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The Notion of the Passions in Thomas Aquinas

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The Notion of the Passions in Thomas Aquinas T he Notion of the Pas s ions in T homas Aquinas S ubmitted by Kyong s ook Kim S upervis ed by Prof. Chris topher S palatin MA in Philos ophy Department of Philos ophy T he Univers ity of S ogang December 1999 토 마 스 아 퀴 나 스 의 열 정 1 9 9 9 년 서 강 대 학 교 대 학 원 철 학 과 김 경 숙 토마스 아퀴나스의 열정 지도교수 신 성 용 이 논문을 문학석사 학위논문으로 제출함 1999년 12월 서 강 대 학 교 대 학 원 철 학 과 김 경 숙 논 문 인 준 서 김경숙의 문학 석사 학위 논문을 인준함. 1999년 12월 주심 박 종 대 부심 성 염 부심 신 성 용 F or my m other and father who went through a lot. Abs tract T he present thesis makes an attempt to point out the status of passions and show what kind of role they do in human life. Passion has two opposing qualities of passivity and activity, which is due to the fact that it undergoes two kinds of movement. Passion is one of the conscious tendencies a human posesses and it should be given a known good to be actualized. It is a passive power in the sense that it can be put into act only after it is moved by a good known by the senses. Once it is stirred, it makes its own movement toward the external good, in which stage it is an active force. T raditionally, passion has been regarded as opposed to reason. However, it is not mere intense emotion, which is often thought of as an obstacle to the well- being of a person for Aquinas. First of all, it is a decent power flowing from the soul like the will and the intellect. T here, of course, exists hierarchy among these faculties. Aside from several exceptions, reason is a higher power than will; and according to the principle that the higher power moves the lower, it moves will. Next, when it comes to the relationship between will and passion, both are powers that tend toward goods (appetitive powers) but their proper objects are different. Whereas the proper object of will is the universal good, that of passion is a particular good. As what is universal is higher than what is particular, will moves passion. T his way, passion is subjected to both will and reason. What is a genuinely human act for Aquinas is a voluntary act in which a human is conscious of the ultimate end. And only this kind of act is moral for Aquinas. In this sense, only humans can be considered morally. T hus, although passions are found both in humans and animals, we can bring hum an passions under a moral light. What is a morally good passion is the one that is in harmony with reason, and contributes a person' s morality. T he fact that Aquinas delves into passions in the second part of Summ a T heologica, which is about the response of the earthly creatures to God, tells us a lot. Everything we have is good because it is from God and can be turned into the means to reach Her. T hus, when we respond to our Creator, we should do it passionately. 초록 본 논문에서는 토마스의 영혼론에서 정열(passion)이 어떤 위치 를 차지하며, 인간의 삶에 어떤 역할을 하는지 알아보고자 한다. 정열 이 한편으로 수동적인 것 같으면서도 또 다른 한편으로 적극적인 운 동을 하는 것으로 보이는 것은 그것이 지닌 역동성 때문이다. 정열은 인간이 지닌 의식적 경향성(conscious tendency, appetency) 중의 하 나로, 그것이 발휘되기 위해서는 반드시 감각을 통해 주어진 일종의 지식(sensory knowledge)이 필요하다. 감각 기관이 외부의 사물 (external object)에서 따낸 상(form)이 주어질 때 정열은 일깨워지는 데, 이러한 의미에서 정열은 인간이 지닌 수동적 기관(faculty) 중의 하나이다. 일단 일깨워진 정열은 정열의 대상을 향한 나름의 새로운 운동을 시작하는데, 이러한 의미에서 정열은 다분히 적극적인 힘이다. 전통적으로 정열은 이성과 대비되는 개념으로 이해되어져 왔다. 그러나 토마스 철학에 있어 정열은 영혼의 안녕을 방해하는, 단순히 고조된 감정이 아니다. 그것은 우선 이성, 의지 같은 지성적 힘과 더 불어 영혼에서 흘러나오는 하나의 힘이다. 다만 그들 사이에는 토마스 존재론 전체를 꿰뚫고 있는 질서 개념과 같이 하나의 위계질서가 존 재한다. 먼저 지성적 힘들인 이성과 의지를 살펴보면 몇 개의 예외적 상황을 제외하고는 이성이 의지보다 더 상위 개념이다. 그리고 상위의 것이 하위의 것을 움직인다는 원칙에 근거하여 이성은 의지를 움직인 다. 다음으로 의지와 정열의 관계를 살펴보자. 의지와 정열은 모두 어 떤 대상을 추구하는 욕구 능력(appetitive power)이다. 그러나 그들의 추구 대상은 다른데, 의지의 대상은 보편선(universal good)이고 정열 의 대상은 개별선(particular good)이다. 보다 보편적인 것이 개별적인 것보다 상위에 있고 또 개별적인 것을 움직인다는 원칙에 의해, 의지 가 정열을 움직인다. 의지의 지휘를 받는 정열은 자동적으로 더욱 더 상위의 것인 이성에 자동적으로 종속된다. 그러나 현실적으로 우리는 정열이 이성을 마비시키는 경우를 종 종 겪는데 이는 이성이 정열을 ‘다독거리고 설득하는’ 방식으로 다스 리기 때문이다. 비록 정열이 이성의 판단을 흐리고 심지어 마비시키기 는 하지만 그것은 일시적이며, 이성에 의해 기본적으로 통제 가능하 다. 토마스에게 있어 진정으로 인간적인 행위는 자유의지에 의한 행 동이며, 이는 또한 궁극적 목표를 의식하고 있을 뿐 아니라 그 목표를 향해 행동함을 의미한다. 그리고 이러한 행동만이 도덕적 의미를 지닌 다. 즉 토마스에게는 이성적인 것이 곧 도덕적인 것이다. 이러한 의미 에서 인간만이 유일하게 도덕적으로 행위할 수 있는 존재이며, 이 이 성적인 동물이 지닌 정열 또한 다른 동물들이 지닌 정열과 달리 도덕 적으로 논의가 될 수 있는 것이다. 토마스에게 있어 도덕적으로 선한 정열은 이성과 조화를 이루는 정열이며, 도덕적으로 악한 정열은 이성 의 지휘를 벗어나는 것이다. 또한 각각은 한 인간의 도덕적인 삶을 고 양시키고 떨어뜨린다. 그러나 그렇다고 해서 정열이 그 자체로 무의미한 것은 아니다. 이성을 지닌 인간이 행복하고 덕스런 삶을 사는데 있어 그것은 중요 한 의미한 지닌다. 정열이 < 신학대전> 2부 즉 신에 대한 피조물들의 응답 부분에 위치해 있는 것이 단순한 우연이 아닌 것처럼 우리의 정 열 또한 단순한 반응 기제가 아니다. 오히려 그것은 신에게서 유래했 기에 선하며, 그것을 지닌 우리는 삶의 부름에 정열적으로 응답해야 한다. 어떤 일을 함에 있어 정열은 단순한 정신 집중이나 쾌락의 차원 을 넘어서 행복과 덕의 추구에 적극적으로 기여한다. 그것은 토마스가 < 신학대전> 2부 첫 머리에서 말하듯 우리의 행동이 자발적인 한 목 표를 지향하기 때문이며, 모든 목표들은 결국 하나의 보편적인 목표를 지향하고 있기 때문이다. CONT ENT S introduction 13 CHAPT ER 1: WHAT IS SUMMA T HEOLOGICA? 16 CHAPT ER 2: T HE DEFINIT ION OF PASSION 19 1. T he Etymology of Passion 19 2. T he Definition of Passion 21 CHAPT ER 3: PASSION AS T HE SENSORY APPET IT E 33 1. Passion Based on the Sensory Knowledge 33 2. T he Movement of Passions 36 CHAPT ER 4: PASSION AND RAT IONALIT Y 43 1. T endencies 44 1.1. T endencies in Non- living T hings 44 1.2. T endencies in Living T hings 45 2. T he Obedience of Passion to the Reason. 47 2.1. T he Superiority of the Will to the Passion 48 2.2. T he Rule of the Intellect over the Passions 51 CHAPT ER 5: PASSION AND MORALIT Y 53 1. Passion in regard to the end of the human act 54 1.1. Humans Seek an End. 54 1.2. Human Acts versus Acts of Man (ST IaIIae.1.1) 56 1.3. Voluntariness in a Human Action 58 2. Passion in Relation to Moral Good and Evil 59 2.1. Moral Good or Evil in the Passions. 59 2.2. T he Passions in Relation to Sin 64 2.3. T he Passions and Virtue 67 conclusion 71 A bbreviations ST Sum m a T heologica or Sum m a T heologiae ST Ia.1.1 Article 1, Question 1, Part I of Summ a T heologica - 13 - introduction What is passion? Many people have praised passions and nearly as many people have warned of their danger. At one extreme we have St. Francis of Assisi and Ludwig Wittgenstein, who are respected greatly for their passions, and at the other extreme we have Camille Claudel and Anna Karenina, who are sympathized for being ' victims' of their own passions 1). Although the passions drove them into opposite directions, their lives all reveal the powerful force of passions. T hen how do we have to consider passion? Is it something that generates its own movement and can hardly be checked, once set in motion? Or is it something that can be controlled and used for a certain purpose? All these questions are closely connected to the problem of rationality in passion. In this thesis, I am going to attempt to point out the status of the passions in St. T homas Aquinas' s philosophy. T his will center around the relationship between the passions and reason. T he topic will sound particularly interesting if one reminds herself of how 1 T he choice of these exemplary people by no means has a sexist connotation. At any rate, Camille Claudel makes an interesting contrast with her lover, Rodin, who was no doubt a passionate figure but was not blindly driven by his passions. Leo T olstoy, A nna K arenina trans. by Alymer Maude (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970) Anne Delbee, Camille Claudel trans. by Myong- ho Kang (Seoul: Joneum- sa, 1989) - 14 - Aquinas' s philosophy is generally understood. As is well known, Aquinas stands out as an intellectualist among Medieval philosophers, especially as opposed to his predecessor, St. Augustine, who put great emphasis on love (passionate conversion to God) throughout his life. For Augustine our ability to love comes first in finding the truth, which is well provided by his famous saying, ' Love and do what you will (am a et fac quod vi s)2)' Now the way to the truth is primarily through the intellect for Aquinas.
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