T he Notion of the Pas s ions in T homas Aquinas
S ubmitted by Kyong s ook Kim S upervis ed by Prof. Chris topher S palatin
MA in Philos ophy Department of Philos ophy
T he Univers ity of S ogang December 1999 토 마 스 아 퀴 나 스 의 열 정
1 9 9 9 년
서 강 대 학 교 대 학 원 철 학 과 김 경 숙 토마스 아퀴나스의 열정
지도교수 신 성 용
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1999년 12월
서 강 대 학 교 대 학 원 철 학 과 김 경 숙 논 문 인 준 서
김경숙의 문학 석사 학위 논문을 인준함.
1999년 12월
주심 박 종 대 부심 성 염 부심 신 성 용 F or my m other and father who went through a lot. Abs tract
T he present thesis makes an attempt to point out the status of passions and show what kind of role they do in human life. Passion has two opposing qualities of passivity and activity, which is due to the fact that it undergoes two kinds of movement. Passion is one of the conscious tendencies a human posesses and it should be given a known good to be actualized. It is a passive power in the sense that it can be put into act only after it is moved by a good known by the senses. Once it is stirred, it makes its own movement toward the external good, in which stage it is an active force. T raditionally, passion has been regarded as opposed to reason. However, it is not mere intense emotion, which is often thought of as an obstacle to the well- being of a person for Aquinas. First of all, it is a decent power flowing from the soul like the will and the intellect. T here, of course, exists hierarchy among these faculties. Aside from several exceptions, reason is a higher power than will; and according to the principle that the higher power moves the lower, it moves will. Next, when it comes to the relationship between will and passion, both are powers that tend toward goods (appetitive powers) but their proper objects are different. Whereas the proper object of will is the universal good, that of passion is a particular good. As what is universal is higher than what is particular, will moves passion. T his way, passion is subjected to both will and reason. What is a genuinely human act for Aquinas is a voluntary act in which a human is conscious of the ultimate end. And only this kind of act is moral for Aquinas. In this sense, only humans can be considered morally. T hus, although passions are found both in humans and animals, we can bring hum an passions under a moral light. What is a morally good passion is the one that is in harmony with reason, and contributes a person' s morality. T he fact that Aquinas delves into passions in the second part of Summ a T heologica, which is about the response of the earthly creatures to God, tells us a lot. Everything we have is good because it is from God and can be turned into the means to reach Her. T hus, when we respond to our Creator, we should do it passionately. 초록
본 논문에서는 토마스의 영혼론에서 정열(passion)이 어떤 위치 를 차지하며, 인간의 삶에 어떤 역할을 하는지 알아보고자 한다. 정열 이 한편으로 수동적인 것 같으면서도 또 다른 한편으로 적극적인 운
동을 하는 것으로 보이는 것은 그것이 지닌 역동성 때문이다. 정열은 인간이 지닌 의식적 경향성(conscious tendency, appetency) 중의 하 나로, 그것이 발휘되기 위해서는 반드시 감각을 통해 주어진 일종의 지식(sensory knowledge)이 필요하다. 감각 기관이 외부의 사물 (external object)에서 따낸 상(form)이 주어질 때 정열은 일깨워지는 데, 이러한 의미에서 정열은 인간이 지닌 수동적 기관(faculty) 중의 하나이다. 일단 일깨워진 정열은 정열의 대상을 향한 나름의 새로운 운동을 시작하는데, 이러한 의미에서 정열은 다분히 적극적인 힘이다. 전통적으로 정열은 이성과 대비되는 개념으로 이해되어져 왔다. 그러나 토마스 철학에 있어 정열은 영혼의 안녕을 방해하는, 단순히 고조된 감정이 아니다. 그것은 우선 이성, 의지 같은 지성적 힘과 더 불어 영혼에서 흘러나오는 하나의 힘이다. 다만 그들 사이에는 토마스 존재론 전체를 꿰뚫고 있는 질서 개념과 같이 하나의 위계질서가 존
재한다. 먼저 지성적 힘들인 이성과 의지를 살펴보면 몇 개의 예외적 상황을 제외하고는 이성이 의지보다 더 상위 개념이다. 그리고 상위의 것이 하위의 것을 움직인다는 원칙에 근거하여 이성은 의지를 움직인
다. 다음으로 의지와 정열의 관계를 살펴보자. 의지와 정열은 모두 어 떤 대상을 추구하는 욕구 능력(appetitive power)이다. 그러나 그들의 추구 대상은 다른데, 의지의 대상은 보편선(universal good)이고 정열 의 대상은 개별선(particular good)이다. 보다 보편적인 것이 개별적인 것보다 상위에 있고 또 개별적인 것을 움직인다는 원칙에 의해, 의지 가 정열을 움직인다. 의지의 지휘를 받는 정열은 자동적으로 더욱 더 상위의 것인 이성에 자동적으로 종속된다. 그러나 현실적으로 우리는 정열이 이성을 마비시키는 경우를 종
종 겪는데 이는 이성이 정열을 ‘다독거리고 설득하는’ 방식으로 다스 리기 때문이다. 비록 정열이 이성의 판단을 흐리고 심지어 마비시키기 는 하지만 그것은 일시적이며, 이성에 의해 기본적으로 통제 가능하 다. 토마스에게 있어 진정으로 인간적인 행위는 자유의지에 의한 행
동이며, 이는 또한 궁극적 목표를 의식하고 있을 뿐 아니라 그 목표를 향해 행동함을 의미한다. 그리고 이러한 행동만이 도덕적 의미를 지닌 다. 즉 토마스에게는 이성적인 것이 곧 도덕적인 것이다. 이러한 의미 에서 인간만이 유일하게 도덕적으로 행위할 수 있는 존재이며, 이 이 성적인 동물이 지닌 정열 또한 다른 동물들이 지닌 정열과 달리 도덕
적으로 논의가 될 수 있는 것이다. 토마스에게 있어 도덕적으로 선한 정열은 이성과 조화를 이루는 정열이며, 도덕적으로 악한 정열은 이성 의 지휘를 벗어나는 것이다. 또한 각각은 한 인간의 도덕적인 삶을 고 양시키고 떨어뜨린다. 그러나 그렇다고 해서 정열이 그 자체로 무의미한 것은 아니다. 이성을 지닌 인간이 행복하고 덕스런 삶을 사는데 있어 그것은 중요
한 의미한 지닌다. 정열이 < 신학대전> 2부 즉 신에 대한 피조물들의 응답 부분에 위치해 있는 것이 단순한 우연이 아닌 것처럼 우리의 정
열 또한 단순한 반응 기제가 아니다. 오히려 그것은 신에게서 유래했 기에 선하며, 그것을 지닌 우리는 삶의 부름에 정열적으로 응답해야 한다. 어떤 일을 함에 있어 정열은 단순한 정신 집중이나 쾌락의 차원 을 넘어서 행복과 덕의 추구에 적극적으로 기여한다. 그것은 토마스가 < 신학대전> 2부 첫 머리에서 말하듯 우리의 행동이 자발적인 한 목 표를 지향하기 때문이며, 모든 목표들은 결국 하나의 보편적인 목표를 지향하고 있기 때문이다. CONT ENT S introduction 13
CHAPT ER 1: WHAT IS SUMMA T HEOLOGICA? 16
CHAPT ER 2: T HE DEFINIT ION OF PASSION 19 1. T he Etymology of Passion 19 2. T he Definition of Passion 21
CHAPT ER 3: PASSION AS T HE SENSORY APPET IT E 33 1. Passion Based on the Sensory Knowledge 33 2. T he Movement of Passions 36
CHAPT ER 4: PASSION AND RAT IONALIT Y 43 1. T endencies 44 1.1. T endencies in Non- living T hings 44 1.2. T endencies in Living T hings 45 2. T he Obedience of Passion to the Reason. 47 2.1. T he Superiority of the Will to the Passion 48 2.2. T he Rule of the Intellect over the Passions 51
CHAPT ER 5: PASSION AND MORALIT Y 53 1. Passion in regard to the end of the human act 54 1.1. Humans Seek an End. 54 1.2. Human Acts versus Acts of Man (ST IaIIae.1.1) 56 1.3. Voluntariness in a Human Action 58 2. Passion in Relation to Moral Good and Evil 59 2.1. Moral Good or Evil in the Passions. 59 2.2. T he Passions in Relation to Sin 64 2.3. T he Passions and Virtue 67 conclusion 71 A bbreviations
ST Sum m a T heologica or Sum m a T heologiae ST Ia.1.1 Article 1, Question 1, Part I of Summ a T heologica - 13 - introduction
What is passion? Many people have praised passions and nearly as many people have warned of their danger. At one extreme we have St. Francis of Assisi and Ludwig Wittgenstein, who are respected greatly for their passions, and at the other extreme we have Camille Claudel and Anna Karenina, who are sympathized for being ' victims' of their own passions 1). Although the passions drove them into opposite directions, their lives all reveal the powerful force of passions. T hen how do we have to consider passion? Is it something that generates its own movement and can hardly be checked, once set in motion? Or is it something that can be controlled and used for a certain purpose? All these questions are closely connected to the problem of rationality in passion. In this thesis, I am going to attempt to point out the status of the passions in St. T homas Aquinas' s philosophy. T his will center around the relationship between the passions and reason. T he topic will sound particularly interesting if one reminds herself of how
1 T he choice of these exemplary people by no means has a sexist connotation. At any rate, Camille Claudel makes an interesting contrast with her lover, Rodin, who was no doubt a passionate figure but was not blindly driven by his passions.
Leo T olstoy, A nna K arenina trans. by Alymer Maude (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970)
Anne Delbee, Camille Claudel trans. by Myong- ho Kang (Seoul: Joneum- sa, 1989) - 14 -
Aquinas' s philosophy is generally understood. As is well known, Aquinas stands out as an intellectualist among Medieval philosophers, especially as opposed to his predecessor, St. Augustine, who put great emphasis on love (passionate conversion to God) throughout his life. For Augustine our ability to love comes first in finding the truth, which is well provided by his famous saying, ' Love and do what you will (am a et fac quod vi s)2)' Now the way to the truth is primarily through the intellect for Aquinas. According to him, one must first know to love. For him love is not primary in the sense it can be activated only after it is given a known good(knowledge). T hen does it lead us to the conclusion that the passions are in opposition to the truth for Aquinas? T his would be oversimplifying his philosophy, especially if one thinks about his vast metaphysical background. Nothing can be meaningless to the extent that it can be denied simply because everything in this world comes from God, the infinite good. Because every thing in the world, however trivial it may seem, comes from the Goodness itself, and thus cannot be evil. Evil is only the lack of good.(ST Ia.5.3) T he methodology I am going to use throughout this writing follows Aquinas' s treatment of the passions in his Sum m a T heologica. T o do that, I will firstly introduce the general lay- out
2 Augustin of Hippo, T ractatus in E p. J oannis, vii. - 15 - of Sum m a. T hen I will explain the etymological origin of the word, passion. Here I will enclose some non- T homist notions of the passions as well. T hen I will get down to treating the actual passions, first taking them as they are. After that I will embark on what kind of passions are found in a human being, which will be the beginning of my discussion of passion and rationality. In Chapter 4, I will attempt to highlight the passions as one of the powers deriving from the soul. T he soul also has the powers of the will and the intellect; and their relation to the passions will be also treated in Chapter 4. Lastly, I will treat the passions in as much as they can be considered moral. My job for this task will be to prove the necessary connection between rationality and morality in Aquinas' s philosophy. In this section I will specifically investigate into the problems of the passions in a sin and a virtue respectively. - 16 -
CHAPT ER 1: WHAT IS SUMMA T HEOLOGICA?
First of all, the Latin sum m a literally means the sum- total of theological knowledge.3) But by the thirteenth century in the West sum m a has taken on a specific meaning that was well- known to the scholars of those days. At that time it referred to a literary work conducted with the following three aims: 1) to exactly state all the main doctrines of a scientific field of knowledge, 2) to organize its subject matter in a precise and synthetic manner, based on compiled pieces of knowledge, and 3) to make the summarized writing appropriate for teaching purposes.4) T he Sum m a consists of three parts and the supplement. T he second part is divided into two distinct sections. T he text is divided into questions and each question is further divided into articles. And each article with several objections, the position of Aquinas, and this is followed by replies to previous objections. T o begin with, the whole Sum m a is carefully planned by the philosopher as a circular scheme. T his is his adaptation of Neo- Platonic scheme and at the same time an ' improvement' on
3 Chenu Dominque, T he Scope of Sum m a of St. T hom as (Washington: T he T homist Press, 1958) p.4 4 Ibid., pp. 5- 6. For the last aim we had better recall what T homas says on the purpose of his writing Sum m a in the prologue of the same book: ' T he doctor of Catholic truth not only has to teach the advanced student; his business is also to enlighten those who are just starting to learn. Hence it is my aim to treat of what pertains to the Christian religion in a manner suitable for the instruction of beginners.' - 17 -
Aristotle in the sense that he makes an attempt to go beyond the boundary of scientific world of Aristotle, yet his starting point still being in this world.5) In the circular Neo- Platonic system, all the beings emanate from the One, forming a strict hierarchy; and all beings return to the One. T he Sum m a T heologica, as the name suggests, is the study of God. But since God is the Creator of the universe, naturally everything can be examined in its twofold relation to God: in its going out from God as Creator and in its coming back to God as End. By appealing to the idea of exitus(going out) and reditus(returning), Aquinas tries to show in the Sum ma the order in the created universe where all creatures are arranged according to genus and species. T hanks to which, we can easily get the common origin of each individual nature in the universe.6) In other words, the Sum m a is a tale of Divine History. In Part I of the Summ a, we have the stories of the ' emanation' of creatures from God as their origin. T he natures of God, angels, and man are explained respectively in this part. Now Part II is about the response of the creatures to the Creator. Lastly, in Part III the returning is exemplified through Christ, the Word- made- flesh. Part III discusses required qualities for man to return to God. Now since passion(emotion) is treated in Part II, we had better take a close look at it. After Aquinas deals with God and
5 Ibid., p. 15. 6 Ibid., p. 16. - 18 -
Her work according to Her will in detail in Part I, he sets down to the treatment of Her image, the human, now according to his free will, i.e. according to the fact that he has free choice and control of his actions (although these are given by God, strictly speaking). Firstly, he demonstrates the fact that all humans are bound to act for an end and pursue one ultimate end, infinite good. T his last end, he calls, true and perfect happiness(beatitudo, eudaim onia) and this is what properly pertains to human nature. Now since this happiness can only be achieved by certain acts, he begins to investigate in human acts specifically those acts which will bring a human being to happiness, and those which will hinder him from it. He first deals with will or voluntary act, believing that it is something that is more properly human or something that makes a human stand out among other animals, i.e. something of an intellective order rather than sensitive order, is more closely connected to happiness. T hen he moves on to a faculty that is common to humans and other animals: the passions. Even though passions have a lower position than will, they can still play an important role in achieving the ultimate end of human life. T his thesis will attempt to see if the passions are properly the human means along with will for humans to obtain not only ephemeral worldly pleasure but also enduring happiness. - 19 -
CHAPT ER 2: T HE DEFINIT ION OF PASSION
1. T he Etymology of Passion
What is passion? Contrary to what many modern people would think, the word passion originally means passive. We find words like pati, passio, and passivus in St. T homas Aquinas' s Sum m a T heologica. T he Latin, pati is the infinitive, ' to undergo' or ' to suffer' 7). T he adjective (passive) is passivus and the perfect participle is passus. Now passio, the most central word to the present writing, comes from passus. Aquinas deals with passio in several places in Sum m a T heologica and each time he employs two senses of the word: passivity and passion or emotion8). T his seems to be a deliberate play on word in order to pave the way for his discussion on passion. Keeping in mind the ' deep- seated' nuance of passivity9), he carefully opens his argument on passion as follows:
1) Is there passion in the soul?(utrum aliqua passio sit in anim a? ST IaIIae.22.1)
7 T his meaning for passion is well exemplified in the passion of Christ, meaning His suffering. 8 T his, of course, is more modern meaning of passion: intense feeling or strong emotional attachment. 9 T his is because Aquinas assumed passio as coming under Aristotle' s tenth category, τσ πασχειν, passio with contrast to the ninth category of τσ π οιειν, actio. - 20 -
2) If passion is in the soul, is it more in the apprehensive or in the appetitive part?(utrum m agis in parte appetitiva quam in apprehensiva? ST IaIIae.22.2) 3) If it is in the appetite, then is it in the sensitive appetite or in the intellectual appetite?(utrum magis sit in appetitu sensitivo quam intellectivo, qui dicitur voluntas? ST IaIIae.22.3)
Some English translations of Sum m a T helologica tried to be more ' faithful' by rendering the word passio into ' passion' while some other versions voted for ' emotion' .10) As for the latter case, the choice for the word ' emotion' over ' feeling' is thought to be due to the idea that emotions are stronger and more enduring than feelings.11) Again, the Latin passio can be traced back to the old Greek,
which means: 1) anything that befalls one, a suffering, misfortune, calamity; 2) a passive condition, a passion, affection; and 3) an incident. Further, is a derivative of , which, as opposed to (logos or reason), was used for anything with a potential, i.e. matter, to receive something. T his is why the word passion still carries the meaning of passivity even in modern
10 Blackfriar' s Sum m a T helogiae translates passio as ' emotion' whereas Encyclopedia Britannica' s Sum ma T helologica. renders it as ' passion' . . 11 T his is supported by some modern psychologists and George Klubertanz, although he thinks of emotions as a species of passion. See his P hilosophy of H um an N ature (New York: Appleton- Century- Crofts, Inc., 1953) p. 206. - 21 - context though the word almost always refers to intense feeling or even an activating force.
2. T he Definition of Passion
Aquinas' s major first treatment of passion appears in his analysis of the intellect in the soul(ST Ia.79.2). Regarding the question of passivity of the intellect, he deals with passion incidentally because passion shares one etymological root with passivity. He says ' to be passive' can be understood in three senses. (Dicendum quod pati tripliciter dicitur.) (1a)First, in a strict sense, we use the word pati when some thing is taken away from a thing because of the nature of the thing. For example, water, when it is heated, becomes hot because it loses its coolness. T his is because of the nature or form of the water. Every form is accompanied by tendency or inclination, and water by its nature has a natural tendency to lose coolness when it receives heat. (1b)His second usage of the word is less strict than the first and he says pati can be referred to the situation where from a thing is taken away something whether it is suitable or unsuitable for the thing. T hus, a person can be said to be passive merely by the fact she or he underwent change of whatever kind. In this sense, not only a happy person but also a sad person can be said to be passive. (1c)Lastly, in a broad sense, he says a thing can be said to be - 22 -
passive when it or a part of it moves from potency to act, even though it does not lose anything. T his is based on Aristotle' s metaphysics of act and potency. For Aristotle, motion accompanies the passage from potency to act and is the same as being perfected. Accordingly, we can say wherever there is change there is passivity or passion. Now he says the kind of passivity our understanding befalls is the last kind12) After he analyzes passion along with the passive intellect, he gives another set of definition in his treatise on human acts(ST IaIIae.22.1) While insisting that passions flow from the soul or from a power of the soul, he introduces another three ways the word passion can be used. As in Part I, Question 79, he depends on the various senses of the word, pati, to define passion as an
12 Another noteworthy thing here is that Aquinas does not give us a clear distinction between passivity and passion. Rather, he chooses either sense as is more suitable. T his can perhaps explain the discordance in translation between Britannica and Blackfriars. Compare their translation.
Original: Sic igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum tertium modum pas s ionis . Et per consequens intellectus est potentia pas s iv a.
Britannica' s: And so it is evident that with us to understand is in a way to be pas s iv e, taking pas s ion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a pas s iv e power.
Blackfriars' s: T hus it is plain that our understanding involves pas s iv ity of the third kind, and that in consequence the intellect is a receptiv e power. (My bold print.) - 23 - emotion13). (2a)First, in a general sense, pati (to suffer, to undergo, to be acted upon) is used whenever a thing receives a quality without it losing anything on its part. For example, air can be said to be passive when it is lit up14). (2b)Secondly, pati can be used in the situation where a thing receives a quality by losing another quality and this takes place in two ways. (2b- 1)First, when a thing loses a quality that is unsuitable for it. A person who has recovered from an illness can be said to be passive in this sense because she has lost the quality of illness, which is inappropriate for her, and gained health which properly belongs to her. (2b- 2)Secondly, we sometimes have the reverse happening to us, that is, we receive a quality unsuitable for us and lose another quality that belongs to us. Modern meaning of patient falls into this case: those who have lost their health and gained some illness. What is noteworthy here is Aquinas' s commentary following the second definition of the second set(2b- 2). He says the word passio is used in the last sense in the most correct sense. T hat is when we lose something which belongs to us and gain something else that is not suitable for us. T his is because to be passive means to be drawn to some agent.(ST IaIIae.22.1) T hus we can say that the more a thing is withdrawn from a quality that is
13 T his is evident in the title of the question: de subjecto passionum anim ae. 14 T his may be not so scientific according to modern science. T o understand some of the examples and analogies used in Sum ma T heologica we should first understand their way of seeing things. - 24 - suitable to it, the more it is drawn to a quality that is other than itself. T his is the state we often notice in a person under the influence of passion(emotion): ecstasy or being carried out of herself. Aquinas goes on to make another significant point about passions: those kinds of passions through which a quality is lost always involve a bodily change15). In a strict sense, only a being that has a body that can undergo change can have passion. Whether the bodily change is for the better or for the worse is central to the present issue and will be discussed later16). After giving two definitions of passion, Aquinas classifies passions into two kinds, concupiscible passions and irascible passions. Concupiscible passions are love, hatred, desire, aversion, joy, and sadness. Irascible passions are hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger. T hese species of passion will be dealt with more in detail in Chapter 3. T o better understand Aquinas' s notion of passion, we need to
15 Klubertanz and some modern psychologists call this a ' bodily resonance' and take the following examples: changes in respiration and pulse; changes in motor activity; changes in external expression; variations in external and particularly internal secretions (tears and perspirations, adrenalin). p. 206. 16 T he Latin: Et hic est propriissimus modus passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem; quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens maxime videtur ad aliud trahi.[...]Passio autem cum abjectione non est, nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem; unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet compositum patitur. Sed in hoc est diversitas:nam quando hujusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius magis proprie habet rationem passionis quam quando fit in melius; unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam laetitia.(ST IaIIae.22.1) - 25 - see how his theory was interpreted and developed by later T homists. Klubertanz for instance delves into the human passion along with other powers of the soul in his P hilosophy of H um an N ature. He defines (animal) passion as any act of the sense appetite or sensory appetency. Clear and simple as it may sound, it is not so easy to fully grasp what he means by it. Prior to the definition of passion we need to know how he defines appetite and appetency. Yet to have the definitions of those two words, we need to start with the most basic conscious activities of animals and patiently proceed step by step. First, he divides conscious activities in two acts: 1) knowledge and 2) appetency. T hen what is appetency? Appetency means conscious tendency, i.e. the experience of striving for or resting in a known good. T his is to be distinguished from natural tendency, which is an inanimate tendency toward a good.17) Now what is appetite? It is the power of tending toward a good or tending away from an evil. In other words, passion is an actualization or expression of the sensory appetitive power. Now Klubertanz classifies the state of passion into four groups: 1) feeling or affection, 2) emotions and sentiments, 3) desires and aversions, and 4) choices. First, feeling is how we react to our environment, especially our bodily condition. Our
17 According to Klubertanz, natural tendency is the tendency due to a thing as having a nature or a form. It is identical with power. It does not presuppose knowledge in the agent. - 26 - dissatisfaction with a humid Seoul summer day is an example of this. Second, emotions and sentiments are more noticeable affections. T his is because these two involve definite bodily changes 18). For instance, when we talk to a long missed person we speak in a trembling voice. T he difference between emotions and sentiments is that the emotions are stronger and less enduring. T hird, we have desire for something we want to acquire and aversion for something we want to avoid. For example, we have a strong desire surging up when we pass by a coffee shop. Fourth, choice is the movement or adherence to one of the several alternatives. It is selection. For example, we choose to stick to philosophy as our major among several subjects. Based on all the above, Klubertanz ventures into other ways of defining passions. He gives six particular meanings of passion, the first three of which are faithfully following Aquinas. First, we use passion when something loses a form (perfection) which belongs to it and gains another form in its place. T his is what we commonly notice in a material change. For example, when we are embarrassed, our face loses previously possessed white color and gains a red one. Second, passion refers to the passage from potency to act where one loses a quality suitable for oneself and violently receives another quality unsuitable for oneself. Jesus' s
18 T echnically, he calls it ' bodily resonance' and some examples are: change in respiration and pulse; changes in facial expression, variations in external secretions, e.g. shedding tears, and internal secretions, e.g. producing more adrenalin. - 27 - violent reception (suffering) of the infliction is a good example. (Notice the phrase the Passion of Jesus.) T hird, something can be passionate simply by acquiring a form (without losing another quality in return). T his is possible because the change happened under the influence of a cause (agent) distinct from the subject (patient). Fourth, we refer passion to an excessive or disorderly expression (act) of sensory appetite (power). T his seems to be closest to the modern meaning of passion. Without any hesitation many modern people call someone a passionate person if she is enthusiastic about and dedicated to a sensitive good(perceived good through a sense organ). For example, when a person' s life revolves around delicious food. Fifth, passion refers to any act of sensory appetite. By analogy, we place the intellectual appetite i.e. will in this category. Lastly, passion means any immanent operation prior to the third meaning above (when something acquires a form without losing another form.). T he operation is immanent in the sense that nothing happens to the object we as the subject like or dislike simply by the fact we like or dislike it19).
19 T o get a full grasp of what immanent activity is, w e should follow Klubertanz' s reasoning from the firs t step: the relation of action to being. T o begin w ith, he says a limited being can reach its full flowering only through action. In other words, activity is an act or perfection of being. Now any kind of action is caused by 1) an agent, 2) an action, and 3) an external effect. Here we can think of two actions w orking on different parts: on the part of the external thing, and that of the agent. Firstly, there is an activity through w hich the external thing (patient) undergoes change, i.e. gets a form. T his is called a transient activity because the activity passes from the agent to the patient w hich is dependent on the agent. Secondly, there is another activity through w hich the agent its elf - 28 -
Now let' s have another look, a more positive one on the meaning of passion. For Paul Wadell passion as an appetite is hunger we have for something we perceive as good but lack.20) For example, when we are lonely we have hunger for others: companionship or intimacy. Even though we seem to take an active position by tending toward something outside us, we are initially placed in a passive state because this desired good always stands outside us, luring us, according to Wadell. Since we as creatures can not obtain this recognized good we are bound to reach out ourselves to grow. T he fact that the spectrum of the objects of our desire cannot be completed and our desire does not know limit implies that we are never in isolation but in a constant contact with other beings, consciously or unconsciously. Reith, another contemporary T homist philosopher, distinguishes several affective terms under the category of sensory appetites(passions) in his book on T homist psychology.21) He refers to passion as an extreme sensual love as well as being acted upon. Emotion is an impulse either towards an object that is helpful or away from one that is harmful. Affection is an inclination to love or to enjoy what is pleasant. Lastly, orexis 22) is
gets perfected and this is called an immanent activity. T he latter is also called vital activity becaus e an agent perfects itself through its ow n activity as is found in the grow th of a flow er. (P hilosophy of H um an N ature, pp. 47- 55.) 20 Paul Wadell, T he P rim acy of Love p. 80. 21 Herman Reith, A n Introduction to P hilosophical P sychology (NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1956) p. 113. 22 It is my correction of erexsis. - 29 - a striving for a goal. And he does not forget to mention that Aquinas' s sensory appetites should be understood in a broader sense than those of modern days. Now let' s look at how other schools of thought define passion. First of all, according to the E ncyclopedia of P hilosophy, passion basically means two things 23): 1) emotions, and 2)dispositions. Emotions are less enduring than dispositions or (emotional) states and have fear, anger, indignation, remorse, embarrassment, grief, distress, joy, craving, disgust and so forth as their species. Dispositions are relatively long lasting and classified as follows: a. attitudes toward particular objects: admiration, contempt, gratitude, resentment, jealousy, hate, sympathy. b. dispositions to act and feel in certain ways toward objects of certain kinds under certain kinds of circumstances: generosity, friendliness, benevolence, humility. c. liabilities to emotional states: irritability, excitableness, fearfulness.
However, the E ncyclopedia of Philosophy adds that when we say passion, we typically mean the emotion rather
23 T he E ncyclopedia of P hilosophyhey does not attempt to distinguish between passion and emotion. T he E ncyclopedia of P hilosophy ed. by Paul Edwards (New York: T he MacMillan Company & T he Free Press, 1978) II, pp. 479- 480. - 30 - than attitudes or other general dispositions or liabilities. Since the book puts a more emphasis on the emotional side of passion, we had better know what features it typically puts under the name of emotional states:
1) Recognition of something as desirable or undesirable. 2) Feelings of certain kinds. 3) Experience of marked bodily sensations of certain kinds. 4) Involuntary bodily processes and overt expressions of certain kinds. 5) T endencies to act in certain ways. 6) T he disturbed or upset condition of mind or body.
For Wadell passion gets its true meaning in a limited fashion, i.e. in employing passion as the best means for pursuing God. It is elevated as an essential element for an individual to create one' s own world for Robert Solomon. First of all, he perceives passion as the very ability to bestow meaning to the circumstance of one' s life. Solomon' s notion of passion has three fundamental species: 1)emotions, 2)moods, and 3)desires 24). So far we have explored the origin of the word passion and how it is defined by some philosophers, especially T homas Aquinas. T o sum up, the word passion is open to wide range of
24 Robert Solomon T he P assions (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976) p. 132. - 31 - interpretations because of its retainment of passive denotation. One can easily imagine how different the philosophy will be when the word passio is rendered into passivity or into receptivity. While passivity is something that happens to us and conjures up the image of a helpless victim, receptivity usually means being open and accepting the world around us. T his difference between passivity and receptivity does merely lie in the choice of words but in philosophically different perceptions of passion. For an example of passive interpretation of passion, we have the Stoics who heavily focused on the passive state of the self that suffers an experience. Regarding passivity as a disturbance to the wholeness of the soul, the Stoics said that even parents should be not be emotionally disturbed when they kiss their children; they should do it as if it were their last time to do so. Seneca, a famous Latin Stoic philosopher, points out the importance of emotional detachment clearly in following words:
But we must choose friends who are, so far as possible, free from passions. Vices are contagious; they light upon whoever is nearest and infect by contact. During a plague we must be careful not to sit near people caught in the throes and burning with fever, because we would be courting danger and drawing poison in with our breath; just so in choosing friends we must pay attention to character and take those least tainted [with passion]. T o mingle the healthy with the sick is the beginning of disease.25)
T his makes a stark contrast with a modern philosopher,
25 Moses Hadas T he Stoic P hilosophy of Seneca (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1968) pp. 89- 90. - 32 -
Solomon, who says passion is the way we can build our own world (surreality as opposed to reality).26) Moreover, the difference between the two different thoughts gets a dramatic significance in the moral world: the question of responsibility in an act. Should we blame the passion or the recipient himself or herself in a particular event? T o see the complexity of the problem we had better listen to what Solomon says about this issue:
T he Myth of the Passion, like all myths, is self- serving, and dramatized for the sake of our own self- image. It is the myth of passivity; the self- serving half- truth is the fact that we often suffer from our passions, submit ourselves to them, find ourselves carried away and foolishly behaving because of them. T he purpose of the myth is evident enough- to cast ourselves in the role of helpless martyr, battling powerful and irrational forces within us.[...]So long as the ' passions' render us ' passive' , the most important and vital attitudes and actions of our lives fall beyond the scope of our doing and our responsibility, and so we find ourselves with an elaborate and convenient system of excuses, for our feelings, for our behaviour, for our Selves.27)
What elements go into such completely different positions toward passion? Is it because passions are considered to be irrational? Or is there any ground for such a thing like rational passion? If so, how is it possible? T his is something I would like to discuss in the following chapters. T he arguments will be mostly based on Aquinas' s psychology and center around the relationship between passion and reason.
26 Solomon, p. 19. 27 Solomon, p. xvii. - 33 -
CHAPT ER 3: PASSION AS T HE SENSORY APPET IT E
T he proper way to see what kind of role something plays in our life would be to analyze its origin and nature. In this section I would like to show firstly the process of how passion is put into act and secondly, its several fundamental species.
1. Passion Based on the Sensory Knowledge
As was mentioned before, the conscious activities of a human is divided into two kinds: knowledge and appetency (conscious tendency). Now appetite is a power that tends toward a good or rejects an evil. Appetite is divided into two sub- groups: intellectual appetite (will) and sensory appetite. Now what is the nature of sensory appetite? Since the knowledge of the object of a thing leads to the knowledge of its nature(ST Ia.78.1), we had better look at the object of the sensory appetite. Both the intellectual and sensory appetites are acted upon by a known good, i.e. a particular/universal good. Since all appetites are, at least at their initial stage, moved, they are called passive or receptive powers. What stirs the appetites are knowledge and the knowledge is divided into two kinds. On the intellective order, we have intellectual knowledge and on the sense level, sensory knowledge. T he object of intellectual knowledge is an intelligible - 34 - good (a good known by the intellect) and that of sense knowledge, a sensible good (a good known by the senses). T his way we have two different kinds of appetites in us on the principle that powers are specified by their formal objects(ST Ia.77.3): intellectual appetite and sensory appetite. As for intellectual appetite, we tend toward intellectually known goods. For example, we love life. As Klubertanz says, many things we know about such a thing as life is material like the wind, earth, food, and so forth. But life as such is an abstract reality. But our love for life is not always in act, which means there should be a power in the soul for this particular act. We call this power the will, i.e. intellectual appetite. Now let us point out several qualities of the will. First of all, the act of willing is an immanent activity because nothing changes by the fact we will it. Secondly, it is a passive power in the sense that it should receive an intelligible good (a good given by the intellect) to be put into act. T hus, we cannot will anything unless we know a littler about it. T hirdly, the will pursues a general (universal) good. T his is because the will follows upon a good given by the intellect, which in fact is a universal concept. T his time let us look at passion as the sensory appetite. First of all, it is a power of immanent operation. As our experience tells us, we cannot bring about any change in another thing by the fact we like or dislike it. Secondly, it is a passive power as is put into - 35 - act when and if it is moved by something outside of it. T hirdly, it pursus a particular good. T his is because passion as a sensory power depends on a bodily organ, which can only deal with particulars. On account of its reliance on a bodily organ passion is also called animal power, which implies that it is common to both humans and animals. Because it uses a corporeal organ it is most frequently accompanied by a bodily change, a physiological modification, technically speaking. Here we had better recall what Aquinas says about passion in his second set of definitions for passion(ST IaIIae.22.1).
T hose kinds of passion in which some quality is lost, however, always involve some bodily change; passion strictly so called cannot therefore be experienced by the soul except in the sense that the whole person, the matter- soul composite, undergoes it.
So far I have shown how the sensory appetency in a human is acted upon by a good known through senses. But this is only half of the story. We, as the subject of the sensory appetency, do not merely stay in a passive/receptive state but start to move toward to the object outside of us, i.e. we form a certain movement of our own- - like we take up a certain attitude to an event- - toward the desirable object, and this is a rather different movement than the first one of receiving the form of the object. How these two movements(passive- turned to- active movement) are conducted will be explained next. - 36 -
2. T he Movement of Passions
Before looking at how the passions are put into act, we should see if all the species of passions follow the same movement. According to the principle that different powers have different ends or terms(ST Ia.77.3; IaIIae.23.1), we have to see if all passions have the same end. And this is not true, in fact. We have certain kinds of passions that arise imm ediately from the sensible goods and evils. In these passions our sensory appetites take the goods as they are, i.e. without considering their qualifications, including the particular circumstances of the particular time. Put in a different way, we desire the good as much as its desirable aspects appeal to our passions. Aquinas names these passions ' concupiscible passions' 28) and their objects, ' absolute goods or evils' . Klubertanz calls these passions ' pleasurable passions' and their objects, ' pleasure goods' . And these passions have love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, and sadness as their emotions. Moreover, concupiscible passions give rise to another kind of passions, namely irascible passions 29). Only after the concupiscible passions are aroused by the object, the specific conditions of the obtainability of the object or the situation is taken into
28 It is the translation of the Latin, concupiscentia, meaning ' strong desire.' Interestingly, the Blackfriars render it into ' affective orexis.' 29 T he original Latin is irascibilis. Blackfriars' s rendering is ' spirited (orexis).' - 37 - consideration. According to these conditions, we have different passions aroused in us. Regarding their particular nature, Klubertanz calls these irascible passions and their objects ' aggressive' or ' difficult passions' and ' difficult goods' respectively. T hese passions have hope, despair, daring, fear, and anger as their emotions. Below I am going to explain the whole process of each passion, taking everyday examples, based on Klubertanz' s well- made scheme where he succinctly organizes Aquinas' s psychology.
Orig in of Know ledg e Intermediate Know ledg e Kinds of Pas s ion common sense 1. Pleasurable good concupiscence - imagination common sense - imagination 2. Aggressive good irascibility - estimative - memorative
Let me give Aquinas' s definition of several new words, first of all. Each one will be briefly explained mainly with Klubertanz' s words here due to the limited space here. Common sense (sensus comm unis) is the power of sensory awareness, which unites the various sensations. Klubertanz calls it a ' unifying sense' . Imagination (phantasia) is the power of retaining and recalling the images of sensible experience. Estimative power (vis aestim ativa.) is a simple power through which an animal estimates something - 38 - either as useful or harmful for itself. According to Klubertanz, it is an innately determined power of apprehending objects, concretely and directly, as suitable or harmful for the individual and/or the species. Memorative power (vis m emorativa) is the power of retaining estimations. T his power enables animals to go beyond their natural store of estimative judgments 30)(ST Ia.79.4) Now let me explain the movement of each passion with an example. Suppose a person sensed or imagined her favorite drink, a freshly brewed cup of coffee, for example. We can point out two things at this stage. One is the first cause of the whole process of the appetites is an external object, a cup of coffee. Another cause is the fact that a certain kind of knowledge is given to the appetite to be actualized. Upon the sensory knowledge she loves (likes) the coffee, and then she comes to have the passion of desire for the coffee, Next, if the coffee is present before her, to her sense of taste, she drinks it and her desire turns into joy (satisfaction). T his way we have the process concerning the concupiscible passions of love, desire, and joy. Now let us take the negative side of the concupiscible passions. Imagine the same person has imagined or sensed an unpleasant thing to her, say, a noisy place. Upon her recognition (sensory knowledge) of it as an evil, she hates (dislikes) it and wants to avoid it. If it is still present, she has to endure it; and
30 Klubertanz, pp. 150- 157. - 39 - she feels sadness. T his way we have the concupiscible passions of hatred, aversion, and sadness. We have seen how the concupiscible passions occur in the two examples above in reference to good and evil. Now let' s look at how the irascible passions take place. A dominant characteristic of the irascible passions is that they are always preceded by the concupiscible passions. Firstly, let' s see how the irascible passions of hope and despair arise. Suppose a person has the concupiscible passion of desire for coffee. T hen her sensory experience or memory begins to consider the specific circumstances of the coffee. For example, her memory tells her that the coffee is in a gourmet coffee shop two kilometers away. Next, she will have two different passions according to the obtainability. If the coffee is obtainable, she is hopeful for it. And if not, due to her difficult financial situation or being too far away, for example, she feels despair. In this way we have the irascible passions of hope and despair. Now this time let' s consider a situation where the concupiscible passion of aversion (avoidance) for something has already arisen. Here again we can think of two different irascible passions. Suppose a person hates a noisy place and is at present sitting in a singing room with her colleagues who are noisily singing. Based on the judgment from her estimative power she will decide whether the situation is avoidable or not. Her reaction will be different according to her decision. If the situation is avoidable, - 40 - she will gather courage (daring) and find a way to vanish from the place. However, if her estimative power tells her that the situation is not avoidable, i.e. she has to stay there to the end, say, because of the presence of her stubborn superior, she will not leave out of fear for her superior. T his way we have irascible passions of daring and fear. Now there is yet another situation where a person is refused a good. T aking the coffee example, the person somehow managed to get to the coffee shop driven by the passions of love (liking) and desiring the coffee followed by the passions (feelings) of hope and daring. But when she got to the coffee shop, she found a note apologizing for their abrupt closing down of the shop- - to her great anger. She walks away in a huff. T his way we have an irascible passion of anger. T he following scheme will be helpful to grasp the whole picture of the concupiscible and irascible passions.
T he Pas s ions
Concupis ce nce Iras cibilit y
love hatred hope despair desire aversion daring fear joy sadness anger
T o sum up, the passions are appetitive powers that follow upon a good or an evil known through the senses. T hey are classified into two kinds according to their objects. First, we have concupiscible passions whose object is an ' absolute good' , i.e. a - 41 - good taken absolutely(ST IaIIae.23.1). Next we have irascible passions whose object is a ' restricted good' , i.e. a good taken along with its circumstances. T he latter presupposes the first because we should love and desire something in the first place in order to seek a good. Specifically, we have hope and despair for the good yet to be obtained in the face of difficulty. And for the evil already present we have daring and fear. T he degree of difficulty is not applicable to the concupiscible passions because they take good and evil irrespective of their qualifications. T he irascible passions not only stem from the concupiscible but terminate in them. For example, we are at rest (the passion of joy) when we have possessed a desirable object through taking a daring action; or we are sad when we cannot possess the loved and desired object. Among all the passions only anger does not have its counterpart because it does not have its natural contrary passion31). As we have seen, passions are sensory appetites as moved by an external object, which, in turn, move toward the object. When passions move toward the object, is the subject conscious of his/her actions? Does the subject have a definite goal in mind? Does the movement involve reason? Or is the subject merely reacting instinctively to the external object? Are humans able to
31 As Paul Glenn says, serenity may be its contrary state but Aquinas does not call it a passion. Paul Glenn A T our of the Sum m a (Illinois: T an Books and Publishers, Inc., 1978) p. 122. - 42 - control their passions or are they merely victims of them? All these questions seem to boil down to the issue of rationality in the passions and this will be the topic of next chapter. - 43 -
CHAPT ER 4: PASSION AND RAT IONALIT Y
T raditionally, passion has been considered as opposed to reason, and the principal idea is that passion on its own leads us astray or haphazardly while reason guides us into the right direction. On account of that, passion has been most frequently associated with negative irrational qualities like perturbation, disturbance, turbulence, attachment, perversion, and madness.32) All these attributes stem from the notion of the fatal defect in passion: irrationality. Rationality is usually associated with positive qualities like certainty, clarity, endurance, tranquility, and even divinity. In this chapter I would like to bring to a focus how rationality is related to passion. My main attempt will be to prove two things: 1) passion is an appetitive power that belongs to the soul, and thus, 2) it must be guided by a rational power. T o do so, I am going to start with some basic tendencies mainly found in non- living things. T his is to locate the passions correctly among other kinds of tendencies. After all, along with natural tendencies human passions are conscious tendencies which surpass the
32 Especially among the Stoics who even diagnose a passion as the disease of the soul. Plato and Augustine seem to share this opinion as well. Understandably, this kind of thought is strongly supported by pantheist philosophy like the Stoa and Buddhism. T he Stoics, for instance, thought an individual reason partakes the universal reason (Reason, logos) through the activity of rational understanding. T hus passion is seen as irrational or anti- rational and opposed to reason. T his is attributable to their idea that human nature is basically rational and it is meant to be rational along with the universal and divine Reason. - 44 - inanimate and sensory levels. T he underlying argument throughout the chapter will be to show how the passions are to be controlled by reason.
1. T endencies
Every being is inclined to act in one way or another.(ST Ia.80.1) T hat is, they have natural tendencies. T he number and quality of tendencies are different according to the kind of beings they are. For Aquinas everything has a position in the hierarchy of being; and the higher a being is, the stronger and the more diverse its powers are.(ST Ia.78.1) T he same is true for tendencies. T he tendencies in higher beings are greater both in number and quality.(ST Ia.80.1) Higher beings have their own distinctive superior tendencies along with the inferior tendencies which they share with lower beings.
1.1. T endencies in Non- living T hings
Non- living things like a stone are characterized by natural tendencies. Natural tendency is the most basic and simplest kind of tendency. Any being as long as it has a nature has this tendency.(ST Ia.80.1) It is a tendency to act according to its own proper nature. Natural tendency is identical with its substantial - 45 - form. T he substantial form of a being makes it im m ediately act for a goal. T hus, natural tendency does not need any medium like a certain kind of knowledge to be actualized. Water is bound to flow from a higher place to a lower place for example.
1.2. T endencies in Living T hings
In general, living things have tendencies to grow, repair injured parts, and reproduce themselves. But there is a dramatic difference among those organic beings that have knowledge and those who do not. T hus we can distinguish plants which do not know from animals which know. Furthermore, the sense knowledge of animals is distinguished from the reasoning knowledge of humans. Let us look at the differences on the appetitive- tendency level.
1.2.1 Living things without knowledge
Living plants belong to this group. Along with the tendencies they share with non- living things, plants have their own tendencies based on their vegetative powers. For example, unlike non- living things they can grow and develop through using their particular powers. However, they do not know, nor are they aware of their growth. T hat is, they do not have any form of knowledge to actualize their tendencies. T hey do it naturally in interaction with - 46 -
Nature.
1.2.2 Living T hings with Knowledge (ST Ia.80.1)
Animals belong to this group. T hey have their own proper tendencies in addition to all the tendencies they share with lower beings. What distinguishes animals from lower beings is their ability to know. T heir knowing power endows them with a conscious tendency that is totally different from the tendencies found in lower beings. T hen what does it mean for animals to know? Most of all, it means they can make forms of other things in addition to their natural forms. T hese new forms are divided into two kinds. First of all, there are sensible forms (form a sensibilis) that are received through their senses from the external sensible things. Next, there are intelligible forms (form a intelligibilis) that are received through the intellect. T he first are proper to animals, whereas the second are proper to humans since they are uniquely rational animals. Any rate, these newly possessed forms bring about a new kind of movement in the animal.(ST Ia.78.4; ST Ia.80,1) Based on the forms they get from the external object, the animal now makes its own movement toward the object and this clearly differentiates it from plant life. Plants only perform activities according to their natural form, which is also the ultimate principle of their - 47 - performance. However, the animal does not only act according to its natural forms but also according to the sensible forms it received from the outside. T hese newly acquired forms bring about a new kind of movement in the animal. T hrough these forms an animal can desire a thing not present to it and moves toward it. A dog desires meat even though it is not presented to his sense of smell. T his new tendency is called an sensory appetite or passion and it qualitatively surpasses natural tendency. Its characteristics are reduced to three points: 1)it is a conscious tendency, 2) it follows upon knowledge, and 3) it moves with a new end given by an appetible thing.33) In the following part, we will take a closer look at this appetency (conscious tendency), especially the one found in humans.
2. T he Obedience of Passion to the Reason.
We have already seen how appetency is distinguished into sensory appetency (passion) and rational appetency (the will) in Chapter 3. We will get down to the question of the rational controllability of the passions in this part. First of all, we should remember Aquinas often employs the word ' reason' (ratio) as a general term for both intellect (understanding, intellectus) and will (voluntas).(ST Ia.79.8) My argument here will be divided into two parts: 1) the
33 Klubertanz, p. 221. - 48 - superiority of the intellectual appetite to the passions as sensory appetites, and 2) the rule of reason over the passions.
2.1. T he Superiority of the Will to the Passion
As we have already seen earlier, there are two kinds of appetites in a human: intellectual appetite (will) and sensory appetite (passion). T hey are not on an equal level since the intellectual appetite is superior to the sensory appetite and thus can move it. T here are two reasons for this. First of all, it is because the will is an immaterial power while the passions are intrinsically connected with matter. T his becomes clear when we compare the way each appetite is put into act. Both intellectual and sensory appetites are moved as passive faculties but their efficient causes are different. What moves the intellectual appetite is the forms received by the intellect, and what moves the sensory appetite is the forms received by the sense. Because intellectual forms are received without a bodily organ it is immaterial, enduring and certain, while sensible forms change and soon fade away, having been received through a bodily organ. Bodily change is an unavoidable result of the passions since they are powers on a sensory level and understandably, excessive physical modification can hinder a person from making a right judgment.(ST IaIIae.22.2- 3) We would hardly expect a person all red with anger - 49 - to behave calmly and rationally. However, his emotional fit cannot last long simply because it is a sensory power. T hat is, as his passion of anger was triggered by the changeable sensible forms, he can soon resort to rational power and calm himself down. As to the controllability of the passions by the will, Aquinas is very optimistic. He says that we can keep our temper even in the most irritable situation.(ST IaIIae.10.3) Secondly, the will is more powerful than the sensory appetite with regard to the object. T he object of the will is the universal good and that of the sensory appetite is a particular good. A power whose object is the universal is superior to a lower power whose object is a particular because the latter depends on the first and is moved by it.(ST Ia.82.4) A syllogism is a good example. In a syllogism, a conclusion about a particular proposition can only be drawn from a universal proposition, not from another particular proposition. Likewise, in our life we often resort to something universal like a law or a principle, to solve a particular affair. T hus, we can say that the will is higher than the passions and moves them. Indeed we often curb or guide our passions with our will power in our daily life. Imagine there is a person who likes tennis very much. She likes it so much that she plays it even to the extent of ignoring her duties. In this case, she can moderate her passion for the sport through her will power. T his is possible - 50 - because her will, which is concerned with a universal thing (playing tennis for her well- being which includes doing her duties) guides her passion, which is concerned with a particular thing (merely instinctively liking to play tennis). Based upon the idea on what she should do for her well- being, she will decide how much tennis she should play and her passion will follow the directions of her decision. T hus, as long as we have will, we can not only control our passions but also direct them into the way that enhances our overall well- being. T he fact that the passions can be controlled by the will is what dramatically distinguishes human passions from brutal passions for Aquinas. He says that human passions can await the command of another kind of appetitive power, the will. On the other hand, the passions in other animals are seldom hindered from being actualized because they lack any counteracting appetite as the will in humans. Aquinas' s reasoning underlying the assertion is as follows:
1. Whenever there are powers, there is order among them. 2. What is higher moves by means of the lower. 3. T he will is a higher power than the passion. 4. T he will moves the passion.34)(ST I: Q81, A3)
34 A similar sort of reasoning is found in Augustine when he insists nothing but our own free will can morally degrade us under the principle that what is lower cannot move what is higher. Augustine of Hippo, De libero arbitrio trans. by - 51 -
2.2. T he Rule of the Intellect over the Passions
In this section we will look at the relationship between the passions and the intellect. T o do so, however, we had better see which one is the higher power between the intellect and the will. T hen we will have a clear idea of the relationship among the three powers of the intellect, the will and the passions. Whatever the order is, the underlying principle is that the higher power moves the lower power, as we have already seen. Aquinas treats the relationship between the intellect and the will in two respects: absolutely and relatively.(ST Ia.82.3) Absolutely speaking, the intellect is a higher power than the will because of the priority of its object to that of the will. T he object of intellect is the idea (concept, notion) of good and that of will is just good as desirable. Now for the will to be put into act, it must have the idea of the desirable object first and this idea is already in the intellect. T o put it in a different way, the will as an appetitive power must have some knowledge from the intellect before it can be actualized. We say the intellect is more powerful than the will in the sense it is prior to the will. However, sometimes the reverse is true. T he will is more powerful than the intellect when its object is more noble than the subject of the will35), i.e. a human. T o better understand this, we
Youm Seong (Waegwan, Korea: Benedict Press, 1998) p. 109. 35 Aquinas regards a human as a master of her actions through the judgment of - 52 - need to compare the way the intellect and the will act respectively. T he intellect through its activity possesses the form of an external thing in itself, i.e. in the mind. T he will, on the other hand, reaches out to the external good. It tends to possess the good as it is in itself. Here we can think of two possible relations, the subject of the intellect and the will (the soul) bears to the object. Firstly, when the concerned object is lower than the soul, we can say it is more powerful to have its goodness in the soul. In this vein, it is better to know than possess a material thing like a book. Secondly, when the object is a being higher than the soul, it is more powerful to reach out for its goodness as it is in itself. T hus, it is better to will God than know Her. As we have seen above, the intellect is more powerful than the will except in some cases. T hus, according to the principle that the higher moves by virtue of the lower, the passions are moved by the intellect, which is the highest power of the soul.(ST I: Q82, A3) T hen how do the passions follow the intellect? T o prove that human passions can be guided by the intellect, Aquinas firstly shows how passions are moved in other animals.(ST Ia.78.4) Both in humans and other animals the passions are acted upon through the sensible forms but there is difference in the way they perceive them. Other animals perceive the sensible forms by some
her reason.(ST IIaIIae.158.2) T his will be further discussed in part V of this thesis. - 53 - instinctive power called estimative power.(See Chapter 3.) On the other hand, humans perceive the sensible forms with a power that can compare them. T his is a kind of cogitative power called ' particular reason' (ratio particularis). And this particular reason is guided by a universal reason(ratio intellectiva) under the principle that the universal moves the particular. T hus far we have seen, how the passions obey the higher part of the soul, namely the intellect and the will. However, it is an undeniable truth that our actual experience often betrays this. T hat is, humans often succumb to the power of our passion. T his is partially due to the particular way the soul rules the passion. T he soul rules a lower faculty, the passions, in a different way than it does other lower faculties, the bodily members. It controls the bodily members in a despotic (despoticum ) way because they do not have their own tendency which will allow them some ground for resisting the command from the soul. But the passions have in- built tendencies, i.e. they tend to go out to the external object and this allows them to resist against the command of the soul to some extent. T hus, the soul rules the passion in a political and royal (politicum et regali) way i.e. by persuasion. Any rate, it hardly changes the fact that the passions can be basically subjected to the command of the intellect and the will.
CHAPT ER 5: PASSION AND MORALIT Y - 54 -
Passions as sensory appetites are common to humans and other animals. However, I am going to deal with human passions in particular in this chapter. What characterizes human passion is its relationship to reason. Because of this rationality it includes the issue of morality in an act of a passion because a human is the only animal that is moral. Since the passions play a significant role in a human life, it would be proper to look at human acts in general as a first step, in order to grasp the meaning of a particular human passionate act. Accordingly, we will first analyze the basic components of acts done by humans, especially the following two issues: 1) whether a person' s acts have an end; and 2) whether voluntariness (the will) is found in those acts. We will also discuss how the passions relate to the will, which is an essential component of a moral act. T hen we will see what kind of role the passions play in moral life and this is divided into two parts: passions in a virtuous act and passions in a vicious act.
1. Passion in regard to the end of the human act
1.1. Humans Seek an End.
T o answer the question whether the (human) passions pertain to morality, we should first ask whether human actions are done for - 55 - an end. It is evident that everything in this world moves 36). But if we take a close look at the being in this world, we can see two basic groups. Firstly, we have a group of beings which are not rationally conscious of the goal of their actions. Inanimate things and animate things without reason belong here. T o borrow Aquinas' s favourite example, a fire is bound to go up due to its natural tendency. T he actions of other animals hardly go beyond their natural and sensory tendencies. With their sense knowledge they may pursue something not present to their senses and may be aware of their acts. T hey have the sensory degree of consciousness. But they do not rationally understand or have knowledge of the ultimate end of their actions. Hence, they cannot bring themselves to choose a certain direction. T hey simply move with their natural sensory tendencies 37). T he movement is dramatically different in beings with reason, i.e. humans. T heir reason enables them to be fully aware of their actions and their goal. T he fact they have knowledge of the goal of their actions implies they can always modify their actions according to the goal. In this vein, a passionate act done by a human should be regarded as directed to an end. One' s passionate
36 T his is the foundational element of Aristotle' s metaphysics where everything moves, i.e. is moved, except the Unmoved Mover. Aristotle M etaphysics ed. by E. Warmington (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969) p.141. 37 It does not, however, mean that animals do not move to an end. All the earthly beings except humans move to a definite end with the guidance of some will power, which Aquinas calls Divine will, which exists outside of the animals. Humans alone recognize their end and choose it.(ST IaIIae.10.4) - 56 - act is not blind as is generally believed. T hat is, a passionate act needs to be put in a different light once it is done by a human because, unlike the brutal sensory passion, it can be now under the guidance of rational power. However, some would still argue that our knowledge of the goal of our actions does not necessarily mean we can control our passions. But it would be even more implausible for a rational animal to be totally incapable of controlling her act when she knows what she is doing and why she is doing it. She cannot be a mere ' outsider' in her own life. She does have a determining power and free choice in her actions. T he necessary connection between reason and free will be further discussed in the following chapters.
1.2. Human Acts versus Acts of Man (ST IaIIae.1.1)
As we have seen above, all the acts a human does are directed to a certain end in one way or another. But not every act a human does falls in the moral domain. What is a genuinely human act is the one done with the will. A human does not merely act/react according to his natural disposition, but is aware and decides to do a certain act. Aquinas calls this deliberate act a ' human act' (actus humanus) in contrast with an ' act of man' (actus hom inis) which he refers to any act a human does. T he latter is not put under moral consideration. - 57 -
Moreover, wilful passions can make our life more meaningful. We say something is meaningful when we can derive more than the literal meaning out of it. Our passions, when left to themselves, pursue a particular sensory object. But once passions are under the rule of the will, they not only pursue a particular good but a universal good as well. More accurately, passions now move to a universal end through a particular good. T his is because the passions are guided by the faculty of will whose object is the universal good. T his is what we often experience in our life. We usually get more than the net value of an act we are passionately involved in. For example, a passionate Baduk player not only learns difficult techniques of the game but a lesson about life through the games. T his seems to be the underlying idea behind a famous Korean saying that ' a passionate devotion to any (small) matter will enlighten the person with T ao(Way, T ruth)' (뭐라도 열 심히 하면 도를 깨친다.) Any rate, all this is possible because human passions are not merely mad or irrational but sober and rational. T he underlying force of sensory passions can be directed to a higher rational end. In this sense, the passions can be employed as an inspiring means to obtain the ultimate end. T he notion of passion as a strategy for Life or T ruth is strongly asserted by Solomon, who basically views passions as rational judgments 38).
38 ' But every emotion is a strategy, a purposive attempt to structure our world in such a way as to maximize our sense of personal dignity and self- esteem. And, as - 58 -
1.3. Voluntariness in a Human Action
Everything moves according to an internal or/and external principle toward an end(ST IaIIae.1.2). T hat is, things are moved to an end by an external agent or they stimulate themselves to move to an end. A movement is said to be more genuinely from within when the internal principle is not only the principle of the movement, but also instigates the movement of tending toward an end.(ST IaIIae.6.1) T hat is, it is more genuine when the subject of the movement knows the end and deliberately moves itself to that end. An action done this way is called voluntary. T hus, only humans among earthly creatures are able to conduct voluntary actions because they have reason to know the end and set themselves into the direction. However, we should be careful when we deal with appetitive powers like the passions, which undergo two different kinds of movement in the whole process. Passions are initially passive and acted upon by an external good. Once they are touched upon, they become active and begin to move to the desired good. It is true that the first principle or the efficient cause of the first movement is the external object. But what causes the second movement is our free will. Some people, focusing only on the first movement, strategies, our emotions can be more or less successful, more or less direct, well or ill conceived, effective or self- defeating.' Solomon, p. XX. - 59 - think that this attraction or pull of the object is irrational. (Notice the English ' fall in love' and the Korean equivalent ' 사랑에 빠지다 /반하다' . T hey both have the connotation of irresistability.) T hey are only grasping a half of the dynamic movement of the passions. Although our appetites need an external object to be actualized, it is us and our free will that causes the second movement. Many people, taking only the initial movement of the passion into account, identify it with passivity and conclude that it does not pertain to morality. But this only provides a convenient excuse for an irresponsible person, as Solomon says. (See Chapter 2)39) T o put it differently, an external object is the efficient cause of the whole movement of passion in terms of time, but properly speaking, our free will is the efficient cause of our passion. T his is because those two movements are qualitatively different as Aquinas says(ST IaIIae.6.1). In this sense, Aquinas calls passion ' moved mover' 40).
2. Passion in Relation to Moral Good and Evil
2.1. Moral Good or Evil in the Passions.
In this section we are going to look at how passions relate specifically to morality. First of all, Aquinas suggests two ways of
39 Solomon, p. xvii. 40 ST IaIIae.6.4. - 60 - looking at passions. If they as sensory appetites are taken as they are in themselves, they cannot be ascribed a moral good or evil. But if they are taken as receiving an order from reason and will, they can be considered morally. T he passions as sensory appetency are common to humans and animals, but if we restrict them to human passions, they fall into the moral domain. What distinguishes the human passions from the ones of other animals is the fact they have a rational element which makes them human acts. Now for Aquinas what is rational equals what is moral, as we have seen above. As long as something is connected to the reason, however remotely, morality can be applied to it. T his has an implication that passions can either diminish or enhance one' s morality. Of course, Aquinas does not deny the purely sensory or irrational element in human passions, but they are still more closely connected with the reason than with the bodily members.(ST IaIIae.24.1) And even the bodily members, he goes on, can be looked at from a moral point of view once they are moved by the will. It would be utterly silly for a thief to accuse his hand and ask for exoneration. Contrary to Aquinas, the Stoics took every kind of passion as morally evil. T heir goal was apatheia, no passion or anti- passion. Because the Stoics thought the whole universe was governed by Reason, anything that was in accord with Reason was morally good, whereas anything that was in discord with Reason was - 61 - morally evil41). T heir distinction of the will and the passions was too arbitrary or simple. T hey thought the will was always under the control of the reason, whereas the passions were always in conflict with the reason. Accordingly, they regarded the will as that which is within a person' s capacity, and the passions as disease or mental disturbance that should be avoided. T he following passage by Epictetus, a famous Stoic philosopher, shows that clearly:
For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to nature, you have every security, every facility, you have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what is in your own power and is naturally free, and if you are content with these, what else do you care for? For who is the master of such things? Who can take them away? If you choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so? If you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not to desire?[...]When then the pursuit of objects and the avoiding of them are in your power what else do you care for?(Epictetus,42)
Aquinas compares the Stoic notion of passion and that of the Peripatetics.(ST IaIIae.24.2) Approving the Peripatetic (Aristotelian) notion of passion, he points out the Stoics' s lack of distinction between sense and intellect as their mistake. According to him, the Stoics regarded both will and passions as appetitive powers, but they simply asserted that the passions are any movements that are outside of rational control, and the will is applied to any movement that is put under the rational control. T hus no passion as sensory
41 Long, George T he Discourses of E pictetus (New York: T homas Y. Crowell & Co. Publishers) p. 39. 42 Ibid., p. 106. - 62 - appetency can ever be connected with reason. But Aquinas, following Aristotle, says that we should aim at a mean even in the passions. For him the passions are not only controllable, but can be used for bettering one' s moral well- being as well. Aquinas further highlights the link between the passions and the reason.(ST IaIIae.24.3) He divides the passions into two kinds according to the time they occur. Firstly, we have ' antecedent passions' (antecedens passio) that occur prior to the judgment of the reason. T his is usually when the passions suddenly arise due to their impulsive character and block the rational power. Passion has some ground to resist reason because it is a sensory power. Since passion is a power that is acted upon by an external object, reason cannot control the existence and the presence or absence of external things. Accordingly, reason cannot completely control the contact of external things with the senses, i.e. sensations. In this sense, passion can be rebellious, at least in its intial stage. However, because passions have other aspects which do not immediately depend on the external things and sensations, they can still receive the command from and be ruled by reason.(ST Ia.81.3) Next, we have ' consequent passions' (consequens passio) that are posterior to the judgment of the reason. We can further divide the consequent passions into two kinds. First, when the will power is so strong that the power is somewhat passed onto the passions. T hese passions signify one' s moral wholeness. T he passionate life - 63 - of St. Francis of Asissi seems to be a good example of this. His firm will to help the poor made him so passionate in his poverty. His passionate life was far from being sensational or irrational, the qualities that are often associated with a passionate life. His emotions were anchored in rationality. T hus, passions were not in the way to his search for T ruth, but instead drove him forward. His passion for life made him so receptive and one with Nature. He is said to have been called a ' wandering minstrel' and even made friends with other animals.' 43) His will was to devote his whole being to T ruth; this seems to be the principle reason for his passionate life. Passion of this kind indicates the person' s moral goodness. T his is why we find his passion not disruptive but all the more touching. T he other kind of consequent passion is found when we deliberately choose to be passionate for a purpose. We take advantage of the stimulating force of the passions in this case. We are often confronted with a situation where we are obliged to do something but do not feel like doing it, or the rate of progress of the work is unsatisfactory. T hen we prompt our action by resorting to the stimulating power of the passions. Suppose there is a teacher who is in charge of a boring class. She is infected with her students' dry and tedious mood; finds herself constantly glimpsing at her watch. Yet she knows it all too well that she has
43 Nikos Kazantzakis F rancesco D'A ssisi trans. by Seong- yeong Kim (Seoul: Koryowon, 1985) - 64 - to teach them sincerely. She begins to reflect on her actions. T hat is, she thinks about why she is involved in such a kind of job in the first place and why she does not like doing it. T hrough this reflection her thought shifts from a particular act of teaching to something more universal. She realizes, for instance, she is teaching not solely for the money but for the pleasure of getting to know people or for the sake of giving the students a good education. Now that she is clear about her ultimate goal, she can not only can put up with the boring atmosphere, but she can also work to stimulate the class to make schoolwork an interesting venture. Now all this will be sufficient enough for us to conclude that a passion either decreases or increases the morality of a certain act. We will look at how a passion affects a sin and a virtue respectively in the following section.
2.2. T he Passions in Relation to Sin
For Aquinas an evil committed through passion is still a sin, but he labels it a ' sin of weakness' (ST IaIIae.77.3) and ' weakness of the flesh' (ST IaIIae.77.3) For him all the sins a human commits are basically caused by the disorder in reason, which is the ruling power in a human being. A thing becomes weak when part of it does not carry out its function properly. Now the passions as part - 65 - of the soul should obey the reason, but they can oppose and go against reason. When passions fail to carry out their work properly, the soul becomes weak; and the person becomes more vulnerable to evil. T he main reason for the deviation of the passions from the rational way is that passions must use bodily instruments. T hus, a person' s (physiological) disposition or temperament has to be taken into consideration in a sinful act done through a passion44).(ST IIaIIae.156.1) T his is actually practised in present day criminology where it is considered less a crime if done in a fit of passion. T hen do passions alleviate sins?(ST IaIIae.77.6) For Aquinas the degree of morality is correlative to the degree of voluntariness since voluntariness is the essential condition of a moral act. Suppose a person committed a sin in a state of passion. If his passion occurred before his act of free will, his sin will diminish as his voluntariness was somewhat circumvented by the passion. On the other hand, if his passion arose after his act of free will, his sin will increase as his voluntariness was enhanced by the passion. T hus, it is better to do good by a rational decision than by the impulse of passion. It may be better sometimes to think about how to help a poor person, than simply giving him food out of sympathy. In the case of an evil, it is the reverse: it is worse
44 Aquinas' s view on women in this respect is interesting. He concludes that women are more irrational than men because women have a weaker temperament than men. T hat is, they are more liable to be fatally emotional.(ST IIaIIae.156.1) - 66 - to do an evil through a judgment of reason than through passion alone. In fact, many sins are committed in a fit of passion. T hen would it be the best if we repressed our passions as much as possible? One might second the opinion, reminding us of the T homistic theme that reason guides us to the last end or happiness.(ST IaIIae.3.5; ST IaIIae.4.7) Should we shun pleasures as much as possible? T his could not be further from Aquinas' s ethic. After all, his moral virtue is about passions and actions, as he admits in Sum m a(IIaIIae.157.1)45). T hus, it is undesirable, even vicious, to be insensible.(ST IIaIIae.142.1) For Aquinas, what is according to nature is good, and what is not is evil. Now nature (God) has endowed us with the passions and this implies that passions are meant to comprise an essential part of our happiness. We all know we cannot help desiring something and our natural desire cannot be in vain, as Aquinas often insists. (Desiderium naturale non est inane. ST II- II: Q158, A8) Our passions may be wild in its initial stage, but they can be tamed as a powerful means to obtain happiness. Our life will be without flavor and color as long as our passions are dormant or repressed. Only when and if our passions are kindled, will our life be fully alive. Furthermore, only then, each of us will become the true master of
45 T his is eloquently explained and elaborated by Wadell in his P rimacy of Love. He names Aquinas' s ethic as an ' ethic of the heart, an ethic of refined and noble affections.' (p. 78) - 67 - our lives because passions are that which intrinsically belong to us. In other words, passions let each of us take our own personal way to something universal or the ultimate end. T hey are constantly awakening us not only to the world but also to ourselves. T o borrow Solomon' s expression, passions are the bridge between my world and the World.46) T here seem to be some people who give up their passions for fear of the possible confusion. But this attitude is like ' deciding not to make soya sauce for fear of maggots' (구더기 무서워서 장 못 담근다), as the Koreans say. Zorba' s words in Z orba the Greek have a similar ring: ' If a man doesn' t break the string, tell me, what flavor is left in life? T he favour of camomile, weak camomile tea! Nothing like rum- - that makes you see life inside out!' 47)
2.3. T he Passions and Virtue
For Aquinas the passions are not only compatible with moral life, but can make a substantial contribution to it. T his is possible due to the unique qualities passions have. Since the qualities have been already explained above, I will attempt to relate some of them to virtue in this part. First of all, the receptive quality of passions exposes us to the goodness in our life. Since this goodness exists outside us, we have to strive for it. T hus, to be human is to be
46 Solomon, p. 67. 47 Kazantzakis, p. 300. - 68 - passionate48). And this is why people often proclaim love as such vulnerability. Secondly, the potential character of our passions perfects us. Earlier, Aquinas said we refer passions to anything that can move from potency to act. Now if something is actualized, it becomes more perfect. T hus, we can improve our lives through passions. T hirdly, this perfection takes place through change. Many people have a negative opinion on passions for this reason. However, the change we go through by passions is not only for the worse. Furthermore, we can change spiritually as well as physically through our passions. As sensory powers, passions inevitably leave a mark in our body; but it can also transform us internally. It gets clear when we carefully look at the movement of our passions. T he desired object awaken the passions with its charm and causes a sense of affinity in the passions, which, in turn, strive to be one with (possess) it. In a passion we try to adapt to the appetible thing, both internally and externally. When we say we miss a person we once loved, we do not merely mean we miss his body but his soul as well. Because we have been changed wholly, i.e. both physically and spiritually, we now find our being left alone strange. Aquinas explains this particular movement of the passions cleary in the following passage:
48 Wadell, p. 80. - 69 -
Correspondingly, the effect produced in the appetite by a desirable object is a sense of affinity with it, a feeling of its attractiveness; then this gives rise to a movement of the appetite towards the object. For there is a certain circularity in the appetitive process, as Aristotle remarks; first the object works on the appetite, imprinting itself there, as one might say; then the appetite moves towards the object, with the purpose of actually pos s es s ing it; so the process ends where it began.49)(My bold print)
Also, Wadell' s powerful expression of the effect of the passions is worth listening to:
Why is it there are certain people we never get over? Or why is it there are people we have not seen for years who still live so powerfully in our hearts? Some people enter our lives so compellingly that we are never quite the same. Even in their absence we feel their presence. Even if we know we shall never see them again, we cannot act as if they had never been part of our lives. For better or worse, we cannot act as if they had never been known. T hey are part of our history, they are inseparable from our identity. For us to be ourself is to know ourself as somehow marked by them. Why is this so? How come certain people affect us so lastingly?50)
With all these fascinating qualities of the passions our life can be still short of happiness, however. T his is because although passions are an important element in our happiness, it is not the only factor. We need something else along with it. Our time and energy are limited; and we cannot be passionate about everything. We should spend our energy on a worthy thing. Otherwise, we will be soon drained of passions and be cynical. T hus, we need a good guidance that will lead our passions in the right way. T his is the role of virtue: it is a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit.(ST IaIIae.59.1) After all, moral virtue, for
49 ST IaIIae.26.2 T his time I quoted from Summ a T heologiae as it seemed to be closer to my interpretation. 50 Wadell, pp. 83- 84. - 70 - both Aquinas and Aristotle, is no different from a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason.(ST IaIIae.59.1) In short, we need to ' strategize' or ' economize' our passions with virtue. T hus, it would be natural for us to conclude that our passions should be about a good that is directly related to our happiness. Even better, the infinite good, God. T he Stoics may be right in believing that passions are attachments, but they should have made a further distinction. It is not morally degrading but even desirable to be attached to a good thing as long as it can be guided by reason(and it is quite possible, as we have already seen). We cannot and should not deplore all the passions but only those that are out of time and manner, as Aristotle says.(ST IaIIae.59.2) Our passions should not be a mere flashing light but an enduring flame to contribute to our happiness. T his is only possible through a (good) habit according to Aquinas.(ST IaIIae.56.3) Wadell explains this clearly as follows:
We are capable of being many things, but are called to become one thing- - in Aquinas' s parlance, we are summoned to be a friend of God. But this does not necessarily happen. It happens only through the development and practice of special habits, which Aquinas calls virtues. Achieving friendship with God demands giving our life a single- hearted focus. It demands restriction, it calls for certain attachments. In order to grow in charity- - friendship with God, which T homas sees as the purpose and goal of our lives, we need to be attached to some things and detached from others, and to foster a special direction for our lives, and that is what the virtues do; it is in this sense that the virtues involve self- definition[...]T he virtues narrow down possibilities so that we can become familiar with the good.51)
51 Wadell, p. 111. - 71 - conclusion
We have seen how passion is understood in Aquinas' s philosophy. Passion, according to its natural genus, is a mere animal power.(ST IaIIae.24.4) But once it is understood as a faculty a rational being has, it is placed under a different light. T hat is, it is never a separate entity which moves on its own; but a part that plays a certain positive role to the perfection of the being. T he fact a human being is a rational being implies that she is a moral being. T hus, it naturally brings us to the conclusion that passion can be morally meaningful. Even the most minute thing in this world is good simply because it originates in God, the infinite good. T hen our mission in this world would be to turn every worldy thing to our advantage. It does, of course, depend on what we mean by advantage. Every single of us as a rational being pursues an end and this end is always a good. But our desire can never be satisfied with a relative good, as our experience plainly tells us. Only when we receive the infinite good, can we be at peace. T hus, it would be more than a safe assumption to generalize that every human being is directed to the absolute good, happiness, in one way or another. Only the means each one is taking is different. And only virtuous people will choose the right and direct their way to the truth because virtue is nothing other than a habit of choosing the right way. T hus, it is - 72 - imperative we have virtue as well as passion in order to be happy. T hen our passions will hardly go astray and disappoint us. Rather, it will let us go the Way of T ruth even with pleasure. And we all know pleasure perfects our work, as Aristotle says(ST IaIIae.33.4). Moreover, this pleasure can go beyond the sensory level because a human being with more perfect knowledge can have enjoyment(fruitio) in a more perfect degree than other animals.(ST IaIIae.11.3) T his is how some great minds in human history overcame their difficulties. We can now easily guess at the kind of passion Jesus Christ suffered. For all the unimaginable difficulties inflicted on him, he might have been smiling a peaceful smile deep inside. Lastly, I would like to draw attention to the fact that there are not only ' rational passions' but also ' lasting passions' . As many people might think, the passions are not a miragelike phenomenon that only flashes through the young. Passion has never been an illusion, but we have extinguished its flame out of fear. However strongly we deny it, we know deep inside that the responsibility is ours. T his is why we are so envious of Zorba as he is depicted in the following words:
His years have not dimmed the flame by which he lives, the gusto with which he responds to all that life offers him, whether he is organizing the work at the mine, coping with mad monks in a mountain monastery, embellishing the endless tale of his past adventures, or making love to Dame Hortense.52)
52 Kazantzakis, the bookcover. - 73 -
Bibliog raphy
P rim ary Source s
Aquinas, T homas Sum m a T heologiae trans. by Dominican Editors, Sum m a T heologiae, (London: Blackfriars, 1969)
Sum m a T heologica trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952)
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Catholic University of America Press, 1981)
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