PAKISTANI NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND THE DANGERS OF STRATEGIC MYOPIA
Timothy D. Hoyt
The formal introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asian regional security raises important questions about the stability of the region. As two traditionally hostile states induct nuclear weapons and so- phisticated delivery systems into their militaries, what will keep them from utilizing these new weapons for coercion or warfare? Proliferation “opti- mists” argue that states will be deterred from destabilizing actions by the inherent mismatch in costs and benefits or risks and potential gains from challenging a nuclear-armed adversary.1 Proliferation “pessimists” point to the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons; the myriad of things that can go wrong once nuclear weapons are introduced into an already heated con- flict situation; and the lack of careful thought and planning that might go into the development, deployment, and use of nuclear forces.2
Timothy D. Hoyt is Visiting Assistant Professor for the Security Stud- ies Program, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and Professor of Strategy in the College of Continuing Education, a nonresident program of the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. The conclusions expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the opin- ions of the Naval War College or any other official organization. Asian Survey, 41:6, pp. 956–977. ISSN: 0004–4687 Ó 2001 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223. 1. These arguments are frequently associated with the neo-realist school of international rela- tions theory. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Autumn 1981); Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Re- view 84:3 (September 1990), pp. 731–45; and John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72:3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50–66. 2. Proliferation pessimists examine the U.S. experience and utilize organizational theory to assess the dangers of nuclear deployment. See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995); Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security
956 TIMOTHY D. HOYT 957 In an effort to examine practice as well as theory, some studies have ana- lyzed South Asian crises in the past two decades in an effort to determine the viability and durability of deterrence in emerging nuclear confrontations.3 Other analysts focus specifically on nuclear policies, arguing that doctrines based on retaliation, supported by small survivable arsenals and clear lines of command and control, will also provide a stabilizing force in regional compe- titions. These analysts pay particular attention to the force posture, doctrine, and command and control (C2) of South Asian nuclear arsenals as they emerge from policies of opacity. The academic literature on nuclear C2 re- lies heavily on the U.S. experience. This experience emphasizes the impor- tance of civil-military relations and civilian control of the military–a phenomenon not experienced in all developing states or emerging nuclear powers. However, some facets of the American experience are applicable–in par- ticular, the concepts of delegative and assertive approaches, and of positive and negative controls over weapons. The assertive approach to nuclear weapons emphasizes civilian control and the ability of civilian leadership to directly intervene in operational and other military matters if necessary. The delegative approach puts greater responsibilities in the hands of the military, particularly in military-technical and operational matters. Military organiza- tions oppose assertive control because it threatens military efficiency and plans. Delegative policies therefore assume a high degree of professionalism and military subordination to civilian direction. As shall be seen in the case of Pakistan, the military is highly professional but far from subordinate. The other critical issue in nuclear C2 is the question of positive and nega- tive controls to deal with what Peter Feaver labeled the always/never prob- lem.4 In Feaver’s analysis, command and control of nuclear weapons
21:3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54–86; and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18:4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66–107. 3. Peter R. Lavoy, “Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia” in Civil-Military Relations and Nuclear Weapons, ed. Scott D. Sagan (Stanford: Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1994), pp. 79–109; Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nucelar Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 178–204; Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” International Security 20:3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 79–114; Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 148–77; Rodeny W. Jones and Sumit Ganguly, “Correspondence: Debating New Delhi’s Nuclear Decision,” International Security 24:4 (Spring 2000), pp. 181–89; and Steve Fetter and Devin T. Hagerty, “Correspondence: Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” International Security 21:1 (Summer 1996), pp. 176–85. 4. Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the U.S. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 12. 958 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 requires tradeoffs between two extremes–the requirement that nuclear weap- ons and doctrine will always function when leaders want them to and the requirement that nuclear weapons never work when leaders have not author- ized their use. The former requires a high degree of survivability, secure communications, and presupposes a high degree of preparedness for use. The latter, on the other hand, may require steps to separate weapons components and make rapid nuclear use impractical or impossible in order to minimize the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch or use by a third party. These two requirements are fundamentally contradictory and improving one type of control will impede the other. Relating the American nuclear experience to Pakistan is problematic in many ways. First, the geography of South Asia makes command and control much more difficult. Pakistan lacks strategic depth, and crucial military and governmental facilities lie close to the border. Missile flight time to these facilities can be measured in minutes and supersonic aircraft can launch strikes without much greater delays. Second, civil-military relations in Paki- stan are fundamentally different from those in the U.S. Third, unlike the U.S.-Soviet competition, that between India and Pakistan has produced four wars including the recent Kargil conflict and several near-nuclear crises–a database of deterrence and crisis that is distinct from the U.S. experience. Evaluation of Pakistani C2 processes and their impact on regional stability therefore requires a brief review of regional history, the motivations for de- veloping the nuclear capability, and the nature of the arsenal and C2 mecha- nism. Because the C2 mechanisms are dominated almost completely by the Pakistani military, a review of the strategic performance of that organization will be conducted to examine whether current C2 processes are likely to re- strain potential nuclear use, and therefore play a stabilizing role, or lead to risky behavior, possibly destabilizing the region.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: Threats and Response Pakistan lives in a rough neighborhood. Located at the junction of the South Asian, Persian Gulf, and Central Asian security complexes, Pakistan per- ceives multiple threats from multiple regions. Since the Pakistani state emerged through partition in 1947, South Asia has been the site of a Soviet invasion, three major Indo-Pakistani wars, one Sino-Indian War, several ex- tended border clashes, and many insurgencies. Pursuit of nuclear capability represents, in theory, a rational response to a highly threatening security envi- ronment. Pakistan’s neighbors after partition included an initially dormant Iran, a volatile Afghanistan, and three of the world’s most populous nations–India, China, and the Soviet Union. The primary threat was India. South Asia be- TIMOTHY D. HOYT 959 came the scene of an ongoing 50-year competition–one of the most persis- tent conflicts of the second half of the 20th century. Pakistan’s development of a nuclear option is the result, at least in part, of its lack of success in the competition with India. After losing a war in 1947–48 over disputed Kash- mir, Pakistan sought to increase its strength through alliance and multina- tional cooperation. Despite Pakistan’s best efforts, it was unable to either position itself militarily or diplomatically as a leader in the Muslim world, or successfully use the U.N. to legitimize its claim to all of the divided province of Kashmir. Pakistan actively sought alliance with the U.S. as a means of acquiring arms and possibly outside assistance against India, as well as pro- viding reassurance against a geographically more remote Soviet and Chinese threat. India’s abysmal performance in the 1962 Himalayan War with China spurred massive increases in defense spending and threatened to significantly revise the region’s military balance. Pakistan was unable to capitalize on India’s military weakness and efforts to achieve a more favorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute failed, despite U.S. diplomatic intervention. In early 1965, after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan organized a border inci- dent in the Rann of Kutch. The incident was resolved in Pakistan’s favor and, emboldened by India’s loss, the Pakistanis authorized Operation Gibral- tar. With the hope of raising up a popular revolt, the operation authorized the infiltration of Pakistani irregular troops across the boundary between Indian and Pakistani-held Kashmir. These troops were intended to stir up and sup- port a popular uprising against the Indian government. This insurgency would again bring the Kashmir issue to the attention of the international sys- tem and also provide an excuse for Pakistani intervention with regular forces if necessary. These efforts failed and escalated into a more conventional mil- itary conflict that ended in stalemate. The net result for Pakistan, however, was particularly poor–it not only failed to accomplish its political aims, but also lost the aid and support of its U.S. ally.5 Pakistan’s nuclear program was initiated in the 1950s but did not take on significant momentum or military implications until the mid-1960s. It was not until that decade that a civilian, Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, began to trumpet the importance of a Pakistani nuclear arsenal.6 The loss of the U.S. alliance made reconnection with the Islamic world more desirable than ever and the promise of an “Islamic bomb” represented a useful negoti- ating tool. China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, while the Indian
5. T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1994), pp. 107–25. 6. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). Bhutto, the foreign minister under President Ayub Khan in the mid-1960s, later became presi- dent and prime minister of Pakistan from 1972–77. 960 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 parliamentary debate over nuclear weapons appeared to indicate that nuclear tests would soon be forthcoming. Furthermore, India’s continuing military expansion, combined with the loss of access to U.S. conventional arms, made nuclear weapons more attractive as a means of countering Indian conven- tional advantages. Finally, launching a nuclear program also raised the possi- bility of reducing the role of the military in domestic politics and increasing that of civilian elites, including scientists. A series of disasters in 1971 provided further impetus for the Pakistani nuclear program. Pakistan’s brutal suppression of political opposition in Bengal set the stage for the creation of Bangladesh. India aided and abetted the Bengali nationalist Mukti Bahini insurgents, raised up a fully justified chorus of international protest against Pakistani cruelty, and eventually in- vaded East Pakistan, liberating it in a lightning campaign. Pakistan’s efforts to punish India in the west were a failure. It lost air and sea control within hours and ended the war defeated and verging on desperation.7 The resulting loss of half of the Pakistani state, the humiliating Simla Ac- cords, and the exchange of 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war dealt a terrible blow to Pakistan’s economy and pride. For instance, the Simla Accords in- cluded a Pakistani acceptance that all border issues would be resolved on a bilateral basis, effectively relinquishing the right to take the Kashmir issue to the U.N. It also threatened the raison d’etre of the Pakistani nation. If two Islamic states could exist in South Asia and India could maintain a secular society with one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, why was Paki- stan unique and necessary? After India’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion,” Pakistan became determined to construct a nuclear weapon. The reasons were essentially the same as during the 1960s, but more urgent because of the changing regional and international environment. The growth of Pakistan’s clandestine program was designed by Bhutto to undercut military influence in Pakistani politics. However, it was quickly subsumed and put under military supervision after Zia ul-Haq seized power in 1978. Within a few years, it became a fixation in the Indo-Pakistani rela- tionship, contributing to the subcontinent’s first nuclear “near-crisis” in 1984. It also became a grave concern to the U.S., eventually leading to the termina- tion of economic and military assistance in 1990. The Pressler Amendment, Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, became law in 1985. It required the U.S. president to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon in order for foreign aid to be distributed. President Reagan so certi- fied during each of his years in office. With the waning of the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the increased evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear weaponization,
7. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). TIMOTHY D. HOYT 961 however, President Bush was unable to certify Pakistan in 1990 and eco- nomic and military assistance was suspended. The most well-known, and controversial, crises occurred in 1986–87 and 1990. The former crisis revolved around India’s extended “Brasstacks” exer- cise. An unusual aspect of this affair was the interview of Dr. A. Q. Khan, a key player in the Pakistani nuclear program, with an Indian journalist. Dr. Khan triumphantly announced that Pakistan had acquired nuclear capability during the course of this interview, which took place at the height of the crisis but was not published until spring 1987. It has never been made clear whether this was a Pakistani effort to signal nuclear capability to India during a period of crisis or if it was simply a spur-of-the moment notion by one of Pakistan’s more flamboyant public characters. Similarly, in 1990 Pakistan was reported to have deployed nuclear weapons, but these reports have been contested. The potential threat of nuclear deployment or use was a serious concern for both governments and other international actors, particularly the U.S. According to the U.S. ambassadors in New Delhi and Islamabad at the time, however, the U.S. government was unaware of any nuclear deployment or even of the evacuation of nuclear materials from Kahuta. Throughout this period, Pakistani nuclear doctrine and policy remained de- liberately opaque and ill-defined. Leaders spoke openly of Pakistan’s nuclear capability when in opposition: Benazir Bhutto, for instance, reported that she had no control over Pakistan’s nuclear forces in the 1990 crisis. Officials implied that the capacity to make nuclear weapons existed, but continued to officially deny the existence of actual weapons. Nevertheless, the most au- thoritative study of Pakistani nuclear doctrine emphasizes that no serious ef- fort was made to develop either a doctrine or a secure command and control system until after the nuclear tests–even though Pakistan had been nuclear capable for a decade. A deliberate policy of opacity presents difficulties for analysts and schol- ars. However, certain key features of Pakistani nuclear policy appear con- stant, and probably remain valid today.8 These include: · Nuclear weapons are viewed as necessary to offset India’s conventional superior- ity; · Deterrence is based on punishment, and the threat is primarily to Indian population centers; · The number of weapons available is relatively small (less than 100);
8. See Gaurav Kampani, “The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implications for Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Report, October 1999, at
Post-Pokhran Evolution in Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine The first major statement on Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine after the May 1998 tests came in the form of a newspaper article written by influential Pakistani elites.9 The article laid down the basic constraints facing Pakistan in South Asia’s new nuclear environment. The emphasis was on costs and the value of minimum deterrence. As Scott Sagan points out, however, this represents an almost classic case of “proliferation optimism.”10 This article also repre- sented a response to India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine, released in the heat of an election struggle and the immediate aftermath of the Kargil War. A posture of minimum nuclear deterrence represents substantial continuity with pre-test Pakistani thought. Minimum deterrence requires a survivable arsenal suffi- cient to cause unacceptable damage to an adversary, tight physical security, and effective command and control. Pakistani procurement of delivery systems emphasizes mobile land-based weapons and aircraft. The Pakistani Air Force (PAF) has a number of nu- clear-capable aircraft, including the F-16 and several versions of the Mirage III and V. These represent the simplest and most cost-effective delivery sys- tems in the Pakistani arsenal. The PAF has high standards, a relatively good training record, and has fought well in previous wars. Aircraft can also lift heavier and less-sophisticated weapons designs and deliver them accurately and effectively. Air delivery alone, however cannot provide an assured deterrent. The South Asian theater is quite compact and pre-strike warning is minimal. Air- fields are vulnerable and key staging fields for the PAF are literally only minutes in aircraft or missile flight time from the Indian border. The PAF
9. Agha Shah, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, and Abdul Sattar, “Securing Nuclear Peace,” The News (Karachi), October 5, 1999. 10. See Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation,” n. 3. TIMOTHY D. HOYT 963 also will have to penetrate Indian air space, which will be defended in any future conflict by the numerically and technologically superior Indian Air Force, as well as by an increasingly sophisticated (but still potentially porous) belt of ground-based air defenses. India has added new generations of fighter aircraft, including the Su-30, the Mirage 2000, and upgraded versions of the MiG-21, in the past five years. Sanctions and lack of resources have handi- capped Pakistan, delaying delivery of promised F-16 aircraft, constraining supplies of spare parts, and preventing acquisition of more sophisticated air- craft. In addition to a more than 2:1 superiority in numbers, India enjoys substantial qualitative advantages.11 Two separate and competing missile programs have been established. The first, and more well-known, is run by Dr. A. Q. Khan, already referred to above. Significant North Korean assistance is involved in this project. A North Korean freighter, the Ku-Wol San, detained during the waning of the Kargil crisis on June 25, 1999, at the Indian port of Kandla, contained equip- ment and designs used for manufacture of Scud-B, Scud-C, and other ballistic missiles, as well as evidence that Koreans were working at a missile manu- facture and testing facility in Pakistan.12 This program produces the Ghauri–a mobile, liquid-fueled missile that bears significant similarity to North Korea’s No Dong and Iran’s Shahab-3 . Ghauri variants have been tested to ranges of 1,500 km, but Pakistani reports state that engine tests promise ranges of 3,000 km or more.13 The second missile program is run from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Com- mission. This program concentrates on mobile, solid-fueled missiles called Shaheen. They bear a strong resemblance to China’s M-9 and M-11 missile series and have been tested to ranges of 600 km.14 Again, Pakistani reports claim that variants will have significantly longer ranges, in the 1,500–2,000 km range. China transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan in the early 1990s and some reports state that Beijing also provided turn-key manufacturing facili- ties, but more recently it has restricted transfers to components.
11. For a discussion of India’s emerging military capabilities, see Timothy D. Hoyt, “Modern- izing the Indian Armed Forces,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 25 (Summer 2000), at
15. See David Albright, “India’s and Pakistan’s Fissile Material and Nuclear Weapons Inven- tories, End of 1999,” Institute for Science and International Security, October 11, 2000, at
18. “National Command Authority Established,” Associated Press of Pakistan, February 3, 2000,
A Strategic Analysis of the Pakistani Military In the study of international relations, strategy refers to the use of various means to achieve national ends or policy. Policy goals must be formulated, implicitly or explicitly, by political leadership. Achieving these goals, espe- cially in a potentially hostile environment, may require the use or threat of
19. From the U.S. Department of Defense dictionary, at
The resort to force, or even the threat of force, is an action fraught with risks and danger. No one starts a war–or, rather, no one in his senses ought to do so– without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The first is its political purpose, the latter its opera- tional objective.26
22. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 128. 23. Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), pp. xii. 24. See Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 2nd. ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 63, for a discussion. 25. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 585–86; and Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 88, 106. These estimates are referred to by Michael Handel as a “rational calculus of war.” See Handel, Masters of War, pp. 59–61. 26. Clausewitz, On War, p. 579. 968 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 When force becomes an option in relations with other states, therefore, mili- tary leadership must be prepared to provide political leaders with appropriate professional advice about the strengths and weaknesses of military instru- ments. They must realistically appraise their ability to achieve political ends and construct military objectives that contribute toward those ends. If the ends cannot be achieved through force, they must inform political leadership of that fact. Ultimately, the realm of strategy lies between the realms of military opera- tions and policy–strategy takes these two distinct activities and connects them. Good strategic performance can be relatively easily discerned. Do military threats and operations contribute to the achievement of national goals? Did the military provide appropriate advice, contributing to these ef- forts?
Assessing Pakistan’s Strategic Performance Has the Pakistani military performed with strategic effectiveness? Does its record of strategic performance suggest that military command of the nuclear apparatus will bring stability, or that it might be used for risky ventures? It is difficult to do justice to such complex questions in a short article. Neverthe- less, some assessment of the Pakistani military’s behavior is necessary, if only to better understand the potential risks for miscalculation or crisis in the emerging nuclear environment. Pakistan has fought three major wars with India, in 1947–48, 1965, and 1971, as well as one minor war in the Kargil region in 1999. It has also engaged in two large-scale border skirmishes: the relatively brief Rann of Kutch incident in 1965 and the ongoing nightmare on Siachen Glacier since the mid-1980s. The two states have also been engaged in three crises that were resolved short of war but which may have entailed nuclear threats or deterrence, in 1984, 1986–87, and 1990. One method of determining Pakistan’s strategic success would simply be to tally up the number of conflicts Pakistan has won (one: Rann of Kutch), how many it has lost (five: 1947–48, 1965, 1971, Siachen, and Kargil), and how many were draws (all three nuclear crises). This suggests a legacy of strategic failure. However, resource disparities between India and Pakistan may explain a significant portion of Pakistan’s succession of military failures. Another way to assess the Pakistani military’s performance is to distin- guish between defensive responses and offensive acts. The kind of advice a military may provide when threatened by invasion will tend to fall close to the military operational side of the strategic divide. The initial goal, after all, is apparent–the deterrence, through denial or punishment, of enemy aggres- sion, and the defense of sovereign territory. Strategic effectiveness is much TIMOTHY D. HOYT 969 more important, and difficult, when contemplating aggressive action against a larger and more powerful opponent. Pakistan’s performance in crises where it was clearly responding to an In- dian threat, real or perceived, is mixed. In 1983–84, there were reports that India was considering a preemptive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities at Kahuta. In the fall of 1984, U.S. intelligence received warning of a possible Indian attack, based on the apparent movement of two squadrons of Indian Jaguar strike aircraft from their usual air base at Ambali. This disappearance was later explained by Indian officers as a passive air defense drill. Pakistan increased air defense patrols over the Kahuta region and requested U.S. air- early-warning aircraft as part of a military aid package. This response was quite restrained and appropriate, given the uncertain nature of the threat and India’s demonstrated nuclear status. The Brasstacks crisis of 1986–87 was much more serious, and the Paki- stani Army again responded professionally and efficiently. In January 1986, India’s foremost military proponent of nuclear weaponization–General Krishnaswamy Sundarji–became chief of Army Staff. With his strong en- couragement, India carried out a series of four exercises, culminating with nearly a third of the Indian Army (and most of its mechanized forces) poised on the Pakistani border in early 1987. India did not inform Pakistan of the massive scope of the exercise–comparable to the largest NATO/Warsaw Pact exercises and far greater than any previous Indian effort. The Indians apparently did not foresee the possibility of an escalatory and effective Pakistani response, although they were aware that the Pakistani Army routinely carried out major maneuvers in November and December. As the Indian exercises increased in scope, Pakistan hedged by shifting its Army Reserve North, including powerful armored formations, to a threaten- ing position near Amritsrar in December 1986. In January 1987, Army Re- serve South moved across the Sutlej River. This position exposed Pakistan’s flank in the Rajasthan area directly across from the Indian exercises, but threatened a powerful counterattack into Punjab (then the scene of a serious insurgency) or Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan was apparently concerned about the threat to Sindh and the Indians became alarmed at the threat to Punjab. Neither side, however, saw fit to use an emergency hotline estab- lished for crisis communications. It is not clear that this response actually deterred India, but it did follow Pakistan’s conventional doctrine of forward defense. Positioning strong tank forces to threaten the Indian state of Punjab, already wracked by an insur- gency, also gave Pakistan the option of launching a preemptive spoiling at- tack, if necessary. This option has been exercised by Pakistan in other conflicts, as we shall see below, and reflects not only a preference but a near- necessity, due to the proximity of Pakistan’s major cities to the border. Paki- 970 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 stan also pursued diplomatic options, and reportedly made a veiled nuclear threat to the Indian ambassador in Islamabad in an effort to contain and defuse the crisis. India’s actions in this crisis were most threatening and sometime opaque. Some analysts believe that Brasstacks may have had open-ended objectives, including an option escalation to preemptive or preventive war, and point to the confusion of simultaneously running an exercise (a training activity) and a military operation (Operation Trident), both of which were occurring on the Pakistani border. Interestingly, however, the 1990 crisis was handled differ- ently. In the spring of 1990, political agitation in Kashmir broke out into a genuine insurgency. Pakistan provided both rhetorical and logistical support for Kashmiri insurgents, reflecting the views of both Chief of Army Staff Aslam Beg and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. India was further concerned by Pakistan’s failure to withdraw forces from the site of their De- cember 1989 Zarb-I-Momin exercise, which explored offensive options for the Pakistani ground forces. In response, by April 1990 Indian officials were stating that the public should be psychologically prepared for war. Again, the Pakistani military behaved professionally in response to a crisis. According to Robert Oakley, the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad at that time, the Pakistani Army believed that its support for insurgents and Islamic zealots provided a possible answer to India’s continuing occupation of Kashmir. In the words of then-Ambassa- dor Oakley, “The military on the Pakistani side were surprisingly, I thought, calm in a sense, but unrealistically confident.”27 The fragile civilian govern- ments on both sides would have faced great difficulties if they appeared to be backing down from a confrontation and the U.S. became worried that a con- ventional war could break out. As a result, a U.S. mission headed by Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates visited both countries that May. The main objective was to de- escalate the crisis, but reportedly the U.S. took a hard line with Pakistan, threatening to implement the Pressler Amendment and cut off all aid. He also warned that U.S. war games of South Asian conflict suggested that Paki- stan could not win a conventional or nuclear war with India. The U.S. was also able to reassure both sides about the preparedness of the other and the likelihood of attack. U.S. military attaches in both countries noted that the key indicators of possible attack–movement of large armored forces and forward basing of strike aircraft–did not occur.
27. Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruqee, eds., Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis, Occasional Paper No. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1994), p. 7. TIMOTHY D. HOYT 971 Pakistan deliberately did not move additional armored units to threatening positions on the border, perhaps because India’s military forces were not poised in as intimidating a fashion as in 1987. Instead, Pakistan reportedly took steps to signal concern, which may have included real or simulated as- sembly or deployment of nuclear devices. Neither of the U.S. ambassadors in Pakistan or India received notification of Pakistani nuclear moves, but the U.S. was aware that Pakistan’s nuclear program had been reactivated. Again, the crisis resolved without military conflict. Pakistan’s performance in 1971, of course, was woeful. Although one is now blessed with the virtues of hindsight, it should have been clear to Paki- stan early in the crisis that India could take advantage of Pakistan’s weakness and distraction. Clearly, a diplomatic solution was necessary, given India’s growing conventional edge and August 9 alliance with the Soviet Union. In the words of one analyst:
The Pakistani generals had opted for the use of violent force against their own citizens when all they had to do was nullify the elections and dissolve the National Assembly. . . . [A]rmy intelligence failed time and again to correctly assess the situation, and the demeanour of the generals was hardly conducive to rational deci- sion-making. Seeking the victory that had eluded them in 1965, the army high command . . . proceeded to conduct a military campaign [in East Pakistan] that was unwinnable in any circumstance.28 Pakistan’s generals reportedly failed to believe that India was prepared to launch a major offensive, even though Indian probes in the east began in early November. Military operations failed completely: forces in East Paki- stan were routed, overrun, and forced to surrender. A feeble preemptive at- tack against Indian airfields in the west achieved no practical result and Pakistan was forced almost immediately on the defensive, fortunately con- cluding the war before Indian reinforcements could reach the western theater and significantly shift the balance there as well. Pakistan lost 5,139 square miles of territory in the west and Bangladesh became an independent state. In short, it appears that when acting on the defensive, Pakistan’s performance in South Asian crises and wars has been erratic. The results of the nuclear crises between 1984 and 1990 were adequate, but the 1971 war was an un- mitigated disaster that should have been avoided–a clear strategic failure. In Pakistani-instigated crises and conflicts, the military has shown much poorer performance and judgment. Efforts to seize Kashmir in 1947–48 were thwarted by Indian intervention, which should have effectively disproved Pakistani stereotypes (inherited from the British) about ethnicity and military effectiveness. Pakistan still holds roughly one-third of Kashmir, seized dur-
28. Laurence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 359. 972 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 ing the conflict. The Rann of Kutch incident, Pakistan’s one indisputable military success, was waged against Indian border police in the spring of 1965 and terminated by Indian concession. This apparently emboldened Pa- kistan to take more aggressive action later in the year–an example of learn- ing the wrong lessons from a brief encounter. In this later incident, Pakistan attempted to spark a local revolt in Kashmir that it would then use as an excuse for a quick invasion and a fait accompli to rearrange the border. This offensive was based on five assumptions: (1) India’s poor performance against China in 1962 demonstrated military weakness, (2) a belief in the superiority of Pakistani troops (“martial races” theory), (3) a perception of weak Indian political leadership, (4) a belief that Pakistani military technol- ogy provided a decisive edge, and (5) a recognition that India’s defense buildup would change the balance of forces.29 Only the last of these assump- tions proved correct. The Pakistani war plan hoped that Kashmiris would fight as fiercely against Indian rule as the Viet Cong were fighting in South Vietnam. In “Operation Gibraltar,” irregular troops were infiltrated across the border to provoke and support the anticipated uprising–and were promptly turned over to Indian authorities by locals. Frustrated, Pakistan launched a conven- tional offensive in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir area and was then sur- prised when India expanded the area of the fighting to the permanent border, threatening the city of Lahore. After about three weeks, the fighting sput- tered to a halt and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir remained firmly in Indian hands. Pakistan’s strategic efforts suffered from over-optimistic planning, poor in- telligence and analysis, and a serious under-estimation of the political will and military capacity of its Indian adversary. The loss of its vital U.S. ally and the non-appearance of Chinese support suggest a poor appreciation for alliance considerations and international reactions to the attack. Use of irreg- ular troops and efforts to capitalize on tensions in India’s multiethnic society demonstrate an appreciation for unconventional force-multipliers and diver- sionary approaches and recognition of a possible Indian weakness and center of gravity. Nevertheless, Pakistan failed utterly to achieve its goals and ended the war economically poorer, militarily weaker, and diplomatically iso- lated–a clear indication of strategic failure. Disturbingly, the Pakistani military repeated these mistakes 44 years later in a nuclear environment, providing poor advice to a civilian, democratic regime. Pakistan’s Kargil campaign is an almost perfect example of strategic myopia–short-sightedness and the inability to perceive strategic issues
29. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, pp. 111–20; and Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, pp. 285–87. TIMOTHY D. HOYT 973 clearly. The details of the campaign from the Pakistani side are still unclear. What is certain is that the military strongly supported the campaign and civil- ian Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif either tacitly or formally approved an inva- sion of Indian territory. Pakistan launched a limited campaign, aimed at seizing key heights in the Kargil region of Kashmir from which it could threaten the critical highway that supplies Indian troops further north at the Siachen Glacier. At considera- ble expense, it infiltrated approximately a brigade of mixed regular, irregular, and insurgent forces across the Indian border during the winter months, dig- ging them into fortified positions at extraordinarily high altitudes. The infil- tration was an extraordinary tactical achievement, but what it was intended to accomplish is a mystery and Pakistan apparently had no plan for what would happen next. Charitably, one might argue that Pakistan assumed it could suc- cessfully carry out a “reverse-Siachen,” grabbing some territory in a disputed region and confining the conflict to an extended tactical engagement. If this was the assumption, it was terribly flawed. Pakistan apparently intended to capitalize on the existing insurgency in Kashmir, a festering sore since 1990, to deflect attention from its direct participation in the campaign. It hoped, presumably, to take advantage of the stability-instability paradox raised by the possession of nuclear weapons. A belief may have existed that the inter- national community would immediately intervene to limit escalation, because of the formal nuclearization of the region after the May 1998 nuclear tests. Finally, it may have hoped to exploit weaknesses in India’s governing coali- tion. In fact, Kargil was launched at an extremely inauspicious time from a stra- tegic perspective. India and Pakistan had just concluded the historic Lahore Agreement, raising the possibility of an extended peace process–an agree- ment viewed with relief and approval by an international community con- cerned by the previous year’s tensions and nuclear tests. Pakistan was also opening a new dimension to the military conflict when India was governed by the most nationalist and pro-military administration in its history. Pakistan’s assault was, in fact, predictable–it had been gamed by Indian defense analysts in the 1990s–even though it achieved tactical surprise. Pa- kistan failed to anticipate either India’s conventional military response, which eventually totaled the equivalent of roughly two divisions plus massed artil- lery, or the use of air support and advanced air-to-ground munitions. Paki- stan grossly misjudged the response of international opinion, for it was strongly rebuffed by both China and the U.S. Pakistan reportedly resorted to nuclear threats to forestall further Indian escalation, including possible air or ground attacks across the Line of Control (LOC). According to one Indian report, “Pakistan’s foreign secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmed, warned India during the Kargil War that Islamabad could use ‘any weapon to defend the 974 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 country’s territorial integrity’.” 30 At the end of the conflict, India was a clear winner, praised for its political restraint and military success. Pakistan was viewed as rash, unpredictable, and aggressive. The Pakistani military has been intimately connected with the military planning and the political authorization of Pakistan’s offensive failures. Whether the leadership was an elected civilian (Nawaz Sharif in 1999) or a “retired” field marshal (Ayub Khan in 1965), the military has provided faulty intelligence, made flawed assumptions, and urged military action with little possibility of strategic success. It has shown a consistent preference, for un- derstandable military reasons, for preventive attacks and an aggressive for- ward defense. It has encouraged, explicitly in 1965 and implicitly in 1999, the use of military adventure to distract from Pakistani domestic unrest. The military has consistently interfered in Pakistani domestic politics, be- lieving itself to be the preserver of true Pakistani virtues and national inter- ests, a belief demonstrated as recently as October 1999 with the Musharraf coup. The officer corps remains, at least in part, convinced that Kashmir is the key to Indo-Pakistani relations and that India can be pressed and perhaps defeated in Kashmir without danger of a wider conflict. According to a re- port by Stephen Cohen, these hard-line officers believed peace would endan- ger Pakistan because of its inferior resource base and that other officers, including some of high rank, seemed eager to settle Kashmir and seek a nor- mal relationship with India.31 Pakistan has demonstrated apparent inability to learn from previous con- flicts, an uncertain grasp of the relationship between political goals and mili- tary threats and operations, and a consistent pattern of underestimating the will and capability of its Indian adversary. Kargil demonstrates that, despite over 50 years of conflict and interaction, the Pakistan military suffers from a terrible case of strategic myopia–it perceives India, and only India, as the threat, but persistently misjudges it.
Ramifications for Stability in the Subcontinent Theoretical arguments over the implications of nuclear proliferation for stra- tegic stability in South Asia have important policy ramifications. But neither neo-realist theory nor organization theory adequately illuminate the potential for regional instability caused by Pakistan’s military-dominated nuclear force
30. “Editorial: Nuclear Restraint & Risk Reduction,” Hindu, October 19, 2000. Note that this is significantly different from a commitment to use nuclear weapons only if the destruction of the state is imminent. 31. Remarks by Stephen P. Cohen, “Pakistan: A Trip Briefing,” delivered at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., February 9, 2001. TIMOTHY D. HOYT 975 structure and doctrine. Neo-realists suggest that nuclear deterrence is stabi- lizing because it encourages rational decisions, discourages risky behavior, and implicitly forces states to accept the status quo–assumptions that are strikingly disproven by the Kargil conflict. Organization theorists argue whether emerging C2 structures increase or decrease the potential for inad- vertent conflict or crisis–an important argument, but one which does not reflect the more important issues of state policy and strategy as “crisis cre- ators.” The Pakistani military, despite its long and rich tradition and demonstrated tactical and (occasionally) operational effectiveness, is a dysfunctional organ- ization. Military organizations can be extraordinarily professional and highly competent, but still strategically ineffective–examples include the German Army in the first half of the 20th century, the U.S. Army in Vietnam, and the Israeli Army in Lebanon from 1982–85. Strategically ineffective militaries provide poor advice to political leadership, which will lead to poor or irra- tional decision making and, potentially, to crisis or escalation. This problem is compounded when the military organization also views itself as the de- fender, or perhaps creator, of policy. Military organizations that assume pol- icy responsibility often make poor strategic choices–a concern that Clausewitz recognized in his discussion of the political nature of war and the paradoxical trinity and that even Sun Tzu was firmly aware of over 2,500 years ago. This problem becomes even more important in a nuclear environ- ment. Pakistan’s military is a strategically myopic organization, focused on a vi- sion of the Indian threat and a definition of Pakistani national interest that may not be shared by other elites or the populace. Because the nuclear doc- trine, according to government spokesmen, is focused on threats to the exis- tence of the state, this distinction is critical. Proliferation optimism is based on rational non-revisionist policies, but significant elements of the Pakistani Army leadership remain determined to overthrow the South Asian status quo by force. As the nuclear threats during Kargil demonstrate, the concept of an existential threat is flexible in Pakistan, so the nuclear threshold is not clearly delineated and can shift to accommodate and facilitate aggressive policies. Pakistan’s emerging nuclear forces are firmly in the hands of the military. Planning, force development, deployment, and employment are all in the hands of committees dominated by military leadership. Given the empirical evidence of Pakistan’s past behavior, the absence of any system of checks and balances on the military represents a serious concern. Nuclear doctrine, nuclear employment, and both military and policy decisions are all in the hands of an organization that has performed poorly and, at times, irrationally. This problem is exacerbated by Pakistan’s revisionist policies, particularly regarding Kashmir. The strongest theoretical arguments of the proliferation 976 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLI, NO. 6, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001 optimists rely on the assumption that emerging arsenals are used for deter- rence. The two optimist articles most focused on C2 in emerging arsenals focus on the minimal requirements of a survivable second strike capability.32 They dismiss two crucial possibilities: that regional competitors will acquire the capabilities to launch successful counterforce strikes, and the possibility that these emerging states will use their nuclear arsenals for offensive or ag- gressive purposes. Both apply to Pakistan. The emerging regional and international security environment poses new challenges and dangers for Pakistan. Missile defenses, both Western and In- dian, are looming on the horizon. Increased antagonism between Iran and Pakistan may result from the crisis over the Taliban and the drift of extremist Islamic centers eastward. A reemergence of the Iran-Iraq arms race, or a renewal of the Israeli-Arab conventional or unconventional weapons compe- tition, will raise new threats to Pakistan from the west, as will the new Amer- ican presence in Central Asia. India’s deployment of reconnaissance satel- lites and accurate long-range missiles may provide the necessary surveillance and strike components for a potential nuclear first-strike threat in the near future. India’s expanding conventional capabilities raise numerous possibili- ties for conventional “counterproliferation” using sophisticated smart muni- tions and deep-strike aircraft like the Su-30. Finally, General Musharraf’s pledge to support the U.S. raises the possibility of either a military coup by a dissatisfied officer corps or of internal unrest and insurgency by Islamic ex- tremists. The Pakistani military’s control over nuclear assets, development, and pol- icy represents a theoretically efficient division of labor and a reasonable orga- nizational solution to the command and control dilemma. It provides for substantial physical security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal–no small matter, given the possibility of unrest and concerns over Islamic militancy–and sub- stantially ensures that the nuclear force will meet the “always function” test. Within these operational parameters, it is clearly preferable to other possible C2 options. As a force for stability, however, its impact is minimal. Theorists may argue that emerging nuclear regimes and their command and control structures implicitly lead to regional stability. The empirical evi- dence, at least in Pakistan’s case, appears to challenge this. The core as- sumption of optimists is that development of survivable nuclear arsenals will deter adversaries from rash or dangerous actions. The Kargil incident sug- gests the flaw in this assumption–far from being deterred by India’s nuclear arsenal, Pakistan assumed that India would be unwilling to respond aggres-
32. Jordan Seng, “Less Is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States,” Security Studies 6:4 (Summer 1997), pp. 50–92; and David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessi- mism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 21:3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 87–119. TIMOTHY D. HOYT 977 sively because of the new regional nuclear overlay. In essence, Pakistani decision makers assumed that their nuclear deterrent was more persuasive than India’s, and allowed them flexibility for offensive operations to rear- range the LOC. It is tempting to dismiss this as irrational behavior and therefore argue that it does not refute theories of proliferation optimism. Unfortunately, Kargil appears to be both a clear challenge to assumptions of nuclear stability and possibly an episode that can be repeated in the near future. Both India and Pakistan continue to prepare for “more Kargils,” and until nuclear thresholds are clearly understood by both sides, the potential for nuclear confrontations will continue. The Pakistani military is not a “rogue elephant.” Its officers and enlisted personnel have demonstrated great courage, patriotism, skill, and integrity. However, its continuing dominance of defense, nuclear, and for- eign policy, its ongoing efforts to revise the South Asian status quo, and its poor strategic judgment suggest that the nuclearization of the subcontinent has led to a new era of instability. Neither nuclear weapons nor even the most robust command and control practices can guarantee stability in South Asia. Ultimately, the only guarantee of stability in this newly nuclearized region is the adoption of sound strategy and policy by the governments and militaries of both sides.