DOCSLIB.ORG

Nuclear Learning in South Asia: the Next Decade

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Nuclear Learning in South Asia: the Next Decade NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA: THE NEXT DECADE Edited by Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan Jacobs and Emily Burke NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL JUNE 2014 TABLE OF CONTENTS S Preface 1 1. The Challenges of Nuclear Learning in South Asia 3 Feroz Khan and Ryan Jacobs 2. The Concept of Nuclear Learning: A Study of the Indian Experience 16 Happymon Jacob 3. The Concept of Nuclear Learning: Pakistan’s Learning Experience 35 Naeem Salik 4. Military Modernization and Technological Maturation, an Indian Perspective: Stabilizing the Instability-Stability Paradox 48 Vipin Narang 5. Trends in Technological Maturation and Strategic Modernization: The Next Decade 58 Mansoor Ahmed 6. The Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine 71 Naeem Salik 7. Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Nuclear Learning and Doctrinal Thinking: Understanding the Pakistani Perspective and Assessing Deterrence Stability 85 Sadia Tasleem 8. Command and Control Trends and Choices for the Next Decade in South Asia 95 Christopher Clary 9. The Next Decade of Nuclear Unlearning: Command and Control and Management of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons 102 Ghulam Mujaddid 10. Nuclear Arms Control and CBMs: Prospects and Challenges 111 Manpreet Sethi 11. The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications on Strategic Stability 121 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 1 Preface This collection of selected papers brings together findings from the Center on Contemporary Conflict’s (CCC) South Asian Nuclear Learning project. With support from the National Nuclear Security Administration, a group of regional scholars from India, Pakistan, and the United States convened in Bangkok, Thailand in 2012 to discuss the concept of nuclear learning and apply it to the regional context of South Asia. Participants presented research findings assessing regional perspectives on nuclear learning, doctrinal developments, command and control setups, deterrence strategies, and approaches towards arms control, and confidence-building measures. Three years prior, the CCC’s South Asian Nuclear Learning project kicked off with a conference entitled, “A Decade of Nuclear Learning: Ten Years After the South Asian Nuclear Tests.” A small group of experts from India, Pakistan, and the United States met in Honolulu, Hawaii to assess the evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear policies since the first nuclear tests in 1998. Scholars evaluated nuclear learning in India and Pakistan by examining divergent developments in nuclear decision-making, nuclear doctrine, command and control, and deterrence in the first decade. This report reflects the findings of both conference iterations. The overarching goal of the conferences was to identify whether India and Pakistan have reached a point in their nuclear learning that would ensure there will be peace and stability in the region. While there have been some positive gains in the realm of nuclear learning, this group of experts concluded that India and Pakistan took divergent learning paths and therefore significant progress still needs to be made to narrow this gulf and ensure détente and peace. The selected papers explore a range of factors that have shaped, induced, and inhibited nuclear learning in South Asia. Feroz Khan and Ryan Jacobs summarize the key findings over the five year period of this research project. They explain the divergent learning pathways taken by India and Pakistan and analyze proposals to enhance nuclear learning proffered during the conference discussions. Happymon Jacob and Naeem Salik provide theoretical insights into India and Pakistan’s respective nuclear learning experiences. Next, Vipin Narang and Mansoor Ahmed identify technological trends and their impact on security doctrines as well as emphasize the role of political leadership in promoting stability. They also assess the implications of military modernization on strategic stability in the region. Contributing authors Naeem Salik and Sadia Tasleem describe steps that Pakistan has taken to develop institutional mechanisms to manage its nuclear capability and tackle the relationship between nuclear learning and doctrinal thinking. Christopher Clary’s chapter traces the differing trends and analyzes the forthcoming challenges in command and control in both India and Pakistan. Following Clary, Ghulam Mujaddid critically analyzes Pakistan’s existing command and control structure and advocates a single joint strategic force command for the future. In her chapter, Manpreet Sethi explains the causes of regional failure on restraint and détente and offers suggestions for improving nuclear arms control and regional confidence building measures. Last, Zafar Jaspal discusses the instability likely to affect in South Asia with the introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense. Both Sethi and Jaspal emphasize the importance of constructive dialogue and ultimately an arms control arrangement to ensure strategic stability. Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 2 The chapters in this volume are produced as written and researched by the authors and have been edited for content, brevity, and scholarly convention. The views and content are the authors’ alone and do not represent the official policy of any government, the editors, the Naval Postgraduate School, or the project’s sponsors. The editors of this volume would like to extend their gratitude to Zachary Davis, Peter Lavoy, Robert Swartz, and Toby Dalton, without whom this project could not have happened. We also thank Neil Joeck, Jeffrey Knopf, and Ashley Tellis, who helped conceptualize the initial stages of this project. Our sincere thanks also go to Raja Menon, Gurmeet Kanwal, Hua Han, Mallika Joseph, Karthika Sasikumar, Amir Latif, and Saima Aman for their invaluable contributions. We also thank John Gill, Thomas Greenwood, and David Smith for their support in executing this project. Finally, thanks go to Al Woodson and Rebecca Dietz for their lead role as research assistants for this project; to Meghan Rasmussen for her project management and editorial skills; and to Colleen Garcia, Ryan French, Nick Masellis, Judith Tulkoff, Robin Walker, and Diana Wueger for their assistance throughout this effort. Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 3 1 The Challenges of Nuclear Learning in South Asia Feroz Khan and Ryan Jacobs he sustainability of strategic stability in South Asia remains of the highest importance to U.S. national security policy. The South Asian Nuclear Learning project was accordingly conceived to examine the region’s nuclear experiences after the 1998 tests. The end of the T first decade (1998-2008) represented a good starting point. Later, the project expanded to further analyze the nuclear learning curve in the next decade, when security environment and technological innovations undertook major shifts. The National Nuclear Security Administration sponsored this research, which involved selected scholars and experts from Pakistan, India and United States. Some of these contributors also helped shape their state’s nuclear decisions in the earlier period following the nuclear tests. Learning, in general, regards change or evolution in existing paradigms “as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.”1 Nuclear learning simply inserts the complexities of nuclear weapons into the discussion. The project initially conceived of learning as a simple and observable phenomenon; however, it soon became clear that we had to define what it meant to learn in a complex fashion. We had to ask: Who learns? At what level (individual, institutions, or states)? In the realm of South Asian nuclear learning, this was no easy task. The following pages represent a partial answer to how South Asia has learned to live with nuclear weapons and what obstacles lie ahead. The Road to Nuclear Learning: What is it? Who Learns? What Matters? Before delving into South Asia’s specific nuclear experiences, some conceptual-level insights will address the questions posed above and will help frame the following analysis. Unsurprisingly, new nuclear weapon states often arrive on the world stage without prior experience in conceptualizing how these weapons interact with a country’s security strategy. This lack of experience tends to complicate the learning process and provide opportunities at multiple levels of learning. Thus, no clear consensus emerges from the theoretical literature on the issue and contributors to this project tended to link different levels of learning without assigning definitive values to them. Individual- based nuclear learning does not automatically disengage the state. Instead, individual learning occurring within organizations can be institutionalized through standard operating procedures and other methods. If observers employ a comprehensive picture of the learning pathway, states also can and do learn. 1 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping A Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 283. Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 4 What constitutes learning? Building on research Breaking Myths to Further Learning by Jeffery Knopf and others, an answer can be Dr. Peter Lavoy- outlined in two categories. Factual learning Myth 1: Track two, non-governmental, consists of the empirical facts associated with and academic gatherings do not matter nuclear weapons – numbers, types and Policymakers mistakenly believe responsibility for capabilities of various weapon systems. problem solving lays with themselves.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International
    world nuclear forces 273 VII. Pakistani nuclear forces shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen Pakistan continues to prioritize the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems as part of its ‘full spectrum deterrence posture’ vis-à-vis India. It is estimated that Pakistan possessed 140–50 war- heads as of January 2018 (see table 6.8). Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal is likely to expand significantly over the next decade, although estimates of the increase in warhead numbers vary considerably.1 Pakistan is believed to be gradually increasing its military fissile material holdings, which include both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) (see section X). Pakistan’s plutonium production complex is located at Khushab in the province of Punjab. It consists of four operational heavy water nuclear reactors and a heavy water production plant.2 Pakistan appears to be increasing its capacity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel—that is, to chemically separate plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. A small reprocessing plant has been expanded at the New Laboratories facility of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Rawal- pindi. A larger reprocessing plant has been constructed at the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex in Punjab and may already be operational.3 Uranium enrichment takes place at the gas centrifuge plant in the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) complex at Kahuta in Punjab and at a smaller plant located at Gadwal, also in Punjab. A new uranium enrichment centri- fuge plant may be under construction in the KRL complex at Kahuta.4 Pakistan’s capacity to produce HEU for nuclear weapons is constrained by its limited indigenous supply of natural uranium.5 Aircraft The Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) Mirage III and Mirage V combat aircraft are the most likely aircraft to have been given a nuclear delivery role.
    [Show full text]
  • Foundation University Medical College, Islamabad (BDS)
    Foundation University Medical College, Islamabad (BDS) S# Candidate ID Name CNIC/NICOP/Passport Father Name Aggregate Category of Candidate 1 400119 Unaiza Ijaz 154023-376796-6 Ijaz Akhtar 92.66761364 Foreign Applicant 2 400218 Amal Fatima 362016-247810-6 Mohammad Saleem 92.29545455 Foreign Applicant 3 400266 Ayesha Khadim Hussain 323038-212415-6 Khadim Hussain 92.1875 Foreign Applicant 4 400114 Umar Fakhar 611012-326296-9 Nawaid Fakhar 90.6875 Foreign Applicant 5 302200 Parisa Saif Khan 61101-6413852-0 Saif Ullah Khan 90.47727273 Local Applicant 6 400148 Ayesha Bashir 373022-885861-0 Mirza Bashir Ahmed 89.78125 Foreign Applicant 7 303109 Sidra Batool 32203-4465194-8 Aman Ullah Khan 89.65909091 Local Applicant 8 300959 Linta Masroor 61101-6613020-4 Masroor Ahmad 89.56818182 Local Applicant 9 307998 Ujala Zaib 32102-7800856-0 Khalil Ur Rehman Buzdar 89.5 Local Applicant 10 301894 Alizay Ali 37301-8963956-8 Fawad Ali 89.38636364 Local Applicant 11 306454 Bakhtawar Mohsin Jami 42501-9843019-0 Mohsin Jami 89.20454545 Local Applicant 12 400237 Saad Sajjad Mughal AS9990403 Muhammad Sajjad Mughal 89.05113636 Foreign Applicant 13 400216 Hana Bilal 121016-527023-6 Muhammad Bilal Ahmad 88.94602273 Foreign Applicant 14 305067 Laiba Khalid 42201-1432628-6 Muhammad Khalid 88.93181818 Local Applicant 15 302632 Muhammad Akhtar 36203-8203731-9 Kareem Bukhsh 88.90909091 Local Applicant 16 301728 Ali Abbas Khan 33100-8906264-1 Shah Nawaz 88.90909091 Local Applicant 17 400059 Muhammad Sohaib Khan MJ4112853 Abdul Saeed Khan 88.86647727 Foreign Applicant
    [Show full text]
  • ISI in Pakistan's Domestic Politics
    ISI in Pakistan’s Domestic Politics: An Assessment Jyoti M. Pathania D WA LAN RFA OR RE F S E T Abstract R U T D The articleN showcases a larger-than-life image of Pakistan’s IntelligenceIE agencies Ehighlighting their role in the domestic politics of Pakistan,S C by understanding the Inter-Service Agencies (ISI), objectives and machinations as well as their domestic political role play. This is primarily carried out by subverting the political system through various means, with the larger aim of ensuring an unchallenged Army rule. In the present times, meddling, muddling and messing in, the domestic affairs of the Pakistani Government falls in their charter of duties, under the rubric of maintenance of national security. Its extra constitutional and extraordinary powers have undoubtedlyCLAWS made it the potent symbol of the ‘Deep State’. V IC ON TO ISI RY H V Introduction THROUG The incessant role of the Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, especially the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), in domestic politics is a well-known fact and it continues to increase day by day with regime after regime. An in- depth understanding of the subject entails studying the objectives and machinations, and their role play in the domestic politics. Dr. Jyoti M. Pathania is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. She is also the Chairman of CLAWS Outreach Programme. 154 CLAWS Journal l Winter 2020 ISI IN PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC POLITICS ISI is the main branch of the Intelligence agencies, charged with coordinating intelligence among the
    [Show full text]
  • 2Nd Stage of Herat
    I LATE riSVvT .'the skies will be clear all over the country during next JU 24 hours. L201977 Kabul Temperature: Max. tomorrow 34C. Vol. XVI, No. 93, Saturday July 9, 1977, Saratan 16, 1356 S.H. PRICE AFS- - I Min. tonight 13C. J :: ; ATC sells Turkey: Fierce fighting orks M i nister opens texti le worth Demirl rejects Ecevit's in Eritrea BEIRUT, July 9, (Reuter) ;278,900,000af . Fierce fighting is raging 2nd stage of PROVINCES! July 9, ). in outskirts of Asmara, Herat . offer coalition the Afghan Textile for capital of Eritrea, between (Reut-er)-.- to Co. has earned some ANKARA, July 9, mirel's Justice Party Eritrean secessionist and afs. from the sale of Social Democratic back himself, or Demirel, or Ethiopian forces, according Ece-v- it an independent politician, . rayon texti-- Prime Minister Bulent to a statement here potable water project its cotton and , issued les during the first three who has failed to win a as premier. yesterday by the Eritrean HERAT, July 9, (Bakht-ar)- . ce of the public utility pro- rajuddin inspected the months of the current year. parliamentary majority for Demirel, is in the process Liberation , right-win- g se- his governm- of reforging a (ELF-RC- ). The work on the jects of the Republican sta- work of Herat-Sab-zu-k A source of the company Council jo- with same al- stage pot- te ; - ent, offered yesterday to coalition the for- cond of the Herat in the framework of the Pass. , Said that some 17,633,000 It said the Ethiopian able water expansion net- Seven Year Development cotton tex-- in his main rival in a broad-base- d lies who ruled with him be- ces to siege ' meters rayon and tried break the A source of Herat-Sabza- k work, was opened by Pub- Plan of the country, Public tiles were produced by the coalition.
    [Show full text]
  • T He Indian Army Is Well Equipped with Modern
    Annual Report 2007-08 Ministry of Defence Government of India CONTENTS 1 The Security Environment 1 2 Organisation and Functions of The Ministry of Defence 7 3 Indian Army 15 4 Indian Navy 27 5 Indian Air Force 37 6 Coast Guard 45 7 Defence Production 51 8 Defence Research and Development 75 9 Inter-Service Organisations 101 10 Recruitment and Training 115 11 Resettlement and Welfare of Ex-Servicemen 139 12 Cooperation Between the Armed Forces and Civil Authorities 153 13 National Cadet Corps 159 14 Defence Cooperaton with Foreign Countries 171 15 Ceremonial and Other Activities 181 16 Activities of Vigilance Units 193 17. Empowerment and Welfare of Women 199 Appendices I Matters Dealt with by the Departments of the Ministry of Defence 205 II Ministers, Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries who were in position from April 1, 2007 onwards 209 III Summary of latest Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG) Report on the working of Ministry of Defence 210 1 THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Troops deployed along the Line of Control 1 s the world continues to shrink and get more and more A interdependent due to globalisation and advent of modern day technologies, peace and development remain the central agenda for India.i 1.1 India’s security environment the deteriorating situation in Pakistan and continued to be infl uenced by developments the continued unrest in Afghanistan and in our immediate neighbourhood where Sri Lanka. Stability and peace in West Asia rising instability remains a matter of deep and the Gulf, which host several million concern. Global attention is shifting to the sub-continent for a variety of reasons, people of Indian origin and which is the ranging from fast track economic growth, primary source of India’s energy supplies, growing population and markets, the is of continuing importance to India.
    [Show full text]
  • Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan
    U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons CMSI China Maritime Reports China Maritime Studies Institute 8-2020 China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan Isaac B. Kardon Conor M. Kennedy Peter A. Dutton Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports Recommended Citation Kardon, Isaac B.; Kennedy, Conor M.; and Dutton, Peter A., "China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan" (2020). CMSI China Maritime Reports. 7. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/7 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the China Maritime Studies Institute at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CMSI China Maritime Reports by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. August 2020 iftChina Maritime 00 Studies ffij$i)f Institute �ffl China Maritime Report No. 7 Gwadar China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, and Peter A. Dutton Series Overview This China Maritime Report on Gwadar is the second in a series of case studies on China’s Indian Ocean “strategic strongpoints” (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms.1 Each case study analyzes a different port on the Indian Ocean, selected to capture geographic, commercial, and strategic variation.2 Each employs the same analytic method, drawing on Chinese official sources, scholarship, and industry reporting to present a descriptive account of the port, its transport infrastructure, the markets and resources it accesses, and its naval and military utility.
    [Show full text]
  • Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia
    Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, editors Copyright © 2004 The Henry L. Stimson Center All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the Henry L. Stimson Center. Cover design by Design Army. ISBN 0-9747255-8-7 The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street NW Twelfth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org Table of Contents Preface ................................................................................................................. v Abbreviations..................................................................................................... vii Introduction......................................................................................................... ix 1. The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia Michael Krepon ............................................................................................ 1 2. Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors Rodney W. Jones......................................................................................... 25 3. India’s Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture Rajesh M. Basrur ........................................................................................ 56 4. Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia Feroz Hassan Khan ...................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Missile Defense and South Asia: an Indian Perspective……………………..………….……………..…..1 Rajesh Basrur
    The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, editors Report No. 46 July 2002 Copyright©2002 11 Dupont Circle, NW Ninth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org About the Project he Henry L. Stimson Center has been working to promote regional security in South Asia since 1991. TThe project focuses heavily on nuclear risk reduction, confidence building, and Kashmir. The Center’s programming has five main components: Χ First, we release publications to stimulate thinking and problem-solving approaches on topics of interest. We are also interested in collaborations across borders to encourage networking. We place our publications and non-published work on the Stimson Center’s website (www.stimson.org). Χ Second, we engage in fieldwork in the region to learn more about subjects of interest. We also work with local co-sponsors to convene workshops in South Asia, reaching key target audiences: government officials, military officers, journalists, academics, and researchers. Χ Third, we hold a series of meetings in Washington for diplomats and military attachés, media, executive and legislative officials, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations. These meetings provide an opportunity to discuss problem-solving ideas in a congenial setting. Χ Fourth, we moderate a cross-border Internet dialogue, known as the Southern Asia Internet Forum (SAIF), designed to generate open dialogue, and broaden the scope of discussion, among individuals working on security issues in the region. The SAIF Dialogue may be accessed via our website. Χ Fifth, we host a Visiting Fellows program, whereby talented individuals from India, Pakistan, and China carry out research and writing at the Stimson Center.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan Tests Shaheen-3 and Shaheen-1A Missiles
    CAPS In Focus 25 Feb 2016 www.capsindia.org 24/16 PAKISTAN TESTS SHAHEEN-3 AND SHAHEEN-1A MISSILES Gp Capt Ravinder Singh Chhatwal (Retd.) Senior Fellow, CAPS Introduction In March 2015 Pakistan carried out the first test of its most advanced 2750 km range, Shaheen-3 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)1. The second test for this missile was carried out on December 11, 2015. The second test was closely followed by a test of its 900 km Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) Shaheen1A, on December 15, 20152. Shaheen-3 is an improved version of the 1500 km Shaheen-2 and can cover entire India. It is the longest range missile in Pakistan’s inventory and is capable of carrying nuclear or conventional warheads. Shaheen-1A is an improved version of the 750 km Shaheen-1 missile. Pakistan has claimed that the Shaheen missile programme is indigenous but there are Image: Shaheen 1A being test fired from undisclosed reports that Chinese engineers have helped test range in Pakistan. Pakistan in the Shaheen-1 programme3. The Source: Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan, Press Release No PR382/2015-ISPR, December 15, 2015. Shaheen series of missiles are all solid fuel road 1 Centre for Air Power Studies | @CAPS_India | Centre for Air Power Studies CAPS In Focus 25 Feb 2016 www.capsindia.org mobile systems. This article briefly discusses launched. Both these missiles benefited from the Pakistan’s Shaheen missile programme. knowledge gained in launching sounding rockets in the 1960’s for which NASA (National Background Aeronautics and Space Administration) of USA, Pakistan started to develop knowledge on assisted Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Indian Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2003
    AnnualAnnual ReportReport 2003-2004 Ministry of Defence Government of India ANNUAL REPORT 2003-04 Ministry of Defence Government of India Front Cover: ‘Tejas’ the world’s smallest light weight multi-role aircraft designed by DRDO to meet the demands of Indian Air Force, has sucessfully completed 200 flight tests. Back Cover: ‘INS Talwar’, the Stealth Frigate, inducted in the Indian Navy in July 2003 adds to Navy’s punch. CONTENTS 1. Security Environment 5 2. Organisation and Functions of the Ministry of Defence 15 3. Indian Army 25 4. Indian Navy 39 5. Indian Air Force 49 6. Coast Guard 59 7. Defence Production 71 8. Defence Research and Development 97 9. Inter-Service Organisations 115 10. Recruitment and Training 127 11. Resettlement and Welfare of Ex-Servicemen 147 12. Cooperation Between the Armed Forces & Civil Authorities 165 13. National Cadet Corps 173 14. Defence Relations With Foreign Countries 183 15. Ceremonial, Academic and Adventure Activities 201 16. Activities of Vigilance Units 211 17. Empowerment and Welfare of Women 213 Appendices I. Matters dealt with by the Departments of the Minstry of Defence 219 II. Ministers, Chiefs of Staff & Secretaries who were in position from April 1, 2003 onwards 223 III. Summary of latest C&AG Report on the working of Ministry of Defence 224 11 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Security environment around India underlines the need for a high level of vigilance and defence preparedness Few countries face the range of security challenges, concerns and threats that India faces, from terrorism and low- intensity conflict to nuclear weapons and missiles, in its neighbourhood.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan's Nuclear Behaviour and Deterrence Breakdown
    CAPS In Focus 01 September 2020 www.capsindia.org 28/20 Pakistan’s Nuclear Behaviour and Deterrence Breakdown Nasima Khatoon Research Associate, CAPS Keywords: Pakistan, Nuclear, Missile systems, MIRV, Nuclear deterrence Pakistan started to develop nuclear weapon in the official statements of Pakistan armed forces2. These changes in nuclear posture and inclusion 1972 after the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971. It of new technologies have the potential to impact conducted the first nuclear test on 28 and 30 the deterrence stability in the region. The May 1998 in response to India’s nuclear test that evolution in nuclear posture has come into being was carried out in the same month. Since its with the introduction of tactical nuclear missile inception, Pakistan’s nuclear development Nasr and submarine-launched cruise missile programme and nuclear strategy have largely Babur-3. With the introduction of Babur-3 remained India centric and it essentially seeks to Pakistan has also claimed to have credible deter India’s conventional force superiority. second-strike capability3. A close look at changes in Pakistan’s Pakistan perceives India’s military nuclear policy over the years indicates this India modernisation and development in the field of centric posture. While its position has remained nuclear & missile programme as a serious threat constant on some policies like the possibility of and seeks to neutralise this impact by further nuclear first use, Pakistan’s nuclear posture has developing nuclear and missile capabilities. This been witnessing constant evolution on policy like threat perception is clearly visible from the fact minimum credible deterrence1. Over time, the that Pakistan’s longest-range missile Shaheen III strategy of minimum credible deterrence has is developed to cover all the parts of India changed to credible minimum deterrence, including Andaman and Nicobar Islands that are credible minimum full spectrum deterrence and “being developed as strategic bases”4.
    [Show full text]
  • Hoả Tiễn Siêu Thanh Brahmos
    Nhóm Mạng Việt Nam Văn Hiến www.vietnamvanhien.net/org/info/com Hoả Tiễn Siêu Thanh Brahmos Nam Phong tổng hợp Hoả tiễn siêu thanh Brahmos đã được phối trí trên những vị trí chiến lược tại Ấn Độ tháng 11 năm 2006. Brahmos là tên cuả một công ty hổn hợp giữa hai chánh quyền Nga và Ấn sản xuất hoả tiễn để trang bị trên phi cơ, tàu ngầm, tàu nổi và trên đất liền. Với những đặc điểm như sau: Tầm xa: 300km Trọng lượng: 300kgs Đường kính: 600cm Chiều dài: 8.4m, ngắn hơn nếu trang bị trên phi cơ Tốc độ: 2.08 - 3 mach = 50km/phút Giá tiền: 2.73 triệu đô Mỹ mỗi cái 1 Hoả Tiễn Siêu Thanh Brahmos – Nam Phong tổng hợp www.vietnamvanhien.net Brahmos (ảnh cuả cautionindia.com) Brahmos trên đất (ảnh cuả forum.bahrat.com) Brahmos trên phi cơ (ảnh cuả nosint.com) 2 Hoả Tiễn Siêu Thanh Brahmos – Nam Phong tổng hợp www.vietnamvanhien.net Brahmos trên tàu chiến (ảnh cuả nosint.com) Brahmos trong tàu ngầm (ảnh cuả nosint.com) Chi tiết hơn như dưới đây: BrahMos From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia . BrahMos 3 Hoả Tiễn Siêu Thanh Brahmos – Nam Phong tổng hợp www.vietnamvanhien.net BrahMos and the launch canister on display at the International Maritime Defence Show, IMDS-2007, St. Petersburg, Russia Type Cruise missile Place of origin India/Russia Service history In service November 2006 Used by Indian Army Indian Navy Indian Airforce (awaiting) Production history Manufacturer Joint venture, Federal State Unitary Enterprise NPO Mashinostroeyenia (Russia) and Defence Research and Development Organization (BrahMos Corp, India) Unit cost US$ 2.73 million 4 Hoả Tiễn Siêu Thanh Brahmos – Nam Phong tổng hợp www.vietnamvanhien.net Specifications Weight 3,000 kg 2,500 kg (air-launched) Length 8.4 m Diameter 0.6 m Warhead 300 kg Conventional semi- armour-piercing Engine Two-stage integrated Rocket/Ramjet Operational 290 km range Speed Mach 2.8-3.0[1] Launch Ship, submarine, aircraft and platform land-based mobile launchers.
    [Show full text]