NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA: THE NEXT DECADE Edited by Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan Jacobs and Emily Burke NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL JUNE 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS S Preface 1 1. The Challenges of Nuclear Learning in South Asia 3 Feroz Khan and Ryan Jacobs 2. The Concept of Nuclear Learning: A Study of the Indian Experience 16 Happymon Jacob 3. The Concept of Nuclear Learning: Pakistan’s Learning Experience 35 Naeem Salik 4. Military Modernization and Technological Maturation, an Indian Perspective: Stabilizing the Instability-Stability Paradox 48 Vipin Narang 5. Trends in Technological Maturation and Strategic Modernization: The Next Decade 58 Mansoor Ahmed 6. The Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine 71 Naeem Salik 7. Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Nuclear Learning and Doctrinal Thinking: Understanding the Pakistani Perspective and Assessing Deterrence Stability 85 Sadia Tasleem 8. Command and Control Trends and Choices for the Next Decade in South Asia 95 Christopher Clary 9. The Next Decade of Nuclear Unlearning: Command and Control and Management of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons 102 Ghulam Mujaddid 10. Nuclear Arms Control and CBMs: Prospects and Challenges 111 Manpreet Sethi 11. The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications on Strategic Stability 121 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 1 Preface This collection of selected papers brings together findings from the Center on Contemporary Conflict’s (CCC) South Asian Nuclear Learning project. With support from the National Nuclear Security Administration, a group of regional scholars from India, Pakistan, and the United States convened in Bangkok, Thailand in 2012 to discuss the concept of nuclear learning and apply it to the regional context of South Asia. Participants presented research findings assessing regional perspectives on nuclear learning, doctrinal developments, command and control setups, deterrence strategies, and approaches towards arms control, and confidence-building measures. Three years prior, the CCC’s South Asian Nuclear Learning project kicked off with a conference entitled, “A Decade of Nuclear Learning: Ten Years After the South Asian Nuclear Tests.” A small group of experts from India, Pakistan, and the United States met in Honolulu, Hawaii to assess the evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear policies since the first nuclear tests in 1998. Scholars evaluated nuclear learning in India and Pakistan by examining divergent developments in nuclear decision-making, nuclear doctrine, command and control, and deterrence in the first decade. This report reflects the findings of both conference iterations. The overarching goal of the conferences was to identify whether India and Pakistan have reached a point in their nuclear learning that would ensure there will be peace and stability in the region. While there have been some positive gains in the realm of nuclear learning, this group of experts concluded that India and Pakistan took divergent learning paths and therefore significant progress still needs to be made to narrow this gulf and ensure détente and peace. The selected papers explore a range of factors that have shaped, induced, and inhibited nuclear learning in South Asia. Feroz Khan and Ryan Jacobs summarize the key findings over the five year period of this research project. They explain the divergent learning pathways taken by India and Pakistan and analyze proposals to enhance nuclear learning proffered during the conference discussions. Happymon Jacob and Naeem Salik provide theoretical insights into India and Pakistan’s respective nuclear learning experiences. Next, Vipin Narang and Mansoor Ahmed identify technological trends and their impact on security doctrines as well as emphasize the role of political leadership in promoting stability. They also assess the implications of military modernization on strategic stability in the region. Contributing authors Naeem Salik and Sadia Tasleem describe steps that Pakistan has taken to develop institutional mechanisms to manage its nuclear capability and tackle the relationship between nuclear learning and doctrinal thinking. Christopher Clary’s chapter traces the differing trends and analyzes the forthcoming challenges in command and control in both India and Pakistan. Following Clary, Ghulam Mujaddid critically analyzes Pakistan’s existing command and control structure and advocates a single joint strategic force command for the future. In her chapter, Manpreet Sethi explains the causes of regional failure on restraint and détente and offers suggestions for improving nuclear arms control and regional confidence building measures. Last, Zafar Jaspal discusses the instability likely to affect in South Asia with the introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense. Both Sethi and Jaspal emphasize the importance of constructive dialogue and ultimately an arms control arrangement to ensure strategic stability. Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 2 The chapters in this volume are produced as written and researched by the authors and have been edited for content, brevity, and scholarly convention. The views and content are the authors’ alone and do not represent the official policy of any government, the editors, the Naval Postgraduate School, or the project’s sponsors. The editors of this volume would like to extend their gratitude to Zachary Davis, Peter Lavoy, Robert Swartz, and Toby Dalton, without whom this project could not have happened. We also thank Neil Joeck, Jeffrey Knopf, and Ashley Tellis, who helped conceptualize the initial stages of this project. Our sincere thanks also go to Raja Menon, Gurmeet Kanwal, Hua Han, Mallika Joseph, Karthika Sasikumar, Amir Latif, and Saima Aman for their invaluable contributions. We also thank John Gill, Thomas Greenwood, and David Smith for their support in executing this project. Finally, thanks go to Al Woodson and Rebecca Dietz for their lead role as research assistants for this project; to Meghan Rasmussen for her project management and editorial skills; and to Colleen Garcia, Ryan French, Nick Masellis, Judith Tulkoff, Robin Walker, and Diana Wueger for their assistance throughout this effort. Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 3 1 The Challenges of Nuclear Learning in South Asia Feroz Khan and Ryan Jacobs he sustainability of strategic stability in South Asia remains of the highest importance to U.S. national security policy. The South Asian Nuclear Learning project was accordingly conceived to examine the region’s nuclear experiences after the 1998 tests. The end of the T first decade (1998-2008) represented a good starting point. Later, the project expanded to further analyze the nuclear learning curve in the next decade, when security environment and technological innovations undertook major shifts. The National Nuclear Security Administration sponsored this research, which involved selected scholars and experts from Pakistan, India and United States. Some of these contributors also helped shape their state’s nuclear decisions in the earlier period following the nuclear tests. Learning, in general, regards change or evolution in existing paradigms “as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.”1 Nuclear learning simply inserts the complexities of nuclear weapons into the discussion. The project initially conceived of learning as a simple and observable phenomenon; however, it soon became clear that we had to define what it meant to learn in a complex fashion. We had to ask: Who learns? At what level (individual, institutions, or states)? In the realm of South Asian nuclear learning, this was no easy task. The following pages represent a partial answer to how South Asia has learned to live with nuclear weapons and what obstacles lie ahead. The Road to Nuclear Learning: What is it? Who Learns? What Matters? Before delving into South Asia’s specific nuclear experiences, some conceptual-level insights will address the questions posed above and will help frame the following analysis. Unsurprisingly, new nuclear weapon states often arrive on the world stage without prior experience in conceptualizing how these weapons interact with a country’s security strategy. This lack of experience tends to complicate the learning process and provide opportunities at multiple levels of learning. Thus, no clear consensus emerges from the theoretical literature on the issue and contributors to this project tended to link different levels of learning without assigning definitive values to them. Individual- based nuclear learning does not automatically disengage the state. Instead, individual learning occurring within organizations can be institutionalized through standard operating procedures and other methods. If observers employ a comprehensive picture of the learning pathway, states also can and do learn. 1 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping A Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 283. Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 4 What constitutes learning? Building on research Breaking Myths to Further Learning by Jeffery Knopf and others, an answer can be Dr. Peter Lavoy- outlined in two categories. Factual learning Myth 1: Track two, non-governmental, consists of the empirical facts associated with and academic gatherings do not matter nuclear weapons – numbers, types and Policymakers mistakenly believe responsibility for capabilities of various weapon systems. problem solving lays with themselves.