Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: CHN31081 Country: Date: 18 December 2006

Keywords: China – Christians – Fujian – 1997

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. Dr Penny said that Protestant Christianity and Roman Catholic Christianity are recognised in China. What other Christian groups operate in (Fujian)China? (I have information on the Shouters already). 2. Is 1997 in particular a significant year for any of these groups? 3. May I have brief information about these groups (or links) please. 4. Links to treatment of Christians in China would be useful too please.

RESPONSE

1. Dr Penny said that Protestant Christianity and Roman Catholic Christianity are recognised in China. What other Christian groups operate in (Fujian) China? (I have information on the Shouters already).

The Chinese government exercises control over Christian worship in China through the Three Self Patriotic Movement/Chinese Christian Council (TSPM/CCC), with which Protestant churches are supposed to affiliate; and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Organisation, which owes its allegiance to the Chinese government rather than the Vatican. However, there are numerous unregistered or “house” Protestant churches throughout China; and an underground Catholic movement which recognizes the Vatican’s authority. The treatment of these unofficial churches, and the application of government religious regulations, varies from province to province: some provinces apply the regulations more strictly, while others are more tolerant and even allow some Christian groups to operate without being registered with the TSPM. The 2006 US Department of State report on religious freedom in China states in general of the treatment of unregistered protestant churches:

Repression of unregistered Protestant church networks and “house” churches continued to be widely reported. Central Government officials stated that friends and family holding prayer meetings at home need not register with the Government, but China’s regulations on religious affairs (RRA) state that formal worship should take place only in government-approved venues. Sources in many locations continued to report that police and officials of local Religious Affairs Bureaus (RABs) interfered with meetings, often accusing the house church of disturbing neighbours or disrupting social order. House church leaders asserted that police routinely used noise complaints as a pretext for raiding their meetings. When police disrupted meetings, they sometimes detained worshippers attending such services for hours or days and prevented further house worship in the venues. Leaders sometimes faced harsher treatment, including detention, formal arrest and sentencing to reeducation or imprisonment. Again, treatment of unregistered groups varied regionally. For example, some local officials in Henan Province often mistreated unregistered Protestants, and some local officials in Hebei Province tightly controlled Roman Catholics loyal to the Vatican. In many localities, however, officials worked closely with registered religious groups to accomplish religious and social goals (US Department of State 2006, International Religious Freedom Report 2006: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and ), 15 September – Attachment 1).

The report later states:

Nearly all local RAB [Religious Affairs Bureau] officials require Protestant churches to affiliate with the (Protestant) Three-Self Patriotic Movement/Chinese Christian Council (TSPM/CCC). Credentialing procedures effectively required clergy to affiliate with the TSPM/CCC, a practice that appeared unchanged since adoption of the new regulations. Many unregistered evangelical Protestant groups refuse to affiliate with the TSPM/CCC because they have theological differences with the TSPM/CCC. Some groups disagree with the TSPM/CCC teachings that all Protestant beliefs are compatible and that differences between Protestant denominations are irrelevant. In a few regions, Protestant groups have registered without affiliating with the TSPM/CCC. These exceptions include the Local Assemblies Protestant churches in Zhejiang Province, where no significant TSPM/CCC community exists, and the (Korean) Chaoyang Church in Jilin Province, both of which operate openly without affiliating with the TSPM/CCC. Additionally, the (Russian) Orthodox Church has been able to operate without affiliating with a government organization in a few parts of the country. In other regions, officially “post-denominational” Protestant churches informally aligned themselves with Protestant denominations. Some pastors in official churches said that denominational affiliation was an important way of drawing parishioners.

Some groups register voluntarily, some register under pressure, and authorities refuse to register others. Some religious groups have declined to register out of principled opposition to state control of religion. Others do not register due to fear of adverse consequences if they reveal, as required, the names and addresses of church leaders or members. Unregistered groups also frequently refuse to register for fear that doing so would require theological compromises, curtail doctrinal freedom, or allow government authorities to control sermon content. Some groups claimed that authorities refused them registration without explanation or detained group members who met with officials to attempt to register. The Government contended that these refusals mainly were the result of these groups’ lack of adequate facilities or failure to meet other legal requirements (US Department of State 2006, International Religious Freedom Report 2006: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September – Attachment 1).

A 2005 research response by the Canadian Immigration and Research Directorate states of the treatment of Protestants in China:

Enforcement of religious regulations is stricter in urban areas such as Beijing and Shanghai, while in the rural areas and in the south of China, there is less scrutiny of and interference in unofficial church activity (Christian Science Monitor 24 Dec. 2003). According to the United States (US) Department of State, “urban house churches are generally limited to meetings of a few dozen members or less, while meetings of unregistered Protestants in small cities and rural areas may number in the hundreds” (International Religious Freedom Report 2004 15 Sept. 2004, Sec. 2). The Department of State also noted that, “[d]ue to a lack of transparent guidelines, local officials have great discretion in determining whether ‘house churches’ violate regulations” (ibid.). Local security officials and Communist Party cadres reportedly choose to enforce certain religious regulations on occasion for personal gain and extort money from “house” church organizers (UPI 20 Feb. 2004; U.S. News & World Report 30 Apr. 2001). According to the executive secretary of the Hong Kong Christian Council, who travels regularly to the mainland to gauge the state of religious freedom and who was most recently in China in August 2005, local officials attempting to extort money from unregistered churches account for many of the reported arrests of church leaders, particularly in rural areas of central China (1 Sept. 2005a).

As the number of Christians has grown, Christian Solidarity Worldwide has argued, government crackdowns have become more systematic and have targeted large-scale gatherings (BBC 9 Nov. 2004). In June 2005, security officials allegedly simultaneously raided 100 “house” churches in the area of Changchun, the capital of Jilin Province (China Aid Association 9 June 2005). Most of the close to 600 church leaders and members who were taken into custody were released after 24 to 48 hours (ibid.). However, by 9 June 2005, about 100 church leaders remained in various detention centres (ibid.). Books were also confiscated during the raids (ibid.). As university students and professors made up a large proportion of the congregants of the raided churches, the China Aid Association speculated that the campaign was an attempt by authorities to eradicate the influence of the unofficial Church on university campuses (ibid.).

Between June and November 2004, Christian Solidarity Worldwide reportedly documented three cases of mass arrests of Christians, each involving the detention of over one hundred people (BBC 9 Nov. 2004). In April 2004, co-workers and worshippers linked to Reverend Xu Shuangfu, founder and leader of the Three Class Servants Church, were purportedly arrested and their homes raided and belongings seized by police in northern China (Freedom House 19 May 2004). Families of the detainees were subsequently placed under surveillance and threatened with arrests when they attempted to enquire about their relatives (ibid.). Rev. Xu, whose Church is purported to have millions of followers, was allegedly kidnapped by police in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province (ibid.). Amnesty International reported arrests of various church leaders in 2004, mostly in the eastern provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Hebei (BBC 9 Nov. 2004). According to the religious rights organization Voice of the Martyrs (VOM), in 2004 authorities also rounded up a group of underground Protestants who had appeared in an American videotape about the activities of an unregistered church in an undisclosed part of China (UPI 20 Feb. 2004).

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported in early 2002 that the government was especially targeting “evangelical movements led by charismatic leaders,” though it remained unclear which groups were perceived to fit this description (9 Jan. 2002). The Christian Science Monitor reported on 24 December 2003 that evangelicals in Henan Province and “house” church leaders in Shanghai had recently been targeted by authorities. In 2004, the same publication noted the arrest of a church historian and a church organizer associated with the evangelical movement in Henan on charges of disclosing state secrets (8 Mar. 2004) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN100387.E – China: Situation of Protestants and treatment by authorities, particularly in Fujian and Guangdong (2001-2005), 7 September – Attachment 2).

The same report continues:

While acknowledging that arrests of church leaders occasionally take place in China, the executive secretary of the Hong Kong Christian Council stated in correspondence to the Research Directorate that the current view of the central government is that unregistered Christian groups should be discouraged but also tolerated (1 Sept. 2005a). Officials are well aware of the activities of unregistered religious groups, and arrests of leaders take place periodically, not as a result of religious policies, but when unregistered religious meetings “become too aggressive or high- profile” or when local officials attempt to extort money from unregistered churches (Executive secretary 1 Sept. 2005a). The executive secretary also pointed out that an ongoing trend in parts of China that is little known outside of the country is the registration of religious sites and bodies with local authorities but not with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (ibid. 1 Sept. 2005b). For instance, the Yanji Christian Church registered with the local authorities in Yanji in Jilin Province back in the mid-1990s but not with the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (ibid.). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. According to The Economist, the Chinese government has a “less antagonistic” attitude towards unregistered Protestants than it does towards unregistered Catholics, though it fears “house” churches may act as a cover for dissidents (21Apr. 2005).

A relaxation of authorities’ treatment of unregistered Protestants in major cities was noted by The Christian Science Monitor in 2004: for instance, an open meeting of young evangelicals was allowed to go ahead in Shanghai, “one of the least accepting cities,” (8 Mar. 2004), though Charles Burton, an associate professor of political science at Brock University, who has conducted fact- finding missions to China, noted that religious groups in Shanghai have “excellent” relations with local authorities (24 Apr. 2003, 16). In another city, overseas Chinese ministers were allowed to speak at “house” churches (Christian Science Monitor 8 Mar. 2004). In 2002, five Chinese Protestants in Hubei Province, who had been sentenced to death for organizing and belonging to an unregistered religious group which authorities deemed to be an “evil sect,” were given a re-trial on appeal (AFP 9 Oct. 2002). Twelve members of the unregistered South China Church in Hubei Province were also granted a re-trial, with the high court citing a lack of evidence for the original convictions (ibid.). According to The Economist, efforts by the government to retain control of religious groups are “faltering” (21 Apr. 2005). Earlier reports indicate that the Communist regime is unsure of how to handle the rapid and “surprising” growth of the number of Christians in the country (UPI 20 Feb. 2004), which is even creating “consternation” among Party officials (Christian Science Monitor 24 Dec. 2003). In part, this growth, The Washington Post concluded, has forced the Communist government to relinquish control “in some places” to the official Church and to reconsider past “repressive” policies (24 Dec. 2002). There appears to be a measure of acknowledgement by the Chinese government that Christianity is growing rapidly and may even be benefiting a “spiritually hungry population” (Christian Science Monitor 8 Mar. 2004). According to observers, the government is intent on preventing any foreign religious organizations from establishing themselves in China (Burton 24 Apr. 2003, 5, 27; Chan and Carlson 2005, 23). Chan and Carlson indicate the government believes that religions must play a role in “cushioning the societal transformations brought on by China’s [World Trade Organization] accession while preventing unwanted foreign influences from infiltrating” (2005, 22). Thus, according to the religious policy as enunciated by the State Administration for Religious Affairs, religion and Chinese socialist society must learn to adapt to each other, and while the “government will not encourage the development of religion [neither will it] suppress all religion by force” (Chan and Carlson 2005, 22) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN100387.E – China: Situation of Protestants and treatment by authorities, particularly in Fujian and Guangdong (2001-2005), 7 September – Attachment 2).

Fujian Province

The sources consulted indicate generally that in Fujian province, as in the rest of China, the official Catholic church is administered by the Catholic Patriotic Association, which owes its allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party; while the “underground” Catholic church maintains its allegiance to the Vatican. The Three-Self Patriotic Movement administers the government-sanctioned Protestant churches; and the unregistered or “house” churches follow various Protestant denominations and are illegal. Both Catholic and Protestant underground churches have suffered crackdowns and arrests from time to time over the years. Fujian has generally been regarded as one of the areas of China that applied regulations on religion more liberally than others, but some recent sources indicate that that there has been an increase in restrictions there.

The 2005 research response by the Canadian Immigration and Research Directorate states of Fujian:

Human Rights in China (HRIC) commented in 4 August 2005 correspondence to the Research Directorate that the treatment of Christians is poor in southern China, particularly in the rural areas, though the organization could not elaborate, citing a lack of available information. However, the executive secretary of the Hong Kong Christian Council commented that Fujian and Guangdong have “the most liberal policy on religion in China, especially on Christianity” (Executive secretary 1 Sept. 2005a). In his travels, the executive secretary has met with local authorities who, he said, usually tolerate activities of unregistered Christian groups (1 Sept. 2005a). While authorities are of a more tolerant nature in rural areas than in urban centres, they would usually take steps to discourage religious activity if it had a link to groups from outside China (Executive secretary 1 Sept. 2005a). The executive secretary stated that he is aware of a number of unregistered churches along with Bible schools, fellowships and even missionaries that have been allowed to operate in the two provinces for years (1 Sept. 2005a). As an example, he cited the case of Pastor Samuel Lamb’s unregistered Damajan Church in , which he said has been allowed to hold meetings on a daily basis for 20 years without interference from authorities (1 Sept. 2005a). In cases where arrests have been made, the executive secretary pointed out that groups such as the Shouters and the Eastern Lighting, which are considered “heretical” by many Christians, have been targeted (1 Sept. 2005a) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN100387.E – China: Situation of Protestants and treatment by authorities, particularly in Fujian and Guangdong (2001-2005), 7 September – Attachment 2).

There have been a number of recent research responses prepared by RRT Country Research on the subject of Christians in Fujian province.

A September 2006 response looks at the Pentecostal groups the Ling Ling Jiao, or Spirit- Spirit sect, and the True Jesus Church, in Fujian (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30550, 13 September – Attachment 3).

A March 2006 response mentions a reference to Fujian province in the 2005 US Department of State report on religion in China, which describes the detention of a Catholic priest and ten other Catholics in Fujian (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30047, 21 March – Attachment 4).

A June 2005 response looks at the True Jesus Church and Christianity generally in Fujian, and refers to church demolitions in the province (RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response CHN17352, 7 June – Attachment 5).

Question 1 of an October 2005 response examines the situation of Catholics in Fujian, including some instances of detention and raids on underground churches (RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response CHN17603, 21 October – Attachment 6).

An August 2005 response looks at Catholics in Fujian (RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response CHN17483, 29 August – Attachment 7).

Question 2 of a 2002 research response provides comprehensive background material on Christianity in Fujian, as well as reports of crackdowns in 1999-2002 (RRT Country Research 2002, Research Response CHN15645, 23 December – Attachment 8).

2. Is 1997 in particular a significant year for any of these groups.

1997 was not a particularly significant year for Christians in China. The Chinese government continued to pursue the policies on religion that it had followed throughout the 1990s.

Of note is an item in the recent US Department of State report on religious freedom, which states that “after the revised criminal law came into effect in 1997, offenses related to membership in unapproved cults and religious groups were classified as crimes of disturbing the social order. A ban on cults, including the Falun Gong spiritual movement, was enacted in 1999” (US Department of State 2006, International Religious Freedom Report 2006: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September – Attachment 1).

The section on religion from the 1997 US Department of State country report on China gives a summary of the situation in that year:

c. Freedom of Religion The Constitution provides for freedom of religious belief. Although there is no comprehensive legislation governing religious affairs, the Criminal Law states that government employees who illegally deprive citizens of this right may, if the case is serious, be sentenced to up to 2 years in prison. There are no known reports of persons being punished under this law. The Government, however, seeks to restrict religious practice to government-controlled and -sanctioned religious organizations and registered places of worship.

The State Council is responsible for monitoring religious activity. During the year, the Government continued a national campaign to enforce 1994 State Council regulations that require all religious groups to register with government religious affairs bureaus and come under the supervision of official “patriotic” religious organizations. Some religious groups were subjected to increased restrictions, although the degree of restrictions varied significantly from region to region and the number of religious adherents, in both unregistered and registered churches, continued to grow rapidly.

In certain regions, government supervision appears to have loosened, but local implementing regulations, such as those for Shanghai, Chongqing, and Guangxi, call for strict government oversight. In some parts of the country registered and unregistered churches are treated similarly by authorities and congregants worship in both types of churches. In other areas, particularly in regions where considerable unofficial and unregistered religious activity has taken place, authorities closely monitor places of worship and the relationship between unregistered and registered churches is tense.

At the end of 1996, the Government reported that more than 70,000 places of worship had registered. During 1997 authorities continued the campaign to register all religious groups. Some groups registered voluntarily, some registered under pressure, while authorities refused to register others. Unofficial groups claim that authorities often refuse them registration without explanation. According to the Government, these refusals were mainly the result of inadequate meeting spaces. Many religious groups have been reluctant to comply with the regulations out of principled opposition to state control of religion or for fear of adverse consequences if they reveal, as required, the names and addresses of members and details about leadership activities, finances, and contacts in China or abroad. In April one of the largest house churches in Zhejiang agreed under persistent pressure to apply for registration on the condition that it would not be required to join the Three-Self Patriotic Movement or the Chinese Christian Council; however, provincial authorities judged that this condition was not in accord with government regulations, declared it illegal, and closed the church down.

The State Council’s Religious Affairs Bureau is responsible for judging the legitimacy of religious activity. The Religious Affairs Bureau and the CCP United Front Work Department, staffed by officials who rarely are religious adherents, provide “guidance and supervision” over implementation of government regulations on religion and on the role of foreigners in religious activity.

The law does not prohibit religious believers from holding public office; however, Communist Party officials state that party membership and religious belief are incompatible. According to an April Hong Kong newspaper article, the Communist Party issued a circular in early 1997 ordering party members not to adhere to religious beliefs. In January 1995, the CCP circulated a document to party organizations at the provincial level ordering the expulsion of party members who belong to open or clandestine religious organizations. In November 1996, the People?s Liberation Army Daily?s report on military “spiritual civilization” stated that “it is necessary to conduct education in atheism so that they (the military) believe in science and oppose superstition. Participation in religious activities is forbidden.” There is no available evidence indicating whether party or PLA military personnel were expelled under the 1995 or 1996 regulations. According to government officials, 20 to 25 percent of Communist Party officials engage in religious activities, an increase over estimates for 1995. Most officials who practice a religion are Buddhist or believe in a folk religion. Religious figures are included in national-level government organizations. For example, the National People’s Congress (NPC) includes several religious figures, including Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai, a Tibetan “living Buddha,” who is a vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. Religious groups are also represented in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a forum for multiparty cooperation and consultation led by the CCP, which advises the Government on policy.

After forcefully suppressing all religious observances and closing all seminaries during the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the Government began in the late 1970’s to restore or replace damaged or confiscated churches, temples, mosques, and monasteries and to allow the reopening of seminaries. Implementation of this policy has varied from locality to locality. According to a government white paper on religion issued during the year, there are 100 million religious adherents, more than 85,000 religious sites, over 3,000 religious organizations, 300,000 clergy and 74 religious schools and colleges. Official religious organizations administer local Bible schools, more than a dozen Catholic and Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train imams and Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks. Students who attend these institutes must demonstrate “political reliability,” and all graduates must pass an examination on their theological and political knowledge to qualify for the clergy. The Government permitted some Catholic seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go abroad for additional religious studies. In most cases funding for these training programs is provided by host country organizations. Unofficial churches, however, have significant problems training clergy or sending students to study overseas, and many clergy receive limited and inadequate preparation.

The authorities permit officially sanctioned religious organizations to maintain international contacts as long as these do not entail foreign control. What constitutes “control” is not defined. Regulations enacted in 1994 codified many existing rules involving foreigners, including a ban on proselytizing by foreigners, but allow foreign nationals to preach to foreigners, bring in religious materials for their own use, and preach to Chinese at churches, mosques, and temples at the invitation of registered religious organizations. Missionaries are currently teaching English on college campuses in China with minimum interference from authorities as long as their proselytizing is low key. In recent years, some local authorities have subjected worship services of alien residents to increased surveillance and restrictions. In one major city appointed Chinese clergy supervise worship services. In the northeast, however, ethnic Korean Catholics freely practice their faith.

During the year, there was a new level of openness to international dialog on religious issues. China invited an increasing number of foreign religious organizations to visit religious sites and talk to official religious leaders and figures. In July a delegation headed by the Director of the State Council Religious Affairs Bureau traveled abroad and met with foreign church officials and NGO?s. In October President Jiang Zemin invited a delegation of foreign religious leaders to visit China in 1998. In October the State Council released a white paper on freedom of religious belief. The paper provided official information and statistics on religious practices and defended government policies but stated the premise that legal protection of citizens? rights should conform to relevant international documents and conventions. It was publicized widely inside and outside China…

…The number of Christians in both official and unofficial churches continues to grow rapidly, particularly in rural areas. This has caused concern among government and Communist Party officials who perceive religious gatherings as a challenge to their authority, a threat to public order, and an alternative to Socialist thought. There was evidence that authorities in some areas, guided by national policy, made strong efforts to crack down on the activities of the unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches. The Government officially permits only those Christian churches affiliated with either the Catholic Patriotic Association or the (Protestant) Three Self Patriotic Movement to operate openly. The Government established both organizations in the 1950’s to eliminate perceived foreign domination of local Christian groups.

In some areas cooperation between official and unofficial churches has expanded so as to blur the line between the two. In other areas, relations between the two churches are hostile . The unofficial, Vatican-affiliated Catholic Church claims a membership far larger than the 4 million persons registered with the official Catholic Church. Precise figures are difficult to estimate because many Catholics, particularly in rural areas, attend both official and unofficial services. According to official figures, there are 4,000 Catholic clergy and over 4,600 churches and meeting houses. There is no Vatican representative in China. Bishops in the official Catholic Church are not ordained by Rome but many have an unofficially acknowledged “relationship with Rome.” The Government maintains that there are between 10 and 15 million registered Protestants, 18,000 clergy, over 12,000 churches, and some 25,000 meeting places. Government officials have noted a rise in Protestant worshipers in the past year, but have not revised statistics to reflect this upward trend. According to foreign experts, perhaps 30 million persons worship privately in house churches that are independent of government control. One informed Chinese source has put the number at 50 to 60 million.

This increase in worshipers has resulted in a corresponding increase in the demand for Bibles. In 1997 the Government supervised the printing of more than 3 million Bibles, a small increase over 1996. A printing company funded by overseas Christian organizations also prints approximately 500,000 Bibles a year. Although Bibles can be purchased at some bookstores they are not readily available and cannot be ordered directly from publishing houses by individuals. However, they are available for purchase at many Chinese Christian Council-affiliated churches. Some underground Christians hesitate to buy Bibles at official churches because such transactions often involve receipts identifying the purchaser. Foreign experts confirm reports of chronic shortages of Bibles as well as logistical problems in disseminating Bibles to churches, especially churches in rural areas, but note that the situation has improved in recent years due to the increase in distribution channels, including to house churches.

Efforts to register unauthorized groups are being carried out by police and religious affairs officials concurrently with other law enforcement actions. Police closed many “underground” mosques, temples, and seminaries, and hundreds of Protestant “house church” groups, many with significant memberships, properties, financial resources, and networks. Police were particularly active during sensitive periods, such as in the aftermath of Deng Xiaoping’s death in February and the reversion of Hong Kong in July. Many leaders of unauthorized groups were targets of harassment, interrogations, and detention (see Section 1.d.).

In some areas security authorities used bribes, threats, demolition of unregistered property, extortion of “fines,” and interrogation to harass religious figures and followers. Implementing regulations, provincial work reports, and other government and party documents continue to exhort officials to vigorously enforce government policy regarding unregistered churches. Authorities particularly targeted unofficial religious groups in Beijing and the provinces of Henan, Anhui, Shanxi, and Zhejiang, where there are rapidly growing numbers of unregistered Protestants, and Hebei, a center of unregistered Catholics. In some cases, public security officials have used detention or arrest and reform-through-education sentences to enforce regulations. In March Henan police detained evangelist Xu Yongze and eight of his associates in an attempt to close down his church network. They were detained without charge and without access to family or counsel, and reportedly suffered beatings. In September Xu was sentenced to 10-years? reform through labor for disturbing public order. In October his wife and two of his associates were given administrative penalties of 1 to 2? years of reeducation through labor. The Government responded to a foreign government?s requests for information on Xu’s case by stating that Xu had promoted a cult and violated the law by preaching that the apocalypse was near and asking worshipers to wail in public spaces for several consecutive days.

In Hebei, where perhaps half of China’s Catholics reside, friction between unofficial Catholics and local authorities continued as police again prevented worshipers from making an annual spring pilgrimage to Donglu to visit a religious icon by erecting roadblocks and checkpoints. Harassment of unofficial Catholics continued in the Baoding area, near Beijing. During the year, Hebei authorities forced many underground priests and believers to make the choice of either joining the “patriotic” church or facing punishment such as fines, job loss, and, in some cases, barring children from school. In October the Cardinal Kung Foundation reported that Baoding Bishop Su Zhimin was placed under detention by local security officials after the closure of his unofficial seminary. Authorities asserted that Bishop Su had not been detained and is free. In December he was sighted in Shanghai with government authorities. There was no independent confirmation of his status at year?s end.

In March Shanghai public security authorities broke into the home of Shanghai underground Catholic Church Bishop Joseph Fan Zhongliang and seized religious materials and currency. Prior to the incident Bishop Fan had been conducting mass for hundreds of underground followers in his apartment. Subsequently he continued services but for only 20 or so believers. Since the raid the police assigned an official to live across the hall from Fan and to monitor his activities. Police also harassed and detained several lay people in the Shanghai area. In January local police in Jiangxi province detained unofficial Catholic worshipers near the township of Chongren, preventing perhaps 10,000 people from gathering for religious observances.

There has been an upsurge of apocalyptic teaching in orthodox as well as heterodox millennial sects as the year 2000 approaches. Such religious groups, which preach beliefs outside the bounds of officially approved doctrine, are being singled out for harassment. A Ningxia Daily account detailing the reasons for arresting three missionaries variously cited their membership in an “heretical” organization, attending an illegal gathering, preaching that Jesus can heal, and conducting activities that disrupted the public order. In 1997 police continued their efforts to close down an underground evangelical sect called the “Shouters,” a branch of a pre-1949 indigenous Protestant group. The sect has been deemed an antigovernment, counterrevolutionary organization, and since the early 1980?s, authorities repeatedly have detained, fined, and imprisoned its members. An indigenous offshoot of Buddhism, the Yi Guan Dao, which was banned in 1949, has become newly active in the 1990?s. In a June press conference, the head of the Religious Affairs Bureau spoke of a “government crackdown on a small number of cults, which threaten the social and public interest.” (US Department of State 1998, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, 30 January – Attachment 9).

A 1999 report by the Canadian Research Directorate quotes material on Christians in Fujian from the late 1990s. It states that there had been a general revival of in the years since the Cultural Revolution, and that:

This revival extends to Fujian province which was described as being particularly vibrant and open with respect to religion by Dr. Daniel Overmyer, professor of Chinese Religion at the University of British Columbia who undertook field research in Fujian during visits between 1996 and 1998 (1 Oct. 1999). However, Dr. Overmyer cautioned that there would be local variations from this openness, dependent upon local officials and attitudes. Two other specialists, Dr. Michael Szonyi (22 Sept. 1999) and Mickey Spiegel (15 Sept. 1999) corroborated this. Dr Szonyi, of the history department at the University of Toronto, has researched popular religion in Fujian extensively and undertook field research in Fujian in the summer of 1999. Ms. Spiegel is a researcher-consultant who wrote the October 1997 Human Rights Watch report China: State Control of Religion, available at IRB Regional Documentation Centres. This sentiment is also echoed in the Australian CIS report Government Attitudes to Christian Religious Activity” which cites the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), stating with respect to the underground and house church movement that:

No one has any real handle on the scope of (underground and house churches) ...nor the extent of its suppression, although it is reasonable to surmise that no general rule can be applied throughout China (28 May 1999).

Both Dr. Overmyer (1 Oct. 1999) and Dr. Szonyi (22 Sept. 1999) stated that religious activities at the local level were generally tolerated, even if they were unregistered, provided they kept a low profile and did not try to organize on too large a scale. Both professors also stated that household shrines would be permitted under most circumstances, again referring to the divergence represented by the attitudes of local officials. This was corroborated in part by Dr. John Lagerwey, Visiting Scholar, Institute of Chinese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, who referred to the status of religious freedom in Fujian as “a fluid situation” (2 Oct. 1999). Dr. Lagerwey offered the following general comments regarding the current state of religious freedoms in China:

The authorities in every town, county, prefecture and province differ in their attitudes and actions toward these problems but I think it is fair to say in a general way that, as long as a movement – house church or other – does not take a political turn, the authorities leave it alone. To understand a particular case of sudden repression, therefore, one must know in detail about local politics: something virtually impossible on the outside (ibid).

According to a 8 August 1998 report in the Fuzhou newspaper Fujian Ribao, between August 1998 and February 1999 a campaign of “checking-up” on sites of religious activity was to be implemented in which:

Stress would be laid on investigating certain activities at religious sites which violated the Constitution, laws, regulations or state policies, such as creating confusion in internal management, interfering in religious affairs by non-religious organizations, practising feudal and superstitious activities in the name of religious activity and causing trouble which might disrupt security and stability (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999, CHN33002.EX – China: Freedom of religious practice and belief in Fujian province, 8 October – Attachment 10).

3. May I have brief information about these groups (or links) please?

The 2006 US Department of State report states:

The Government has banned all groups that it has determined to be “cults,” including the “Shouters” (founded in the United States in 1962), Eastern Lightning, the Society of Disciples (Mentu Hui), the Full Scope Church, the Spirit Sect, the New Testament Church, the Guan Yin (also known as Guanyin Famin, or the Way of the Goddess of Mercy), the Three Grades of Servants (also known as San Ba Pu Ren), the Association of Disciples, the Lord God Sect, the Established King Church, the Unification Church, the Family of Love, the South China Church, the Falun Gong, and the Zhong Gong movements. (Zhong Gong is a qigong exercise discipline with some mystical tenets.)

After the revised criminal law came into effect in 1997, offenses related to membership in unapproved cults and religious groups were classified as crimes of disturbing the social order. A ban on cults, including the Falun Gong spiritual movement, was enacted in 1999. Under Article 300 of the criminal law, “cult” members who “disrupt public order” or distribute publications may be sentenced to three to seven years in prison, while “cult” leaders and recruiters may be sentenced to seven years or more in prison. Under the new Public Security Administrative Punishment Law, which took effect March 1, 2006. Falun Gong adherents could face five to fifteen days of administrative detention and fines of up to $125 (1,000 RMB) for using superstitious cults or qigong activities to disrupt public order or harm public health. Public security officials said the law would be used against Falun Gong (US Department of State 2006, International Religious Freedom Report 2006: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September – Attachment 1).

A 2005 research response by the Canadian Immigration and Research Directorate states of illegal groups:

In 1995, a circular issued by the State Council and the Communist Party Central Committee labelled a number of Protestant groups “evil cults” and declared them illegal organizations (Chan and Carlson 2005, 14-15). These groups included the Shouters, Full-Scope Church, New Testament Church, Eastern Lightning, and Spirit Church (ibid., 15). According to Chan and Carlson, since the 1999 introduction of a resolution banning cults, which targeted Falun Gong, “the government has focused on enforcement on all groups labeled as ‘evil cult’ organizations” (ibid.). Human rights groups claim that following the 1999 anti-cult resolution, authorities cracked down on more than a dozen evangelical Christian groups (AFP 9 Oct. 2002; see also SCMP 9 Jan. 2002). However, one source reported that the authorities’ focus on Falun Gong led to an easing in arrests and harassment of unregistered churches in some areas (U.S. News & World Report 30 Apr. 2001). (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN100387.E – China: Situation of Protestants and treatment by authorities, particularly in Fujian and Guangdong (2001-2005), 7 September – Attachment 2).

A 2001 RRT Research Response examines the implementation of the 1999 anti-cult law; lists the Christian groups which were declared evil cults under the law; gives each group’s Chinese name; and provides a brief description of each (RRT Country Research 2001, Research Response CHN14548, 19 March – Attachment 11).

A November 2006 research response is of interest as it examines the reason why particular Christian groups are banned and not others. It indicates that some Pentecostal Christian groups which are overtly evangelical, and which have particularly Salvationist teachings such as the imminent coming of the Apocalypse, from which membership of the church offers protection, are perceived as a threat to a unified social order under the control of the government and Chinese Communist Party (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30978, 15 November – Attachment 12 ).

4. Links to treatment of Christians in China would be useful too please.

The following are recent reports on the general situation of religion in China.

A March 2006 report by Human Rights Watch comments that “one year after China’s Regulations on Religious Affairs came into force, Chinese citizens’ ability to exercise their right to freedom of religion remains as subject to arbitrary restrictions as ever”. The report goes on:

Chinese officials claim the new regulations safeguard religious freedom through the rule of law, but the intentional vagueness of the regulations allows for continued repression of disfavoured individuals or groups. There’s nothing accidental about the vagueness – it gives officials he room they need to legitimize closing mosques, raiding religious meetings, “reeducating” religious leaders, and censoring publications. The regulations took effect on March 1, 2005. At the time they came into force, the Chinese government asserted that the national regulations, the first comprehensive set of regulations on religion in China, constituted “a significant step forward in the protection of Chinese citizens’ religious freedoms”. However, local officials continue to repress religious activities that they determine to be outside the scope of the state-controlled religious system. Their decisions are often made arbitrarily and in a manner inconsistent with the right to freedom or belief or religion. Chinese officials continue to detain and arrest religious believers, close religious sites, and impose restrictions on movements, contacts, visits, and correspondence of religious personnel (Human Rights Watch 2006, China: A year after new regulations, religious rights still restricted, 1 March – Attachment 13).

The 2006 report on China by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom contains the results of a visit to China by the Commission in early 2006. The report on the visit, and the general section on China, are both attached. The Commission sums up its assessment of China thus:

In China, where the Commission made its first official visit last year, the government continues to be responsible for pervasive and severe violations of religious freedom and related human rights. Every religious community in China is subject to serious restrictions, state control, and repression. The most severe religious freedom abuses are directed against Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, Roman Catholics, house church and unregistered Protestants, and spiritual groups such as the Falun Gong—abuses involving imprisonment, torture, and other forms of ill treatment. Though the Chinese government issued a new Ordinance on Religion in March 2005, its provisions, in fact, restrict rather than protect religious freedom, offering Party leaders more extensive control over all religious groups and their activities. Prominent religious leaders and others continue to be confined, imprisoned, tortured, “disappeared,” and subjected to other forms of ill treatment on account of their religion or belief. What is more, the Chinese government, in its treatment of refugees from North Korea, continues to disregard its international obligations to protect those who face persecution on their return. For more information on all of these concerns, see the chapter on the Commission’s visit to China in this report (US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2006, Annual report on the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (Excerpt on China pp 107-117), May http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/2006annualRpt.pdf#page=1 – Accessed 18 October 2006 – Attachment 14).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Google search engine

Databases: ISYS, CISNET

List of Attachments

1. US Department of State 2006, International Religious Freedom Report 2006: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September

2. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN100387.E – China: Situation of Protestants and treatment by authorities, particularly in Fujian and Guangdong (2001-2005), 7 September

3. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30550, 13 September

4. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30047, 21 March

5. RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response CHN17352, 7 June

6. RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response CHN17603, 21 October

7. RRT Country Research 2005, Research Response CHN17483, 29 August

8. RRT Country Research 2002, Research Response CHN15645, 23 December

9. US Department of State 1998, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, 30 January

10. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999, CHN33002.EX – China: Freedom of religious practice and belief in Fujian province, 8 October

11. RRT Country Research 2001, Research Response CHN14548, 19 March

12. RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response CHN30978, 15 November

13. Human Rights Watch 2006, China: A year after new regulations, religious rights still restricted, 1 March (CISNET: China CX147591).

14. US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2006, Annual report on the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (Excerpt on China pp 107-117), May http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/2006annualRpt.pdf#page= 1 – Accessed 18 October 2006.