong Missile intellectual property. It is understood North Korea has over than run any risk of hav ing a garrison outlook. '"> S.E.Mori son. Thoughts on Naval Strategy. World War II' (March 1968). repr. in Naval War College Review. Winter. 1998. p.63 was operational. In July. Iran launched the Shahab-3 with a 5.000 tonnes of chemical agents including nerve, choking, Defence of the inner arc. unless conceived of with D.Homer. High Command. Australia's Struggle for an Independent range that has the capability to strike targets in Israel. blister and blood. Its biological capability includes anthrax, sufficient flexibility, is potentially vulnerable to other War Strategy. 1939-45. second edn (Si Leonards. 1992). pp. 194-5 Turkey. Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. small pox. the plague and cholera. Many also believe North distractions and commitments. A threat to the arc may be F.Uhlig. How Navies Fight. The U.S.Nax? and its Allies (Annapolis. In August. North Korea launched the Taepo Dong I which Korea is a nuclear power. Any of these WMD can be fitted part of a regional (even global) emergency, in which the 1*194). p 195 1X0 D.Grinncll-Milne. The Silent Victory. September /940(London. 1958) over flew Japan. The latest edition of Jane's Strategic to their TBMs. focus could not be confined to local defence. Simultaneous <*"> Written in July. 1902. quoted in D.Slevens (ed ). In Search of a Weapon Systems reports that the Taepo Dong 1 has a range To understand why TBMs are now the weapon of emergencies are frequently the work of an enemy strategy. Maritime Strategy. The Maritime Element in Australian Defence Planning Moreover, if Australia's local security is threatened it will Since 1901 (Canberra. 1997). p. 155 of approximately 2.000 kms. threatening all of Japan and choice for many nations one has only to witness a Western be by a power possessing or contesting sea control as in US bases as far away as Okinawa. This test confirmed the military operation on TV. Whenever the West enter a 1941-42. The primary threat to Australia is not. therefore, (*)Dr John Reeve is a Senior Lecturer and Osborne Fellow in Naval ease with which an impoverished nation with massive conflict they immediately establish complete air History at The Australian Defence Force Academy. His article is an to its landward (as opposed to its maritime) territoriality, economic problems, including famine, could develop and superiority, usually via the USAF. Airpower is used to abridgement of a Working Paper soon to he published by the RAN's Sea but lo its maritime communications. Yamamoto. who did Power Centre launch a long ranged TBM. displace the enemy's offensive and defensive capabilities.

VOL 62 NO. 3 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL 62 NO. 3 7 This not only denies the enemy the means to use its air In the first attempt to destroy a TBM target, a prototype force for defence but also for attack. Consequently, the SM-2 Block IVA missile performed as expected. The only way to counter US/Western air superiority and attack imaging IR seeker successfully performed target search, the US and its allies is to go over their air superiority acquisition and missile hand-off. guiding the missile to a umbrella. lethal intercept. Just before intercept, the IR seeker TBMs provide an attractive counter to Western air imagery was sent by real time telemetry to ground stations power as they are launched with no warning, have short showing a well defined image of the TBM target. Several flight times (which limits response times), are impossible sensors fitted to the target to record warhead fragmentation to kill without specialised equipment and their payloads reported lethal warhead impact with the TBM totally can vary from HE (High Explosive) to chemical, destroyed. biological, nuclear or submunitions. A TBM's range means To demonstrate the lethality of the Standard SM-2 Blk that they can strike targets deep inside USAF defended IVA warhead design under simulated flight conditions, the areas such as air bases where air superiority is vulnerable. USN conducted extensive warhead sled testing. In these Ballistic missiles are also very cheap, plentiful and tests, a sled propelled the Blk IVA warhead toward replicas becoming increasingly accurate. With the recent superficial of enemy TBM warheads and AAW targets. These tests

victory of airpower during 'Operation Allied Force' over The Indian Agni-ll ballistic missile is believed to have a range of more than were as close to actual flight dynamic conditions as Serbia many Western nations are falling into the trap of no 3.000 kms and can be fitted with many warhead types the Indian's may wish The USN Aegis cruiser BUNKER HILL (CG-53) successfully tracked and possible. Target designs included simulated nuclear longer considering sole air campaigns an option but a to employ. plotted the trajectory of four M '< ballistic missiles used by China in IWH. This warheads, chemical. HE and submunitions. In the tests, the map slums the impact points of the TBMs. SM-2 warheads were detonated at a miss distance necessity. reinforcement personnel. The study concluded that airbase predicted at the outer boundary of 90'/f of all successful Part of the problem with the TBM not being seen as a destruction could be achieved with as little as 30 TBMs. or was still able to. without any TBMD thought going into its intercepts. These conservative values were used to measure serious threat is the misconception that it is a high priced for the price of four F/A-I8s, and with land and air based surveillance architecture, gain valuable intelligence on the the effectiveness of the warhead in 'worst case' and 'best complex weapon and thus not plentiful. However. Defence TBMD systems still languishing in design and testing, the North Korean missile's flight. These and other detection case* scenarios. strategists should view the TBM as a simple round of current level of naval TBMD provides the only real answer. and tracking events have provided valuable intelligence ammunition. In WW II Hitler fired over 4300 V2 TBMs data to system engineers and computer programmers, as During 1998 and 1999. six sled tests were conducted whilst undergoing Allied strategic bombing and massive well as tracking experience for shipboard crews for further against nine TBM replica warheads and three AAW targets. resource deficiencies. TBMs are also considered inaccurate Desert Storm TBMD development. In each test, the warhead performed exactly as designed. and thus militarily insignificant however, today. TBMs Desert Storm taught the West several important lessons Ail tests achieved kills of the TBM and AAW targets. have GPS to aid in guidance and accuracy and are far less about the need for TBMD after Iraq demonstrated the ease The SM-2 Block IVA Chemical suhmunition casings were penetrated, rendering indiscriminate than their V2 ancestors. The Russian SS-21 that a belligerent could use them. Scud attacks on cities, the chemicals ineffective. battlefield ballistic missile, recently used in Chechnya, is a despite being tactically unsuccessful, affected coalition Two naval TBMD weapon systems are currentlv under good example of the modern TBM. Small, accurate, cheap, military strategy and constrained US options. However, at testing in the US. They are the Area Wide, using the SM-2 easy to move around and with very different warhead the Port of Jubayl a potential campaign 'show stopper' Blk IVA as a common AAW and TBMD missile, and Naval TBMD types. Intelligence sources suggest that the SS-21 system event occurred. An Iraqi Scud fired at the port fell in to the Theatre Wide, using the newer SM-3 missile used In the era of 'The UN Operation' international strategy and ammunition stocks were recently sold to North Korea sea adjacent to the dock, but had it hit a major catastrophe exclusively for TBMD outside the earth's atmosphere. has relied on force deployment from bases around the via Syria. The North Koreans can be expected to reverse would have occurred. Unloaded on the dock were For the purposes of this article and its relationship to world. Airlift and sealift arc the precursors to these engineer the guidance system for use in its designs making thousands of tonnes of 155mm and 203mm HE artillery the RAN and its AAW requirement we will concentrate on operations, but the ports and airfields through which forces them 75c/f more accurate. shells, aircraft fuel and military vehicles. Tied up alongside the Area Wide system. The Standard SM-2 Blk IVA missile and reinforcements must arrive are known to the enemy Improvements in warhead payload have also given the that dock was the LHA USS TAWARA. an army barge is the newest of the AAW Standard missiles produced. It and thus vulnerable to TBM attack. Currently, the only way modern TBM a new lease on life. The US RAND loaded with ammunition, one bulk fuel carrier and three provides the capability for all round defence in a severe to provide protection for these debarkation points is from Corporation recently published a study on modern TBM container ships. Although no damage was inflicted the electronic environment against aircraft and ASMs (even ships at sea. If these ports and airbases are made unusable, effectiveness. It found that the use of submunitions in TBM potential for devastation woke many to the threat posed by with low radar cross-sections) from high altitudes down to bearing in mind that the enemy would want to restrict warheads is a very effective way of neutralising airbases TBMs. sea-level and with a TBMD capability. military operations against them at every stage, then the through attacks on parked aircraft, taxiways. runways, The Mark 125 warhead of earlier Standards is retained UN action cannot go ahead, giving the enemy victory. airbase infrastructure and the inev itable tent city of surged Real World TBM Events in the missile with a new fuzing system to meet a wider A credible deterrent and warfighting capability range of relative target speeds for precise burst-point independent of foreign control and relatively free from USN ships have often been in position to obtain real selection. A Raytheon IR seeker, which is covered by an reliance on overseas bases and support is only achievable world TBM tracking data. During Desert Storm. AEGIS ejectablc faring, is also fitted to aid in accuracy and ships in the north of the Persian Gulf were the first to detect provide a real time video data link to the launch ship for and track Iraqi Scud missiles. missile identification purposes, an indication that the TBM In March 1996 USS BUNKER HILL (CG-52) detected was destroyed and to replay on CNN as proof of and tracked four Chinese M-9 missiles fired into the waters destruction. The IR seeker positions the warhead to impact near Taiwan. BUNKER HILL successfully detected and the target or pass close enough to enable the warhead tracked the missiles with an older variant of the SPY-1A fragments to be effective. The high closing velocities radar with no external cueing, no developmental radar encountered in TBM engagements require precise fuze improvements and a crew that was not specially trained for timing. To aid a Forward Looking Fuze (FLF) is fitted. The the mission. The crews existing air defence skills translated FLF uses angle and angle-rate information from the IR well to TBM tracking. seeker and range and range-rate information from a high Tracking by AEGIS ships continued when USS frequency short-range radar incorporated in the SM-2 MITSCHER (DDG-57) tracked Syrian TBM development missile. These two sensors provide data to the FLF to test flights in the eastern Mediterranean with near 'fire- compute warhead detonation time and positioning to place control quality . the most fragments on the target. The new fuze will also The highly effective Russian SS-21 'Scarab' battlefield missile is a good example In August 1998. JDS MYOKO (DDG-175) tracked direct the blast energy of the warhead towards the side of of the modem ballistic missile. It is cheap, easy to move and very accurate. It can the SM-2 the TBM will pass as direct hits at these speeds he fitted with various warhead types including an anti-radar homing head. North Korea's first Taepo Dong I missile as it flew over will be rare. The SS-21 is believed to have made it to North Korea via Syrian. Japan. This launch was unexpected and sudden yet the ship The effective ranges of North Korea's ballistic missiles.

x VOL 62 NO 3 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 3 9 MK 104 DTRM History has shown lime and again that in the opening jungles and islands of Indonesia would be virtually Warhead In Production IR Seeker days of a crisis, forward deployed naval forces bring a impossible given the 'Desert Storm' experience. Two-Axis In Production wide range of capabilities, now including TBMD. into The RAN needs to develop a TBMD capability as MK 72 Booster TVA I Seekerhead theatre in a few days. In the modern context that could also TBMs become more attractive to the West's adversaries. In Production mean just when the heaviest TBM attacks would be likely. North Korea. China. Iran and Syria are but a few countries Naval forces with TBMD provide significant flexibility. of many who are capable of making and selling TBMs and From a few stations in the Sea of Japan. USN TBMD tend not to be loo selective who they sell to. With advances equipped surface ships can provide an effective TBMD in Western AEW&C and stealth aircraft the TBM is the force covering most of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and only counter that many nations can hope to employ, Japan. The beauty of ships is that they can be visible or militarily and economically. unobtrusive, are self-sustaining and can cam out other With the acquisition of an AAW destroyer the RAN can traditional naval missions such as protection of air and sea be expected to use of Standard SM-2 Blk IVA. It makes Power Control and Telemetry lift, air intercept control, shore bombardment. ASW and sense to use the latest Standard available as this will be the Guidance Section Steering Control Sectn High Bandwidth Telemetry maritime interdiction, while simultaneously providing only Standard missile in production. The USN w ill use this Advanced Guidance and Control In Production TBMD missile for some time thus ensuring a 30 year logistics and I IK- Standard SM - WIK IV A built A AW/ TBMD missile in production. Il is currently ready for deployment and should equip any RAN destroyer supply p

in VOL. 62 NO. 3 THF. NAVY Flash Traffic Reporting on the progress of the Sea Eagle ASM update its position relative to the upgrade project RADM Briggs said target before dropping back to sea- withdrawn ESSM scores kill Collins submarine HMAS WALLER and FARNCOMB. modification trials of engine mount skimming height. The missile's would be available for operations this stiffeners on one of DECHAINEUX's The UK has announced the early onboard flight-control computer The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile upgrade on track year. three engines were successful in withdrawal of its locally developed allows it 10 vary the attack height, fly (ESSM) has achieved a kill of a Later this year WALLER will take reducing vibration. air launched ASM. The air launched random manoeuvres during the final BQM-34S Firebee target drone The upgrade of iwo Collins class part in RIMPAC - an exercise with They have now been filled to Sea Eagle ASM served ihe RAF and stages, fly over other targets or ships, during its first guided flight test at submarines to increased operational and against the US Navy near Hawaii. COLLINS and will be finally fitted to RN for 15 years. The UK MoD ignore countermeasures or decoys White Sands Missile Range. New capability was on track to meet its COLLINS will also travel to Hawaii the fast track submarines. believes that since the demise of the and attack from any required bearing. Mexico. ESSM is under development December 2(MM) target. Head of the then on to testing 011 a US Navy range In 1999 COLLINS and Cold War. for which the weapon was A 5001b semi-armour-piercing by Raytheon Company's Missile Submarine Capability Team (SMCT). off Alaska. DECHAINEUX trialed various designed, strategic circumstances no warhead is used with a delayed action Systems business unit lor the U.S. Rear Admiral Peter Briggs. said. He said by the en J of the year five measures in propeller and hull longer require such a weapon. impact fuze. The propulsion unit is Na\y and the 13 member nations of DECHAINEUX and SHEEAN submarines will have been delivered changes and engine fixes which had reported lo have a low infra-red the NATO Sea Sparrow Consortium, are currently being upgraded to make to Navy. The sixth. RANKIN, is been successful in improving signature and is smoke free. The including Australia. them faster, quieter, more reliable and expected to be launched in November reliability and reducing the noise missile has a maximum range of 2000 and start sea trials in April 2001. signature. NO km. All six submarines will be Modifications to the fin. casing The helicopter-launched version home ported at HMAS STIRLING and platform were now being fitted to is in service with the for Admiral Briggs said Navy was DECHAINEUX and SHEEAN. use on Sea King helicopters and working to progressively overcome Currently a new Electronic Jaguar strike aircraft owned by the the Collins class submarine's Support Measure (ESM) system is Indian Air Force. It is believed thai operational deficiencies, improve being delivered for DECHAINEUX Sea Eagle missiles were also exported their reliability and upgrade many of and SHEEAN. The system is a critical lo Chile and Saudi Arabia. the electronic and platform systems area of self defence enabling the onboard. submarine to dctcci radar What the UK intends 10 do with S2f>6 million was allocated from transmissions. The submarines' its Sea Eagle stocks is presently the Defence budget and approved by communication and combat systems unknown. the Federal Government in December will also be augmented this year. last year to achieve the upgrade of Admiral Briggs said the fast track An early model RN Sea Harrier launches a Sea Eagle IRAN tests new DECHAINEUX and SHEEAN to program built on work approved by anti-ship missile. Without Sea Eagle ihe RN Harriers are without an clfcctivc long range aim-ship missile. increased operational capability. the Government in mid-1994) which ASMs RADM Briggs said half of this had resulted in significant The Sea Eagle entered service in Iran has announced that it has tested funding was being used to incorporate improvements to noise signature in 1985 as a long range fire and forget two new indigenous developed ASM. new technology and to enhance the COLLINS. \n I.SSM leaving its test launch canister The ESSM will ami the K\Vs I His and An/acs ASM. Production was completed in The first missile type is a operational performance of the (Raytheon) COLLINS has also had its combat 1992. Il was launched from RN Sea reworked US RIM-66 Standard SM-I submarines. He said the balance of system augmented and trials of this Harriers and RAF Tornado GR.IBs naval anti-aircraft missile delivered to the funding would be used to rectify equipment, together with additional Ihe missile, dubbed Control Test less vulnerable to detection RADM which replaced the Buccaneer in this Iran in Ihe 1970s. The missile's shortcomings, many of which were testing of platform improvements, role. The decision also comes about Vehicle-4A (CTV-4A). was launched Briggs said. electronics have been digitised identified by the Mclntosh/Prescott will be carried out at sea in the from the recent UK Strategic Defence Irom the IX-sert Ship launch complex RADM Briggs said three allowing the use of a frequency agile report. coming month. Revjew recommendation to withdraw at White Sands Missile Range. After a submarines. HMAS COLLINS. receiver for semi-active command the GR.IB froi service as anti- series of controlled manoeuvres, the "We have also been encouraged by guidance, providing greater resistance missile transitioned to guided flight the response to a number of initiatives shipping roles would now be in to jamming with solid rocket fuel, resulting in the tactical kill. Real time, to retain existing submariners and littoral waters as opposed lo open warhead and powcrpacks now visual, radar and telemetry data attract new personnel." he said. ocean operations of the Cold War. being made locally. Although not showed the missile maintaining "In September last year we began The availability and use of possessing the warhead effect of a proper controlled and guided to implement our plan lo achieve an Harpoon in the RN surface fleet also Harpoon or Exocct the main flight with the flight trajectory effective personnel capability. This brought about the decision to retire advantages of this missile is its size comparing favourably with preflighl included an increase in submarine the missile early. and supersonic speed, thus making it predictions. service allowance, a financial bonus Sea Eagle uses incrtial guidance difficult to counter. ESSM is the next-generation Sea for two years' service, a three-watch for mid-course, followed by a J-band Sparrow missile. Features include a system, stress management training (10 to 20 GHz) active pulse radar The second missile is a locally larger diameter rocket motor, a tail and a dedicated trials crew to reduce terminal seeker w ith a range of 30kni. modified Chinese C-802. The control section, thrust vector control family separation." he said. On launch, the missile accelerates to modification allows the missile to be lor vertical launch capability and an "We have four submarines its Mach .85 cruise speed, descends to air launched and gives it a more upgraded ordnance package. CTV-4A manned. We currently have 42 per cent sea-skimming height and then turns robust guidance system with, it is was the first of fifteen planned flight of the final number of submariners on to the target bearing. When the believed, a data link back to the tests scheduled for this year. The required. We will need to build the missile is approximately I Skills from launch aircraft. NATO Sea Sparrow has been the numbers farther to ensure we have its target, the radar seeker switches on The presence of both new types of primary surface-to-air ship self enough personnel to run the licet and and locks on to the enemy ship. On a ASMs will make naval operations in defence missile system for USN and support infrastructure based on shore." long-range mission, the missile can. if the Gulf and in particular the Straits member nations" ships for more than By Vic Jeffery . Navy Public Affairs required, climb when some 3()kms of Hormuz that much more 30 years. HMAS WALLER «mi ihe surface in Darwin Harbour The upgrade lor all si* submarines is on track. WA from its target and use its seeker to problematic. 27 26 VOL 62 NO. 13 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 Two more large complement of anti-ship It is not known if KIEV will be RSN commissions Landing Ships Logistic (LSL) SIR missiles. She was launched in used as an aircraft carrier or as an PERCIVAL and SIR C.ERAINT in Sovremennys for 1972 and withdrawn from service example to the Chinese for their two LSTs and plans 2003/2004. China in 1994 carrier construction. However, the circumnavigation The new ships, expected to be at The Russian paper reported that a carrier is very similar to what India least K).(KK) tonnes each, will be Russia is selling two of its existing US-Chinese firm. Maritime has recently chosen which is to be The Republic of Singapore Navy much larger, more capable and Sovremenny class DDGs to China. Suppliers, is understood to have extensively modified to take the MiG- (RSN) has commissioned two flexible than existing RFA LSLs and This comes on the heels of the arri\ai signed a sale agreement with the 29K fighter. As the Chinese do not locally-built ENDURANCE class will provide a major increase in the Russian Defence ministry. use the MiG they could opt for the LST (Landing Ship Tank). The capability of the RFA to support commissioning ceremony signified What the Chinese paid for the SU-27K which is in Chinese airforce amphibious operations and other that the two LSTs. RSS ENDURANCE carrier is not known but the MINSK hands, which incidentally was military tasks such as peacekeeping and RSS RESOLUTION, the first of and NOVOROSSIYSK, same class, thought to be for a carrier when duties and disaster relief around the The New USMC A AAV The vehicle would serve the a total of four, have attained were sold lo South Korea as scrap lor initially purchased. world. Australian Army well from the LPAs KANIMBLA and operational status. Singapore's MANOORA. (USMC) $US4.5m and $US4.3m respectively. The UK Strategic Defence Deputy Prime Minister and Minister According to Kommersant. the Review gave a clear commitment to Vehicle (AAAV). designed and built for Defence. Dr Tony Tan officiated Russian Defence ministry has said Another FFG for improved specialist amphibious by General Dynamics Land at the commissioning ceremony at that all military equipment had been shipping for the Joint Rapid Reaction Systems. The test ux)k place at the Taiwan Tuas Naval Base. stripped from KIEV. Forces, including the building of two Patuxent River Naval Air Station in China has been keen to acquire The Taiwanese Government has The two LSTs are part of the new RFA landing ships. These vessels Maryland. aircraft carriers for many years. decided to resurrect plans for an RSN's new-generation LSTs that will enable the UK to maintain its The AAAV is a new amphibious Recent reports have stated that it will eighth Olivier Hazard Perry class replace the five ageing ex-US County leading position in amphibious APC for the USMC. It can self deploy complete its first locally constructed FFG. The plan to build the eighth ship Class LSTs. They have greater lift capability within Europe and help across water and land with 17 fully carrier in 2005 with construction was shelved in 1997 due to budgetary capacity and longer range but operate Europe field a stronger and more equipped Marines. It is armed with a starting later this year. constraints. The Taiwanese FFGs with half the crew. With its enhanced coherent contribution to NATO. 40mm gun and can travel on the water differ from those found in the RAN logistics transportation capabilities, A Sovremenny class DDG Two are lo he taken "ui The ships will offer flexibility for at more than 3()kts in Sea-State 3. and USN in two main areas. They <<| Russian sen ice. refuted and then sold lo China. the LSTs have been designed to worldwide operations, and will be On land it has a maximum speed have two quad ASM missile support Singapore's overseas training essential elements in future of 75kph+. Its armour provides launchers behind the bridge for requirements. as well as of China's first Sovremenny (see amphibious warfare operations. They protection from Armour-Piercing eight indigenously produced Hsiung peacekeeping and humanitarian THE NAVY Vol 62 No.2). The next is will be the force multipliers for the 14.5mm rounds and the vehicle has an Feng II missiles and two 40mm Type missions. The new LSTs are equipped due in Chinese waters by the end of UK's amphibious warfare fleet, automatic fire extinguisher 75 Bolors guns amid ships behind the with the latest technology such as the the year. moving the heavy vehicles, system. ship's boats. All the ships in the class Electronic Chart Display and The two Russian Navy equipment, stores and troops that During the test the AAAV are named after Chinese generals Information Systems (ECDIS) for Sovremennys will be withdrawn from sustain a landing force anywhere in prototy pe reached speeds in excess of and warriors. A Prairie Masker more accurate navigation at sea. serv ice and modified ai the Severnaya the world and disembark them in 2()kts over a one-mile distance. This hull acoustic suppression system is Verf shipyard. At the invitation of the USN. RSS tactical formation directly into test also marked the first attempt to fitted and a point defence missile ENDURANCE will take part in the combat. power the AAAV at the full-up The modifications to be system may be fitted in place of International Naval Review (INR) plane position it uses to ride on the conducted are still unknown but it is the 40 mm guns. Raytheon's RAM from 3 to 7 July 2000 in New York water. thought thai the work may be simple is a possibility (see THE NAVY City Harbour. This is a first for the repair and a minor upgrade to bring Vol 62. No.2). USMC AAV water "Taking a vehicle that can litem in line with China's brand RSN. While en-route to New York. tested successfully perform like an M-1 tank on land and new Sovremennys. However. China These seven FFGs. and the eighth RSS ENDURANCE will be sailing to turning it into a speedboat on the remains in negotiations with Russian when built, form the 124th Attack ports in the United Slates and The USMC has completed the first water is quite an engineering feat" officials on possible new weapons Squadron. Mexico. On its way back to high-speed water test of its new said Colonel Blake Robertson. for these ships. Why Taiwan would resurrect this Singapore, it will call on ports in Advanced Amphibious Assault USMC AAAV programme manager. The cost to China of the two class of ship is a mystery given that Canada. United Kingdom. France. second hand ships will be the design dates from the 1970 s, is Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This voyage significantly less than the first two not stealthed like its new La Fayettcs by RSS ENDURANCE marks the brand new ships and stocks of the Standard SM-1 anti- first time that an RSN ship will aircraft missile are dwindling. It circumnavigate the world. could not be considered a counter to KIEV destined for China's new Sovremenny's as the UK to build new SM-I missile and Phalanx would China provide little to no protection from landing ships the SS-N-22 Sunburn' ASM now The Russian "Kommersant" daily The UK Ministry of Defence has entering service w ith the PLA-N. It is newspaper has reported that the invited five UK shipbuilders to tender also understood that China will be 40.000 tonne aircraft carrier for the construction of two new large licensed to produce 'Sunburn' KIF.V. mothhallcd by Russia landing ships logistic for the Royal missiles giving it a superb ASM over six years ago. has been sold Reel Auxiliary (RFA). w ith options for capability against all ships without to China. a further three ships of the class. Standard SM-2 or a sophisticated The carrier originally The two new vessels, with an command, control and survcillancc accommodated 12 Forger VTOL approximate contract value of £130 The Russian carrier KIF.V during the Cold War. What system. fighters. 20 helicopters and had a plans the Pl.A-N has lor the carrier arc unknown. million, will replace the two RFA The USMC's new armoured amphibious assault vehicle during water dials. (USMC)

14 vol. 62 NO. 3 THF NAVY THF NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 3 15 During 1999. the A AAV prototype Los Angeles-class attack submarines Under the terms of the 1993 HMNZS Following her Gulf deployment in , India to receive more successfully completed safety checks, or lo serve as a down payment on treaty, ballistic missile submarines 1996. was further crew familiarisation, thruster and converting several Ohio-class cannot be used for other missions WELLINGTON altered by replacing the old Bear water mobility testing, and land- strategic ballistic missile submarines unless the missile tubes are Decommissions missile system with the Phalanx The Indian Navy has announced it has speed performance requirements at to carry cruise missiles. significantly different from what is CIWS and enlarging the hangar in selected the Russian Tupolov Tu-142 Quaniico in Virginia. This issue is being debated within already fitted. Otherwise, the modified HMNZS WELLINGTON, well anticipation of the replacement naval 'Bear' for Maritime Patrol duties. The "A prototype engine is 75^ the USN who must decide on where submarine would still count as part of known to many in the RAN. has helicopter. Tupolov beat the French Atlanlique through ils l.(MX)-hour engine to allocate the money. However, the warhead totals under the treaty's decommissioned after 18 years and However, personnel training which happens to be used by India's durability testing and another has because of arms control treaty provisions, even if there are no 352.000 nautical miles in RNZN demands were beginning to dominate neighbour and part time enemy started the 400-hour standard NATO uncertainty, it seems more likely the ballistic missiles on that submarine. service. the Navy's day to day management. Pakistan. testing." said John Wosina. Land USN will take the Los Angeles-class If the USN decides to go with the The Indian Navy will purchase six Systems Vice President of Amphibious option. The USN have four SSN-688 SSBN conversion option now it could Tu-142 aircraft which will be Operations. "The prototype vehicle is that will have to be decommissioned be forced to pay a huge cost increase equipped with (he British made Sea scheduled lo continue water testing in 2002 if they don't refuel them. if arms control implications are not Eagle ASM (Anti-Ship Missile, see through this summer in preparation The Ohio-class conversion at addressed before work starts. Rather earlier news item) and cost for Early Operational Assessment present is considered risky. If changes than lose the opportunity to increase approximately SUS200 million. testing later this year". to the existing Strategic Arms the SSN force structure, it is believed The Indian Navy already operate Limitations Treaty II cannot be the USN is more likely to choose eight Tu-142 'Bear' for maritime negotiated lo allow strategic missile refuelling. Nuclear refuelling of the patrol. This was considered a major USN SSNs may get submarines to be converted to carry Los Angeles-class subs costs about factor in favour of the decision lo new life cruise missiles, then the USN will be SUS200 to SUS250 million per boat. purchase the Russian aircraft which forced to completely remove the If the decision is made to forgo have the ability to operate off the Citing costs and the need for more missile compartment from each sub ballistic submarine conversion at this Western Australia coastline. submarines, the USN is likely to and replace it with a different type. time, the issue is not dead. Navy The Indians also have plans to earmark more than SUSI billion to This approach is viewed as very officials said, adding that converting equip the new aircraft with (he much extend the life of Us SSNs rather than costly. It is estimated thai this special ihe four strategic submarines could feared SS-N-27 ASM. convert four Ohio class SSBNs to missile compartment conversion still be carried out to boost the total carry cruise missiles. would cost an extra SUS500 million number of attack submarines to 62. HMNZS WELLINGTON during happier times. (John Mortimer) The USN placed SUSI. I billion in per sub. taking the four-ship The USN believes thai this is still not Navy League award its 2001 budget request that would be conversion costs to about SUS 4.5 enough to handle all the missions the for HMAS used either lo refuel four SSN-688 billion. sub force faces today. WELLINGTON was acquired and in late 1997 the ship was from the Royal Navy in 1981 having designated the Navy's training ADELAIDE already served for 12 years as HMS . The Navy League Community BACCHANTE in RN Service. As a During 1998. incidentally. Service Award Shield for 1999 has gun-armed Leander she was fully WELLINGTON conducted the last been won by HMAS ADELAIDE. compatible with existing RNZN operational flight of a Wasp Commodore M.J. You I AM . She sailed for New Zealand helicopter. RAN(Retd). representing the Federal in 1982 and went straight inio a Last year a decision was made lo President of the Navy League of lengthy refit. Changes were made lo place her alongside at extended notice Australia, presented the award to the bring her into line with RNZN following the announcements of a Ship's Commanding Officer. Captain standards - such as the ASW mortar three frigate policy for the RNZN. W.M. Gately AM RAN. on Ihe flight- which was removed and replaced None the less, the ship made one last deck of HMAS ADELAIDE berthed with two triple ASW torpedo tubes. passage to the city of Wellington at Fleet Base East. Most significantly though was her where her charter of the freedom of The Navy League of Australia fuel capacity being doubled, setting the city was returned. Since then Community Service Award is her apart from her contemporaries. WELLINGTON has served alongside presented annually to the HMA ship Other changes were made included an in a training role and support role for or establishment that has made the RCA digital fire control system and the fleet. most significant contribution to the gunnery radar, anti-missile chaff In his closing remarks at the civilian community during the launchers, new ESM and an updated decommissioning ceremony on 5 calendar year. The contribution need surface search radar. May. the RNZN Chief of Navy said not be made in Australia. It can be In 1991 the ship again entered "Farewell WELLINGTON and thank made anywhere in the world and can major refit with the installation of the you - for the happiness we have range from a rescue at sea. fighting NAUTIS F action information system, shared: for the friendships made and bushfires or raising funds for charity. and Ihe new LW-08 long range air Ihe frustration's endured: for the The Federal Council of the Navy warning radar. Such equipment memories, and the sea-stories they League selects the winner of the served her well for one of her most generate: and for bringing us safely award from nominations forwarded to extensive deployments when in 1996. home. May I wish all that have served it by the various RAN commands. in her every success and remember, WELLINGTON was sent to the The League's executive admit that whilst her people will soon leave the North Arabian Gulf, as New- it is not an easy decision to make as ship. Ihe ship will never leave her Zealand's first contribution to the ships and establishments vary greatly UN-mandated sanctions against Iraq. people." The USN SSN USS KEY WEST Refuelling four SSNs will help ihe USN meets its submarine patrol responsibilities. (USNl in size. Obviously establishments

I ft VOI.. ft2 NO. 3 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. ft2 NO. 3 17 such as HMAS CERBERUS, with a and particularly the fact (hat. although exploring issues relevant to the Observations ships company of several thousand, they all had busy jobs on board, they acquisition of an effective Air Warfare has more opportunities to qualify for were prepared to spend their spare capability for the ADF's surface fleet." DEFENCE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE the award than a patrol boat with a time raising funds and helping these Mr Moore said that a decision on crew of 20 or so. organisations when they could. The a naval Air Warfare capability would By Geoffrey Evans The award was first presented in Ship's Company also kept close ties be made following the Defence 1981 to HMAS PENGUIN and since with the organisations by sending White' Paper, due for release later Looking at the defence scene in early May 2(KX) it appears Given convergence of the factors outlined above - with then it has traversed the length and regular newsletters and updates. this year. to the writer that the present government will have to face defence debts exceeding income - it seems something will breadth of the country a number of Commodore Youl said that "their A joint Defence and industry team up to some troublesome defence issues in the very near have to give: A reduced defence capability or more funds times. The list of winners includes efforts were a credit to the Ship's has been established to determine the future. to meet the nation's security insurance policy? Not an easy HMAS CONNAWARRA. Naval Company". most effective way to acquire the All the indications point to a defence force expected to decision for any Australian government. Communications Station HAROLD E "The thousands of kilometres that capability for the ADF. perform too many tasks with inadequate resources. Both HOLT. HMAS STIRLING. MM A the shield had travelled since it was "The Government recognises that financial and human. The tasks range from peacemaking and Sea/Shore Postings Cairns. HM\s CERBERUS. HMAS first awarded demonstrates that an Anti-Air Warfare capability in the peacekeeping missions in foreign lands to a defence force The April issue of the Defence Personnel Executive's ALBATROSS and HMAS HARMAN. Australian sailors, wherever they surface fleet is an important expected to have the ability to deter anyone contemplating publication THE KEY contains interesting information on Until this year it had been might happen to be. contribute much consideration, it also is an expensive a challenge to Australia's national sovereignty. The Defence Department's decreasing proportion of the the problems of achieving a reasonable balance between presented to a ship on only 4 to the community which in turn one." Mr Moore said. national financial cake is almost, if not quite, as well sea and shore time in the RAN at the present time. occasions - HMAS CESSNOCK reflects well on the communities "The Federal Government and the known as widely reported cost overruns in some The aim of the sea to shore ratio is to provide 10 years t twice i. HMAS BRISHWI .md perception of the RAN" he added. Defence Department will continue to acquisition programmes; the additional costs involved in service at sea in a 20-year career: Ideally the sea/shore ratio HMAS ANZAC three years ago. work with industry lo investigate the rectifying these deficiencies are however small compared would be: HMAS ADELAIDE was a very question of the future of Australia's w ith the certain cost of replacing major items of naval, air • Warrant officer 1:2 worthy winner for 1999 given the Kidds rejected, Again surface fleet, including Air Warfare force and army equipment many of which will become • Chief Petty officer 2:3 excellent work which the Ship's capable ships. The Minister for Defence. John obsolescent at about the same time - 'block obsolescence' • Petty officer I. I Company had done in supporting the Moore, has announced that the "This will include consideration as it is know n in defence circles. Ships and aircraft do not • Leading Seaman 3:2 Colton w ard at the Adelaide Women's Defence Capability Committee of industry's future ability to support come cheaply. • Able Seaman 2:1 and Children's Hospital. St Ann's (DCC) has formally decided that the the ADF in the provision of its Efforts to avoid block obsolescence have been made by The ideal is rarely achieved for many reasons Special School, and their support for US Navy Kidd Class destroyers will maritime capabilities." Mr Mixire said. defence planners for many years but governments tend to including: the Naval Reserve Cadets of TS not be acquired by the ADF. Industry is already gearing up to procrastinate when faced with significant equipment • operational requirements. ADELAIDE. The Ship's Company The DCC reached its decision on meet the capability requirement of the expenditure. Governments failing lo act in a timely way • career progression (promotion and training had raised a considerable amount of the basis that, in the present RAN with many major shipbuilders can however, claim with some justification that the requirements). funds for the hospital and the school. environment, they do not provide from around the world expressing community has other priorities in the relatively peaceful • known discharges. Members of the Ship's Company had climate in which most Australians have lived, virtually longer term value for money. interest. Whether any new ship on • billet requirements. \ isited the hospital and the school and since the Second World War. "The Kidds were only one option offer will be as capable, survivable • personal posting preferences. spent time with the children. Children Human resources: Not surprisingly, personnel costs for Navy's long term Anti-Air and powerful as the Kidds is open to If possible, six to eight months notice of postings is from the school were also given an have for long formed the largest item of expenditure in Warfare capability and they were debate. Hew many will be acquired is given to members but this can be affected by factors exclusive tour of the guided missile defence budgets - only rarely falling below 5()9f. In recent closely examined." Mr Moore said. also unknown but if the decision is to such as: frigate. years particularly these costs have escalated and will "'Although they will not be be based on the White' Paper's • changes to a sailor's medical category or to personal or continue to do so as pay scales based on rank are Commodore Youl congratulated acquired, the examination of the Kidd recommendations that number could family circumstances. increasingly discarded in favour of pay. for specific skills the Ship's Company for their efforts option proved a useful exercise in be quite low. (not so long ago only medical and dental officers received • unexpected discharges. salaries more closely aligned to their civilian colleagues). • personnel shortages etc. A fall in uniformed and civilian members has not been At the present time an overall shortage of personnel in matched by a corresponding fall in personnel expenditure the RAN. intensified in certain categories, has meant more - in fact costs w ill almost certainly increase as the Services time at sea for some people: however, the need to have strive to match wages and conditions prevailing in civil ships manned and operationally fit to go to sea makes this employment in order to not only attract recruits but to inevitable. retain serving members. (In the writer's experience sailors were not particularly In addition to the need to meet increased equipment and adverse to seatime. in fact it was sometimes a relief to see personnel costs, operational expenses have also grown Sydney Heads or some port with all its entanglements especially since the East Timor venture: while some disappear over the hori/on) peacemaking/keeping expenditure may be reimbursed by the United Nations overall operational costs are unlikely to Coastwatch decrease in the foreseeable future and are more likely to rise as tensions in our region show few signs of easing. Coincidentally a decision to hold yet another inquiry into The Howard Government appears to recognise the coastal surveillance arrangements was announced at the approaching problems and one might assume it awaits with same time the April-June edition of THE NAVY in which some trepidation the Defence White Paper it commissioned this column pleaded for no more inquiries, was published. in 1999. which among other things will provide the current The latest inquiry - there have been at least ten since strategic outlook. One does not have to be a foreign affairs 1971. the latest in 1999. an average of one every three or defence expert to realise that we do not yet live in a years or less - is to be conducted by the Joint Committee world in which nations have decided to dismantle their of Public Accounts and Audit. armed forces, discard their armaments and henceforth live Members of the public were invited to express their The Kidd class DDG USS CHANDLER enters Sydney Harbour for the last time The Kidds were at one stage the most powerful destroyers in the world. (Brian happily alongside one another: indeed, one might reach a views on the performance of Coastwatch. submissions to Morns*w. Warships and Marine Corps Museum Inti quite different conclusion. be made by 2 June 2(XX).

IK VOL 62 NO 1 THE NAVY VOI. 62 NO. 3 As Britain broadens the roles of its SSBN force, so the proportionate contribution of this force to NATO's Submarines jn Britain's Defence strategic deterrent continues to grow. Rear Admiral R. P. Stevens. Britain's Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM). noted that Britain's 'SSBN force contributes 20 per cent of NATO's maritime nuclear forces, a hefty contribution in comparison with |Britain's| relevant size.' This proportion w ill continue to grow if START II is implemented to bring U.S. Nav y SSBN levels down to 14. On top of this, given that the U.S. Navy may have to re-port some of its Atlantic- Fleet SSBNs to the Pacific following the prospective conversion of four Pacific Fleet SSBNs (the first four of the Ohio-class) into special forces and land attack platforms, the relative proportion of British SSBNs in the

The Trafalgar class SSN HMS TRECHANT was painted with a special blue Atlantic - and committed to NATO - will increase further. paint in selected areas oxer the hull lo examine their visual stealth effects in Today, an SSBN's land attack influence has moved shallow water. Success would mean more shallow waler/lilloral operations for beyond strategic nuclear targeting. The U.S. Navy is RN SSNs (RNi continuing design work for converting its first four Ohio- class SSBNs into dedicated special operations and land conventional forces. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate attack platforms. The significance of this emerging guarantor of national security. They also provide programme is in the land attack role. As Rear Admiral unprecedented military and political standing. By Malcolm Fages (U.S. Navy Director of Submarine combining stealth and survivability with the lethality of Warfare) noted, the land attack role 'barely existed as a nuclear weapons, submarines are the most independent, submarine capability just ten years ago'. The converted covert and survivable deterrent asset. Former British Ohio SSGNs w ill be able to fire 154 TLAMs in six minutes Defence Secretary George Robertson noted recently that "a - bringing strategic and tactical surprise from a stealthy, submarine on continuous patrol, because it is inv isible and forward-deployed unit. The RN is monitoring these undetectable, is the most secure, and therefore crucially the developments closely. The RN has only four SSBNs. all of most stable, means of maintaining nuclear deterrence". which are required in the deployment cycle to maintain one SDR mandated that Britain will retain continuous at- The RN SSBN HMS VICTORIOUS nukes an unprecedented port visit to the French Port of Brest. The roles of RN SSBNs are expanding and becoming more flexible (R SSBN on station as a continuous at-sea deterrent. Yet an sea deterrent patrols, a role that has been perhaps the operational challenge here would be lo dual-role the SSBN RN's most significant post-war achievement. In an tin station to maximise its operational capacity without Dr Lee Willet* unprecedented open discussion of British nuclear strategy. impinging on the survivability of the strategic deterrent. SDR mandated that Britain's SSBN force levels would With the IK expanding its submarine capabilities. I)r Lev Willet examines the utility of this capability enhancement and carry reduced warhead loads while operating at reduced Since SDR. there has been a greater staled emphasis on its implications to I k military strategy. The importance of nuclear power to the RN*s submarine force, and future readiness levels. However, reflecting emerging thinking in the secondary roles lor SSBNs. Such operations include strategic direction, is considered vital in this expanding role for Britain's submarines. the RN and elsewhere, perhaps the most significant hydrographic surveillance, training operations and port visits. The much-publicised visits by HMS VANGUARD Initially, submarines were regarded as "a weapon of the British defence policy is the maintenance of an development was that Britain's Trident force would carry to Gibraltar and HMS VICTORIOUS to Brest in France weak*. With nuclear propulsion, submarines emerged as independent national nuclear deterrent complemented by Britain's sub-strategic deterrent capability. highlight the potential relevance of submarines to Dcfcncc the ultimate weapon of the strongest powers in the nuclear conventional forces capable of operating operations across This new role developed from Britain's reassessment of Diplomacy, a central component of brilain's defence age' Bringing scope for speed and for deep-di\ed. the range of modern military operations. Across this the causes of conflicts which might provoke the use of mission in the wake of SDR. U.S. SSBNs have begun to sustained reach, nuclear power turned submersible spectrum - from having sole responsibility for Britain's nuclear weapons. Britain drew several conclusions from participate in w ider fleet exercises. A further challenge - torpedo-boats into submarines. Although the only nuclear deterrent, from a new source ol land attack from this re-assessment. First, deterrence is no longer wholly dependent tin linkage to nuclear weapons. Second, the in maximising the operational output of an SSBN - would difference between a nuclear-powered and a conventional the sea in its newly-deployed Tomahawk Land Attack increasing number of rogue states in possession of or in be to deploy an SSBN with a maritime task group for a submarine is the power plant (sensor and weapons Missile (TLAM) capability to the ability to operate across pursuit of a WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) mission in conjunction with - or other than - its deterrent technologies will be equivalent in capability), a nuclear the spectrum of operations from high intensity conflict capability do not share Western understandings of role. power plant brings operational capabilities of a different (such as special forces insertion) to operations other than deterrence. Third, in recent months - despite the decision order of magnitude because of the speed and endurance it war (such as providing intelligence in counter-drug to ratify the START II nuclear amis control treaty - Russia brings as core assets to the submarine. operations) - submarines bring unrivalled flexibility to has reviewed its own strategic posture and has announced SSNs Mtnlern warfighting technology highlights the role of influence events above, on and below the surface of the sea. that it will consider first use of nuclear weapons, at both In providing presence, sea control/denial, anti- stealth. The most effective way to make a sea-based For this reason, submarines remain indispensable to British strategic and tactical levels, if necessary. submarine/surface warfare, indicators and warnings platform stealthy is to hide it beneath the surface. Nuclear policy and to military taskings. submarines provide - in one multi-dimensional, modular The decision to adapt Britain's Trident programme to a (INW). special forces operations, the protection of the Britain's 1998 Strategic Defence Review underscored unit - a balanced strategic, operational and tactical force greater variety of roles highlights how the flexibility of the strategic deterrent and coercion or strike operations with package presenting discretionary political and military as key aspects of British policy the kinds of roles for w hich Trident D-5 missile has proved wholly appropriate to the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM). SSNs can choices across the spectrum of sometimes blurred and non- nuclear submarines prov ide a unique contribution - power British purposes, linking conventional and strategic- operate across the spectrum of military taskings. Here. permissive strategic challenges. Their unique agility projection in distant, expeditionary operations. Under nuclear deterrence by prov iding deterrence at levels below SSNs can be "covert when required, overt if desired'. SSNs derives largely through two key strengths: stealth and SDR. Britain will have a force of 14 submarines: four grand strategic. All four British SSBNs are designated as can undertake these operations cither autonomously or in flexibility. Stealth lends the ability to employ surprise, a Vanguard-class Trident SSBNs: and 10 Trafalgar- and sub-strategic platforms, providing strategic and sub- support of a joint task group. key principle of war and a fundamental asset of the Astute-class SSNs. strategic deterrence for the UK and for NATO. A sub- Britain's SSN fleet continues to undertake core tasks submarine. strategic policy might see Britain use the threat of a sub- wholly similar to those conducted in the Cold War Since In the post-cold war world the British nuclear SSBNs strategic. preventive strike to deter the use of WMD by a the advent of nuclear power. British SSNs have conducted submarine fleet has been forced to undergo a basic re- rogue slate. Constituting only an adaptation of Trident's sustained operations as primary forward-deployed assets at evaluation of its contribution to Britain's defence mission. The role of Britain's military is to deter aggression and existing capabilities, sub-strategic is not so much a military perhaps the highest levels of force readiness. Two new However, the Royal Navy (RN) Submarine Service has support Government policy. A principal aim here is to capability as a cost-effective means of extending and developments are the introduction of land attack cruise undergone a period of strategic reassessment perhaps maintain an independent national nuclear deterrent tailoring strategic responses in proportion to perceived missiles and increasing requirements for SSNs to act as unrivalled in Britain's armed services. A principal aim of complemented by flexible and multi-dimensional national interest. forward-deployed intelligence assets.

20 VOI. 62 NO. .1 THE NAVY THE NAVY vol. 62 NO 3 Tactical Tomahawk (TacTom) and beyond (with the a cornerstone of the maritime contribution to joint and in these calculations the requirements for TLAM land Advanced Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, or ALAM). combined expeditionary operations. A measure of how far attack were not vectored in as force drivers. When However. Britain's SSNs need to show that they the RN Submarine Service has come is found in 'Allied procuring TLAM. the RN calculated that three SSNs were provide more capability than land-attack. 65 TLAMs is not Force': British and American SSNs fired 25# of the required for TLAM missions alone to guarantee achieving a cost-effective load-out for a handful of billion-pound TLAMs employed: in Operation 'Desert Storm' in 1991 the desired coercive effect. Thus, these analyses suggest a platforms. SSNs are very much part of the fleet. When and Operation 'Desert Fox' in 1998. U.S. SSNs alone requirement for as many as seven SSNs on station in any deployed with TLAM. SSNs provide an invaluable prov ided only 4W of the TLAMs fired. given operation. A force level of 14 boats produces an contribution to Task Group operations with their inherent operational cycle of five boats on station, a force level of reach, stealth, mobility and flexibility. British SSNs are Challenges for Britain's ten produces jusi three. Moreover, the lack of available integrated more closely with Task Groups and their units, hulls will limit the ability of SSNs to carry out strike while retaining broader presence, flexibility and autonomy Submarine Force mission requirements without impinging on other in many diverse warfare roles. As military forces seek The RN Submarine Service clearly is making strides operations, or vice-versa. Thus there is an argument that knowledge dominance in the modern battlespace. SSNs towards meeting the strategic challenges of the modern Britain should have been looking to increase, not decrease, have an increasing role. SSNs provide sustained, forward- world and towards maximising its contribution to British its SSN force levels. A recent study by the U.S. Joint Chiefs The RN's acquisition of TLAM (Tomahawk l-and Attack Missilei gives their based INW. Through maximising their ability to defence policy. However, there remain some significant of Staff has concluded lhat U.S. SSN levels should rise SSN fleet greater scope to contribute u> maritime operations, i RN i disseminate this information. SSNs can contribute directly obstacles to further evolution. These are: connectivity, from Ihe current level of 56 hulls to perhaps as many as 76 to the real-time recognised maritime picture. boats. This requirement is diametrically opposed to the Britain procured 65 TLAMs. for deployment across its force size and the costs of nuclear ownership. conclusion of the 1997 Quadrennial Defence Review, SSN fleet, as weapons for strategic coercion. Procured which had stipulated a force level of no more than 50 hulls. from the U.S. in 1998. Britain fired its first TLAMs in Submarine Operations in Kosovo Nuclear Ownership combat in Operation Allied Force' in Kosovo during What may be of interest to the RN are U.S. submarine SSNs made several critical contributions in 'Allied Nuclear submarines often are viewed as expensive March 1999 W hen deployed on SSNs. TLAM enhances developments beyond its new Virginia-class SSN. U.S. Force". In an operation which challenged much of tne logic Cold War relics making only a limited contribution to significantly British capabilities and transforms the nature submarine designers are looking at modular designs for of contemporary Western s(ra(egic thought, the nuclear military operations. Now that the submarine services of of Britain's conduct of warfare from the sea. The sea is no future submarine classes, with submarine hulls having the submarines of the American and British Navies showed the Britain and the U.S. have gone some way towards re- longer a self-contained battlespace. but a medium on which capacity lo be fitted for a variety of roles - from ability to exert a range of unique, flexible options across aligning and re-communicating the enduring multi- and from which warfare is conducted. TLAM-capable conventional submarine operations, to special forces the spectrum of combat. When military capabilities are functional contribution of nuclear submarines to such SSNs bring a decisive and unprecedented maritime options to conventional and nuclear land attack capabilities viewed as a whole, from sea control to stealthy TLAM operations, a significant challenge which remains is the contribution to joint and combined operations ashore, - as operational requirements dictate. This modularity strike, the ability of an SSN to bring a range of battle-ready issue of the cost of nuclear power. What is often adding to a Task Group a stealthy reach, power projection would obviate the need for two different types of capabilities to (he comba( theatre in a single unit is evident. overlooked, however, is the cost-effective capability that is and surprise, often in non-permissive environments. With submarine. The RN is in the process of making a decision From Ihe U.S. Navy's perspective. USS MIAMI (SSN- procured with a multi-dimensional and flexible platform only limited rounds available, from the British perspective to extend the life of its Trident SSBN hulls to 36 years, the 755) became Ihe first SSN to contribute to the land attack whose life expectancy can surpass 30 years. Simply, SSNs are " self-evident I y the ideal delivery platform |for first step in a process which will bring Britain's programme strikes in two theatres in the same deployment, having nuclear submarines provide more bang for the buck. This TLAM|. operating at low levels of self-risk and more closely into line with its U.S. counterpart. It should taken part in Operation Desert Fox' in December 1998 argues against (he logic of force level cuts in SSNs. unsupported for extended periods.' With the combined be noted here thai designers of Britain's Future Attack before deploying lo the Adriatic for Allied Force'. USS reach of a precise. 1.000-mile range missile and a covert, Submarine (FASM) are keeping (heir options open for NORFOLK (SSN-714) switched between INW and TLAM sustainable and forward-deployed sovereign platform, this Force levels installing a nuclear strike capability. Once Trident reaches operations, while USS ALBUQUERQUE (SSN-706) force package brings the ability to: to instil uncertainty in its life expectancy, the option of deploying nuclear cruise contributed lo (he TLAM strikes while filled and deployed I nder SDR. Britain's SSN force was cut from 12 to 10 the mind of a prospective aggressor: to exert strategic missiles as the strategic and sub-strategic deterrenl will as a special operations platform. Other U.S. submarines. hulls. As SDR sought to reduce Britain's defence surprise: to reach in-land at distance, into and beyond the re(um lo the fore - as it has on Ihe occasion of each British USS BOISE (SSN-764) and USS NARWHAL (SSN-671 >. expenditure, two SSNs arguably were sacrificed to fund littoral, with considerable, precise deep-strike point target debate on the strategic deterrent issue. A submarine force also contributed to the operation. two new aircraft carriers. This decision was aided by the force across all levels of warfare from deterrence (through capable of providing both strategic deterrence and From (he British perspective. HMS SPLENDID costs of nuclear ownership and. more specifically, by the coercion) to the shaping of the strategic and operational traditional SSN roles would help the RN's cause in budget diverted from passage to ihe Persian Gulf with (he HMS prospective savings lo be made from cancelling some battlespaces. As well as reducing risks to friendly forces debates. INVINCIBLE Task Group to be (he first Allied unit into submarine re-fits. Yet SDR's decision lo trim SSN force and non-combatants. TLAM has developed into a 'weapon Moreover, as the requirements for stealth increase, so action on the first night of Allied Force'. HMS levels from 12 to 10 hulls is set against a backdrop of of choice' in a category of preferred weapons'. TLAM is will the demands for multi-purpose, covert platforms such TURBULENT was also deployed, as an ASW asset to increasing requirements for submarine missions and the a weapon of choice for both political leaders and force as nuclear submarines. Here, the modus operandi for a counter the prospective threat from Serbia's sole fact thai the background research for SDR showed that commanders. submarine on strategic deterrent patrol is not so different conventional submarine. In undertaking the full range of more than 14 SSNs were needed lo meet national (askings. Britain's First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Michael Boyce from thai of a bout on TLAM strike. The key factors here autonomous, joint and combined operations. HMS This calculation centred on the need to have five SSNs on noted that TLAM provides Britain with political options are the differences in range between the two missiles and SPLENDID and TURBULENT showed how RN SSNs are station - one each to tackle the tasks of INW. Special and force capabilities consistent with SDR's requirements Forces insertion. ASW. ASuW and land attack. Moreover. ihe resultant fact thai a TLAM shooter deploys further up- for more flexible and rapidly-deployable forces able to threat. However, prospective improvements to TLAM respond to the challenges of a complex modern world. Sea- speed and range in the ALAM concept suggest that there is based land attack cruise missiles may prove to be of greater some potential for operational congruence leading to a significance for the Royal Navy in the future. In an era of multi-purpose submarine carrying both strategic deterrent casualty intolerance, as Australia's Deputy Secreiary for and conventional land attack weapons. Such a platform Strategy Hugh White noted a( the RAN's Maritime War would bring greater payload to bear from under the sea. 21' conference in Sydney in February 2(XX). the future for Improved payload. along with connectivity, will be crucial manned aircraft remains uncertain at the very least. Thus. to the ability of the submarine to continue to influence TLAM and its equivalent or successor cruise missiles look 1 events ashore. likely to remain a central factor in the equation for any future offensive air system. Moreover, the case for cruise missiles may be pushed harder still by developments in Connectivity

ballistic missile defence technologies. Britain has a seat at 1 - , J* Hi' Today. there is a greater emphasis in the UK on SSNs (he cruise missile table, through TLAM. However, the RN providing forward-based intelligence. SSNs must be able Submarine Service will need to re-assess its rationale for to interact more closely in joint and combined operations to deployment of TLAM if it is to remain in the conventional Many fell thai with the end of the cold war (he sun would set on the need lor For many years the submarine lost the capability lo apply firepower to shore SSNs. However, the need has only grown with the modern SSN capable of largets with the deletion of the deck-mounted gun. TLAM returns this capability make a direct contribution to the real-time intelligence so land attack game now that the U.S. has moved lo the conducting numerous military operations. (RN) lo the RN hut with far greater accuracy and effectiveness. (RN) crucial for shaping the modern battlespace.

26 VOL 62 NO. 3 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 27 II N IN lo he accepted thai network-centred operations will provide the framework for implementing military force, the RN Submarine Service understands thai Airpower for Australia communications remain its Achilles heel. In the words of I S. Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig. the challenge for submarine services is developing the: ability to inn-grate the submarine fort e w ith the rest of Part 2 the Navy antl the whole suite of national security activities. It is I the I ability to work with the battle grtm/t It is I the I ability to come in close to the littoral. It i\ an ability to define submarining not as a lime some venture but as a venture that connects with others... We need lo men tune the notion that "run silent" is the necessary imperative of the submarine [on e in all circumstances. Yet an SSN must be able to provide INW while exploiting its traditional, unique virtues of autonomous, sustained stealth. SSNs must generate functional interoperability with other units. In recent operations. British SSNs have experienced difficulties in Ihe SSBN IIXIS VIGILANT on the surface Ihe main and only role ol the SSBN communicating with other forces. However, as was during ihe cold war was strategy nuclear strike Today, the RN is expanding the discovered in Kosovo, the Tl.AM communications SSB\s role and lis contributions lo maritime security and military operations iR\> infrastructure may provide a larger framework for communication wiih other assets. combat potential threats by camouflaging the hulls of some The Re-emergence of the Light Fleet Carrier From the RN's perspective, there is a grow ing argument of its submarines. British nuclear submarines pro\ ide more lor upgrading SSN communications to tackle and exploit capabilities than the maintenance of the strategic The Spanish carrier PRINCIPE: DE ASTURIAS is an ideal example of ihe modern Light Reel Carrier. the challenges of knowledge dominance in modern deterrence and land attack capabilities. warfare. Here, the I S. Navy already has fitted 50'» of its Alongside Britain's aircraft carrier and amphibious By George Kaplan SSNs with HHI (Extremely High Frequency) forces, the RN's Submarine Service presents a formidable strategic triad of core capabilities for projecting ashore communications capabilities, including switching its In part two of our series on Maritime Air for Australia. George Kaplan examines the re-emergence of the Light Fleet select political influence* and raw combat power and for Tl.AM communications infrastructure to EHF. Without Carrier in many Navies around the world. The examples in the article provide an interesting insight into what Australia supporting national interests. Britain's submarine LHK the lack of sufficient bandwidth is a central source of could afford. the communications problems facing SSNs. Moreover, community, however, continues to make rapid and robust limited communications capabilities will restrict Britain's progress in meeting the continuing changes of the new For many years it appeared that the operation of organic Operations in Somalia, the Gulf, evacuations from world order. In meeting the core mission requirements of ability to exchange Tl.AM targeting data and broader fixed wing air support at sea was a pastime affordable only strife torn African countries and closer to home. East the SDR. a current operational snapshot might see British Battle Plans wiih the U.S. It is understood that U.S. EHF by the richest of nations. Many of the countries who had Timor, have brought home the essential value of mobile air submarines deployed with combined task forces in the technologies tor these purposes IN subject to Foreign embraced naval aviation in the relatively peaceful years power, operating whenever and wherever required, Persian Gulf, deployed in support of British peace Military SalcN legislation. Rear Admiral Stephens is follow ing the end of the Second World War had given the independent of basing rights in other countries, and enforcement operations in Sierra Leone, conducting actively pushing the case lor the RN lo switch to EHF. game away when the cost of replacing the ubiquitous ex- training exercises in the Mediterranean, protecting responsive to national imperatives, rather than the shackles Royal Navy Majestic class light aircraft carriers became sovereign territory m the South Atlantic and maintaining of collective operations. apparent. Conclusions Britain's strategic deterrent in the North Atlantic. Rear The RAN once operated a Majestic class light carrier. The changing role of the submarine has been the key Admiral Stevens has scripted a vision in which the RN While several of these navies had investigated the The increasing costs of operating conventional carrier issue for the RN Submarine Service since the end of the Submarine Service w ill continue to develop a force capable operation of the Harrier STOVL (short take off/vertical aircraft and the cost of a replacement for HMAS cold war. The primary challenge has been to justify of dominating any maritime environment, complementary landing) aircraft, there had always been a question mark MELBOURNE proved too much for the government of the retaining a force seen as expensive and outdated. IX'spite with other assets and fully integrated into the framework surrounding the aircraft's performance in comparison to day. Perhaps the time may be right to cast an eye over what ihe strategic challenges of the modern world and a general for the RN's contribution to the national defence mission. more conventional aircraft. can be achieved at a quite reasonable cost. misunderstanding of ihe vital, unique contribution of To the RN Submarine Service. SDR only built on a These doubts were conclusively put to rest following For the purpose of this article an arbitrary limit of submarines to the national security of a maritime power, "process of change already underway in the nature of the the Harrier's magnificent performance in the 1982 25.000 tonnes has been set as the demarcation point. the British and American submarine communities actively Flotilla's mission." Recent British Ministry of Defence Falklands Conflict in the South Atlantic. are seizing the opportunity to assert the primacy of nuclear- analysis of future force requirements in the 2015 period In the years following the Falklands campaign several powered submarines at the leading edge of contemporary and beyond have concluded that submarine roles will not navies laid down snips specifically designed to operate The United Kingdom military operations. New strategies and new technologies change UK) much up to thai time-frame. This suggests that VSTOL aircraft, providing organic air cover when and The RN has considerable experience in operating are enhancing this utility further. current submarine roles are significant and enduring. On where required. Italy. India. Spain and Thailand now VSTOL aircraft at sea. dating back to the late 1970s. The First, nationa' (askings for British and American this basis, there is no doubting that nuclear submarines w ill operate such carriers, with several others considering Sea Harrier has operated from the decks of the three submarines are increasing despite declining force levels. make an enduring contribution to military operations in the acquiring similar capabilities. Invincible class CVLs. INVINCIBLE. ILLUSTRIOUS and Second, a growing number of nations are pursuing new millennium. Today the cost of introducing organic fixed wing ARK ROYAL, in numerous wars and UN sanctioned submarine and nuclear capabilities. This underscores the (11.Some U.S. SSBNs already have been filled wiih special operations aviation support to smaller Navies has never been more operations. So effective is the capability offered by these enduring need to maintain traditional ASW skills. Third, capabilities In the IWOs. the Benjamin Franklin-class SSBNs U.S. affordable. A number of shipbuilders have designs on offer three ships that they are undergoing modifications to allow nuclear-powered submarines provide the covert, Kamchameha (SSBN 642) and USS Polk (SSBN-645) were re-fitted for which provide a level of capability once thought well them to operate additional aircraft. This will sec them sustainable, forward-deployed capability crucial to special foa-cs operations. Several SSNs also have been lined similarly. requirements in contemporary military operations for <2».For example, in I9W USS Alabama (SSBN-731 > joined the USS beyond the means of smaller nations. losing the Sea Dan surface to air missile system to make strategic surprise and active shaping of the battlcspacc. Carl Vinson Carrier Battle Gioup (CVBG) for the first-ever participation Given the continuing high level of conflict which seems room for additional deck parking space for embarked RAF Fourth, developments in sensor technologies may serve to by a Pacific Fleet SSBN in an ASW Exercise. to have enveloped the globe in the last 15 years, and the GR-7 Harriers and their armament. (•)Dr Lee Willctt was leverhulme Research Fellow at ihe Centre for make surface warships increasingly vulnerable. Little growth in peace keeping operations in more distant parts of Controversial when first proposed, the Invincible class Security Studies. University of Hull. UK when this piece was written progress has been made in improving the transparency of He is now ciMilercnce coordinator lor the Military Science Programme the world, the trend towards more, rather than less carriers were first designated 'through deck cruisers' to escape the the oceans. Even here, however, ihe RN has moved to at the Royal United Sen ices Institute for Defence Studies seems set to continue. ire of opponents of the Navy's plans to acquire air capable

vol. 62 no 3 VOL 62 NO 3 communications facilities are unrivalled in the RN. maintenance personnel. To deliver her troops four Landing Ships complement is 555. with an embarked air group allowing them to command full task forces of warships and Craft Vehicle/Personnel are carried on davits, together with of 201 plus a small embarked flag staff. amphibious groups. two small Griffin hovercraft. Built to a price, the Spanish Navy has obtained a So successful have the class been that the RN has OCEAN carries many lessons for other Nav ies looking surprisingly effective unit that provides capability far confirmed that they will be replacing the three ships of the to return to the av iation fold. Her mix of military and civil beyond its initial cost. So successful has PRINCIPE DE class with two much larger ships, on the order of 40.000 sy stems have produced a capable force projection asset at ASTURIAS been that the Spanish Navy intends to acquire tonnes or more, operating up to 50 aircraft each. Estimated a discounted price bv comparison w ith a new build vessel a second, improved version when funding allows. in service date is around 2020. constructed to military standards only. In addition to the three Invincible class, the RN also Whilst OCEAN herself is not designed to provide Italy operates the 21.758 tonne helicopter carrier HMS OCEAN. permanent basing for Harrier aircraft, this was a decision Commissioned in 1998. OCEAN is designed to prov ide a made to optimise her for the amphibious support role. A The Italian Navy has long recognised the benefits helicopter lift and assault capability for the embarked 850 sister ship designed for carrier operations could operate a accruing to organic fixed wing aviation, having begun troops of a Royal Marine Commando battalion. To provide much larger air group than ihe Invincible class, based on construction of a carrier late in the Second World War. This the troop lift OCEAN embarks 12 Sea King transport the larger hangar space available. Incorporating the benefits ship. AQUILA. was never completed, however, a series of helicopters and will embark six AH-64D Apache attack of almost 20 years of RN VSTOL operations, a modified innovative helicopter capable cruisers have seen service in helicopters to provide hard-hitting fire support to the (X'EAN would be attractive to many Navies worldwide. the years since World War II. A decision was taken in the embarked Battalion. late 1970s to construct a through deck carrier design, OCEAN is interesting in that she represents a major Spain initially to operate helicopters but incorporating a 6.5 departure in build philosophy for the RN. The first major degree 'ski jump' for VSTOL aircraft. RN warship largely designed and built to mercantile Spain bucked the trend of small Navies' post-World However, a problem arose over a 1923 law that laid standards. OCEAN was completed at a cost of War II. and approached the US. rather than the UK. for a down ihe provision of fixed wing support to Navy was an approximately £200 million pounds, equivalent to the cost small aircraft carrier. Spain acquired the Independence Air Force responsibility. The Italian Air Force however, The RN Invincible clavs earner HMS ILLUSTRIOUS alter her class light carrier CABOT in 1967. a veteran of the Pacific- refused to acquire VSTOL aircraft to operate al sea so an conversion to lenww the Sea Dart missile launcher and plate user the of a single Duke class frigate. Built by Vickers turn This concers-on allows nklitional deck parking for aircraft while Shipbuilding and Engineering, who subcontracted the War. under the name of DEDALO. Faced with the amendment was pushed through the Italian Parliament in ihe Sea dart mago/inc now provides more stores space for embarked actual construction and basic fitting out work to Kvaerner requirement to replace the increasingly difficult to 1989 to allow the Navy to acquire a fixed wing arm. RAH OR 7 Homers 1RN1 Govan. a mercantile yard. OCEAN completed basic sea maintain DEDALO in the lale 1970s. Spain chose to build allowing the purchase of AV-8B Harrier II aircraft. a new carrier, based on a USN design. Despite these dramas the GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI has ships. Comedians of the lime described ihem as "sec- trials before military equipment was fitted by Vickers. This design was the Sea Control Ship (SCS) concept, proven lo he a capable platform, incorporating a useful through carriers". A Defence Review of the early 1980s Based on successful trials. OCEAN has undertaken championed by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. USN Chief of anti-ship armament as well as a powerful aircraft almost saw INVINCIBLE sold to the RAN. however the deployments as far afield as the Carribean. where hot Naval Operations during the lale 1970s. Admiral Zumwalt complement on 13.850 tonnes displacement. Falklands Conflict put paid to any thought of selling an> of weather trials were interrupted by relief missions to proposed the development of smallei helicopter and the class. Since then all three have been busy in trouble countries in the region devastated by a severe hurricane. Commissioned in August 1987. GIUSEPPE spots throughout the world, most recently in operations OCEAN uses a hull form based on thai of the Invinc ible VSTOL capable vessels as the low end of a high/low mix GARIBALDI normally operates an air group of up to 18 over Kosovo. class, with a modified superstructure providing more of naval aviation. The SCS would be built to provide aircraft, made up of a mix of AV-8B Harrier ll's. Sea Kings organic aviation support to convoys and amphibious and AB-212 ASW helicopters. In an emergency additional Commissioned in 1980-85. the Invincible class useable flight deck area. While a ski jump is not fitted, the groups, freeing up the vastly more capable (and expensive) displace 20.600 tonnes and. following their most recent installation of tine would be a comparatively minor aircraft could be operated for short periods. refit, can operate a peacetime mix of up to 15 FA2 Sea modification. As currently lilted out. OCEAN can carry super carriers for offensive strikes. The plan fell afoul of For specialist tasks such as vertical troop assault, an air Harrier and (iR-7 Harrier aircraft, in addition to nine Sea and operate Harriers and Sea Harriers however, the naval aviation community in the USN who saw it as a group of seven Sea Kings and four AB-212's operated by King or Vlerlin helicopters. Several of the Airborne Early maintenance facilities are not available. threat to the continued funding of the large Nimitz class the Navy were joined by six AB-205. two CH-47 Chinook Warning variants of the Sea King are also embarked, Diesel engines were specified for gtxxl range and aircraft carriers. troop carrying helicopters and three A-129 Mangusta deemed essential after the RN's experiences in the minimal impact on the ships internal layout, providing a Whilst deemed 'unsuitable' for the USN. the concept attack helicopters of the Italian Army. Falklands. maximum speed of 19 knots and a maximum range of met most of the requirements of the Spanish Navy, and Four Fiat/General Electric LM-2500 gas turbines propel Powered by tour Rolls Royce Olympus gas turbines, 8.000 nautical miles. For self-defence OCEAN carries the design was acquired for construction by Bazan in GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI at 30 knots, with a maximum the Invincible class have a maximum speed of 28 knots, three Phalanx close in weapons systems in addition to eight Spain. Numerous minor modifications were made range of 7000 nautical miles at 20 knots. Self defence is and a range of 7.000 nautical miles al an economical speed 20mm cannon, as well as the usual suite of chaff launchers. however, the ship remains true to the SCS concept, provided by two eight cell missile launchers firing the of 19 knots. For last ditch defence against anti-ship Complement is 268 plus 180 aircrew and helicopter prov iding a way to get a useful number of aircraft to sea at Alenia Aspide anti-aircraft missile, while close in defence missiles the ships are armed a reasonable cost. is prov ided by three twin Ott»breda Compact 40 mm mounts. with three Goalkeeper close Displacing 17.188 tonnes. PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS A number of unusual weapon systems have been fitted in weapons systems, in has a normal air group of eight EAV-8B Harrier II Plus, to GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI, including two triple ASW addition to the usual chatT together with ten Seahawk. AB-212 ASW and Sea King torpedo tubes mounted port and starboard, and eight and electronic warfare helicopters. Two of the latter are the Airborne Early Teseo anti-ship missiles. Taken together GIUSEPPE capability. Warning variant. Spain hav ing taken heed of ihe RN's hard GARIBALDI possesses a versatile mix of offensive and Complement of the ship lessons of 1982. In an emergency a maximum of 37 aircraft defensive armament, whilst still operating a useful air is 685. with an air group of could be operated, however this number would involve group, however, the question must be asked as to whether 366 RN and RAF personnel some overcrowding. too much has been attempted on too small a displacement? embarked. Two of the ubiquitous General Electric LM-2500 gas On a displacement of less than 14.000 tonnes the ship In addition to operations turbines propel PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS to a maximum must be cramped, and have limited growth potential for as an aircraft carrier, speed of 26 knots, with a maximum range of 6.500 nautical new systems. the class can carry a miles at 20 knots. Self defence is provided by four of the Perhaps aware of these limitations, the Italian Navy is Royal Marine Commando indigenously developed Mcroka 12 barrelled 20 mm close looking to a much larger vessel as a supplement to Battalion of up to 600 in weapon systems, plus a comprehensive electronic GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI. Plans for this ship, combining (light) troops over short warfare suite. To allow the ship to carry out her role as the features of both aircraft carrier and amphibious assault distances. and their One of the most interesting designs of lale is the RN carrier HMS OCEAN. This ship was built using a mi* of flagship of the Spanish 'Battlegroup Alfa' task force, she is ship, are currently being finalised however, some details command. control and commercial and military standards in the design lo significantly reduce cost yet not al the expense of capability (RN i fitted with a comprehensive command and control system. arc available. 59 || VOL. 62 NO. 2 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 four Phalanx close in weapons systems and a suitable However, the increasing range of designs available, electronic warfare system. utilising a mix of civil and military construction Displacing 11.483 tonnes. CHAKRI NARUEBET is techniques, together with innovative manning concepts, powered by two General Electric LM-25(X) gas turbines in have reduced the cost of entering the carrier game to a level conjunction wilh two MTU diesels. prov iding a maximum not seen since the end of the Second World War. speed of 26 knots and a range of I0.(XX) nautical miles al Today the choice of vessel available is truly wide 12 knots. ranging. Scratch any serious builder of warships and you CHAKRI NARUEBET can operate an air group of up will find a carrier design available, in a range of si/.es to to 12 aircraft, although more could be embarked in an match any budget. emergency. The air group is made up of a mix of Ba/an in Spain. Fincanteri in Italy. Bremer Vulcan and ex-Spanish Navy AV-8S Matador (Harrier) and S-70B-7 Blom and Voss in Germany and DCN in France are Seahawks. although other Navy and Army helicopters can amongst the yards that have designs on offer, ranging from be embarked as required. small vessels of some 6-8.(XX) tonnes up lo 2().(XX) or more Complement is 455 wilh an addi(ional 146 personnel tonnes. embarked wi(h the air group. Facilities are also included Most offer a duel capability in both (he aviation and for members of the Thai Royal family. amphibious support roles, operating a mix of helicopters On a limited displacement and budget, the RTN has and VSTOL aircraft, often with a complement of landing managed to acquire the basics of a maritime capability as craft. yet unmatched by any South East Asian Navy. Whilst the The simplicity of VSTOL carriers, compared with the development of organic aviation expertise has been The Thai CHAKRI NARUEBET is a scaled down version of Ihc Spanish The Italian carrier GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI is a ginnl example of a complexities of conventional carriers (steam-powered PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS. It is optimised for disaster relief having large multi-capahic carrier It has its own anti-aircraft missiles. ASW temporarily curtailed by the economic recession which catapults, mirrored landing aids and arrester gear) has accommodation facilities and kitchens. Her inclusion in the INTERFET support torpedoes and anti-ship missiles as well as its air complement of swept the region in 1999. the capability remains to be reduced the cost of construction dramatically. The example fleet would have hecn vers welcomed. She also cmharks Harriers and Harriers and Sea Kings exploited once the economy improves. Once the full range of CHAKRI NARUEBET is illuminating. The RTN ASW helicopters of armament and electronics have been fitted the RTN will acquired her for some SUS303 million, about the cost of a The new ship, tentatively named LUIGI EINAUDI. is possess a formidable regional asset to support whatever single Anzac class frigate. aircraft types, with their attendant separate maintenance, designated as an LHA (General Purpose Amphibious regional strategy il may chtx>se to pursue. At that price the RAN would be able to acquire several spares and training costs. Assault Ship) and will displace some 22.5(H) tonnes. suitable vessels, capable of operating as both a carrier and With ihe eventual retirement of the F-l 11, and (he Propelled by a combination of gas turbines and diesels, (he amphibious asset. Such platforms would allow the RAN to conversion of the two F-l 11 squadrons to the JSF joining new ship will be capable of up to 28 knots. The air group The Future provide a greatly increased level of helicopter support to the current Hornet squadrons. Australia would have five will normally comprise eight AV-8B Harrier II plus aircraft Navies around the world have not lost sight of the the Army in the case of further operations such as those front line JSF squadrons. One of these squadrons could be and 12 EH-101 Merlin helicopters, with multiple benefits that these versatile platforms provide however, the undertaken in East Timor. equipped with the VSTOL variant of ihe JSF for operations helicopter operating spots as well as a ski jump at the bow. costs involved have for many years seemed lo place their In addition, the carriers would provide the centrepiece from a Navy carrier. To belter transport and deliver bulky cargo such as capabilities out of reach of all but the largest and wealthiest of RAN task forces deployed in Australia's area of Thus Navy would provide the platform and rotary wing tanks and artillery a large well deck will be lilted at the nations. responsibility. The enhanced maintenance capability of a element whilst the RAAF couhd provide the fixed wing stern to accommodate up to four landing Craft Mechanical The advent of Ihe new breed of smaller aircraft carrier, carrier would provide additional support for the embarked component. This would answer Navy's needs for air cover (or a single Landing Craft Air Cushion > while four Landing during operations distant from Australia, whilst as epitomised by the vessels described in this article, have Seahawks. Sea Kings and Super Sea Sprites of the task Craft Personnel will hang from davits. The ship is not centralising the maintenance and logistics of the squadron once again opened the way for mid-si/cd Navies to force. intended to transport troops, instead providing heavy under the logical command of the RAAF. contemplate the acquisition of organic air support to Equipped with all three helicopter types, a helicopter equipment lift in support of the Italian Navy's three San The possibility exists for the Navy to regain this maritime and amphibious operations. carrier would provide a powerful centrepiece in anti- Georgio class LPDs. capability wilh the support of both Army and Air Force for For relatively modest cost Nav ies can acquire one of the surface. anti-submarine and amphibious warfare. The LHA will have a substantial self defence capability, the acquisition of a carrier. most versatile maritime platforms available, equally at The vexatious question of which aircraft type to including missiles and guns and will be fitted to provide a A suitable vessel, capable of providing support to home in search and rescue and disaster relief roles as operate from the carrier and by whom could also be solved command capability for an amphibious commander and his amphibious operations, and embarking an air group of amphibious and maritime operations. through some judicious forethought. The Harrier, in its start. Commissioning dale is tentatively set for 2007 and Navy helicopters and Air Force JSF variants, would Several regional Navies are in the market for carriers, various incarnations, is ncaring the end of its details will undoubtedly change before (hen. provide Australia with a force projection asset vital to the development life however, a replacement aircraft is either lo replace existing but aging vessels (India) or to nation. Particularly important if Australia is to be seen as a under development. provide new power projection capabilities (China). Whilst robust defence partner throughout the South East Asian Thailand The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a multinational project Thailand is the first in the South East Asian region to area. involv ing the US and a number of partner nations, w ith the The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) had initially signed a operate these economical and versatile vessels, they will Recent statements from the government and from aim of bringing into service an aircraft to replace a wide contract with Bremer Vulcan in Germany in early 1991. for surely not be the last. within the ADF have spoken of the need for the ADF to be a small aircraft carrier, the countries first. This contract was range of aging aircraft types. The RAN has been without organic fixed wing air able to operate throughout Australia's area of national cancelled mid year and a new contract was let with Ba/an The JSF will be built in three types, a conventional lake support since the demise of MELBOURNE in the 1980 s. interest. The capability to deploy troops, equipment and in Spain, builders of (he PRINCIPE DE ASTURIAS. for a off and landing version for Ihe US Air Force, a carrier The costs of acquiring and operating the next generation of airlift wherever required is a fundamental capability smaller version of (hat ship. compatible version for the US Navy, and a vertical take off conventional carrier aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom was currently lacking in the ADF. The Thai requirement was for a ship capable of and landing version for the US Marines. Royal Air Force simply beyond the resources of the Defence budget, as was The acquisition of a basic aircraft carrier/amphibious operating aircraft for a range of tasks, primarily Exclusive and Royal Navy. ihe cost of acquiring a carrier large enough to operate them. support ship would provide this capability and together Economic Zone surveillance, disaster relief, search and The RAAF's F/A-18 Hornel fleet is due to be replaced The advent of the Harrier appeared to give the RAN a with an embarked complement of fixed wing aircraft, rescue and law enforcement at sea. Secondary tasks are air in the 2010-2012 timeframe with the same aircraft in all way out of the ever-increasing size and cost spiral of would provide Australia with an invaluable capability support for maritime operations and command and control likelihood replacing Ihe F-l 11 in 2020. Obviously the most conventional carrier operations. The offer by the RN to sell for safeguarding Australia's interests throughout the of naval forces. likely contender lo replace the Hornet is the JSF. INVINCIBLE to the RAN seemed an opportunity too good region. Commissioned in March 1997. CHAKRI NARUEBET The aim of the JSF is to achieve maximum possible to be true, unfortunately the put paid to that was completed for a reported SUS303 million, although commonality across all three variants, and it would not be In Part three of our series we examine an innovative, offer. Since then the RAN has seemingly resigned itself to much equipment remains to be fitted. It is believed that the too difficult to envision the RAAF acquiring a mix of indigenous design for a multi-purpose air capable final equipment fit w ill include a Mk-41 eight cell vertical being without the substantial benefits that accrue to a Navy conventional and VSTOL variants of the JSF. This would platform designed hv and for the RAN. The Littoral launch system for (he VL Sea Sparrow an(i-aircraft missile. possessing these versatile assets. avoid the problems of operating two widely dissimilar Suppftrt Ship.

26 VOL 62 NO. 60 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 27 Hatch, Match & Dispatch PRODUCT REVIEW

Battle of the Java Sea them. This non-military stance won over and cost more than 2000 servicemen their lives and the loss of many ships. Odessa Documentaries. 1995 The Australia cruiser PERTH features in the Director: Nick Happen documentary with personal accounts of the battle provided MATCH Length: 1X5 mins by the former crew members. Arthur Bancroft. Bill Bee. James Brown. Max Jagger. Jim Millerick and Norman White. LEEUWIN & MELVILLE Commission Review copy supplied by: Crusader Trading, shop 7 The battle only delayed the Japanese invasion of the For the first time in the history of the RAN two sister ships Cosmopolitan Court. 60-6-1 Wollongong St. Fyshwick Dutch East Indies by a day and was strategically have been commissioned together. ACT 2609 insignificant to the outcome of the war. The battle has also Ph (02) 6239 2332. www.crusaderhooks.cttm.au The historic commissioning ceremony occurred at received little Australian public recognition when Price: $45 Trinity Wharf in Cairns and marked the commencement of compared to Coral Sea or Midway. However, the large Video reviewed by: Mark Schweikert official Navy service for Australia's new hydrographic Dutch involvement and the losses that they took mean it After only two ships were left. PERTH and ships. has great significance to them, hence it being a Dutch HOUSTON, of a force of 14 that had engaged a very large documentary. The two ships. HMAS MELVILLE and LEEUWIN. Japanese task group, the Australian Captain Hec Waller, replace the existing hydrographic ships. HMAS being senior to the American skipper, signalled the The battle and its geographic location is significant MORESBY and FLINDERS heavy cruiser HOUSTON: "Suggest we make for today as it is believed the new Australian "White" paper HMAS MELVILLE and LEEUWIN will provide the Batavia 20kts". To which HOUSTON'S captain replied w ill focus on this part of the world and use the battle as an RAN with one of the most advanced hydrographic "Suggest 3()kts". example of where our defence interests lie. capabilities in the world. Fitted with state-of-the-art The video documentary' Battle of the Java Sea' 'The Battle of the Java Sea' is a very well researched and informative documentary. The only drawback to the technologies, the sister ships are each crewed bv 48 contains many accounts such as this that have not made it movie is that most of it is subtitled in English, being a personnel. into the history books. The documentary is a vast collection of personal first hand accounts and anecdotes of the battle. Dutch film. However, the interviews with crew members In another first for the RAN. personnel have been The footage used to illustrate the documentary is also very from the UK cruiser EXETER, the US cruiser HOUSTON formed into three crews, who will rotate between the two interesting and complements the stories of those and PERTH are in English, with no subtitles, and adds to ships. This new manning system will maximise the ships' interviewed. the perception that each ship's crew had a different operational time, with each ship expected to spend 300 perspective of the battle. Most of the English speaking Former crew members of the 14 ships from The days at sea each year. crews are interviewed towards the end of the documentary Netherlands (including native Indonesians). Australia, the which provides relief from the subtitles as the documentary US and UK give their own accounts of each stage of the is quite long. battle that claimed over 2000 lives. Even Japanese crew members who took part in the battle arc interviewed. The film won the 'Best Documentary' award at the In one account given by a Dutch Seaman, he 1996 Dutch Film Festival and if one is not too put off by remembers one of the crew who. during the heal of battle, reading subtitles then 'The Battle of the Java Sea' is well recommended. The While Ensign is lowered for Ihc last time on the decommissioning had had enough of the fighting and walked off the ship into DlXi HMAS HOBART. I Brian Morrison. Warships and Marine Corps the sea never to be seen again. Another account concerns a Museum Ino US submarine surfacing amongst Dutch survivors in the water after their ship had been sunk. The US submarine In a traditional naval ceremony, the Australian White skipper collected two Americans, posted as signalmen to Ensign was hauled down for the last time before the Dutch before their ship sank, pointed the Dutch HOBART's crew marched oft the ship. The Commanding survivors the way to Surabaya and submerged beneath Officer then presented the ensign to the Maritime them. Commander. Rear Admiral John Lord, signifying the end One crew member from HOUSTON tells of how he Nl SHIP LEEUWIN during sea (rials of HOBART's 35 years' service in the RAN. watched the Dutch ship KORTENAER deliberately put herself in between HOUSTON and a Japanese torpedo. After commissioning in 1965. HOBART conducted KORTENAER had to go around the US cruiser and then numerous tours of duty in the South East Asian and Pacific DISPATCH crash stop to make sure the torpedo hit. As a result the regions. These included three six-month deployments to Dutch ship sank. Even before the battle HOUSTON had HOBART Decommssions Vietnam for operations with the US Seventh Fleet during been given the nickname "The Galloping Ghost of the Java The Commanding Officer. HMAS HOBART. Commander 1967. 1968 and 1969 HOBART was also one of the first Coast" as she had survived so many Japanese attempts to Peter Murray RAN. sent the following message just ships to prov ide relief to the citizens of Darwin after the sink her. after his ship conducted her last speed trial off the NSW devastation caused by Cyclone Tracy in 1975. The personal accounts in the documentary are placed coast; HOBART is the only serving RAN warship to have together in such a way as to tell the story with little to no SUBJ HMAS HOBART FINAL ENTRY TO suffered a missile hit during a conflict. She also holds the narration. SYDNEY HARBOUR record for winning the Gloucester Cup eight times, for The footage used in places of the ships before the battle 1 WITH FOUR BURNING AND TWO TURNING having the best overall efficiency. HOBART is the last is remarkable. It includes early pre-war colour footage of HOBART CONDUCTED HER LAST FULL POWER RAN major surface warship to operate with an all-male Dutch naval manoeuvres in the Java Sea. Others include the arrival of HMS PRINCE OF WALES in Singapore. The TRIAL AND ENTRY INTO SYDNEY HARBOUR. ship's company. SPEED BY FIX WAS 36 KNOTS. SPEED BY GPS 35.8 smoke that a USN 1918 four Stacker destroyer can make The 4720 tonne warship was the second of three Perth has to be seen to be believed and cannot be fully KNOTS class guided missile destroyers built for the RAN in appreciated in a photograph. 2 AGE DID NOT WEARY HER. BUT THE YEARS Michigan. USA. Together with her sister ships BRISBANE The documentary also examines the reasons for the CONDEMNED. WE WILL REMEMBER HER. and the recently decommissioned PERTH. HOBART has battle. How many senior officers wanted the force The Royal Australian Navy's oldest warship, the generally been regarded as one of the RAN's best balanced withdrawn to Australia, whilst some government officials guided missile destroyer HOBART decommissioned at and most capable warships. wanted the force to stay and show the local colonised native Reet Base East in Woollwmooloo on Friday. 12 May. Truly an impressive ship that will be sorely missed. Indonesians that the Dutch were not just there to exploit

VOL. 62 NO 3 THE NAVY THE NAVY vol.. 62 NO 3 31 S I VI KMi:\ r of I'OI.IO

\.H \ I .Will • 'I \u-ll .ill.I

The strategic background to Australia's security has • Advocates the development of a defence industry changed in recent decades and in some respects become supported by strong research and design more uncertain. The League believes ii is essential that organisations capable of constructing all needed Australia develops capability to defend itself, paying types of warships and support vessels and of particular attention to maritime defence. Australia is. of providing systems and sensor integration with geographical necessity, a maritime nation whose prosperity through-life support. strength and safety depend to a great extent on the security As to the RAN. the League: of the surrounding ocean and island areas, and on seaborne • Supports the concept of a Navy capable of effective trade. action off both East and West coasts simultaneously The Navy League: and advocates a gradual build up of the Fleet to • Believes Australia can be defended against attack ensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF. this can by other than a super >.r major maritime power and be achieved against any force which could be that the prime requirement of our defence is an deployed in our general area. evident ability to control the sea and air space • Believes it is essential that the destroyer/frigate around us and to contribute to defending essential force should include ships with the capability to lines of sea and air communication to our allies. meet high level threats. • Supports the ANZUS Treaty and the future • Advocates the development of afloat support reintegration of New Zealand as a lull partner. capability sufficient for two task forces, including • Urges a close relationship with the nearer ASEAN supporting operations in sub-Antarctic waters. countries. PNG and the Island States of the South • Advocates the acquisition at an early date of Pacific. integrated air power in (he fleet to ensure (hat ADF • Advocates a defence capability which is deployment can be fully defended and supported know ledge-based with a prime consideration given from the sea. to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. • Advocates that all Australian warships should be • Believes there must be a significant deterrent equipped with some form of defence against element in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) missiles. capable of powerful re(alia(ion at considerable • Advocates that in any future submarine construction distances from Australia. program all forms of propulsion, including nuclear, • Believes the ADF must have the capability to be examined with a view to selecting the most protect essential shipping at considerable distances advantageous operationally. from Australia, as well as in coastal waters. • Advocates the acquisition of an additional 2 or 3 • Supports the concept of a strong Air Force and Collins class submarines. highly mobile Army, capable of island and jungle • Supports the development of the minc- warfare as well as the defence of Northern Australia. countermeasures force and a modern hydrographic/oceanographic fleet. • Supports the acquisition of AWACS aircraft and the update of RAAF aircraft. • Advocates the retention in a Reserve Fleet of Naval • Advocates the development of amphibious forces to vessels of potential value in defence emergency . ensure the security of our offshore territories and to • Supports the maintenance of a strong Naval enable assistance to be provided by sea as well as by Reserve lo help crew vessels and aircraft in reserve, air to friendly island states in our area. or taken up for service, and for specialised tasks in • Advocates the transfer of responsibility, and time of defence emergency. necessary resources, for Coastal Surveillance to the • Supports the maintenance ot a strong Naval defence force and the development of the capability Reserve Cadet organisation. for patrol and surveillance of the ocean areas all The League: around the Australian coast and island territories, Calls for a bipartisan political approach to national including in the Southern Ocean. defence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-up • Advocates the acquisition of the most modern in our national defence capability including the required armaments and sensors to ensure that the ADF industrial infrastructure. maintains some technological advantages over While recognising current economic problems and forces in our general area. budgetary constraints, believes that, given leadership by • Advocates measures to foster a build-up of successive governments. Australia can defend itself in the Australian-ow ned shipping to ensure the carriage of longer term within acceptable financial, economic and essential cargoes in war. manpower parameters.

vol. 62 no 3 THE NAVY sTh e Magaxine of the Navy League of Australia

"THIS SPOT Vc-.ase: COULD BE photographic, U.V. stabilised t YOURS" matt reproductions are available from the Contact Phone (02) 6785 1749 Peter Jordan Mr Joe Christensen. (03) 9645 0411 8 Kamilaroi Cres. Manilla, NSW, 2346

The Kidd class DDG USS SCOTT leaving Sydney Harbour for the lost time (see flash Traffic section^. The improvements the R/'.N were planning to make to the Kidds. if purchased, would have made them the most powerful and versatile surface combatants in the Southern Hemisphere (Brian Morrison, Worships and Marine Corps Museum Int) HAWS HObfiRT k a/Jig M

ME p— OCTOBER - DECEMBER 2000 $5.45 (including GST) www netspace netau/-navyleag VOLUME 62 NO. 4

The Magazine of the Navy League of Australia Exploding the Myth Maritime Airpower of Surface Ship for Australia, Vulnerability Part 3

ISSN 1322-1.831

Australia's I .cadiit # Xaval Magazine Since 1938

100th ANNIVERSARY NEW SOUTH WALES DIVISION By Geoff Evans. Graham Harris. Sir William Deane. Painm: Mis ExccUency. The (iovenka of New S.«ith Wales Piuidcnl: K < > Albert AM. RFD. RD. Vice Admiral David Shackleton Page 4 Hon. Secirtim: J C J JeppRcn (XVM. RH). GPO Box 1719. Sydney. NSW 1013 Telephone: t(C>9232 2144. Fox: (02(9232 8383. EXPLODING THE MYTH OF SURFACE SHIP VICTORIAN DIVISION VULNERABILITY hrtrun: His Excellency. The Governr 1Vicuna I'resident: J M Wilkins. RFD By Mark Schweikert Page 10 Hon. Secretary: Gavwi Bum. PO Box 13UV Box Hill Vic 312X MARITIME AIRPOWER FOR AUSTRALIA, Telephone: (03)9841 857U Fax: (WiWMI K107 IJIUII QUVSTN o/cnwul cxnau PART 3 THE LITTORAL SUPPORT SHIP Membership Secretary: LCDR Tom Kilhum MBF. VRD By Dr Norman Friedman Page 27 Tefcphimc: 4(131 W27. PO Box 13(13 Box Hill VIC 312X QUEENSLAND DIMSH>N CATCH F-22 Patnm: Ihs Excellency. The Guwratf ot (>ieensland By CMDR Jeff Hubher. USN Page 31 I "resident: I M Fnter. OAM Hun. Secretary: Adrian B.WWK- PO BOX 41)1 R.wiu Street. Bnshune. Qld 4(1)3 Telephone. (07) 33fi3 1319 Stale Branches: Cairns: A Cumineca PO Box 1009. (aims. Qkl 4X71) lelcphonc: (07) 4054 1195 From the Crow's Nest Page 2 lownsvRe: I McDm*aIL PO Box I47K. Townsville. Old 4X10 Page 2 Tekptvme: (07)477245X8 From Our Readers Mackay: K MillwanL POBox 5527. Qld 4741 Hatch. Match and Dispatch Page 16 Tekphm: (07)4942 2965 Flash Traffic Page 21 Bundaberg: I Lnh*. PO Box 5141. Bundahay West. Qld467(1 Telephone: (07)4151 2210. League Policy Statement Page 36 S«i*>0rt:IVR«cK>Bm4MfcSiUh|Mtyid42l5 Tefcplw (07|55322447

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN IHVLSION The opinions or assertions expressed in THE NAM' are those of Patnm: His Excrilencv The Govern* of Sixith Australia President: Alan Previa*. RFD. 15 Sleep* Hill Drive. Panraiiu SA5f Ihe Kditor. Desonport: P O'Leaiy. 11 Tasman Place. IX-\i«ifx«t T» 7310. Tdephime: (03)6424 5064 power of information? Front cover: The Navy League of Australia's crest with Bumie: G DuMv40Chem Street Bume. Tas 7320 Tdef*»«ie (03) 6431 4(C3 I jtunnMon: LL. Shea. 15 Pioen Chief. Rixeisafc. Tas. 7150 the motto 'Keep Watch', reminding its members and WESTERN ACSTRA1JAN DIVISION friends to guard against apathy towards maritime defence. Patnm: His FxueHenex. The Govern* <4 Western Australia ADI is the answer. For military commanders, information is one of the most valuable assets available. Now. (John Wilkins. NLA) I'resident: AH lk-witt JP Hon Secretary : MisCi Hewitt 13 Lawler R.ud. Attalak-. WA 6156 ADI's advanced command support system provides commanders with a highly automated process to harness the The Navy Telephone: (08)9330 3600. All letters and contributions to: State Branches: (ierakhon: I Beckwith. 2 PWchell Street Rangeway. WA 6530 information power necessary to direct strategic, operational and tactical commands. A mass of data is collected, Mark Schweikert Telephone: ((8)9921 376»H)(08)992I I2(I)IBI Editor. THE NAVY Atomy: D Bray. Li< 46 Frederick Street Glcdhow. via Alhuny. WA 6330. Tdephme (08)9841 6542 analysed, displayed, updated and disseminated. ADI's extensive capabilities in electronic systems are features of PO Box 832 FEDERAL ADVISORY COUNCIL I Geoffrey Evans. OBE. VRD. Chatmun projects such as the SI billion minehunter ships contract and ADI's successful bid for the upgrade of the Royal E-mail to: mark(«'teknet.net.au Neil Baini. Chainnan Band PuNicatums Wm Botitho. AM Subscriptions and Membership enquiries to: A W

BUSINESS FROM <)l R RE \I)I RS 1. To confirm the Minutes of the Annual General Meeting held in Canberra on Friday, 12 November. 1999 2. To receive the report of the Federal Council, and to consider matters raised therefrom Dear Sir perimeter by capturing Fiji. Samoa and New Caledonia in 3. To receive the financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2000 I have recently been passed a copy of the briefing for July. They already held the Solomons which they planned 4. To elect Office Bearers for the 2000-2001 year as follows: the Commemoration of the "Battle for Australia" w hich is to use as a springboard for these operations. - Federal President said to honour (he courage, sacrifice and service of Important though the results of Coral Sea were for the - Federal Vice-President Australians who repulsed the Japanese attack on Australia maintenance of transpacific communications they were as - Additional Vice-Presidents (3) in 1942. My attention was draw n to the lack of any mention nothing in comparison to those of Midway which forced Nominations for these positions are to be lodged with the Acting Honorary Secretary prior to the of the operations w hich lead to the capture of Guadalcanal. the Japanese to recognise that America held the initiative commencement of the meeting. Clearly the author did not regard those operations as being and that it was essential that they establish a defence part of the "Battle for Australia". He repeated the myth that perimeter through the Central Pacific to the south west 5. General Business: the Australians at Milne Bay had inflicted the first Within a week of Midway they had cancelled their plans -To deal with any matter notified in writing to the Acting Honorary Secretary by 14 November. 2000 significant defeat on the Japanese. for further expansion and had begun consolidating their - To approve the continuation in office of those members of the Federal Council who have attained 72 years of As the author of "The Shame of Saw" (Allen and position in the Solomons whilst continuing operations in age. namely John Bird (Vic). Joan Cooper (Tas), Arthur Hewitt (WA), Gwen Hewitt (WA).John Jeppesen Unwin Sydney 1994) I can claim to have some knowledge Papua New Guinea, apparently, with the limited aim of (NSW),Tom Kilburn (Vic) and Andrew Robertson (NSW). of the launching of the Japanese attack into the South West capturing Port Moresby . There could have been no thought of providing Ihe carrier support essential for operations Pacific. That attack had begun with Pearl Harbor and ALL MEMBERS ARE WELCOME TO ATTEND proceeded without check until Coral Sea when the further afield such as an invasion of Australia. The Japanese were forced to abandon an assault by sea on Port Americans' reaction to their success at Midway was a little By order of the Federal Council slower but just as dramatic for on June 24th Washington Moresby and proceeded to attack over the Owen Stanleys. Ray Corboy, Acting Honorary Federal Secretary, PO Box 309, Mt Waverley VIC 3149 Coral Sea was however, regarded by the Japanese as only a ordered an assault on Guadalcanal to start on August 1st. temporary check and planning continued to expand their This date was a bit optimistic so thai it was not until August Telephone (03) 9888 1977 Fax (03) 9888 1083

VOL 62 NO 4 THF NAVY THE NAVY VOI. (i2 NO. 4 The Navy League in Australia - The nineteen-sixties were unhappy years for the RAN JOIN THE - it had been a period of accidents including the MELBOURNE / VOYAGER collision and the of 100 Years On AUSTRALIAN a number of midshipmen from the carrier SYDNEY. Many in the Navy League felt more interest should be taken in the SEA CADET naval situation while the Chief of Naval Staff. Sir Victor By Geoffrey Evans Smith, obviously thinking along the same lines, sought the CORPS support of the wider naval community, in particular Ihe It is a mailer lor regret that ihe early history of the Navy latter a misnomer as the cadets are not members of the T.S. BARWON Navy League and the Naval Association. League in Australia is lost in the mists of time hut it is Defence Force. A Navy League was also established in the SPECIAL NUWC So far as the league was concerned one of the known hevond doubt that a branch of Britain's Navy United Stales at the turn of the century, but more about difficulties was lack of knowledge of the RAN's problems, SYLLAiUS OF TRAINING League was formed in Launceston in the year 1900 - on this later. TV nfetm at training coxn i S*U£M - HM. USI ul S. of information that was essential if the League was to be 26th November of that year to be precise - and called the From their inception until World War II the Australian of any real assistance to the Navy. In the event an North Tasmanian Branch. branches of the Navy League took a sporadic interest in understanding was reached between the principals involved The parent Navy League was formed in Britain in 1894 naval defence, members spending most of their time and and the League has been consistently well-briefed by Navy with the commendable object of "urging upon the money on sea cadet training units that had been formed in for more than 25 years. Government and the Electorate the paramount importance Northern Tasmania. Sydney and Melbourne. This situation The Navy League also found that the more deeply it of an adequate Navy as the best guarantee of Peace." Of continued until after the war. became involved in naval affairs and with the integration of concern at the time was the high proportion of foreigners in In 1947 the Branches formed a loose coalition and the three Service Departments into a single Department of British Merchant ships, the crews of which were largely sought naval assistance for the NL Cadets. The Naval Defence, a need to think more broadly and to embrace not interchangeable with those manning Royal Navy ships and Board not surprisingly declined to negotiate w ith a London iM^cmVW r soI* I** »~»mu»M only the role of the Army and Air Force but foreign affairs, formed the Navy's Reserve: It was believed the foreign based organisation and it was not until 1950 that the Navy Tn»w« st>e HANtOS I'nM. IW-h defence policies and not least, the commercial shipping element weakened the Roy al Navy. League of Australia came into being as an autonomous 1—.V kovrt I* K».'l Ml »«>->• '« 1-U. VI J IUK.1 W industry. The seventies and eighties were a stimulating M. »..&.,, »« Lm G~lar«. PW. League Boys Naval Brigade." NL Sea Cadets' and The Naval Defence Act (this was in the days when the concerned about the escalating cost, while Navy League (in Australia) Australian Sea Cadet Corps' and since 1973 Navy. Army and Air Force were separate Departments of had major problems in funding the buildings required for the government sponsored "Naval Reserve Cadets' - the State and had their own rules and regulations) limited the new Units. Moreover the size of Australia and vast distances caused administrative problems. In practice each Division of the Sea Cadet Corps virtually ran itself. In 1966 a small sub-committee of the Sea Cadets Council was formed to advise on the future of the ASCC. There were only 3 members - the Director of Naval reserves who was chairman of the Council, the Federal President of the League (CMDR. John Howse) and the writer as Vice-President. Given the legal limits placed on naval assistance to what was regarded as a private organisation, as well as the financial strain on the Navy League, the sub-committee recommended that the Sea Cadet Corps be made the responsibility of the Navy and brought into line with the Army's school cadets and the Air Training Corps. The recommendation was accepted by the Naval Board and the Federal Council of the Navy League and the League lost its cadet organisation on 1st January 1973. Although giving priority to its Cadet training activities the Federal Council did not neglect the naval scene and supported the RAN's efforts to establish a carrier based fleet air arm. However, while the future of the ASCC was Pan of Ihc training given lo Ihe Sea Cadets, and to today's Naval Cadets, The Queen inspects members of the Australian Sea Cadet contingent at Buckingham Palace in June 1952. The Cadets were attending the 2nd Empire Sea being discussed other more worrying events were taking is Sail Training. Here. Cadets from TS VOYAGER learn to sail on Cadet Training Course. LEl'T Geoff Evans accompanies the Queen with Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton in the background. place. Hobsons Bay in Victoria during the 1950s.

|| 4 VOL. 62 NO. 2 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 A Message of Congratulations from the National Patron of the Navy League of Australia His Excellency, the Governor-General, Sir William Deane

Government House Canberra ACT 2600

In November 1981 the first Navy League of Australia community award m * was won by HMAS PENGUIN. Captain John IX* Costa accepts the award from Federal President Geoff Evans I left I Also in the background Ihc newest Naval Cadet unii in Australia. TS KYBRA from Western is Rear Admiral Andrew Robertson now a Federal \u>traha. exercising their 'Freedom of Entry' to Esperance. Vice-President of Ihe Navy League ' M Leaguo was able to give more attention to maritime affairs including the establishment of sophisticated PR facilities in general and to diversify its membership by including within the Department of Defence and a plethora of representatives of most parts of the maritime community. defence orientated publications, have helped to create The Njluxul Pjinm nl ihc Nj*> A more representative membership enabled the League problems for high quality magazines such as THE NAVY Um^ik- til Australia. Hi. Excellency the to participate actively in many issues involving the which are increasingly costly to produce and distribute. (ititcnMY-Gcncut. Sir William IX-JIK country's maritime wellbeing. from the hotly debated As the Navy League in Australia enters its l(M)th year As Patron-in-Chief of Ihe Navy League of Australia I am delighted to send this message of aircraft carrier debate that continued through the seventies and the 21st century dawns, (he question needs (o be asked until 1984. the decline in Australian flagged merchant will there be a place for a Navy League in a world that congratulations to the League and all its members and supporters as the League enters its 100th shipping: the place of Reserves in increasingly has changed in so many ways in the 2()th century? Or for year of service in Australia. sophisticated navies: regional relationships and other that matter, other maritime-conscious organisations? issues \ital to Australia's future. The writer believes the answer is probably "yes". One This is a time when many changes are taking place, not only in our own (Australian) society In many respects the Navy League of Australia became thing has not changed - the sea and its continuing influence less like ils British Commonwealth counterparts and more on the affairs of nations and communities worldwide. An but in communities worldwide. We need to be reminded on occasion that important things and akin to the influential Navy League of the United Stales organisation dedicated to reminding generations of (N'LUS) which, while supporting a sea cadet organisation, Australians of the vital importance of the sea to their traditions endure. focused its attention on America's naval and maritime needs. wellbeing in both peacetime and war will almost certainly The largest and certainly the most expensive project need to keep on reminding future generations that the sea The Navy League came into existence in Britain in 1884. Its first Australian Branch was undertaken by the League in Australia (it cost over is not simply a place for leisure. founded in Tasmania on 26 November 1900, when a relatively small group of people, realising $200,000 and could not have been completed without the In terms of security, recent events close to Australia aid of a generous benefactor) was an educational video titled have no doubt jolted many Australians who have grown the importance of the sea, the way it was used and its ultimate influence on the well-being and "The Sea anil Australia": A two-and-a-half hour video - complacent about their country's future and suddenly security of their fellow citizens, formed the League to remind their fellows of that importance and six self-contained episodes on a single tape it covers: compelled to realize how close Ihey are to their neighbours Episode I The Voyage of the First Fleet. A Tour of and how different the conditions under which those influence. Sydney Cove and Port Jackson neighbours live - and die. Memories however, tend to be The Exploration and Early Settlement of short and again, the Australian Navy League's task as an As the Navy League enters its 100th year and the 21st century it will continue to remind Australia educational body would seem endless. It is however, for the future generations of Australians of the immense importance of the sea to their wellbeing in both Episode 2 The Nature of the Sea present generation of young Australians to produce leaders Episode 3 The Resources of the Sea to willingly accept the responsibilities involved. peacetime and war and the need to remember that the sea is not simply a place for enjoying Episode 4 Commercial Shipping. Ports and Harbours. one's leisure time. This message is conveyed by supporting youth training organisations such as Episode 5 Navigation and Safety at Sea Episode 6 Protection and Conservation (including a the Sea Cadet Corps and the Naval Reserve Cadets, by promoting public discussion, and short history of (he birth and development of through publications such as The Navy. the RAN) The video was distribu(ed free of charge to over 2.5(X) It gives me great pleasure to commend the activities of the Navy League of Australia and to secondary schools in Australia, happily with the co- operation of six separate Stale educational authorities and congratulate it on its achievements over 100 years. continues to be sought by groups involved with the sea. The most lasting of the Navy League's contributions has been THE NAVY, a maga/inc produced since 1938 and currently a quarterly distributed throughout Australia. For a substantial part of this period THE NAVY provided the RAN with a 'voice' not otherwise available to the 'Silent Service'. While the Navy League can still express naval The most recent recipient of the Navy League of Australia Community Award is the FFG HMAS ADELAIDE. Here. CDRE Mcrv Youl AM. problems (with or without the Navy's prior knowledge) RAN (Rid) presents the award to Ihc ship's crew on behalf of the through THE NAVY, changes in (he defence organisation Federal President of the league. Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia ft VOL. ft2 NO 4 THE NAVY THK NAVY VOI. «2 NO 4 7 Message from the Federal President of the Congratulations to the Navy League of Australia - Navy League of Australia, Mr Graham Harris By Vice Admiral David Shackleton AO, RAN The year 2(HH) sees a number of notable as boys. It is a very worthwhile Navy run. but centenaries. Among them is that of the Navy community based organisation. I believe the League of Australia. Navy League is entitled to be proud of what it On the 25th November I9<)0. the first first started 100 years ago. Australian branch of the Navy League was While the support, maintenance and The Royal Australian Navy is community, of which the founded in Launeeston. Tasmania. This year we administration of the Cadets may have been an organisation that relies Navy League is one of its are to hold our centenary celebrations in that city. the dominant activity of the League until the heav ily on the support of past most important advocates. In The creation of the first Australian branch of 1970s promoting the wider maritime interest serving members and all this regard, the leadership, the League followed shortly after the formation was not neglected. There have been sectors of the community. The dedication and experiential of the Nav y League in Great Britain at the end publications of various sorts since the 1920s. formation of the Navy League knowledge of the Australian The Nuvx Magazine has been produced since of the 19th century. Its objective was said to be in Australia in 19(H). several Navy League will continue to the arousing of interest in the British Navy. No 1938. years prior to the induction of be heavily drawn upon to doubt in 19(H) that was a view shared in In 1970 the League created the Navy The Federal President of the the Royal Australian Navy, support the activities of Australia. We of course also had our various Navy l eague of Australia. League of Australia Perpetual Award- resulted in an immediate Australia's Navy. colonial naval forces and with Federation in Mr (iraham Harris Community Award. It is presented each year nw The League's function of 1901 the need for a Royal Australian Navy was to the ship or establishment which makes the support base from which the to be considered. Indeed defence was one of the important greatest contribution to its local or adopted community. Navy cleverly employed acting as one of the primary factors in Federation. 1900 was a timely birth date of the By this award we wish to recognise and encourage during its early years. The educational bodies concerning League. Navy working with the community, for it is one of the selfless support from the Navy naval and sea power matters is Following the example of the League in Great Britain, best ways of reminding people that they do have a Navy League resulted in Ihe becoming progressively more cadet units were established in Australia. This was seen to and that this wide brown land is in fact just a great big utilisation of the requisite important. The promotion of be an effective way of interesting young people in the island. V/ knowledge and experience Navy's image by the Navy Navy. Freed of the responsibility for the Cadets the League, required to build the edifice League in this respect is also As branches of the League were established so u>o were over the last three decades, had had more resources for upon which the role and w vital to the sustained retention units of the Sea Cadet Corp. Indeed, for the first three what is now undoubtedly the number one objective; to of our personnel. quarters of the League s first century the Cadets were the promote maritime interest and in particular maritime traditions of the Australian principal preoccupation. defence. Navy were formed. Indeed On behalf of the Royal The branches of the League had been originally set up Over this period we have issued press releases, made were it not for the newly Australian Navy. I offer my as branches of the UK Navy League and this situation submissions to Parliamentary committees and when formed Navy League in warmest congratulations to remained until after World War II. You can imagine the requested appeared before them. We have held meetings Australia, the genesis of both the Navy League on its !(H)th organisational and financial effort required by these various, and seminars in various forms. Numerous letters have been the Permanent and Reserve anniversary. The past hundred in those days separate, branches to run their Cadet units. written seeking to promote or argue issues of concern to Naval Forces in Australia years has offered numerous After the Second World War the branches formed a the League. A cross-section of the issues the League has would have been adversely accomplishments to our loose coalition and sought the assistance of Navy. To interested itself in over just the last three or four years delayed. nation, many of which have facilitate dealings w ith Navy the various branches in 1950 includes: arguing for the use of wave piercing been derived from ihe formed the Navy League of Australia. catamarans/more money for Defence; the composition of The Navy of today owes sacrifices made by the The year 2000 is therefore not just the hundredth the Ocean Policy committee; the recognition of particular much to the highly ships crews in Vietnam; the support for Naval Museums distinguished members of our anniversary of our beginnings in Australia. It is also the experienced and influential 50th anniversary of our federation and existence as an and historic buildings; the question of a Coastguard; and. Navy League. The current members of the Navy league independent entity. the ability of the ADF including Navy, to provide adequate serving members of both the earlier last century. However, it The Navy was. by statute, limited in the support it could air defence for deployed ADF units. Permanent and Reserve provide. It provided uniforms, responsibility for training In a sense the last thirty years have been a period of was not until the nineteen- The Chief of Navy. Vice Admiral David Shackleton AO. RAN Forces of the Australian Navy and some training equipment. The Navy League was transition. We have moved from being an organisation sixties that the then Chief of have not forgotten the dedicated contribution of the Navy responsible for everything else. This included primarily concerned with running a community based Naval Staff. Sir Victor Smith, actively sought and League's former and present members. accommodation (drill halls) and administration. youth organisation, the Sea Cadets, to one which has as its embraced the full support of the Navy League during a The Australian Sea Cadet Corp. as it was called, number one objective that of keeping before the Australian time of mixed success. This necessary partnership has The Royal Australian Navy will continue to look prospered. From some 500 just after the war it grew to people that we are a maritime nation and require a strong continued through to the present day where the close and towards the wisdom that is embodied by the Navy 2500 by 1965. As growth continued unabated Navy Navy. mutually beneficial alliance has ensured that the Australian League of Australia. Your services to the Australian Navy became concerned about escalating costs. At the same time It is a quite different task to that which we had in earlier Navy is adequately represented across the broader and indeed Australia as a nation will always be highly the League had major problems funding the buildings decades. The League must seek to target opinion formers community. valued, and will be in great demand as uncertainty and required for new units. The League was also encountering and decision makers. We must be prepared to adapt to administrative difficulties running a growing organisation achieve our aim. Inevitably we will have to give more The Australian Navy has a long and proud history, insecurity dominate our national landscape in the years by now spread throughout Australia. By about 1970 it was attention to media relations, to government and to the attributable to the courageous men and women who have to come. seen to be inevitable that the League and the Cadet Corp parliamentary process. This is some challenge as we will elicited a broad spectrum of both peacetime and wartime would have to separate. On the 1st January. 1973 the Navy be playing on a crowded stage with many very professional successes. Many personnel who have contributed to our assumed responsibility for the Sea Cadet Corp. well-funded organisations seeking their share of attention. past are now members of today's Navy League. The Navy- Although the League no longer has responsibility for Many of these organisations will want money spent on League of Australia, therefore, has the unrivalled their concerns not on the League's. the Navy Reserve Cadets as they are now called, it still distinction of being in the best position to represent our retains an active interest in their welfare. Each year the best I am confident that the League will be able to meet the interests. We are now entering a new era. both as a Navy Cadet Unit in Australia receives the Navy League challenge. Past performance can be a useful guide to future and as a Nation, where dynamic and multifarious forces Efficiency Award. In each State there is a similar award for outcomes. When looking at what the League has achieved each State. Cadet units are also helped financially. over its first 100 years I am sure that my successor in 100 will incessantly impact upon our future successes. In order D. J SHACKLETON. AO There are nowadays over 3000 cadets in 75 community years will also have a good talc to tell. to combat this changc. the Australian Navy will Vice Admiral. RAN based and 8 school units. These days there are girls as well increasingly rely on the support of the Australian Chief of Navy

VOL 62 NO. 4 THF. NAVY THF NAVY VOL 62 NO. 4 "HANDBRAKE" The reason for the high number of failed bombing attacks came from the presence of the ship based anti- Exploding tile Myth of The first, and much quoted, example of surface ship aircraft missile Sea Dart. Knowing Sea Dart's inability to vulnerability concerns the 1982 Argentine Exocet attack engage low flying targets, the Argentineans were forced to on the RN Type 42 destroyer HMS SHEFFIELD. fly at very low level when near the islands and when SHEFFIELD was acting as part of a three-ship radar picket attacking ships to avoid being shot down in Sea Dart's Surface Ship^aerabHity South of Port Stanley when at approximately 15:50hrs on higher-level engagement zone. This flight profile resulted 4 May 1982 the code word HANDBRAKE' flashed across in higher fuel consumption, thus less time over the target, the fleet. This code word denoted the detection of a Super and an atypical weapon employment resulting in failures Etendard's attack radar by one of the ships in the task (bombs were dropped from such low level that they didn't group from which it could be reasonably assumed that an have time to arm). Exocet attack would follow. Thus, the presence of an air warfare destroyer with an The two Argentine Super Etendards were each carrying area air defence weapon, despite its limitations, was crucial an AM-39 Exocet ASCM and approached the group from to the conflict. It should be noted that ships shot down below the picket's radar horizon. The Argentine's made no more aircraft than Harriers alone with most of the Harrier effort to locate the carriers and fired both missiles at the kills the result of vectoring prov ided by the ships. first target that was detected. SHEFFIELD, for fear of The other point to consider was the use of Exocet. being shot down. Seven Exocet were fired during the conflict. Four hit their As luck would have it. at the time of the attack targets. SHEFFIELD. ATLANTIC CONVEYOR (2) and SHEFFIELD was communicating by satellite with Fleet GLAMORGAN (it is also understood that all failed to HQ in the UK. Although it was known that this mode of detonate). SHEFFIELD and ATLANTIC CONVEYOR communication conflicted with electronic warfare systems were abandoned due to uncontrollable fire and smoke. used to defend against Exocet type threats, the requirement GLAMORGAN successfully fought the fire in her of higher command for information tends to take helicopter hanger and later rejoined the battle. Three precedence. As was expected, this created a condition that Exoeets were successfully decoyed/missed, one flew over HM AS NEWC ASTLE at S>Jnc> Heads Once ihe FFCi upgrade has installed ihe new ASMD package. Australia's FFGs will he amongst the world's most rendered the ship deaf and blind. Had SHEFFIELD seen the target's flight deck. defended ships, i Brian Morrison. Warships & Marine Corps Museum Int) the attack, or heard the warning, appropriate action would The Exocet's success rate in the South Atlantic was less have taken place, which in all likelihood would have than expected despite being used against a ship that was By Mark Schweikert prevented the ship from being hit by one of the two ASCMs prevented from defending itself. SHEFFIELD: a merchant (before deploying to the South Atlantic the Task Force ship that couldn't defending itself. ATLANTIC conducted a series of "live fire' work up exercises off CONVEYOR: and a ship that was too close to the launcher Is the modern surface combatant all that vulnerable or are the claims based on misinformation and a failure to Gibraltar. SHEFFIELD proved to be the most proficient to react in time. GLAMORGAN (the ship was conducting understand our maritime environment? Mark Schweikert examines the basis of misguided vulnerability claims and ship in the Task Force). shore bombardment duties off Port Stanley w hen hit by the details some of the advances in ship self defence and the limitations of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). The Exocet that hit SHEFFIELD failed to explode. land based Exocet). However, the resulting fire, fed by ruptured fuel lines and These examples of failed bombing and ASCM attacks The two most quoted examples of the threat posed by journalist, who is not a military expert, does not allow time unspent solid rocket fuel, eventually forced the bear testimony against those who see the Falklands as the ASCMs (Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles) to surface combatants for proper scientific or academic examination. Media abandonment of the ship due to intense smoke. Part of the turning point for surface combatants. Some argue had the remain the Exocet attacks on the UK destroyer reports are designed to simplify the issue for lay audiences reason for the premature abandonment was the shortage of war continued that the RN Task Force would have SHEFFIELD tl982) and the US frigate STARK <1987). and generally lack accuracy (the recent KURSK incident is reliable water pumps and basic fire fighting equipment eventually been sunk. However, the truth is. Argentine But are these 1980s examples against 1970s era warships a good example w ith many journalists reporting conflicting owing to funding cuts imposed before the war by the then aircraft attrition rales were disproportionately higher than British Government. However, despite being hit by an justified in demonstrating what some perpetuate to be the stories and facts). Journalists record incidents combined ihose of the RN's ships. This is besi illustrated by the San Exocet and abandoned to the fire SHEFFIELD did not intrinsic vulnerability of the modern surface combatant? I with sensationalism, not reasons. In this environment Carlos amphibious landings where the RN lost two light sink. frigates. ARDENT (the victim of 17 air attacks) and would say not. as both these ships were prevented from normal susceptibility is portrayed as high vulnerability Five days after the attack the ship was towed to South ANTELOPE, while the Argentine's lost approximately 40 defending themselves and essentially presented co- which is further characterised as defencelessness. Other Georgia for salvaging. Given the absence of crew, power, aircraft. A rather unsustainable effort for the Argentineans operative targets for what could be more accurately issues like survivability, resistance to attack and targeting pumps, the large amount of fire fighting water already described as live fire training exercises. Hardly a scientific are conveniently ignored. test for those serious about examining military capability present in the ship and the hole in its side, water seeped in What is also constantly overlooked is the fact that or history. during a fierce South Atalntic storm causing the ship to ASCMs are not impervious to jamming, confusion, slowly fill with water, capsize and sink. SHEFFIELD and STARK could certainly have malfunction, weather, operator error or destruction. Given So should this count as one of the quintessential defended themselves and were equipped w ith the necessary the very technical nature of ASCMs many journalists avoid examples of intrinsic surface ship vulnerability? A ship that weapons and systems to do so. Although this may seem reporting these issues leading many to believe in the 'silver was prevented from defending itself yet could, was ill- simplistic, ev idence of other warships hav ing successfully bullet' theory (one target, one bomb). The fact is it is easier equipped to handle the fire due to measures beyond her defended themselves from the same type of threat, and in than many believe to defeat the modern ASCM. Further, control and yet did not sink and was sea worthy enough to some cases a far greater threat, tend to support such a the damage caused .by ASCMs is very localised ie. only be salvaged. One would think not. hypothesis. Why SHEFFIELD and STARK were prevented affects one point, not the whole ship. from defending themselves shall be explained later. The current Australian Defence Green Paper tat the At one stage or another the tank was too vulnerable, as Operation Corporate/Rosario was the fighter, the strike aircraft, the submarine, the list time of writing the Paper had not matured to a 'White' The ever-shifting counter-argument used by some to re- goes on. In Australia, at present, the greatest threat to our Paper) makes the claim that surface ships are becoming too invigorate the 'intrinsic vulnerability' claim is the sinking vulnerable yet fails to support these claims with any surface combatant force isn't the proliferation of the of four ships (ARDENT. ANTELOPE. COVENTRY and evidence. The foundations of these claims may stem from newest Russian ASCM. as claimed in the Green Paper and SIR GALAHAD) by conventional bombing. However, the It is not widely known thai an Exocet did not sink SHEFFIELD. Five media reporting of the SHEFFIELD and STARK incidents a local Aerospace magazine, but the stroke of an ill- days after hcing hit SHEFFIELD was towed by HMS YARMOUTH to 18 ships damaged by the same means that did not sink tend South Georgia for salvaging. On route, the ships encountered a large The ubiquitous seven-second grab of the professional informed pen in the upcoming White Paper. to disprove this counter-argument. storm. SHEFFIELD slowly filled with water and capsized.

27 26 VOL 62 NO. 71 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 administration and US military. To the crew of STARK, the Iraqi's were the good-guys' and not to be feared (the enemy of my enemy is my friend). On the night of the attack a patrolling USAF E-3 AEW&Cs (Airborne Early Warning & Control) aircraft detected and tracked an Iraqi F-l Mirage fighter flying a familiar pattern observed on many occasions for attacking merchant ships in the lower half of the Persian Gulf. The AEW&C designated the F-l 'friendly' and gave it the designation TN-2202. This information and radar picture was data linked to STARK who accepted it as posing no danger given its 'friendly' classification. Despite Sea Dart's inability lo engage low flying targets its presence was absolutely vital to the outcome of Ihe Falklands conflict Here a modified The Iraqi F-l was on an anti-shipping mission and Type 42 air warfare destroyer fires a Sea Dart lo port carried two Exocel missiles. When the Iraqi pilot found STARK on his radar he fired, without identifying it. as evidenced by ihe very few aft attacks after the San Obviously, if he had then he would have ignored STARK Carlos battle. and left the area to attack merchant ships, vital to Iran's war A Harpoon missile in its cruise phase. Dcspiic having a range of nearly 12()kms. The real lesson of the Falklands was the fundamental use of the weapon at Ihis range reduces the probability of hii due to w ind, minor effort, as was his mission. navigational errors and the distance ihe ship travels during the missile's flight. advantage of sea control, which has never lost. The When ihe CIC crew on STARK realised what was An AM-39 Exocel fitted lo a Super Entendard. Seven Exocets were fired during Effective ASCM use requires excellent surveillance, locating, identification and Argentine plan for Falklands/Maivinas security was a happening it was too late as TN-2202 had already closed to the Falklands conflict. Only four scored hits with all bul one failing to explode. targeting information to he successful. strategy of denial through ihe employment of air power and such a short range and fired her missiles that any defensive land forces around an island chain (as proposed in the action would have been useless. Of course, had the ROE So does the STARK incident constitute as another JOHN HANCOCK was the mistaken target of an Iraqi current Green Paper). Even though ihe Argentine's had air been written to favour STARK and count the Iraqi's as 'classic example' of surface ship vulnerability? A ship that Exocet attack. Details are scarce but the missile did not hit superiority it was the British thai won the conflict despite hostile the F-l would not have gotten so close. STARK was prevented from defending itself due to the ROE. the the destroyer due to a tugboat which crossed the paih of the being 8.000 miles from home, fighting for more than three- would have either identified herself to the Iraqi long before perception that the Iraqi's were the 'good-guys', as so incoming missile which was hit instead. Effective targeting months. in a conflict ihey had not prepared for. in an area he could fire or shoi him down. To prove the former designated from the USAF AEW&C aircraft, and in an may have avoided the tugboat - assuming the destroyer never envisaged, and against a worthy non-Warsaw Pact scenario, a few days before another US warship, being far area flushed with ASCMs. I would think not. as again. was the target. The point should also be made that law of opponent. The value of sea control, which can only be more cautious than STARK, warned off an Iraqi Excoet STARK was essentially a cooperative target. the sea conventions and UN resolutions will deny the use achieved wilh surface combatants, is something our carrying F-l by using one of its fire control radars to of 'maritime free fire zones' due to civilian maritime traffic defence planners pay little attention loo. as with the case 'illuminate' the aircraft thus identifying its warship status Generic limitations of ASCMs congestion. for the RAN air warfare destroyer. and the fact thai il was ready to shoot. The Iraqi aircraft left During the Tanker War the Iranians set up floating the US warship and attacked a merchant ship elsewhere. The most important requirement for the use of ASCMs decoys and radar reflective barges to fool Iraqi Exocet TN-2202 The STARK incident was more a case of fratricide than the is the necessity for locating, identifying and targeting. armed aircraft. Many of the decoys were fired on more than victim of enemy action due lo intrinsic surface ship Many fail to address this point and see the ASCM's 'fire 20 times as the Iraqi's continually neglected to identify One of the more perplexing ASCM attack examples vulnerability. One can reasonably expect allies not to and forget' status as a 'fait a compli' for the surface ship their targets. centres on the 1987 Iraqi Excoct attack on the US f rigate deliberately try and kill you. The Iraqi's themselves were based on the land experience where the target is usually During the Falklands conflict Admiral Woodwood sent STARK As with SHEFFIELD. STARK did nothing to quite shocked and embarrassed at what occurred. So much static. Dr Eric Grove of the University of Hull's Strategic a rather terse message lo RAF Command as their Nimrod defend herself due to measures beyond her control. so that when a US delegation visited Iraqi to find out what Studies Centre recently said "the vastness of the sea can patrols were not identifying radar contacts. On one Two Exocet missiles hit STARK tin 17 May 1987 in the happened the F-1 pilot was 'missing' and had not been seen provide the bulk of your protection". This is sometimes occasion a group of RN ships was detected on radar and Persian Gulf. One of ihe missiles failed to detonate but since he climbed out of his cockpit the night of the attack. known as the big ocean theory. Or to put it another way. "if reported as trawlers and a container ship an aircraft carrier. ironically caused the most damage due to the fires it started you can't see me you can't hit me". From a land The consequences of getting it wrong in a shooting war are The point should be made that STARK was not only fed by large amounts of unspent rockct fuel. Despite being perspective the sea presents a ridgeline every 20nm. and obvious, not only for ammunition holdings. capable of shooting down the missiles but also the aircraft hit by two Exocets. losing 37 crew as well as the ship's then another 2()nm. and so on due to the curvature of the itself before it fired its Exocet's (had (he ROE been A fortunate example of failed targeting occurred during most experienced damage control officer, she did not sink earth. Consequently, those who claim ships are easy to find rewritten to accommodate such action) - STARK, like the Gulf War. HMAS SYDNEY was on Combat SAR nor was abandoned. Although representative of the and target 'as the ocean is flat' demonstrate a complete SHEFFIELD, had also reached or exceeded Ihe combat (Search And Rescue) duties when fired on by an Iraqi survivability of warships and the localised nature of ASCM ignorance of the sea and its enduring characteristics. performance standards for operational deployment to a war 'Silkworm' ASCM. However, due to poor targeting (a warhead effects does it provide a useful example of surface zone and was fully versed in defending against threats such The case of the Falklands and Gulf should be treated, in common trail it would seem for the Iraqis) the missile hit ship vulnerability? The point should also be made that the as Exocet. the most part, as the exception to the 'big ocean theory'. In an oilrig instead. STARK incident proved that survivability and v ulnerability the Falklands the Task Force was generally tied to one spot The targeting and identification problem also gets far are mutually exclusive terms, a hit docs not mean a kill. due to the air support requirements of the land force and more difficult as the range of the engagement increases. Al the time of the STARK incident the US was engaged the lack of AEW&C aircraft, yet on most occasions the The greater the range the lower probability of a hit due to in 'Operation Ernest Will', more colloquially know as the Argentine's could not find the Task Force. In the Persian the constant moving status of the surface ship, unlike the 'Tanker Wars'. 'Ernest Will' was a result of the Iran-Iraq Gulf, the waters are naturally confined. fixed land target, and navigational errors brought about by war taking on a maritime dimension due to the stalemate in In our region. ASCM targeting is vital. Enemy ships weather and sea state (not to mention operator error). The the land battle. Merchant ships were being attacked to need to be found, identified and then targeted in order to increase in range means that surveillance assets will have affect the other sides oil exports and thus income which avoid hitting non-combatants such as trawlers, sampans, to close to identify the ship and remain in contact for was being used to finance the war. With the world's oil pleasure craft, merchant ships, allies, man made structures follow up attack platforms. If closing on an air warfare supply at risk the US and UK began escorting and (oil rigs) or natural structures such as rocky outcrops or destroyer for identification purposes an airborne protecting tankers through the trouble zone. islands, which litter our archipelagic environment. This surveillance asset will more than likely have to close to Immediately the US painted the Iranians as the 'bad- identification requirement is vital as ASCMs like Harpoon within the destroyer's SAM envelope, wilh inevitable guys'. The US attitude was a result of the Iranian storming and SS-N-27 cannot tell the difference between these results for the aircraft (proven time and again in naval of the US Embassy in Tehran and the subsequent hostage structures and the intended target. An example to prove the exercises such as RIMPAC). Aircraft will also have to close drama still present in the memories of the Reagan Tlie most puzzling ASCM allack was thai on the USS STARK in the Persian point occurred on 21 January 1985 (two years before the the range if radar jamming or non-combatants are present Gulf during 1987. Two Exocets hit STARK. One of Ihc warheads exploded, the STARK incident). The Spruance class destroyer USS in the vicinity of the target in order to fix their position. other started a massive fire. Dcspiic ihe hits. STARK did not sink. 27 26 VOL 62 NO. 72 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 and a layered defence against ASCMs. For example, soft missiles and a 2.4001b laser guided bomb the ship did not kill can be used to lure, through chaff or Nulka. an ASCM sink. This didn't stop the anti-ship lobby from claiming the to a particular sector where a hard kill measure has greater exercise to be "classic text book stuff". For Australia's effectiveness. Hard kill can aid soft kill as near misses with maritime security sake I hope they're not serious, let alone proximity rounds or missiles can damage the ASCM's listened Ux> as sinking enemy warships may be necessary seeker thus enabling soft kill measures to be more for our future security. Believ ing it is easy will produce effective. Soft kill effectiveness also saves the ship hard kill force structure weaknesses. ammunition. No western warship has been hit by an ASCM since New command and decision support computer aids for 1987. over a decade ago. despite at least four other known ship's defence also take into account wind, ship speed and attempts. No Western warship can be said to have sunk as direction and prov ide advice on the best course and speed a direct result of an ASCM hit alone, even the target hulks. with the best ASMD measure lo protect the ship relative to Australia's warships will be. shortly, the most defended ships in the world against ASCM so why do we need It) HMAS SYDNEY in Ihe Persian Gull during ihe Gull War. Any future conflicts the ASCM. Systems such as this rank the relative thai Ihe RAN is engaged in will probably see the return of Ihe DSTO s RAM Despite being hit by three Hellfire missiles, three Harpoons and a 2.4001b LGB defend the reputation of the surface ship and reiterate the effectiveness of each ASMD measure and advise what, panels 11K- reduced RCS of SYDNEY with RAM was described as significant". ihe RIMPAC target ship, ihe former DDG USS BUCANNON. remained afloat. value of sea control to an island nation's strategic thinkers? This measure enhances counlcrmeasure effectiveness and makes the ship harder when and were to use the measure, either sequentially or Special scuttling charges had to be placed by hand lo eventually sink her. Anti- Perhaps they should think a little harder. In detect, locate, identify and targcl. (USN) concurrently. They also prov ide advice to avoid confliction ship proponents call ihcsc attacks on the targei hulk as "classic text book stuff '. What they fail lo realise is thai the ship was in a known position, didn't defend Whilst this article is long it has only touched on some between systems such as the example of SHEFFIELD itself, wasn't moving and had no damage control crew. (USN) of the many issues relating lo ASCM use and ASMD. ASCMs also have other limitations which do not using her satellite communications equipment. A chaff Issues such as survivability, ship strategic and tactical receive much attention. Sea slate alYects the height at cloud fired from a ship inadvertently coming in between an enable the operations room to predesignate ASCM targets manoeuvre and ASMD tactics against specific threats are which the sea skimming ASCM can fly and thus its ASCM and the ship's lire control radar could be disastrous via radar and electro-optical sensors thus reducing the loo long and detailed to go into in one article. But perhaps detectability. Sea state can also prevent ASCMs from being as the chaff cloud would mask the target. Phalanx's automatic reaction time of three seconds, vital the last word should go to the RN Type 42 air warfare fired, usually sea state 5-6 for most missiles, as Some of the soft kill measures that are employed today against a supersonic ASCM which only gives you 30 destroyer HMS GLOUCESTER. During the 1990-91 Gulf mountainous seas can hide a ship. include systems that confuse, jam and seduce the seeker of seconds to react. War she was acting as goalkeeper to the US battleship Weather can play a part, strong crosswinds can prevent the ASCM through the use of chaff. IR flares, onboard The ESSM will be more than a match for all ASCMs on MOUSOURI whilst it pounded Iraqi positions in Kuwait. launch and blow the missile off target. Rain can also electronic jammers, off board systems such as the the market today, including the Russian sca-skimming SS- A Silkworm ASCM was fired at the battleship but was shot degrade the seeker heads ability to search for a target. Australian hovering rocket Nulka or inflatable radar N-22 and 27 variants as used by China and India down, very calmly, by the RN destroyer. Perhaps this is the One of the big problems with ASCM use. particularly reflective decoys. Raytheon is in the process of designing a respectively. real turning point. in poorer countries, is operator proficiency. The old Phalanx armed with a low energy laser to confuse, blind The Anzac package has yet to be decided but what has computer adage of 'garbage in. garbage out' is particularly and or destroy passive IR seeker heads in some ASCMs already been approved is ESSM. Nulka and a second fire appropriate for ASCM use. Operator error can be such as Penguin. control channel. Other improvements currently on the reasonably blamed for a land based Exocet passing over Some of the more common hard kill weapons include drawing board include a second type of ASMD missile, Ihe flight deck of Ihe RN Type 21 frigate HMS AVENGER the 20mm Phalanx gun CIWS (Close In Weapon System), long-range chaff launchers and more VLS cells to during the Falklands conflict without hitting or detonating the 30mm Goalkeeper. RAM (Rolling Airframe Missile). accommodate more ESSM. its proximity fuse. During Ihe Tanker war of 1988 an Sea Sparrow. Sea Wolf and some Standard SM-2 variants. Iranian Harpoon missile fired at the cruiser USS The new Raytheon ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile), WAINWRIGHT was fired with the wrong data which to be first fitted into an Australian warship, will be the Conclusion negated the missile finding the ship despite passing world's leading hard kill ASMD weapon. Four missiles fit harmlessly by her port side. 'Smart Weapons' cannot Of course nothing is invulnerable, nothing. The claims into one VLS (Vertical Launch System) cell giving the overcome the burden of 'dumb Operators' and hype created by uninformed commentators present a FFGs and Anzacs 32 ready to use missiles. The ESSM is disproportionate argument with real dangers - particularly As seen money needs to be spent not only on war stocks designed to allow one fire control radar to control three if the public and strategists are swayed by them, as seems of ASCMs but more importantly on training stocks. Not ESSMs in flight simultaneously. The missile has a greater to be the case in Australia. Ship vulnerability claims also many countries in our region can afford the vast stocks of range than its predecessor, the Sea Sparrow currently in use attack the very foundation of Australia's security, sea ASCMs needed to 'swamp' the defences of our ships in on the An/acs. as well as being quicker to react, faster, control. Cold War Soviet style raids. At best. ASCM use will more accurate and more manoeuv rable. Each ESSM can be closely follow the Argentine example of occasional hit and The makers tjf the Harpoon ASCM claim the missile to expected to have a Probability of Kill (Pk) in the order of run perimeter sniping due to their multi-million dollar price have a success rate of 93%. What they don't reveal is that .80 against a supersonic ASCM. With three being able to be tag. Militaries around the world are being squeezed for the figure is derived from target practice shots against money and have many competing and more important controlled simultaneously from each fire control radar, a unarmed, un-manned, stationary, known hulks. acquisition programs to fund than stockpiling ASCMs. ship with two such radars can be expected to engage at Historically. ASCM success rates are significantly lower least four supersonic ASCMs simultaneously in the hard than manufactures claims. Of all the examples mentioned kill mode alone. When coupled with soft kill the figure in this article the ASCM has only been approximately 37% ASMD would be much higher. accurate (actually hitting its target) and approximately 18% effective (contributing to a chain of events that led to loss). Hard and Soft Kill Of the 135 merchant ships hit by Exocet during the Tanker Not much attention is given to the symbiotic RAN ASMD Upgrades War only 14 sunk. relationship between hard and soft kill defensive systems The RAN is adopting a number of ASMD upgrade An example of the naivety of the anti-ship lobby on warships. The term hard kill relates to the actual measures on its FFGs and Anzacs which will make them concerns their reaction to the recent live fire exercise destruction of the ASCM while soft kill aims to prevent it amongst the world's most defended ships. conducted during RIMPAC 2000. An old Charles F. Adams from achieving its makers intent through manipulation of Briefly, the package for the FFGs includes: ESSM. class DDG was put out on the sea range and used for target the missile's seeker. When used in isolation, as was the Nulka and long range chaff launchers for confusion and practice. This was a target with no crew, no Captain, no case in the early days, each measure produced mixed seduction chaff and IR decoys. The ships new Phalanx weapons, no power, by itself and in a known stationary results and ultimately had limitations. However today, hard Block 1A has greater range, ammunition capacity and position without any civilian or friendly units in the and soft kill ASMD measures are coordinated to mutually vicinity. And yet. despite being one of the easiest targets to An ESSM being fired. The ESSM represents the best hard-kill measure against accuracy compared to earlier Phalanx models. The Block (he new. and proliferating. Russian ASCMs. Tlte missile is being installed on the enhance each other thus providing greater effectiveness 1A is incorporated into the ship's electronic architecture to sink and absorbing three Hellfire and three Harpoon FFGs and An/acs. (Raytheon) 73 || VOL. 62 NO. 2 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 Hatch, Match & Dispatch

HATCH The growth in Australia's GDP resulting from the FORGACS PARRAMATTA launched project is already sufficient to cover the cost of The seventh ANZAC class ship built by Tenix Defence constructing the Darwin-Alice Springs rail link. for DEFENCE Systems has been launched at Williamstown. Victoria. Tenix Defence Systems is building 10 ANZAC class The ship. PARRAMATTA. was launched by Mrs Jill ships eight for Australia and two for New Zealand. for AUSTRALIA Green. The name honours the three previous PARRAMATTAs that have served with distinction in the MATCH RAN. 1 Mrs Green is the daughter of LEUT George Langford. WEEWAK Returns Ship Repair ' Ship Building RAN (Mention In Despatches, deceased). LEUT Langford The LCH WEEWAK has returned lo (he fleet after a 1 1 was one of (he officers killed while serving in period of 15 years in reserve. Her return to service comes Engineering Design PARRAMATTA II when she was torpedoed and sank in as a result of (he Timor and Bougainville operations A 1 1 1941. He had never seen his daughter. placing a strain on the availability of other ships of the In-Service Support Training class. WEEWAK started life in the RAN in 1972 and was laid up in reserve in 1985 as an economy measure. V • Corporate Office: The Australian built LCHs can carry a varied load: Dtniua Strut CMMNGTON. NSW AUSTRALIA 2294 either three Leopard tanks: 23 quarter tonne trucks; four PImm: + II 241122111 Fai: -I- II 241122141 LARC Vs or 13 M-l 13 APCs. Armament consists of two www.forgact.com.au .50 cal machine guns Email: [email protected] WEEWAK's return to service gives the RAN six functioning and operating LCHs. Accreditations ISO 9001 LRS NORMAN Commissions CSSR DEF AUST 5658 The Huon class Mine Hunter. NORMAN, has commissioned into (he RAN. HMAS NORMAN joins her sister ships HUON and HAWKESBURY with the final three ships. GASCOYNE. DIAMATINA and YARRA yet to join the Heel.

The recently launched PARRAMATTA with the Melbourne skyline in Ihc distance. (Tcnix)

Tenix Managing Director. Mr Paul Salteri. said "The ANZAC Ship Project has had a deep-seated impact on Australian industry. Through participation in the project A U Stredtrt lis Australian companies have become more innovative: improved business practices: increased export opportunities: and acquired new defence capabilities. expuilmtj sontii "One in five Australian businesses involved in the ANZAC Ship Project has obtained new technology as a result and ANZAC Ship Project companies are two to three to the wufki times more likely than others to implement best-practice business and management techniques." Mr Salteri said. More than 13(H) Australian and New Zealand companies are supplying products and services to the SAUS6 billion project. A study commissioned by the Australian Industry Group found that by constructing the ANZAC frigates in Australia, instead of purchasing overseas. Australia is generating: • $200m-$500m in additional annual GDP (growing GDP by at least 53b over the 15-year construction phase). • $l47m-S3(K)m in additional annual consumption (growing consumption by at least $2.2b over the same THOMSON MARCONI period). NORMAN was delivered on time and on budget by ADI from its Newcastle facility. NORMAN is seen here during her commissioning • Around 7.850 fulltime equivalent jobs. ceremony at HMAS WATERHEN in Sydney. (Brian Morrison. Warships www.pty.tms-sonar.com • Sav ings of about $520m in through life support. and Marine Corps Museum Int)

16 THE NAVY VOL 62 NO 4 17 f RIMPAC 2000

(ABPH Damian Pawlenko) The -.hip of RIMPAC 21*10 during a group formation

The very capable South Korean destroyer EUUIMUNDOK entering Pearl The Japanese helicopter carry ing destroyer Kl'RAMA at the entrance lo Pearl Harbor (Brian Morrison, warships and Marine Corps Museum Inn Harbor. (Brian Morrison, warships and Marine Corps Museum Int)

The Seaking from HMAS SUCCESS (lying over HMAS NEWCASTLE. HMAS WALLER entering Pearl Harbor for the fin.1 lime. HMA Ships ADELAIDE lleft>. SUCCESS (middle). NEWCASTLE (right). HMAS ARUNTA with USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN in the background (ABPH Damian Pawlenko) (ABPH Damian Pawlenko) DCBBO (back left). ARUNTA (hack middle! and GLADSTONE (back right tin (ABPH Damian Puwlenko) formation on the way lo RIMPAC (ABPH Damian Pawlenkoi

VOL. 62 NO. 4 IM VOL. 62 NO 4 THE NAVY Flash Traffic RAN Fixed Wing era Subject to successful negotiations. With the exception of a hole in the Raytheon will commence a phase-in forward hatch. Ihe HUNLEY was comes to an end of operations in early 2001. with full found intact. It is believed the submarine was quickly covered and The last two RAN fixed-wing aircraft, service delivery by mid-2001. filled with sediment. "In many ways a pair of HS 748s. have been From Navy News this is like recovering a bottle - withdrawn from service. The planes everything is contained inside the had been on the job for 27 years. Historic submarine submarine". Neyland said. In Attached to 723 Squadron, the HUNLEY raised mid-May. a team of experts working aircraft were built in the UK and H.L. HUNLEY. a submersible known in zero visibility began work to raise accepted into the RAN in 1973. They as the 'South's secret weapon', had HUNLEY from the sea bottom, were bought to replace the venerable just turned for shore after sinking where it laid completely buried Dakota. the Union blockader USS under thrce-to-four feet of sand The planes were initially used for HOUSATONIC one chilly February and shells. navigation training and transport duties. night in 1864. when it vanished in When the recovery, excavation, and In 1980/81 they were modified to Charleston Harbor. South Carolina, conservation of HUNLEY are provide electronic warfare (EW) with all hands. complete. HUNLEY will be on training for the Australian fleet. display al South Carolina's As the only EW platform of its Charleston Museum in a new wing type in the south east Asia region the built especially for the vessel and its HS 748s took part in most fleet work- associated artefacts. ups and in domestic and international exercises. They also provided logistic Admiral Zumwalt support to ADF personnel and were class DD-21 awarded the Navy League of Australia Plaque for aid to the The President of the United States has civilian community following announced that the Navy will honour Cyclone Tracy. Admiral Elmo R. Bud' Zumwalt Jr.. Two years ago one of the aircraft by naming its 21st century Land shuttled between Nowra and Attack Destroyer (DD 21) after him. Zumwalt. who became the youngest Merimbula supplying helicopters HUNLEY suspended in a hoisting frame after being man ever to serve as chief of Naval involved in the Sydney to Hobart raised from the bottom of Charleston Harbor Operations (CNO) in 1970. passed yacht rescues with spares, stores and away in Durham. North Carolina on maintainers. The fate of the first submarine to Jan. 2. 2000. Appropriately, this class Their departure closed the final sink an enemy vessel in combat and of 32 future warships will embody chapter of fixed wing operations in her nine young volunteer crewmen Zumwalt's visionary' leadership and the RAN. remained a mystery for nearly 135 well-known reputation as a Navy Navy is negotiating with years, until a team led by the Naval reformer. Entering the fleet at the end Raytheon Systems Company Historical Center (NHC) in of this decade. USS ZUMWALT will Australia for the provision of Washington. D.C.. provided some usher in the Navy's newest class of Electronic Warfare (EW) Training answers. Doctor Robert Neyland. destroyers. These revolutionary Services to enhance the operational NHC's chief underwater effectiveness of Navy tleet units. archaeologist and HUNLEY project Five commercial offers were director, called the revolutionary evaluated for the $60m contract vessel "a national treasure" which will extend over 10 years. The comparable to the Wright brothers' decision. under the Defence aircraft. "It is the very first successful Commercial Support program, is military submarine", he said. "Not expected to provide an updated EW until World War 1 would another training capability appropriate to submarine sink an enemy ship". contemporary EW technology on a Novelist and adventurer cost-effective basis. and divers from his non-profit Rathcon will be required to National Underwater and Marine provide, on a privately financed basis, Agency found HUNLEY in 1995. A the platform, equipment and all team led by the National Park Service resources needed to deliver the full Submerged Cultural Resources Unit training services around Australia surveyed the wreck in 1996 to

and. if required, to units deployed in determine if the submarine could be A computer generated image of the new the South East Asia region recovered. DD-21 Zumwalt class destroyer

76 || VOL. 62 NO. 2 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 DDGs. The first three will be built warships are being designed to meet capability against high value, fixed "HOBART was the second of components and blocks can be and has 40^ greater range than the by BAE SYSTEMS and Vosper post-cold war requirements using 21st land targets, ships at sea or in port, and three guided missile destroyers competed for by companies current Hornet. It also has two extra Thornycroft. century naval warfare concepts. The at standoff ranges greater than 150 acquired for the Navy and has served throughout the UK with the weapons pylons and stealthing. Zumwalt class will incorporate nautical miles High survivability and Australia with pride and distinction", Twelve Type 45 DDGs are appropriate experience and facilities. The Super Hornet has some big several advanced technologies and lethality are assured by SLAM-ER's said Mr Moore. planned with the first ship entering BAE SYSTEMS says this strategy shoes to fill as it is replacing the introduce a number of design features adaptive terrain following, passive The ship has been towed from service around 2007 and the last in will also mean that the ships should Tomcat. F/A-I8C/D and the A-6 to a to improve the DD 21 sailor's quality seeker, precise aimpoint control, and Sydney to South Australia i.nd will be 2014. Total cost of the project be substantially more cost effective lesser extent. of life. Armed with an array of land improved penetrating warhead. scuttled off the Fleurieu Peninsula, including weapons systems is than previous classes. All of this comes amid the attack weapons. USS ZUMWALT south-east of Adelaide to form the estimated to be £6 billion. The MoD The Type 45 destroyer will announcement that the price for the will be capable of delivering an HOBART Gifted to nucleus of an artificial . will negotiate a £1 billion order for introduce Integrated Electric F-22 Raptor (see article in this unprecedented level of offensive Currently, weapons and fittings are the construction of the first three Propulsion into the RN for the first edition) has risen yet again. The US firepower from the sea. It will also be South Australia being removed lor use on other Navy ships of the class with prime time. Benefits include a reduction in DoD believe that 339 F-22s will cost contractor BAE SYSTEMS later the first U.S. Navy ship to be powered The Minister for Defence. John ships with HOBART also undergoing costs through-life because of lower the US Taxpayer $US48.6 billion. and propelled by a fully integrated Moore, has announced that the guided an extensive clean-up operation to Many in the US believe that if the power system, including modern missile destroyer HOBART. has been remove oil and other pollutants. expensive project goes ahead that only electric drive. The cruiser-sized 100 to 200 aircraft will be purchased. Zumwalt will be manned by a crew approaching one hundred and will 27 feature new habitability standards and AIEWS passes US shipboard amenities. including Navy CDR staterooms for the entire ship's company. The AN/SLY-2(V) Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System (AIEWS) has passed its US Navy SLAM-ER reports Critical Design Review (CDR). for duty The successful CDR was the final BAE systems concept fo« the Type 45 'Daring' class destroyer. design review on the technical The USN recently announced that the progress of the shipboard electronic Stand off Land Attack Missile - this year. The programme is expected maintenance and fuel consumption warfare system that will be widely Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) has to provide up to 5.500 jobs in costs. The propulsion system gives deployed on all Navy ships for at least entered into full production and has BAE SYSTEMS Marine and greater flexibility to ship's electrical the next 20 years. reported for duty' in the fleet. Rear Vosper Thornycroft shipyards and distribution systems allowing for The first low-rate initial Adm. John B. Nathman. director of With most of her equipment removed. HOBART leaves Sydney for the last time to he turned into a in other defence industries around considerable growth in demand production system for installation on Air Warfare, spoke at a joint dive wreck. (Brian Morrison. Warships & Marine Corps Museum Inl) the UK. through life. the Arleigh Burke class DDG-91 will Navy/Industry event at the Pentagon gifted to the South Australian The delay in replacing the Type occur in 2003. to mark the occasion. "Precision RNZN Seasprite first Government for use as a recreational 42s is a direct result of the efforts to "Because the Navy's baltlespace engagement is much more than going diving attraction. flight design a 'joint' anti-air destroyer with is increasingly expected to be a some where and blowing things up. USN places Super "This is the first time the Federal France and Italy - Known as Project littoral, or coastal, environment Accuracy and the ability to plan and The first of the RNZN's new SH-2G Hornet Order Government has made a gift of this Horizon - which was cancelled last instead of deep water, it needs a determine where and how to control Super Seasprite naval helicopters type to South Australia. There has year. However, the main combat Confident in the performance of the system capable of dealing with the the effects of that engagement is key. successfully underwent its first flight been great interest in obtaining system of the Horizon project, the new Super Hornet the USN has dense electromagnetic environment SLAM-ER is a true stand out of an during the afternoon of 2 August. HOBART and this decision has the Principal Anti Air Missile System placed and order for 222 F/A-I8E/F area defence weapon. Combined with The aircraft. NZ 3601. will undertake typical of the littorals", said Dr. Peter potential to provide a real boost to the (PAAMS) is still being developed tri- Super Hornets valued at SUS9 Super Hornet, the potential is a complex flight test program which Costello, director, ship electronic local tourism industry". Mr Moore nationaliy and will be used on the Billion. The first squadron will tremendous", said Nathman. SLAM- will culminate in weapons proving warfare systems". AN/SLY-2 is an said. Type 45s. deploy aboard the US carrier ER provides a surgical strike trials in Arizona later this year. It will EW system that provides situational The Type 45 will be known as the ABRAHAM LINCOLN in June 2002. "The hulk of former destroyer- be joined in the program by the next awareness, counter targeting and anti- D' Class and the first two ships of the escort SWAN, which was given to the three aircraft in the initial New The Super Hornet is claimed to ship missile defence. It has. for class are to bear the names HMS Western Australian Government in Zealand production contract. provide twice the number of sorties example, radar-quality angular 1997. has been dived on by an DARING and DAUNTLESS. The A fifth Seasprite is also to be resolution markedly better than what estimated 14.000 Australian and third ship in this batch will be named built, but its delivery is not due the Navy has ever had available overseas divers, and I am advised that later. until 2002. before". this has contributed an additional $5.2 An order for the construction of Lockheed Martin Naval million in earnings to Western the second batch of ships is expected Electronics & Surveillance Systems Australia". to be placed with the prime contractor (NE&SS) in Syracuse is responsible Return of the Daring around 2004. HOBART saw 35 years' service in for leading the AN/SLY-2 team which the RAN. having been commissioned class, the T^pe 45 The build strategy being adopted includes Litton Advanced Systems on the 18th December 1965. She is based on the latest developments in and Sensytech. The team is DDG advanced outfitting and modular completed three tours of duty with US developing the AN/SLY-2 construction techniques. This will forces during the Vietnam War. The UK Government is proceeding engineering development model mean that, while the ships themselves coming under fire while serving as with the construction of the Type 45 (EDM) high-resolution antenna a unit of the US Navy's Seventh will be assembled in the prime destroyer. The Type 45 will The Super Hornet will become the USN's main strike arrays, receivers, pulse-sorting defence shipyards, some of the major A test shot SLAM-ER in flight. (Boeing) Fleet. replace the now ageing 11 Type 42 fighter until the arrival of ihe JSF. (Boeing) hardware and complex processing

26 VOL 62 NO. 23 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 software. In a parallel contract. DSR Coastwatch get Singapore Sawari II frigate developed jointly by Thomson-CSF The submarine. LE TERRIBLE, is is developing control and processing and DCN. is based on the French expected to enter service in 2008. software as well as the displays as an new surveillance commissions launched Navy's La Fayette class system. The France already has LE TRIOMPHANT as six-i ate contractor to the Navy, with aircraft submarine The first of the SAWARI II frigates frigates will also be equipped with the and LE TEMERAIRE in service with Lockheed Martin having overall ordered by Saudi Arabia, the AL Aster air defence system currently VIGILANT expected to be ready by system integration responsibility. Bombardier Aerospace has delivered The Singaporean Deputy Prime RYADH has been launched from the used on the French aircraft carrier 2004. two Q200 Series turboprop to Minister and Minister for Defence. Dr DCN-Lorient shipyard. CHARLES DE GAULLE. The first antenna array prototype The Triomphant class is replacing Surveillance Australia, who will Tony Tan. has officiated at the has already started testing at the L'Inflexible M4 class SSBNs and operate the aircraft on the commissioning ceremony of the Chesapeake Beach as pan of are built at DCN's Cherbourg COASTWATCH programme on Republic of Singapore Navy's (RSN) shipyard. The first submarine. LE the AlEWS' programme's risk behalf of the Australian Customs submarine. RSS CONQUEROR, at TRIOMPHANT. entered service in management. It is expected that the Service. Tuas Naval Base. 1997. The second. LE TEMERAIRE. prototype soon will be used in at-sea RSS CONQUEROR will enhance entered service in 1999 with the tests to validate the performance of The two Q2(XK were ordered in the RSN's capability to safeguard third. VIGILANT, still under the AN/SLY-2 system. September 1999 by Surveillance Singapore's maritime interests and Australia of Adelaide, a wholly construction. approaches. owned division of National Jet Each submarine carries 16 The submarine was launched in Production of SAN Systems Pty. Ltd. vertically launched M45 SLBM May 99 at the Kockums shipyard in (Submarine Launched Ballistic The aircraft has had long-range ANTONIO LPD 17 to Karlskrona. Sweden. She is the first of Missiles), supplied by Aerospatiale. inner wing fuel tanks installed on the the four RSN submarines to arrive in Each missile carries six Multiple begin production line. Other specialised Singapore. Prior to her return in May Re-entry Vehicles (MRVs). each of equipment includes large observation Litton Avondale Industries has this year. RSS CONQUEROR went 150 kT. The range is estimated to be window inserts in each of the mid- received approval by the USN to through a refurbishment programme approximately 6.000 km. The new fuselage emergency exits, a Raytheon begin production of the lead ship in in Sweden. In Singapore, she has enhanced M5I missile, due to enter SV-1022 search radar in a belly the USN's new SAN ANTONIO gone through a series of stringent sea service in 2008. will carry a warhead radome. a Wescam 16DS turret (LPD-17) Class of amphibious trials to verify the performance of the with 12 MRVs. and an increased assault ships. containing Forward Looking Infra submarine systems in local conditions. range to approximately 8.000 km. Red (FLIR) and a daytime television The LPD-17 Amphibious The submarines were put through The submarine's sub-surface to camera. The sensors are controlled Transport Dock Ships will replace the a tropicalisation programme to adapt surface missile is the Exocet SM-39 from one cabin console, and are LPD-4. LSD-36. LKA-113. and LST- it to operations in tropical waters. supplied by Aerospatiale. It has four integrated with the aircraft's 1179 classes of Amphibious ships. Warm tropical waters ar* more 533 mm torpedo tubes and has the navigation system to provide time The LPD-17 ship's mission is to conducive for active marine growth capacity to carry a mixed load of 18 and position data, while imagery is The Royal Saudi Navy's new Sawari I! frigale is launched from France's DCN. (DCN) embark, transport, and land a landing on the submarine surface. The high ECAN L5 Mod 3 torpedoes and recorded for later use. The other force in an assault by helicopters, salinity of tropical waters also Exocet missiles. console controls a comprehensive makes the pipes and valves of the landing craft, and amphibious The Sawari II contract, signed by The DR 3000U electronic support electronics suite that will allow submarine susceptible to corrosion. Fourth lYiomphant vehicles. It will be capable of France and Saudi Arabia in 1994. system supplied by Thomson-CSF is communications with ships at Battery cooling is also a concern and embarking the LCAC hovercraft added three more ships to the class SSBN to be a radar warning receiver operating in sea and Defence and Customs can affect discharge and recharge rates. and the MV-22 Osprey Tilt-rotor original Sawari I contract for four built D to K bands. The system uses a aircraft. resources. The tropicalisation programme ASW frigates. The three Sawari II masthead antenna array with addresses these problems and also multipurpose stealth frigates, Start of production of the LPD-17 The two new aircraft will join France is to build a 4th SSBN omnidirectional and monopulse increased crew comfort. It entails: designed and built by DCN. the (nuclear powered ballistic missile lead ship follows a 36-month period three Dash 8 Series 200 aircraft that directional antennas and a separate • Changing the steel pipes and French naval shipbuilder, are submarine). periscope warning antenna. of design, material procurement and have been operating successfully with valves that come into contact with derivatives of the La Fayette class engineering. In addition to design Surveillance Australia since 1996 seawater to copper nickel iron frigate used by France and soon to be work begun for the new class in 1997. from bases at Broome. Darwin and ones in order to reduce corrosion. used by Singapore. They are 135 Litton Avondale has already Cairns. The COASTWATCH mission • Installing a marine growth metres long, with a 17-metre beam constructed a series of pilot ship is to patrol the Australian Exclusive protection system to minimise the and displace over 4,500 tons. sections to demonstrate the maturity Economic Zone (EEZ). searching for growth of marine barnacles on the Thomson-CSF is prime contractor of the design and efficient production illegal fishing, immigrants, narcotics submarine surface. for Sawari II. Its main industrial processes. smugglers. marine pollution, • Installing a freon compressor to partners on the contract are DCN/DCN quarantine threats, etc. Missions can To date, four ships have been enhance the cooling efficiency International for the platform and last up to 9 hours. awarded in the 12-ship program, with within the submarine. propulsion system: SFCS (a joint eight additional ships planned in the In its COASTWATCH venture of DCN International and next four to five years. The first ship configuration, the Q200 can transit Thomson-CSF) for the combat system: will be delivered in late 2003. Value 300 nm (555 km) at its max cruise NAVFCO for crew training: of the four ships awarded to date is in speed, fly a low-level search track of SODETEG and SOFINFRA for excess of SUS2 billion. about 1.000 nm( I 851 km), resulting design and construction of shore Eight of the ships will be built at in 90.000 nm2 (260,000 km2) of infrastructure in Jeddah (school and facilities): and Aerospatiale-Matra- Litton Avondale in New Orleans, coverage per mission, including a Missiles for missiles. while four are currently planned for number of target identifications, before returning to base with The frigates' automated production at Bath Iron Works in One of Singapore's new submarines on ihe surface. adequate fuel reserves. information processing system. LE TERMERAIRE on Ihe surface. The French Navy intends lo build a fourth SSBN. Maine. (RSN) (Marine National/French Navy)

|| 24 VOL. 62 NO. 2 THE NAVY THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 2 The submarine is filled with the Whai type of cruise missile was Maritime Airpower for Australia Thomson Sintra DMUX HO bow and used is open to conjecture as there has flank array sonar suite. The DMUX never been an indication that the / HO provides passive target ranging ^^B a iwSE • Ml Israelis have purchased the US Tomahawk missile. It has been widely - Part 3 ~ and interception capability. The submarine's very low frequency ilil speculated for some lime that Israeli towed array sonar prov ,des very long engineers have re-worked sub- range capability. WgJ Harpoon missiles to the land attack Triomphant class submarines have role but this would only provide a a submerged speed in excess 5001b HE warhead to a range in the of 25 knots and a surface speed of vicinity of 12()kms. 20 knots.

The MKSMA steam plant before being installed into France sells FOCH Stonefish Mines for ihe AIP module for testing. AIP will give ihe Pakistani Navy a near nuclear powered submerged capability. to Brazil ADF (DCN I France has sold the 37 year-old aircraft carrier FOCH to Brazil for BAH Systems has been selected to during April. The steam generator $US42million. The 40.000 tonne provide the ADF with the Stonefish module will be attached to the LOX Australian Strategy and Mk III Maritime Mining System, a carrier will be delivered to the hull subsection early next year and Brazilian Navy in mid-November. family of multi-influence ground sea thoroughly tested on shore before the FOCH will be renamed SAO mines. AIP plug' is attached to the The Littoral Support Ship PAULO and replace Brazil's existing The mines can be deployed from submarine. carrier MINAS GERAIS (ex HMAS The LSS concept ship with another concept vessel, an Australian designed air warfare destroy er. surface ships, submarines and aircraft AIP will give Pakistan's such as the F-lll. F/A-18 and AP-3C VENGEANCE) whicit will be offered submarines increased underwater for sale. By Dr Nornuin Friedman Orion. range and decreased indiscretion rates Work will be done in France at the The system uses the one mine as they won't be required to surface or DCN facility to dis-arm the carrier In part three of our series on maritime airpower for Australia, world renow ned naval expert and accomplished author, type or combat mine' but with as much. and re-equip it for Brazilian use Dr Norman Friedman, examines the need for Australia to .seriously consider its maritime nature and the value of the different deployment and influence which includes the removal of capability provided by the Littoral Support Ship (LSS) concept. It should be noted that the LSS is a concept and not a modes. This is achieved through off asbestos. The carrier should set sail plan or acquisition 'wish*. The concept was borne out of a capability requirement of the ADF that has emerged in the the shelf software and special purpose Israelis test sub- for Brazil some time in April 2001. past decade and currently filled by a number of platforms at a far more exorbitant price than what the LSS could be kits that configure the mine to the acquired and operated for, and with greater capability. desired mode. A full training package launched Cruise Brazil is expected to operate around 23 ex-Kuwaiti A-4MB is also included in the deal. Speculation is mounting that an The East Timor operation recently re-focussed Australians in point. Should this seem the nattering of a hyper-critical Skyhawks from the new carrier. The Stonefish was chosen under Israeli Dolphin class submarine (see on their regional responsibilities, and thus, indirectly, on American, the reader may recall that during the Cold War Phase IA of Project 2045. Further THH NAVY Vol 61 no.4) fired a their need to be able to project military power. The great the U.S. Air Force built a bomber base at Shemya. in the phases are expected to acquire a cruise missile to a range of 930miles question is whether the current capability matches current Aleutians, then realised it was unneeded - and abandoned standoff sea mining capability for the off Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean. and future needs. It seems a particularly apt question as a it (the runways could not be destroyed or blocked). From Collins class submarines enabling The first indication of the test new White Paper is being prepared. Hopefully comments then on. Soviet seizure of Shemya was high on the list of them to launch mines into harbours or launch came from a British press by an outsider will seem relevant to this process. potential World War III nightmares. Australia has no' one. patrolled shipping lanes from distance. report published in mid-June quoting Clearly the single greatest fact of Australian geography but numerous. Shemyas. and unnamed Israeli source. is that the country is an island, the other great fact is that It would probably be impossible to keep an invader Pakistani Agosta 90B It is w idely known that Israel and the interior is largely empty, and that the country's from gaining a foothold in some relatively deserted part of Sri Lanka share close military population (and wealth) is largely confined to points the country. Successful defence of Australia would gets AIP relations. Whether the test was widely scattered along a long coastline. The island aspect probably entail a seaborne attack on this position, which The French naval shipbuilder DCN conducted by a submarine or a makes invasion difficult, but the scattered character of the would of course be defended. Thus the current defence has taken delivery of the first AIP (Air submerged test rig is yet to be population centres makes defence difficult. Modern forces policy would seem to require an Australian ability to mount Independent Propulsion) system to be confirmed. are very expensive, and it is impossible to multiply them an opposed landing at a considerable distance from a base, installed onto an Agosta 90B The Arab press has long claimed sufficiently to cover the whole country against a supported by Australian aircraft. Without such an ability,

submarine on order for Pakistan. that the new Israeli subs were The French carrier FOCH has been sold to Bra/il and determined attack. For over a decade the has been the system of unmanned air bases around the coast is an The LOX (Liquid ) tank intended to carry cruise missiles to will arrive in April next year. to build and maintain a string of air bases to which the open invitation to any potential attacker. Air support, of was installed into a hull subsection use against them. (Marine National/Fiench Navy) limited force of modern F/A-18 fighters can deploy in an course, would be necessary because anyone seizing one of emergency. At all other times the bases, which arc in the deserted air bases would use it for just that purpose. largely deserted areas, are unmanned - and unguarded. The The distance factor is due to the sheer length of the basis of the concept was the expectation that the Australian Australian coastline. Although Australian aircraft would government would enjoy adequate warning of any assault, enjoy the advantages of interior lines of communication hence would be able to deploy in good time. Of course, the (they can. of course, cross the middle of the country at concept has its problems. A lawyer would call an will), the distances are great. Tactical aircraft can be unmanned base an "attractive nuisance." because seizing it tanked, but the longer their flights the better the chance that would offer enormous advantages. A historian might relatively minor damage will prove fatal. As a case in point, observe that warning has not always been available as the US Air Force lost an F-111 in the long-range attack on needed - Pearl Harbor is hardly the latest, or the only, case Libya in 1986. whereas naval aircraft flying over

26 VOL 62 NO. 4 THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 4 £ 27 In the past. Australia pursued a national strategy of forward presence, in which Australian troops and aircraft were stationed in places such as Malaysia to demonstrate support. This policy was exemplified by the Confrontation and by Australian participation in Vietnam. It was rejected because the presence of troops on the ground tends to demand involvement; the Australian government would prefer to decide when and where it becomes militarily involved. Moreover, experience shows that it is often difficult to gain agreement to insert troops or ground-based aircraft, and that their withdrawal can carry terrible penalties for national prestige - and can send very misleading messages, with severe consequences. Under the current policy of forward engagement. Australia extends The LSS is a multi-rolled ship being able lo provide full replenishment services to escorts and other ships. friendship and offers support - using forces which generally do not require permanent basing abroad. Thai much shorter ranges were unscathed. Not only does it seem means both the offer of long-range air support (mainly likely that the damage which proved fatal to the P- 111 using F-l I Is) and the offer of naval support. Of the two, would not have been deadly at shorter ranges, but pilot naval support has enormous advantages. It is continuous, fatigue was surely a factor. In addition, the F-111 portion and it can be highly visible on a sustained basis. Yet it does The only thing stopping this RAAF Hornet from landing on Ihe USS INDEPENDENCE below is the parked aircraft on Ihe deck. The RAAF's Hornets of the raid was considerably reduced because so many not require any surrender of sovereignty by the supported require little modification to bring them hack lo the USN carrier borne aircraft standard. (RAAF) aircraft had to drop out due to minor defects, which would country, and there is no basing with consequent possible not have mattered at shorter ranges. These considerations friction. In the important case of supporting a friend From a strategic point of view. then, it can be argued operate standard classes of surface escorts and auxiliaries, would be important even if the aircraft simply attacked pre- against another country, warships can appear without the that what Australia brings to the regional table is the ability both sharing the same type of engine. It is not clear to what selected targets. However, support of a landing would unfriendly country's consent, yet without actually to project military power in support of regional allies - that extent that is practicable. However, it is clear that require that aircraft engage enemy aircraft and also thai attacking it (aircraft based on a distant continent do not is a major reason they are regional allies. For this capability auxiliaries can be standardised, with considerable savings. ihey hit pop-up targets: in either case, they would have to offer this sort of opportunity). To be meaningful, presence to be worthwhile, it ought to be effective in the face of It turns out that a single type of ship can accommodate both spend considerable time in the combat area after iong must carry a military capability. For navies that means opposition. Specialist ships are required, not least in order fuel (for replenishment) and troops and vehicles, the tanked (lights across Australia. It would seem to follow that either the ability to land and support troops, or the ability to maintain multi-service capability in power projection. former in her hull and the latter on her decks. The RAN has some kind of deployable platform for aircraft is a to do significant damage to assets ashore. Without heavy Anyone aware of Second World War history will know just already operated a ship of this type, the ex-carrier HMAS prerequisite for the defence of Australia, given the guns or organic attack aircraft, the Royal Australian Navy how difficult it was for the Allies to build up and maintain SYDNEY, which transported troops and their vehicles on "attractive nuisance" airfields which would so greatly cannot do much direct damage - but it can land Australian their amphibious capability, which proved so important - her hangar and flight decks. She could fuel ships alongside simplify an attacker's task. troops. and in which Australia participated very heavily, for from her capacious tanks. example in Ihe Solomons and New Guinea. Without East Timor exemplifies another consideration in However, the capacity to transport the troops' specialist ships, training is difficult at best, and problems Australian defence. Australia is inescapably a regional supporting vehicles is inherently limited. The more serious which crop up in reality are often missed. That was The LSS power, gaining enormously from her connections with the opposition the Army faces, the more it needs a certainly the case in US pre-1941 amphibious training, Last year three members of the RAN's Directorate of nearby countries, particularly in the island barrier to the combination of armour and anti-tank helicopters. The conducted with neither specialised ships nor specialised Naval Materiel. John Truelove. Stephen Kretschmer. and north. An outsider would observe that such engagement Army has a limited capability of this kind right now in the landing craft. Peter Clark, examined the concept of a multi-role ship as a requires that Australian friendship offer some special two ex-US LSTs. So what is needed? Troops need fast transports, which advantage: otherwise it may well be more attractive for The ability to operate at a distance also depends on the carry them, their supplies, and. as importantly, their heavy neighbours to seek control over Australian wealth and fleet's ability to replenish its ships, which currently * vehicles. For modern assaulLs. moreover, the ships ought to resources. Australia is more technologically advanced lhan depends on a pair of tankers substantially slower than fleet carry helicopters, both troop carrying and fire support. The her neighbours, so from a military point of view the speed. In a contested operation, the tankers themselves larger the number of helicopters (operable more or less ,y advantage should, in theory, be some form of leverage would need separate escorts, thus reducing whatever simultaneously), the faster the assault and the fewer the based on technologically advanced forces. At present, for firepower the fleet could bring to bear at a landing site. example. Australia is the only regional power with long- casualties. Big transports are likely to have the range range bombers (the F ills). The Royal Australian Navy needed, but their escorts probably will not, so power can escort ships in the teeth of air attack, and it can convey projection requires underway replenishment ships. > Australian troops, albeit in limited numbers. However, the Preferably both transports and replenishment ships are fast, troops will find it difficult to deal with serious opposition, since speed is a valuable form of protection against since the fleet has only limited firepower. Air strikes submarine attack. The larger the ships, the easier to mounted from Australia may be able to deal with targets maintain high speed, particularly in rough weather. What is identified in advance, but aircraft cannot be maintained "on less widely known is that larger is by no means necessarily call" to support troops. That is. it has long been known that more expensive: ship steel is quite cheap. Incidentally, aircraft waiting on an airfield generally cannot answer larger ships are generally far less vulnerable to attack urgent calls for assistance hundreds of miles away. Quite because weapons, hitting either above or below the aside from the time lag involved, conditions at an airfield waterline, generally destroy structure over a limited length. may well preclude immediate take-offs. That reality has The less the proportion of the overall length of the ship, the been blurred in recent operations (such as Kosovo) by the less damaging is each hit. On the other hand, a larger ship use of aircraft exclusively to attack pre-selected targets. does not have so much larger a signature that she is much Australian troops lacking air support would presumably more likely to be found or hit. feel that such attacks were beside the point. Much the same The idea or using a flat decked ship for troop transport isn't new . In fact The LSS can. if wanted, also act as an airpowcr projection platform with Standardisation is another consideration. The more the carrier' platform is the most versatile weapon in history. Here the may be said of urgent requests for air support against the ability to embark the RAAF's F/A-18 for Tighter cove: wd or strike distinct classes of ships a Navy operates, the more aircraft carrier HMAS SYDNEY is used to transport troops and heavy attacking aircraft. is.To facilitate this, the LSS uses arrester wire gear and either a expensive is that operation. Ideally the RAN ought to equipment to Vietnam. catapult or ski jump.

VOL 62 NO. 4 THF. NAVY VOL 62 NO 4 29 -TafeSterv. Inirr rr During the Hornet's initial flight testing il was subjected lo 'ski jump" take-off trials with great success. The results indicate that an LSS fitted with a ski jump can launch Hornets with no loss of aircraft performance or load. Another of the LSS' roles is that of troop and heavy lift transport. The ship can also act as a command and control ccntre plus support troops determine the overall size and volume of the ship. The ashore with 'Hotel services', as provided by USN Helicopter assault proposed design is 247.0 m overall x 28.0 in (45.0 m at the carriers during the recent Timor operation. upper/flight deck) x 7.8 m. with a CODOG (COmbined training exercise. They soon found that the long Hat decks Diesel Or Gas turbine) powerplant. required for the troop vehicle role made it possible for the Overall, the LSS is a very innovative solution to a ship to operate the aircraft the troops might need to support difficult problem: Australia badly needs the ability to them in combat. The natural size of the ship, about 30.000 project military power, but she cannot keep buying a very tons, turned out to be well adapted to the F/A-18 currently varied fleet, which is inherently difficult to maintain. The operated by the RAAF. Moreover, built to civilian solution, both in Australia and in other navies, has standards, it would be less expensive than the new air generally been to blend several ship functions together in The Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor. The aircraft is most vulnerable on the ground, and in goverment finance committees with the unit price rising every year. defence escorts the Navy currently plans to buy. The five order to limit either overall numbers or. at the least, the (USAF) current Australian fleet auxiliaries (two underway number of separate types. The LSS is certainly a step in replenishment, three troop carriers) could be replaced by this direction. That it looks like an aircraft carrier is not the Commander Jeff Huber, USN* four of these fast support ships. point: the design was determined by the needs of troops The study called the proposed ship a Littoral Support and of underway replenishment. Carrier capability is a With many expecting the new Australian Defence White Paper to be a 'Battle of Britain* strategy written for the 21st Ship (LSS). because it was key to supporting Australian bonus, not a drawback. Moreover, without some kind of century version of the Spitfire, the F-22, some balance on the claims about iLs performance are warranted. If the F-22 is intervention in regional littoral areas - in the areas of mobile base, it is difficult to see how the expensive eventually chosen to replace the RAAF's F/A-18 and F-l 1 Is each one could cost as much as an Anzac frigate and yet use greatest interes( to Australia, and in which she can make (hence not numerous) F/A-I8s or any successors can have exactly the same weapons as the aircraft it replaces. The following was first published during 1997 in the United States (he greatest contribution to regional alliances. The ships' much relevance to two of the most important Australian Naval Institute's magazine 'Proceedings' and is reprinted with the Editor's permission. open hangar spaces could easily be filled out as troop defence problems, the defence of the country itself and The first F-22 airframe - Raptor 01 - 'The Spirit of Defensive Counter Air. accommodations. Vehicles or aircraft could be carried on power projection in support of regional friends or allies. America'- rolled out of a Lockheed hangar on 9 April 1997 deck. The key to the design is the realisation that open amid a firestorm of budgetary controversy. The stealth Being stealthy for the purpose of shooting down space makes a ship adaptable to a very wide variety of * The views expressed in this article are the author's own. fighter, currently estimated at more than SAUS 200 million strikers isn't a persuasive F-22 selling point. DCA fighters roles. As it happens, one of them is aircraft support (in one and should not he attributed to any organisation, including per copy, is catching flak from countless sources, most operate over friendly territory and don't have to worry version of the LSS. a steam catapult is installed), but in fact the U.S. Navy, for which he has worked or is currently notably the US Congress. about bad-guy surface-to-air missiles. For the sake of role the other roles, which a variety of ships already fill. working. In an attempt to polish the project for the legislative expansion, however, proponents attribute to the aircraft a eye. the USAF (United States Air Force) has expanded the 'unique' DCA ability to shoot down stealthy cruise jet's role from an air superiority only fighter to a multi- missiles: The F-22 also will carry the next-generation mission platform. The January 1997 issue of Aviation Week AIM-9X and improved versions of the AIM-120 & Space Technology featured a series of articles on the AMRAAM designed to destroy low-observable cruise state of the stealth fighter program that aptly summarises missiles expected to be on the market early in the next the body of F-22 advocacy. At first glance, these arguments century. seem compelling. A peek beneath their surface, however, Land-attack cruise missiles avoid radar detection by reveals the house-of-cards nature of the USAF's flying low against the terrain, putting the earth between 'expanding role' F-22 strategy. themselves and enemy radars. Spending extra money to make them stealthy is a curious notion. Even if the arms industry can create a viable market for low-observable Air Superiority cruise missiles, there's genuine doubt as to whether The three components of air superiority are defensive advanced air-to-air missiles will be able to shoot them counter air (DCA). offensive counter air (OCA), and down. suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD). In DCA. good- Regardless, whether whiz-bang air-to-air missiles will guy fighters shoot down bad-guy strikers before they can be able to shoot down whiz-bang cruise missiles has drop bombs on good-guy ground and surface forces. In nothing to do with the F-22's stealthy airframe. The air-to- OCA. good-guy fighters clear the sky of bad-guy fighters air missiles and their companion avioni . will work so that good-guy strikers can bomb bad guys. SEAD. equally well on any fighter airframe in the current OCA's partner in protecting strikers, neutralises bad-guy inventory. More important, fighters are almost certainly the surface-to-air missiles. least cost-effective or tactically effective means of The LSS as it would look from Ihc air. Il should be remembered thai the LSS is a concept and not a planned acquisition nor an aircraft carrier in the traditional meaning of the word. The F-22's sales pitch frames it as the undisputed defending against cruise missiles. Cheaper, better master of each air superiority task. I'm sceptical. countermeasures can be found.

VOL. 62 NO. 4 i THE NAVY VOL. 62 NO. 4 31 Offensive Counter Air the sky and knocked them back down until they were all On Time, On Target, On Per Diem gone or they just gave up and ran off. The tactic's attrition For the OCA role, stealth fighter advocates describe Expanding into the role of a true strike fighter, the F-22 efficacy was particularly notable in the MiG Alley brawls divisions of F-22s circling over enemy territory in 'free-fire is being readied to carry and deliver state-of-the-art of the Korean War. though its overall operational and zones', within which they could attack any 'positively precision-attack munitions: improved joint direct-attack strategic worth was questionable. In subsequent conflicts, identified target". In fact, 'free-fire zones' and 'positive munition (JDAM). JAST-1000. miniaturised munitions the sweep has made negligible dents in enemy fighter identification' are mutually exclusive terms in the technology, wind-corrected munitions dispenser (WCMD). inventories. air-to-air world. Free-fire zones are so named because low-cost autonomous attack system (LOCAAS), and they don't require positive identification of a target to More recently, the sweep has been modified to include GBU-22 Paveway. It's great that they'll spend tons of engage it. a loose connection with the strike mission. Fighters ingress money to modify these weapons so a SAUS200 million + The free-fire concept declares that because projected F- some set amount of time before the strikers enter the area. jet can carry them in its weapons bay. It's not so great that 22 tactics 'ensure' that no stealth fighter will accidentally This, theoretically, allows for a freewheeling air to air fight existing $AUS40-60 million dollar jets (Super Hornet, JSF, shoot down his wingman (a leap of faith worthy of Martin that clears bad-guy fighters from the sky for at least as long Rafale. Eurofighter) can or could carry the same weapons Luther), anything within an F-22's detection and weapons as it takes the strikers to hit the target and skedaddle back without having to spend money to modify them. envelope is a hostile aircraft and may be engaged. to the fort. Unfortunately, any innocent aircraft happening into the What really happens is that in the process of raging zone gets whacked along with the bad guys. Worse yet. any around the sky over the bad lands, the sweepers manage to Hyper-cruise make absolutely certain that every element of the enemy's good-guy strikers (who are the reason for having the free- "You have the stealth of an F-117 hut you add integrated air defence system is wide awake and ready to fire zone in the first place) flying into the zone get whacked supercruise. Therefore, anybody's reaction time in dealing rumble. The sweepers run out of gas before they kill as well. That's why beyond-visual-range engagements with F-22 is reduced considerably. require positive identification. anybody and go home before the strikers show up. Bad-guy - A senior USAF official. strip alert fighters get airborne just in time to jump on the The free-fire zone is a groovy concept, but doesn't Speed is life. It's the key to mission accomplishment strikers like sharks on a school of goldfish. work. Associating the term 'free-fire zone' with the F-22 and survival. By the time they see me coming. I'm already implies that the stealth fighter is somehow better able to A last word about the sweep: there's an odd irony in gone. Wait a minute...If I'm stealthy, how did they see me kill more bad guys more quickly than any other fighter using F-22s as sweepers. You can only sucker bad guy USAF and Lockheed Martin officials have made numerous and coming? with similar weapons, sensors, and command-and-control fighters into coming up to fight if they know you're there. grandiose claims about the F-22s performance. Some of which are very connectivity. Not. If you're stealthy, how do they know you're there? contradictory. The fact remains that the F-22 is the last ultra expensive "Wait" cry F-22 pundits, "we're not talking about strike But forget the cruise missile and sweep things. We've hangover from Ihc Cold War. (USAF) Now You See 'em, Now You Don't got the no-fooling F-22 air-superiority tactic - raid support: we're talking about the pure air superiority sweep And if bad guy really wants to launch massive strikes, "Because the F-22's Idetectahilityl has been so disruption. This is where we sneak up on enemy airfields mission"! he can counter raid disruption with raid dispersion. dramatically reduced, the single pilot's defensive duties - while bad-guy strike groups are forming up and blow them In this OCA tactic, the fighter cavalry 'sweeps' into Dozens, scores, or hundreds of strike aircraft can be a time-consuming task in conventional aircraft - have been away before they even finish their rendezvous. This sounds Indian country alone and unafraid, unencumbered by any launched in small packages from multiple fields spread taken out of the new stealth fighter." great if you're going up against one of General Savage's requirement to defend strike aircraft or any danger of over a broad geographic area. Raid disruption F-22s would -A Lockheed Martin official. 'Twelve O'clock High' thousand-plane B-17 raids. accidentally shooting them, and takes on latter-day Red be unable to engage enough of these strike packages to The real bottom line of F-22 advocacy is that while it Problem is. modem tactical air strikes aren't anything like Barons in a duel for control of the sky. keep the rest from saturating and overwhelming our air won't do much that existing tactical aircraft couldn't do. that. They can consist of as few as four. two. or even one The fighter sweep is a relic of the two world wars and defences. it's stealthy! Well, sorta. aircraft. It takes very little time for small strike packages to Korea. The primary objective was attrition. Good-guy Or. if bad guy doesn't have enough airfields for Besides HARM, the F-22 and its stealthy cousins (the join up and press on to the target. fighters flew near bad-guy airfields, drew their fighters into dispersion, he can just attack during the day. Stealth F-117 and B-2.) are being designed, refitted, or projected to aircraft may have radar and infrared detection avoidance carry all sorts of advanced standoff weapons. Why would characteristics, but they can't evade the human eye in broad stealth aircraft need to shoot standoff weapons? daylight any better than any other aircraft. Raid disruption, Aviation Week & Space Technology, says USAF like stealth, is pretty much a nighttime thing. planners concede that to preserve maximum stealth. F-22s Day attack also offers bad guy a bonus convenience - will have to be flown in specific attitudes relative to enemy his pilots don't know how to fly at night anyway. radars. What if they have to change their attitudes to shoot somebody down? Or drop a bomb? Or launch a HARM? That could get 'time consuming'! Suppression of Enemy Air Defences Yet another unidentified senior USAF official concedes HARM (High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile) allows that the United States "must guard against the fact that tactical aircraft to destroy or shut down an enemy surface- someday, given enough [data] netting and sensors, the to-air missile while flying outside that missile system's value of stealth could be reduced". This Air Force official, range. The launching aircraft "can have one or both of two apparently, didn't predict anything about stealth's cost objectives for employing HARM: (I) to attack the missile adjusting over time in proportion to its value. from a safe distance, allowing other aircraft to fly through Stealth technology is not a panacea. It does not make its envelope, or (2) to protect itself from the enemy missile. aircraft invisible to all radars and passive sensors; it just An aircraft protecting other aircraft from a safe distance makes them less visible. The 'stealth gap' conundrum is doesn't need to be stealthy, and a stealthy aircraft doesn't that even before newer, better, and more expensive stealth need to protect itself from a surface-to-air missile. aircraft come on-line, newer, better, and cheaper counter However, Aviation Week & Space Technology explains. stealth detection and targeting are out there waiting. "Air Force officials favour over flying the target with a Stealthiness is not a bad thing, even if it is not perfect. stealth aircraft and dropping much more powerful weapons The point is to shrink enemy weapon systems' envelopes as to destroy a radar site". much as reasonably possible. Some stealth is better than If they favour over flying the target so much, why did none. More stealth is better than some. If we can reduce a they spend the money to redesign the HARM so it would threat envelope by 25% or even just 10% at an equitable An F-22 Raplor during one of its many (light trials. By the time il becomes available to the RAAF each one could cosl as much as an Anzac frigate with thai money going overseas. (USAF) fit into the internal weapons bay of the F-22? cost, that's a significant and affordable tactical advantage.

32 VOL. 62 NO. 4 THE NAVY NO. 4 33 PRODUCT REVIEW

THE FIFTY-YEAR WAR, The overland route using Nepal was maintained but effectiveness could not be maintained as with the airdrops. CONFLICT AND STRATEGY The Tibetan's never had a "rear area" with which to retreat, IN THE COLD WAR rest and train in - as did the Afghan Mujahadeen. Nepal eventually closed its borders. Only after the Sino-Indian by Norman Friedman border war in 1962 did the Indians become friendly to the Reviewed by Keith Jacobs cause. "In 1958-59. the Tibetans were doing better against U.S. Naval Institute Press the Chinese than the Afghans would do against the Soviets, 2062 General Highway and they were far more united". Annapolis. MD 21402 The six parts of the book offer thirty-eight short www.usni.org chapters. Source material is extensive and original, much ISBN I-55750-264-1 of the Soviet military changes being based on declassified Illustrated. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) documents. In the last November 1999. 697 pages Part, the author offers a perspective on the collapse of the $US3H.95 USSR rarely offered, the influence of the computer and the THE FIFTY-YEAR WAR. CONFLICT AND spread of information in the former-USSR under STRATEGY IN THE COLD WAR is a history of the Cold Gorbachev. The volume is certainly timely, as the Russian War from the latter days of Stalin to the collapse of the bureaucracy and military find them responding to the loss former-USSR, with a strong emphasis on the changing of the "KURSK" nuclear submarine (SSGN) in much the strategies and weapons procurements of the major powers. same manner as they did during the Cold War. yet Russian The author asks some salient questions with the most public indignation has risen measurably over this incident. important of those being: THE FIFTY-YEAR WAR. CONFLICT AND STRATEGY 11 Did the West defeat the Soviets, or did the Soviet IN THE COLD WAR is highly recommended. The most recent test of the F-22 Raptor was the firing of a Sidewinder missile. The ironic point about the F-22 is that it uses the same weapons as most other aircraft systems carry with it such damming flaws that the outcome The point proponents make is that it's stealthy' What they fail to mention is that its stealth is only effective at certain ranges, heights, (light profiles and against was inevitable, and. particular types of radar and detection equipment. (USAF) 2) Was the Cold War....about Communism versus But with the prices we're looking at for aircraft such as the (Supplementary. Oct 2000) capitalism? Or was it about old-fashioned Russian F-22 and the B-2. the stuff ought to work like a Romulan Three years after "Proceedings' originally published imperialism, cloaked in a largely irrelevant ideology? cloaking device. 'Catch F-22'. controversy slill plagues the stealth tighter The author places some emphasis on "relationships" project in the US. A few months ago. CNN ran a story on throughout the work, including that of the Soviet the issues surrounding its future. A retired USAF Colonel. Communists with the Western left movements, the Soviet The F-22 Catch Col Everest Riccioni. convincingly stated that aerospace leaders and their military: the Soviet perceptions in the engineering analysis shows the F-22's radar cross section Middle East and the U.S. in Vietnam: and. that of The Joint Strike Fighter, conceived from the ground up and performance characteristics are only marginally better Khrushchev. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders with the as a multirole stealth jet. is just down the road. Most than those of the USAF's present air superiority fighter, the West. estimates peg it at a third or less per-copy than the F-22. F-I5C Eagle. "The F-22 is really not a spectacular increase Particularly interesting is coverage of the Tibetan IN TMI COLD WAR My Vote is to skip the expensive one and buy the less costly in capability over current aircraft...It was maldesigned to insurgency, in which the author suggests the CIA may have one-but I'm not voting. The guys in the US who are have an extent, coceived for a mission that no longer exists, and made contact with as early as 1951 - well before the constituent local economies at stake. They're under is totally irrelevant to modern warfare" he said. shooting end of the Chinese Civil War. "The sustained pressure to balance the budget, salvage what key social The counterpoint snippet was a quote from U.S. armed rising was a major opportunity, particularly since programs they can. and ensure that a fair share of the Congressman Randy 'Duke' Cunningham, the Vietnam era the Tibetans soon showed that they were very willing to government dollar gets to their home states and districts. In air ace. He said something that sounded to me like. "Shoot, fight. Effective cooperation apparently began in 1956, with addition, they must judge the F-22's worth in terms of that guy ain't got no combat experience. What the hells he equipment and men dropped in. The CIA trained Tibetan capability, which must be a nightmare. For every know? His figures is just plain wrong!" recruits, initially in Taiwan, eventually in Colorado. By uniformed knucklehead like me who says the platform The USAF's current pro-F-22 propaganda campaign 1956. the resistance army -was tying down 14 PLA can't walk its talk, there's another who says it can. Norman Friedman boils down to. "Do you want your sons and daughters divisions. Maintaining them in Tibet must have been Early air power theory centred on the notion that the flying into combat with anything less than the very best extremely costly, perhaps limiting Chinese freedom of bomber yill always get through. When fighters and air America has to offer?" action anywhere else. The Chinese were also defence artillery proved that maxim wrong, air power force Lamentably, in the American political process, good- uncomfortably aware that other border regions were planners adopted a strategy of designing and buying more ole'-boy anecdotal testimony and shameless manipulation probably restive", (p. 210) The support provided was theoretically defensible and costlier manned bombers. of public sentiment oujweigh scientific fact. Here's hoping mostly by C-130 airdrops but after the Gary Power's U-2 When that didn't work, they sank money into escort our Australian friends can find a more elevated framework shoot down over Russia. President Eisenhower banned fighters to protect the bombers. of debate. flights over Communist territory thus ending the Hercules The B-2 and F-22 are direct conceptual descendants of supply line. the Flying Fortress and its P-51 Mustang escorts. The {*)Commander Huber originally published "Catch F-22" world has changed: the thinking hasn't. It is imperative that in the September 1997 edition of Proceedings'. At the time today's planners apply a transformational philosophy to he was CO of the VAW-124 Bear Aces ', an E-2C Hawkeye designing our future air power force structure. If we keep Sqn on board the carrier USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV- _ asking for money we don't really need, we might find 67). He is presently Operations Officer on the aircraft ourselves cut off completely. carrier USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71).

THE NAVY VOL 62 NO. 4 VOL. 62 NO 4 35 S I VI KM I N I of I'OI U N V. i . . . • v Is Your Crew Protected? The strategic background to Australia's security has • Advocates the development of a defence industry changed in recent decades and in some respects become supported by strong research and design more uncertain. The League believes it is essential that organisations capable of constructing all needed Australia develops capability to defend itself, paying types of warships and support vessels and of QuikShade. particular attention to maritime defence. Australia is. of providing systems and sensor integration with geographical necessity, a maritime nation whose prosperity through-life support. -Reportable strength and safety depend to a great extent on the security As to the RAN. the League: v * of the surrounding ocean and island areas, and on seaborne • Supports the concept of a Navy capable of effective OU Second trade. action off both East and West coasts simultaneously The Navy League: and advocates a gradual build up of the Fleet to Shelter • Believes Australia can be defended against attack ensure that, in conjunction with the RAAF. this can by other than a super or major maritime power and be achieved against any force which could be • is your answer to ail your health and safety' issues Quikshade will allow you to continue maintenance on deck protecting you crew and that the prime requirement of our defence is an equipment in all weather conditions (UPF 50+ canopy), ideal for promotional purposes or protection at the base of the brow on open days Qufcahad* deployed in our general area. is a portable shelter thai two people can erect in 60 seconds and dismantle in the same time Not only is it a great lime saver but folds down into a evident ability to control the sea and air space • Believes it is essential that the destroyer/frigate compact bag a little larger than a goll bag. an excellent option when storage space is limited Qufcihxk is available in 8 different sizes to suit your around us and to contribute to defending essential force should include ships with the capability to individual needs and many colours We can even put your ships colours and include your ships name on the roof What a great opportunity to lift your lines of sea and air communication to our allies. image and protect your crew at the same time Quikshad* is for people on the move and its use is only limited by your imagination meet high level threats. • Supports '.he ANZUS Treaty and the future • Advocates the development of afloat support reintegration of New Zealand as a full partner. capability sufficient for two task forces, including For more information or • Urges a close relationship with the nearer ASEAN supporting operations in sub-Antarctic waters. detailed brochure call - ' countries. PNG and the Island States of the South • Advocates the acquisition at an early date of Pacific. integrated air power in the fleet to ensure that ADF • Advocates a defence capability which is deployments can be fully defended and supported 1800 678 982 know ledge-based with a prime consideration given Email: [email protected] from the sea. to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. • Advocates that all Australian warships should be www.qttikshade.com.au • Believes there must be a significant deterrent equipped with some form of defence against element in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) missiles. capable of powerful retaliation at considerable • Advocates that in any future submarine construction distances from Australia. program all forms of propulsion, including nuclear, • Believes the ADF must have the capability lo be examined with a view to selecting the most protect essential shipping at considerable distances advantageous operationally. from Australia, as well as in coastal waters. • Advocates the acquisition of an additional 2 or 3 • Supports the concept of a strong Air Force and Collins class submarines. highly mobile Army, capable of island and jungle warfare as well as the defence of Northern • Supports the development of the mine- Australia. countermeasures force and a modern hydrographic/oceanographic fleet. MM \S S\ DM V II • Supports the acquisition of AWACS aircraft and the update of RAAF aircraft. • Advocates the retention in a Reserve Fleet of Naval • Advocates the development of amphibious forces to vessels of potential value in defence emergency. ensure the security of our offshore territories and to • Supports the maintenance of a strong Naval Reserve Superbly designed on a mirror-like background is a enable assistance to be provided by sea as well as by to help crew vessels and aircraft in reserve, or taken representation of HMAS SYDNEY 11 in fine silver. air to friendly island states in our area. up for service, and for specialised tasks in time of Limited to just 20.000 coins, this is a beautiful work of expert craftsmanship. An individually numbered • Advocates the transfer of responsibility, and defence emergency. Certificate of Authenticity accompanies every coin, necessary resources, for Coastal Surveillance to the • Supports the maintenance of a strong Naval Reserve briefly outlining the story of HMAS SYDNEY II. defence force and the development of the capability Cadet organisation. photographic U.V. stabilised for patrol and surveillance of the ocean areas all The League: around the Australian coast and island territories, Calls for a bipartisan political approach to national matt reproductions are awHabie including in the Southern Ocean. defence with a commitment to a steady long-term build-up • Advocates the acquisition of the most modern in our national defence capability including the required from the armaments and sensors to ensure that the ADF industrial infrastructure. maintains some technological advantages over While recognising current economic problems and forces in our general area. budgetary constraints, believes that, given leadership by • Advocates measures to foster a build-up of successive governments. Australia can defend itself in the Australian-owned shipping to ensure the carriage of longer term within acceptable financial, economic and Phone (02) 6785 1749 essential cargoes in war. manpower parameters.

Mr Joe Christensen.

8 Kamilaroi Cres. Price: $32.3! incl GST

36 VOL. 62 NO. 4 THE NAVY Manilla, NSW, 2346 NAVAL PERSONNEL ESPECIALLY WELCOME

Fremantle. Western Australia 31 October - 2 November 2000

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