Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia
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PAKISTANI NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND THE DANGERS OF STRATEGIC MYOPIA Timothy D. Hoyt The formal introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asian regional security raises important questions about the stability of the region. As two traditionally hostile states induct nuclear weapons and so- phisticated delivery systems into their militaries, what will keep them from utilizing these new weapons for coercion or warfare? Proliferation “opti- mists” argue that states will be deterred from destabilizing actions by the inherent mismatch in costs and benefits or risks and potential gains from challenging a nuclear-armed adversary.1 Proliferation “pessimists” point to the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons; the myriad of things that can go wrong once nuclear weapons are introduced into an already heated con- flict situation; and the lack of careful thought and planning that might go into the development, deployment, and use of nuclear forces.2 Timothy D. Hoyt is Visiting Assistant Professor for the Security Stud- ies Program, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and Professor of Strategy in the College of Continuing Education, a nonresident program of the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. The conclusions expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the opin- ions of the Naval War College or any other official organization. Asian Survey, 41:6, pp. 956–977. ISSN: 0004–4687 Ó 2001 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223. 1. These arguments are frequently associated with the neo-realist school of international rela- tions theory. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Autumn 1981); Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Re- view 84:3 (September 1990), pp. 731–45; and John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50–66. 2. Proliferation pessimists examine the U.S. experience and utilize organizational theory to assess the dangers of nuclear deployment. See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995); Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 956 TIMOTHY D. HOYT 957 In an effort to examine practice as well as theory, some studies have ana- lyzed South Asian crises in the past two decades in an effort to determine the viability and durability of deterrence in emerging nuclear confrontations.3 Other analysts focus specifically on nuclear policies, arguing that doctrines based on retaliation, supported by small survivable arsenals and clear lines of command and control, will also provide a stabilizing force in regional compe- titions. These analysts pay particular attention to the force posture, doctrine, and command and control (C2) of South Asian nuclear arsenals as they emerge from policies of opacity. The academic literature on nuclear C2 re- lies heavily on the U.S. experience. This experience emphasizes the impor- tance of civil-military relations and civilian control of the military–a phenomenon not experienced in all developing states or emerging nuclear powers. However, some facets of the American experience are applicable–in par- ticular, the concepts of delegative and assertive approaches, and of positive and negative controls over weapons. The assertive approach to nuclear weapons emphasizes civilian control and the ability of civilian leadership to directly intervene in operational and other military matters if necessary. The delegative approach puts greater responsibilities in the hands of the military, particularly in military-technical and operational matters. Military organiza- tions oppose assertive control because it threatens military efficiency and plans. Delegative policies therefore assume a high degree of professionalism and military subordination to civilian direction. As shall be seen in the case of Pakistan, the military is highly professional but far from subordinate. The other critical issue in nuclear C2 is the question of positive and nega- tive controls to deal with what Peter Feaver labeled the always/never prob- lem.4 In Feaver’s analysis, command and control of nuclear weapons 21:3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54–86; and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18:4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66–107. 3. Peter R. Lavoy, “Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia” in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994), pp. 79–109; Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nucelar Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 178–204; Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” International Security 20:3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 79–114; Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 148–77; Rodeny W. Jones and Sumit Ganguly, “Correspondence: Debating New Delhi’s Nuclear Decision,” International Security 24:4 (Spring 2000), pp. 181–89; and Steve Fetter and Devin T. Hagerty, “Correspondence: Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” International Security 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 176–85. 4. Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the U.S. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 12. 958 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 requires tradeoffs between two extremes–the requirement that nuclear weap- ons and doctrine will always function when leaders want them to and the requirement that nuclear weapons never work when leaders have not author- ized their use. The former requires a high degree of survivability, secure communications, and presupposes a high degree of preparedness for use. The latter, on the other hand, may require steps to separate weapons components and make rapid nuclear use impractical or impossible in order to minimize the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch or use by a third party. These two requirements are fundamentally contradictory and improving one type of control will impede the other. Relating the American nuclear experience to Pakistan is problematic in many ways. First, the geography of South Asia makes command and control much more difficult. Pakistan lacks strategic depth, and crucial military and governmental facilities lie close to the border. Missile flight time to these facilities can be measured in minutes and supersonic aircraft can launch strikes without much greater delays. Second, civil-military relations in Paki- stan are fundamentally different from those in the U.S. Third, unlike the U.S.-Soviet competition, that between India and Pakistan has produced four wars including the recent Kargil conflict and several near-nuclear crises–a database of deterrence and crisis that is distinct from the U.S. experience. Evaluation of Pakistani C2 processes and their impact on regional stability therefore requires a brief review of regional history, the motivations for de- veloping the nuclear capability, and the nature of the arsenal and C2 mecha- nism. Because the C2 mechanisms are dominated almost completely by the Pakistani military, a review of the strategic performance of that organization will be conducted to examine whether current C2 processes are likely to re- strain potential nuclear use, and therefore play a stabilizing role, or lead to risky behavior, possibly destabilizing the region. Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Threats and Response Pakistan lives in a rough neighborhood. Located at the junction of the South Asian, Persian Gulf, and Central Asian security complexes, Pakistan per- ceives multiple threats from multiple regions. Since the Pakistani state emerged through partition in 1947, South Asia has been the site of a Soviet invasion, three major Indo-Pakistani wars, one Sino-Indian War, several ex- tended border clashes, and many insurgencies. Pursuit of nuclear capability represents, in theory, a rational response to a highly threatening security envi- ronment. Pakistan’s neighbors after partition included an initially dormant Iran, a volatile Afghanistan, and three of the world’s most populous nations–India, China, and the Soviet Union. The primary threat was India. South Asia be- TIMOTHY D. HOYT 959 came the scene of an ongoing 50-year competition–one of the most persis- tent conflicts of the second half of the 20th century. Pakistan’s development of a nuclear option is the result, at least in part, of its lack of success in the competition with India. After losing a war in 1947–48 over disputed Kash- mir, Pakistan sought to increase its strength through alliance and multina- tional cooperation. Despite Pakistan’s best efforts, it was unable to either position itself militarily or diplomatically as a leader in the Muslim world, or successfully use the U.N. to legitimize its claim to all of the divided province of Kashmir. Pakistan actively sought alliance with the U.S. as a means of acquiring arms and possibly outside assistance against India, as well as pro- viding reassurance against a geographically more remote Soviet and Chinese threat. India’s abysmal performance in the 1962 Himalayan War with China spurred massive increases in defense spending and threatened to significantly revise the region’s military balance. Pakistan was unable to capitalize on India’s military weakness and efforts to achieve a more favorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute failed, despite U.S. diplomatic intervention. In early 1965, after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan organized a border inci- dent in the Rann of Kutch.