Issue 81, 2nd Quarter 2016
The Joint Force after Huntington Fighting Ebola Defense Entrepreneurship JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY ONE, 2 ND QUARTER 2016 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Erin L. Sindle
Book Review Editor Dr. Frank G. Hoffman
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; LTG Robert B. Brown, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Christopher A. Coffelt, USAF/Air War College; Col Keil Gentry, USMC/Marine Corps War College; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Steven J. Grass, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Brig Gen Darren E. Hartford, USAF/National War College; Col Brian E. Hastings, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RADM P. Gardner Howe III/U.S. Naval War College; LTG William C. Mayville, Jr., USA/The Joint Staff; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Brad Williamson/Joint Forces Staff College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/ National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/ National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
Printed in St. Louis, Missouri, by
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): “America’s Arctic Warriors” use teamwork to drag ahkio sled loaded with over 300 pounds of gear during annual U.S. Army Alaska Winter Games at Fort Wainwright, January 2016 (U.S. Army/John Pennell); Marine with 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit engages targets during desert survival and tactics course while training with 5th Overseas Combined Arms Regiment in Djibouti (U.S. Marine Corps/Steve H. Lopez); U.S. Air Forces in Europe Band during Fasching parade, February 2015, in Ramstein-Miesenbach, Germany (U.S. Air Force/Timothy Moore) About the Cover In this Issue Gunner’s Mate 2nd Class Arlan Mecham instructs Sailor firing M240 machine gun during live-fire Forum exercise on fantail of USS John C. 2 Executive Summary Stennis (CVN 74), Pacific Ocean, August 29, 2015 (U.S. Navy/ 4 Crafting and Managing Jonathan Jiang) Effects: The Evolution of the Profession of Arms By James G. Stavridis, Ervin J. Rokke, and Terry C. Pierce 10 Errors in Strategic Thinking: Anti-Politics and the Macro Bias By Celestino Perez, Jr. 19 Strategy 2.0: The Features Joint Doctrine Next Generation 76 Cheap Technology 129 Interorganizational By Margaret M. Polski Will Challenge U.S. Cooperation III of III: The Tactical Dominance Joint Force Perspective 26 Rediscovering the Art of By T.X. Hammes By James C. McArthur, Cara Allison Strategic Thinking: Developing Marshall, Dale Erickson, E. Paul 21st-Century Strategic Leaders 86 The Missing Lever: A Joint Flowers, Michael E. Franco, George By Daniel H. McCauley Military Advisory Command for H. Hock, George E. Katsos, Luther Partner-Nation Engagement L. King, William E. Kirby, William M. Mantiply, Michael E. McWilliams, 34 Strategic Agility: Theory By Kevin D. Stringer and Practice A. Christopher Munn, Jeffrey K. 92 Back to Basics on Hybrid Padilla, Elmer L. Roman, Raymond E. By Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., Vanzwienen, and Jeffrey P. Wissel with Ryan L. Shaw Warfare in Europe: A Lesson from the Balkans 140 Thoughts on Force Protection By Christopher J. Lamb and By Richard E. Berkebile JPME Today Susan Stipanovich 43 Sustaining the “New 148 Joint Doctrine Update Norm” of Jointness 102 Economic Development in By Case Cunningham, Patrick Counterinsurgency: Building Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National a Stable Second Pillar Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Donahoe, Mike Jernigan, Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship and Michael Riggins By Patrick H. Donley joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and 48 The Future of Senior 112 Defense Entrepreneurship: other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat Service College Education: How to Build Institutions for terrorism; homeland security; and developments in Heed the Clarion Call Innovation Inside the Military training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus By Charles D. Allen and By James Hasik to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting Edward J. Filiberti freedom today. All published articles have been vetted through a peer-review process and cleared by the 54 Officers Are Less Intelligent: Recall Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. What Does It Mean? NDU Press is the National Defense University’s 118 If We Fight Joint, Shouldn’t cross-component, professional military and academic By Matthew F. Cancian Our History Reflect That? publishing house. By David F. Winkler The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the Commentary contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of 62 Fighting Ebola: An Interagency Book Reviews the Federal Government. Collaboration Paradigm 124 Counterinsurgency in Crisis Submissions and Communications JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent By Ross F. Lightsey Reviewed by F.G. Hoffman research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, 70 Harnessing the Influence of 125 Clausewitz academic specialists, and civilians from the United Senior Enlisted Leaders States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration Reviewed by John T. Kuehn to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. By Paul Kingsbury manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress. Or write to: 126 Superforecasting Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Reviewed by Michael J. Mazarr NDU Press 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 Email: [email protected] JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm 2nd Quarter, April 2016 ISSN 1070-0692 President Kennedy, President Eisenhower, and military aides at Camp David, Maryland, April 22, 1961 (Robert L. Knudsen/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)
Executive Summary
n a previous career, I was a strategic- them to use maps with more familiar but planning is everything. There is and operational-level planner. One U.S. terrain including Gettysburg and a very great distinction because when I of the many quotations I learned other Civil War venues. It seems that you are planning for an emergency you early on was from one of World War planning for the last war is not some- must start with this one thing: the very II’s great leaders who himself was an thing new. Unknowingly, the planners’ definition of ‘emergency’ is that it is effective staff officer, General Dwight first intuition to use European battle- unexpected, therefore it is not going D. Eisenhower. Speaking at a gather- grounds was correct; a few years later to happen the way you are planning” ing of American business leaders well the maps selected were dead center on (remarks at the National Defense Exec- into his second term as President, Ike the battlefields of 1914–1918, but in utive Reserve Conference, November related a story about a group of officers Ike’s view, the skills they developed in 14, 1957). Later, as a planner, I told my who were working out how to employ the planning effort were more import- teammates that planners learn to plan, large formations before the Great War ant than the plans they produced. He and then plan to plan again. Nothing broke out. These officers were using felt so strongly about the value of the was ever fixed because a plan was only maps of the central terrain in Europe, planning process that he told these a reflection of the information available but their superiors at Leavenworth told industrialists, “Plans are worthless, at the time. The key to success was
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 how well planners learned from their In researching how the military Services T.X. Hammes warns us of the poten- experiences. This constant renewing is develop strategists, M.M. Polski offers tial for significant threats to our major essential for developing the minds of a close look at what success the Services weapon systems from increasingly easy those involved than whether the plan have had in this effort. Daniel McCauley to obtain technologies. Seeing a require- would be useful. next helps us focus on strategic thinking ment for a new organizational structure For me, teaching the next generation as the key to the development of the next requirement based on recent part- of leaders in the national security world generation of strategic leaders. Virtually ner-nation engagements, Kevin Stringer has served to reinforce Ike’s wisdom. every study and article on how to deal suggests that the Defense Department Planners plan and then plan again. Then, with the threats we face today mention field a Joint Military Advisory Command when a crisis hits, the plan is only as good the need to be agile, but few have fully to better deal with this growing area of as the capabilities available and the minds connected the dots between theory and operations. As Europe’s security situ- of those charged with figuring out how to practice as Charles Jacoby, Jr., and Ryan ation begins to show signs of stress on adapt. Throwing the plan out and starting Shaw do for us in this issue. the NATO Alliance, Christopher Lamb over is certainly an option. Sometimes JPME Today continues to attract a and Susan Stipanovich offer a case study not having a plan yields a better solution. wealth of ideas from, for, and about the from the Balkans on how to address the But the more I teach students to think learners engaged in our schoolhouses, growing problem of hybrid warfare. critically—a core capability of any planner both students and faculty. A team of grad- Highlighting another lingering problem or leader in my view—the more I realize uates from the Joint Forces Staff College, from our recent counterinsurgency expe- the value of any effort is more dependent Case Cunningham, Patrick Donahoe, riences, Patrick Donley offers his insights on how people use their minds than any Mike Jernigan, and Michael Riggins, gives on how to build the economic pillar tactic, technique, or weapon they may call us a close assessment of today’s jointness needed to achieve success. As money on. After all, smart weapons are only as and how to sustain it (which is very timely for defense spending remains tight, good as the people who wield them. given the approach of the 30th anniversary James Hasik believes the key to Defense From Sun Tzu to John Boyd, from of Goldwater-Nichols). From the U.S. Department entrepreneurship is found in Clausewitz to Ike, all the greats affirmed Army War College, Charles Allen and building up the military’s internal institu- the value of educated people in dealing Edward Filiberti offer some thoughts tions that promote innovation. with the expected and the unexpected. on how our war colleges are evolving. In Recall, David Winkler reflects Feeling underexperienced as a planner or In what is probably one of the most on jointness as reported in our military needing some new ideas on how to deal eye-opening articles I have seen in recent histories, which tend to be Service-centric with uncertainty of the future? A good years, Matthew Cancian discusses the in his view. We also bring you three place to help your own personal planning uncomfortable truth and implications of a important book reviews and two inter- for the future is right here in these pages. steady drop in the quality of our youngest esting articles that accompany the Joint We offer you some valuable ingredients military officers. (Spoiler alert, more edu- Doctrine Update. First, our friends at the for your planning in this and every Joint cation will be required, not less.) Joint Staff and other agencies complete Force Quarterly. In Commentary, in what is a first for their three-part series on interorganiza- Thinking, planning, and acting at a military journal, Ross Lightsey chron- tional cooperation with a look at the joint the strategic level are the central themes icles the success of the joint task force force perspective. Next, investigating the of any war college curriculum, and this assigned to help combat the spread of the doctrine on force protection, Richard edition’s Forum provides a wealth of Ebola virus in 2014–2015. Key to that Berkebile discusses his views on ways it discussions worthy of consideration for operation’s success was the way the mili- could be improved. strategists and students of strategy alike. tary response helped integrate the many So if planning is a constant and many Our first article by James Stavridis, Ervin governmental and nongovernmental orga- of you are involved in figuring out how to Rokke, and Terry Pierce investigates the nizations involved, a model Lightsey finds deal with the future you face, we hope this connections between the profession of plausible for future similar operations. As edition of JFQ provides you with some arms and how military leaders seek to our joint force shrinks, one way that lead- new inputs to your process. As always, we develop and achieve the effects desired in ership can figure out how to meet mission, would like to hear from you as you work the modern battlespace. Helping us navi- Paul Kingsbury believes, is to better use through your planning cycle and continue gate the difficult terrain between our ears, the frontline abilities of senior enlisted to add to your personal planning “soft- Celestino Perez, Jr., warns us about the leaders who directly influence our troops. ware.” Given Ike’s trajectory from staff biases that strategic thinkers are prone to Our Features section offers a range of officer to President and all he achieved exhibit and provides a number of useful ideas that both acknowledges where we along the way, it would seem good plan- suggestions on how to combat them. As have been and suggests better ways to get ning does produce great leaders. JFQ I emphasized above, the key to the mil- where the joint force needs to go. Always itary’s ability to develop useful plans are looking into the space between military William T. Eliason the officers charged with making them. operations and technological change, Editor in Chief
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Eliason 3 U.S. Marines practice “combat gliding” during Integrated Training Exercise 2-15 at Camp Wilson on Twentynine Palms, California, January 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kathryn Howard)
Crafting and Managing Effects The Evolution of the Profession of Arms
By James G. Stavridis, Ervin J. Rokke, and Terry C. Pierce
ecent operations conducted ber 2014, a high-profile breach of Sony responded to Pyongyang’s alleged cyber against U.S. businesses and Pictures Entertainment was linked to a attacks on Sony by imposing sanctions citizens have reemphasized a state-sponsored cyber attack by North against the country’s lucrative arms R 2 critical vulnerability in how the U.S. Korea. Apparently, North Korea was industry. It is too soon to tell whether Government thinks about and defends motivated by opposition to the film The this response was appropriate and effec- itself against nonkinetic instruments of Interview, a comedy about the assas- tive. However, the apparent difficulties power. This is particularly true in the sination of North Korea’s leader Kim we faced in determining how best to manmade domain of cyber. In Decem- Jong-un.1 The Obama administration respond indicate that the assumptions underlying the definitions and responsi- bilities of our military profession, most of which emerged following World War Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN (Ret.), Ph.D., is Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D., is the Senior Scholar in the II and the beginning of the Cold War, Center for Character and Leadership Development at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Captain Terry C. are badly in need of updating to accom- Pierce, USN (Ret.), Ph.D., is Director of the Department of Homeland Security Center of Innovation at modate new forms of warfare. the U.S. Air Force Academy.
4 Forum / Crafting and Managing Effects JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 The end of World War II and emer- in the natural domains of land, sea, air, of force. A new assortment of nonkinetic gence of the Cold War resulted in a surge and space, but also in the increasingly sig- actors using soft power in the cyber as of brilliant academic scholarship con- nificant manmade domain of cyber. well as the natural domains can achieve cerning the profession of arms. In 1957, hard-power kinetic effects. for example, Harvard political science Huntington’s World: Civil- Both national and nonstate actors op- professor Samuel Huntington published Military Relationships erating in the cyber domain have targeted his seminal book, The Soldier and the The profession of arms as we know Iranian oil ministers’ computers, foreign State. This was a monumental effort it owes much to Huntington’s financial institutions and energy sectors, explaining why and how the modern mil- ground-breaking framework for civ- and even senior political and military itary officer corps represents a profession il-military relations and national secu- leaders, causing significant damage.10 In in the same sense as those of law, clergy, rity. The Soldier and the State is rooted 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of and medicine.3 Two key themes emerged in a bipolar world where most of the Staff Admiral Mike Mullen stated that from Huntington’s work. First, the destructive military power was possessed cyber was “the single biggest existential optimal means for civilian control of the by the United States and Soviet Union. threat that’s out there” because “cyber, military was to professionalize it. Second, A key tenet of Huntington’s work is a actually more than theoretically, can Huntington argued that the central skill complex relationship between civilian attack our infrastructure and our financial of military competence, unique to its pro- and military authorities, with the mili- systems.”11 Cell phones, for example, are fession, was best summed up by Harold tary subordinated to civilian control. He an essential tool for economic prosperity Lasswell’s phrase, “the management of offers several prescriptions for achieving as well as for financing and planning violence.”4 In short, for Huntington as and maintaining the stability and the terrorist operations. Significantly, such well as other nationally recognized schol- utility of this relationship. The output cell phones costing $400 today match ars of his time, the unique professional of Huntington’s theory includes an the computing power of the fastest $5 expertise of military officers was focused intellectual framework for analyzing million supercomputer in 1975.12 on the achievement of successful armed the extent to which the system of civ- combat.5 il-military relations in a society tends New Answers to We believe the first part of to enhance or detract from the military Three Questions Huntington’s theory still holds. In a security of that society.8 Our call to update Huntington’s defi- democratic society, the military is a Huntington’s focus is on the na- nitions and prescriptions for the profes- profession requiring civilian control. We tion-state with its responsibility to thwart sion of arms is driven by the emergence argue, however, that the Huntington threats arising from other independent of new answers to three fundamental assertion of “management of violence” states.9 For him, achieving a stable and questions that have been traditionally as the unique expertise of the profession productive relationship between civilian used to define a global security situa- of arms needs to be updated from his and military authorities is essential for tion: Who are the major actors? What 1957 model. We maintain that members maximum security of the state. A key as- can they do to one another? What of today’s profession of arms are “the sumption of Huntington’s model is that do they wish to do to one another? managers of effects” while the primary violence almost always originated with a Scholars of international politics and responsibility for defining the desired nation-state and was directed toward an- national security, beginning with Pro- effects, particularly in the strategic arena, other nation-state. In this environment, fessor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard lies with civilian leadership at the national the threat or actual use of force embodied University, have taught us that when level. This assertion builds upon the in national armies, navies, and air forces the answers to these questions change concept of soft power introduced by is the best way to keep the peace. Thus, in significant ways, the global security Professor Joseph Nye in 1990, which Huntington asserts that the unique environment is fundamentally altered.13 argued that “winning the hearts and expertise of the military profession is to Historical examples include the Peace of minds has always been important, but it manage violence. Westphalia (1648), French Revolution is even more so in a global information Huntington’s model proved useful for (1789), Congress of Vienna (1815), age.”6 Since 1990, soft power has grown half a century, during which security de- unification of Germany (1870), and the in importance as information-age tech- pended largely on national capacities for end of World War II (1945). nologies advance. More importantly, managing violence in the natural domains Thus, the emergence of new actors the information revolution is changing of land, sea, air, and space. His model, (the United States and Soviet Union), the nature of power and increasing its however, falls short with the emergence capabilities (nuclear weapons), and diffusion, both vertically and horizontally, of nonkinetic instruments of foreign intentions (propelled by the ideological marking the decline of the sovereign state policy to include those within the cyber split between democratic and communist and the rise of a new feudal-type world.7 domain. Particularly within that domain, ideologies) formed the intellectual plat- Finally, we maintain that these hard and nation-states and their militaries are no form and inspiration for “new thinking” soft effects could be generated not only longer the sole managers for instruments about the profession of arms by early
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Stavridis, Rokke, and Pierce 5 President Obama at Rural Council meeting in Eisenhower Executive Office Building, February 2016 (The White House/Pete Souza)
Cold War scholars. Quite properly, their disappeared, while others, to include global terrorism using various means analyses and policy prescriptions were a variety of non–nation state entities, of attacking nation-states, from suicide based on “new realities” of the postwar have emerged. Many of the traditional operations to decapitation of individual period and ultimately came to reflect the major actors emerged with the Peace of citizens. Ironically, these new actors are desired effect of “containment,” which Westphalia in 1648, the treaty ending in some important ways “returning to was conceived and developed by civilian the Thirty Years’ War.14 This agreement the way war worked before the rise of the leadership at the national level. set the stage for the previous warfighting state.”16 Many of the nonstate actors also entities such as families, tribes, religions, are adept at using modern, nonkinetic in- Realities of the 21st Century cities, and even commercial organiza- struments such as social media and other Now we must come to grips with the tions to consolidate and fight under the tools emerging from the cyber domain new realities of the 21st century that monopoly of the nation-state militaries.15 to achieve their desired effects. By using emerged with the fall of communism and Until recently, such state-versus-state these cyber tools, they have, in effect, re- the Soviet Empire in the 1990s. With warfare remained the standard model. vitalized and bolstered Sun Tzu’s notion such additional dynamics as the incredi- However, we are now witnessing a partial of “getting into your opponent’s head.” ble advances in technology and commu- resurgence of the pre-Westphalia model They have expanded the battlefield nications as well as the end of the Cold as nonstate actors such as the Islamic beyond the traditional domains of land, War, the global security system clearly State of Iraq and the Levant, al Qaeda, sea, air, and space to accommodate more has once again faced new answers to Hamas, Hizballah, and others—including effectively than ever before the battles of Professor Hoffmann’s three fundamental drug cartels and crime syndicates—have wits. questions. As in 1789, 1815, 1870, and emerged as very real participants in the What Do They Wish to Do to Each 1945, the global world of national secu- international security environment. Other? Nation-state actors still appear rity has been turned on its head. What Can They Do to Each Other? focused primarily on traditional goals Who Are the New Actors? Some As demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks, of maintaining and expanding their actors on the international scene have these nonstate actors are capable of power and influence, but they generally
6 Forum / Crafting and Managing Effects JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pays respects to victims of terrorist attack in Paris (United Nations/Eskinder Debebe) follow internationally accepted Geneva to reduce the problem scope to a more Cognitive psychologists also tell us Conventions for conducting war. This manageable, “bite-size” challenge. Most that such simplifying lenses inevitably is not the case, however, with the new certainly, this pertains to the analysis turn out to be inadequate for com- nonstate actors, who frequently have of predicaments that nations face on a prehending realities faced in complex eschewed conventions accepted by the continuing basis in the arena of national problem sets. We have previously argued more traditional nation-state actors since security. Such analysis is at the heart of that the CAW concept encounters this Westphalia. For them, the battlefield John Boyd’s “orientation phase,” the difficulty when used as a lens.18 In our has taken on a wider range of options most critical component of his famous current security arena, for example, it fails with less regard for such notions as just “observe, orient, decide, and act” cycle to accommodate the emerging cyber do- war theory. Indeed, recent attacks in- (the OODA loop).17 It is the stage in main as well as nonkinetic instruments of volving malware tools for hacking into the cognitive process at which the par- power resident in the traditional land, sea, corporate entities such as banks and large ticipants attempt to define the “reality” air, and space domains. Because the CAW merchandise sales entities (Target, The of their problem set. Quite understand- concept limits “vision” to the traditional Home Depot, Sony, and others) as well ably, the simplifying lens traditionally instruments of military force, new forms as Internet accounts of private individuals used by leaders in the national security of power, to include those emerging demonstrate a departure from traditional arena has focused on the military from the cyber domain, are anomalies emphases by combatants on enemy mili- weapons of the time. Indeed, this tra- and excluded from our concept of reality. tary targets. dition has been employed since at least Understanding the power of these anom- the Chinese Spring and Autumn periods alies requires a new way of thinking and The Need for a Wider Lens of the 8th through the 4th centuries thus a new and wider lens beyond the Cognitive psychologists tell us that BCE. Today, it exists in the form of the traditional CAW lens with its focus on when faced with complex problem sets, combined arms warfare (CAW) concept the natural domain weapons systems. The we are “wired” to simplify our task by with its focus being ships, planes, tanks, new lens we have offered might properly using “frameworks, lenses, or concepts” and missiles. be called combined effects power (CEP).
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Stavridis, Rokke, and Pierce 7 The CEP construct is a way to maximize our military instruments to successfully strategies and instruments of power. and harmonize the effects of kinetic and fight wars of destruction, we must first Needless to say, desired effects exist at nonkinetic power. The key issue it tackles have an answer to a foundational chal- the operational and tactical as well as the is what effects we want to achieve using lenge: What is the effect that we wish to strategic level. Civilian leadership is likely both hard and soft power.19 achieve? In most situations, particularly to call for greater military involvement In a thoughtful piece titled “Winning at the strategic level, this is a question in the development of desired effects at Battles, Losing Wars,” Lieutenant for our senior civilian policymakers. these less strategic levels. General James Dubik, USA (Ret.), sug- They must be the primary determiners gests that this dilemma has characterized of desired effects. Equally important, The Need to Update virtually all post-9/11 wars and attributes they must understand that without a Huntington’s Framework: it in large part to the “civil-military nexus coherent definition of desired effects, the The Sony Example that underpins how America wages military and other entities with foreign As we wrote this article, our national war.”20 We agree with this assertion and policy tools are not in a position to craft leadership’s response to the challenge believe that the problem emerges with effective responses beyond the CAW of the cyber strike against Sony Corpo- the very first challenge in international model. This is true regardless of how ration could be described as perplexed, conflicts: the selection of proper war accurate their assessments of the secu- if not confused. Whether it was an aims. Too often, our war aims (desired rity challenge might be. attack on a vital American interest or, effects) are neither crisp and coherent nor In sum, we believe Huntington’s con- less seriously, an act of vandalism was realistic in terms of their demands on the cept of civilian control, with its emphasis unclear. The strike was apparently the American people for blood and treasure. on the professional development of our product of a national decision by North One need only review the predicaments military, remains vital to a democratic Korea, but the target was a nonstate we face or have recently faced in Syria, society. Also required is a capability and actor (Sony), and the location of the Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea willingness of our national-level civilian strike force could well have been a third to understand how battles can be won leadership to assume a primary role in de- country. The attack, while not violent while their wars are lost. termining and articulating desired effects. in a traditional way, was serious in its War aims go wrong when they are For its part, the military profession must costly impact of some $300 million in based on faulty assessments of reality. be capable of managing the full spectrum damages as well as its negative impact Assessments of reality are wrong when of capabilities within its purview, both on an American First Amendment core the concepts or “lenses” we use to help us kinetic and nonkinetic, to accomplish value. In short, it represented major understand our security predicaments are the desired effects. This may well require new answers to at least two of the fun- unable to accommodate complex chal- some expansion of the traditional profes- damental questions asked by Professor lenges. In short, we cannot adequately sional development process for military Hoffmann: What can the actors do to address the complicated, nonlinear personnel. They will need the expertise one another? What do the actors wish aspects of international conflict in to- for an improved capacity to manage a to do to one another? From a tradi- day’s world if we rely on the linear CAW broad spectrum of tools for achieving tional perspective, North Korea was not approaches designed for the simpler hard- desired effects as well as the less complex a new participant in our nation’s histor- power era of the Cold War. Huntington’s challenge of Huntington’s 1957 notions ical arena of conflict, but it was clearly 1957 framework was brilliant in its hard- about managing violence. acting in a new cyber domain, which power design and has served us well. The And so it is that a new first ques- made its fundamental character very time has come, however, to flesh it out tion—“What is the desired effect at the different from what we faced when it with new realities, including soft power, strategic level?”—can open the door to a invaded South Korea in 1950. As such, that square more accurately with the 21st more holistic assessment of and response there may or may not have been a new century. We must come to grips with to the security predicaments in which we answer to Hoffmann’s third question. the facts that the post–Cold War era has find ourselves. As such, it broadens our Whatever the case, the 1957 vin- yielded fundamentally new answers to perspective to go beyond a traditional tage Huntington model was proved an Professor Hoffmann’s three questions. focus on military instruments to include inadequate framework for dealing with a more balanced appreciation for nonki- the North Korean strike against Sony. The Need for a New netic alternatives in the natural domains Indeed, its narrow focus on traditional Way of Thinking of land, sea, air, and space and, equally instruments of force seemed to suggest We believe that the first step in this important, the emerging cyber domain. only two alternatives, both of which process is to change the initial ques- Once our national security leadership has were unacceptable. Few, including the tion that is often asked for addressing developed desired effects, they become President of the United States, were will- emerging challenges in the national touchstones that can enable military pro- ing to respond with kinetic instruments security arena. In place of the traditional fessionals to go about the task of arraying, of power. At the same time, the United focus on how we might best combine selecting, and implementing appropriate States wanted to make clear to North
8 Forum / Crafting and Managing Effects JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Korea and the world that the strike against Sony would not go unpunished. Perhaps this notion of punishment was the “desired effect.” If so, the instruments of power to create such pun- ishment fell largely outside the traditional tools relevant to Huntington’s definition of the “unique military expertise” as the “management of violence.”
Conclusion National security conflicts are increas- ingly a battle of wits, and we must update the way we use them to match the increasingly complicated world in which we live. The challenge goes well beyond what we think; it is also how we think about problem sets that rests on new realities and principles that render traditional linear approaches Thousands of people take part in Madrid rally against terror and war, November 2015 (Adolfo Lujan) insufficient, if not irrelevant. Against this background, Huntington’s classic answers to Professor Hoffmann’s three 11 Jason Healey, “No, Cyberwarfare Isn’t framework has proved inadequate for salient questions. This new way of think- as Dangerous as Nuclear War,” U.S. News and World Report, March 20, 2013. accommodating the cognitive and oper- ing requires us to adapt our simplifying 12 James Manyika et al., Disruptive Tech- ational pathways required for meeting lens to the more complicated world of nologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, today’s challenges of the orientation the 21st century. It also requires us to ask Business, and the Global Economy (New York: and subsequent phases of Boyd’s a new question at the outset: What effects McKinsey Global Institute, May 2013). 13 OODA loop. The Sony crisis can, do we want to achieve using both hard Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Es- says on the Theory and Practice of International however, provide an important learning and soft power? Fortunately, as cognitive Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), 92–93. experience for dealing with even more psychologists tell us, we are “wired” to 14 William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth serious situations of a similar nature in do this. JFQ Generation War,” Military Review, September– the future. October 2004, 12. General Dubik’s assertion that our 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 12–16. modern dichotomy of winning battles Notes 17 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot and losing wars can be attributed at least Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Back Bay 1 Don Clark and Nathan Olivarez-Giles, in part to the “civil-military nexus that Books, 2002), 327–344. “Hackers Hit Sony, Microsoft Videogame Ser- 18 Ervin J. Rokke, Thomas A. Drohan, and underpins how America wages war” has vices,” Wall Street Journal, December 27–28, Terry C. Pierce, “Combined Effects Power,” substantial merit. Waging war involves 2014, B1. Joint Force Quarterly 73 (2nd Quarter 2014). selecting proper war aims; we see this as 2 Carol Lee and Jay Solomon, “North 19 Ibid. Korean Arms Dealers Targeted,” Wall Street the crafting of desired effects and con- 20 James Dubik, “Winning Battles, Losing Journal, January 3–4, 2015, A1. sider it to be primarily the responsibility Wars,” Army Magazine, December 2014, 3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and 16–17. of senior civilian policy leaders as an the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Mili- initial step in their decision matrix. Such tary Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, desired effects rise above the selection of 1957), 7. kinetic and nonkinetic instruments for 4 Ibid., 11. 5 their achievement. As such, they provide Ibid. 6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means a critical context for the selection of rel- to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAf- evant instruments and their operational fairs, 2004), 1. deployment. This, we believe, is a mana- 7 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power gerial and leadership responsibility of the (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 113–114. 8 military profession. Huntington, viii. 9 Ibid, 1. In summary, we are calling for a new 10 Isaac Porche, Jerry Sollinger, and Shawn way of thinking on the part of our senior McKay, “An Enemy Without Boundaries,” national security leaders, both military United States Naval Institute Proceedings 138, and civilian, to accommodate new no. 10 (October 2012), 35.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Stavridis, Rokke, and Pierce 9 Marines with 7th Marine Regiment scout for avenues of approach and egress points at al-Asad Air Base, Iraq, October 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Akeel Austin)
Errors in Strategic Thinking Anti-Politics and the Macro Bias
By Celestino Perez, Jr.
Simply the application of force rarely produces and, in fact, maybe never produces the outcome we seek.
—General Martin E. Dempsey 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff August 14, 2013
ow can military professionals performance too often surprises and American participation in the 2011 improve U.S. strategic per- disappoints. Strategic discontent, which North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s H formance? If General Martin arises from the failure to conjoin stra- (NATO’s) intervention in Libya exem- Dempsey, who served as President tegic intent and actual outcomes, may plifies the inefficacy that induces strategic Barack Obama’s principal military well be the default expectation, whereas discontent. Soon after Operation Unified advisor, is correct, American strategic strategic satisfaction is the rare surprise. Protector, U.S. policymakers, military leaders, and public intellectuals assessed the toppling of Muammar Qadhafi’s re- Colonel Celestino Perez, Jr., USA, Ph.D., is the Chief Security Cooperation Planner for U.S. Army North, G5. gime to be a success. For example, in the
10 Forum / Errors in Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 spring of 2012, Ivo Daalder and Admiral that something is amiss in U.S. strategic elements frame how people perceive and James Stavridis, USN, published an arti- performance. These thinkers converge interpret the world.5 The elements also cle in Foreign Affairs optimistically titled regarding a principal source of strategic operate simultaneously and vary over “NATO’s Victory in Libya.”1 discontent: the persistent failure to under- time. In the aggregate, they compose— Yet satisfaction with the Libya op- stand the sociopolitical aspects of those via causal interactions between them—a eration was short lived. Two years after places wherein American Servicemembers population’s “politics.” If military profes- Daalder and Stavridis’s glowing report, apply lethal and nonlethal power. More sionals are to serve as politically attuned Daveed Gartenstein-Ross wrote “The specifically, policymakers and military agents, they should acquire causal literacy Consequences of NATO’s Good War professionals too often intervene without in how political outcomes emerge—espe- in Libya,” which included a dismal understanding how military operations cially in the wake of violence and conflict. assessment: “NATO’s intervention was affect ground-level politics and, in turn, Military interventions should help thus executed nearly flawlessly, yet ap- how ground-level politics affects military attain—at the very least—minimally pears to be a strategic mistake.” To wit, and strategic performance. acceptable political outcomes. Army doc- “the intervention in Libya left behind a Note that the term ground level as trine mandates that ground forces exist country beset by instability, and has had a used here is not a synonym for tactical. “to create the conditions for favorable destabilizing effect on Libya’s neighbors. The term describes all interactions that conflict resolution.”6 The conditions Taking these consequences into account, make a physical difference in the world, Servicemembers must create are, as it is not clear that lives were saved on the whether the interaction occurs in the Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, whole by NATO’s intervention.”2 The Oval Office (as when the President USA, instructs, fundamentally political. downstream consequences of Operation issues an order) or in Anbar Province He reminds military professionals that Unified Protector, including increased (as when indigenous leaders gather for “war is political,” a fact he reinforces by regional instability and loss of life, rein- a meeting). Both interactions shape the quoting the 2014 U.S. Army Operating force Dempsey’s claim about American landscape on which military profession- Concept: “Army forces are prepared to strategic inefficacy. als do their work. do more than fight and defeat enemies; This article, which presumes that Politics, in this article, encompasses they must possess the capability to trans- military professionals share with policy- formal and informal governance, eco- late military objectives into enduring makers an obligation to improve strategic nomics, civil society, and culture insofar political outcomes.”7 performance, posits that two intellectual as these systems influence (in Harold If military interventions often fail to errors contribute to strategic discontent. Lasswell’s well-known formulation) “who achieve satisfactory political outcomes, The first error, anti-politics, indicates the gets what, when, how” among persons they do—with much greater reliability— Servicemember’s tendency to discount living in a community.3 Politics emerges effect a tornadic reordering of those very the military importance of ground-level from a constellation of causal elements, political elements whose fortunate con- politics. The second error, which aggra- including: fluence is necessary for “favorable conflict vates the anti-politics error, is the macro resolution.” It follows that the military (relatively) nonmanipulable or struc- bias in strategic thinking. This bias leads •• professional should study how best to tural elements (for example, geogra- strategists and military professionals to nudge into reality, in cooperation with an phy, the global economic system, and neglect the importance of local knowl- international array of military and civilian the distribution of natural resources) edge and bottom-up dynamics. This partners, satisfactory political outcomes. intentionally manmade or institu- error eclipses crucial strategies to mitigate •• Macro bias is evident to observant tional elements (rules, policies, regu- violence through local solutions. professors and students in mid- and lations, strategies, and organizations) I argue that there is a strategic imper- senior-level military education. Teachers meaning-infused or ideational ele- ative for military professionals to study •• often reinforce this bias with the admo- ments (such as communal norms, how lethal force and politics are causally nition to “avoid getting in the weeds” values, beliefs, practices, varieties interdependent, all the way down to during planning exercises or seminar of religiosity and secularity, and the sandy-boots level. The macro bias discussions about strategy. The macro narratives) in strategy formulation and military bias also appears on classroom white hard-wired or psychological elements planning inhibits a satisfactory under- •• boards, which often betray a wave-top (cognitive processes, heuristics, and standing of the environment, especially its approach to understanding a conflict’s biases).4 sociopolitical dynamics; therefore, the in- environment. At times, students (too) tegration of cutting-edge political science These four types of elements exert neatly arrange the elements composing in military education would mitigate the causal force, albeit in different ways, “the operational environment” in an foregoing errors and thereby improve the on human behavior. Structural and orderly matrix with columns labeled prospects for strategic satisfaction. institutional elements compose a ma- political, military, economics, social, in- I first show how several top foreign terial obstacle course that people must formation, and infrastructure. On other policy thinkers and practitioners agree negotiate. Ideational and psychological occasions, white boards provide little
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Perez 11 Secretary Kerry and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir at French Foreign Ministry in Paris before multinational meeting to discuss future of Syria, December 2015 (State Department) more than a listing of abstract terms, intelligence analysis, military planning, or the world of strategic importance to such as transnational crime organiza- strategy formulation. the [United States].”9 Similarly, in tions, drug-trafficking, corruption, and Reforming military education would 2013, General Raymond Odierno, murder/kidnapping/robbery. Sometimes be a way to account for ground-level USA, General James Amos, USMC, only a scatter plot of country names, politics and mitigate the macro bias. and Admiral William McRaven, USN, connected by solid, dashed, or colored The integration of the social sciences of U.S. Special Operations Command lines appears. (especially political science) in the military called upon the American profession of The macro bias is most noticeable by classroom could instill the very modes arms to “expand the dialogue around what is absent. First, nothing in the class- of critical analysis and creativity senior the ‘social sciences’ of warfare” as a way room suggests that military students are leaders desire. This reformation is feasi- to reverse poor strategic performance.10 performing scientifically informed causal ble, especially for a subset of the student Finally, in January 2015, the U.S. Army analysis. Dog-eared articles from, for in- populations in mid- and senior-level War College convened an assembly of stance, the Journal of Conflict Resolution education.8 social scientists to produce a framework or PRISM do not appear on desks during The proposal to integrate social for understanding the “human elements” planning sessions, and white boards and political science in military educa- in the operational environment. The do not reflect tightly specified causal tion is consistent with the aims of the workshop’s sponsors included U.S. Army arguments about current and future Department of Defense (DOD) and joint Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. conditions. Second, students in military community. The Minerva Initiative is a Special Operations Command, and U.S. classrooms do not engage in sustained “university-based social science research Marine Corps. study of real-world contemporary crises— initiative,” whose principal goal is “to Efforts to mitigate anti-politics and comprising actual populations, political improve DOD’s basic understanding the macro bias via educational reform will dynamics, and armed actors—with the of the social, cultural, behavioral, and be difficult. One challenge is the potential detail and skill necessary for adequate political forces that shape regions of for senior leaders to limit their efforts at
12 Forum / Errors in Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 strategic reform to rhetoric and exhor- military officer should become an “expert Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003 tation as opposed to closely monitored in violence” by studying how violence— as a conventional interstate war; how- educational reform and talent manage- regardless of source—affects politics and ever, it morphed into something else ment. A second challenge is a “bailiwick vice versa. It is not sufficient to be a mere partly because of (if Odierno is correct) approach” among educators regarding “manager of violence” who knows only the U.S. military’s failure to appreciate what military expertise and advice entail; how to deliver ordnance.14 political elements. Politics was similarly that is, the flawed idea that the military’s Odierno’s own instruction regarding important to Dwight Eisenhower, who expertise, or bailiwick, concerns solely the military’s neglect of politics is em- in 1942 lamented, “The sooner I can get the unidirectional delivery of ordnance, phatic and self-critical: rid of these questions that are outside the whereas the reciprocal causal connections military in scope, the happier I will be! between war’s destructive and construc- The thing I learned most—and I always Sometimes I think I live ten years each tive elements are someone else’s (perhaps use Iraq as an example. When we went into week, of which at least nine are absorbed a diplomat’s) bailiwick. Iraq in 2003, we did everything we wanted in political and economic matters.”18 to do. We very quickly removed the regime. If Odierno’s and Eisenhower’s expe- Politics, Anti-Politics, and We gained control of the population. We riences illustrate the centrality of politics the Military Professional had no idea or clue of the societal devasta- to interstate wars, Major General Michael Prominent thinkers and practitioners tion that had gone on inside of Iraq and Nagata, USA, asks similar sociopolitical observe that the American polity suffers what would push back on us. We didn’t questions about the Islamic State of from recurrent bouts of strategic discon- even think about it until we got in there. So Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Nagata, the tent. Henry Kissinger, in the Washington we can’t allow that to happen again.15 commander of U.S. Central Command’s Post in March 2014, remarked, “In my special operations effort in the Middle life, I have seen four wars begun with The application of lethal military East, declares, “We do not understand great enthusiasm and public support, power certainly affects rifle-bearing ad- the movement, and until we do, we are all of which we did not know how to versaries. But lethal power also disturbs not going to defeat it.” Moreover, “We end and from three of which we with- politics, and this political disturbance have not defeated the idea. We do not drew unilaterally.”11 In his book How in turn engenders boomerang effects even understand the idea.”19 Wars End, Gideon Rose attributes the on military and strategic performance. Military professionals hoping to country’s war termination troubles to Odierno’s reflection shows how the understand ISIL should consult the strategic leaders—both civilian and mil- causal relationships between military force relevant scholarship. Over the past 15 itary—who fixate on war’s destructive and politics are reciprocal and hidden. years, a community of political scientists dimension while failing to apply “due His memory also betrays the existence has become especially attuned to how diligence” to its constructive, political of anti-politics, which indicates the civil wars comprise entangled lethal and dimension.12 Similarly, Odierno, Amos, Servicemember’s tendency to neglect the political elements at the ground level. and McRaven attribute a strategic-level military relevance of sociopolitical factors. Stathis Kalyvas, an authority on civil wars, “repetitive shortfall” to the military’s Rose and Odierno are not alone in observes that “analysis of the dynamics neglect of sociopolitical dynamics: highlighting the influence of anti-politics. of civil war (how and why people join or “Time and again, the U.S. has under- A 2012 study by the Joint Staff finds defect, how violence takes place, et cet- taken to engage in conflict without fully that the U.S. military’s number one era) is impossible in the absence of close considering the physical, cultural, and shortcoming during this century’s first attention to local dynamics.”20 social environments. . . . One has only decade of war was a “failure to recognize, Kalyvas’s research program, which to examine our military interventions acknowledge, and accurately define the explores ground-level lethal and political over the last 50 years in Vietnam, Bosnia operational environment,” to include dynamics, could help military profession- and Kosovo, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghan- “information about ethnic and tribal als improve the efficacy of humanitarian istan to see the evidence and costs of identities, religion, culture, politics, and interventions, transitions to civilian au- this oversight.”13 Strategic discontent, if economics.”16 A 2014 RAND report thority in the wake of conventional wars, the foregoing thinkers are right, has its echoes the Joint Staff’s findings by at- and the prosecution of irregular wars. Yet roots in the neglect of “the political,” tributing mediocre strategic performance it is precisely the intertwined lethal and and especially the two-way causal con- to the military professional’s failure to political dynamics that military profes- nections between military interventions give due weight to “the sociocultural and sionals neglect. and politics. historical knowledge needed to inform Senior military leaders, seeking to Efforts to link strategic discontent to understanding of the conflict, formula- align the American profession of arms the neglect of sociopolitical dynamics are tion of strategy, and timely assessment.”17 with the imperatives of the security a recurrent theme among critics. This ne- The need to overcome anti-politics is environment, grasp the importance of glect is not solely the policymaker’s error. not only a counterinsurgency imperative. overcoming anti-politics. They desire Military professionals also play a role. The It is crucial to all military operations. officers to expand their intellectual diet to
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Perez 13 encompass the study of politics, including social, cultural, and political dynamics on regional- and country-level actors and governance, economics, culture, ethics, at work within the populations where dynamics, whereas the latter feature local and lethal power. For example, Dempsey these wars are fought.”27 This imperative tensions concerning political power, land articulates the need to study rising requires mid- and senior-level military rights, and ethnicity. Autesserre finds that powers, nonstate actors, criminal organi- students to study those political elements the macro bias “precluded action on local zations, religious groups, and ideological whose fortunate confluence constitutes violence, ultimately dooming intentional agitators.21 Odierno calls for the study “favorable conflict resolution” and efforts” to bring peace to the Congo.31 of cultures as well as socioeconomic and “enduring political outcomes.” Put Deibel’s approach seemingly postures political underpinnings.22 otherwise, this imperative requires that his readers to cultivate a macro bias. He The testimony of General Lloyd military teachers and students study the insists that strategy is, first and foremost, Austin, USA, before Congress illustrated new science of politics and war. “comprehensive.” Strategists are “to look how political elements are a top military at the whole picture” and make “a con- concern. His 2014 and 2015 posture The Macro Bias in American scious effort to consider the whole range statements describe the importance of Strategic Thinking of issues in the nation’s external relations, appreciating “the political, economic, Overcoming anti-politics requires those relating to functional concerns (like and socio-cultural currents” that drive attentiveness to ground-level politics. population, the environment, prolifera- attitudes and behaviors in U.S. Central Political scientist Séverine Autesserre’s tion, or trade) as well as those relating to Command’s area of responsibility.23 In research program posits that the neglect all regions and countries of the world.”32 March 2015, Austin more specifically of ground-level politics extends beyond Deibel warns against the “natural temp- described the “underlying currents” the profession of arms to the interna- tation of policymakers, confronted with he must consider, including fracturing tional peacebuilding community. She crisis after crisis . . . to jump into the institutions, a growing ethno-sectarian argues that “peacebuilders” (including problem of the day and try to solve it.”33 divide, a struggle between moderates diplomats, representatives of nongov- But the question arises: If the and extremists, rejection of corruption ernmental organizations, and military strategist is to cleave to the macro or and oppressive governments, and a youth officials) tend to restrict their analysis of comprehensive level (that is, “external bulge. Most importantly, Austin insisted, a conflict’s causes to regional- or coun- relations,” “functional concerns,” and “To be effective, our approach in deal- try-level actors and above. This macro “regions and countries”), when are ing with the challenges that exist in the bias causes peacebuilders working in meso- and local-level dynamics to receive region must address these complex root the Democratic Republic of the Congo, due analytic attention? A good strategy is causes.”24 for example, to neglect local drivers of tactically feasible; for example, it is feasi- Any examination of “complex root violence and, thereby, local solutions.28 ble at the physical locus of intervention. causes” requires analytic attention, as Autesserre’s findings suggest that mili- But how are strategists to assess local Austin instructs, to ground-level poli- tary practitioners and policymakers can, feasibility and identify windows of oppor- tics. In fact, the 2014 Army Operating with fastidious attention to bottom-up tunity without a granular analysis of local Concept states, “Army commanders causes of violence, improve strategic dynamics?34 [must] understand cognitive, infor- outcomes.29 Colin Gray asserts that strategists mational, social, cultural, political, and The macro bias, when applied to the should bridge policy and tactics, par- physical influences affecting human American military context, comprises ticularly with regard to feasibility.35 Do behavior and the mission.”25 A careful three subordinate biases regarding levels, strategists who strive to be “compre- reading of this passage reveals two anti-intellectualism, and compartmen- hensive” cultivate the skills necessary to imperatives. First, military students talization. I briefly apply this argument analyze a variety of local dynamics and, must learn to proffer and assess causal as a plausibility probe to two excellent thereby, assess feasibility? Deibel fails to claims. Strategies, campaign plans, op- strategic education texts: Terry Deibel’s address this requirement. It is notable erations orders, and mission statements Foreign Affairs Strategy and Colin Gray’s that Deibel’s own proposal for a foreign are ultimately causal claims about the Fighting Talk.30 My aim is to indicate affairs strategy specifies just two actors in good things one hopes will arise if a how these biases inhere in the texts. To his layout of the international strategic commander employs his or her troops, the degree the works are representative environment.36 These actors, “countries” resources, speech, and relationships in a of American strategic pedagogy and prac- and “cultures,” are macro-level elements particular way.26 tice, the biases likely inhere in American whose consideration does not penetrate Second, the military professional’s strategic thinking more broadly. to the local level. Yet such analytic understanding of causality must be po- The Macro Bias. Autesserre con- penetration—as Autesserre finds—is a litically attuned. In McMaster’s words, trasts macro or “top-down” accounts of prerequisite for good strategy. “We need to educate our soldiers about conflict in the Democratic Republic of The Levels Bias. A derivative bias the nature of the microconflicts they are the Congo with micro or “bottom-up” relates to the centrality that levels play in a part of and ensure they understand the accounts of conflict. The former focus thinking about strategy. Gray speaks of
14 Forum / Errors in Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Secretary Carter attends North Atlantic Council meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, February 2016 (DOD/Adrian Cadiz)
“three levels of behavior,” each captured of state instructs a general to launch an terrain, natural resources, organizations, in his maxim, “Strategy is more diffi- attack; a local leader calls for his followers rule sets, norms, neural networks, viruses, cult than policy or tactics.”37 He adds, to commit genocide; a terrorist decapi- and ideas are understood to be dynamic “Policymaking and tactics are not easy, tates a journalist. Strategists and military systems with agency insofar as they but they are activities for the performance professionals must not merely pay atten- interact and, at times, create altered or of which there are skilled professionals, tion to “the local”; they must rigorously completely new systems.42 steeped in relative experience.”38 Gray analyze it. For instance, proposals to Examples of these system interactions suggests that those operating at the point intervene in a civil war (such as Syria’s include Max Weber’s Protestant ethic of physical intervention confront more or and Iraq’s) must account for Kalyvas’s thesis, whereby an economic system and less familiar problems. But this assump- scholarship on the relationship between a cluster of interpreted religious symbols tion is misleading, especially if the world’s a civil war’s “master cleavage” (the coun- interact in concrete associations among complexity is scale-free. try-level conflict) and the war’s many persons to engender modern capitalism;43 Every potential or actual interaction “local cleavages” animated by private or a Syrian rebel uses an iPad’s acceler- that concerns policymakers and strategists conflicts and agendas.40 ometer and global positioning system relates to the ground level and entails The strategist should dampen think- to adjust mortar fire;44 or a volcanic physical effects. For instance, Gray speaks ing in terms of levels. The alternative, eruption in Iceland engenders the firing of seven “contexts of war,” including the following the sociologist Bruno Latour, of General Stanley McChrystal, USA, political, sociocultural, economic, tech- is to “flatten” and “localize” one’s world- and the revamping of U.S. strategy in nological, military-strategic, geopolitical view and focus more on concrete sites of Afghanistan.45 and geostrategic, and historical.39 These interaction between lethal, sociopolitical, Strategic thinking, rightly under- contexts of war cease to be abstractions cultural, and technological systems.41 stood, should not be confined to a when they converge in complex ways at Moreover, and following the political rarefied “strategic level”; rather, strat- the ground, local level. theorist William Connolly, the strategist egists must now attend carefully to All interactions and proposed inter- should adopt a capacious definition of how their decisions, in the wake of an ventions are local; for example, a head “system” and “agency” such that persons, interaction here, might affect dynamics at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Perez 15 educators. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review describes several po- tential threats, including North Korea, China, violent extremism, sectarian con- flict, proxy groups, resource competition, fragile states, spillover effects, criminal or- ganizations, militias, corrupt officials, and transnational crime.50 Social and political scientists are producing valuable work on these topics. Clausewitz should be a staple in military classrooms, but so too should the science that bears directly on contemporary and future military work. Deibel recognizes the value of social science, but he fails to unpack how this value translates into the exercise of stra- tegic judgment. For instance, he spends nine pages reviewing older literature from scholarly and policy journals on the efficacy of sanctions as an instrument of national power.51 This exercise is fruitful. Yet Deibel should include one additional instruction: For any given problem, the strategist should consult the relevant science. This exercise would bring to the fore complementary and competing causal stories whose mapping would st th nd Soldier assigned to Delta Company, 1 Squadron, 8 Cavalry Regiment, 2 Brigade Combat Team, fruitfully complicate the strategist’s and 1st Cavalry Division, conducts presence patrol around U.S. Consulate in Herat, Afghanistan, January 2014 (U.S. Army/Alex Flynn) military professional’s thinking. This ex- ercise is the fundamental requirement of the proposed locus of intervention there. exists as a scientific practice;46 however, abductive reasoning as appropriate to the Attending to “the local” is not optional, it is underdeveloped as a habit of mind practitioner. but a critical part of the strategist’s and appropriate for practitioners, especially The neglect of abductive reasoning military professional’s task. military professionals and strategists.47 entails a two-fold danger. First, the Anti-Intellectual Bias. The impli- The practice of abductive reasoning military classroom will continue to rely cations of the foregoing argument are requires the integration of leading-edge on fictional scenarios and accompanying severe. If the strategist is to craft com- expert perspectives; however, there exists scenario reference books as opposed prehensive foreign policies and strategies an anti-intellectual strain that encourages to real-world crises. Fictional scenarios regarding Ukraine-Russia, Syria-Iraq, strategists and military professionals to discourage original research and thereby China, cyber, and so forth, decisions limit their reading to a certain canon. For short-circuit the very skills military about prioritization and interventions instance, Gray writes, “If Thucydides, professionals and learning organizations must account for local knowledge. Since Sun-Tzu, and Clausewitz did not say it, require. Second, students will, in the this intellectual burden is immense, strat- it probably is not worth saying.”48 Gray’s absence of theory, rely too heavily on egists must integrate expert perspectives caveat takes on a disciplinary parochialism intuition. This reliance is counterproduc- in their analyses, including scholarly, prac- as well: “By way of sharp contrast to the tive, particularly when much of politics, titioner, and stakeholder perspectives. contributions from arts disciplines, science of which war is a subset, is hidden and The expert perspectives relevant to and social science do not offer methodol- counterintuitive. any single case will include a multiplicity ogies useful for the derivation of helpful For instance, anyone evaluating op- of complementary and competing ac- understanding of the strategic future.” tions to counter ISIL should consult the counts. The strategist must develop the He goes on to assert that social science’s vast literature on civil wars.52Also useful skill of examining and assessing these methods are “thoroughly disabled, not is Marc Lynch’s Project on Middle East divergent expert perspectives and their merely disadvantaged, by their nature.”49 Political Science, which renders much attendant causal stories about current Gray’s instruction on this matter of literature easily digestible for, among conditions and proposed interventions. is unfortunate, particularly given his others, troopers and strategists.53 Officers This enquiry, called abductive reasoning, influence among strategic and military who understand ground-level politics
16 Forum / Errors in Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 and violence in civil wars improve their which is why they implore military audiences—however unpalatable or preparation for all missions, from security professionals to study the complex inconclusive they might be.”57 If the cooperation to conventional wars. interactions among the exercise of lethal scientist has an ethical obligation to get Compartmentalization Bias. Finally, power, the sources of ambient violence, the causal story right, the practitioner, strategic thinking suffers from a compart- and politics. Similarly, Autesserre’s especially the military professional, has mentalization bias (which equates to the research program reveals that peace- an ethical obligation to consult the causal bailiwick approach plaguing educators builders (including military profession- story. The place to begin is in the class- described previously) whereby military als) too often neglect bottom-up socio- room. JFQ professionals believe their role is merely political sources of violence and war. to fight wars while civilian partners think The need to attend to these political about political outcomes. This bias led elements is arguably the principal lesson Notes General Walter Boomer, USMC, to won- from the century’s first decade of war. 1 der why State Department representatives Yet despite top leaders’ exhortations Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to were not parachuting out of planes to and a new, politically attuned Army Run an Intervention,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 handle the conflict termination phase Operating Concept, it is not clear that (March–April 2012), available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Perez 17 13 Odierno, Amos, and McRaven. national Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge 48 Gray, Fighting Talk, 58. 14 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the University Press, 2010). 49 Colin Gray, Defense Planning for Nation- State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 29 Séverine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict al Security (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Resolution and the Everyday Politics of Interna- War College Press, 2014), 15, 17. 1957). tional Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge 50 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (Wash- 15 Raymond T. Odierno, “Amid Tighter University Press, 2014). ington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014). Budgets, U.S. Army Rebalancing and Refocus- 30 The merit of the plausibility probe is to 51 Deibel, 243–252. ing: A Conversation with Raymond T. Odier- explore whether a given argument has sufficient 52 A small sample of the literature in- no,” interview by James Sciutto, Council on warrant for further study. The probe does not cludes Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Foreign Relations, February 11, 2014, available produce a knock-down, unassailable argument; Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- at
18 Forum / Errors in Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Marine currently embarked aboard littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) performs sight survey on Jikdo Island, Republic of Korea, as part of training exercise during Foal Eagle 2015 (U.S. Navy/Conor Minto)
Strategy 2.0 The Next Generation
By Margaret M. Polski
The heart of the challenge is this: as we move into an uncertain future we must get better as we get smaller.
—General John M. Shalikashvili, USA
here is widespread concern and environment that General Shalikashvili regions formerly at peace, the changing a great deal of collective hand- described in introducing the 1994/1995 role of alliances and the range of situa- T wringing these days about defense Autumn/Winter issue of Joint Force tions in which we are called upon to use strategy. Seasoned observers will note Quarterly in the epigraph above is strik- the military, the ambiguity and prolifer- that this is not a new problem. The ingly familiar 20 years later: conflicts in ation of threats around the world, and the ever-quickening pace of change in science and technology that nourishes competitors and substantially reduces Margaret M. Polski is a Research Analyst in the Strategic Studies Division at the Center for Naval Analyses. She is also an affiliate Research Fellow at the Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study, a the time it takes for a force to go from Consultant to the National Academies, and a regular National Science Foundation Panel Member. state-of-the-art to obsolescence.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Polski 19 Figure. Budget Outlays: 1949 2039 ability to meet the not-so-revolutionary requirements of the near term. 100
90 One More Time: What Is Strategy? 80 A well-trained analyst learns that he 70 or she cannot study something with rigor until it has been defined. But 60 as we learn from painful experience, 50 definition is often one of the problems that plagues a sponsor’s presenting chal- 40 lenge. And despite considerable reflec- 30 tion and extensive doctrine, military
Percent of Total Spending Percent of Total strategy is beset with definitional issues. 20 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint 10 Operations, defines strategy as follows: “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing 0 the instruments of power in a synchro-
1979 nized and integrated fashion to achieve 1949 1959 1969 1999 1989 2019 2029 2039 2009 theater, national, and/or multinational Net interest Discretionary spending Defense/International Mandatory spending objectives.”3 Among strategists, the typi- Sour e M.M. Polski and Sarah Nutter, “Truth and Consequences A Guide to Understanding U.S. cal shorthand definition has something to Government Debt and Deficits,” Mercatus Center Working Paper No. 10-76, December 20, 2010. do with integrating ends, means, and ways e Net interest spending comprises interest payments on the Federal debt. Discretionary and defense to achieve national security objectives. international spending include all other Federal spending, including that on defense, foreign assistance, and transfers to local governments. Mandatory spending comprises payments to individuals under social Our doctrinal definition would no insurance, pensions, and veteran benefits programs. doubt satisfy Carl von Clausewitz, who defined strategy as “the use of engage- Moreover, in fiscal year 1995, the about, plan, and build our defenses. Over ments to attain the object of the war,” Armed Forces also confronted declining the course of his term as Chairman of which is “a mere continuation of policy defense budgets and military resources. the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin by other means.”4 Similarly, it is consis- The figure shows that mandatory and Dempsey not only confronted similar tent with B.H. Liddell Hart’s definition net interest expenses have been fairly circumstances but also appealed for inno- of strategy as “the art of distributing and consistently crowding out discretionary vation and transformation. applying military means to fulfill the ends spending since 1979. An analysis of The call to innovate and transform of policy.”5 current Congressional Budget Office falls squarely in the strategist’s wheel- While every strategist we met could projections leads us to expect that the house. But it is not entirely clear how a recite some version of these definitions of next decade will look a lot like 1999: military strategy organization should re- strategy, we found quite a few who were annual defense and international budgets spond to this demand. Some people quip dissatisfied with them. What most worries are likely to average 13 percent of total that innovation in a military organization them is the tendency to conflate strategy budget outlays, or about 2.8 percent of is an oxymoron, noting that it is extraor- and planning. Whereas planning is fo- gross domestic product, over the period dinarily difficult for large hierarchical cused on operations, tactics, and effective 2016 to 2026.1 organizations that dominate their area execution, strategists prefer to focus on Nor have topical issues changed much of operation in the near term to willingly something grander that they just cannot since General Shalikashvili’s tenure. The transform themselves into revolutionaries. quite put their collective finger on. above-referenced issue of Joint Force To help address these concerns, the Turning to more modern texts Quarterly focused on a new defense con- Center for Naval Analyses recently com- for guidance, we consulted Lawrence sensus, Service identities and joint culture, pleted a comparative study of strategy Freedman’s recent tour de force, Strategy: civilian control of the military, information activities in the Army, Marine Corps, A History. With reference to history warfare, and joint operations in the civil Navy, and Air Force to identify common and drawing on studies in philosophy, war. It should be no surprise that strategic challenges, alternative approaches, and military studies, social science, and priorities top the list. Reflecting on strate- potential opportunities for change.2 The management, Freedman ultimately gic issues in his introduction to the issue, following is a summary of our findings characterizes strategy as the art of getting Shalikashvili argued that the Armed Forces and further reflections on how the Armed more out of a situation than the starting were facing revolutionary challenges that Forces could nurture revolutionary balance of power would suggest, or “the required radical changes in how we think change without compromising their art of creating power.”6 Unfortunately,
20 Forum / Strategy 2.0 JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Center for Information Dominance Corry Station oversees career management and training for officer and enlisted students of U.S. military and allied forces in fields of information warfare, information professional, cryptologic, and information technology, May 2011 (U.S. Navy/Gary Nichols)
Freedman’s definition also fails to satisfy rivalry or competition as a part of their Finally, there is a tendency in the military strategists. But we liked the pithy definition. Yet Sun Tzu, whose classic strategy community to focus on products approach, so whenever possible we asked treatise The Art of War appears on every and primers rather than analysis, vision, strategists to complete the sentence: professional military education strategy or effective processes. This is illustrated “Strategy is the art of . . .” While we course syllabus, emphasizes the impor- by a proliferation of strategies across found that strategists readily embrace tance of “the art of the attack,” which the Department of Defense and the the notion of strategy as an art and often specifically involves understanding rela- interagency community. Noting that the like to talk about beginning with a blank tive strength, perceiving intentions, and list is not all inclusive, Joint Publication canvas, this exercise failed to define that calculating strategic advantage.7 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, lists 15 certain je ne sais quoi that strategists ap- Second, while strategists intellectually additional sources of national strategic pear to strive for but cannot specifically understand that there is an interdepen- guidance beyond those produced in the articulate. After trying but failing to come dent and iterative relationship between joint planning system.11 up with a satisfying alternative, strategists policymaking, strategy, and planning that There has been a similar proliferation default to doctrine. is reinforced in Title 10 authorities, there of strategies within the Services. Service In my view, the most interesting is a persistent and contradictory tendency chiefs compound the problem when they aspects of our findings regarding defi- to demand top-down guidance.8 Many task multiple units with strategy issues or nitional issues are threefold. Foremost, strategists complain that they cannot create additional working groups without none of the more than 75 military produce strategy if they do not have up- also creating a coordination mechanism strategists we spoke with defined strategy to-date national security strategy.9 Some to facilitate deconfliction, alignment, and with reference to rivalry or competition. crave precise guidance on priorities and communication. Strategists point out Although some strategists worried that an resources.10 These demands, as we shall that less is more when it comes to strat- emphasis on planning tends to obscure see in the findings that follow, undermine egy: too many strategies create strategic a realistic assessment of the environment the potential value of strategy activities in confusion, which ultimately decouples or particular strategies, no one included the Armed Forces. strategy from other critical processes.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Polski 21 Manpower Airmen work hand in hand with units and independent innovation working group to discover new ways to enhance Aviano Air Base’s performance during time of dwindling resources, June 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Austin Harvill)
Common Challenges and restructuring of the global political resources and capabilities and developing economy, and innovation in science and more efficient and effective organizations. Military strategists struggle with a technology create noise and rapid shifts in Programmers rule while more strategy number of other issues beyond defini- demand that make it difficult for strate- focused efforts to understand the impli- tional matters. Title 10 authorities and gists to keep up. cations of rapid advances in science and the peculiarities of American Federalism While some signal distortion is to be technology and the emerging capabilities dictate that strategy has many masters. expected in an uncertain environment, and intentions of near-peer competitors However, as some of our respondents we found that both strategy producers languish. ruefully pointed out, almost everyone and consumers are asking fundamental Despite the obvious need for strat- likes to talk about strategy but few want questions that suggest a pervasive absence egy, we found widespread concern to do it—particularly today. While each of strategic vision and leadership, such as across the Department of Defense of the Services has unique strategic “Strategy for what?” “Which strategy?” about the quality of strategic thinking. challenges, a number of common issues “What are our real priorities?” “How are Decisionmakers and planners are con- emerged in our study. resources tied to strategies?” cerned that they are not adequately Not only has there been a prolifera- In what Yogi Berra would call “déjà anticipating change in the environment tion of strategies and strategy activities, vu all over again,” we also found that and that professional military education but also both strategy producers and con- each of the Services is reevaluating its is not keeping up with requirements.12 sumers indicate that it is often difficult to “value proposition,” or how it will con- Many feel that personnel management distinguish between strategy to organize, tribute to joint warfighting now and in systems create incentives that inhibit equip, and train the force; warfighting; the future. While this kind of reexamina- strategy education, training, and career and organizational change initiatives. The tion is painful to undertake, in my view progression. Strategists complain about current environment is producing weak it is to be expected after a decade of war, how strategy assignments and time out and often conflicting signals for strategy and it should be welcomed as we grapple for education and teaching are treated and resource allocation. Current events in with future requirements. in promotion decisions as well as the domestic and international environments, Meanwhile, strategists report that impact of the “up or out” rule in devel- policy conflict, sequestration, pervasive Service chiefs are focused on sustaining oping and retaining soldiers with critical crises, demographic factors, the volatility and defending near- and medium-term knowledge and skills.
22 Forum / Strategy 2.0 JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Finally, some strategists are con- Developing the next generation each of these areas and can quickly and cerned about the validity and reliability of strategists includes activities such as fearlessly identify and draw upon needed of current decision analysis tools and promoting the value of strategy and expertise. Strategists told us that it is approaches. Potentially useful innovations strategic practice; creating communities important to effectively work across func- that have been developed in defense of practice; educating, training, coaching, tions and organizations. To do so, they research communities, which leverage and mentoring; and promoting capable must have the skills to cultivate mutually advances in the computational and strategists into positions of organizational beneficial relationships with counterparts, complexity sciences, have not been fully authority and influence. wherever they reside. disseminated into strategy education and Our analysis suggests that the military practice. Core Strategy Competencies strategy community may need further Taken together, these challenges We define core strategy competencies as development in core competencies re- indicate that key strategy functions, core sets of knowledge, skills, and abilities lated to analysis; in professional program competencies, and process are underde- associated with successfully performing management and planning; and in its veloped or poorly aligned. key strategy functions. We derived our knowledge of budgeting, programming, list of core competencies by analyzing force planning, capital investment, Key Strategy Functions strategy careers; the types of activities economics, business, finance, gover- Four types of functions emerged from that strategists reported performing; nance, and developments in science and our analysis of strategy organizations and strategy organizations; linkages with technology. activities across the Services: supporting other critical areas, such as budgeting, decisionmaking, anticipating and shaping programming, and capital investment; Developing Strategies demand, meeting demand, and develop- and Service operating styles. Four core Our analysis identified three types of ing the next generation.13 Key strategy strategy competencies emerged from strategy development processes: duty functions are interdependent: activities our analysis: strategy, evolutionary strategy, and and outcomes feed and reinforce each transformational strategy. Real strategy qualitative, quantitative, and exper- other. While each of the Services has •• processes and products are classified. imental analysis of patterns, trends, efforts under way to improve strategy Duty strategy processes meet bureau- structure, and outcomes related capabilities, we did not find any Service cratic demands for strategy inputs that to global competition, rivalry, in which all four functions are fully oper- arise from routine planning processes and warfare; to complex physical ational or tightly integrated. or crises. Evolutionary processes meet and social systems; to strategically Functional activities that support the need to regularly review, update, important industries, operations, decisionmaking include organizing and adapt existing strategies. Transfor- organizations, and people; and and facilitating decisionmaking events, mational processes meet the need to to national security policies and developing analyses and tools to in- rethink and radically change the way programs form decisionmaking, and making that the Services will fight in the future. program management and planning recommendations. •• Duty and evolutionary strategy pro- rhetorical skills (verbal and written Activities associated with anticipating •• cesses involve extensive coordination communication and persuasion) and shaping demand for strategy include across functions and organizations. knowledge of history, current affairs, collecting data; building networks of •• They rely on a consistent core group and relevant policies, processes, relationships; participating in internal and of trained and disciplined analysts with systems, stocks, and flows related external analytical and decisionmaking operational expertise, a well-defined to budgeting, programming, force processes; identifying and communi- organizational structure, and widely planning, and capital investment; to cating patterns and trends; forecasting, understood authorities and operating global politics, economics, business, wargaming, and engaging in other types procedures. Typically, transformational finance, and governance; to diplo- of simulations, exercises, and experimen- processes are relatively short lived, macy, development, finance, intelli- tation; organizing inquiries and meetings; expert led, and custom tailored to meet gence, and law enforcement; and to and producing innovative concepts or senior leadership needs. They look 30 science and technology. analyses that challenge prevailing thinking to 40 years into the future and create or practice. Tactical expertise is the foundation alternative ways of promoting and Functional activities associated with of military excellence in all the Services, defending vital interests. meeting demand for strategy include but good strategists are visionary gener- We found good contemporary ex- responding to requests for strategic infor- alists: they are Jacks or Jills of all trades amples of duty and evolutionary strategy mation or analyses, communicating about but masters or mistresses of none. No processes in the Services. However, there strategy, developing strategies, and or- strategist can be an expert in all four areas is a clear need across the Services to ganizing and participating in long-range of core competency. Instead, we found reduce the number of strategy products planning processes. it imperative that they are familiar with and to rationalize processes to better
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Polski 23 and core competencies. The U.S. Armed Forces are a joint force, and this is not likely to change over the next genera- tion. This means that strategy and the development of strategic leadership are a joint function. It is time to build a joint strategy community and to rationalize and align strategy education and training. While each Service must make its own determination about how it develops, coaches, and mentors future leaders, only those who can demonstrate joint strategic competence should be promoted to gen- eral/flag officer. Our lives and the future peace and prosperity of our country depend upon their strategic, operational, and tactical expertise. Our organizational structures are a strategic nightmare. Federalism in a large and boisterous democracy such as the United States breeds polycentricism: Marines post security on patrol during Forest Light 15-1 at Oyanohara Training Area in Yamato, many independent centers of decision- Kumamoto Prefecture, Japan (U.S. Marine Corps/Warren Peace) making and control.16 However, the integrate strategy with resource allocation to think and act strategically, strategists solution to marshaling these forces is and research and development activities. can only soldier on, redouble shaping not to centralize command and control; Transformational strategy is a greater efforts, and prepare for opportunities to polycentric structures are difficult to pen- challenge and a pervasive need across the emerge from changes in leadership or the etrate, which can be a strategic advantage, Department of Defense. We had to reach environment. and they are adaptive. What is needed back in time to the Air Force’s “mis- to overcome the strategic disadvantages sion-pull” strategy exercises in the late Implications and of polycentricism is better coordination, 1990s to find a tested process. Originally Concluding Thoughts which is achieved by empowering capable developed by the Office of the Secretary Our study has a number of implications people, reducing unnecessary activities, of Defense, the mission-pull approach for the Chairman, Service chiefs, and developing resilient networks, and imple- involves specifying the long-term future Department of Defense. First, regarding menting sustaining processes. security environment (30 years out) and the debate about whether the strat- The way to go about improving joint disaggregating it into operating envi- egy problem is a people problem or a coordination will be tedious but straight- ronments, missions, and critical tasks. process problem, it is clear that people, forward if the Chairman and Joint Chiefs Senior leaders create a future Service by structures, and processes all matter. Our are ready and willing to lead the way in imagining and debating several alter- analysis suggests that capable people making organizational change across the native concepts of how they will fight. and strategic vision can be defeated by joint planning system and the Services. Consensus around a particular vision pro- inadequate organizational structures Efforts could begin immediately to: vides the basis for evaluating competing and that inadequate people can defeat Rethink key strategy functions and resource requirements.14 well-designed structures and processes. •• make investments that focus on sup- Strategy process requirements depend Current events and trends suggest that porting and shaping decisionmaking on the type of strategy that senior leaders we need to ensure that we develop and about the long-term future of joint demand and on the larger organizational promote highly competent strategists, warfighting. What are strategists environment.15 There is a great deal rationalize strategy organizational doing now that they should be that strategists can do to shape demand structures and products, and undertake doing, and how well are they doing for strategy; however, their influence transformational strategy development it? What are strategists not doing is a direct function of senior leadership processes. that they should be doing? What are commitment and support. Even a Let us begin with people. Our analysis strategists doing that they do not high-functioning strategy organization indicates that there is a significant risk really need to do? cannot compensate for an absence of se- that current investments in developing Ensure that investment in people and nior leadership receptivity and creativity. the next generation of strategic leaders •• processes will continually develop When leaders are unable or unwilling may not align with key strategy functions
24 Forum / Strategy 2.0 JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 12 and sustain core competencies by We found that both the Office of the Notes Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Joint identifying and mapping sets of Staff J7 have undertaken analyses of profes- critical strategy structures, process, 1 Author’s compilation based on the Con- sional military education (PME) to identify products, and relationships; assessing gressional Budget Office (CBO),The Budget opportunities for innovation and reform. A resources against core competencies; and Economic Outlook: 2015–2026 (Washing- 2010 House Armed Services Committee report and closing gaps. ton, DC: CBO, January 2016). was specifically critical of strategy PME: “Joint 2 We designed and conducted a modified and Service efforts to cultivate military strat- Rationalize duty strategy develop- •• data-driven business process analysis of how egists are disassociated and producing mixed ment processes, strengthen evolu- each of the Services was developing and align- results. The committee recommends each of tionary processes, close gaps, and ing resources with strategy during the period the Services carefully review and coordinate seek efficiencies and effectiveness. October 2014 through December 2014. The their PME efforts with the goal of educating •• Better leverage existing resources to goal of our analysis was to identify key strategy qualified strategic decisionmakers, and that they functions, core competencies, and examples of should consider sponsoring additional junior complement and augment capabil- types of strategy organizational structures and officers for advanced degrees in top-tier civilian ities and lay the foundation for the processes. The study generated a high-level universities. These officers should be considered Chairman to implement a transfor- description of efforts under way in each of the for command, staff, and faculty positions.” See mational joint strategy development Services to better align strategy with resource House Armed Services Committee No. 111-67, process. allocation. We did not assess the quality or Another Crossroads? Professional Military Edu- value of Service strategies or strategy organiza- cation Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols The 2015 leadership transition year tions and activities. A comprehensive analysis, Act and the Skelton Panel, Hearing before the was a critical moment for implementing which would include detailed business process Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, mapping and analyses of resources, require- 111th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 2009. change. Moreover, the current environ- ments, and performance, was beyond the scope 13 We define afunction as a core set of ment provides ample opportunities for of this study. policies, procedures, and processes that enable the Joint Chiefs to innovate. However, 3 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Opera- people to carry out specific responsibilities as- successful organizational change manage- tions (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August sociated with a particular area of organizational ment efforts require a disciplined process, 11, 2011). performance, such as strategy. Note that our 4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (New York: focus in the cross-Service study was to identify team effort, strong senior leadership, and Modern Library, 2000 [1832]), book II, chap- functions, not to assess quality or performance. independent expertise. Internal personnel ter 1; book III; and book I, chapter 1 (24). 14 For a description of the mission-pull often do not have the time, experience, 5 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: approach, see Clark A. Murdock, “Mission-Pull or interest to envision and implement Faber and Faber, 1967 [1954]), chapter XIX. and Long-Range Planning,” Joint Force 6 change while attending to current re- Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History Quarterly 6 (Autumn 1994/Winter 1995). We (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), xii. are grateful to Dr. Murdock, who helped the sponsibilities. And even welcome change 7 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Air Force implement mission-pull in the late involves addressing sensitivities and Modern Library, 2000), chapters 1, 3. For 1990s and early 2000s, for his generosity in entrenched interests that are difficult an analysis and comparison of the differenc- sharing his experience and working papers. Dr. for current staff to identify and manage. es between Western and Chinese military Murdock’s book, Future Making: Getting Your Independent analysts provide objective thinking, see Francois Jullien, A Treatise on Organization Ready for What’s Next (Stevens- Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking ville, MD: Murdock Associates, 2007), provides perspective and extra hands on deck to (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004). additional guidance and applications. assist a change management team with Additional perspective is found in Fumio Ota, 15 The larger organizational environment process management, data collection, “Sun Tzu in Contemporary Chinese Strategy,” for strategy includes authorities to act, history, analysis, design, and implementation Joint Force Quarterly 73 (2nd Quarter 2014). culture, operating style, resources, initiatives 8 activities. Service strategy organizations serve the under way, leadership transitions, events, fiscal chief and secretary. According to Title 10 constraints, and political cycles. and relevant doctrine and policy, the role of 16 For an analysis of polycentricity in Amer- Cognizant of the challenges presented a Service chief and Service secretary includes ican political and administrative life, see the by the revolutionary changes he foresaw advising senior leaders in developing and work of Vincent Ostrom, including A Political 20 years ago, General Shalikashvili pro- achieving realistic national security objectives; Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing vided guidance that is worth revisiting directing operational design, analysis, and plan- the American Experiment, 3rd ed. (Lanham, ning; organizing, training, and equipping the MD: Lexington Books, 2008); The Meaning and updating to meet today’s require- force; providing appropriate doctrine, concepts, of Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing ments. Arguing that we must hedge and operating instructions; allocating resources Society (San Francisco: Institute for Contempo- against the future, not the past, he urged to achieve short-, medium-, and long-term ob- rary Studies Press, 1994); and “Polycentricity,” us to take prudent risks and invest in re- jectives; and representing the Service in foreign a conference paper presented at the annual sources for the future. His words provide and domestic security cooperation activities. meeting of the American Political Science 9 We duly note the potential for strategic Association, Washington, DC, September a fitting conclusion for this article: “Yet withholding among those who disagree with 5–9, 1972, which is reprinted in Polycentricity we cannot retreat, we must go forward. policy but are compelled to comply within the and Local Public Economies: Readings from the I am confident that we will triumph in chain of command. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, these revolutions and that our Armed 10 Ibid. ed. Michael McGinnis (Ann Arbor: University 11 Forces will remain the most formidable in JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning (Wash- of Michigan Press, 1999). ington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 2011), JFQ the world.” figure II-3.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Polski 25 President Obama convenes meeting on Zika virus in Situation Room, January 2016 (The White House/Pete Souza)
Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking Developing 21st-Century Strategic Leaders
By Daniel H. McCauley
t a time when global instability ability to operate effectively around the cracies, today’s joint strategic leaders and uncertainty are undeniable, world.1 Tactical supremacy and the lack immerse themselves in current opera- A the demand for astute American of a peer competitor have contributed tions, reacting to, rather than shaping, global strategic leadership is greater to strategic thinking becoming a lost future events. than ever. Unfortunately, tactical art. This critical shortfall has been This strategic leadership shortfall is superficiality and parochial policies recognized for a number of years. not unique to the military establishment. of convenience are undermining joint General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), A 2014 leadership study conducted by strategic leader development and the and Tony Koltz stated in their 2009 the Palladium Group surveyed more than book Leading the Charge that leaders 1,200 companies in 74 countries. In this today have no vision and consequently study, although more than 96 percent of Dr. Daniel H. McCauley is an Assistant Professor at have “lost the ability to look and plan the “respondents identified strategic lead- the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. ahead.”2 Trapped within rigid bureau- ership as an organizational ‘must-have’
26 Forum / Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 and a key to future success,” over 50 Figure 1. Industrial Age Skills percent of the respondents “stated that Low Environment the quality of their organization’s strate- Unfamiliar 3 gic leadership was unsatisfactory.” Fully Humanistic Knowledge two-thirds of the respondents serving Meta Knowledge in an organizational capacity as board Foundational Competence member, chief executive officer, or man- Knowledge aging director “did not believe that their Task Unfamiliar current leadership development approach Task was providing the necessary skills to suc- Familiar cessfully execute their strategy.”4 Degree of Agreement Obviously, there is a recognized strategic leadership gap across multiple Knowledge disciplines, but how to remedy that Environment shortfall has eluded both trainers and High Familiar High Low educators. The only certainty is that Degree of Certainty strategic leader development remains entrenched within the same development processes that are falling well short of uncertainties, and complexities of the years of war, various organizations and the desired outcome. In an attempt to 21st-century global security environment. studies assessed strategic thinking and change this legacy thinking, General strategic leadership as lacking during Martin Dempsey, USA, during his last Strategic Leadership national strategic decisionmaking.7 2 years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Why are the Chairman and so many These five reasons demand that joint issued white papers on mission com- others focused on leadership? There are officers develop a level of understanding mand, the profession of arms, and joint a number of reasons. First, local and not previously required from a national education, as well as a memorandum on regional trends, which were once some- security perspective or demanded of them desired leader attributes. Each of these what isolated and constant, are interact- individually. This newly required depth documents highlighted this shortfall in ing with global trends to accelerate rates and breadth of understanding entail strategic leadership in some form.5 The of change. This increased acceleration the development of a perspective that then-Chairman’s direction, however, leaves little decisionmaking time for encompasses longer periods of time—not failed to change the approach to leader cumbersome bureaucracies; rather, the only the present and near future, but development in any meaningful way. environment demands timely strategic also the distant past as well as the distant Instead of designing a strategic leadership decisions at the field level. Second, the future. By drawing on an understanding program to meet the demands of the 21st accelerated rates of change in local, of the past, joint strategic leaders can century, the military community contin- regional, and global environments build a realistic vision that pulls joint ues to embrace the outdated practices of have increased uncertainty at all levels, organizations through the challenges of the past. paralyzing decisionmakers looking the present while positioning the Nation To rediscover the art of strategic for risk-free strategies or plans. Third, for future success. Without a vision of the thinking and planning, joint strategic as the world appears to grow smaller future, the joint force is at a distinct dis- leader development must disconnect due to advanced communications and advantage, as it will be caught unaware of itself from the paradigm of the past in transportation systems, complexity actu- developing trends, policies, and potential which outcomes are known, risk is certain ally increases because of the expanded adversaries. and manageable, and linear thinking is numbers of stakeholders in today’s Strategic leader responsibilities gen- the norm. In its place, a developmental interconnected global systems. Fourth, erally encompass multiple organizations paradigm that embraces the discomforts global interdependencies—economic, and echelons diverse in missions and re- of ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity social, religious, and military, among sponsibilities.8 The interdependencies and must be adopted. Modifying the training others—demand that local or regional interactions of the global environment adage that the joint force must train the issues be viewed in a depth and breadth have created a skills mismatch for joint way it will fight, joint strategic leader de- not previously undertaken.6 Joint stra- strategic leaders over the past few decades. velopment must reflect the realities of the tegic leaders are reluctant to embrace The current challenge is how to address global environment within which strate- security issues in their broader context the multitude of global challenges, given gic decisionmaking occurs. Specifically, even when the interrelated global secu- the limited range of individual and staff the joint force must develop strategic rity environment requires a long-term expertise and experiences. Considering thinking competencies that will prepare approach to do so. Finally, in a review figure 1, one can get a sense of the skill strategic leaders for the ambiguities, of the lessons learned over the past 13 requirements necessary in the industrial
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McCauley 27 Figure 2. Information Age Skills decisionmaking transitions from the joint task force (JTF) or component level to Low Environment Unfamiliar the combatant command, Joint Staff, and interagency levels. JP 1 does provide Competence a short description of the profession of arms, listing character traits, competen- cies, and values, but these are relegated Task to an appendix not quite two-and-a-half Unfamiliar 14 Task pages in length. Familiar Foundational Knowledge Recognizing this shortfall in joint Humanistic doctrine and leader development, Degree of Agreement Knowledge Meta General Dempsey provided new guid- Knowledge Knowledge ance for the joint community based on a review of the past 13 years of war. In Environment High Familiar 2013, he laid out six desired attributes High Low Degree of Certainty for leaders in a memorandum for Service chiefs, combatant commanders, the National Guard bureau chief, and the di- age. Generally, the degree of certainty of Joint Leadership rectors of the Joint Staff. These attributes any given issue and the degree of agree- Given the skills required of strategic assist the joint force in developing “agile ment among experts for a solution (as leaders in the information age, it is and adaptive leaders with the requisite indicated by the x and y axes) were fairly necessary to undertake a short review values, strategic vision, and critical think- high. As such, knowledge—usually in the of Service and joint leadership devel- ing skills to keep pace with the changing form of domain-specific experts—was opment and doctrine to identify the strategic environment.”15 Coupled with foundational in developing an under- current strategic leadership shortfall. As the character, values, and competencies standing of the issue. In most cases, expected, the Services do an excellent listed in JP 1, a leadership framework both the tasks and the environment were job describing leadership at multiple begins to emerge.16 familiar; thus, the need for different think- command levels. For example, Army Examining this framework, two ing methodologies (meta-knowledge) Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army issues become readily evident. First, the and cultural understanding (humanistic Leadership,10 and the Air Force’s Core definition of joint leadership is missing. knowledge) was relatively small in com- Doctrine, Vol. II, Leadership,11 provide Second, the competencies as described parison to foundational knowledge. If a definitions, purpose, competencies, and in joint doctrine focus primarily on the problem was encountered, an expert was attributes required by leaders for con- tactical and low operational levels of war called in to “solve” it.9 ducting warfighting. Service leadership and fail to address strategic leadership in Figure 2 illustrates the transposition clearly formed the bedrock of American any form. Unfortunately, each of these of skills needed in the information age. tactical and operational successes for missing pieces reinforces a tactical per- Again, generally speaking, the strategic many decades. spective of leadership at all echelons. Joint operating environment has expanded In his white paper titled America’s doctrine appears to assume that Service to include regions for which the United Military: A Profession of Arms, General leadership development is adequate for States has little or no expertise, with Dempsey further amplified this sym- strategic leadership despite recent evi- tasks becoming increasingly unfamiliar. biosis between battlefield success and dence to the contrary. As the degrees of certainty and expert leadership, stating that the foundation As General Dempsey and others have agreement have decreased, the need for of the military profession is leader- noted, the required leadership skills can domain-specific foundational knowledge ship.12 Unfortunately, unlike the focus vary broadly depending on the level of has significantly diminished. In the the Services place on leadership, the operations. For example, most joint offi- information age, meta- and humanistic joint community falls short. In lieu cers are familiar with their Services’ roles knowledge come to the fore as the need of leadership, joint doctrine relies on and missions, having spent the majority to address the dynamics of integrated do- operational concepts, functions, and of their careers in the tactical environ- mains and multiple cultural perspectives processes. For example, Joint Publication ment. This familiarity generally includes increases. Specific foundational knowl- (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces the types of organizations (for example, edge is decreased proportionally because of the United States, does a very good JTFs and components) and processes collaborative approaches can potentially job describing command and control (for example, troop-leading procedures develop multiple solutions needed to within joint organizations.13 However, and the air-tasking cycle). At this level, address the complexities of integrated it fails to describe the leadership dif- complexity is limited because most inter- security domains. ferences that emerge as leadership and action is at the individual or small group
28 Forum / Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Nepalese army ranger works with U.S. Army Soldier during Situational Training Exercise portion of U.S. Army Alaska Warrior Leader Course on Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, August 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Justin Connaher) level, with decisionmaking measured in decades. Finally, at the national stra- the strategic leadership shortfall while seconds, minutes, hours, or a few days. tegic level, decisionmakers such as the incorporating the desired leadership The operational level of leadership President must deal with global complex- attributes identified by General Dempsey. expands complexity to include multiple ity that involves decisions spanning the Joint leader development thus becomes organizations and the proliferation of time range of each of the lower levels— the vehicle that transitions the outdated the number and types of processes and seconds, days, months, and years. military educational paradigm of the products used. Reflecting this increased Wherever one resides in an or- industrial age into one that serves the complexity, combatant commands oper- ganization—whether at the tactical, realities of the current information age ate at a different speed of decisionmaking operational, or strategic level, or some environment. to incorporate increased stakeholder level in between—different leadership views and desires. Combatant command paradigms exist. To meet strategic leader- Strategic Thinking regional and functional strategies and ship demands, the joint community must Competencies plans are complicated further by the develop strategic thinking competencies. To reacquire the lost art of strategic needs of the individuals and organizations Strategic thinking is a cognitive process thinking, seven competencies have at the tactical level. The strategic level used to design and sustain an organi- emerged as vital for strategic leaders: of leadership expands complexity to zation’s competitive advantage.17 It is a critical thinking include the defense enterprise decision- holistic method that leverages hindsight, •• creative thinking makers, such as the Secretary of Defense insight, and foresight, and precedes •• contextual thinking and Chairman. At this level, specific strategy or plan development. Strategic •• conceptual thinking processes reduce in number, but the thinking relies on an intuitive, visual, •• cultural thinking numbers of stakeholders, including allies and creative process that explores the •• collaborative thinking and partners, increase across a broader global security environment to synthesize •• communicative thinking.19 range of domains, such as the economic emerging patterns, issues, connections, •• and domestic domains. Decisionmaking and opportunities.18 Developing strate- Cultivating these strategic thinking can lengthen to months, years, or even gic thinking skills or competencies fills competencies can provide current and
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McCauley 29 Figure 3. Critical Thinking When applying critical thinking to the global security environment, the American Security + sheer volume of information and po- + + Nat’l Deficit Global + tential actors is overwhelming. Two key Security + + + Innovation + + tools of critical thinking that facilitate + + Universal Values + joint strategic leader understanding and + + + American Strength and + Economy American Power + Influence Abroad enhance their organizational principles + + International Order Iran are systems thinking and visual thinking. + + + + + Systems thinking is an approach that + Education + Open International promotes understanding of events and Economic System Health Care + Global behavior through the identification and American Prosperity + Prosperity understanding of underlying structures.21 + Viewed as systems, these structures are an organized set of elements intercon- nected in a way that achieves the stated Figure 4. Creative Thinking: Iranian Systems Map purpose. Systems, therefore, have three components: elements, relationships, and purpose. System elements can be either
Demographic, Economic, Power tangible or intangible, although tangi- and Political Systems Cultural Factors + ble elements are naturally more readily External Threat + identifiable. System relationships or inter- Life Conditions International + Socio-Political Political connections hold the elements together
+ War and represent the physical flow governing Values a system’s processes. A system’s purpose + Education Nutrition Education Attainment + is not easily discerned because the formal Budget Health Care + Expenditures stated function is often different from its Education Health + + + actual purpose. So the best way to deduce Education Government the system’s purpose is to observe it for a Cost/Student Spending + Mortality while.22 + GDP Fertility + + Visual thinking engages the Births Population + 23 Economy + unconscious mind and is vital in + Physical GDP Investment problem-solving and modeling systems, per capita Economic - + Demand especially ill-structured problems.24 Age/Sex + Deaths Distribution + + Visual thinking allows for the processing Social Investment of enormous amounts of information across multiple dimensions,25 adds clarity Life Expectancy to communication, more fully engages group members, and enhances memory.26 future strategic leaders with the skills creation, must be understood. The Visual thinking assists joint strategic lead- necessary to develop and execute strate- continued interplay of these dynamics ers by increasing their ability to recognize gies and plans successfully. provides additional system insights and patterns and similarities and to see formal The first competency, critical think- aids in the development of foresight. and informal relationships. ing, provides joint strategic leaders with Trend extrapolation provides strategic An example of critical thinking that a depth and breadth of understanding leaders with a temporal bridge between leverages systems and visual thinking is that leverage hindsight, insight, and the past and present to the future. This the international security challenge the foresight. Insight represents the ability extrapolation of both environmental United States faces with Iran. Critical to analyze a thing and break it apart to change and constants aids joint strategic thinking requires the strategic leader to see how its individual components are leaders in developing an understanding undertake a historical analysis of the two related and work together. By breaking of what may lie ahead and in anticipating countries to develop an understanding a thing down into its component parts, future events and subsequent plan devel- of the current grievances between them. elements and relationships not usually opment.20 Understanding the possible, A systems map, leveraging visual think- visible or understood are exposed. To plausible, and probable futures of a ing, helps to illustrate the current U.S. gain an appreciation of a system’s current system aids strategic leaders in shaping national security system and how Iran is state, the past, including the environ- the current conditions into those that are undermining it (see figure 3). National mental dynamics responsible for system more preferable. security interests and the intensity of
30 Forum / Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 General Dunford gives remarks on leadership at Wall Street Journal Chief Executive Officer Council annual meeting, November 2015 (DOD/Dominique A. Pineiro) those interests, along with key leverage creative thinking, is needed to overcome results. Systems and visualization tools are elements, could be identified using a sys- this flawed perception. Creative thinking particularly effective for gaining insights tems map. In addition, possible strategies forces joint strategic leaders to challenge into complex, adaptive systems (see figure or approaches to limiting Iranian influ- underlying assumptions, look for system 4). Creative thinking leverages primarily ence are more easily identified, together patterns, view relationships and actors in critical and collaborative thinking. with the associated first-, second-, and new ways, take more risks, and leverage The third strategic thinking compe- third-order effects. Systems and visual opportunities. Creative thinking uses the tency is contextual thinking. Contextual thinking enhance joint strategic leader critical thinking tools of systems thinking thinking leverages the skilled judgment critical thinking by portraying system and visual thinking to expose preexisting of the joint strategic leader by analyzing complexity and interrelationships in paradigms and develop new paradigms an environmental fact or situation as an ways that simple narratives or discussion for developing and integrating new individual part of a complex continuum cannot. perspectives. Joint strategic leaders who rather than the outcome of a specific Solving globally complex security can represent problems in as many ways cause or influence. Contextual thinking problems is the raison d’état of joint as possible will ultimately achieve higher assists strategic leaders in the develop- strategic leaders; unfortunately, finding rates of success. ment of a better understanding of the enduring solutions is frustratingly elusive. Systems and visual thinking tools nature of social interactions and the Why is that? Typically, the same assump- enable joint strategic leaders to develop effects on cognitive processing. In com- tions that created the problem continue different perspectives of an opposing plex problems, when context is missing, to frame any potential approaches to solv- system. For example, creating a depic- meaning is lost. In the global strategic ing it. As assumptions are the personal or tion of the Iranian socopolitical system security environment, the multiple solu- organizational perceptual bedrock used might provide the strategic leader with tions, methods, criteria, and perspectives to develop and sustain views of reality, the new insights into why current policies or surrounding the ill-structuredness of second strategic thinking competency, operations are not creating the desired the security issue must be conveyed,
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McCauley 31 not eliminated. Joint strategic leaders and motivates people to learn, de- different ideological context that calls for must then learn to sift through layers of velop, share, and adapt to changes. international security responsibilities that context to identify those that are most Collaborative thinking assists joint go beyond individuals and nation-states.32 relevant and important when solving strategic leaders in developing synergy Joint strategic leaders regularly face tough problems.27 from stakeholders by openly sharing ethical challenges because of various For example, in a typical military knowledge and experience, while ac- cultural factors. The greater the com- context, there is often a failure to differ- knowledging and affirming the same plexity of the environment within which entiate between the strategic, operational, in others. Mutual sharing, respect, the joint force is operating, the greater and tactical levels of war when discussing diversity, and equal participation that potential there is for ethical problems an issue. As we know, stakeholders and occur through high-order social learning, or misunderstandings to exist. As joint problems change depending on perspec- thinking, and communicating character- strategic leaders become ethically at- tive. There are a number of questions ize collaborative groups.31 Collaborative tuned, they must learn to view the world that can be used to help frame context. communication is the foundation of through a variety of lenses, developing a What is the history of the issue? What was effective engagement, peak performance, personal sense of right and wrong, and the strategic political and social context? and innovative outcomes; more impor- to interpret the influences that affect Who were the actors? What was the tantly, it helps to develop and achieve individual and group behavior.33 Cultural central issue? What were the surrounding common goals across national and insti- thinking leverages critical, collaborative, issues? Contextual thinking frames a tutional boundaries. and communicative thinking. point of common understanding for all In today’s global security envi- The last strategic thinking com- stakeholders and participants. It leverages ronment, the joint force cannot claim petency is communicative thinking. critical, creative, and conceptual thinking. expertise across the globe. Rather, joint Communicative thinking is used by The fourth strategic thinking com- strategic leaders must integrate stake- joint strategic leaders to understand petency, conceptual thinking, is used by holders’ deep understanding of their the various means and modes of com- joint strategic leaders to understand a environments to find a heightened level municating, as well as the challenges situation or problem by integrating issues of perception and new ways to think associated with communicating complex and factors into a conceptual framework. about issues. Collaborative thinking issues among individuals, organiza- Concepts, and the resulting maps, are directly enhances critical and creative tions, societies, cultures, and nations. the basis for human understanding and thinking and is influenced by cultural and A strategic leader must be able to build reasoning. Therefore, concepts are a form communicative thinking competencies. a desired, shared vision for the orga- of knowledge structure that facilitates Cultural thinking, the sixth stra- nization and communicate that vision understanding.28 Purposeful models tegic thinking competency, is used to internally and externally to various help strategic leaders structure the ex- understand the interconnected world, audiences. Joint strategic leaders must ploration of a problem situation and are incongruence of national borders, conceptualize complex issues and pro- the most common means of initiating a and synthesis of perspectives across a cesses, simplify them, and inspire people comparison stage of problem-solving or broad spectrum of cultures. Cultural around them. In today’s multicultural understanding.29 thinking enables joint strategic leaders world, strategic leaders must be able to When dealing with complex prob- to understand a wider range of views communicate across cultures as easily as lems, conceptual thinking helps joint and the beliefs, norms, values, and rit- they can communicate internally. strategic leaders illustrate interrelation- uals associated with the global security Joint strategic leaders must un- ships, facilitating much-needed discourse. environment. Enabled by information derstand the cultural nuances of Complex systems must be conceptually technology, the post–Cold War se- communication and be capable of com- simplified to make them understand- curity environment collapsed into an municating using multiple modes and able.30 Conceptual thinking requires joint intrinsically connected economic, cul- methods, including blogs, tweets, written strategic leaders to be open to new ways tural, and security global village. This and oral reports, videos, storyboards, of viewing the world, with a willingness interconnected world requires joint stra- PowerPoint presentations, and formal to explore issues through alternative tegic leaders to understand that today’s and informal sessions. They must also be disciplines. Conceptual thinkers can security environment is not only multi- aware that communication occurs contin- effectively translate abstract thoughts polar but also exhibits characteristics of uously and that it can occur nonverbally to unfamiliar audiences. Conceptual cross-pollinated perspectives, ideologies, and through inactivity. Joint strategic thinking leverages critical, creative, goals, and capabilities. leaders must understand that commu- contextual, and communicative thinking Within this global village, the costs of nication is a filtered, continuous, and competencies. individual action have been intensified, active process and cannot be undone.34 The fifth strategic thinking compe- with potentially substantial implications Communicative thinking leverages crit- tency is collaborative thinking, which for the international security community. ical, collaborative, and cultural thinking creates synergy, improves performance, This new security reality has created a competencies.
32 Forum / Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 11 Recommendations tactical levels of war, and is insufficient for Air Force Core Doctrine, Vol. II, Lead- ership (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF the development of joint strategic leaders. and Conclusion Doctrine Center, 2012). In the slower moving world of the Joint officer development must 12 Dempsey, America’s Military, 1–6. industrial age, joint strategic leaders change the paradigm of the past 50 13 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the could plod their way through familiar years or so to acknowledge the new Armed Forces of the United States (Washing- tasks and concepts, developing solutions skills required as the world continues ton, DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013), V-1–V-20. to a level of certainty most experts the transition from the industrial age to 14 Ibid., B-1–B-3. could agree on. In the fast-moving the information age. As the Chairman 15 Dempsey, Desired Leader Attributes, 1–2. interconnected global security envi- and others have identified, strategic 16 JP 1-0, B-1–B-3. ronment of today, however, strategic leadership is a necessity for operating in 17 T. Irene Sanders, Strategic Thinking and leaders do not have the luxury of the 21st-century security environment. the New Science: Planning in the Midst of Chaos Complexity and Change (New York: The Free time, task familiarity, or certainty. As This framework provides an approach to Press, 1998), 162. a result, strategic leader competencies fill the leadership development shortfall 18 Hughes and Beatty, 43–51. are needed more than ever. The differ- in joint officer development, education, 19 Daniel H. McCauley, “An Institution for ence between strategic leadership and and doctrine. JFQ the Profession of Arms and Thought,” Cam- “regular” leadership is that a strategic paigning, Fall 2014, 7. 20 Edward Cornish, Futuring: The Explora- leader’s responsibilities are far broader tion of the Future (Bethesda, MD: World Future and deeper in scope. These responsibil- Notes Society, 2004), 1–8. ities typically cross not only functions 21 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The 1 and domains, but also often encompass Jason Katz, “America’s Lack of Leadership Art and Practice of the Learning Organization Is Feeding Global Instability,” Congress Blog, multiple organizations that have diverse (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 6, 186. September 18, 2014, available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McCauley 33 Staff Sergeant Russell Vidler, USA, leaps over wall at Fit to Win obstacle course on Fort Jackson, South Carolina, September 2015 (U.S. Army/Brian Hamilton)
Strategic Agility Theory and Practice
By Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., with Ryan L. Shaw
s the combatant commander for I was charged with, and like the other ways to employ available means in the homeland, every day I con- combatant commanders (CCDRs) support of my assigned strategic ends. I A templated the extant and emerg- who are faced with sustaining U.S. also had responsibility for the accrued ing threats to our people, territory, and leadership and protecting U.S. interests risk. This is the strategic calculus that way of life. Defense of the homeland in in a complex and dangerous world, I all CCDRs must continually manage depth was one of the strategic ends that worked with my staff to find effective in the face of changing realities. In the homeland, the consequences of miscal- culation come at the direct expense of our people and way of life. General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA (Ret.), commanded at every level of joint and Army service. Most recently he was Commander of Multi-National Corps–Iraq from 2009–2010; Director of Strategy, Plans, For the North American Aerospace and Policies (J5) for the Joint Staff from 2010–2011; and Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) from 2011–2014. Major Command, our ends are fixed, and (P) Ryan L. Shaw, USA, is a Strategist assigned to NORAD and USNORTHCOM. A doctoral candidate in history at Yale University, Major Shaw has commanded a cavalry troop in Operation Iraqi Freedom and they will not change. Obviously, we will taught history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. never decide not to defend the territorial
34 Forum / Strategic Agility JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 integrity of the homeland. Nor will we model of how agility works in our system Strategic Agility give up on sustaining a peaceful interna- of national defense, and offering some Carl von Clausewitz defined a satisfac- tional order, protecting universal values, or thoughts on how we might increase our tory theory of war as “one that will be promoting global prosperity, and we will agility and therefore better balance the of real service and will never conflict not break faith with our international allies. strategic equation in this period of na- with reality.”2 A satisfactory theory of But it is equally certain that our means are tional security vertigo. agility in war must meet the same cri- contracting. Budget cuts and drawdowns The time is right for a deliberate teria. Theory is useful only insofar as it are happening, and they will continue. look at agility. Our potential rival states reflects reality; reality cannot be remade This is a reality we have faced before, and are steadily increasing their investment to reflect our theory. And to be useful, we will manage it as best we can. in military capabilities at a rate not seen a theory cannot be overly narrow—a Unfortunately, this time we seem to since the end of the Cold War, and they theory of strategic agility cannot be have lost the conversation on risk. In our are demonstrating ever more assertive incompatible with the common usage eagerness to put years of war behind us regional and global designs. Despite our of the word agility, nor can it contradict and to turn our resources toward other years of effort and some real successes agility at the tactical and operational important projects, we are increasingly against al Qaeda, the terrorist threat levels. Academics discuss mental agility unwilling to be honest with ourselves remains and is retrenching in undergov- and business leaders pursue agile mar- about the level of risk we currently face erned spaces across the Middle East—a keting and supply chain strategies, but and are willing to assume in the future. fact made plain in recent months by the the most common context in which We frame the conversation in the abso- rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the agility is understood is in the physical lute terms of winning and losing without Levant. The security of our homeland domain of athletics. Even those of us asking the more relative question: “At and our interests abroad is increasingly who are neither athletes nor fans under- what cost?” But the trust of our offices threatened by transnational criminal net- stand agility when we see it displayed demands that we have that conversation, works that traffic in narcotics, weapons, on a field or court. Quite simply, the especially regarding the homeland. and other illicit goods, including humans. common usage of the word agility is in With our ends fixed and our means Our growing reliance on cyber and space reference to athletics, so athletic analo- in decline, we must confront risk—but assets makes us simultaneously more ca- gies can be useful for communicating a we must also recognize our obligation to pable and more vulnerable. As a changing theory of strategic agility. mitigate that risk by finding better ways climate opens new approaches to the Clausewitz further claimed that to use our available means. Agility seems homeland and makes weather-related the “primary purpose of any theory is to be the currency with which we hope disasters more frequent, the demand for to clarify concepts and ideas that have to buy better ways. This is not a new Defense Support of Civil Authorities become, as it were, confused and en- idea: from AirLand Battle in the 1980s continues to climb. Together, these tangled. Not until terms and concepts to the 2012 Capstone Concept for Joint developments mean that threats and have been defined can one hope to make Operations, agility has long been a part challenges are less predictable, more dif- any progress in examining the question of our operational concepts, but we have fuse, more globally interrelated, and less clearly and simply and expect the reader never defined it in our doctrine.1 attributable than ever before. Meanwhile, to share one’s views.”3 Toward that end, Nevertheless, in this particular mo- our economy continues to struggle and we offer the following definitions of ment of strategic challenge, the idea of our deficits increase. After more than a agility. Agility is the capacity to respond agility has more cachet than ever. In May decade of wartime spending, our people quickly, effectively, and efficiently to a 2014, the Secretary of Defense hosted and leaders are anxious to focus on real wide variety of unpredictable demands. the CCDRs for an offsite discussion of issues at home, even as we are forced to More than mere strength, speed, power, strategic agility while the Joint Staff J7 si- confront continued challenges abroad. or endurance, agility implies a capacity multaneously hosted a Chairman-directed Our budgets will not let us get bigger, to employ any of these competencies wargame to test concepts of global agility. and our threats will not let us do less. individually or in combination and to The latest operating concepts for each Agility seems to be the answer to this switch between employment patterns to of the Services prioritize agility in one conundrum. accomplish a goal with a minimum waste way or another. Yet it still seems that we But if agility is to be more than just a of time or energy. In the athletic realm, lack a common understanding of what buzzword, we need to give it some hard while sprinters are fast, running backs agility means in the abstract and how and deliberate thought. Our doctrine are agile; marathons demonstrate endur- we might cultivate it in our joint force. needs to comprehend a definition of ance, but parkour demonstrates agility; Given our current, hard-edged calculus agility and its component parts. We need weightlifting demonstrates strength, but of ends, ways, means, and risk, we need to develop institutional and operational wrestling demands agility. In the context more clarity than that. This article hopes processes that promote agility. And as a of military strategy, agility is the ability to to advance the discussion by defining and foundation to all of this, we need a work- identify and capture relevant opportuni- analyzing agility, providing a conceptual able theory of agility. ties faster than our rivals, to rapidly adjust
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Jacoby with Shaw 35 Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Cecil D. Haney, and U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Mark A. Welsh III speak during strategic studies seminar at Eisenhower Executive Office Building, December 2014 (DOD/Sean K. Harp)
international security environment in an environmental context. Indeed, as Table 1. even with limited and uncertain fiscal discussed above, the absence of obstacles Physical Capacity resourcing. or opponents negates agility as a relevant Agility Environmental Dexterity factor. Athletes apply agility on a course, Decisiveness Components of Agility court, or field; we defend the Nation In any context, agility depends on across the hard geographic realities of priorities and shift resources to the main the three components of physical land, sea, and air, in the developing do- effort. We define strategic agility as our capacity, environmental dexterity, and mains of space and cyber, among varied capacity at the global or theater level to decisiveness. human cultures, and against thinking and rapidly assess complex and unpredictable Physical Capacity. While agility is adaptive enemies. security challenges and opportunities and not merely strength, speed, power, or Environmental dexterity requires to decide and respond quickly, effectively, endurance, those are all prerequisites, or both knowledge of the environment and and efficiently. enablers, of agility. The laws of physics the ability to shape and use it. A running A sprinter, runner, or lifter may, in still matter. To win through agility, one back reads the defense, uses his blockers, fact, be agile, but one could not know it does not have to be the fastest or the and quickly changes direction based on by watching them compete within the strongest, but one does have to be strong an intuitive sense of the interface of his predictable parameters of their respective enough and fast enough. The athletic cleats with the turf. A parkour practi- disciplines. Similarly, we do not demon- application is obvious; for military power, tioner turns obstacles into opportunities strate agility by throwing resources this has to do with the hard facts of by vaulting, jumping, or swinging in against a predictable threat, no matter budgets, programming, acquisitions, and ways that increase rather than decrease how great the threat or the magnitude research and development, along with momentum. For military purposes, of the resources. But agility allows us to recruiting and training personnel. knowing the environment requires sus- promote and defend the Nation’s inter- Environmental Dexterity. Agility is tained strategic intelligence and cultural ests in a complex and rapidly changing never exercised in a vacuum; it happens acuity. We shape and use the environment
36 Forum / Strategic Agility JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 through Theater Security Cooperation Table 2. (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC), through access agreements, prep- Manpower ositioned stocks, and the discriminating Physical Capacity Materiel Services, FCCs use of overseas basing and force rotations, Training which provide us with what Antoine Agility Know the Environment Environmental Dexterity GCCs, FCCs Henri De Jomini called “pivots of opera- Shape the Environment tions” across the globe.4 Clarity of Purpose Decisiveness. No amount of physical Decisiveness POTUS, OSD, JS capacity or environmental dexterity can Know capabilities and limitations compensate for an inability to make de- cisions. Agility demands both the ability “backbone,” the scaffolding that enables Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and the willingness to assess, decide, and our global reach, and they develop and enables effective and properly resourced execute in stride. This requires clarity of employ our strategic capabilities in space, steady-state activities across DOD during purpose (the running back knows that cyber, and global strike. Phase 0, and efficient transitions to crisis no matter how many times he changes Geographic combatant commands action planning when necessary. In the direction, his aim is forward yardage), an (GCCs) provide environmental dexter- words of the doctrine, “Clear strategic appreciation of your own capabilities and ity. With support of the FCCs, GCCs guidance and frequent interaction among limitations (how far can I jump? how fast develop intelligence, refine cultural senior leaders, Combatant Commanders, can I run?), and courage (execute with acuity, and maintain up-to-date strategic and subordinate joint force commanders conviction or fail). In national defense, assessments. Through TSC and BPC, promotes an early understanding of, and these requirements translate to a wide- they shape the environment on a day- agreement on, strategic and military end spread agreement on the national interest to-day basis during Phase 0 and Phase I. states, objectives, planning assumptions, and a shared strategic vision or “theory of In coordination with the Department of risks, and other key factors.”6 The prod- victory,” which allow for a rapid consen- State, GCCs earn strategic access for the uct is a clear set of strategic priorities sus on relevant, emerging opportunities. Department of Defense (DOD); it is the and a shared understanding of strategic Capturing those opportunities requires long-term, steady-state engagement of risk. In other words, the JOPP is built clear and appropriate authorities at all the GCCs that facilitates rapid shifts of to provide clarity of purpose and a clear levels and strategic leaders with the cour- priority during crises. understanding of capabilities and limita- age to say “yes” or “no.” At our best, we While decisiveness is important at tions, the first two components of the enable decisiveness through a culture of every level, for the achievement of global decisiveness required for strategic agility. mission command—through decentral- agility at the national strategic level, The third component—courage—is a less ized execution and mission-type orders, decisiveness is the purview of the Joint tangible question, a moral one. As such, through trust-empowered command Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense it cannot be programmed so deliberately. and control (C2) and unity-of-effort (OSD), and President. It is here that relationships. strategic ends are set, strategic priorities The Moral Component established, and strategic opportunities In our business, agility is only partly Our Agile System identified. It is here that a culture of a physics problem—it is also a moral These three components of agility— mission command begins, and in a problem. We cope with the laws of physical capacity, environmental dexter- resource-constrained environment, it is nature and also the laws of human ity, and decisiveness—map directly to here where hard decisions must receive nature. Behind the questions of physical three strategic-level components of our “yes” or “no” answers. capacity and organizational processes defense establishment. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation there lies a question of trust. In fact, Our physical capacity lives within Planning, describes a proven process for any experienced athlete or coach would the Services—Army, Marine Corps, identifying ends, setting priorities, and agree that there is a moral component to Navy, Air Force—and the functional allocating resources at the strategic level. competitive sports as well—if there were component commands (FCCs)—U.S. Through documents ranging from the not, spectators and fans would not find it Strategic Command, U.S. Transportation National Security Strategy to the Joint so compelling. But dealing as we do with Command, and U.S. Special Operations Strategic Capabilities Plan, the President, the deeply moral questions of state-sanc- Command. It is built through the Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of tioned violence, the lives of our sons and strategic acquisition of manpower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic daughters, and the sacred obligation of materiel and through tough, realistic, and direction that enables the CCDRs to defending American sovereignty and consistent training. As force providers, produce coherent theater strategies, our way of life, this moral dimension the Services train and equip our com- campaign plans, and contingency plans.5 is infinitely more important for the bat formations. The FCCs provide the When properly executed, this Joint soldier than the athlete—more critical,
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Jacoby with Shaw 37 Ugandan Brigadier General Apollo Kasiita-Gowa talks to U.S. Army Pacific Commanding General, General Vincent K. Brooks, during U.S. Army War College International Fellows program’s visit where 39 participants received firsthand experience on strategic-level leadership and national security challenges (U.S. Army/Kyle J. Richardson)
combatant commands have to know that Table 3. their interactions with the Joint Staff will Physical Capacity be governed by the prerogatives of our Individual Agility Environmental Dexterity national strategic ends, not by Service Organizational Agility parochialism, the equities of a particular Decisiveness staff section, or the “job jar” of a given Trust duty description. Likewise, when the uniformed force interacts with the civilian in fact, than the physical components. As to drag him from the field if he becomes leadership at OSD, the civilians must be Clausewitz wrote of the moral compo- wounded. This is tactical courage based confident that they will receive unvar- nent, “Theory should only propose rules on tactical trust, but the culture of trust nished professional military advice based that give ample scope to these finest and always has started and always must start on the needs of the Nation, not the paro- least dispensable of military virtues, in all at the top, and it is sustained reciprocally chial interests of a Service or component, their degrees and variations.”7 with the faith of our people. and the military must be confident that We have one of the few forces in the Across the Total Force—across all that advice will be received in good faith world that will reliably close with and Services, Reserve Components, and and incorporated into decisions fully in destroy the enemy. This is based on a National Guard—we must be able to our best long-term security interests. This courage born of trust. The rifleman will believe that we are all working toward is never easy, but it all becomes much move forward to the objective because the same ends. We cannot be agile if more difficult as budgets get tighter. he has absolute confidence in the soldiers some of us are prioritizing job security Physical competence, environmental to his right and left, that the logistician over national security—or even if it dexterity, and decisiveness, together with will find a way to support him when he seems that we are. And we cannot be the added moral component of trust, gets there, and that a medic will be there agile if we confuse means with ends; the comprise a model of agility that applies
38 Forum / Strategic Agility JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 to athletics and to any other meaningful Even in an era of tight budgets and Table 4. application of the word, including the reduced acquisitions, we must keep faith Competitive Advantages tactical, operational, and strategic levels with our partners in industry to maintain • The All Volunteer Force of war. In fact, it applies to individual the on-demand capacity of our industrial • The Defense Industrial Base military leaders as well. Agile organi- base. We have to find a way to sustain • Exercises, Education, Training • International Alliances zations demand agile leaders, and we readiness in our combat formations • Defend Forward Strategy encourage leaders and leadership theorists through tough and realistic training and • Jointness & Civilian Control to examine the utility of this model at the exercises, and when we are down to our individual leader level. But the focus of last dollar, we should spend it on profes- GCCs, with our country teams under this article is the corporate agility of our sional military education. the guidance of the State Department, national strategic-level defense enterprise. Sustaining the competitive advantage build and maintain trust as the face of What follows are some initial thoughts of our all-volunteer force means we have America in our longstanding alliances, about our present level of agility and our to keep faith with our veterans and care and they are the physical embodiment possibilities for improvement. for our families, ensure we maintain of the forward defense strategy that has adequate and predictable compensation served us well since 1917. Power politics, How Can We Be More Agile? packages, and manage talent within the nation-states, and relationships still mat- First, do no harm. Six competitive force to make a career of military ser- ter; they happen in geographical space, advantages have sustained American vice both personally and professionally and managing those relationships within military preeminence for many decades. rewarding. The early phases of this draw- that space is expressly the role of the We must sustain these at all costs, what- down have generated much discussion GCCs. As long as Sustaining U.S. Global ever challenges lie ahead. We must not and warning of a “hollow force.” By this Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century allow them to be broken, either by sins we usually mean that we should not try Defense is still our strategy, and if greater of commission—from an eagerness to to sustain a force structure larger than agility is what we want, we should redou- change just for the sake of change—or what we can adequately train and equip. ble that Phase 0 investment, not cut it. omission—from neglect for lack of But that is only part of it—the hollowest The Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces resources. We should frame our strate- of forces is the force that does not have or concept, if properly defined and exe- gic choices in terms of their effects on does not understand its mission. We will cuted, could be an important step in that these six. Three of these competitive only sustain vitality in our all-volunteer direction. Because the GCC construct is advantages feed our physical capacity: force if leaders at all levels communicate not broken, we should not try to fix it. the all-volunteer force, our defense to their formations the essential role of Decisiveness. As discussed above, industrial base, and our tradition of their mission in the Nation’s defense the JOPP does provide us with the tools excellence in exercises, education, and strategy—and leaders can only do that if we need to conduct effective shaping training. Two of them have to do with the strategy has an essential and clearly operations in Phase 0 and to plan for the our environmental dexterity: our inter- defined role for each of those formations. contingencies we foresee; it does set the national alliances and our time-tested Environmental Dexterity. In the conditions for agility—but only if we use strategy of defending forward. And quest for greater agility and lower it correctly and adapt it as required. one—our culture of jointness and civil- expenditures, there has been much dis- Each of the system’s products is ian control—enables our decisiveness cussion of reorganizing the combatant essential to the production of the others, and is built on trust. commands. With every budget cycle, so they each must be produced on time Physical Capacity. For the last we see a renewed proposal to reduce and to standard. In this sense, the agility quarter century, we have enjoyed a tre- the number of GCCs, usually by re-ab- required to manage the unexpected mendous advantage in physical capacity sorbing U.S. Africa Command into U.S. demands some degree of predictability over any potential rival. With downsizing European Command or by combining in our processes. Working backward in an imminent reality, we must be careful U.S. Northern Command and U.S. time, a GCC cannot transition well to to remain big enough, strong enough, and Southern Command. Recent think-pieces crisis action if it does not have the right fast enough—not just to win, but to do have proposed hybrid or flexible C2 contingency plans. Those contingency so without violating our moral imper- arrangements, organized against specific plans must be nested with the Theater ative to minimize the risk to American global threats rather than by geographical Campaign Plan, all of which must be lives. We must sustain our dominance in areas of responsibility. While it is true that nested with the endstates prescribed strategic lift; intelligence, surveillance, each problem set is unique and many of and the resources allocated in national and reconnaissance; global strike; and the today’s threats recognize no political or strategic guidance, particularly the special operations forces enterprise—the geographic boundaries, it remains the theater endstates in the Guidance for backbone that enables our agility. And we case that we buy agility for Phases I–V Employment of the Force (GEF) and the must build and maintain resilience in the with our investment in knowing and resource allocation in the Global Force cyber and space domains. shaping the environment in Phase 0. The Management Implementation Guidance
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Jacoby with Shaw 39 Secretary Carter answers Sailor’s question during troop event at Naval Base San Diego, California, February 2016 (DOD/Tim D. Godbee)
(GFMIG). It would be an inappropriate Chairman. The Joint Staff has the trap- reprioritize, but we owe it to our allies overreach for the combatant commander pings of a general staff and we frequently not to reprioritize for anything less. to write a plan that pursued endstates treat them like one, but the Chairman— The drawback of the current system is other than those prescribed by the by design, as the principal military advisor that synchronization of contingency plans GEF or that depended for success on to the President—has no command between combatant commands happens resources not made available through the authority. This makes it difficult to only in an ad hoc, nonbinding, and inde- GFMIG. It is likewise—and equally—an reallocate resources between GCCs pendent manner, and the Services—the awkward overreach and a violation of the during Phase 0. Some argue that we force providers—are only indirectly mission command philosophy for OSD could increase our agility by investing the accountable to the commanders who em- to produce a GEF that prescribes objec- Chairman with real command authority. ploy those forces. We can do better than tives, rather than endstates, in an effort But that would be a fundamental depar- this. We should adapt to the reality of to avoid tough decisions about resource ture from the time-tested arrangement of globalized threats with a process for the allocation. This amounts to a bureau- the National Command Authority, which global synchronization of contingency cratic sleight of hand to conceal risk we should not undertake without serious plans for Phases I–IV while enhancing when what we really need is a more hon- consideration of how it would affect the the assurance function in Phase 0 with est conversation between the Secretary Chairman’s advisory role. In any case, appropriate and reliable steady-state force and the combatant commanders, the reallocating resources between theaters allocation. principals who actually own the risk. The during Phase 0 represents a departure It must also be said that we cannot first thing we can do to improve our from approved Theater Engagement plan for future agility in the absence of agility is to use the system we have in the Strategies and a reprioritization of our clear resource guidance in the Federal way it was designed. commitments to our alliances; that should budget. As commissioned officers in Recent conversations about strategic be difficult. Under the present arrange- the Armed Forces, we took an oath to agility and the related concept of dynamic ment, it takes true escalation of a real obey the lawful orders of the President. presence have focused on the role of the security crisis to engage the Secretary to A signed budget is just such an order,
40 Forum / Strategic Agility JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 and we will obey them when they come branches of government that are designed have different priorities regarding fund- whether we like them or not. But re- to check and balance each other inevi- ing, structure, and readiness issues based, cent budget battles and the calamity of tably draws senior military leaders into according to the dominant interpretation sequestration represent an absence of political controversy. As a recent reviewer of Huntington’s theory, on different coherent orders, which results in strategic tells it, “Huntington suggests that as a imperatives influencing their professional paralysis—the opposite of agility. When result of this constitutional arrangement, military ethic. This potential conflict we are denied the ability to decide and his objective form of civil-military con- between components with different act strategically, the best we can do is trol is literally impossible in the United pathways of accountability is in essence to decide and act morally—to prioritize States.”9 Since Huntington’s writing, the a political conundrum between levels the readiness of the Soldiers, Marines, effect of military policy domestically and of government. While it is appropriate Sailors, and Airmen whom we send into of American foreign policy internationally to consider the prerogatives of each of harm’s way and do our best not to break has grown more consequential, and our the components when shaping the Total those six competitive advantages. That recent ventures in stability operations and Force, our model of strategic agility is nonnegotiable, but it comes at the nation-building abroad demand greater would dictate that, for both the integrity cost of future agility. And the ongoing political involvement than other forms of the process and the efficacy of the budget negotiations—the attempts to of military operations. Our system was product, the requirements for national protect pet projects for key constituencies designed to make military professionalism security and global agility should take against the best military advice of our hard, and it is only getting harder.10 priority over the interests of individual senior leaders—threaten even our ability But this makes professional military components. to provide for that readiness and maintain advice and a professional military ethic The Moral Component. Courage— those advantages. Part of the decisiveness more important, not less. Though we and the trust that is both its cause and its required for strategic agility must come never will completely, we are all obligated effect—cannot be budgeted for. It cannot from our elected leaders. to try to live up to Huntington’s ideals be legislated into being, designed in a lab, This speaks to the larger question of of professionalism and objective control. or built into an organizational process. civil-military relations, which inevitably Senior military officers—active and It can only be demonstrated by example affect our decisiveness and are presently retired—should aspire to provide their and promulgated by practice. It is tough under real strain. In 1957, Samuel best military advice and to leave politics to build and easy to lose. Huntington claimed, in The Soldier and to the politicians. Likewise, the deeper Fortunately, just as we have inherited the State, that military professionalism that partisan politics are allowed to reach an overwhelming physical capacity and a was best promoted and preserved by into the uniformed Services, the more proven institutional process, we have in- what he called an objective model of military professionalism is compromised. herited a longstanding American tradition civil-military relations.8 In contrast to the Frankly, the sheer size of OSD, with a of courage and trust in the service of our politicized military of subjective control, civilian counterpart for every desk at the nation. Despite our flaws and our mis- objective civilian control seeks to insulate Joint Staff and every directorate at the steps, the American people continue to the military from politics as much as pos- combatant commands, and with political trust their military Services—as evidenced sible, allowing them to develop expertise appointees proliferating deeper into the by the fact that they are still willing to in the management of violence on the organization at the expense of the profes- contribute their best and brightest to battlefield while the politicians develop sional staff, ensures that politics will reach our ranks. They will continue to give us and exercise a separate expertise in policy, very deeply indeed. Any continued efforts that trust as long as we continue to earn strategy, and diplomacy. Huntington’s to resize DOD should look at trimming it. It is the trust we have built with each book became the standard in the field, OSD to save not just money, but also our other that has enabled us to develop, and it remains the starting point for dis- tradition of civil-military relations. over the last several decades, a culture of cussions of civil-military relations at the Civil-military challenges, born from true jointness that is the envy of militar- academies and war colleges today. His constitutional checks and balances not ies across the world. Our civil-military preference for objective control has thus only within the Federal Government but relations have not always been happy, become an article of faith. also between the Federal and state gov- but happiness is necessary neither as Even in 1957, though, Huntington ernments, also affect each of the elements a prerequisite nor as a product of that was clear that objective control was an of strategic agility. Almost by design, relationship. Trust, however, is necessary. aspirational rather than a descriptive idea. our Total Force system creates tension We have always been at our best when The Founders made the American mili- between the Federal components (both there was trust sufficient to the mission, tary subordinate to the President, who is Active and Reserve) and state forces in and historically, our failures have involved the commander in chief, but accountable the National Guard. Federal forces ac- a deficit of trust. Do we have sufficient to Congress, which raises it, funds it, and countable to the President as commander trust now? authorizes its employment. This require- in chief and state forces accountable to This moral component of agility is ment to provide military advice to two their respective governors are likely to ours to lose. To retain it, we only have
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Jacoby with Shaw 41 6 to live up to the highest ideals, laws, and understood concept of agility in athletics, Ibid., x. 7 Clausewitz, 86. traditions of our American profession this construct of physical capacity, envi- 8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the of arms. As we face the difficult choices ronmental dexterity, and decisiveness, State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military ahead, let us maintain faith with the plus the moral component, is equally Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, American people and with one other, and applicable to all other meaningful uses 1957, 1981), 80–85. let us renew our determination not to of the word, including the tactical, op- 9 Dayne E. Nix, “American Civil-Military Relations: Samuel P. Huntington and the Po- lose it. erational, and strategic levels of war. It litical Dimensions of Military Professionalism,” is further hoped that the specific recom- Naval War College Review 65, no. 2 (Spring Conclusion mendations for increasing our strategic 2012). Any attempt to move the recent focus agility will at least spur honest discussion 10 Ibid. 11 on agility—which has been earnest, and help move the idea from an abstract Ibid., 89. if poorly defined—from mere words buzzword to a real focus of our defense into meaningful action implies three strategy. The task ahead is to incorporate possibilities: We must either make some agility into our doctrine, adapt our pro- changes to gain the agility we now cesses to promote it, and recommit to a desperately need, or work to preserve professional ethic of courage based on the agility we have and must retain, or trust. JFQ debunk agility as the coin of the realm every time we face a budget cut and admit that agility either is not what we Notes want or is too hard to achieve. We argue 1 that agility is the right approach for our Agility was one of the four tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine, which approached future national security strategy. From a definition but was focused primarily at the our perspective, we have the baseline tactical and operational levels and did not components for agility, and we only usefully distinguish agility from speed: “Agility need to capitalize on them in a delib- emphasizes the ability of friendly forces to act erate way, but we can also make some faster than the enemy.” See “Doctrine and Concepts” in Department of the Army Histor- substantive changes to improve our ical Summary: Fiscal Year 1989 (Washington, agility moving forward. DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, In constructing his theory of war, 1998), 46, available at
42 Forum / Strategic Agility JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Sailor and Marine with 3rd Marine Regiment brace as CH-53E Super Stallion with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 366 takes off from Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, July 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Owen Kimbrel)
n May 25, 2011, a platoon from the U.S. Army’s 1st Battalion, Sustaining the “New O 133nd Infantry Regiment, was ambushed near the village of Do Ab, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. An Norm” of Jointness estimated force of more than 300 Taliban engaged the small unit. As By Case Cunningham, Patrick Donahoe, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades Mike Jernigan, and Michael Riggins exploded around the Americans, two U.S. Air Force joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) contacted a U.S. Air Force MC-12 tactical reconnaissance air- Today’s Joint Force is a highly experienced, battle-tested body of men craft to relay requests for air support to other aircraft. While the Soldiers fought and women, with a decade of practical, focused warfighting knowledge. . . the Taliban, who outnumbered them . We must learn and properly place in context key lessons of the last decade roughly five to one, the JTACs directed fires from Air Force F-16s, F-15Es, and of war and in doing so, we will prepare our leaders for what is ahead.1 AC-130s; Navy F/A-18s; and Army —General Martin E. Dempsey AH-64s and OH-58s. The battle raged 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012 for 12 hours before the Taliban aban- doned their attempts to overrun the platoon. More than 250 enemy forces were killed during the engagement. No American lives were lost.2 This short vignette is just one of Colonel Case Cunningham, USAF, is Commander of the 432nd Wing at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada. many examples of the power of joint Colonel Patrick Donahoe, USA, is Chief of Staff at the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, cooperation in combat operations. Georgia. Colonel Mike Jernigan, USMC, is Engineer and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Branch Head at Headquarters Marine Corps. Captain Michael Riggins, USN, is assigned to the Office of the Commander, Whether through the synergistic employ- Tenth Fleet, N5, Navy Plans and Policy. ment of Service capabilities, as a result
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Cunningham et al. 43 Sailors direct F/A-18C Hornet from Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 83 on flight deck of USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) in U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in Arabian Gulf, February 2016 (U.S. Navy/Lindsay A. Preston) of individual augmentee assignments invasion of Grenada. Following these a solution: “I can have the F-16s supporting another Service’s efforts, two events, Congress took action with ‘sparkle’ the intersections where the or through experience serving on joint the Goldwater-Nichols Department of unit needs to turn and we can walk the warfighting staffs, the officers of today’s Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and patrol into the target—turn by turn.” American military are arguably more joint created requirements for joint education, The ability of the aircraft to illuminate than in any other time in the Nation’s qualification, and cooperation. each intersection with an infrared beam history. With U.S. forces in Afghanistan visible to the patrol under night vision drawing down substantially, the best way The New Norm goggles is an example of the types of to sustain this “new norm” of jointness Over the last 13 years, U.S. Service- capabilities that should be understood is to bring these lessons to the junior members have come to recognize the at the lowest echelon before combat, officer and company-grade professional capabilities that each Service brings not learned during it. We now have the development programs of each Service. to the battlefield. In Iraq, the tactical opportunity to formalize an educational This article argues that giving junior of- implications of joint enablers often were approach to ensure the next generation ficers more joint experience, education, not readily apparent to platoon leaders learns this lesson in a classroom or an and training opportunities earlier in their and company commanders on the exercise rather than having to relearn careers will accelerate this joint experience ground. This shortcoming was brought it the next time the capability can be endowment and increase the combat ef- home to one unit while conducting brought to bear in combat. fectiveness of the joint force. operations in a small town southwest In each Service, the first tour of duty The current American tradition of of Baghdad in early 2006. As the patrol for a company-grade or junior officer joint warfare came about as a direct attempted to negotiate the warren of is spent learning the foundational skills result of the failed rescue attempt in twists and turns in a village along the of his or her trade, whether that of a 1980 of 53 Americans held hostage Euphrates, it continually made wrong pilot, platoon commander, ship driver, in Iran and the difficulties realized turns. In the Battalion Tactical Opera- or signals officer. These formal courses in joint operations during the 1983 tions Center, an Air Force JTAC offered traditionally focus on Service capability
44 JPME Today / Sustaining the “New Norm” of Jointness JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 U.S. Army Warrant Officer presents team findings during Warrant Officer Solarium at Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 2016 (DOD/David Vergun) but should also incorporate elements Chairman’s instruction continues: “ser- the Chairman’s guidance. Beginning with of joint training and education. As the vice schools that have programs centered the Army, the Captains Career Course “sparkle” above illustrates, it is less likely on pay grade O-3 officers will foster an states that its mission is to: that optimum force can be applied to understanding of joint warfighting neces- an enemy at a decisive point if leaders in sary for success at this level.” Even more [provide] captains with the tactical, basic maneuver formations do not under- specifically, appendix B to enclosure E of technical and leader knowledge and skills stand the capabilities of the joint force. the instruction states that the joint em- needed to lead company-size units and The U.S. military’s asymmetric advantage phasis of instruction in branch, warfare, serve on battalion and brigade staffs. The in combat stems from the strength of un- staff specialty schools, and primary pro- course emphasizes the development of leader paralleled experience in joint warfighting. fessional military education courses must competencies while integrating recent Even at the basic levels, Service schools prepare “officers for service in joint task operational experiences of the students with must train to fundamental joint capabili- forces (JTFs) where a thorough introduc- quality institutional training. It facilitates ties to effectively employ the force. tion in joint warfighting is required,” to lifelong learning through an emphasis on Career-level school for Army captains include “the fundamentals of joint war- self-development. The curriculum includes and Navy lieutenants (O3 level) in each fare, JTF organization and the combatant common core subjects, branch-specific of the Services is another opportunity to command structure, the characteristics of tactical and technical instruction, and instill the efficacy of joint warfighting. a joint campaign, how national and joint branch-immaterial staff officer training.4 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of systems support tactical-level operations, Staff Instruction on Officer Professional and the capabilities of the relevant sys- Note that a focus on education in the Military Education defines this level tems of the other services.”3 synergistic employment of joint capa- of schooling as “primary education.” A quick survey of the mission bilities is missing in action in the above While these schools focus on “preparing statements of the primary education insti- definition. junior officers to serve in their assigned tutions of each of the Services, however, Moving to the Air Force, the branch, warfare, or staff specialty,” the shows a less-than-enthusiastic embrace of Squadron Officer School’s stated purpose
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Cunningham et al. 45 Marine assigned to 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit coordinates landing of MV-22 Osprey on San Clemente Island, California, September 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Alvin Pujols) is to “educate, motivate, and men- the exchange of practical experiences, schools that are only three weeks in length. tor captains as current and future Air and reinforced with extensive practi- More joint familiarization is good, and the Force leaders.”5 But as with the Army, cal application and numerous planning younger in a career it occurs [the] better. there is no mention of joint leaders. exercises.”8 In just one example of Navy Joint is how we fight now.10 Furthermore, the school aims to have primary education, the Surface Warfare “officers step out of their specialties and Officers School’s stated mission is “to broaden their focus on essential leader- provide a continuum of professional edu- Vision for Joint Officer ship competencies . . . in Officership, cation and training in support of Surface Development Leadership, Problem Solving, Core Navy requirements that prepares officers The Chairman’s Vision for Joint Officer Values, and the Air Force as an institution and enlisted engineers to serve at sea.”9 Development lays out a structure for in the profession of arms.”6 According to As these examples show, all of the a joint learning continuum with four the written goals of the school, “educated Services’ junior officer–level courses pillars: joint individual training (JIT), students will value their unique role as have gaps in following the Chairman’s joint professional military education Air Force officers by applying airpower guidance and are missing opportunities (JPME), joint experience, and self- leadership to effectively execute military to create the next generation of warfight- development.11 The Army has built missions, and valuing the warrior-leader ers who think jointly. General Anthony on this guidance with its Army Leader ethos and its impact on airpower develop- Zinni, USMC (Ret.), the former com- Development Strategy (ALDS), which ment.”7 Again, as in the case of the Army, mander of U.S. Central Command and a frames this process into three domains: there is no reference in the Air Force defi- well-respected authority on joint educa- institutional (the Service schoolhouses nition to developing an understanding of tion, agrees. As he stated in an interview and their professional military educa- joint capabilities. in 2014: tion); operational (the experiences The Marine Corps and Navy schools gathered while operating as a member have similarly stated Service-exclusive We need to push joint education to lower of military organizations and units); and goals: “The Expeditionary Warfare and lower ranks. In my day, we only got it self-development.12 These domains are School challenges students to think criti- at the war colleges; now it is at the major’s similar to the Joint Officer Develop- cally as Marine Air Ground Task Force schools. We need to get it to the captain’s ment categories when JIT and JPME officers by providing them with a firm schools—in Expeditionary Warfare School. are viewed as subsets of the institutional doctrinal foundation, augmented with Also, we do more of it at “touch point” domain. ALDS provides a useful frame-
46 JPME Today / Sustaining the “New Norm” of Jointness JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 work to address proposed changes to focus must be placed on ensuring that Notes junior- and company-grade officer pro- joint operational exercises are the norm fessional development. rather than the exception. The increased 1 Martin E. Dempsey, “Joint Education From an institutional standpoint, the capability of live, virtual, and constructive White Paper,” July 16, 2012, 3, available at career-level Service schools should con- exercise frameworks can provide excellent
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Cunningham et al. 47 Pilots from 80th Flying Training Wing’s Euro- NATO Joint Jet Pilot training program prepare to take off at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, October 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Danny Webb)
The Future of Senior Service College Education Heed the Clarion Call
By Charles D. Allen and Edward J. Filiberti
n 2014, Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) This article continues the discourse on to become an integral part of our helped stimulate professional dia- JPME policy issues. Although initially military culture. Applying the U.S. I logue on joint professional military directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Army leader development framework, education (JPME) by establishing a Department of Defense Reorganiza- the three pillars of joint training, joint new section titled “JPME Today.” tion Act of 1986, jointness has grown work experiences, and JPME all served to reinforce competencies and helped acculturate jointness within a hereto- fore Service-centric military. Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA (Ret.), is Associate Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies at The current strategic environment the U.S. Army War College. Colonel Edward J. Filiberti, USA (Ret.), is Associate Professor of Force Management Studies in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. has aided this transition. Unified opera- Army War College. tions during the war on terror have been
48 JPME Today / The Future of Senior Service College Education JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 inherently joint with officers gaining on overseas deployments resulted in published their academic campaign plan invaluable experience with assignments routine deferrals from required profes- in JFQ.4 Both sought to reinforce the in joint, interagency, and headquarters sional military education (PME).2 This relevancy of their institutions to national and organizations. Focused joint training led to a backlog of SLC deferrals where defense. Reforms at the Army War programs also helped prepare leaders and a good portion of those affected stu- College also focused on faculty creden- developed their competency in tactical dents would still greatly benefit from tialing along with the development and and functional tasks. Notwithstanding, SLC education. The withdrawal from delivery of a curriculum that addressed as historian Richard Kohn notes, “The Iraq and Afghanistan and correspond- concerns about the rigor of senior PME. practice of the profession is almost wholly ing drawdown of forces, however, may Although these are important measures new to an officer at each successive level lead to some misguided policy decisions to improve the educational programs of of responsibility.”1 So while joint tacti- that fail to capitalize on current SLC the SLC, none of these efforts addresses cal wartime experiences can serve as a throughput to address the backlog as the important opportunity of increasing springboard for continued development, well as expand the base of educated the proportion of SLC graduates within at the most senior levels—operational and senior officers to meet future military the post-drawdown senior officer popula- strategic—attaining these new competen- expansion requirements. tion by maintaining current throughput. cies for our maturing warfighters will Historically, as the military draws A key question to address for this continue to depend on education. down, there has been an institutional drawdown remains: Is a reduction in the Importantly, senior level colleges compulsion to proportionally reduce number of educated senior officers and (SLC) provide the key educational venue attendance at senior PME programs. civilians that is proportionate with force for this development of critical compe- With the current competition for fiscal cutbacks prudent for the joint force? This tencies required at higher levels. While resources, the tendency is to equivalently is an important question to address given senior fellowships are an important part reduce or “salami slice” all institutions the frequently stated imperative to invest of broadening the perspectives of senior and activities. For example, a 20 percent in leader development and education officers, for most officers, the required cut in end-strength could be applied during periods of military drawdown. foundational knowledge is gained across the board to institutional and func- Historical examples often cite the inter- through attendance at resident and dis- tional organizations. That would translate war period between World War I and II, tance education programs of the senior to a 20 percent cut in staffing of PME the resumption of senior military officer Service colleges. As the U.S. military schools and, consequentially by design, education with the start of the Korean restructures to meet Title 10 manning, a 20 percent reduction in the number of War, and the re-professionalization of the training, and equipping demands as well officers educated within those programs. force following the Vietnam War. as to provide warfighting capabilities to An unstated objective may be to return the joint force, tensions reemerge about to pre–war on terror levels for student Realities of the Strategic where to invest resources, especially dur- populations. Environment ing times of fiscal austerity. The purpose In fact, the current drawdown has The contemporary operational and of this article is to examine the changed already driven proportional reductions in strategic environments are no less context for leader development and pro- manning and resourcing at PME institu- unstable or uncertain than those his- pose several initiatives to posture the U.S. tions. The Army reduced faculty positions torical examples and are likely to pose military for future expansion and success for intermediate level education at the similar or arguably even greater leader in the post-drawdown strategic environ- Command and General Staff College education challenges for the joint ment. The most important proposal is to and Army War College. Commensurate force. As the Service with the largest maintain current student throughput— with the 29 percent budget cuts over manpower authorizations (nearly 1.5 and the associated faculty resources—at recent years at National Defense million strong when counting Active, the senior level. This article primarily University (NDU) (which includes the Reserve, and civilian components), focuses on Army senior officer education, National War College and the Dwight D. developing adequate numbers of Army but the arguments could be generalized Eisenhower School for National Security senior leaders while drawing down may to the joint force. and Resource Strategy) is the reduction be the sine qua non for responding to of student selections and throughput.3 future expansion requirements. With The Challenge to PME For academic year 2015, National War fewer senior officers on hand, those While providing an important experi- College student enrollment dropped we retain must be the best that we can ence base for joint officer develop- from 224 to 208—just over 9 percent. make them. ment, the war on terror and associated In response to both critics and cham- While the 2012 Defense Strategic operational demands emphasized pions of PME, NDU unveiled “Break Guidance (DSG) directed a rebalance to in-theater warfighting service and indi- Out” as its campaign strategy for the the Asia-Pacific region, the strategic en- rectly diminished the perceived value education of senior leaders at the same vironment continues to reveal challenges of school attendance. The emphasis time as the Army War College leaders elsewhere. As Yogi Berra once stated,
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Allen and Filiberti 49 “The future ain’t what it used to be.” A range of policies that assure nearly every specific positions on manning authoriza- corollary might be that with the increas- available officer will be rotated into key tion documents that require MEL 1 to ingly volatile environment, “It never and essential positions. For instance, support successful individual leader and will be.” Just in the past year, emerging Congress established laws and DOD organizational performance. Given a crises in Ukraine with Russia and the promulgated policies placing limits on specific number of positions, the Army Middle East and the Levant as well as the deployment-to-dwell ratios for both units personnel management system could Ebola emergency response in West Africa and individuals.6 These measures require then select the requisite number of of- demonstrated that the Army is expected the tracking and reporting of deploy- ficers (by grade and specialty) to attend and required to respond with its existing ments and set thresholds that require the SLC venues and then distribute those forces across a wide range of mission sets. Service secretaries’ or the Secretary of the officers to the force to fill those billets. Such operations call for adaptive, strategic Defense’s approval to exceed. This will This method would seem to be the pre- leaders who have talented and expert limit the repeated use of selectively edu- ferred way for the Army to do business, senior officers in command and on their cated senior officers. identifying requirements and then filling staffs. Importantly, the DSG recognizes The Army’s present challenge is to them. It has been discussed often but “our inability to predict the future” and meet drawdown requirements for an end- never implemented due to the constraints directs that the Department of Defense strength of 450,000 Soldiers by fiscal year it would place on the personnel manage- (DOD) “will manage the force in ways 2018. With the all-too-real prospects of a ment system. that protect its ability to regenerate ca- second sequestration, this drawdown may While designating certain billets pabilities that might be needed to meet be continued to reach 420,000 under the as MEL 1 may be reassuring to the future, unforeseen demands, maintain- provisions of the Budget Control Act of Army bureaucracy, it ignores or at least ing intellectual capital and rank structure 2011.7 The nightmare scenario for the downplays the broader purpose: The that could be called upon to expand key Army includes the prospect of reducing development of the requisite Army lead- elements of the force” (emphasis added).5 Active Component (AC) end-strength to ers and institutionalizing the flexibility 380,000 or lower depending upon com- demanded by emerging requirements Provide Capability and Capacity peting budget pressures driven by the and the likely expansion of the force. We Despite the pressures to reduce defense U.S. economic and political climates. cannot afford a management approach spending, the U.S. military will still be that breaks down when faced with real- called on to employ its available capa- Senior Education Requirements world requirements and inevitable crises. bilities based upon the operational and In an Army based on detailed force The Army Leader Development Strategy strategic demands of an increasingly planning and documented require- (ALDS) sets the goal of providing “the unstable global environment. Given ments, it seems implausible that the right officer with the right education persistent conflict and reduced force Service does not have explicit require- at the right time.”9 We believe the goal structure because of political and fiscal ments for senior officer education or a should be more explicit for senior lead- realities, the joint force will require plan to distribute the valuable JMPE ers—to develop the greatest number of high the repetitive assignment and rota- graduates and their intellectual capital potential officers in order to provide the tion of its field-grade and most senior to key and essential positions within Army with the pool of talented, educated military officers into key strategic level the force. It does have a policy for officers to act as strategic leaders and senior headquarters and organizations. Thus, officer development that addresses advisors through MEL 1/SLC experience. the joint force will need talented and senior Service college education for These officers have a greater likelihood of educated leaders and managers from command and staff positions requiring being promoted and selected for service the Services to provide the capacity “a thorough knowledge of strategy and at the O6 grade and beyond. Realistically, to fulfill rotational assignments that the art and science of developing and they will likely have multiple assignments persistent conflict demands. Mission using instruments of national power . . during the remainder of their careers, success will be dependent on expert . during peace and war. This knowledge with one or more postings requiring SLC knowledge, judgment, and strategic is necessary in order to perform Army, education. leadership competencies of experienced Joint, or Defense Agency operations at There are impediments, however. In and appropriately educated leaders. the strategic level.”8 Within DOD, this large measure, the Army is dealing with Accordingly, mid- and senior-grade offi- is Military Education Level 1 (MEL an artifact of the war on terror, which cers will assume a host of new key and 1) for selected successful lieutenant placed a premium on service in key posi- essential positions as additional joint colonels and colonels at the respec- tions within the deployed operational headquarters and staffs are established tive grades of O5 and O6. Civilians in force over JPME attendance. This led to or augmented to deal with a wide range the GS-14 and GS-15 grades are also a culture of deferral for PME where being of emerging operational demands. offered MEL 1 opportunities. selected was more important than attend- Accordingly, the years of persistent One method of identifying SLC ing SLC. Members of the profession of conflict have also institutionalized a attendance requirements is to identify arms in the AC and Active Competitive
50 JPME Today / The Future of Senior Service College Education JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Members of 366th Fighter Wing train alongside Army and Marine Corps affiliates during capstone training event, November 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Roy Lynch)
Categories (ACC) watched and learned well as additional scrutiny of deferments Program. ACC officers occupied 390 that it was possible to succeed without by elevating the approval authority. In of the 527 seats in the resident and PME attendance. Concomitantly, the November 2014, Air Force Chief of Staff 61 seats in the fellowship programs, Army culture shifted over the past decade General Mark Welsh also directed a rebal- as well as 60 of the 419 seats in the of war to one that generally dismissed ancing of PME within his Service: “to be distance program. Under current education in the face of demands for promoted to colonel, lieutenant colonels Army processes, the number of officers training and operational experience. The must have finished senior developmental selected for senior-level education opportunity now exists to reset such “be- education at Air War College, or an depends largely on the capacity at the liefs and expected behaviors” with the AC equivalent [MEL 1] program.”10 various colleges and in the fellowship and ACC officers. While the number of operational program—not on validated educational The key to attaining the ALDS goal deferments has been greatly reduced, the requirements for specific billets in the is to embed PME attendance into the Army still needs a few years to recover operating and generating forces. culture of the Army where being MEL from the shift in priorities that reduced Previous studies by the Department 1 credentialed is what successful profes- educational attendance for more than a of the Army examined O5 and O6 posi- sionals strive to achieve and how they decade during the Operation Enduring tions and determined that approximately obtain those key billets. This is now the Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom 75 percent of O6 positions required case within the Reserve Component conflicts—hence the need for a second MEL 1. A 2012 Army-funded RAND (as evidenced by sustained demand for “clarion call.”11 study was unsuccessful in explicitly Distance Education Program attendance) identifying MEL 1 requirements across and within some Special Branches (with The Army Case Army organizations.12 Although the requests for increased number of MEL 1 For the 2014 academic year, 946 seats Army seeks and values MEL 1 graduates, slots). were available for Army officers in the RAND found no consistent rationale The greatest redress to this war on Active and Reserve components. Of to validate MEL 1 assignment require- terror cultural artifact has been Army these, 527 seats were in the Resident ments. The RAND study confirmed Chief of Staff guidance that requires Education Program and the Army the conclusion of prior studies that at- MEL 1 completion prior to assuming War College Fellowship Program; 419 tendance is dictated principally from the command or assignment to key billets as seats were in the Distance Education capacity of MEL 1 institutions. Even
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Allen and Filiberti 51 of this increased demand can be exten- sive. For instance, during the start of the war on terror, the number of Army O5 and O6 positions to support DOD, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, joint, and special operations force activi- ties grew by over 500. This demand equates to around 5.5 percent of the projected total O6/O5 AC population in fiscal year 2018 and almost 4 percent across all (Active and Reserve) compo- nent O6/O5 populations. Maintaining the current throughput of Army officers across all SLC venues would increase the percentage of O6 MEL 1–qualified officers from approxi- mately 74 to around 78. Importantly, the proportion of MEL 1 ACC O6s would increase from about 77 percent to 89 percent, significantly adding to Students from National Defense University listen to brief in combat direction center aboard USS Shiloh in Yokosuka, Japan, October 2014 (U.S. Navy/Liam Kennedy) the quality of the bench of the smaller pool of officers. We have also seen the during the “Grow the Army” initiative to those MEL 1 positions are currently not number of deferments decline due to support the surge of units for Enduring coded, and it also leaves the “bench” the reduction in operations tempo and Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the number empty for when the MEL 1 positions are policy decisions by Army senior leaders. of seats for uniformed officers remained invariably expanded during periods of Consequently, SLC attendance should steady. Paradoxically, during those years war. occur earlier in an officer’s career—im- the Army War College was permitted The projected reduction of Army mediately following successful O5-level to expand its capacity by adding four force structure decreases the AC from command or equivalent. Combined seminars to accommodate an increase in 569,000 to 490,000 for fiscal year 2016 with sustained throughput, this would International Fellows (IFs) (from 40 to with much smaller reductions in the increase the proportion of Army O6 80) attending the Resident Education Reserve (1,000) and National Guard MEL 1 ACC graduates in the force to 90 Program. The other attendance numbers (8,000). The Department of the Army percent or more. Importantly, this would stayed fairly constant with some wide G1 projects that the operating strength increase the proportion of Army MEL 1 swings in Reserve Component atten- of ACC O6s will be reduced by 11.2 per- graduates across the Active and Reserve dance based upon approved AC deferrals. cent and ACC O5s by 14.2 percent—a components to more than 80 percent of For fiscal years 2012–2015, approxi- combined reduction of 12.5 percent by serving O6s. mately 74 percent of Active and Reserve 2018. A salami-slice reduction in Army component O6 officers have completed War College capacity proportional to the Implications or will complete MEL 1. Of particular end-strength reduction would reduce In 2004, Defense Secretary Donald interest, 77 percent of currently serving ACC students by 12.5 percent (167 to Rumsfeld notoriously remarked that ACC O6s are MEL 1 qualified or are 146 officers). To meet JPME seminar “you go to war with the Army you have, attending a MEL 1–producing venue. composition requirements, there would not the Army you might want or wish These percentages approximate the pro- be a corresponding reduction in the to have.”13 While he was severely criti- portion of billets (75 percent) previously number of IF, civilian, and other Service cized for what was interpreted as a flip- found to require MEL 1 education. What attendees for the Resident Education pant response to a Soldier’s issue with the 74 percent of the total O6 popula- Program. Humvee armor protection, it brings to tion qualified as MEL 1 compared to light a force management truism. The the approximate 75 percent of positions A Strategic Choice military must respond to crises with requiring that level of education does not A stated goal of the Army Chief of what we have and, at the senior level, account for is that MEL 1 graduates will Staff is to increase the quality of the with those whom we have. For most generally serve in two to three different officer corps to meet the demands of an projected contingencies, there will senior leader positions before retiring. increasingly complex strategic and oper- likely be limited time to train, educate, This makes management of MEL 1 of- ational environment and to enable the and gain the senior leader experience ficers problematic, especially given that rapid expansion of the Army. The scope necessary to fill key positions compe-
52 JPME Today / The Future of Senior Service College Education JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 tently. Senior leaders are not grown or recently reinstated. This represents an ening PME at the Senior Level: The Case of the U.S. Army War College,” Joint Force Quar- educated overnight. And at the strategic important institutional commitment terly 74 (3rd Quarter 2014), 50–57. level, pedestrian performances can have to resourcing senior leader education. 5 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priori- profound negative consequences. To However, in the current era of competi- ties for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: expand positions at these high levels, we tion for diminishing resources—in this Department of Defense, 2012). must rely on the bench, and the bench case enabled by funding—future calls for 6 10 U.S. Code § 991, “Management of Deployments of Members and Measurement must be as talented as possible. There is “fair-share cuts” could inevitably result in and Data Collection of Unit Operating and a range of relatively low-cost initiatives another round of salami-slice reductions Personnel Tempo,” 2011; and Acting Under that can help build the bench. across the force. We should be reminded Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readi- Reestablishing an appropriate balance that essential elements of strategic leader- ness Memorandum, “Deployment-to-Dwell, of education with operational experience ship are enabling the future success of Mobilization-to-Dwell Policy Revision,” November 1, 2013. and training, especially for senior officers, an organization and setting priorities to 7 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub.L. requires demonstration of its value to the do so. Continuing to prioritize SLC at 112–25, S. 365, 112th Cong. (Washington, profession of arms. First, selection and the current throughput of around 950 DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August attendance at SLC must be the norm senior Army officers accomplishes both 2, 2011). for high-potential lieutenant colonels. of those strategic imperatives. This will 8 Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Develop- Second, the officer leader development achieve an overall goal of 80 percent ment and Career Management (Washington, policy has to establish time in officer MEL 1–qualified colonels from all DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, career paths to include SLC attendance. components and a specified goal of 90 November 1, 1998), 29. Third, completion of SLC programs must percent for ACC colonels. 9 A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st be viewed as institutional/professional Century Army (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, November 25, 2009). certification for command and key billet Since JPME policies dictate an in- 10 Stephen Losey, “New Education Rules assignments. Finally, while education may terconnectivity across all SLC venues for Air Force Officers Begin Dec. 1,”Air enable the individual’s contribution to or- to meet minimum Service and inter- Force Times, November 7, 2014, available at ganizational missions, duty performance agency mix requirements, we believe
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Allen and Filiberti 53 Newly commissioned Navy ensigns and Marine Corps 2nd lieutenants from 2011 U.S. Naval Academy class celebrate graduation with traditional hat toss at Navy–Marine Corps Memorial Stadium (U.S. Navy/Kevin S. O’Brien)
Officers Are Less Intelligent What Does It Mean?
By Matthew F. Cancian
An online degree from the South Harmon Institute of Technology in Interdisciplinary Studies doesn’t make you smart.
—A Sarcastic Captain
he American military is not Information Act request, the intel- getting the leaders it needs for ligence of new Marine Corps officers T the complexities of 21st-century has declined steadily since 1980. Two- warfare. This refrain has been a cen- thirds of the new officers commis- Matthew F. Cancian, USMC (Ret.), served as terpiece of the “Force for the Future” sioned in 2014 would be in the bottom an Artillery Officer from 2009 to 2013. He is initiative, and now there is some hard one-third of the class of 1980; 41 currently a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Candidate in the Fletcher School of Law and evidence to support it. According percent of new officers in 2014 would Diplomacy at Tufts University. to data obtained from a Freedom of not have qualified to be officers by the
54 JPME Today / Officers Are Less Intelligent JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 standards held at the time of World Figure 1. General Classification Test and College Participation War II. Similarly, at the top of the College Participation Rate Axis Is Inverted Scale distribution, there are fewer of the very 132 18 intelligent officers who will eventually become senior leaders. This trend has not been caused by 130 20 Marine Corps policies; it is a reflection of the expansion of higher education in 128 22 America. In 1980, 18.6 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds were in college. Today, that number is close to 30 percent. The 126 24 dramatic rise in college attendance has GCT Annual Average increased the pool of people eligible to 124 26 become officers in the military (posses- sion of a bachelor’s degree being one of 28 the chief requirements to be commis- 122 College Participation Rate (Inverted Scale) sioned as an officer in all branches), but 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 it also means that possession of a college degree is a less significant indicator of in- GCT Annual Average College Participation Rate 1 telligence now than it once was. Marine College participation rate is lagged 4-year moving average Corps officers have reflected this trend, declining in average intelligence along with the population of college graduates How Higher Education in 1980. The private sector and civilian (see figure 1). Has Changed agencies of government have responded A similar decline in intelligence has The percentage of young Americans by demanding a postgraduate education likely occurred in the other Services’ of- in college was relatively steady during for more jobs, but a comparable shift ficer corps, as this is a trend in the pool the 1960s and 1970s, but this started has not been made in the military. The of all college graduates and not some- to change in the early 1980s. Over result of this effect is that the pool of thing specific to the Marine Corps. For the next three decades, the percent- potential officer candidates has become example, the average Scholastic Aptitude age of young Americans in college less intelligent. Test (SAT) score of a Navy Reserve increased by over 50 percent—not just Officer Training Corps graduate in 2014 the number of Americans, but their Why It Matters was the same as that of a new Marine share of the population. Contrary to The link between intelligence and officer.2 In the Army, the test scores of the assumptions of many, students in performance in the enlisted ranks has previously enlisted officer candidates have 1980 were not accepted into college been well studied and found to be quite been declining since at least the mid- just because they came from a privileged significant. In World War II, individuals 1990s (although the Army attributes this background, but rather because of their who tested in the lowest mental cat- decline to changes in accession sources, intelligence; in fact, over 80 percent of egories (IV and V) had to be sent to unlike this article, which views the issue Americans in the top quartile of intel- special training units before they could as more broadly based).3 This article fo- ligence went to college.5 Before World go to boot camp. Now, by law, no more cuses on the Marine Corps because it has War II, college attendance was based than 20 percent of any given year’s administered the same test, the General almost entirely on social status, but it enlistees may be Mental Category IV Classification Test (GCT), for decades had shifted toward merit with the intro- (the second lowest category), and they and because of its responsiveness to the duction of the GI Bill and other factors. must possess a high school diploma. Freedom of Information Act process.4 There were some people in 1980 who No Category Vs are allowed to enlist.6 More study is needed to ascertain the were intelligent but could not afford The aggressive recruiting of intelligent degree to which this phenomenon pres- to go to college, and there still are in enlistees makes sense given the link ents across the Department of Defense. 2016. But overall, the expansion in between intelligence and enlisted job A good first step would be to administer college attendance since 1980 has been performance; studies show that more the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude from students who are less intelligent intelligent enlistees are more proficient Battery (ASVAB) to all officer candidates on average than college students in at technical skills, make more lethal in all Services, study what makes an ef- 1980. This means that young people riflemen, and are more law abiding.7 fective officer, and implement long-term who possess a college degree in 2016 The most holistic studies are found in reforms to strengthen the officer corps of are, on average, less intelligent than the congressionally mandated Job Per- the 21st century. those who possessed a college degree formance Measurement project, a series
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Cancian 55 Marine supervises The Basic School permanent personnel battalion during 10-mile hike aboard west side of Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, June 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Cuong Le) of broad, multimillion-dollar studies Marine officer candidates was 120).11 grade at TBS and a 0.65 correlation assessing how accurately intelligence The GCT score was found to be highly with total grade there.12 This means that tests could predict on-the-job success correlated with success there. In fact, it GCT scores have a 0.6 correlation with for enlisted members in the military.8 was so important that it was administered nonacademic events. It is likely, therefore, The Army’s “Project A” was conducted to all officers again at the beginning of that not only does the GCT correlate in the 1980s as an extension of this infantry school to ensure that they were strongly with academic ability, but that it effort.9 The results are unambiguous: competent enough to be suitable combat also correlates to leadership grade at TBS. intelligence testing provides an excellent leaders. Additionally, there was much de- No pen and paper test can exactly predict way to predict the job performance of bate about whether 110 was a sufficient leadership; these results, however, indi- enlistees. But what about officers? minimum score, as most of the failures cate that there is a relationship between The link between intelligence and at Army OCS were by candidates who GCT scores and the leadership potential performance in officers, while less thor- scored between 110 and 115. of young officers. oughly studied than the link in enlisted, is Scores on the GCT have been found It is impossible to link particular still clear. In World War II, there was no to be highly indicative of performance at episodes in recent history to a decline in requirement that an officer have a college The Basic School (TBS), the 6-month- intelligence in the officer corps. However, education, but possessing a 4-year degree long initial training for Marine officers. one can point to incidents and note allowed one to be commissioned with- New officers at TBS are graded on a that they are what one would expect to out taking the GCT. Without a college mix of military skills (such as running an see and that will be seen more often if degree, enlistees in the Army who scored obstacle course or orienteering), leader- current trends continue. For example, above 110 on the GCT were considered ship evaluations (made by staff members in May 2010, 13 junior Marine Corps for Officer Candidate School (OCS),10 and peers), and academics (technical officers were administratively discharged which was used to train and screen po- knowledge). The GCT score was found because they had cheated on a land tential officers (the minimum score for to have a 0.75 correlation with academic navigation course at TBS. According to
56 JPME Today / Officers Are Less Intelligent JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 the Marine Corps Times, “At least one of Figure 2. GCT Score Kernel Distributions, 1980 and 2014 the lieutenants investigated told officials he didn’t understand the need to learn .04 land navigation skills when technology, such as GPS [global positioning system], could do the work for them.”13 This .03 incident is indicative of what we could expect from an officer corps of declining intelligence: officers who cannot meet the .02 standards and who rely on technology to compensate. In a different Service, we might point to the 79 Air Force nuclear .01 weapons officers at one base who faced disciplinary action for cheating on an exam. 0 In the field, the decline in intelli- gence might manifest itself in a focus on 80 100 120 140 160 adherence to process output instead of achieving a desired outcome. Less intel- GCT Score ligent officers need metrics that focus on 1980 2014 how well they execute a process (output), rather than whether they accomplished the commander’s mission (outcome). In Defense for Personnel and Readiness, on our mid- and upper-level leaders. The Afghanistan, many of the metrics focused Brad Carson, in presenting his “Force Roman Legions did not employ artillery, on output instead of outcome: “shuras of the Future” initiative, asked, “Are we tanks, communications, or any number held versus local goodwill, number of choosing from too narrow a pool our of technical branches that we have today. partnered operations rather than real re- next Navy Admiral James Stavridis, Air Consider the job of the contemporary lationships built outside the wire, dollars Force General Norton Schwartz, or Army infantry platoon commander, the least spent versus actual popular commitment, Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster?” technical, most leadership-intensive posi- IEDs [improvised explosive devices] The evidence suggests yes. tion. In a conventional war, he must be found versus demonstrated local security a physically fit leader, but he must also forces readiness.”14 The result was a cam- A Modest Proposal know how to program a radio, accurately paign that was less effective than it might Some might argue that junior officers locate targets for airstrikes and artillery, have been. only need leadership and physical and calculate geometries of fire, among The decline in average intelligence fitness. If so, we already have a cadre many other intellectual demands. In manifests itself not just in the middle who fit that bill: our staff noncommis- an unconventional conflict, we also ask of the distribution, but also at the top. sioned officers (SNCOs). Why not have him to be a cultural expert, government Figure 2 shows the distribution of intel- them lead our platoons, companies, builder, and humanitarian aid planner. ligence scores for 1980 and 2014. Note and battalions? While many might This requires a high degree of intel- how not only the average has declined, dismiss this idea outright, in the long ligence. While contemporary enlistees but also the number of officers who are view of history, it has been done before are on average the brightest they have achieving the highest scores. by successful armies. Take the Roman ever been, there is a wide variance in their There has been a lot of writing about Legions, for instance, whose centurions quality that makes the “Roman solution” how to promote “strategic” or “critical” rose through the ranks to lead all units ill advised today. thinking in the military.15 The story told up to the cohorts (battalion equiva- Physical fitness does not have the by GCT scores is especially worrisome lents). Thus, centurions, proven enlisted correlation to military performance that in this regard. In 1980, there were 14 leaders, held responsibility equivalent general intelligence does. In an initial Marine officers entering who scored to that of a lieutenant colonel. A small statement to the Marine Corps Times above 155 (on a test with a maximum group of educated aristocrats was regarding this new data, Marine Corps score of 160). In 2004, the year of in- needed only for the highest ranks.16 Recruiting Command repeated a com- coming officers who are now recently That functioned very well—2,000 years mon rebuttal to these findings: new promoted majors, there were only two ago. While the nature of warfare has not Marine officers are the most physically fit lieutenants who scored above 155. In changed, its practice certainly has. that they have ever been, achieving an av- 2014, there were none. The Acting The complex nature of contemporary erage physical fitness test score of 279.17 Principal Deputy Under Secretary of warfare puts great intellectual demands Our military leaders, however, need to
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Cancian 57 be more than just tough. While physical drifting in a way that made questions Why Are the SAT and fitness is probably well correlated to suc- from 1941 less clear to test-takers. As GPA Insufficient? cess in some military skills events, such this does not make much sense, we can In selecting candidates for OCS, the as the endurance course, it does not have reject this theory. Services have relied on possession of the strong correlation to total TBS grade Another objection is that poor re- a college degree, grade point average that intelligence does (0.65). There are cord-keeping for GCT scores invalidates (GPA), and SAT score to judge the numerous studies correlating intelligence any conclusions drawn from test scores. candidates’ intellectual abilities.22 As to success in the military; there are none It is true that the number of scores in discussed earlier, the primary qualifica- doing the same for physical fitness. the data set represents about 85 percent tion for officership, possession of a Finally, most members of the military of all the officers who joined the Marine college degree, is not as discriminating would argue that having distance between Corps during this time period. Having as it used to be. SAT scores and GPAs commissioned officers and the enlisted 85 percent of the scores, however, still are also unsatisfactory. The problems is necessary for military effectiveness; the enables us to be extremely certain of the of relying on GPA, a rather slippery decline of officer intelligence and the result; we can be 99 percent confident metric, were noted by John Jordan in rise in enlisted intelligence has blurred that the difference between the mean an article in the Marine Corps Gazette.23 these lines. Given that the intelligence of score in 2010 and 1980 is between 7.58 GPA varies greatly by school, and entering enlisted has risen over time, and and 8.42 points. Either way, the decline is grading standards have eased over time that more intelligent enlisted tend to be substantial. The only other way that miss- with rampant grade inflation.24 A GPA promoted, it is not unreasonable to guess ing records could affect the data is if high of 4.0 from a community college might that right now the average intelligence of test scores were systematically removed not indicate that one candidate is more SNCOs is close to that of our junior of- starting in 1983 and removed in increas- intelligent than another with a GPA of ficers.18 If officers are much like the troops ing numbers every year for the last 35 3.0 from an Ivy League school. The they command, why have an officer corps years. This is unlikely. Services have tried to compensate for at all? Raising average officer intelligence A final question is whether the GCT this effect, but with mixed success. is necessary to maintain the utility and results are still valid given that the GCT There is good reason to doubt the credibility of the officer corps. no longer serves any administrative year-to-year comparability of the SAT: purpose. While the GCT was used in it seems incredible to claim that, since Possible Objections to the GCT World War II to screen enlistees and of- 1990, the number of Americans in col- One objection to using the GCT to ficer candidates, after the war it shifted to lege increased by over 50 percent, and track intelligence is that the test is influence only the Military Occupational the number taking the SAT has increased 75 years old and therefore contains a Specialty (MOS) assignment of officers. by 66 percent, but there has been no “cultural distance” that makes it invalid At some unknown point, this function change in average SAT score.25 America’s today. In this view, the vocabulary and too was lost. Today, the GCT is only inability to detect the decline in intel- phrasing of the questions would be administered to “indicate the general ligence of college graduates is similar to clearer to someone from 1941 than to health of the officer corps.”21 Change why the Flynn effect, the rise in intel- someone from 2015; the test-taker from in motivations, however, cannot explain ligence in the Western world over the 20th 2015, therefore, might score lower the smooth downward trend that we century, was not noticed until the 1980s than someone of the same intelligence see. If the change in the use of the GCT when James Flynn compared the scores from 1941. This is similar to the argu- in determining MOS was made before of unnormalized IQ tests between years ment that the SAT is biased against 1980, the data would not be affected. (just like the study of GCT score does). non-whites because it contains cultural If its use was changed during the time In fact, some of the strongest evidence references that only white test-takers period studied and that change had a for the Flynn effect comes from the re- would understand.19 The dynamics of large impact, we would expect to see a sults of military intelligence tests; using the decline in the GCT score, however, large drop in scores during the year that the GCT to inform our understanding of disprove the applicability of this theory. the use of the GCT was changed. For civilian trends, therefore, is very much in In 1980, the average GCT score of motivation to have caused this trend, keeping with psychometric literature.26 Marine officers was 131, slightly higher lieutenants at TBS would have to have The SAT can, however, tell us how than the average GCT score for college become 0.5 percent less motivated about incoming military officers compare to students during World War II.20 The this test every year for the last 35 years. the average college-bound high school score began slowly and steadily declin- This defies belief. Anecdotally, I can also student in any given year. In 2014, the ing in the early 1980s. For the cultural state that young lieutenants at TBS still average SAT score of incoming Marine distance theory to be true, there has to took the GCT seriously in 2009. It is officers was 1198, compared to an aver- have been no cultural distance between hard to find a group of young men and age of 1010 for college-bound high 1941 and 1983, at which point Ameri- women as earnest and eager to excel as school seniors.27 The average SAT score can culture began slowly and steadily young Marine lieutenants. of incoming Marine officers was not
58 JPME Today / Officers Are Less Intelligent JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Drill instructor with New Jersey Army National Guard corrects Albanian officer candidate during 12-week Officer Candidate School program modeled after Active-duty program at Fort Benning, Georgia (DOD/Mark C. Olsen)
maintained by Marine Corps Recruiting Servicemember was in the 80th percentile administered to potential enlistees. It Command before 2005,28 but the of physical fitness of all Americans (to should also be administered to all officer Center for Naval Analyses reported the use an arbitrary number). In 2014, the candidates; this solution is a low-cost and average SAT score of incoming Marine average Servicemember was still in the simple way to measure the intelligence of officers in 1983 to be similarly higher 80th percentile of all Americans, but the all officer candidates on a scale that can than their nonmilitary peers.29 Marine average physical fitness of Americans had be controlled by the military and easily Corps officers therefore continue to be declined dramatically because of obesity. compared to enlistees. With 1 year of more intelligent than the average college Being in the 80th percentile is now not as ASVAB scores for all officers, the Services student. The average college student rigorous as it was in 1980. The average would have a good data set to analyze today, however, is much less intelligent Servicemember from 1980 would run and determine follow-on policy. than they used to be because there are so faster and be stronger than the average Incorporate ASVAB Scores into many more of them. Insofar as we believe Servicemember of today, despite them Accession Decisions. The Army cur- that the military should reflect society in both being in the 80th percentile of their rently administers the ASVAB to officer general, the officer corps continues to ac- peers. This absolute, not relative, decline candidates who go through OCS, and complish that goal. But in absolute terms, is true for intelligence, too. they have established a minimum score our officer corps today is less intelligent of 110. Applying a similar policy to can- than it was 35 years ago. What Is to Be Done? didates in all Services, therefore, is not a Consider if the military’s physical How should we react to the results of radical departure from the past. Simply fitness testing did not give out absolute the General Classification Test? cutting a number of the least intelligent scores (which the current Physical Fitness Administer the ASVAB to Every candidates, however, is not a solution in Test and GCT do) but rather just re- Officer Candidate. Officer candidates itself; to make the average of 2014 equal ported how the Servicemember stacked are almost all screened at a Military to the average of 1980, the Marine Corps up against the average American (like Entrance Processing Station prior to would have to cut the bottom 57.4 per- the SAT). Say that in 1980, the average joining the force. There, the ASVAB is cent of second lieutenants. A minimum
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Cancian 59 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert and Navy Master Chief Petty Officer Mike Stevens speak to Sailors assigned to Naval Education and Training Command and Training Support Center at Naval Station Great Lakes (U.S. Navy/Peter D. Lawlor) score, furthermore, risks constraining Corps has recently discussed introducing adaptive leaders capable of operating with the Services too much and shifting the “non-cognitive tests” to measure poten- disciplined initiative. This is especially balance between leadership, intelligence, tial motivation or “grit.”30 Measuring important at the junior level.”32 So far, and physical fitness too much toward the these factors has historically been difficult; however, the Force of the Future initia- intelligence pole at the expense of less efforts by the Israeli army to quantify tives appear to be an increase in officer quantifiable leadership qualities. We must personality traits, for instance, were only incentives with a vague goal of “compet- shift the accession balance away from partially successful.31 Determining what ing with Google.” If we simply increase physical fitness (which again has never weight these factors should have in refer- incentives without knowing what we been shown to have a correlation with ence to physical fitness and intelligence is want, we will end up with a more ex- officer success) toward intelligence, while a difficult issue that will require detailed pensive version of the force we currently keeping a similar weight on leadership. analysis. It may be cautioned in advance, have. These initiatives need to be more Study What Qualities an Officer however, that non-cognitive tests cannot focused based on what qualities we want, Needs. The military has made wide study simply replace cognitive tests. Ceasing to and general intelligence must be one of of what qualities it needs in enlistees and measure officer intelligence just because these qualities. how to identify and recruit enlistees with we do not like the results we get would those qualities. Similar study should be be a dereliction of our moral duty. Conclusion made of officers. There has already been Study How to Attract Intelligent According to Marine Corps Doctrinal some recent movement on this front by Officers. Brad Carson, now the Publication 1, Warfighting, “A leader the Services. For example, the College Undersecretary for Personnel and without either interest in or knowledge of Operational and Strategic Leadership Readiness, has stated that the first les- of the history and theory of warfare— at the Naval War College has made it a son from Operations Enduring Freedom the intellectual content of the military priority in recent years to study indicators and Iraqi Freedom is that the “Army profession—is a leader in appearance of character and leadership. The Marine must continue to develop agile and only. Self-directed study in the art and
60 JPME Today / Officers Are Less Intelligent JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 19 science of war is at least equal in impor- Corps Strategy for Success: A Proposed Human Paul Pringle, “College Board Scores with Capital Model Focused Upon Talent (Carlisle Critics of SAT Analogies,” Los Angeles Times, tance to maintaining physical condition Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April July 27, 2003. and should receive at least equal time. 2009), 9. 20 Walter V. Bingham, “Military Psychology This is particularly true among officers; 4 The information about incoming scores in in War and Peace,” Science, August 22, 1947. after all, the mind is an officer’s princi- the Navy was fragmented into several depart- 21 Commandant of the Marine Corps, pal weapon.”33 ments, making it harder to collate. The Army “Marine Corps Order 1230.5B: Classification and Air Force FOIA responses denied having Testing,” September 11, 2009, 4, available at Many observers may recoil at the any information on average Scholastic Aptitude
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Cancian 61 Airman assists healthcare worker in donning personal protective equipment to work in Ebola treatment unit (U.S. Army/V. Michelle Woods)
Fighting Ebola An Interagency Collaboration Paradigm
By Ross F. Lightsey
Our daily contact with key Liberian government ministries helped us to understand the government’s plan to contain the Ebola virus, and enabled us to develop critical relationships in keeping lines of communication open, which allowed us to apply resources at the right place at the right time to fully support their plan.
—Major General Gary J. Volesky, USA Commander, Joint Force Command–Operation United Assistance
n old fable tells that a single stick If, on the other hand, all 100-plus by itself is weak; bundled with organizations had not been united by A others, however, the stick will the Liberian government to stamp out be much stronger. Likewise, during Ebola, the effort would have been weak Lieutenant Colonel Ross F. Lightsey, USA, is a the world’s 2014–2015 response to the and ineffective. Special Forces and Civil Affairs Officer assigned Ebola crisis in Liberia, interagency, Many organizations, institutions, to the Joint Planning Support Element within intergovernmental, and international teams, and individuals came to assist the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. Previously he was the Joint Force Command J9 forces were strong and firmly united, Liberia in stopping the spread of Ebola, during Operation United Assistance in Liberia. moving forward with a singular agenda. as the Liberian government took the
62 Commentary / Fighting Ebola JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 lead in harnessing resources and funding, corralling numerous aid workers, and Figure 1. JFC-UA Ebola Tracking Chart providing leadership in the implementa- 100 tion of a strategic healthcare plan. The Liberian government accomplished this 90 through a unifying process that was la- beled the Incident Management System, 80 which was a clearinghouse of meetings 70 and decisions made at the National Ebola 1 Command Center (NECC). Having 60 State of Emergency shared equities, the joint, interagency, Lifted intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM); 50 nongovernmental organization (NGO);
and economic communities came to- Number of cases 40 gether and became a true force. On September 16, 2014, President 30 Barack Obama conveyed four goals to President 20 combat Ebola: Announces U.S. Deployment •• control the outbreak 10 •• address the ripple effects of local 0 economies and communities •• coordinate a broader global response 3-Oct 2-Jan 5-Dec 9-Jan 5-Sep 7-Nov 17-Oct 31-Oct 21-Jan 12-Dec 10-Oct 16-Jan 15-Aug 19-Dec 24-Oct 12-Sep 19-Sep 26-Dec 21-Nov 14-Nov 26-Sep 22-Aug 29-Aug •• urgently build up a public health 28-Nov 2 system in these countries. Incident cases (First-time positive laboratory results, 7-day average) The goal of coordinating a broader Situation report cases (suspected and probable, 7-day average) response later included providing unified and coherent leadership by having the U.S. interagency community and military train indigenous and international initial 1976 outbreak of the disease support the efforts of the Liberian gov- •• healthcare workers occurred.3 It has existed for decades ernment. With that said, the collaborative build a healthcare worker–specific but has been generally contained with atmosphere lent significant confidence to •• ETU varying degrees of success in other the international community in the com- sustain collective Ebola logistical African regions. In humans, Ebola is petence of the unified partners who were •• requirements. typically spread through bodily fluids, tackling the tasks at hand. The American similar to HIV. Although Ebola is not people needed this confidence with a uni- The end result was a greatly dimin- an airborne disease, it has a high rate of fied leadership as the fears of Ebola were ished Ebola transmission rate in Liberia. transmission among humans, especially rapidly growing in the fall of 2014. Upon the arrival of U.S. troops in with physical contact of dead tissue or The deployment of the 101st Airborne Liberia in September 2014, the rates of person-to-person contact (transmittable Division (Air Assault) headquarters and Ebola infections were approximately 367 only if one has Ebola and is symptom- applicable units, with 2,692 Soldiers new cases per week; upon their departure atic and permeating Ebola). Because at peak manning in both Liberia and in March 2015, however, new cases were of the rapid transmission rate and Senegal, formed Joint Force Command– less than 2 per week (see figure 1). In unprecedented outbreak in West Africa, United Assistance (JFC-UA), which short, JFC-UA in support of USAID Ebola became a global concern and was supported the Liberian government efforts, coupled with other U.S. inter- deemed a matter of national security by and the U.S. Agency for International agency partners and the international President Obama. Development’s (USAID’s) Office of community writ large, banded together In July 2014, American fears of Ebola Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to focus on one task: eliminate Ebola in were validated when a missionary doctor and, more specifically, a USAID/OFDA Liberia. contracted the disease and was medi- Disaster Assistance Response Team cally evacuated to the United States. In (DART). JFC-UA was tasked to: Understanding Ebola and Military Application Background September, the incident at Texas Health construct Ebola Treatment Units Presbyterian hospital in Dallas increased •• The word Ebola is derived from the (ETUs) across the country concern as a nurse contracted the disease Ebola River Valley in the Democratic while treating Thomas Eric Duncan, a Republic of the Congo, where the
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lightsey 63 Figure 2. Joint Force Command JFC Task rganization: Mission-Specific Construct
JFC
Staff
Combat Support Area obile Contracting Ci il Affairs Head uarters Engineer Sustainment A iation ilitary Police Hospital Laboratory attalion Company Support rigade rigade attalion Company raining Healthcare Epidemiological Contracting fficer Connection attalion E U Construction Enabling the C UH CH Security Wor ers Laboratory esting Support and elationships
training, however, as we defaulted to an educational approach in learning about Figure 3. Relationship Diagram of Ebola itself, the culture and leadership Ma or U.S. Partners in Fighting Ebola of Liberia, and our operational environ- ment (including our JIIM partners). We also reached out to interagency partners CDC USAID DA U.S. Embassy USA IC Atlanta A Washington DC onro ia Stuttgart ermany (USAID and CDC), as well as various international governmental organiza- ain Coordination Head uarters tions (United Nations [UN] Mission ain Coordination PC N Head uarters for the Ebola Emergency Response and CDC DA ission as ing atri C UA World Health Organization). onro ia onro ia onro ia To educate the command and staff, a 2-day Interagency Academics Seminar was developed by the Mission Command Liberian who was the first to be diag- vention (CDC) to determine what the Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, nosed with Ebola in the United States. tasks were and what Request for Forces Kansas, and the division G9. This seminar Fear in the American populace caused the would be sent to the Office of the Sec- brought together USAID/OFDA, CDC, President to act decisively and quickly. retary of Defense (OSD). Department of State, UN, U.S. Army The 101st Airborne Division (Air Medical Research Institute of Infectious The U.S. Response Assault) was chosen to lead the effort by Diseases (USAMRIID), Department In his September 2014 speech, Presi- providing a division-level staff to direct of Health and Human Services (HHS), dent Obama announced his plan to use and manage various units derived from and U.S. National Institutes of Health 3,000 troops in West Africa to support 16 different installations. The coordina- (NIH). USAID as the lead Federal agency. tion and synchronization in bringing He spelled out that the troops would these various entities together were JFC-UA Composition primarily operate in Liberia and would daunting, but were a definite requirement Noted earlier, USAFRICOM and be supported from an air bridge out as the specialty fields (such as epidemiolo- USARAF developed the manning of Senegal. Immediately, U.S. Africa gist) do not solely reside within a U.S. requirements through the JOPP with Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. Army division headquarters or Brigade inputs from USAID/OFDA and CDC. Army Africa (USARAF) began on- Combat Team. Those involved planned products ground assessments and also initiated to tackle Ebola through the train- the Joint Operation Planning Process Unique Training ing of volunteer healthcare workers, (JOPP) to determine what kind of So how do an Army division staff and constructed ETUs, sustained military military capabilities were required, what applicable units train for such a deploy- logistical requirements, and assisted the support mechanisms would be needed, ment? Of course, the applicable units international community with logistical and where to place the troops in respec- at their respective U.S. locations con- requirements. The task organization tive countries. In all of this, USAF- ducted mandatory donning and doffing was developed by function or enabling RICOM and USARAF staff worked training for protective equipment and support (see figure 2). closely with USAID/OFDA and the some standard predeployment training. Centers for Disease Control and Pre- Preparation needed more than tactile
64 Commentary / Fighting Ebola JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Liberia: An American Extension DART was comprised of staff from vari- as well as JFC-UA, which contributed One of the best explanations for rapid ous U.S. agencies, including USAID/ experienced and competent LNOs that success in Liberia was working with a OFDA, CDC, and HHS (see figure 3). had previous exposure to interagency and supportive government that has close USAID used the Mission Tasking Matrix U.S. Embassy operations. It is important ties with the United States and other (MITAM), a mechanism used to request that the LNOs to be exchanged are able Western nations. A considerable portion operations from the DART to JFC-UA. to articulate operations through effective of the Liberian leadership is Western It was developed by USAID and is a communication as well as expressing the educated, and its military receives train- standard procedure for validating, priori- command message. ing in the United States. For example, tizing, submitting, and tracking requests To ensure transparency, there were the primary driver in the Liberian Min- for Department of Defense (DOD) sup- some growing pains in communication istry of Health (MoH) was educated port during disaster responses. Some of at the initial onset of the operation. at The Johns Hopkins University, and the validated requests were forwarded JFC-UA and DART tackled this com- a senior commander within the armed from the DART Civil-Military Affairs munication gap by having daily meetings forces of Liberia is a 2012 graduate Coordinator/MITAM Manager to the at the Embassy with the command group from the Command and General Staff JFC for review and execution at the and Chief of Mission (U.S. Ambassador), College at Fort Leavenworth. lowest level, but some of the MITAM semi-weekly interagency synch meetings, Liberia is primarily an English- requests were from USAID to OSD at and nightly operations-synch meetings speaking country, predominantly higher levels. Regardless, the MITAM with the DART MITAM managers. Christian, has a similar governing consti- process was vetted, validated, and coordi- Furthermore, to reach a consensus in tution and democratic process (executive, nated at the applicable parallel chains of having a common language, an “Ebola legislative, and judicial branches), and authorities. synch matrix” was collectively established retains many American cultural norms between DOD elements and the inter- due to its historical ties with the United Building Civil-Military agency community to assist in mapping States. These close ties date back to the Relationships the fast-paced construction of the ETUs, antebellum years when freed slaves from Many questions were asked about how training healthcare workers, establish- the United States established Liberia.4 As multiple, unrelated entities built such a ing Army medical test (verifying Ebola a result, U.S. efforts were well received, solid foundation by working together. samples) labs, and providing DART- making communication, coordination, One answer: do not get fixated on what directed logistical support via MITAMs and collaboration more fluid. you are wearing, whether a vest, tie, to the international community. This Working in a permissive environ- or military uniform. Rather, focus on Ebola synch matrix of time-to-task map- ment and operating with a supportive solving the problem facing all. More- ping put everybody on the same page indigenous populace, U.S. preparation over, do not worry about who receives and gave a greater shared understanding for language and cultural training in credit in the various tasks at hand, but of impending requirements. Indeed, the a standard contingency premission stay on-task and be passionate about level of collaboration between units and training model was nearly moot. This the one common goal—eliminating the organizations is directly proportional to environment was unique in that the U.S. threat of Ebola. interpersonal skills and open-mindedness military directly supported the USAID/ In Monrovia, the DART consisted of to new and different people. OFDA DART. Working together, both approximately 20 experienced disaster re- the DART and JFC-UA coordinated all lief personnel in the Ebola fight, whereas Snapshot of Partners operations in Liberia through the U.S. at peak manning, 2,453 personnel were U.S. Interagency Community and Ambassador in Monrovia. assigned to JFC-UA (“boots on the DOD. The DART, Embassy, and JFC-UA reported to USAFRICOM ground” in Liberia), a huge variance in JFC-UA were not the limit of American for military-related tasks and manage- capacity and capability between the two. cross-organizational exposure; there ment of Ebola resourcing through the So how do we collectively integrate oper- were numerous other U.S. interagency overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic ations with such a huge disproportion in partners that were brought into the aid lines of accounting. Furthermore, personnel and logistical footprints? First fold. The largest and most knowl- logistical support, budgeting allocation, comes communication, then coordina- edgeable institution that the DART military orders, transportation, and other tion, then ultimately collaboration. and JFC-UA collaborated with was military operations were coordinated To have communication among these the CDC. CDC epidemiologists and through USAFRICOM. entities, having strong, experienced, and leadership gave specific insight and USAID/OFDA operated on the knowledgeable liaison officers (LNOs) direction in how to contain Ebola, if ground via the DART, which was respon- is a must. An LNO can assist in staffing not completely eradicate the disease. sible for coordinating the interagency requirements and can be a strong strate- Moreover, other institutions greatly response, assessing the situation, and gic voice to speak on a unit’s behalf. The contributed to the fight in Liberia: U.S. identifying gaps in response efforts. The DART had solid civil-military LNOs, Public Health Service, Defense Threat
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lightsey 65 J9 Civil Affairs planner works with local populace in Voinjama, Liberia (DOD)
Reduction Agency, Defense Logis- was to have limited authorities over exist- synchronization effort that included, but tics Agency, Naval Medical Research ing organizations in the fight against was not limited to, JFC-UA civil affairs Center, HHS, USAMRIID, and the Ebola through what is termed the UN teams, UNMIL, UN Children’s Fund, NIH. All organizations were tied to one Cluster System where a unity of effort is World Health Organization, World Food another through LNOs, routine meet- pursued within the multiple UN systems.5 Programme, UN Disaster Assessment ings, or other routine dialogue forums. “Clusters” are groups of humanitarian and Coordination, UN Development Again, having dedicated communication organizations (both UN and non-UN) Programme, Office for the Coordination through physical presence and proxim- working in the main sectors of humani- of Humanitarian Assistance, UN ity is key to having a successful collab- tarian action—for example, shelter and Humanitarian Air Service, Economic orative environment. health. They are created when clear Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Organizations. humanitarian needs exist within a sector, World Bank, African Union, International U.S. involvement in Liberia was only a there are numerous actors within sectors, Organization for Migration, International portion of the total contribution from the and national authorities need coordina- Committee of the Red Cross, and African international community. For example, tion support. Obviously, coordination is Development Bank.6 The JFC-UA used the United Nations Mission in Liberia vital in disaster responses. Good coordi- the special operations force approach of (UNMIL) has over 6,000 peacekeeping nation means fewer gaps and overlaps in using existing international and indig- troops and police currently stationed humanitarian organizations’ work, and enous assets and gained benefits of these throughout Liberia and has an already ex- coordination ensures a needs-based rather supporting infrastructures of knowledge isting logistical structure and knowledge than a capacity-driven response. It aims through human engagement. of key civic Liberian enablers in the field. to ensure a coherent and complementary Multinational Efforts. Excluding There were many other organizations, approach, identifying ways to work to- UNMIL, which had over 45 nations but most notably the newly established gether for better collective results. represented, there were a number of in- UN Mission for the Ebola Emergency So accordingly, UNMEER led and dependent efforts from various countries. Response (UNMEER), whose charter managed a Liberia-wide civil-military Most prominent to the collective efforts
66 Commentary / Fighting Ebola JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 between the DART and JFC-UA was the structures, capabilities, organizations, in assisting the training of the Liberian German NGO Welthungerhilfe, which people, and events) analyses throughout military that had been ongoing for a offered to build four ETUs in southern planning processes. A deliberate Liberian number of years. Having this back- Liberia through DART assistance and country study and operational analysis ground was fortuitous, as the National funding. This gesture at the beginning were indeed conducted prior to JFC-UA Guard’s “Persistent Engagement” with of American involvement lent solid evi- departure and employment. However, the Liberian military assisted JFC-UA in dence of quickly forming multinational we undervalued the economic aspect in sustaining rapport through longstanding relationships. U.S. forces came en masse PMESII, as upon arrival we found many military-to-military relationships.8 starting as early as September 2014 and commercial investors involved in the Other DOD efforts in the fight were quickly followed by the Germans, fight against Ebola due to profits being against Ebola included the Defense a Swedish contingent, and a Chinese adversely affected. Their influence was Logistics Agency, U.S. Transportation military delegation—all assisting in the of notable significance during the initial Command, and Defense Attaché office construction and manning of ETUs. mass exodus of influential leadership in resident with the Embassy in Monrovia. Again, having shared equities among the the summer of 2014 as economic forums There were also nine U.S. military of- international community, the DART, began to form. For example, private ficers assigned to UNMIL. Though they JFC-UA, and Liberia itself benefited from investors developed the Ebola Private were not directly supporting JFC-UA the informal tight band of this ad hoc Sector Management Group, where overt or Ebola efforts, the UNMIL officers coalition. information was disseminated and private provided excellent connectivity to the Host-Nation Organizations and collaboration between business leaders 6,000-plus UNMIL force operating Military. In recent combat experiences, was initiated. in Liberia and coordinated support for the U.S. military conducted multiple Another example where private JFC-UA. civil-military tasks of support to civil ad- industry proved valuable to the ef- National Ebola Command Center. ministration, where emerging and newly fort was during the initial days of the Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the center formed democracies had much room outbreak. The Firestone Corporation of gravity where collective and collabora- for improvement—and, to be candid, offered JFC-UA partial use of their tive decisions were made was within the these experiences were an uphill battle.7 one-million-acre rubber tree plantation. NECC, a three-story business building However, the Liberian government is The facility included its own medical that was converted for a single opera- extremely competent, educated, and facilities, educational system, security, tions nerve center. Since Liberia is a fully highly organized. The most prominent and essentially its own infrastructural functioning and sovereign state, the organization that JFC-UA and DART system—all separate from the govern- Liberian MoH managed the NECC’s collaborated with was the Liberian ment of Liberia. Principally, the negative functions and led frequent Incident Ministry of Health. On a daily basis economic impact caused Firestone as Management System meetings. In ad- JFC-UA and DART sought interaction well as other corporations (for example, dition to these meetings, side meetings and communication with the MoH at ArcelorMittal, Exxon-Mobile, Severstal regarding nationwide logistical coordina- multiple levels. Furthermore, as social mining, Chevron) to have vested interests tion, civil-military coordination meetings, mobilization and psycho-social issues in tacitly or overtly supporting the Ebola psycho-social mobilization strategy meet- related to spreading the word on the containment effort. With this in mind, do ings, dead body management, the Ebola prevention of Ebola, our LNOs attended not discount or underestimate the power hotline, and epidemiological surveillance meetings at the Ministry of Information, and influence in the economic industry meetings occurred on a routine basis Culture, and Tourism. before, during, or after a humanitarian at this location. It cannot be stressed In addition to the MoH, the gov- assistance/disaster relief operation. enough that the NECC was the most ernment of Liberia relied heavily on its Other DOD Agencies. JFC-UA was central location and source of informa- military to help control the outbreak and not the only DOD entity operating tion and was where major cooperation contain the disease within its borders. within Liberia, as coordination with other and decisionmaking occurred. If it had Obviously, JFC-UA was the primary in- institutions was vital. In any joint task not been developed and implemented by terlocutor with the DART and other U.S. force–like system, there may be other the MoH, the opportunity for organi- organizations as the Liberian military DOD entities that are not directly sub- zational collaboration would have been worked closely with JFC-UA to provide ordinate to the JTF command structure hard pressed for success. security, construct ETUs, and facilitate but that will at least have some sort of JFC-UA and DOD operations. coordinating responsibility, as efforts will Correlation versus Causality? Economic and Commercial Interests. surely need synchronization. If one objectively looks at the Ebola In a JIIM-centric mission, units typi- An existing Department of State trend chart, there is a direct inverse cor- cally research their PMESII (political, Partnership Program (Operation Onward relation between the arrival of JFC-UA military, economic, social, infrastructure, Liberty), primarily led by the Michigan and the regression of confirmed Ebola and information) or ASCOPE (areas, National Guard, was a separate effort contractions. It is easy for various insti-
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lightsey 67 Students in Ebola Treatment Unit Course led by Joint Force Command–United Assistance, diagnose potential patient for symptoms of virus during scenario training, Monrovia, Liberia, November 20, 2014 (U.S. Army/V. Michelle Woods) tutions to take credit, but there is not investments.”9 However, the arrival of be safe to assume that the arrival of U.S. enough scientific analysis to determine over 2,600 U.S. troops, helicopters, troops and an overtly collaborative inter- the actual catalyst and cause in eradicat- trucks, medical personnel, the DART, national community played a significant ing Ebola. Perhaps the precipitous drop CDC, and other U.S. interagency efforts role in the eradication of Ebola in Liberia. in Ebola rates in the fall of 2014 may collectively conveyed confidence—not not be directly attributed to the arrival only among the Liberian population but Ebola: Humanitarian of JFC-UA and the DART, whereas also in the international community. The Assistance/Disaster Relief, or the arrival of thousands of U.S. troops, arrival of troops and the DART was a National Security Threat? along with hundreds of epidemiological catalyst that brought in other nations, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Depart- specialists, provided surety, speed, flex- NGOs, international organizations, ment of Defense Dictionary of Military ibility, but most importantly confidence volunteer healthcare workers, and the and Associated Terms, defines foreign in that the international community was return of independent missionary and humanitarian assistance (FHA) as serious about assisting Liberia eliminate philanthropic organizations that were “activities conducted outside the Ebola. previously treating Ebola patients. United States and its territories to We should keep in mind that dur- As such, the speed of DART and directly relieve or reduce human suf- ing the past 15 years, Liberia has had its JFC-UA efforts in building the ETUs, fering, disease, hunger, or privation.”10 share of internal strife, and in the sum- training healthcare workers, providing Moreover, JP 1-02 defines foreign disas- mer of 2014 during the mass exodus of direct funding, and assisting with logistics ter relief as “assistance that can be used expertise, the conditions were ripe for might have prevented total loss of civil immediately to alleviate the suffering of civil disorder. According to a World Bank control and order during this tenuous foreign disaster victims that normally survey, “Nearly 85 percent report having and fragile state of uncertainty. To reaf- includes services and commodities as sold assets, sold or slaughtered livestock, firm, it would be judicious to caution well as the rescue and evacuation of borrowed money, sent children to live against attributing direct success related victims; the provision and transporta- with relatives, spent savings, or delayed to JFC-UA and the DART, but it would tion of food, water, clothing, medicines,
68 Commentary / Fighting Ebola JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; lack of education, lack of healthcare, lack Notes the furnishing of medical equipment, of transportation, lack of information ar- medical and technical personnel; and chitectures, massive poverty issues, and the 1 Analogous settings would be a national- making repairs to essential services.”11 resistance to change cultural norms (for level civil-military operations center or humani- Because “disease” is mentioned in example, bodily contact with the deceased tarian operations center. 2 the definition of foreign humanitarian during ritual burial practices). “Remarks by the President on the Ebola Outbreak,” Centers for Disease Control and assistance, doctrinally this mission could To address the poverty gap, World Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia, Septem- be considered an FHA mission, and not Health Organization officials and UN ber 16, 2014, available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lightsey 69 Marine assigned to Detachment 4th Force Reconnaissance Company jumps from UH-1Y Venom helicopter during airborne insertion training at Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, June 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Aaron S. Patterson)
Harnessing the Influence of Senior Enlisted Leaders
By Paul Kingsbury
ver the past 11 years I have had my skill sets, it has become clear to me stand the full potential of the SEL posi- the privilege to serve as a senior that many leaders are not fully harness- tion to align expectations and ensure O enlisted leader (SEL) in a variety ing the influence and capabilities of they know how to get “max return on of billets. I have engaged with a wide their SELs. SELs today now serve on investment” from us; similarly, as SELs, audience of enlisted and officer leaders a much broader scale than perhaps in we must understand how our roles in a variety of formal and informal set- previous generations, influencing and and influence change in these billets tings. Although I have been fortunate advising Service and Department of to ensure we are providing maximum to work for many officers who valued Defense (DOD) leaders and staffs at the value to our commanders. operational and strategic levels—but perhaps we have failed to completely Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities consider and effectively communicate There are many unique attributes that Fleet Master Chief Paul Kingsbury, USN, is Fleet Master Chief for U.S. Fleet Forces Command in the full value we can provide. It is SELs of any Service possess that leaders Norfolk, Virginia. important for commanders to under- should strive to take advantage of. We
70 Commentary / The Influence of Senior Enlisted Leaders JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 have decades of experience dealing with tional- or strategic-level asset engaged To Speak to the Force on Behalf of the enlisted policy issues from a variety of at that level. For example, some SELs Commander. One of the privileges and perspectives and positions within the have had supervisors tell them, “Go do most rewarding roles of being an SEL chain of command. Unlike senior offi- what Master Chiefs do” or have had is getting out and speaking with a wide cers, who cycle in and out of command their role captured as “heads and beds.” variety of audiences, both officer and positions over the course of their careers, Additionally, some perceptions exist that enlisted. During a variety of engagements SELs have consistent “front office” SELs are trying to be the “number two” ranging from site visits to recognition experience because we are consecutively in command. These are all indicators of banquets, SELs have the opportunity to assigned at the command level of leader- a lack of a consistent, DOD or Service- communicate what their commander’s ship. SELs also occupy a unique position wide accepted understanding of what the roles, responsibilities, and objectives are. outside the chain of command that SEL community does or a lack of desire This not only reinforces what is going allows them to stand back from the orga- to leverage it. on and what the organization does, but nization, figure out what works and what Following the establishment of the it also helps translate the commander’s does not, and then influence change. Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman intent. A critical part of speaking to the We can access, observe, and advise all (SEAC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff joint force is to pass on messages that officer and enlisted personnel within the position in 2011 under then-Chairman support the commander’s strategic com- commander’s sphere of influence. SELs General Peter Pace, it was disestablished munication plan. Since SELs have the have been promoted to their highest pay under Admiral Mike Mullen. Admiral unique experience of having served as ju- grade, so they no longer have promotion Mullen believed that he had appropriate nior enlisted, they can often package the boards acting as potential behavioral DOD-wide senior enlisted perspective message in a way that translates well to barriers to unfettered advice. Many have through the Service SELs but offered the force. We can also speak to the force degrees in fields such as business and that if someone could explain the on behalf of the Service (and DOD) since leadership, or have attended advanced value added by the position he would we attend meetings and symposiums that professional military education and exec- reestablish it. Apparently we could not provide insight on broader policy affect- utive education courses and seminars, or did not, but fortunately, General ing personnel and their families. and understand how organizations func- Martin Dempsey realized the potential To Serve as the Eyes and Ears for tion at the strategic level. Furthermore, value and reestablished the position. the Commander. In this capacity, the SELs are well networked, which contrib- Understandably, some people have had SEL speaks to the commander on behalf utes to increasing their command’s con- bad experiences with an SEL at some of the force and observes and reports. nections and information powerbases, point in their careers that negatively Commanders often do not have the thus improving the command’s capacity shaped their perceptions. Some SELs do time—despite their desire—to engage for effective communication. not live up to the expectation of their in frequent, small group discussions; roles, but the majority do, and should however, SELs do, and thus can get the Current Perceptions not be defined by the poor performance story behind the PowerPoint briefs and and Utilization of a few. The increased visibility and bad stoplight charts that the commander The generally accepted responsibility of a press highlighting those SELs who fail typically sees. Once the SEL has spoken SEL is that of the commanding officer/ to adhere to our standards further shape to the force on behalf of the com- commander’s enlisted advisor and perceptions. We also must consider that mander, he should engage in discussions advocate for enlisted Marines, Sailors, because of what we do, we often have to to solicit feedback and identify areas or other Servicemembers. I have often challenge existing norms and processes, where communication is inadequate, or seen this captured as “providing advice which can create conflict. Similarly, many where policy could be revised in the best on all matters affecting the training, senior officers and SELs do “get it,” but interest of enlisted personnel. Examples utilization, morale, etc., of the enlisted still miss the chance to leverage the SEL of broad questions SELs should ask in- force.” Although those descriptions position to its full potential. How can and clude, “What do you need?” “How can broadly capture some of what we do, I should SELs be effectively utilized? I help?” “What did we get wrong with think they fail to fully communicate the a given policy change or recommenda- broad spectrum of how SELs can be lev- Harnessing SEL Influence tion?” “What can I provide clarification eraged, particularly those serving assign- In 2007, while I was attending the on?” Answers to such questions provide ments at the general/flag level, or those National Defense University’s (NDU’s) commanders and their staffs valuable more experienced SELs with multiple Keystone course, I consistently asked insight and feedback. During visits, the consecutive tours as an SEL. There are the enlisted and officer mentors what SEL takes a fix on behaviors and condi- a number of general/flag officers who role and value they thought the SEL tions they observe that might indicate think SELs should be the command/ provided. Their perspectives helped where resources are inadequate or where tactical-level problem-solver across their form how I try to engage and influence leadership attention is lacking. They force, rather than serve as an opera- as an SEL working for a flag officer. can provide some valuable “watch team
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Kingsbury 71 Navy Senior Chief Fire Controlman stands watch aboard USS Mustin (DDG 89) during bilateral training with Republic of Korea navy in waters east of Korean Peninsula, October 2015 (U.S. Navy/Christian Senyk) backup” and their unique perspective with captured this role as “getting out of For example, while serving as an SEL or background might help identify root your comfort zone,” but I have come to in both Guam and Japan, I developed causes that other leaders miss. It is criti- appreciate it as our potential to help ad- personal relationships with the leaders cal that the SEL maintain transparency vance regional partnerships and alliances. of the United Service Organizations, when reporting issues they observe in the SELs at general/flag levels will engage Navy League, and the Japan and U.S. fleet. This “observe and report” role is with military and civilian stakeholders Navy Friendship Association to promote one that some officers may find threaten- outside of their command structure. their programs and the value they bring ing due to our direct access to the boss; Through these engagements they can Servicemembers and their families. communication is key to prevent this mis- share information and raise awareness Commanders who integrate their SEL understanding. The SEL should ensure of what our people and organizations into these events also have the oppor- that a unit’s commanding officer knows do, while forging relationships that pro- tunity to show partner nations the high they are visiting, and provide specific unit vide resources for the enlisted force. As value the U.S. military places on its en- concerns to the unit’s leadership as one the SEL for Navy Region, U.S. Forces listed force. form of watch team backup. The intent of Japan, I gained as much insight from Commander’s Confidant. It is com- these visits should not be to identify com- Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force monly understood that the SEL is one of mand discrepancies; rather, they should SELs as I provided. I also learned that the only people with the experience, ac- be to gather a broader pulse on issues they have many of the same challenges cess, and trust to provide the boss candid such as health of the force, the effective- that we do, so we were able to have a feedback, especially on matters relating to ness of communication and fiscal effects productive exchange of ideas regarding their personal behavior, including percep- on readiness, and then provide sound potential solutions. SELs should work to tions. As I have mentioned, SELs are the recommendations to the commander. build strong relationships with allied and only ones without evaluations hanging Engagement with External partner nation militaries and other U.S. over their heads, and thus should not be Stakeholders. One general officer I spoke Government and civilian organizations. influenced by artificial barriers to telling
72 Commentary / The Influence of Senior Enlisted Leaders JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force James A. Cody speaks to Airmen of 353rd Special Operations Group at Kadena Air Base, Japan, July 2015 (U.S. Air Force/John Linzmeier) the truth. We also serve to consult our available to shape readiness and success fully harnessed, and this starts with bosses on how effectively they use their are promoted, compliant, and effective, improving communication with both power and influence. We have many and they should serve as a positive and officers and enlisted personnel. opportunities to observe leaders as they engaged mentor for SELs within their First, instructions and policies that engage, observe the response of the orga- scope of influence. Also, it has been my govern the responsibilities and assign- nization, and then provide feedback and experience that many civilians working on ments of SELs should better outline advice for improvement or let them know military staffs can benefit from the advice, examples of the responsibilities, roles, they are on target. feedback, and perspective of the SEL. and expectations for SELs working Mentoring and Advising Officer and Although I have offered five broad for general/flag officers. For example, Enlisted Sailors Throughout the Chain of roles for SELs, their application will vary the Navy’s OPNAVINST 1306.2G, Command. Because of our unique posi- depending on the billet being filled. The Command Master Chief program in- tion outside the chain of command, SELs scope of engagement at each level should struction, outlines the responsibilities are vested with the ability to provide ad- align with the scope of responsibility, for those SELs working at the unit level, vice to all officers and enlisted personnel authority, and accountability of the com- but fails to capture the unique roles and in the command. SELs attend meetings mander. As SELs progress to billets of responsibilities for SELs working for with the commander and staffs and sit increasing influence, the scope of their flag officers. Many of the nomination on many other councils and commit- roles and the stakeholders with whom announcements do provide role and tees. We have the experience to provide they engage should be expected to evolve responsibility descriptions that would advice ranging from how the commander as well. be ideal to include during the next revi- could better communicate with his fleet sion of our instruction. We should also and staffs to how a fellow SEL could be The Way Forward consider the consistency of the roles and more effective. SELs work to ensure the There are several things DOD leaders responsibilities among fellow Service SEL wide range of programs and resources could do to help ensure SELs are being programs. During periodic meetings with
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Kingsbury 73 Air National Guard senior noncommissioned officers listen to presentations during Stat Tour Senior Enlisted Leaders Fly-In Conference at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, November 2015 (U.S. Air National Guard/John E. Hillier) the combatant commanders and Service that many officers may have limited time Training Symposium or the Navy Senior SELs, the SEAC should encourage infor- working closely with a SEL and might Leader Seminar. These are all great fo- mation-sharing, exchange best practices, not fully understand what we do. For rums to enhance understanding of what and work to align SEL roles, responsibili- example, the Master Chief Petty Officer we do and how we could and should be ties, and protocol, wherever practical. of the Navy (MCPON) recently imple- leveraged. Similarly, senior officers who Additionally, officer leadership should mented an Executive Leadership Course have had an SEL should communicate take a vested interest in the development designed to indoctrinate potential gen- to their staffs and wardrooms how they and revision of these policies. Many of eral/flag-level SELs into their new roles. value and use them, while explaining my peers and I have noticed a lack of Is the content perfect? No, but it is a start ways they integrated them into organiza- awareness by many officers regarding the and will improve as long as we continue tional efforts. selection, assignment, and distribution of to ensure relevant, forward-looking Third, commanders and their staffs SELs. Ultimately, we are your assets, and content supported by real-life examples should give deliberate thought to, and your thoughts and intent should be cap- of currently serving SELs. NDU could discuss, how the SEL could be integrated tured in the Service SEL instructions. develop a short online learning module into strategic engagement and commu- Second, we should look for oppor- that would be a valuable tool to help in- nication efforts. Rather than adopting tunities to educate and raise awareness doctrinate SELs into their new roles. We a position of “go do what SELs do,” or of our roles and how we can and should should actively seek formal and informal assuming that the SEL “gets it,” wise be integrated toward achieving organiza- opportunities to explain to senior officer commanders should take time to reflect tional goals. As a community, we need to leadership what we can do. Senior SELs on how to leverage their SELs in ways do a better job of mentoring our fellow and general/flag officers should continue commensurate with their own scope of SELs who will eventually have the oppor- to speak and mentor at NDU’s Capstone responsibility, authority, and account- tunity to serve at the general/flag level, course. The Services should also look for ability. Commanders should take time to and although every tour for a SEL is at other venues where SELs could speak reflect on how they are currently utilizing the command level, we must remember at such as the Flag and Senior Executive their SEL, whether their SEL is engaging
74 Commentary / The Influence of Senior Enlisted Leaders JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 at the appropriate level and being lever- speak when you don’t see things right.” aged to their full potential to further I would add that we need to also speak New from organizational objectives. Unfortunately, when things are working, but could still some organizations fail to consider invit- be better. We owe it to our leadership, to NDU Press ing SELs to events where they can pursue our Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen, for the Center for the Study of the opportunities I have mentioned. and Coast Guardsmen to take a fix and Chinese Military Affairs SEL participation in these engagements ensure the SEL role remains relevant as Strategic Forum 289 should be a priority with a defined inten- DOD (and the Department of Homeland An Empirical Analysis of Claimant tion—engagement with a purpose. SELs Security) continues to evolve. For SELs Tactics in the South China Sea should not be off on their own agenda; are, as Admiral Zumwalt observed, “Not by Christopher D. Yung and rather, their engagements should be well only the voice of personal experience, but Patrick McNulty thought out and complement organiza- of the broad and ever-changing spectrum China, tional strategic communication and key of the enlisted experience.” JFQ Taiwan, leader engagement plans and objectives. Vietnam, the Although the commander and SEL may Philippines, often have to execute “battlefield circu- Malaysia, and lation” alone, their messages must be Brunei have aligned and should be guided by a well- used a wide thought-out plan. We must think about variety of tac- these positions in a broader strategic-level tics to protect context and avoid the pitfall of expecting and advance their maritime territo- performance only at the levels of previ- rial claims in the South China Sea. ous billets. Although we are improving, China is the most active user of the many of our general/flag-level positions nine categories of tactics identified appear largely incorporated as com- in this paper, with the exception of mand/tactical-level problem-solvers and legal actions, and accounts for more communicators and miss opportunities than half of all military and paramili- to strengthen warfighting readiness and tary actions since 1995. alliances. We must also ensure SELs The unclassified database used continue to be deliberately selected as in this analysis undercounts military members of working groups and boards and paramilitary actions, but cap- that will make recommendations of last- tures enough activity to provide a ing impact on enlisted personnel. representative sample. A classified Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., version that captures more activ- described characteristics of the first ity would improve the potential MCPONs (who were the Navy’s first to develop the database into an SELs) in his foreword to Charlotte Crist’s Indications and Warning tool to Winds of Change: The History of the Office assist in monitoring and managing of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the tensions in the South China Sea. Navy, 1967–1992: “They learned when to bend and when to stand firm. They adjusted, adapted, and adhered.” Forty- seven years since MCPON Delbert Black first took office, the Navy’s Command Master Chief community has continued to grow in span and influence. The recent decision to name future Arleigh- Burke–class destroyer DDG-119 the USS Delbert D. Black serves as formal acknowledgment of his legacy and is the result of ongoing advocacy by sev- eral former MCPONs. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert Visit the NDU Press Web site for challenges and expects us to be “bold and more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu confident leaders” who “stand up and
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Kingsbury 75 Chairman and CEO of AeroVironment briefs Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert on capabilities and potential applications of Global Observer, a long-range, long-duration UAV, Simi Valley, California, November 2014 (U.S. Navy/Peter D. Lawlor)
Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance
By T.X. Hammes
he convergence of dramatic ties—extending even to the individual. internal combustion engines, radio, improvements in the fields of This new diffusion of power has major radar, and weapons. In 1914, at the T robotics, artificial intelligence, implications for the conduct of warfare, beginning of World War I, battleships materials, additive manufacturing, and not the least of which are the major were considered the decisive weapon for nanoenergetics is dramatically chang- hazards or opportunities that it presents fleet engagements, and the size of the ing the character of conflict in all to medium and even small powers. The battleship fleet was seen as a reasonable domains. This convergence is creating a outcome will depend on the paths they proxy for a navy’s strength. The war’s massive increase in capabilities available choose. single major fleet action, the Battle of to increasingly smaller political enti- Jutland, seemed to prove these ideas Historical Case correct. Accordingly, during the inter- Fortunately, this level of technological war period, battleships received the change and convergence is not unprec- lion’s share of naval investments. Navies Dr. T.X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research edented. From 1914 to 1939, there took advantage of rapid technologi- Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the were technological breakthroughs in cal gains to dramatically improve the National Defense University. metallurgy, explosives, steam turbines, capabilities of the battleship. Displace-
76 Features / Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 ment almost tripled, from the 27,000 understanding when the character of At the same time, AM is dramatically tons of the pre–World War I U.S. New naval warfare changed and naval aviation increasing the complexity of the objects York-class to the 71,660 tons of Japan’s capabilities exceeded those of the battle it can produce while simultaneously Yamato-class. The largest main bat- line. Interestingly, there was also relatively improving speed and precision. Recent teries grew from 14-inch to 18-inch little investment in submarines, the other technological developments indicate guns with double the range. Secondary powerful newcomer to naval battle. industry will be able to increase 3D print- batteries were improved, radar was Submarines progressed from a fragile but ing speeds up to 100 times, with a goal of installed, speed increased from 21 to 33 deadly weapon system in World War I to 1,000 times—all while providing higher knots for U.S. fast battleships, cruising one that almost defeated Britain and did quality than current methods.3 In January range more than doubled, and armor destroy Japanese industry in World War 2015, Voxel8 revealed a new printer— improved. Yet none of these advances II. It is essential to remember that institu- with a cost of $8,999—that printed a changed the fundamental capabilities tional biases can keep investment focused complete, operational unmanned aerial of the battleship; they simply provided on the dominant technology even as vehicle (UAV) with electronics and incremental improvement on existing multiple emergent technologies clearly engine included.4 In February 2015, strengths. This is typical of mature tech- challenge it. Australian researchers printed a jet en- nology—even massive investment leads gine.5 Furthermore, the very nature of to only incremental improvement. Evolving Technologies AM reduces the price of parts because In contrast, naval aviation was in its We are in an area of rapidly evolving there is little or no waste. With subtrac- infancy in 1914. Aircraft were slow, technologies that, when combined, may tive (or traditional) machining, one starts short-legged, lightly armed, and well radically alter the way we fight. with a block of metal and cuts it to the used primarily for reconnaissance. Air This article is much too short to even correct form, wasting a great deal of combat was primitive; one early attempt begin to explore the explosion of new material. With AM, material wastage is involved a grappling hook. Military avi- technologies that are daily changing near zero; thus it may be cheaper to make ation made great strides in tactics, tech- our lives. But it will take a look at a few a part from titanium using AM than nology, and operational concepts during that will have short-term effects on how from steel using traditional machining. the war. Yet after the war, aviation, wars are fought. This article also con- Only two decades old, AM is starting to particularly naval aviation, remained siders how they may come together to encroach on a wide range of traditional auxiliary and was funded accordingly. change conflict. manufacturing. The American and British governments Additive Manufacturing. In the last Nanotechnology. Another field that focused most of even this limited invest- few years, additive manufacturing (AM), is advancing rapidly in many areas is ment on heavy bombers. Despite this also known as 3D printing, has gone nanotechnology. Two of these technolo- neglect, by 1941 carrier aviation in the from an interesting hobby to an industry gies are of particular interest. The first form of fighters, dive bombers, and producing a wide range of products from is nanoenergetics or nanoexplosives. As torpedo bombers dominated Pacific an ever-growing list of materials. The early as 2002, nanoexplosives generated naval warfare. Most of the advances global explosion of AM means it is virtu- twice the power of conventional explo- in aircraft design and production that ally impossible to provide an up-to-date sives.6 Since research in this field is “Close applied to naval aviation were developed list of materials that can be printed, but a Hold,” it is difficult to say what, if any, for civilian uses. Aircraft production was recent Top 10 list includes metals such as progress has been made since that point. a wide-ranging and highly competitive stainless steel, bronze, gold, nickel steel, However, even if 2 times is as good as it business that led to these rapid tech- aluminum, and titanium; carbon fiber gets, a 100 percent increase in destruc- nological advances. Relatively modest and nanotubes; stem cells; ceramics; and tive power for the same size weapon is a investment in these new technologies food.1 In addition to this wide range of massive increase. Much smaller platforms resulted in massive increases in aircraft materials, AM is progressing from a niche will carry greater destructive power. The capability. As a result, during World capability that produces prototypes to a second area is that of nanomaterials. This War II, aircraft—the small, swift, and manufacturing industry capable of pro- field has not advanced as far as nanoener- plentiful weapons of naval forces—could ducing products in large quantities. The getics, but the potential for nanocarbon swarm and destroy the less numerous United Parcel Service (UPS) has created tubes to dramatically reduce the weight but powerful battleships. By mid- a factory with 100 printers.2 The current needed for structural strength will have 1942, the battleships were reduced to plant requires one operator per 8-hour significant implications for increasing the expensive antiaircraft and naval gunfire shift and works 24/7. It accepts orders, range of UAVs. In a related field, numer- platforms. prices them, and then prints and ships ous firms are applying nanomaterials to It is important to note, however, them from an adjacent UPS shipping batteries and increasing their storage that the transition took nearly 20 years. facility the same day. UPS has plans to in- capacity.7 In fact, a recent accidental Thus the early investment in battle- crease the plant to 1,000 printers in order discovery may triple battery power stor- ships was correct. The failure lay in not to support major production runs. age and increase battery life by a factor of
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Hammes 77 Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 5 return after learning about downward thrust of Kaman K1200 (“K-MAX”) unmanned helicopter during initial testing in Helmand Province, Afghanistan (U.S. Marine Corps/Lisa Tourtelot) four.8 At the University of California, San other cube satellite companies achieved operations.13 For very long endurance, Diego, researchers have found a cheap low-cost launch by serving as ballast on several organizations are pursuing solar- way to coat products with a super-thin, larger rockets. Today, New Zealand’s powered UAVs.14 nonmetal material that manipulates light Rocket Lab is proposing to conduct Artificial Intelligence. Two areas of and radar waves.9 These improvements in weekly launches specifically for cube artificial intelligence (AI) are of particular energy storage, materials, and explosives satellites to allow rapid and inexpensive importance in the evolution of small, will lead to increases in range, payload, launch. Although Rocket Lab has not yet smart, and cheap weapons: navigation and stealth for a wide variety of vehicles, opened its space port, numerous firms and target identification. The Global including inexpensive UAVs. have signed up for its services.11 Positioning System (GPS) has proven Space-Like Capabilities. The addi- Other firms are working on systems satisfactory for basic autonomous UAV tion of cheap, persistent space-based and that can duplicate the communications applications such as the unmanned air-breathing surveillance will provide and surveillance functions provided K-MAX logistics helicopter used by the the information necessary to employ by satellites. Google’s Project Loon is Marine Corps in Afghanistan.15 However, these new technologies. In space, several attempting to provide reliable, cost- GPS will be insufficient for operations in companies, including Skybox Imaging, effective Internet services for much of narrow outdoor or indoor environments, which was recently purchased by Google, the southern hemisphere by deploying a dense urban areas, and areas where GPS are deploying cube satellites. Their goal is constellation of balloons that will drift in is jammed. Academic and commercial to sell half-meter resolution imagery with the stratosphere.12 High-Altitude, Long- institutions are working hard to over- a revisit rate of several times a day—in- Endurance (HALE) UAVs are another come the limitations of GPS to provide cluding interpretation of what the buyer avenue to satellite capabilities without truly autonomous navigation for UAVs.16 is seeing.10 A buyer could literally track the satellite. The U.S. Air Force has suc- Inertial and visual navigation are advanc- port, airfield, road, or rail system activity cessfully tested the Global Observer UAV ing rapidly and are already inexpensive in near-real time. Initially, Skybox and to conduct surveillance and intelligence enough to use in small agricultural
78 Features / Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 drones.17 Clearly, the commercial ap- armored targets. Weighing as little as a inexpensive enough for small companies plications for navigating in agricultural few pounds, these penetrators can destroy or even individuals to own a large swarm areas and inspecting buildings in urban even well-armored vehicles. In Iraq, coali- of simple, autonomous UAVs. areas could be adapted for military uses. tion forces found EFPs in a wide variety The U.S. Air Force is in fact actively While such a system would serve to get of sizes—some powerful enough to de- exploring the use of swarms, but is a UAV to the target area, it would not stroy an Abrams tank. Others were small focusing on smart swarms that com- ensure it could hit a specific target. For enough to fit in a hand or on a small municate and interact with each other that, optical or multispectral recognition UAV. 22 And of course nanoexplosives at and other platforms.25 The U.S. Navy is is essential. There have in fact been major least double the destructive power of the also pursuing swarming technology with advances in surveillance and tracking weapons. the Low-Cost Unmanned Aerial Vehicle software that are more than sufficient for The primary limitation on produc- Swarming Technology (LOCUST),26 as an autonomous UAV to attack specific tion in Iraq was the need for high-quality well as small craft.27 While these programs classes of targets—and perhaps specific shaped copper plates that form the are vague about how many UAVs they targets.18 Today, AI can identify a distinct projectile when the charge is detonated. envision being able to employ, recent object such as an aircraft or fuel truck Until recently, this was a significant chal- dramatic cost reductions in each of using onboard multispectral imaging.19 lenge that required a skilled machinist the needed technologies will increase In short, the AI necessary for many types with high-quality tools. However, in the the number by an order of magnitude. of autonomous UAV operations currently last few years AM has advanced to the Researchers in England have prototyped exists and is operating aboard small com- point that it can be used to print a wide a simple UAV body that costs roughly $9 mercial UAVs. variety of materials, to include copper.23 per copy.28 Researchers at the University AI is the development that makes The National Aeronautics and Space of Virginia are 3D printing much more the convergence of material, energetics, Administration has printed a copper complex UAVs in a single day, then UAVs, and additive manufacturing such a combustion chamber liner for a rocket adding an Android phone to produce dangerous threat. It is advancing at such motor.24 Thus, we can expect small- and a $2,500 autonomous UAV.29 Thus a a rapid rate that more than 1,000 distin- medium-sized UAVs to pack a significant small factory with only 100 3D printers guished researchers signed an open letter punch against protected targets. using the new printing technology noted seeking to ban autonomous weapons. The second approach—to bring the above could produce 10,000 UAVs a day. They stated that “the deployment of such detonator—applies to aircraft, vehicles, The limitation is no longer the printing systems is—practically if not legally—fea- fuel, and ammunition dump targets. In but rather the assembly and shipment sible within years, not decades.”20 It is each case, the objective is simply to deto- of products. Both processes could be exactly that autonomy that makes the nate the large supply of explosive material automated with industrial robots. The technological convergence a threat today. provided by the target. Against these limitation then becomes preparing the Because such UAVs will require no exter- targets even a few ounces of explosives UAVs for launching when they arrive in nal input other than the signatures of the delivered directly to the target can initiate theater. Preparing and launching thou- designated target, they will not be vulner- the secondary explosion that will destroy sands of UAVs at a time would require able to jamming. Not requiring human the target. refined organization, planning, and intervention, they will be able to operate The convergence of the new tech- equipment. in very large numbers. They can be pro- nologies discussed above may allow these Moreover, cheap UAVs will not grammed to wait prior to launch or even small, smart, and cheap weapons based be limited to the air. In 2010, Rutgers proceed to the area of the target but hide on land or sea or in the air to dominate University launched an underwater until a specified time or a specified target combat. Anyone with a television or ac- “glider” UAV that crossed the Atlantic is identified. cess to YouTube during the last decade Ocean unrefueled.30 Such UAVs are UAVs. Clearly, UAV capabilities have has become familiar with America’s use being used globally and cost about increased dramatically in the last 5 years of UAVs both to hunt enemies and to $100,000.31 In 2015, the U.S. Navy and, perhaps most significantly, usage protect U.S. and allied forces. Although launched its own underwater glider that has spread widely. Still, small UAVs can numbering in the tens of thousands harvests energy from the ocean ther- carry only a limited payload. This limita- worldwide, these UAVs represent only mocline and plans to operate it without tion can be overcome via two separate the first wave. Like many technologies, refueling for 5 years.32 Based on the approaches. First is the use of Explosively early versions were expensive and dif- commercially produced Slocum Glider, Formed Penetrators (EFPs).21 The sec- ficult to operate, so only the wealthy a 5-foot-long autonomous underwater ond (and less technically challenging) employed them. But over time, technol- research vehicle, it can patrol for weeks approach is to think in terms of “bringing ogy becomes cheaper, more reliable, and following initial instructions, then surface the detonator.” more widely employed. We are seeing periodically to report and receive new For harder targets, EFPs will allow this with the explosive growth in com- instructions. In short, small sea plat- even small UAVs to damage or destroy mercial UAVs. AM will soon make them forms have demonstrated the capability
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Hammes 79 of achieving intercontinental range conduct initial target studies without For the first time in history, insurgent while producing very little in the way of leaving their houses. Using Tor and the groups may well be able to purchase signatures. current version of the Silk Road Dark weapons that can project force far outside Ashore, mobile landmines/autono- Web site, they will be able to purchase the the area of conflict. Very-long-range mous antivehicle weapons are also under systems, too. UAVs and submersibles give an insurgent development.33 The natural marriage Clearly, today’s commercial products the capability to strike air and sea ports of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have demonstrated the ability of an au- of debarkation—and perhaps even em- to inexpensive, autonomous unmanned tonomous UAV to reach a target area, but barkation. This will create major political ground vehicles (UGVs) is virtually what weapon could it use? Against the problems in sustaining a U.S. effort. For inevitable. However, truly autonomous thin skin of an aircraft, a simple 3-ounce instance, a great deal of our support into UGVs—those that actually move on the warhead would be sufficient, so even Iraq flows through Kuwait. Suppose ground—will remain the most difficult very small commercial quadcopters could the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant challenge simply because land is the most destroy an aircraft on the ground. Against (ISIL) demonstrates to Kuwait that it complex combat environment. Thus AI armor, the UAV designer might choose can deploy UAVs that can hit an airliner and maneuvering for UGVs require an the heavier and more complex explosively sitting at Kuwait International Airport. order of magnitude more capability than formed penetrator. This would require ISIL states that it will not do so as long as for air or sea. In the interim, cheap fixed- larger quadcopters/UAVs, but would Kuwait withdraws landing rights for those and rotary-wing UAVs will provide an also provide standoff distance. Like most nations supporting Iraq. Similar threats inexpensive way to strike ground targets. commercial products, for more money, could be made against sea ports. Is the State and nonstate actors alike can rapidly one could purchase more capability in West prepared to provide the level of air transition to UGVs that can hunt mobile terms of payload, range, and discrimina- defense required to protect key targets targets.34 tion. Advances in additive manufacturing, across those nations providing interim composite materials, energy densities in bases and facilities? Implications for the gel fuels, and nanoexplosives indicate that Conventional War. While these Modern Battlefield we will be able to build longer range, systems create a genuine threat to all Irregular War. Unfortunately for more powerful, and stealthier UAVs in nation-states, they and their descendants nation-states, autonomous UAVs will ini- the immediate future. Unfortunately, will provide a significant boost to the tially favor less technologically advanced almost all of our antiterror physical defense similar to that between 1863 actors because their targeting problem defenses are based on blocking observa- and 1917, when any person or animal is simpler. For instance, a nonstate actor tion and ground access to targets. UAVs moving above the surface of the ground may not own armored vehicles or aircraft, will simply fly over existing defenses. could be cheaply targeted and killed. so its autonomous UAVs only have to Defending against this threat is feasible Defense became the dominant form of find and attack any armored vehicle but expensive—particularly when the cost ground warfare. UAV swarms may make or parked aircraft. It does not have to of defending against these weapons is defense the dominant form of warfare in discriminate but instead simply fly a pre- compared to the cost of employing them. ground, sea, air, and space domains. UAV programmed route to a suspected target In theater, top-down attack UAVs swarms will also be able to attack the area. Target areas for many locations in will negate the gains the West has made physical elements of the cyber domain. the world—to include most airfield flight in survivability against ground IEDs. The advantage will lie with those who can lines—can be determined using Google Even Mine Resistant Ambush Protected exploit the domains while operating from Maps or Google Earth. Inexpensive opti- and light armored vehicles will no longer a heavily defended and fortified position. cal recognition hardware and software protect our people or supplies. Even Ground Domain. The performance that provide effective target discrimina- more troubling, fuel and water trucks of American and British armored forces tion are also becoming widely available. are distinctive and vulnerable. A smart in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Thus, once in the target area, the UAV enemy could ignore our combat forces Iraqi Freedom showed how well-trained can scan for an easily identifiable tar- and literally fly over them to attack our crews with advanced gunnery systems get—say, a large cargo aircraft—and then logistics forces. Operationally, how do could make short work of poorly trained simply crash into it. Limited standoff is we protect ports of debarkation and crews in less-capable tanks. It seemed also currently available. If the software of logistics nodes? How do we defend inter- the combined arms team in the offensive a farmer’s autonomous UAV can point mediate supply depots? Overhead cover was dominant on the battlefield. Then and shoot a camera, it can point and will work, but that dramatically increases the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah summer war shoot an explosively formed penetrator. the time, resources, and effort that must indicated that well-trained, determined Skybox Imaging or similar firms will be dedicated to logistics support. Of irregulars armed with advanced antitank soon provide near-real-time imagery to course, the supply vehicles would remain weapons, particularly guided antitank anyone with a credit card and a laptop. vulnerable while loading and transport- missiles, could make the defense domi- Terrorists and insurgents will be able to ing those supplies. nant again in ground warfare. Since then,
80 Features / Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 conventional ground warfare has become both deadlier and cheaper. Direct-fire Is It Possible to Launch Thousands of UAVs? It is one thing to have access to thou- targets and an extended range of 1,000 gunnery systems have improved and sands of unmanned aerial vehicles kilometers.2 One can assume China wire-guided and fire-and-forget missiles (UAVs); it is quite another to have the has made similar improvements to its systems are proliferating, but both are logistics and manpower available to systems. Thus, by using old technol- very expensive. In contrast, artillery can effectively employ them. One method ogy the capability to launch swarms of now provide much cheaper precision that demonstrates it can be done is a UAVs already exists. Furthermore, the fire. While each Excalibur 155 millimeter Chinese system that mounts 18 Harpy Harpy is not a small weapon system. (mm) round costs about $100,000,35 the unmanned combat air vehicles on A similarly sized vehicle could be con- Army let a contract in 2015 for a new a single 5-ton truck using a system figured to carry over 100 Switchblade- 155mm fuze that makes any 155mm similar to a Multiple Launch Rocket size UAVs or perhaps a thousand 1 3 artillery round a precision weapon. Each System. The Chinese can transport, mini-UAVs. fuze costs only about $10,000.36 erect, and fire these fairly large UAVs using a single 5-ton vehicle and one- The next great leap will be inexpensive or two-person crew. Initially developed UAVs. For much less than the price of Notes in the 1990s by Israel as an anti-radar a precision fuze, commercially available system, the Chinese version has a range 1 “UAV/UCAV: Harpy/JWS01,” Chi- autonomous UAVs will provide greater of 500 kilometers and a warhead of 32 nese Military Aviation, available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Hammes 81 the same 40 percent predicted for satel- bordering the South China Sea and its and sea launchers, they can be either lites,43 one could buy almost 30,000 such critical straits to interdict trade. While dispersed or hidden in underground UUVs for the current cost of a Virginia- they cannot stop trade, damaging a few facilities (including commercial parking class submarine. Of greater importance, ships would cause dramatic increases in garages) until minutes before launching, the skills and organization needed to maritime insurance rates. To date, no thus remaining both immune to most build and employ a glider are orders of nation has developed a mine-hunting preemptive strikes and much less expen- magnitude less than those needed for a force capable of destroying clearly smart, sive than ballistic missiles. nuclear submarine. self-deploying mines with a high degree The previously mentioned U.S. Air Sea mines should be a particular of confidence. Force experiments using cargo aircraft concern to trading nations. They have Air Warfare. For airpower, the key to launch dozens of UAVs also has a the distinction of being the only weapon problem will be protecting aircraft on number of interesting implications for that has denied the U.S. Navy freedom the ground. An opponent does not have the future of airpower. The combination of the seas since World War II. Mines first to fight modern fighters or bombers in of cheap UAVs and much more ca- defeated a U.S. amphibious assault—the the air. Instead, he can send hundreds pable cruise missiles may offer small and U.S. landing at Wonson in 1950. While or even thousands of small UAVs after medium-size states antiaccess/area-denial lanes were eventually cleared through each aircraft at its home station. Support (A2/AD), precision strike, and long- the primitive minefields, forces attacking aircraft, such as tankers, Airborne range strike capabilities in the air domain. up the east coast of Korea had already Warning and Control System planes, Space Warfare. In space, the advent seized the amphibious objectives before and transports, are even more difficult to of micro- and cube satellites paired with the first amphibious forces got ashore. protect on the ground. Even if aircraft commercial launch platforms will allow After Wonson, the commander of U.S. are protected by shelters, radars, fuel a middle power to develop an effective naval forces noted that the most power- systems, and ammunition dumps will still space program for surveillance, com- ful navy in the world was stopped by be highly vulnerable. Range is currently munications, navigation, and even attack weapons designed 100 years ago and a problem for printed UAVs. However, of other space assets. In addition to delivered by ships designed 2,000 years an Aerovel commercial UAV first crossed Skybox Imaging and Rocket Lab, Japan’s ago. Not much has changed. In February the Atlantic in 1998, and the company Axelspace Corporation is launching a 1991, the U.S. Navy lost command of now sells an extremely long-endurance cube satellite. In this case, the Japanese the northern Arabian Gulf to more than UAV. 48 The exceptionally rapid increase company launched a $1.9 million satellite 1,300 simple moored sea mines that had in commercial UAV capabilities indicates to provide navigation assistance in the been sown by Iraqi forces.44 range problems will be solved soon even Arctic. Axelspace Corporation plans to Since 1950, mines have become for markedly smaller UAVs. launch a constellation of cube satellites progressively smarter, more discriminat- While manned aircraft will become similar to those of Skybox Imaging that ing, and more difficult to find. They have more vulnerable due to basing issues, will provide hourly satellite imagery of sensors that can use acoustic, magnetic, cruise missiles will become both more Tokyo’s traffic.52 Surveillance and naviga- and other signals to attack a specific capable and less expensive. According to tion satellites are thus already within reach kind of ship.45 As early as 1979, the the Naval Air Systems Command, the of a small or medium power; that power, United States fielded CAPTOR mines, older Tomahawk Land Attack Missile however, could also choose to purchase encapsulated torpedoes anchored to the (TLAM) cost $607,000 in fiscal year the service from a commercial company. ocean floor. When they detect the des- (FY) 1999 dollars.49 Today that cost is In addition, HALE UAVs, capable ignated target, they launch the captured $785,000 in FY2013 dollars.50 As noted of staying aloft for months at a time, and torpedo to destroy it out to a range of earlier, Lockheed Martin expects to be even balloons are being tested by a num- nearly 5 miles.46 Today, China possesses able to cut the cost of two new satellites ber of commercial firms as alternatives for “self-navigating mines” and even rocket- by 40 percent using AM. This has some providing Internet connectivity and sur- propelled mines.47 We are seeing early interesting implications for reducing the veillance. The British Ministry of Defence efforts to use UUVs to deliver mines. cost of complex systems. If we assume is studying the Zephyr 8, a solar-powered Since commercially available UUVs are that we can obtain production savings UAV that can fly at altitudes of up to already crossing the ocean autonomously, similar to those projected for the satel- 70,000 feet and provide surveillance and pairing UUVs with mines will almost lites, TLAMs will cost about $470,000 communications at a fraction of the cost certainly make it possible to mine sea each. These missiles carry a 1,000-pound of current satellites.53 ports of debarkation and perhaps even sea warhead for a distance of up to 1,500 Cyber Warfare. While one would not ports of embarkation, as well as sea lines miles (Block II). 51 While somewhat ex- normally think of UAVs as part of a cyber of communication. pensive, missiles such as these can provide conflict, it is important to remember that These gliders can also be used against long-range heavy strike—particularly if all networks have nodes in the real world. commerce. Launched from shore bases, the warhead uses nanoexplosives. Because Furthermore, some of these nodes, these systems will allow any nation they can be fired from a variety of land such as key fiber optic network lines and
82 Features / Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 C-5 Galaxy cargo hold and intercontinental flight capabilities were major assets for deploying equipment during Operation Desert Shield (U.S. Air Force)
switches, are quite exposed. For instance, army (twice) as well as to drive al Qaeda ports and airfields of embarkation in its satellite downlinks and points where fiber and the Taliban out of Afghanistan homeland—does the cost of intervention optic networks come ashore are both using a small ground force. However, expand nearly exponentially? Just as trou- exposed and vulnerable. Smart UAVs the convergence of several new technol- bling, the mechanics of moving forces provide a way to attack these nodes from ogies seems to be pointing to the revival from home bases to the combat zone will a distance. of mass (in terms of numbers) as a key become much more difficult. Will other Offering more potential for preci- combat multiplier. The small, smart, nations provide transit or port rights if sion effects, Boeing successfully tested and cheap revolution will provide all it means their homeland is subject to its Counter-electronics High-Powered nations—and some nonstate groups— significant attacks? Militarily powerful Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) in with capabilities previously reserved for nations will find their options limited 2012. CHAMP is a UAV-mounted elec- great powers simply because they cost and will be required to rethink how they tromagnetic pulse system that successfully so much. project power. knocked out all electronic targets during Western forces have had the luxury of its test.54 Such a system could target spe- unopposed access to the theaters of op- Conclusion cific nodes of an enemy’s network, while erations outside Europe for decades. This The world has entered an era of rapid not damaging friendly nodes. monopoly is changing, however; U.S. ac- and converging technological advances cess will be contested in several domains. in many fields similar to that following Strategic Implications We have to ask the question, “Does the World War I. This creates the potential Since Desert Storm, there has been a strategic cost/benefit calculation change for disruptive shifts by creative applica- belief that information superiority tied as a result?” When almost any enemy can tions, especially by combinations of to precision weapons will defeat mass. cause severe damage throughout even a these advances. The key question is It certainly allowed numerically smaller major power’s supply, deployment, and whether we will invest in the equivalent allied forces to defeat Iraq’s much larger employment chains—perhaps even to the of battleships or aircraft. Will our invest-
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Hammes 83 for 3D-printed Electronics,” Gizmag.com, January 14, 2015, available at
84 Features / Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Hammes 85 Marine spots for his teammate, who ith the rise of the Islamic is firing at distant, static targets on State of Iraq and the Levant range aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, October 2015 W and the subsequent require- (U.S. Marine Corps) ment to retrain a partially collapsed Iraqi military and provide advisors to moderate elements of the Syrian opposition, the primacy of the military advisory mission for U.S. forces comes again to the forefront. Though the tradition of military advising efforts is ancient, modern U.S. efforts began with Korea and Vietnam and continue with Iraq and Afghanistan. The mili- tary advisory mission has proved cost effective with relatively small footprints and inexpensive technologies, while leveraging foreign partners. These characteristics make the advisory focus both attractive and effective in today’s sequestration environment. While military advising is a core competence for U.S. special operations forces (SOF), the conventional military, with greater resources, continues to be called on to address this persistent and growing requirement; however, it does so with ad hoc organizational and personnel solutions that often achieve suboptimal results. Mainstream military culture re- sists the strategic significance of military advisors and often relegates this mis- sion to a second-tier status. Hence, the Department of Defense must establish a conventional joint subunified command under U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) focused on the military ad- visory mission to instill the advisory skill as a core competency for conventional forces and to better support the mission. The Missing Lever Strategic Significance U.S. advisory activities fall under the A Joint Military Advisory umbrella of foreign internal defense (FID) and security force assistance (SFA). At the strategic level, these Command for Partner-Nation foreign policy tools are used to reinforce partner nations and engender regional Engagement stability.1 FID supports a host nation’s (HN’s) internal defense and develop- ment to protect its society from subver- By Kevin D. Stringer sion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to security.2 FID has traditionally been the purview of U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin D. Stringer, USA, Ph.D., is a Foreign Area Officer at Special Operations Command Europe and a Non-Resident Fellow in the Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations SOF. SFA consists of military activities at West Point. that “contribute to unified action by
86 Features / The Missing Lever JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 the U.S. Government to support the generalist units, to conduct stability oper- advise, train and equip them.”15 Neither development of the capacity and capa- ations and perform peace-building tasks. the conventional Army nor Marine bility of foreign security forces and their This world situation suggests that the Corps has established an institutional supporting institutions.”3 It falls in the conventional military will need to culti- foundation for specialized combat advi- conventional force realm.4 vate a broad range of advisory skills since sor capabilities, which would include In the FID and SFA context, advising America does not have sufficient ground dedicated force structure to advise, train, is a preventive measure intended to stop forces to meet all potential commitments and assist partner nations.16 Similarly, the growth of insurgencies before they and must, therefore, rely on the strategic the mainstream Air Force relies on ad grow into severe national security threats leverage that foreign troops provide.10 hoc means to assess and train foreign air for HN governments.5 By design, such arms. Air Force component commands advisory interventions tend to have a Current Deficits and regional staffs possess little expertise small footprint, with military forces pro- In the past, FID and military advis- in airpower for FID operations and the viding training, education, and technical ing were traditionally the primary associated knowledge of operating in assistance to local security forces.6 In this responsibility of SOF. Yet, U.S. SOF less-developed countries.17 Equally, the role, American advisors can serve as effi- units have finite numbers of person- conventional Navy only has minimal and cient combat multipliers for these partner nel and multiple operational taskings immature constructs for addressing the nations in addressing latent, emerging, or that preclude them from being the military advisory mission. Currently, only existing threats.7 sole resource for such global advisory joint SOF have a truly professional mili- Military advisory missions have engagements. While expanding SOF tary advisory expertise in their profile. Yet strategic significance for the U.S. Armed might seem like the logical solution, SOF cannot be considered a dedicated Forces due to their frequency of occur- the rigorous selection process for SOF force structure for this assignment given rence and inordinate effect on emerging operators, plus their long train-up other mission sets such as unconventional or existing security threats in relevant period, prevents greatly increasing their warfare, direct action, and strategic re- partner nations. These missions provide numbers without affecting their quality. connaissance. Additionally, and already a low-cost investment with enormous This means the training of foreign noted, SOF units have limited numbers leverage that can positively influence and forces will become a core competency and cannot meet the demand of increas- shape the preconflict phase in threatened of both regular and Reserve units of all ing military advisory requirements found states, precluding later, more costly inter- Services.11 in today’s international security context. ventions. In 2008, then–U.S. Secretary This development trend mirrors the According to Mark Grdovic, a retired of Defense Robert Gates illuminated the historical experience of Vietnam, where senior Special Forces officer and the importance of the contemporary military the advising mission eventually exceeded author of “The Advisory Challenge” and advising mission in an address to Cadets the capability of U.S. Army Special A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional at the U.S. Military Academy at West Forces.12 OEF and OIF have been no ex- Warfare: Point: “From the standpoint of America’s ception to this rule. For these campaigns, national security, the most important as- advisor teams were manned on an ad U.S. advisory efforts have suffered from an signment in your military career may not hoc basis, and the requirement for thou- inaccurate perception that they are merely necessarily be commanding U.S. Soldiers, sands of mainstream advisors in Iraq and a sideshow effort—somewhat important, but advising or mentoring the troops of Afghanistan represented a monumental but not enough to warrant the diversion of other nations as they battle the forces of burden and stress for the conventional resources from the conventional warfight- terror and instability within their own armed forces.13 In light of recent Iraqi ing capability. . . . In order to be effective, borders.”8 military performance, the effective- advisory efforts must have the same criti- Gates’s comment reflected the ness of these conventional force ad hoc cality and legitimacy of all other major historical record and ongoing national advisory teams has come into question. operational and strategic efforts within security situation, where military advis- Nevertheless, conventional forces, given the military. No aspects of a military op- ing forms an integral part of America’s their larger numbers when compared to eration demonstrate its importance more strategy, either on a grand scale as il- SOF, will continue to be required to bear clearly than the recruitment, selection and lustrated in Operations Iraqi Freedom the load for SFA/FID operations in the career-management of the operation’s as- (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) or future, even though their advisory skills signed personnel. Recruitment efforts need in places of smaller, diverse magnitudes, may be inadequate.14 to be selective and attract only qualified such as Georgia or Mali.9 The current Unfortunately, the present orga- volunteers who possess the unique quali- world situation—with conflicts erupting nizational setup and culture for the ties required of an adviser. During the throughout Africa, the Middle East, Asia, military advising mission is sub-optimal. Vietnam War, General Creighton Abrams Europe, and elsewhere, as well as budget- As Secretary Gates acknowledged, the observed that U.S. advisers saw themselves ary constraints—requires larger numbers “U.S. military was designed to defeat as second class citizens in the Army and of dedicated military advisors, rather than other armies, navies and air forces, not to were treated as such.18
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Stringer 87 Partner-nation members prepare for rifle range during UNITAS Amphibious 2015 at Ilha do Governador, Brazil (U.S. Marine Corps/Ricardo Davila)
This same view permeates the most To correct such a situation, a joint (BCT) approach23 to the establishment recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, subunified command is needed. Such of a permanent advising training center where despite the necessity, validity, and an organizational solution takes joint hub,24 none explicitly calls for a joint value of the unconventional advising force ownership of the military advisory subunified command. Such a command mission, the mainstream military mar- mission in order to institutionalize such is necessary to make the advising ginalized the effort and relegated it to a operations within the Department of mission joint, specialized, and institu- second-tier status.19 Defense culture. Equally important, this tionally mainstream. The danger with this marginalization construct could share lessons learned and While individual Service advisory ef- approach is that many of the world’s con- be the official proponent for advisory forts have, to date, brought some success, flicts continue and military advising will professional education, doctrine, research the current and future conflict environ- be the central tool for addressing these and applications, and training to keep ment requires a joint approach. Land struggles. Yet the Services forget the les- the military adequately balanced and pre- component advisory has occupied the bulk sons learned over the past decades and pared for future contingencies.22 of the discussion, but air advisory to HNs exacerbate the organizational memory is equally important since the control of loss through defunding advisory-relevant The Need for and Benefit of a the aerial dimension is an enduring ad- training institutions and discarding ad- Joint Subunified Command vantage most nations have over insurgents visory experience as a career-enhancing This organizational proposal builds on a and terrorist groups. Similarly, as littoral- qualification in the personnel system.20 rich body of Army, Air Force, and think- ization increases, naval advisory efforts will This situation mirrors the Vietnam War, tank literature focused on institutional- become paramount. Here, the U.S. Coast where the mainstream military steadily izing the advisory experience within the Guard will also be of value since it can forgot many of the lessons learned from U.S. military. While these sources offer “train and assist” for coastal patrol, fisher- advising, and this organizational resis- a number of different structural solu- ies oversight, and port security missions, tance translated into a rejection of the tions ranging from keeping the Army roles that correlate well with the responsi- advising mission as a core competence.21 advise-and-assist Brigade Combat Team bilities of navies in developing countries.25
88 Features / The Missing Lever JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Joint Expeditionary Team advisor teaches Afghan National Army commandos about improvised explosive devices at Camp McCloskey, Afghanistan (DOD)
Equally, a joint military advisory com- Unfortunately, considering the history To institutionalize this organization, mand meets the need for specialization. of successful military advising, the mass such an entity would be created as a joint This is controversial since the Services are production of effective advisory skills from conventional force, subunified command loath to move away from general purpose generalist forces is illusory.27 As one study under USSOCOM. This placement organizations. Reasons for this attitude noted, “The structure and function of would embed it within the headquarters include institutionalized cultures, budgets, specialized advise-and-assist units—specifi- with the most advisory experience and processes, and personnel systems that cally combat advisors—are vastly different allow certain synergies and cost efficien- incentivize a focus only on the main con- than those of large-scale conventional cies to be created. This military advisory ventional missions for each Service, with units designed to wage either maneuver subunified command would be led by a all other tasks being viewed as secondary warfare or direct counterinsurgency.”28 general officer, potentially a dual-hatted or peripheral. Representative of this per- Hence, adapting a conventional brigade USSOCOM deputy commander, to over- spective on military advisory, two authors to the advisory mission is still an ad hoc see the selection, training, deployment, wrote, “We believe that discussions to solution to the challenge. Also, advis- and redeployment of combat advisors.31 develop a custom-designed advisory force ing HN units and institutions requires It would possess a staff and school to structure to replace the BCTs are moving specially selected and trained personnel develop strategic concepts, create doc- in the wrong direction. With the proper to successfully accomplish these mis- trine for combat advisors, and provide training focus and enabler augmentation, sions.29 Finally, from an organizational formal education and training for their the BCT structure has the built-in flexibil- design perspective, a standing organiza- operational employment.32 In addition, ity to perform any mission assigned. There tion, regardless of purpose, would likely advisors would receive further instruc- is no need for wholesale force structure produce better results than a temporary tion in language proficiency, as well as redesign.”26 Yet such an approach results organization established in response to an an in-depth area orientation focusing on in jack-of-all-trade organizations opti- emergency.30 These observations point to religious, cultural, social, and economic mized for everything, but truly excellent the need for specialized joint command concerns.33 Such a joint military advisory in no one task. for military advisory activities. headquarters would provide the necessary
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Stringer 89 properly addressed, then their risks could incubate and ultimately threaten the U.S. homeland. Islamic terrorism and the Ebola virus are but two examples of this phenomenon.
Financing the Command History has often confirmed that it is not superior weapons but superior orga- nizations that are the most important factor in achieving military success, and often these organizations should be spe- cialized and not all-purpose.36 Yet in an era of declining military budgets, a new, specialized subunified command appears hard to justify. While the establishment of new commands has merit, critics note such a course of action is both costly and resource intensive, with personnel Afghan commando noncommissioned officer gives instruction to junior enlisted commandos at Foreign requirements for joint qualified military Internal Defense training in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, March 2013 (U.S. Army/Wes Conroy) officers and supporting civilian and con- unity of command across the Services and experience for promotion to the senior tractor staff.37 combatant commands to achieve synchro- ranks. Based on the historical reluctance But there are two strong arguments nization for all advisory activities, while of the Services to embark on such steps, for approving this business case. First, a also offering a clearinghouse for advisory external pressure from the Secretary military advisory command is an invest- experience and lessons learned in regions of Defense or Congress is needed to ment in prevention to save on much as dissimilar as Latin America and Eastern catalyze this process. The December higher and longer term intervention costs Europe. Under current arrangements, this 2015 announcement by the Secretary of when partner-nation situations get out of global knowledge transfer among Services Defense to review the Goldwater-Nichols control. For example, armed groups of and regions is haphazard at best. Department of Defense Reorganization ethnic Chechens confronted the govern- The USSOCOM placement Act of 1986 would be an ideal opportu- ment of Georgia over the Pankisi Gorge would engender more habitual SOF- nity for evaluating the military advisory region in 2002. To address this subver- conventional teaming that would enable function and mission as an integral part sion, the U.S. Government initiated a the development of deeper advisory of the military personnel system and insti- $64 million advisory program for the expertise, create a cadre of qualified tuting the needed reforms. individual and collective training of four advisory professionals, and facilitate the Finally, the establishment of a new battalions of the Georgian army and deliv- production of advisory doctrine and subunified command to meet either a ered a consignment of new or refurbished common procedures.34 SOF advisory functional or regional requirement has UH-1 Iroquois helicopters to successfully expertise could flow freely into the sub- organizational precedents in the U.S. address this threat.38 To place this expense unified command. The structure would military experience. While their justifi- into context, by June 2006 OIF had also remove conventional advisors from cations differ from the proposed joint already cost 4,500 times as much as the mainstream military commands when military advisory command, Alaskan Georgian program.39 Hence, the example assigned to advisory missions, thereby Command, U.S. Cyber Command, and illustrates the much smaller investment reducing issues of acceptance, priority of Joint Special Operations Command are required for preventive train, advise, and mission, and integration.35 current subunified examples in the force equip missions that often nip emerging In addition to the subunified com- structure. Essentially, by standing up such insurgencies or conflicts before they get mand, the Services would need to a command, the Department of Defense out of control. A subunified command support the concept by developing career would both institutionalize and specialize would be able to synchronize such structures and incentives for advisors. a part of the overall defense enterprise for missions globally and share the lessons These measures would include creating a recognized and multifaceted mission learned with other regions of the world. special skill identifiers for qualified advi- requirement that continues unabated. Second, the costs to stand up a sors, tracking and managing advisors to The creation of an advisory subunified subunified command with long-term use their expertise and avoid filling new command would focus efforts on the impact are miniscule compared to sev- advisory requirements with inexperienced complex security challenges faced by U.S. eral weapons systems currently under personnel, and requiring military advisory partner nations. If their threats are not development. Scaling back one of these
90 Features / The Missing Lever JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 16 projects would free up budgetary funds Freedom, and other smaller missions David W. Barno, Andrew Exum, and Matthew Irvine, The Next Fight: Time for a for a joint military advisory command. would be preserved, transmitted, devel- Change of Mission in Afghanistan, Policy Brief A good perspective to this approach is oped, and enhanced for future advisory (Washington, DC: Center for a New American comparing the cost of U.S. Joint Forces endeavors. Overall, this step to a joint Security, 2011). Command (USJFCOM) to the F-35 advisory command is an excellent finan- 17 Vick et al., 139. Joint Strike Fighter program. Closing cial investment to avoid larger future 18 Mark Grdovic, “The Advisory Chal- lenge,” Special Warfare, January–February USJFCOM was part of Secretary Gates’s intervention costs while leveraging 2008, 22–28, specifically 28. push to eliminate $101 billion over other nations’ military assets to achieve 19 Hajjar, “Military Warriors,” 647–672. 5 years in unnecessary organizations greater regional and global security 20 McAdam, 55–58. and transfer those savings to weapons objectives. In the end, investment in 21 Hajjar, “Military Warriors,” 647–672. 22 programs.40 While the actual costs of organizational effectiveness trumps John R. Moulton II, Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense USJFCOM were never exactly deter- superior weaponry and technology. JFQ (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1991); mined, the price tag ranged between and Hajjar, “Military Warriors,” 647–672. $400–$750 million.41 These figures pale 23 See Philip Battaglia and Curtis Taylor, in comparison to the F-35 program. Notes “Security Force Assistance Operations: Defin- As of December 31, 2013, the total ing the Advise and Assist Brigade,” Military 1 Review, July–August 2010, 2–9. acquisition cost of the F-35 program Melissa McAdam, “Military Advising After 24 See Linda Robinson et al., Lessons from 42 Afghanistan,” Marine Corps Gazette 98, no. 8 was about $323.5 billion. This equates (August 2014), 55–58. Thirteen Years of War Point to a Better U.S. to an average procurement cost per air- 2 Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, Foreign Inter- Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014); craft (without engine) of $89 million.43 nal Defense (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, and Hajjar, “What Lessons Did We Learn,” Although a joint subunified command July 2010), ix. 63–75, specifically 72–73. 3 25 For a discussion of littoralization see would cost less than a full combatant JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The command such as USJFCOM, even tak- DC: The Joint Staff, November 8, 2010, as Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New York: ing the high figure for a USJFCOM-like amended though November 2014), 96; and JP Oxford University Press, 2013); FM 3-24, 6-3. structure of $750 million would imply re- 3-22, VI-32. 26 Battaglia and Taylor, 2–9. ducing the F-35 program by nine aircraft. 4 McAdam, 55–58. 27 Anna Simons, “Rebalancing U.S. Mili- 5 tary Power,” Parameters 43, no. 4 (Winter Such a reallocation is certainly pragmatic Alan J. Vick et al., Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Impor- 2013–2014), 35–44. and justifiable if the future security tance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions 28 Barno, Exum, and Irvine. environment is more about personnel- (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 70. 29 JP 3-22, VI-33. intensive partner-nation interactions than 6 Ibid. 30 Pirone. technology and high-end warfare. While 7 John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adapta- 31 For a similar, but more Afghanistan-cen- tric view, see Barno, Exum, and Irvine. this question requires a risk-adjusted an- tion: It’s Time for an Army Advisory Com- mand,” Military Review, September–October 32 Nagl, 21–26; and Moulton II. swer, recent and current events in Syria, 2008, 21–26. 33 Ibid. Nigeria, Ukraine, and other locations 8 Robert M. Gates, speech, U.S. Military 34 See Robinson et al. seem to indicate the former state of af- Academy, West Point, New York, April 21, 35 Hajjar, “What Lessons Did We Learn,” fairs, rather than the latter. 2008. 63–75, specifically 69. 9 McAdam, 55–58. 36 Kevin D. Stringer, Military Organizations 10 Remi Hajjar, “What Lessons Did We for Homeland Defense and Smaller-Scale Con- Conclusions Learn (or Re-Learn) About Military Advising tingencies: A Comparative Approach (Westport, The future is about working with After 9/11?” Military Review, November–De- CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 6. partner nations and leveraging their cember 2014, 63–75, specifically 66; and Nagl, 37 Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command capabilities to suppress security threats 21–26. Plan and Combatant Commands: Background 11 and Issues for Congress, R42077 (Washington, before they propagate. The main path Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsur- gency (Washington, DC: Headquarters Depart- DC: Congressional Research Service, January for achieving this objective is through ment of the Army, 2006), 6-3. 3, 2013), 61–62. the military advisory mission. By cre- 12 Hajjar, 63–75, specifically 64. 38 Vick et al., 88–89. ating an affordable joint subunified 13 McAdam, 55–58; and Remi M. Hajjar, 39 Ibid., 91. command under U.S. Special Opera- “Military Warriors as Peacekeeper-Diplomats: 40 John Bennett, “Lawmakers Offer Little Resistance to Gates’ Efficiency Proposals,” tions Command, the Department of Building Productive Relationships with Foreign Counterparts in the Contemporary Military Federal Times, October 4, 2010. Defense would take a proactive step Advising Mission,” Armed Forces & Society 40, 41 Mark R. Hirschinger, “The Disestablish- to reducing latent or emerging global no. 4 (October 2014), 647–672. ment of U.S. Joint Forces Command: A Step threats. Through this institutionaliza- 14 Sean R. Pirone, “Security Force Assis- Backward in ‘Jointness’” (master’s thesis, Joint tion and specialization, ad hoc advisory tance: Strategic, Advisory, and Partner Consid- Forces Staff College, 2011). 42 Jeremiah Gertler, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter solutions for general-purpose forces erations” (master’s thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2010). (JSF) Program, RL30563 (Washington, DC: would be avoided and the wealth of 15 Robert M. Gates, “The Future of U.S. Congressional Research Service, April 29, advisory experience from Operation Security Assistance: Helping Others Help Them- 2014), 16. Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring selves,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (2010), 2–5. 43 Ibid., 16.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Stringer 91 NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and General George Joulwan meet at Brussels airport with Richard Holbrooke en route for Bosnia as Special Envoy for President Clinton (NATO)
Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe A Lesson from the Balkans
By Christopher J. Lamb and Susan Stipanovich
he complex mix of aggressive by one scholar as “a tailored mix of political objectives.”1 North Atlantic behaviors Russia used in Georgia conventional weapons, irregular tactics, Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders T and Ukraine is commonly terrorism, and criminal behavior in the fear Russia will use hybrid warfare to referred to as hybrid warfare, defined same time and battle space to obtain destabilize or occupy parts of Poland, the Baltic states, or other countries. They are trying to devise more effective Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is Director of the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National responses to counter such a possibil- Strategic Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University. Ms. Susan Stipanovich is Program ity. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Manager for the Program on Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Studies at INSS. For an in- asserts that NATO must adapt to meet depth explanation of the Bosnia Train and Equip task force and its performance, see The Bosnian Train 2 and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power, Strategic Perspectives the hybrid warfare threat. Speak- 15 (NDU Press, March 2014). ing at the same event, U.S. Secretary
92 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 of Defense Ash Carter agreed and Countering Hybrid staunch opposition from European allies suggested “part of the answer” was Warfare in the Balkans reversed that decision. “increased readiness, special operation In the early 1990s, Yugoslavia disinte- The Clinton administration re- forces, and more intelligence.”3 Several grated in the wake of the Soviet Union’s doubled efforts to explore diplomatic months earlier, Carter’s deputy, Robert demise, releasing a mix of nationalist options for conflict resolution and scored Work, declared the United States also and ethnic movements. Ill-disciplined a success by brokering an agreement needed “new operational concepts” to combinations of regular and irregular to end the Muslim-Croat conflict. In confront hybrid warfare.4 Meanwhile forces struggled to control territory March 1994, the Washington Agreement some NATO countries are establishing and protect or herd civilians in attempts formally brought the two warring ethnic special units to counter hybrid warfare to produce ethnically homogenous factions together as a single political and tactics,5 and the U.S. Congress has populations, a process widely referred geographic entity, creating a Muslim- required the Pentagon to come up with to as “ethnic cleansing.” Serb forces, Croat Federation. A year later, however, a strategy to counter hybrid warfare.6 which had inherited the most personnel President Clinton’s chief negotiator for While senior leaders and scholars and weapons from the former Yugoslav Bosnia, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, continue to debate the merits of the army, captured 70 percent of Bosnia observed that the federation “existed only term and its defining characteristics,7 and laid siege to Sarajevo. By late 1992, on paper” and that “friction between the NATO appears to be in danger of miss- it was clear that the better equipped and Croats and the Muslims was enormous.”8 ing the most obvious aspect of hybrid trained Serbs were particularly guilty of By spring 1995, the Bosnian conflict warfare and what it demands. As the term ethnic cleansing, having placed thou- had taken 100,000 lives and generated implies, hybrid warfare fundamentally sands of Bosniak men in concentration more than a million refugees. Concerns involves an integrated mix of previously camps and women in “rape camps.” about the future of NATO as a strategic separate instruments of power, whether They also destroyed non-Serb cultural alliance and outrage over gross human military, diplomatic, intelligence, covert, and religious sites and ransacked and rights abuses began to soften U.S. public informational, or other capabilities. An burned non-Serb homes. resistance to intervention. Increasing effective response to a multidimensional In February 1992, the United numbers of government officials, threat requires an equally well-integrated, Nations (UN) Security Council had Members of Congress, and prominent multidimensional solution. To success- formed a protective force to facilitate a pundits called for action. Ambassador fully adapt in response to Russian hybrid ceasefire in Croatia and secure conditions Holbrooke and an interagency team warfare, NATO needs a new cross-func- for peace talks. In June, the Security conducted Balkan shuttle diplomacy tional command and control mechanism Council extended its mission to cover looking for a negotiated settlement, but that can quickly integrate the Alliance the Sarajevo airport and later widened it Serb military advantages diminished their response across its multiple bodies of again to provide protection of humani- incentives for compromise. One event functional expertise. tarian aid deliveries. By February 1993, in particular convinced Holbrooke that Skeptics will doubt this is possible, 9,000 UN troops were protecting six more military force would be required to but NATO has dealt successfully with specifically designated Bosnian “safe bring the Serbs to the negotiating table. hybrid threats before, most notably in areas” or security zones from Serb forces: In May 1995, NATO responded to Serb the Balkans in the mid-1990s. NATO’s Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Goražde, Bihac´, attacks on UN safe zones with “pinprick” European and American leaders were Žepa, and Tuzla. NATO backed up the airstrikes as it had the previous year. initially flummoxed by sectarian fighting UN forces with promises of air support However, this time the Serbs responded that mixed political warfare, propaganda, in case military force was necessary to by taking 350 UN peacekeepers hostage. diplomacy, and military force in a “hybrid protect the enclaves. Holbrooke encouraged the Clinton ad- threat” to European peace. Eventually, Meanwhile, European diplomats ministration to increase the bombing, but however, NATO, with U.S. leadership, struggled to find a political solution Europeans, particularly those countries adopted a multidimensional approach that would end the fighting. But after whose soldiers were hostages, opposed to conflict resolution that involved two primarily European diplomatic that course of action. some novel command and control ar- initiatives (the Carrington-Cutileiro and The Clinton administration began rangements. One such mechanism was Vance-Owen plans) failed to quell the looking for ways to shift the military bal- the Bosnia Train and Equip Program. fighting or stop atrocities, pressure for ance. While formally abiding by the UN A review of this little-remembered but U.S. intervention increased. Shortly after arms embargo, the United States tacitly important success is instructive. It dem- taking office in early 1993, President allowed arms to flow to the Bosnians, onstrates why a multidimensional threat Bill Clinton decided on a “lift and strike mostly from majority-Muslim countries requires a multidimensional response, policy” for Bosnia—that is, lifting the in the Middle East. In addition, the and how small, well-led, and integrated arms embargo and employing limited United States supported Croatia’s ef- cross-functional teams can spearhead ef- airstrikes against Serb targets. However, forts to build up its military forces. The fective responses to hybrid threats. Department of State quietly approved
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 93 nonlethal assistance to the Croatian contentious issues. Finally, the par- first by eradicating the growing influence Ministry of Defense. The Croatians were ties agreed to terms, and the Bosnian, of radical Iranian-sponsored mujahi- assisted by the U.S. company Military Croat, and Serb leaders signed what deen, and second by instilling Western Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), became known as the Dayton Accords on civil-military norms and NATO military which was led by former U.S. Army Chief December 14, 1995. standards. Congress made the military of Staff Carl Vuono. The Train and Equip Program. and economic assistance to the Bosnian The United States also lobbied its A military assistance program for the government contingent upon Iranian- European allies to accept a mix of di- Bosnians was part of the Dayton Accords, supported foreign forces leaving Bosnia. plomacy and military force. American in part because Bosnian President Alija Rapidly establishing the Train and Equip arguments were strengthened by notori- Izetbegovic´ refused to sign the agree- Program was meant to give the Bosniaks ous mass killings of Bosniak civilians, ment without a U.S. commitment to an incentive to take the politically painful including a mortar attack against the train and equip his forces. But the pro- step of dismissing their co-religionists Markale marketplace in August 1995. gram also had the support of several key who had flocked to Bosnia to fight with The tipping point was the appalling Members of Congress and senior Clinton fanatical commitment. However, U.S. massacre of more than 8,000 Bosniak administration officials. As Secretary of leaders would not permit the program men sheltered in the UN “safe zone” of Defense William Perry stated in justify- to deliver training or weapons until the Srebrenica in July 1995. Amidst wide- ing the program, “To achieve a lasting Bosnian government arranged the depar- spread outrage over the horrific event, peace in the Balkans, it will be essential to ture of foreign fighters. U.S. policymakers argued that such achieve stable and balanced force levels The Train and Equip Program was merciless disregard for human life and within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among controversial from the start. U.S. mili- contempt for international peacekeeping the states of the former Yugoslavia.”10 tary leaders feared the program would forces called into question the continu- The Dayton Accords were widely undermine the impartial peacekeeping ing relevance of NATO and jeopardized judged to be fragile. The warring par- image they needed to execute the IFOR transatlantic security relations. ties were expected to renew fighting if mission. They worried Serbs would In August 1995, several military NATO forces left, so the initial 1-year view the program as blatant favoritism developments finally pushed the Serbs duration for international peacekeeping and attack U.S. peacekeeping troops. to the negotiating table. First, Croatia forces (IFOR) was considered a “waffle The Europeans shared this concern launched punishing offensives against the of the first order,” an impractical, glar- and mostly refused to participate. The Serbs. The Croatian army evicted Serb ing signal that U.S. commitment was Europeans believed that if a military forces from the self-declared Republic limited.11 The precarious peace and short balance was necessary, it should be es- of Serbian Krajina, producing a large 1-year IFOR tenure underscored the tablished through arms reduction and number of Serb civilian casualties and sensitivity and urgency attached to the control. refugee flows. Then, operating in concert Train and Equip Program. The primary Many Balkan experts, journalists, and with Bosnian army units, Croatian forces objective of the program was to create a scholars thought the Train and Equip routed the Serbs who were occupying military balance of power in Bosnia by Program was misguided because the other parts of Croatia and Bosnia. And offsetting Serb advantages. If IFOR was tenuous Bosniak-Croat Federation would finally, on August 30, NATO launched only going to stay a year, it was impera- be overcome with nationalist ambitions airstrikes against the Serb targets. After tive the program begin immediately and and crumble. The Serbs, of course, 11 days of airstrikes, the Serbs stopped be executed rapidly. agreed that the federation was not viable their attacks on Sarajevo. The United States also intended to and that Train and Equip was destabiliz- Two months later, the United States use the Train and Equip Program to ing. They promoted the narrative that hosted a peace conference in Dayton, strengthen the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Bosniak forces were Muslim extremists Ohio. President Clinton justified U.S. A key assumption was that cooperation who wanted to see the establishment of involvement to the public, stating, “The between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks an Islamic state in Bosnia. The Serbs were Balkans lies at the heart of Europe, next on security matters would facilitate prog- not alone in asserting that Washington door to several of our key NATO Allies ress in other sectors. Without agreement was being duped by wily Muslims. and to some of the new, fragile European on security, it was difficult to imagine Looking back, one former senior State democracies. If the war there reignites, much political progress in the federation. Department and UN official concluded it could spread and spark a much larger The sooner the Federation Ministry of the Muslims played the United States conflict, the kind of conflict that has Defense was integrated and working “like a fiddle.” drawn Americans into two European wars smoothly, the more likely it was that In sum, other than the U.S. in this century.”9 American and European other aspects of postwar reconstruction President, a handful of his top national actors shuttled among the various would gather momentum. security officials, some strong supporters Balkan factions promising security and The final objective of the program in Congress, and those directly involved aid and working through innumerable was to orient Bosnia toward the West, in the Train and Equip Program,
94 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic´ and Croatian President Franjo Tudman sign Washington Agreement, March 1994 (Central Intelligence Agency) most informed opinion in the U.S. schedule, traveling extensively, overcom- The IDA study team found the Croat Government and European leadership ing major setbacks, and beating back and Bosniak armies in dire need of training circles thought Train and Equip was bureaucratic resistance to secure interna- and basic equipment. The young, battle- destabilizing and counterproductive. tional donor funds and create a web of hardened troops in both armies suffered Nevertheless, the program succeeded. private- and government-sector entities from a lack of formal training at all levels. Team Performance, 1995–1998. to implement the program. Most of their weaponry was decades old After the Train and Equip Program was Pardew recruited a small team of and worn out from prolonged use. Pardew in effect for 18 months, many observers seven other people from Defense, State, used the IDA assessment to inform a considered it a juggernaut propelling the and the Intelligence Community, some Deputies Committee meeting (a National region toward renewed hostilities. Yet of whom had to eventually leave gov- Security Council staff meeting attended when it began in December 1995, the ernment service and come aboard as by the second highest officials from all program seemed anything but a runaway contractors. By August 1995, Pardew the major departments and agencies) on success. Jim Pardew, who had headed had secured an interagency agreement his program requirements. The deputies the Pentagon’s Balkan Task Force and that a Train and Equip Program should approved Pardew’s five-page paper laying traveled with Holbrooke’s interagency be “modest” and concentrate on “de- out policy, goals, leadership, objectives, negotiating team, led the program. He fensive capabilities,” but the exact size concept, and next steps for the program started with no staff, no budget, no and shape of the program was disputed.12 on December 28, 1995. They stipulated clear requirements, and no committed So an Institute for Defense Analyses that training and equipping required international support. Armed only with a (IDA) team was asked to travel to Bosnia Bosniak and Croat commitment to the mandate and drawdown authority from and make a complete assessment of the federation and for Bosniak leaders to sever Congress, Pardew went to work imme- military balance “to identify priorities for ties with Iran and mujahideen fighters. diately after the Dayton agreement was training and equipment improvements; Pardew immediately began looking signed. Over the next 2 years, Pardew and to develop alternative equip and for financial support to the program. and his team maintained a workaholic train packages.”13 Most of the congressionally mandated
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 95 Bosnia Train and Equip: Lessons for Syria? In early October 2015, the Pentagon announced it was suspending the Syria Train and Equip Program about 9 months after it began. The decision came just 3 weeks after the Com- mander of U.S. Central Command testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that only “four or five” U.S.-trained Syrian fighters remained on the battlefield and that the program would not reach its goal of train- ing 5,000 fighters.1 Labeled a “total failure” by congressional leaders, the demise of the program eliminated a key piece of the Obama administra- tion’s strategy to end the conflict in Syria.2 It is more likely the program Syrian soldiers who have defected to join Free Syrian Army hold up rifles as they secure street in would have succeeded if modeled after Damascus suburbs, January 2012 (Freedom House) the Bosnia Train and Equip effort. No two cases are alike, but there are will run into trouble with the bureau- or replace a covert CIA-led arming and enduring lessons from the Bosnia Train cracy, and reports indicate it did. One training program.”6 A major lesson from and Equip Program, both for manag- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) con- the Bosnia Train and Equip Program ing complex foreign policy problems in tractor helping the rebels quit, stating, is that security assistance programs in general and security assistance programs “They’re asking us to perform miracles, war zones are complex politico-military in particular. To demonstrate why the but they’re giving us nothing.” Now- undertakings. They require multiple, Bosnia model would have improved retired Lieutenant General Michael tightly integrated instruments of power. chances for success in Syria, we need Flynn, USA, and former Director of the An interagency approach similar to to identify the most prominent reasons Defense Intelligence Agency recalls that the one used in Bosnia is much better why the Syria effort failed. Although we even small things were hard from the for such highly sensitive, situation- are still awaiting an Inspector General’s program. The process in Washington dependent missions. Lead agencies just report or some equally authoritative was “completely choked. It was always do not have the breadth of perspective explanation for the poor results in the a ‘mother-may-I.’ And the ‘mother- and collective experience to manage Syria Train and Equip Program, we may-I’ would take a long time.”5 By multiple instruments of power. They already have enough congressional contrast in the case of the Bosnia Train naturally follow their preferred ap- testimony and press exposés to identify and Equip Program, the White House proaches and procedures. A major study several key factors in the failure. strongly supported the program—even of the Afghan and Iraq wars by National First, the President and some of intervening to secure difficult-to-find Defense University scholars concluded his key advisors were notably skeptical funding—and the bureaucracy largely that DOD made the mistake of “try- about the program from the beginning. got out of the way as a result. ing to create forces that mirror-imaged According to some reports, “President Second, the administration assigned those of the West” in those conflicts. Barack Obama never seemed to want the complex Syria train and equip It “developed ministries and military a train-and-equip program for Syrian mission to lead agencies rather than forces modeled on U.S. institutions,” rebels.”3 “One former administration configuring it from the beginning as an and failed to make the effort “trans- official whose views are closely aligned integrated interagency effort. It began actional” and “conditional,” based with the President,” stated the objective as a CIA-run covert operation. Then the on shared objectives and situational of the train and equip program was a administration decided to increase the variables.7 It appears likely that the same “fool’s errand,” a way to make people scale and profile of the effort and gave it thing happened in Syria, which brings feel better about themselves while they to the Department of Defense (DOD). us to the third major reason for failure. watched Syria disintegrate.4 Lukewarm Accordingly, in the spring of 2015, The third factor cited in critiques of support from the White House for a Congressional Defense Committees the failed Syria train and equip effort is controversial program ensures that it approved $500 million to “supplement how divorced it was from local political
96 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 $100 million in drawdown authority for realities. Frederic Hof, a former senior presence of fighters sympathetic to Train and Equip would come from Army advisor on Syria for the Obama admin- extremist elements and terrorism who stocks, including rifles, machine guns, istration, notes that the “formula of were fighting on “our side.” Moreover, radios, tactical telephones, tanks, heavy recruiting people [nationalist rebels] American security assistance began artillery, armored personnel carriers, light who had been hammered for four while the fighting was still under way, antitank weapons, and utility helicopters. years by the [Bashar al-Asad] regime and as the fortunes of war shifted Otherwise, no taxpayer funds would be to fight exclusively against [the Islamic against the Serbians, U.S. diplomacy used for the program’s execution. Thus, State of Iraq and the Levant] was an used battlefield changes to help shape a Pardew had to appeal to other countries elegant Washington maneuver totally peace that all parties could support. We for cash and in-kind donations to finance disconnected from the reality on the cannot be sure that a program modeled the remaining $700 million of the esti- ground inside Syria.”8 Many others on the Bosnia Train and Equip effort mated $800 million program. make the same point, including the would have succeeded. However, it Turkey agreed to host a donor’s Syrians we were trying to train and does not take much insight to see that conference in Ankara on March 15, equip. The Syrian rebels’ elected com- White House support, a full-time inter- 1996, shrugging off complaints from mander, Amin Ibrahim, a former Syrian agency team to manage the effort, and the European Union. The conference army lieutenant colonel, was candid program leadership with deep expertise started well despite the absence of Russia about the trainees’ tense relationship on the Syrian crisis, would have signifi- and other key European countries. with American trainers: “I told them cantly improved chances for success. Thirty-two nations and five international the whole idea is wrong. I said, ‘We organizations attended, but the confer- are Syrians. Our problem is with the ence fizzled. The Europeans extolled [Asad] regime. Help us to get rid of the Notes the importance of arms control while regime.’ The response was, ‘You should 1 Muslim countries asserted the right to not shoot a bullet against the regime.’” “U.S. Strategy Against ISIS,” C-SPAN. org, September 16, 2015. self-defense. U.S. representatives made So, he continued, “we all got up and 2 Department of Defense, “Statement on eloquent arguments about the fragility walked out.”9 Syria,” Release No: NR-392-15, October 9, of peace and the need to build a deter- As others have noted, political 2015. rent force. In the end, concrete pledges correctness of this kind would have 3 Tara McKelvey, “Arming Syrian Rebels: of cash support did not materialize. In doomed efforts to support French Where the U.S. Went Wrong,” BBC News, October 10, 2015. Pardew’s words, the conference “was a resistance in World War II, where many 4 Ibid. complete disaster.”14 fighters harbored communist sympa- 5 Ibid. With time ticking and criticism of the thies. Ambassador James Pardew, who 6 Julian E. Barnes, Adam Entous, and program splattered across newspapers, led the Bosnia Train and Equip effort, Carol E. Lee, “Obama Proposes $500 Pardew turned to the White House. He had been working the problem for Million to Aid Syrian Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2014. reminded senior leaders that the pro- years and knew all the circumstances 7 T.X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring gram was a personal commitment from and major parties involved well. He Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in President Clinton. The President dis- resisted political handicaps that would Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long patched his lifelong friend and counselor, cripple his program—such as the early War, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph Thomas “Mack” McLarty, to the Gulf inclusion of Serbians—and successfully J. Collins (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015). with a personal request for assistance. defended his approach multiple times 8 Joe Gould, “Was Syrian Train-and- A trip to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab before senior interagency bodies, warn- Equip Effort Always a ‘Mission Impossible’?” Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait on April 14 ing them that a failed effort was worse Defense News, September 21, 2015. and 15 netted $115 million in cash. With than no effort at all. 9 Roy Gutman, “What Really Happened funding from the Gulf priming the pump, Some will claim Bosnia and Syria to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?” McClatchyDC.com, December 21, a second trip to Malaysia and Brunei are not comparable, and that Syria—an 2015. eventually increased program donations active war zone—presented a tougher to $147 million. Although this was a far set of conditions for security assistance. cry from IDA’s estimated program needs, There are differences, of course, but the Train and Equip team doggedly pur- the relative level of difficulty is not one sued in-kind donations over the next 2 of them. Bosnia, after all, was notably years, securing pledges from 14 countries labeled as “the foreign policy problem valued at another $129 million. In addi- from hell,” and too tough to tackle. tion to the $100 million in U.S. military Just like Syria, it involved incredibly assistance, the total value of the program brutal internecine conflict and the was over $400 million in cash, equip- ment, training, and technical support.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 97 View of downtown Grbavica, a neighborhood in Sarajevo, March 1996 (Stacey Wyzkowski)
Successfully obtaining funds gener- duty to protect the property on behalf awarded the contract to MPRI, a deci- ated an unforeseen and pressing problem: of the donors, which meant ensuring sion that had unanimous support. The how to legally spend other countries’ the funds were allocated consistent with company was well known for its work in money for an American-led foreign donor intent. Obtaining support from Croatia, and Pardew believed that the military program. Constitutionally, the the Departments of Justice and Treasury company was committed to the mis- Executive is not permitted to spend ensured broad government support for sion and took pride in facilitating the money without congressional approval. It the funding mechanism. execution of U.S. foreign policy. With took a unique legal construct and a joint After securing interagency and donor experience working in the region, MPRI effort by State, Treasury, and the Justice agreement for this novel approach, the understood the conflict and the chal- Department to allow those funds to be Bosnian Defense Fund was established lenges it would be facing. used consistent with U.S. law and the on April 22, 1996. Through support- The Train and Equip staff also began policy objectives of the Train and Equip ing arrangements for administering the negotiating with the Department of the Program. A winning formula was found funds, including a set of administrative Army on what material could be drawn after a number of false starts. procedures, the program was able to down from Army stocks. Ultimately, the Legal advisors reasoned that be- ensure donor funds never passed through program secured a wide range of light cause the funds had been given to the Bosnian hands. The funds always went lethal and nonlethal assistance, includ- United States for a specific purpose, the directly for training and equipment that ing 45,100 M16 rifles, 1,000 machine Department of State could create a com- the Bosnian defense leadership agreed guns, an assortment of field radios and mon law trust for them. Setting up such was necessary. telephones, and other gear. The heavy a trust allowed the U.S. Government to Meanwhile, the Train and Equip team equipment included 45 upgraded administer the money but did not give had worked hard to put a contract in Vietnam-era M60A3 main battle tanks, it ownership rights or direct control place for training federation forces. Since 80 armored personnel carriers, 840 light over how the funds were to be used. the Department of Defense wanted to antitank weapons, and 15 Huey util- Washington would hold the funds in distance itself from the program, private ity helicopters.15 Train and Equip also the U.S. Treasury with an affirmative contractors were used. The federation obtained other items from U.S. excess
98 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 defense articles, most notably 116 large augment their technical competence with the more moderate Izetbegovic´. His towed howitzers. deft diplomacy. Initially, meetings were Iranian ties were well known, and in the In addition, team members went fraught with ethnic tension and occa- postwar environment, removing radical shopping throughout Europe and the sional threats of violence. But over time, Iranian fighters and persons of influence Middle East, hunting for the best equip- the animosity was replaced by bureau- was a nonnegotiable, congressionally and ment at the best price. Pardew’s team cratic struggles over offices and furniture. Presidentially mandated prerequisite for secured the help of some Army experts Eventually, with a great deal of MPRI the Train and Equip Program to begin. on foreign weapons systems to assess coaching and after-hours socializing, Pardew informed Izetbegovic´ that keep- attractive buying options. When pos- bantering and joking between the two ing people such as Cengic´ around “was sible and cost-effective, the task force sides became common. MPRI also faced not a strategy for security” but a “road to also wanted to stimulate the indigenous enormous technical hurdles. It had to isolation and partition.”18 Bosnian defense industry. It let a contract set up quickly in an austere postconflict The situation came to a head as the for the production of Kevlar helmets and environment with a tight budget, and United States prepared to deliver its first small caliber ammunition after ensuring it had to integrate and maintain diverse shipment of heavy weapons. Pardew in- the Bosnians could match a competi- used equipment donations, which arrived sisted that a letter signed by Secretary of tive price and obtained approval to buy at different intervals. State Warren Christopher and Secretary Bosnian-produced 122-millimeter (mm) Yet within seven months of hitting of Defense William Perry be sent to towed howitzers. the ground, an integrated Federation Izetbegovic´ demanding the removal of Most of the weapons had to be Army School and Computer Simulation Cengic´ as Minister of Defense. State obtained elsewhere, though. Western Center for both soldiers and officers considered removing ministers in other European opposition to the program opened, and brigade- and battalion-level governments extraordinary, inappropri- influenced some Eastern European training began in earnest. By the end ate, and fraught with political risks. The countries, such as Poland and the Czech of the program’s second year, 5,000 idea went against State proclivities, and Republic, to decline participation. But soldiers had concluded unit training, no immediate decision from Secretary others, such as Ukraine, Romania, and and 2,500 had gone through the school Christopher was forthcoming. While Slovakia, were eager to sell some of their and simulation center. MPRI also taught waiting, Pardew learned one day that excess Warsaw Pact equipment for cash. small unit tactics, conducted battle man- Secretary Perry was in the main State Egypt also offered a heavy equipment agement training with U.S. computer building for a ceremony. He button- donation to the federation, thus seizing systems at a combat simulation center holed Perry and made his case. Perry the opportunity to be a cooperative ally near Sarajevo, and established live-fire took Pardew to Christopher, who was and possible future seller to the Bosnian tank and artillery training at ranges in hesitant. However, with Secretary Perry’s military. western Bosnia and Turkey. encouragement, he agreed and added his In December 1996, the first non-U.S. Political tension between Bosniaks signature to the letter. donation to Train and Equip arrived at and Croats was a constant challenge. Pardew went to Sarajevo and deliv- the Croatian port of Ploc˘e: 36 105mm Both factions were “suspicious of ered the ultimatum to Izetbegovic´. The howitzers with ammunition and spare American commitment,” wondering insistence on Cengic´’s removal began parts from the UAE and 12 130mm if the United States was “in this for a tense period of high political drama field guns, 12 122mm howitzers, and 18 the long haul.”17 During the first year, involving numerous senior leaders in the 23mm antiaircraft guns with spare parts much effort went into forging a working U.S., Bosnian, and Croatian govern- from Egypt. Shortly thereafter, the UAE relationship between the two previously ments. While Izetbegovic´ considered the delivered 44 ML90 armored personnel warring groups. The Train and Equip implications of the ultimatum, the Train carriers and 42 French-built AMX30 Program had to tackle high-level political and Equip Program was put on hold, tanks, and in October 1997, the United problems, including passing new legisla- which meant the large U.S. merchant States delivered 116 refurbished 155mm tion so there would be a legal basis for ship carrying U.S. weapons idled in the field howitzers. As these arms flowed the new federation command structure Adriatic from October 24 on, burning to federation forces, Western European and suppressing usage of old nationalist fuel and program dollars. For the task diplomats and military leaders repeated symbols such as flags, insignia, and auto- force, wasting drawdown dollars in such their argument that Train and Equip was mobile license plates. a fashion was agonizing. As weeks passed, a “recipe for more war” and that “one In the midst of all this political ma- Pardew orchestrated support from U.S. day American-made tanks will be rolling neuvering, Pardew considered one issue leaders who, whenever they met with across Bosnia’s plains.”16 important enough to risk his entire pro- Izetbegovic´ or those close to him, en- MPRI moved to execute its contract gram: the removal of the Bosniak Deputy couraged the Bosnians to sever ties with as soon as it received U.S. Government Defense Minister Hasan Cengic´. As a Cengic´. approval. By any standards, it faced a Muslim hardliner, Cengic´ was perceived After considerable delay, Izetbegovic´ tough task. MPRI personnel had to as close to but ultimately out of step with agreed to let his longtime associate go on
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 99 the condition that Bosnian Croat Deputy realizing it, the Bosnian Serbs were never Serbs might have had about the merits Minister of Defense Vladimir Šoljic´ also tempted to renew hostilities. of renewing hostilities. If federation be dismissed. Pardew was eventually able The Train and Equip Program also leaders ever harbored illusions about to secure the cooperation of the Croats helped orient Bosnia toward the West. renewing hostilities, they diminished as on this condition, and Šoljic´ resigned on Narrowly construed, this meant expelling the program’s limited scope and duration November 18. Several days later, the U.S. foreign forces and detaching the Bosniaks became clear to them. Both objectively, ship offloaded the American weapons at from their relationship with Iran, which in terms of actual military capability, and the Croatian port of Ploc˘e. For the Train largely succeeded. Pardew forced the dis- subjectively, in terms of perceived relative and Equip team, the firing of Cengic´ missal of Cengic´ to accelerate the process capabilities, the program did not over- had been a high-stakes gamble, but one of severing Bosniak ties with Islamic radi- shoot its mark as so many worried. On that paid off. It sent a signal to federation cals. Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary the contrary, it diminished the influence officials: no more games and no more Guards and mujahideen forces were of extremists and foreign meddling in playing both sides. expelled from Bosnia. In later years, the Bosnian politics and moved the political Meanwhile, many Western European Bosnian government continued to coop- mainstream to favor greater integration. officials continued to oppose Train and erate with the United States in identifying Equip. The British, whose opposition and expelling extremists. In October The Way Forward was apparent from the beginning, were 2001, six Algerians were arrested by NATO’s experience in Bosnia, includ- by far the boldest and most adept. They the Bosnian police and later sent to ing the Train and Equip experience, considered the program akin to “pouring Guantánamo Bay. In 2007, the govern- illustrates that hybrid threats to NATO gasoline on a fire.”19 One British general ment revoked the citizenship of over 420 are not new and that the Alliance has in particular made a practice of harassing people connected to “foreign forces.” experience with successful mechanisms MPRI, disrupting meetings and under- Close observers have argued the United for managing them. Initially, NATO mining the program. British diplomatic States largely succeeded in thwarting al leaders hoped diplomacy alone would personnel worked in lockstep with their Qaeda influence in Bosnia. generate peace. Later, they hoped that military to prevent the Train and Equip Broadly construed, orienting Bosnia positioning military forces around safe Program from getting necessary permits toward the West meant imparting Western havens in Bosnia would suffice and, and approvals. They were particularly norms on civil-military relations and finally, that isolated airstrikes would do successful in delaying combined live-fire forging ties with Western leaders and the job. But lurching from diplomacy to training at the new Combat Training institutions, which most would conclude military force generated little progress. Center outside of Livno, which was is still a work in progress. Some partici- Resolving what one former Secretary located in the British-controlled sector pants in Train and Equip believed this of State called “the problem from hell” of Bosnia. It took more than a year and happened, asserting the program proved required a sophisticated and ongoing a half to overcome British impediments the federation could integrate its militaries mix of diplomacy, military force, and before the center opened. and professionalize them, which inclined other tools of statecraft. Net Assessment. It is not possible to military leaders to be more apolitical.20 Eventually, the United States put an enumerate all the administrative, techni- An International Crisis Group report in interagency team together that could cal, and political achievements of the December 1997 supported this assess- coordinate diplomatic, political, military, Train and Equip task force here. The im- ment, observing there was more evidence and informational activities quickly and portant point is that it achieved its larger of cooperation in the federation Ministry to good effect. The first team was led by goals, the most immediate of which was of Defense than in other sectors, and that Holbrooke and the second by Pardew. securing a military balance so the Bosnian the program provided transparency for Both pursued this integrated approach Federation could defend itself. The pro- federation military developments. Because to great effect. Indeed, Pardew used a gram was supposed to provide a rough Train and Equip helped Westernize similar approach later to facilitate peace balance between the federation and the postwar Bosnia, the report concluded it in Macedonia and Kosovo. Some NATO Republika Srpska. NATO forces would “would be foolish to scrap this asset.”21 partners were slow to learn the necessity of deter conflict among the larger regional Bosnia’s future remains uncertain, a multidimensional response, but having powers. The point of the Train and Equip but 20 years later, there is no doubt ceded the lead to the United States, they Program was local military stability in the program achieved its operational had to follow the American approach to Bosnia, which reduced the demands on goals. In less than 2 years, the task force move forward, and it proved a success. the program, and also meant the program rectified the military imbalance between Russia is a much more capable and was unlikely to precipitate a regional Bosnian Serb and federation forces, serious threat than Serbia but what the conflict because it was not a threat to and did so with only about half of the United States demonstrated in Bosnia, Croatia or Serbia proper. The task force resources originally estimated necessary. and what NATO must understand now, was highly successful in this respect and, The program reassured the federation is that all hybrid threats require new and eliminated any misconceptions the command and control arrangements.
100 Features / Back to Basics on Hybrid Warfare in Europe JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 There is nothing wrong with the military and periodically review the terms of refer- Peace Process and an Exchange with Report- ers,” Washington, DC, October 31, 1995. steps NATO has taken to date to reas- ence for the teams led by Holbrooke and 10 House Foreign Relations Committee, sure Eastern European countries facing Pardew. Approving the mechanism and prepared statement of Secretary of Defense Wil- hybrid threats from Russia—for example, procedures would be a worthy objective liam Perry, The Deployment of Troops to Bosnia, strengthening the Response Force and for NATO’s July 2016 Warsaw Summit. November 30, 1995. Perry made the same bolstering air policing and air surveil- Certainly these steps would be more point privately to President Izetbegovic´. Derek Chollet, The Road to Dayton Accords: A Study of lance in the Baltics. However, these practical than more speeches on the impor- American Statecraft (London: Palgrave/Mac- military steps need to be integrated with tance of hybrid warfare or debates about Millan, 2005), 169. informational, political, diplomatic, and the concept’s definitional parameters. JFQ 11 David Halberstam in Chollet, 196. economic measures. Russia will be much 12 These and other attributes were repeat- more easily deterred if it sees NATO can edly mentioned in discussions of the program and codified in the National Security Council match its multifaceted aggression with Notes (NSC) documents. See, for example, “Equip- multidimensional security measures that ping and Training the Federation,” tab C, 1 Frank G. Hoffman, “On Not-So-New are well coordinated, mutually support- September 29, 1995, Deputies Committee Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats,” Meeting, Declassified Document C05961572, ing, and quickly implemented. WarontheRocks.com, July 28, 2014, available at September 21, 1995, Bosnia, Intelligence, and Some will argue that what was achieved
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Lamb and Stipanovich 101 Afghan police officers and Afghan National Security Forces move up mountain pass in Paktika Province, Afghanistan, January 2014 (DOD/Jared Gehmann)
Economic Development in Counterinsurgency Building a Stable Second Pillar
By Patrick H. Donley
he future of U.S. participation will likely sidestep our unprecedented At its core, a counterinsurgency is a in counterinsurgency (COIN) is superiority in traditional, force-on-force, battle for government legitimacy in the T uncertain, but not so the prob- state-on-state warfare. And so insur- minds of its people.2 Writing in 1963, ability that future adversaries will avoid gency . . . will be our enemies’ weapon David Galula summarized the insur- U.S. conventional military dominance of choice until we prove we can master gent aim: “If the insurgent manages to by using asymmetric, unconventional it.”1 Unfortunately, because no two dissociate the population from the coun- methods. As COIN theorist David Kil- insurgencies are exactly alike, mastering terinsurgent, to control it physically, to cullen warns, “Any smart future enemy COIN will be a perpetual endeavor. get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, Colonel Patrick H. Donley, USAF, is a Security Forces Officer assigned as the J34 Division Chief 3 overseeing Force Protection, Antiterrorism, and Critical Infrastructure Protection for Combined Forces at worst, on its submissiveness.” One of Command and United States Forces Korea. the chief ways insurgents attain popular
102 Features / Economic Development in Counterinsurgency JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 support is by capitalizing on government government control of the populace and Economic Development ineffectiveness. In fact, government il- area; and gain the populace’s support.”11 Principles legitimacy is considered by many COIN Since publication of the military COIN Rather than propose a new definition strategists as the “root cause of and guidance, many observers believe the for economic development, this article the central strategic problem in today’s strategy has been expanded to include a uses Kilcullen’s description of the unstable global-security environment.”4 preliminary “Shape” phase (intelligence economic pillar in his Inter-agency Counterinsurgents, then, must have as preparation of the battlefield, interagency Counterinsurgency Framework. Within their primary objective the creation of a planning, and so forth) and a conclud- the pillar, he includes “Humanitarian government that derives legitimacy from ing “Transfer” phase (bulk U.S. force Assistance, Development Assistance, its ability to provide its population with withdrawal, primary responsibility shifts Resources & Infrastructure Manage- effective security, responsive governance, to HN security forces, and so forth).12 ment, and Growth Capacity” as key and sufficient economic development.5 In Whether the military’s “Shape, Clear, tasks.13 Economic development, then, is fact, Kilcullen considers the security, po- Hold, Build, and Transfer” model is the provision of sufficient basic services, litical, and economic mission elements to correct, it provides a useful framework infrastructure, and economic essentials be co-equal “pillars” in his Inter-agency that political and economic development to garner popular support and engender Counterinsurgency Framework.6 experts can use to integrate their actions government legitimacy. Because “suffi- Due to the complexities of COIN, with their security colleagues. cient economic development” is largely the U.S. Army and Marine Corps col- To date, political and economic based on the affected population’s laborated in 2006 to provide their forces developers have not created comparable expectations, it is always contextually with “a manual that provides principles models to guide their actions or inform determined. and guidelines for counterinsurgency their mission partners. Consequently, As a growing number of development operations.”7 Recognizing “that every their efforts appear somewhat reactive experts have observed, economic devel- insurgency is contextual,” the authors and disjointed, and may, as a result, be opment is not a panacea and cannot be set out to highlight the “common char- perceived as being subordinate to the divorced from security and governance. acteristics of insurgencies” to provide security mission. To address this weak- The government cannot gain sufficient military implementers of COIN “a solid ness, this article focuses on the economic legitimacy solely by building projects or foundation for understanding and ad- development mission. It proposes five key otherwise infusing money into a local dressing specific insurgencies.”8 Along principles that should guide economic economy.14 In fact, such development can with security, the manual concedes the development activities in a counterin- actually increase instability rather than criticality of governance and economic surgency, and it presents a four-phase decrease it.15 Andrew Wilder and Stuart development to COIN success, and ac- conceptual model that can be used by Gordon conclude from their research in knowledges that military members must economic developers, as well as security Afghanistan that U.S. and international work closely with “many intergovern- and political planners, to better syn- aid efforts “show little evidence of . . . mental, host-nation, and international chronize all COIN efforts. It does not, winning hearts and minds or promot- agencies” to capitalize on skills such however, offer a context-independent ing stability.”16 An Afghan tribal elder as “rebuilding infrastructure and basic recipe for COIN success or an easy-to- summed up the argument this way: “Lack services” and to facilitate the establish- follow checklist that simplifies COIN of clinics, schools, and roads are not the ment of “local governance and rule of complexities. No matter how efficiently a problem. The main problem is we don’t law.”9 Moreover, it advocates synchro- COIN campaign is run, success depends have a good government.”17 nizing these three mission elements and on a number of complicated factors, This finding was echoed by a group unifying “efforts of joint, interagency, many of which are outside the economic of development experts who discussed multinational, and Host Nation (HN) developers’ control. Most importantly, the topic at the 2010 Wilton Park forces toward a common purpose.”10 COIN success presupposes a capable Conference “Winning ‘Hearts and While military forces have a legitimate HN government partner that is willing Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the role in each of the mission elements, to make the changes necessary to win Effectiveness of Development Aid in their primary expertise lies in providing a popular legitimacy. Secondly, it assumes COIN Operations.”18 The end-of-con- secure environment so that political and that the United States wants to defeat the ference report found that “many Afghans economic development can occur. To insurgency and not merely alleviate some believe the main cause of insecurity to this end, the chapter titled “Executing lesser risk. Both of these are weighty be their government, which is perceived Counterinsurgency Operations” assumptions that may, at some stage, to be massively corrupt, predatory and advocates using a “Clear-Hold-Build” ap- prove inaccurate. While this article hopes unjust. . . . Without getting the ‘politics proach for “specific, high-priority area[s] to provide general guidance that will right’ both military and aid efforts are experiencing overt insurgent operations” increase the probability of U.S. COIN unlikely to achieve their desired effects.”19 in order to “create a secure physical and success, it concedes the enormity of the In contrast to the U.S. Army’s 2009 psychological environment; establish firm COIN challenge upfront. handbook Commander’s Guide to Money
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Donley 103 as a Weapons System, which claims that increases mission effectiveness, bolsters work together to develop compatible warfighters can use “money as a weapons HN capability, and lends credence to the plans. It may also require appointment system to win the hearts and minds of the government. If the HN structures are in- of a single decisionmaker who exercises indigenous population to facilitate defeat- effective, U.S. developers should use their authority over all three missions. ing the insurgents,” mounting evidence expertise and financial leverage to reform Synchronization is also key to indicates that money (and economic them since the HN will eventually inherit eliminating gaps between mission ele- development more broadly) is effective the long-term mission.23 Reforming the ments. The counterinsurgents’ ability in COIN only if it bolsters government government institutions can be problem- to eliminate gaps between missions can legitimacy.20 Development can buy the atic since affected HN officials may resist be the difference between success and population’s goodwill temporarily, but the changes and accuse the United States failure. Each COIN mission assumes it cannot do so indefinitely by itself.21 of neocolonial meddling—an accusation prominence at a different point in the While economic development efforts will the United States is particularly keen on campaign even though all three operate depend on the nature of the insurgency avoiding and one insurgents can exploit throughout the COIN effort.24 Security and the specific context of the situation, to discredit HN government legitimacy. is the foundational need for all others and U.S. economic development strategies Resolution of these conflicts will be dif- therefore takes priority in the early stages for a counterinsurgency should broadly ficult and will require diplomatic acumen, of a COIN operation.25 Development comply with five key principles. but the United States cannot simply reaches its critical point after security has Endgame Legitimacy. Economic acquiesce to HN intransigence if it hopes been established but is a precursor to development in COIN must have as its to be successful. and facilitator for effective subnational overriding purpose the creation of HN Similarly, economic development governance. Lastly, political mobilization legitimacy. Every other aim must be should utilize HN implementers as much is critical toward the end of the COIN subordinated to this objective. While the as possible so that the HN gets the credit. effort because the HN government must concept is easy to understand, it is often While this development approach takes be capable of exercising long-term effec- difficult to practice consistently and may longer and may require more people to tive governance before successful transfer increase local instability and opposition institute initially, it builds long-lasting of the mission can occur. in the short term. It requires developers HN capacity and engenders popular Economic development must be to bypass unethical local powerbrokers support for the government. Making synchronized with the security mission so and shun corrupt business practices in this more difficult is the fact that U.S. that there is no gap between the termina- favor of closely monitored, community- economic developers are usually under tion of kinetic operations in the security led development programs. Using this pressure from an impatient U.S. public mission and the initiation of humanitarian approach, developers may be opposed to generate results quickly. Consequently, assistance in the economic development by economically powerful business developers are susceptible to two com- mission. Immediately following the Clear people, corrupt government leaders, mon development pitfalls. Either they phase of the security mission, the local organized crime syndicates, and local are tempted to use whatever structures population is likely to feel a degree of warlords who seek to protect their power are already in place without regard for cautious optimism that the HN govern- and influence, in addition to traditional the negative effect such practices have on ment can positively change their lives. insurgents. Nevertheless, to achieve the the local population, or they opt to do While locals may not yet feel comfortable long-term goal of building HN govern- all the work themselves. Both of these expressing support for the government, ment legitimacy, economic developers approaches delegitimize the HN gov- they are expectant and hopeful that their and policymakers must resist the urge to ernment and minimize the chances for lives might improve. Simultaneously, the compromise overall mission success for long-term success. immediate post-kinetic period is when short-term progress. This is far easier said Synchronicity of Missions. Economic local populations are particularly vulner- than done. development must be integrated and fully able and dependent on the government One way of legitimizing the HN compatible with security and political to meet their needs due to injuries, government is to work within the HN strategies. As all three mission elements infrastructure destruction, economic structure as much as possible. Rather are necessary to generate the requisite upheaval, and population displacement. than setting up parallel U.S. structures legitimacy to defeat the insurgency, great If the necessary assistance lags behind that delegitimize the HN government, care must be taken not to pursue one the security operation or is inadequate in U.S. developers should adapt to HN at the expense of the other two. This its scope, the people’s hopes are dashed institutions if they exist. It is possible that requires thorough inter-mission planning and their assessment of government the HN government has capabilities and and an acknowledgment that each com- legitimacy declines, possibly even below institutions that are uniquely suited to the ponent affects the success of the others. pre-security operation levels. This sense culture and the expectations of its popu- To achieve this synergy, planners from all of betrayal gives the insurgent another lace.22 By utilizing them and building three mission sets, including representa- leverage point with which to influence upon their expertise, the United States tives from the HN government, must the population.
104 Features / Economic Development in Counterinsurgency JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Children in boys and girls school in Kabul (U.S. Air Force/Stacey Haga)
Moreover, the longer it takes the the economic development with effec- tactical development and operational counterinsurgent to follow the security tive HN governance, which can only be development, economic development has gains with economic development, the accomplished if the political mission is the potential to generate crucial effects at less able the security forces are to main- functional and effective while economic both levels. Effective economic develop- tain the secure environment. Effective development is taking place. Simply put, ment will strive to take advantage of both economic and political development people are more likely to respond favor- domains to bolster government capability activities build confidence among popu- ably to governance when they associate it and generate popular support. lations, resulting in the growth of an with meeting their needs. At the tactical level, economic devel- internal security dynamic. Without this Simultaneous Tactical and opment provides the counterinsurgent internal security, it is virtually impossible Operational Development. Economic with a tool to incentivize the popula- to maintain any security at all, regardless development must be employed simul- tion to resolve factors of instability and of the number of people at their disposal. taneously at tactical and operational bolsters local support for the HN gov- Insurgents will eventually infiltrate back levels. Along these lines, the Wilton Park ernment. Pragmatically, it also buys the into the community and exact vengeance conferees made a distinction between counterinsurgent limited goodwill and upon those who collaborated with the “stabilization” and “development objec- forms the basis for trust from the local government. The resultant insecurity tives” of economic aid. Stabilization population. Effective economic develop- will further highlight the government’s funds were those used for “relatively ment must take advantage of this window ineptness and create lasting doubt in the small scale and short-term projects of optimism and provide tangible benefits minds of the people that will be difficult designed to promote stability effects at that cannot easily be countered by insur- to eradicate. a tactical level” and development funds gent information operations.27 Early on, Similarly, there should be no gap were for “larger-scale and longer-term tactical economic development comes between effective economic development development aid projects designed to in the form of emergency provisions and and the establishment of good gover- promote development objectives.”26 humanitarian assistance such as medical nance. To achieve the intended COIN Whether the distinction is between sta- care, food and water, and temporary shel- effect, the local population must associate bilization and development or between ters. Because of the kinetic nature of the
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Donley 105 Afghan presidential candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani sign Joint Declaration of the Electoral Teams in Kabul, August 2014 (State Department) environment, implementers at this stage community’s capacity to take control of international aid effectively. Vitally im- will primarily be military personnel. its economic future and set the stage for portant to generating confidence within Once immediate needs are met, tacti- the political pillar to operate effectively. the HN population and the international cal economic development progresses Operational economic development, community is the creation of transparent to the provision of necessary economic on the other hand, is aimed at increas- procedures for financial accountability. infrastructure (for example, wells, roads, ing the HN government’s legitimacy by Host-Nation Capacity-Building. electrical generators), resolving commu- bolstering its ability to provide economi- Economic development must deliberately nal instability, and laying the framework cally for the entire country. What tactical build HN government capacity so that for sustainable development institutions. developers do inside and among local the government is eventually able to Tactical economic development should communities, operational developers do conduct the mission without U.S. assis- not be a blank check designed to meet on a national scale—using development tance. From planning to implementation every individual desire within a com- to resolve disputes, increase employment to sustainment, U.S. developers must munity; instead, it should be an incentive opportunities, and provide skills training. prioritize “transferability” by using meth- to motivate community members to U.S. economic developers at this level ods the HN government can perpetuate. work together to identify and solve local serve as advisors to key development min- The goal of U.S. developers should be problems. In this latter stage, economic istries, facilitate U.S. access to key HN to transfer the mission seamlessly to developers provide populations with leaders, and act as the conduit for HN- their HN partners so that the population training in basic economic development U.S. meetings. Moreover, they should experiences no difference in the quality principles and organizational expertise assist the HN government in identifying of service it receives. To this end, the and assist them in the acquisition of and sourcing large infrastructure proj- United States must avoid using equip- necessary infrastructure development in ects that will have a positive national ment or software that the HN can neither accordance with the community’s priori- impact, training government personnel operate nor sustain. This constraint can ties. Ultimately, the latter stage of tactical to implement and oversee these projects, be challenging for U.S. developers, who economic development should build the and increasing HN capability to use often rely on the latest technological
106 Features / Economic Development in Counterinsurgency JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 and mechanical tools. They must either a stabilization framework designed to the development budget must allow for change their way of doing business to be highlight sources of instability, but to be popular input into the decisionmaking compatible with HN capabilities, or they truly effective, USAID needs to partner process.32 must invest in the HN’s long-term infra- more comprehensively and consistently A compromise approach would be structure development and commit to its with trained HN personnel to administer to give each community a per capita sustainment and maintenance until the it.28 amount of money for spending on a HN is able to sustain it on its own. Not only would HNDTs bring community-selected project, in addition Because of the lead-time required cultural expertise and a shared cultural to other centrally selected development to train HN personnel and the need to identity to complex situations, but they packages. The community project could avoid gaps between the mission sets, the would also represent the HN government then be used as a skills-development op- United States must begin capacity-build- in a way that foreigners never could.29 portunity in which development experts ing at the tactical and operational levels Additionally, because of their knowledge mentor community leaders through long before the need for implementation. of the HN government, they would be every phase of project implementation. Once there is agreement between the better able to coordinate the people’s A similar approach is already used effec- U.S. and HN governments regarding the perceived needs with the long-term plans tively by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Rural manner in which economic development of the government. For instance, if a Rehabilitation and Development with its will occur (in the early planning phase), particular community desired the con- National Solidarity Program.33 Time and the United States should prioritize the struction of a new school, members of an again, this community empowerment capacity-building mission at the opera- HNDT would be better placed to liaise and rural development program is lauded tional and tactical levels. Early on, U.S. with the appropriate government depart- by researchers and inspectors alike for its personnel may out of necessity lead de- ment to ensure the proposed school high accountability, broad popular sup- velopment efforts, but they must not do aligns with HN government plans and port, and national reach.34 so indefinitely—particularly at the tactical resources. Too often, foreign economic Regardless of the details of the level. The United States must deliberately developers, hoping to engender goodwill economic development strategy that is taper its involvement until it is an unseen with a population, build infrastructure implemented, U.S. developers would do entity providing advice, technical exper- projects in the wrong locations or to the well to incorporate these five economic tise, and funding. wrong specifications because they do not development principles, even if it means For the tactical mission, the United coordinate their actions with the HN the pace of development is slower, the States must strive to transfer implementa- government.30 Instead of fostering HN selection of projects is suboptimal, or tion responsibilities to the HN as soon government legitimacy, the abandoned the credit for the efforts goes elsewhere. as possible. To facilitate this, the United project becomes a testimony to the HN Above all, the United States should re- States must ensure the HN has a rapidly government’s inability to meet the popu- member that if economic development is deployable development capability that lation’s needs. delinked from HN legitimacy, it is a fruit- can quickly reach all parts of the country. Responsiveness to Local Input. Finally, less exercise and a potential contributor Recognizing that some countries cannot economic development must respond to instability. afford to support permanently based to local demand. When seeking to bring local HN developers in every part of the economic development to a community, Economic Development Model country, the United States should train U.S. developers have a tendency to Utilizing the five economic develop- deployable HN Development Teams assume they know best what the com- ment principles above, it is possible to (HNDTs) to meet this need. These teams munity needs and what will most quickly construct an economic development should comprise people who work for resolve instability and engender legiti- model for COIN operations to guide various HN development ministries or macy. To simplify logistical and financial future planning efforts. The model is departments and who have the requisite planning and avoid conflict among local composed of four phases: Shape, Sta- skills and knowledge to mobilize post- communities over aid equity, it is tempt- bilize, Build, and Transfer (figure 1). kinetic populations, manage expectations, ing for U.S. developers to eschew input While three of the phases share the same assess immediate needs, and distribute from the local populace.31 While these names as their security model counter- essential life-sustaining necessities in concerns may be valid, they do not justify parts, they do not necessarily share the conjunction with applicable government ignoring local input entirely. After all, same timelines. Figure 2 illustrates the departments. In addition to meeting im- the point of economic development is to correlation between the security and mediate needs, these HNDTs should be create HN government legitimacy in the economic development models. trained to identify sources of instability minds of its people, which requires gov- Phase 0: Shape. This phase is primar- within populations so that development ernment responsiveness to the perceived ily for planning and preparation. For the resources can be used to resolve them. needs of the people. There are reasonable COIN effort to be successful, represen- The U.S. Agency for International limits to the flexibility that can be al- tatives from all three mission elements Development (USAID) already employs lowed in the system, but some portion of must participate equally in building a
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Donley 107 Figure 1. Economic Development Mission Element acquisition of necessary resources. To prevent a security development gap from Zone of Host-Nation Government Legitimacy occurring, the financial mechanisms, personnel, and key equipment must be Shape Stabilize Build Transfer ready in advance. Moreover, economic U.S. Leads, Tactical: Host • Government legitimacy developers should identify, train, equip, Planning (Interagency, Host Nation Nation Leads, Intermission, and Host Nation) in support U.S. in support • Partnership and exercise HN Development Team Advise on suitable kinetic capacity endstate • Tactical quick • Community • Infrastructure members. Because of the questionable Preparing impact projects mobilization • Stabilization targets security environments and austere loca- Identify resources • Initial stability • Need Prepare logistics surveys/ID prioritization tions in which they will operate, HNDT Identify team • Manage • Community expectations commitment members should possess a wide variety Training Host Nation of skills. If development skills are lack- Central Government and HNDTs Operational: U.S. Leads ing, the United States should consider Managing Host-Nation • Ministerial Expectations assistance initiating educational programs for host • Technical nationals in return for their obligatory expertise • Funding government service. This “development Special Forces/Civil Affairs/OTI, PRTs, HNDT/NGOs college” would not only benefit the individuals and the HN government Time in the short term, but it would also broaden the foundation for longer term economic success as the graduates apply their skills after completing their service Figure 2. Security and Economic Development Comparison obligations. Phase 1: Stabilize. This phase is Zone of Host-Nation Government Legitimacy divided into two stages. The first stage Shape Clear Hold Build Transfer begins while the security mission is still conducting clearing operations. Because kinetic operations are ongoing, Security the military leads this phase, primarily using special operations forces and civil affairs teams who have been trained in economic development tasks. As the environment becomes more secure, eco- Shape Stabilize Build Transfer nomic development responsibilities shift to civilian experts from USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives and joint civil- Economic military Provincial Reconstruction Teams Development (PRTs). Economic development in this early stage focuses on providing advice to U.S. military combatants on how best Special Forces/Civil Affairs/OTI, PRTs, HNDT/NGOs to terminate their operations to facilitate economic development success, assess- ing humanitarian damage for planning macro-level COIN plan. Because one mis- transition points between one mission refinements, and providing emergency sion element’s needs may drive the actions element and another to ensure there is no humanitarian assistance. As the security of the other two, it is critical that planning gap in momentum or service to the popu- effort transitions from Clear to Hold, for all three mission elements be inte- lation. Each mission element should share HN economic developers play a greater grated from the beginning. For example, special considerations regarding timing, support role, helping U.S. PRTs conduct if successful economic development in location, measures of success, and follow- initial needs assessments and stability sur- a particular area requires uninterrupted on actions. At the micro-level of economic veys with returning internally displaced electrical power, economic development development planning, military, inter- populations. They also work together to planners should convey this requirement agency, and HN personnel should actively initiate small-scale projects designed to to the security planners so that they con- participate, even if it slows the process. build on the population’s optimism, all duct their operation accordingly. Special In addition to planning, the Shape the while actively managing the popula- emphasis should be placed on planning phase is devoted to identification and tion’s expectations.
108 Features / Economic Development in Counterinsurgency JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Security force team member for PRT Farah maintains security and checks communications during meeting with Farah Provincial Chief Justice in Farah City, Afghanistan (U.S. Navy/Josh Ives)
The second stage of this phase occurs government. In addition, they advise the political thrust. Throughout this phase, when security has become fairly constant government on strategic messaging and PRTs continue to distance themselves and the environment is relatively safe help it navigate the complicated financial from the day-to-day mission, and PRT for civilian workers. The HNDTs lead rules of U.S. funding. Just as tactical expertise either moves from the tactical this effort at the tactical level with the developers seek to gain the trust of the level to the operational, or prepares to PRTs providing support when necessary. people at the community level, operational move to the next community. Because U.S. presence can be a destabiliz- developers seek to gain the trust of HN At the operational level, U.S. devel- ing force within some communities, PRTs government officials. opers concentrate almost exclusively on should limit their involvement to provid- Phase 2: Build. This phase begins as building long-term capability. They em- ing advice and access to U.S. development the environment becomes more consis- phasize their role as advisors rather than funding for projects, as needed. HNDTs tently secure and trust develops between implementers and seek to transform tacti- should concentrate on conducting stabil- the HNDTs and populace. At the tactical cal successes into broader government ity surveys, mobilizing the population level, HNDTs continue to collect stabil- legitimacy by helping the government to prioritize the community’s needs in a ity data, but their emphasis transitions to with its information operations. Former systematic way, and providing the com- resolving the sources of instability using PRT members with unique development munity members with necessary training the previously collected and analyzed skills (for example, civil engineers, agri- for follow-on infrastructure projects. information. During this phase, HNDTs cultural specialists) move from the tactical At the operational level, U.S. devel- utilize the construction of new infrastruc- level to the relevant operational minis- opment experts work within key HN ture projects as a vehicle for mentoring tries, further increasing HN government government development ministries. They communities through the development capacity. At some point in this phase, the advise the HN government departments, process by training, advising, and moni- HN government should attain sufficient train civil servants, and act as liaisons toring the community’s efforts. HNDTs legitimacy and capability to act with mini- between the U.S. chain of command and also begin to interact more frequently mal U.S. technical assistance. the HN government, as well as between with experts from the political mission Phase 3: Transfer. This phase must the tactical development teams and central element in anticipation of the upcoming be an overall COIN decision, not just an
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Donley 109 economic development decision. It is the should focus its efforts at the operational term success.” See Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, November 26, least complicated phase to explain but level as soon as possible. Developers must 2007, available at
110 Features / Economic Development in Counterinsurgency JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 18 “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghani- the moment a force enters a country, its leaders Report,” Kabul, Afghanistan, January 21–27, stan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Develop- must keep this in mind, striving to meet the 2012. Especially impressive is the fact that the ment Aid in COIN Operations,” Wilton Park expectations of the liberated in what becomes NSP has achieved these results when the maxi- Conference Report (WP1022), March 11–14, a race against the clock.” David H. Petraeus, mum dollar amount for any village is $60,000. 2010, 2, available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Donley 111 Airman connects AIM-9 Sidewinder to guidance control section unit test set at Misawa Air Base, Japan, July 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Kia Atkins)
Defense Entrepreneurship How to Build Institutions for Innovation Inside the Military
By James Hasik
ears of slipping dominance are decisions under uncertainty, and then of destruction are spreading fear that driving an American push for meld the factors of change in sticky (that hitherto regional actors and super- F military innovation. But while the is, locally commercialized) ways. Their empowered individuals will break the accomplishments of American indus- entrepreneurship sometimes falters, as American monopoly on some of the try are enviable, not all innovation is the controlling tendencies and vested grandest instruments of military force.1 grounded in technology or flows from interests of the bureaucratic apparatus In response, then–U.S. Secretary of the private sector. The U.S. Armed resist. Defense entrepreneurs must over- Defense Chuck Hagel in November Forces have a considerable history with come greater barriers than those faced 2014 launched a formal “Defense Inno- internally driven innovation, and today by private entrepreneurs, but policymak- vation Initiative” aimed at reshaping a new class of innovators is emerging ers could speed their progress by build- research and development (R&D) with within the Services. These public entre- ing the right organizational models in a “Third Offset Strategy,” focused on preneurs watch for opportunities, make staffing, structures, and incentives. robotics, miniaturization, and additive manufacturing.2 In these fields in par- Understanding the Internal ticular, officials and analysts have been Innovation Imperative exhorting industry to innovate, “save James Hasik is a Nonresident Senior Fellow for Defense in the Brent Scowcroft Center on Is the dominance of the U.S. military innovation,” and practice “innovation International Security at the Atlantic Council. at risk? A host of democratized tools warfare.”3
112 Features / Defense Entrepreneurship JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 But while the largest defense contrac- part-time project by a small team of gov- Defining Defense tors would always like more government ernment engineers at Naval Air Weapons Entrepreneurship funding, they are only now increasing Station China Lake in California.14 More When creativity like this is unleashed, their heretofore scant spending on inter- recently, the initial prototypes of the now impressive forces can be raised. But just nal R&D.4 Unless the defense industry ubiquitous Joint Direct Attack Munition creating the demand for any program creates “more compelling threats of po- (JDAM) were similarly developed at can be hard institutional work. In the tential lost business,” these firms will be Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.15 classic telling, “manager and entrepre- unlikely to boost their own investments.5 Thus, as Deputy Secretary of Defense neur” U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Wayne At the same time, large-scale innovation Robert Work notes, the first requirement Meyer, the legendary father of the may become more difficult as a result of of this new offset strategy is to foster more Aegis air defense system, had a task as the increasing accumulation of knowl- innovative people.16 Fortunately, among broad as the head of any startup busi- edge, such that each dollar spent on the middle ranks, a group of innovators ness. Meyer had to “organize his staff, defense does not deliver as much techno- is again emerging, this time connected prepare designs for contractors, develop logical advancement as in the past.6 If this by social media and driven by a sense a working relationship with his sponsor happens, the price of dominance will be- that change is necessary. They are tack- in OPNAV [the headquarters staff], come prohibitive. The technological gap ling the middle-level problems resident make sure Aegis ships met fleet needs, between the United States and its near- in questions of organization, training, and keep Aegis afloat in Congress.”24 peer competitors will continue to narrow, doctrine, and even weapons engineer- Meyer matched private industrial initia- exposing America’s vulnerabilities.7 ing.17 “Following in the wake of military tive to public service to bring about a In other ways, however, the rate of innovators and reformers past, like William revolution in air defense. recombinant technological change is Sims and John Boyd, they have begun This idea of a public entrepreneur outpacing the bureaucratic processes to organize,” forming associations like originates with the noted economist of defense planning and acquisition.8 the now decade-old Small Wars Journal, Joseph Schumpeter in the 1940s, but Firms that do not normally conduct the Center for International Maritime was brought to fuller understanding by business with defense ministries may be Security, and the Defense Entrepreneurs Robert Dahl in the 1960s.25 While pre- outpacing the record of innovation by Forum.18 Simply put, they are today’s de- cisely defining the nature of entrepre- traditional contractors in fields such as fense entrepreneurs. neurship can be challenging, describing microsatellites, cyber defense, robotics, Perhaps most prominent is the what entrepreneurs do is easier.26 For and networked communications.9 These Defense Entrepreneurs Forum. Now in over a century, military innovation has advances then cause their own problems, its third year, the forum benefits from been a collaborative enterprise and an as offset strategies built on commercial combining external sponsorship (pri- emergent process among government, technologies raise relatively fewer barriers marily by the U.S. Naval Institute and the military, and industry.27 The entre- to entry to those up-and-coming pow- University of Chicago) with a selected preneurs have been innovators in all ers.10 Where others can access common membership of substantially junior- and three fields and have functioned as orga- technologies, creating advantage requires middle-ranking officers. Their work so nizational agents of change. As Peter melding people, products, and processes far features some compelling ideas.19 Klein and others have summarized, the in novel but sticky ways.11 David Blair, an Air Force gunship and management literature characterizes unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) pilot their functions in three ways.28 Highlighting Examples fresh from a Ph.D. at Georgetown, wants First, entrepreneurs watch for oppor- of Internal Success to harness the big data of black boxes to tunities.29 They will find “gaps between Before overhauling the supply base, continuously train better pilots. He calls actual and potential outcomes or perfor- reaching for unobtainable advantages, the idea Moneyjet, but he also wants to mance, and look for resources to close” and building a new innovation-industrial keep the data from the micromanage- them.30 Incentives for action vary in complex, however, the defense industry ment of higher headquarters.20 Mark source and intensity. On the battlefield, should consider leveraging internal Jacobsen, an Air Force transport pilot the military champion of change may resources. Some of the best new ideas now at Stanford University, is building view innovation as a matter of survival. have come from within the Armed cargo UAVs for humanitarian relief inside In the laboratory or factory, contractors Forces, and from the relative bottom air defense umbrellas.21 Matthew Hipple, view opportunities as serving customers of the hierarchy.12 Examples abound, a Navy helicopter pilot, is conceiving and earning profits. At headquarters, reaching back decades. Consider how a force of networked decoy UAVs to motivations may stem from a sense of the initial impetus for employing assault “confuse, distract, and seduce” enemies.22 obligation, the opportunity for advance- helicopters in combat came from a group Think of it as a combination of the Ghost ment, or merely the prospect of retaining of junior aviators in the Marine Corps in Army of World War II and the helicopter a job. The motivations may be duller the late 1940s.13 The still-vaunted Side- decoy tactics of the Falklands War—or than in commercial enterprises and lan- winder heat-seeking missile began as a maybe even “smart chaff.”23 guishing under the “trained incapacity”
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Hasik 113 Captain Frank Futcher explains display of 3D-printed objects during Navy Warfare Development Command–sponsored innovation workshop at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia (U.S. Navy/Jonathan E. Donnelly) of bureaucracy.31 Because these mo- the change in people and teams as well. could support both the battalions of the tivations exist, however, they can be Indeed, the institutions themselves even- line and special operators. Two com- leveraged in emergencies. tually become as outdated as the obsolete manding officers tried to suppress his Second, entrepreneurs readily make technology supporting them. At that brief and higher headquarters attempted judgments under uncertainty about where point, both organizational and techno- to classify it before Joint Force Quarterly to invest money and effort.32 In this logical changes are required. One of the published him.36 Why does this happen? formulation, uncertainty is not risk that “spillovers of private actions to the public Perhaps foremost, the bureaucratically can be modeled with probabilities, but is domain” is then the “establishment of minded dislike risk and detest uncertainty. at best a known unknown. Uncertainty [new] social norms and values,” which As Max Weber put it, “bureaucratic about reflexive bureaucratic hostility to drives better behavior by less enterprising administration means fundamentally discontinuous breakthroughs can deter elements of the bureaucracy.35 the exercise of control on the basis of those investments to an extent that simple knowledge.”37 Without clear knowledge risk does not. So entrepreneurs inform Explaining How to point to, informal authority can wane. their judgment by probing and learning, Entrepreneurship Falters This limitation can induce controlling preferably in ways that are inexpensive The trouble is that the incentives for tendencies with which officials attempt to and, in retrospect, almost obvious.33 this internally driven change do not define and rationalize what they can. Third, entrepreneurs know how to always align. Consider the tale of Major Opportunity is not everyone’s prefer- meld the factors of change in sticky ways.34 Robert Seifert, USAF (Ret.), an AC-130 ence. Those with vested interests hold Engineers create new products and gunship pilot whose experiences over back reform through a lingering focus on processes, but entrepreneurs bring about Iraq led him to conclude that the aircraft existing technologies and comfortable
114 Features / Defense Entrepreneurship JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 WARNER, a teaming of Worcester Polytechnic Institute and Carnegie Mellon University, navigates debris field during DARPA Robotics Challenge in Pomona, California, June 2015 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams)
operating concepts.38 Sometimes the Appearing to move quickly stimulates Hake, who founded a 30-person private process will be unconscious; the laggards the governmental antibodies of change, foundation to seek donations for military will be trapped by their adherence to old slowing the possible rate of innovation. hearts-and-minds activities, did not start paradigms. At other times, however, the Here again, where revolutionary change well—intervention by then–Secretary rear guard actions will be quite deliberate. is required by abrupt changes in technol- of Defense Leon Panetta was eventu- One of the more salient, if anonymous, ogy or the correlation of forces, failure to ally required.42 But public and private quotes from the Vietnam experience innovate is not an option. entrepreneurship remain interdependent, features a senior officer who insisted, “I’ll and effective defense entrepreneurship be damned if I permit the United States Building Institutions will require the co-evolution of an active Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its for Innovation public enterprise system with that of a traditions to be destroyed just to win this Whether Seifert’s idea was the best for more vigorous private defense industry.43 lousy war.”39 supporting troops, it probably deserved The quality of the institutional arrange- Finally, public entrepreneurs “are a better airing. This is where the spon- ments supporting public entrepreneur- constrained by the need . . . to avoid sors of entrepreneurs must undertake the ship “is crucial for democratic capital- excessive novelty.”40 Combining liberal fourth function—to work to overcome the ism” generally, and for the efficient democracy with a bureaucratic state barriers to innovation. As some private supply of the Armed Forces specifically.44 apparatus naturally tends to restrain op- entrepreneurs entering the public realm Large organizations vary widely portunities for bold leadership, simply to have painfully realized, the challenges in their ability to innovate, and the guard against “a dismantling of formal can be both impressive and confounding. Department of Defense should not be institutional checks and balances.”41 The recent story of venture capitalist Jim satisfied with its innovative capacity. So
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Hasik 115 what can Pentagon policymakers do? Honestly vetting these ideas up the chain America’s Military Edge,” War on the Rocks, October 28, 2014; Doug Cameron and Julian Encouraging entrepreneurship in defense of command is not a natural process for E. Barnes, “Pentagon Presses Contractors to is not just about funding the occasional most of the Armed Forces. Innovate,” Wall Street Journal, November 20, technical breakthrough from small To make that happen, innovation 2014. business or madly throwing money at needs incentives. Fostering entrepreneur- 4 See, for example, Zachary Fryer-Biggs, possibilities.45 Recent research at Bain & ship is not just about finding the smartest “Northrop CEO: Low DOD R&D Spending Puts U.S. Tech Superiority at Risk,” Defense Company, a global management consult- and most motivated entrepreneurs; it News, September 16, 2013. ing firm, suggests that better innovative requires crafting the right rules of the 5 Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners, performance flows from an organiza- game for those entrepreneurs to succeed. quoted in Marcus Weisgerber, “Defense Firms tional culture that nurtures new products Leaders of the Armed Forces and the Could Be Skeptical of Investing in Research,” and processes.46 When strategies “bubble defense agencies, as well as those within Defense One, November 26, 2014. That said, at least one top manager is concerned. See up and accrete from below . . . the initia- the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Paul McLeary, “CEO: Focus on Short-Term tives advanced by the operating levels of ought to be asking themselves whether Dividends Could Blind Defense Industry to the organization are determined by the their organizations are rewarding, pro- Long-Term Viability,” Defense News, December staffing, structural, and incentive deci- tecting, and promoting the 21st-century 11, 2014. 6 sions” made by top management.47 Williams Sims, Pete Quesadas, Hyman Benjamin F. Jones, “The Burden of Knowledge and the ‘Death of the Renaissance Staffing is perhaps the most challeng- Rickovers, Brute Krulaks, Frank Aults, Man’: Is Innovation Getting Harder?” Review 52 ing problem. In defining innovation as and John Boyds. Review boards need to of Economic Studies 76, no. 1 (January 2009), “the profitable application of creativity,” care more about pushing envelopes than 283–317. Darrell Rigby, Kara Gruver, and James peccadillos. As long as leadership is not 7 Jon Hamilton and Eric Williams, USMC Allen of Bain & Company stress the actively pushing out the innovators, the Strategic Initiatives Group Scouting Report, October 24, 2014. importance of the differing skill sets for cause is not lost, for not every potential 8 Ibid. creation and commercialization. Citing public entrepreneur “is going to want 9 Secretary Chuck Hagel made a particu- examples such as Steve Jobs and Tim to make a fortune by age 30 in a social lar point of this in his speech. See also Paul Cook at Apple, and Bill Bowman and media start-up.” If personnel systems can McLeary, “DOD, Industry Huddle as Civil Phil Knight at Nike, they note that great offer opportunities for those with the cre- Firms Gain,” Defense News, November 1, 2014. 10 Loren Thompson, “Pre-Mortem: Hagel teams are built from both.48 Military or- ative itch to exit, make that fortune, and Innovation Initiative Is Too Little, and Way Too ganizations, however, tend to breed more then serve again, the cause is not lost. The Late,” Forbes, November 18, 2014; James Hasik of the latter than the former. This ap- Department of Defense and the defense and Alex Ward, “Third Offset Strategy, Second proach must be revised, however, because industry that supports it must compete Adversary,” Defense Industrialist, November 18, melding that enduring change requires with the better opportunities to build per- 2014; Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Adversaries Will Copy ‘Offset Strategy’ Quickly: Bob Work,” the inclusion of multiple kinds of people sonal wealth that are offered in the public Breaking Defense, September 19, 2014. in the organization. entrepreneurial space, but they often do 11 James Hasik and Byron Callan, Disrupt Command structures must become provide more compelling technical and or Be Disrupted: How Governments Can Develop honest brokers for innovation. Senior operational challenges than those found Decisive Military Technologies (Washington, leaders must choose the right pace of in writing messaging apps.53 JFQ DC: The Atlantic Council, May 2014). 12 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military change and know when to kill off bad Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Stud- 49 ideas. Thinking inside the box some- ies 29, no. 5 (October 2006), 905–934. times leads to more usable ideas.50 This Notes 13 B.J. Armstrong, “The Nuclear Option: must not be allowed to justify the protec- Military Organizations, Leadership, and the 1 tion of vested interests, but discipline is James Hasik and Mark Revor, Democra- Entrepreneurial Spirit,” War on the Rocks, tized Destruction: Global Security in the Hacker November 29, 2014; “The Answer to the needed to foster what Scott D. Anthony, Era (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, Amphibious Prayer: Helicopters, the Marine David Duncan, and Pontus Siren of the September 2014). Corps, and Defense Innovation,” War on the growth strategy firm Innosight call a mi- 2 Chuck Hagel, “A New Era for the De- Rocks, December 17, 2014. nimum viable innovation system, defined fense Department,” Defense One, November 14 Ron Westrum, Sidewinder: Creative as the “important intermediate option 18, 2014; Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “DOD Re- Missile Development at China Lake (Annapolis, shapes R&D, Betting on Future Technology,” MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013). between ad hoc innovation and building Defense News, April 20, 2014. 15 James Hasik, Arms and Innovation: En- an elaborate, large-scale innovation fac- 3 See Marcus Wesigerber, “Hagel to Chal- trepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First- tory.” This can be aimed to produce what lenge Defense Industry to Innovate,” Defense Century Defense Industry (Chicago: University serial entrepreneurs sometimes call the News, September 3, 2014; Aaron Mehta, “At of Chicago Press, 2008), chapter 4; Michael R. minimum viable product, that combina- AFA, USAF Secretary Calls for Innovation,” Rip and James Hasik, The Precision Revolution: Defense News, September 13, 2013; Sydney GPS and the Future of Warfighting (Annapolis, tion of proverbial “pipe-cleaners and J. Freedberg, Jr., “How DOD Is Trying To MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 236. cardboard” for working out the concept Save Innovation,” Breaking Defense, October 16 Remarks at the Defense One Summit, that forms the starting point for func- 28, 2014; and Adam J. Harrison, “Innovation Washington DC, November 19, 2014. tional prototyping and early fielding.51 Warfare: Technology Domain Awareness and 17 For the historical record of this phenom-
116 Features / Defense Entrepreneurship JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 enon in the 1940s, see Paul Kennedy, Engineers neth Burke,” K.B. Journal 2, no. 1 (Fall 2005). Science Quarterly 28, no. 3 (September 1983), of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned 32 Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and 223–244. Emphasis added. the Tide in the Second World War (New York: Profit (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921). 48 Darrell K. Rigby, Kara Gruver, and James Random House, 2013). 33 Gary S. Lynn, Joseph G. Morone, and Allen, “Innovation in Turbulent Times,” Har- 18 B.J. Armstrong, “More Than an Offset: Albert S. Paulson, “Marketing and Discontinu- vard Business Review, June 2009. Defense Innovation from the Inside,” War on ous Innovation: The Probe and Learn Process,” 49 Adam Bluestein, “Debunking the Myth the Rocks, November 26, 2014. California Management Review 38, no. 3 of Innovation,” Inc., September 2013. 19 For details on each proposal, see the (Spring 1996), 8–37. 50 Drew Boyd and Jacob Goldenberg, Inside White Board: The Defense Entrepreneurs Forum, 34 Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of the Box: A Proven System of Creativity for Break- available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Hasik 117 Air Force F-16A Fighting Falcon, F-15C Eagle, and F-15E Strike Eagle fighter aircraft fly over burning oil field sites in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm (U.S. Air Force)
If We Fight Joint, Shouldn’t Our History Reflect That?
By David F. Winkler
merican forces are fighting joint Yet because its historical assets remain control systems and data storage. While as never before in conjunction in a pre-1986 Service-centric paradigm, this article touches on that, it focuses its A with the armed forces of allied the Department of Defense (DOD) has argument on the idea that realignment is nations. Joint and combined operations denied itself valuable historical analyses of needed to correct a void in its historical in Afghanistan and Iraq and current the many joint and combined operations chronicling and connecting process. operations over Iraq and Syria have that have occurred since the landmark demonstrated conclusively that the legislation. We are failing to effectively Stovepiped History Goldwater-Nichols Department of “collect, chronicle, and connect.” These To illustrate the problem, there are no Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 three words, once used by now-retired unclassified DOD-produced historical came at the right time and has subse- Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., to monographs from the first Gulf War quently produced impressive results. describe what the Navy expects from its that cover the big picture. Instead, each history, could be extended to the joint Service published works document- and combined level.1 ing the missions and accomplishments DOD faces tremendous challenges in of the forces they provided. The U.S. Dr. David F. Winkler is Director of Programs at the the collection realm, given the increasing Army Center of Military History pub- Naval Historical Foundation. sophistication of digital command and lications include The Whirlwind War:
118 Recall / If We Fight Joint JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 The United States Army and Operations Director of Joint History formed a Joint The Special Operations Example Desert Shield and Desert Storm and Operational History Branch within JHO This conclusion factors in the experi- Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian to assure historical coverage for joint task ences of the U.S. Special Operations Gulf War.2 The Air Force History forces created for contingency operations. Command (USSOCOM) history office. Support Office publications include On To do this, the branch liaised with the Working with a small permanent staff, Target: Organizing and Executing the history office of the combatant command this office keeps pace through the use Strategic Air Campaign Against Iraq.3 charged with conducting a contingency of Reservists and contract employees. Representing the Naval Historical Cen- operation to determine requirements. These trained individuals convert ter’s contribution to this genre is Shield Each combatant command has a history materials collected from the field into and Sword: The United States Navy office, which usually consists of one or operational studies that are fed into and the Persian Gulf War. The Marine two historians and a clerical assistant. the USSOCOM hierarchy. In many Corps History Division has several To meet contingency operation his- cases, the Reservists chronicling recent monographs in print.4 tory gathering requirements, the JHO actions are the same ones who were These publications are well written requested Reservists from the combat deployed to the field to gather the raw and do not ignore joint and combined documentation assets of the four Service materials. Because of the initiative of the operations. Shield and Sword, for in- history organizations.7 With the some- USSOCOM historian and the willing- stance, argues that the Navy needed to be times reluctant cooperation of those ness of his superiors to fund Reservists better integrated at the joint command organizations, JHO deployed joint from the four Services to produce some level, citing naval air’s difficulty in receiv- documentation teams to cover operations of the best narrative analyses that will ing air tasking orders. But Service biases in Somalia, Guantánamo Bay, Rwanda, never be read by the general public, can be clearly discerned from such works Haiti, and the Balkans, and in recent USSOCOM is receiving products that as the Air Force’s Decisive Force: Strategic years to capture the history of operations are integral for the training and plan- Bombing in the Gulf War, which posited in Iraq and Afghanistan. ning of future missions.10 that the Gulf War–demonstrated airpower Putting joint combat documentation Unfortunately, the USSOCOM could bring down an enemy’s military teams in the field addresses only the col- experience is atypical. Unlike the special and economic infrastructure with few lection part of the mission. The recipients operations community, where officers civilian casualties and minimal application of the electronic data, oral interviews, and rotate in and out of related assignments of ground forces.5 other materials received from these joint and appreciate the need for a robust his- While it could be argued that a combat documentation teams are the tory program, officers assigned to other span of 4 years may not have allowed historians and archivists of the combat- joint staffs usually have 2- to 3-year tours Goldwater-Nichols an opportunity to ant command history offices. Having a and then rotate back to their respective trickle down within the DOD historical responsibility to produce “accurate, thor- Services. Involvement with their combat- community at the time of the Gulf War, ough, and objective historical accounts of ant command history offices during their that excuse holds little water nearly three their commands, including all significant joint assignment yields little bang during decades later. Again, the Service history contingency and joint operations con- their tours. Thus, due to benign neglect, offices strove to chronicle their branch’s ducted by their respective commands,” combatant command history offices are story in the global war on terrorism.6 these individuals have to cull through understaffed and often not attuned to the Then there is the problem of con- this mountain of material to extract the commanders they support. necting. Historians tend to focus on information needed to chronicle recent Instead, DOD depends on each of researching, writing, and getting their operations.8 The first step is establishing the Service history offices to collect and products to press. Marketing is someone a chronology of events. This task alone is chronicle its operational combat history. else’s job. To their credit, the Services daunting, given the increasing complexity But since the combatant commands are have Web sites that list their publications of combat operations. joint, and the Services are fighting jointly, and are posting some of these works on- Some of this work is being con- why are the Service history offices still line. However, most hard-copy products ducted at the JHO level. For example, in the business of collecting material for, are distributed to limited internal audi- Frank N. Schubert’s Other Than War: producing, and distributing operational ences. Useful studies conducted by one The American Military Experience and histories? Is this a call to abolish the Service history office are not being taken Operations in the Post–Cold War Decade Service history offices? Hardly. Producing advantage of by other Services, govern- (2013) brings clarity to a list of nearly operational history is only a fraction of ment agencies, and outside institutions. 300 military deployments from 1989 the valuable work these organizations As for collecting, the picture is some- to 2001.9 Are the combatant command perform for their respective Services. what brighter due to the efforts of the offices, however, properly resourced to Each branch still recruits, trains, equips, Joint History Office (JHO). In 1993, produce the operational historical analy- administers, and provides the forces recognizing the inadequacies of joint his- ses for their respective commands? The that the combatant commanders draw tory coverage during the Gulf War, the consensus points to a negative response. on to perform the mission of defending
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Winkler 119 National Museum of the Marine Corps, located in Triangle, Virginia, next to Marine Corps Base Quantico, is center for all Marine Corps history (U.S. Marine Corps) the Nation. These processes have to be Directorate of Military Traditions and Outreach Division. If the United States documented and chronicled. In addition, Heritage. What emerged from this were to apply the Canadian/U.S. Navy each Service has a rich heritage and lore amalgamation were five sections that model across DOD, the outcome would that must be preserved and promoted as addressed various aspects of history and be a large Defense History and Heritage a means of instilling institutional identity. heritage. Most germane to the focus of Agency (DHHA). The DHHA would But a realignment of how DOD this narrative is the History and Archives take on the operational history col- employs its historical assets to support the Section, which gathers, preserves, and lection, chronicling, and connection chronicling and connecting of its opera- imposes intellectual control over the mission. Such an agency could not only tional history at the joint level should be historical record (including unit annual take charge of the overall collection and considered. An obvious answer is ramp- historical reports and unit operational chronicling efforts, but also take com- ing up the current 2- to 3-person shops at records), carries out historical research mand of all DOD historical resource the combatant commands to much larger and provides historical support on management efforts. The current JHO offices to include dedicated Reservist demand, and publishes official, com- and Office of the Secretary of Defense combat documentation collection sup- memorative, and popular histories to (OSD) Historical Office could come port, additional historian and archival meet the goals of the Department of under this new agency’s auspices. personnel to chronicle command events, National Defence. In addition to captur- As with other Service mergers leading and individuals to oversee the distribution ing the narrative history, this section to the creation of other defense agencies, of materials. However, bolstering the his- manages the Canadian Forces combat initial consolidation efforts would be tory offices of the combatant commands art program. Other sections manage painful and costly. However, longer term is only part of a more efficient solution. uniforms and ceremonial matters; the efficiencies could be realized through The USSOCOM history office experi- museums, military heritage, and tradi- standardization of collection and archival ence is instructive, as that command hires tions; and the nation’s military bands.11 practices, the creation of joint storage and help only when it is needed. It is interesting to note that minus preservation facilities, and the discontinu- the musical component, the Canadian ation of nonessential and overlapping Oh, Canada! sectional alignments are quite similar to functions. For a complete solution, it is useful to the direction the U.S. Navy took with its While it could be entertaining to examine how another country tackled Naval History and Heritage Command, conceptualize the creation of a DHHA, the problem. In Canada, the Director- which comprises a History and Archives however, there are words of caution: Be ate of History and Heritage was created Division, a Collections Management careful what you ask for. In addressing in 1996 by combining the National Division, a Museum Systems Operations the challenge of producing operational Defence History Directorate and the Division, and a Communications and histories from a joint perspective, the
120 Recall / If We Fight Joint JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 DHHA solution is akin to hitting a tack with a sledgehammer. As the Canadian Forces found out when they had all of their personnel don the same uniform, there are benefits to having distinctions of Service identity. Just as it is impossible, for example, to envision the U.S. Marine Band (“The President’s Own”) report- ing to a Director of Defense History and Heritage, it is hard to see how any of the Services would want to part with their Service heritage and museum establish- ments—especially when considering the size of each of the American Services matches that of the whole Canadian Forces and then some.12 A criticism of the Canadian model is that the indi- vidual service components have been shortchanged within the whole historical narrative. Because the U.S. Service his- tory organization historians focus on their respective Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air U.S. Army Africa staff apply lessons of World War II to current mission by visiting places of Army legend in Tunisia such as Kasserine Pass, Longstop Hill, and El Guettar (U.S. Army/Rick Scavetta) Force, and Coast Guard narratives with all the Service-specific weapons systems, Maryland, facility that opened in 2011. nent worthy of emulation is the creation command and control structures, and cus- While each of the Services retains its well- of a schoolhouse. A Defense History toms, they produce quality Service-specific established public affairs organizations, School could offer courses to military work. For these Service historians, there is DMA performs functions that not only personnel assigned to combat docu- a learning curve, and the quality of work enhance Service-specific outreach capa- mentation duties such as those assigned they produce often becomes apparent in bilities but also improve the overall DOD to Army Military History Detachments comparison to projects contracted out to information dissemination capability. and the Navy’s Combat Documentation PhDs with little military experience. DMA has organized itself into seven Detachment. Such a course would help operating components. Its two most to standardize collection methodologies A Public Affairs Template well-known components—the American and build camaraderie across Services. Rather than dismantle the current DOD Forces Radio and Television Service and Other courses provide initial profes- history infrastructure and build anew Stars and Stripes—continue to operate sion development to newly hired civil around a DHHA, a more practical from their respective offices in California service/contractor historians, archaeol- proposal would be to create an activity and in Washington, DC, Germany, and ogists, librarians, curators, and informa- that aims to coordinate and synthesize Japan. Other Fort Meade–based compo- tion management specialists to broaden collection, chronicle, and connec- nents include the Defense Information the understanding of available resources tion functions. Instead of creating yet School; a defense visual information and methodologies and, most impor- another huge bureaucratic agency, it is component that manages the Joint tantly, to build professional relationships proposed that a Defense History Activ- Combat Camera program; a production that will benefit DOD in the long term. ity (DHA) be stood up—ideally at Fort component that provides services such as A Washington, DC–based orientation Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC, the Pentagon Channel, Joint Hometown program could offer students visits to to be collocated with the U.S. Army News Services, and support for the vari- the local Service history offices as well Center of Military History and the ous Service Web sites; a technical services as tours of the Navy, Marine Corps, and National Defense University’s National component that hosts hundreds of DOD eventually, Army museums. War College. DOD executed a similar Web sites including the OSD Historical The Defense History School could concept with the creation of a Defense Office Web site; and a support services also manage an internship program Media Activity (DMA) in 2008. component that manages the activities’ expanding on an initiative by the OSD An outgrowth of the Base administrative and logistical needs.13 Historical Office to bring in students Realignment and Closure study that from respected graduate programs, occurred in 2005, DMA consolidated Future History obtain needed clearances, and obtain various Service media functions into one DMA could most definitely serve as a experience on producing historical activity headquartered at a Fort Meade, template for a DHA. The first compo- products. By collocating DHA with
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Winkler 121 Curtiss A-1 Triad seaplane built in 1911 on display at Naval Air Station North Island as amphibious assault ship USS Peleliu (LHA 5) transits San Diego Bay (U.S. Navy/Troy Wilcox) the National War College, the Defense University Press, this section could that could host or link to classified History School could co-host sympo- provide a publishing option for different chronologies, narratives, selected sia such as the “Air War in Vietnam” DOD history entities. Other DHA coor- situation reports, after action reports, conference in October 2015 that was dination/facilitation functions on behalf and summaries and transcripts of co-sponsored by the Air Force, Navy, and of DOD might include: interviews with individuals serving in Army Historical Foundations, and the theater. The site could also serve as a The creation of an Operations Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. •• repository for end-of-tour interviews Section to assure material is col- Another section of DHA could conducted by the various Services lected, properly archived, and serve as a clearinghouse for historical and combatant command history turned into narrative. This section products—both classified and unclassi- offices. By offering access to opera- would coordinate with combatant fied—produced by the Service history tional history through one Web site, command history offices to assure organizations, combatant command DHA would make a valuable contri- they are adequately resourced to history offices, and affiliated academic bution in connecting with the forces document and chronicle current organizations such as the war colleges. in the field. operations. As part of its mission, While the classified publications and Finally, the DHA should coordinate this section could liaise with institu- •• studies should be shared and posted on a with the DMA to have a strong tions within and outside of DOD classified network, unclassified products public affairs and marketing func- to include war colleges, academic could be offered for purchase to the tion. Staffed by individuals with institutions, other agency historical general public through a Defense History journalism and marketing skills, this offices, and even historical offices of Bookstore. More than just a clearing- function could have an important allied nations. house, this section could provide some collection and dissemination role. The creation of a Defense History comparative analyses of the different •• Regarding collection, this branch Bookstore would require the cre- products through a comprehensive re- should be on the distribution list ation of an Information Manage- view program that aims to push relevant to receive press releases from all ment Branch and could develop the materials to proper audiences. Finally, operational commands within DOD. mother of all joint history Web sites in partnership with National Defense While not often detailed, these press
122 Recall / If We Fight Joint JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 releases often provide the who, what, day after they retire. That mindset must 2006); and C.M. Kennedy et al., U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibli- when, and where vital to writing be changed. We owe it to the men and ography (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps 14 good narrative. In addition, this women—and their leaders—who are History Division, 2006). branch could coordinate with the currently fighting for their country to 7 The Air Force and Marine Corps depend various news bureaus to collect news capture their story in a way that will be on Individual Mobilization Augmentee Reserv- reports from reporters in the field most beneficial to future generations. JFQ ists who report, respectively, to the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air covering various conflicts. For source Force Base, Alabama, and the Marine Corps material gathering to chronicle Historical Center in Washington, DC. The operational history, the media serve Notes Army mobilizes three-person Military History as a force multiplier. Detachments from the Army Reserve and Na- 1 Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., speech at tional Guard to capture history. The Naval His- Having a robust combat documenta- the 75th anniversary of the Naval Historical tory and Heritage Command in Washington, tion collection and operational history Foundation, March 15, 2001. DC, is the gaining command for Naval Reserve 2 production capability ensconced within a Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, Naval Combat Documentation Detachment eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States 206. DHA would yield several benefits: Army and Operations Desert Shield and Desert 8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff •• First and foremost, the Reservists Storm (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Instruction 5320.01A, “Guidance for the Joint Printing Office [GPO], 1995); Stephen A. History Program,” August 14, 2003. who conduct combat documentation Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian 9 Frank N. Schubert, Other Than War: The and the historians responsible for Gulf War (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002). American Military Experience and Operations writing operational history would be Three other recent Center of Military History in the Post–Cold War Decade (Washington, DC: gathering material for an organiza- books on operations in Southwest Asia touch Joint History Office, 2013), iii. tion that could make immediate use on the Gulf War. 10 John Partin, the U.S. Special Operations 3 Richard G. Davis, On Target: Organiz- Command historian for two decades, retired in of it and provide content of value to ing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign 2008. all Services. Against Iraq (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003). 11 See National Defence and the Canadian •• An operational history organization 4 Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Forces, Directorate of History and Heritage, at DHA would encourage joint train- Schneller, Shield and Sword: The United States available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Winkler 123 in Crisis, which argues that Her Maj- clearly established objective.” Some may esty’s armed forces overestimated the suggest that counterinsurgency doctrine relevance of their past imperial policing was flawed or, as the title of the book to contemporary challenges. suggests, a concept in crisis. But the real If you want to read a sentimental regi- problem was simply too little strategic mental history of valor and glory in Iraq thinking and too few forces, something and Afghanistan, you will want to pass the authors document depressingly on this book. Counterinsurgency in Crisis well. The principal challenge, however, is not draped in mythology; it is a sober, was shortfalls in strategic thinking. As dispassionate, and objectively critical Ucko and Egnell observe, “the British evaluation of British strategic perfor- capacity for strategic thinking—its abil- mance. Both authors have stellar scholarly ity to formulate a campaign plan—has credentials and excellent prior works proved consistently and fatefully prob- on counterinsurgency. Dr. David Ucko lematic throughout the last decade of teaches at the College of International operations.” Security Affairs, a component at the This will not be news to informed stu- National Defense University. His Swedish dents of British security matters. British writing partner, Dr. Robert Egnell, generals, including Lieutenant General was a visiting professor at Georgetown Paul Newton, who now heads the Center University. Together they have produced for Strategy and Security at Exeter a scathing indictment of British prepara- University, have argued quite openly that tion, strategic direction, and operational the strategy flame is unlit in London. Counterinsurgency in Crisis: practice in contemporary conflict. Their Former Chief of the Defence Staff Air Britain and the Challenges brutal bottom line: “There is no fig leaf Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup decried of Modern Warfare large enough here to cover the deep the loss of “an institutional capacity for flaws in the British government’s own and culture of strategic thought.”2 After By David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell approach and conduct in their counterin- considering the past decade, looking at Columbia University Press, 2013 surgency campaigns.” the prospects of a security environment 250 pp. $26.00 The United Kingdom’s poor showing laced with instability and complex contin- ISBN: 978-0231164269 in Iraq and Afghanistan is multidimen- gencies similar to the last decade, Ucko Reviewed by F.G. Hoffman sional. One shortfall identified by the and Egnell conclude their book with an authors was the existence of a smug per- ominous assessment of current British ception that British forces were uniquely capability. riting in his seminal The qualified in counterinsurgency because The United Kingdom entered two British Way in Counter- of the United Kingdom’s extensive ex- wars with an overestimation of its grasp W Insurgency, David French perience in Africa and the Middle East, of contemporary conflict, inadequate concluded that the United Kingdom peace support tasks in the Balkans, and machinery and poor practice at linking its had created a “chequered history of of course, Northern Ireland. Much of objectives to a sound strategy, and a mili- gathering, analyzing, and disseminat- that experience was dated and certainly tary culture that was short on education ing the lessons” from its irregular not well represented in British doctrine but long on improvisation and “cracking campaigns. This conclusion contrasts or military education. Ucko and Egnell on.”3 Doctrine was lacking, but counter- with Dr. John Nagl’s case study of found that this unique heritage retarded insurgency theory cannot be a panacea Britain’s superior organizational learn- learning and adaptation, further degrad- for so many structural, educational, and ing in Malaya in his Eating Soup with a ing performance. cultural gaps. Nor can shortfalls in our Knife. Both books focused on Britain’s The authors’ transition to an as- understanding of contemporary insur- imperial past. More recently, veterans sessment of the strategic level does not gency be employed as an excuse to shelter from the United Kingdom’s campaigns improve their view of British counterin- less than stellar strategic competence in in Iraq and Afghanistan have sided with surgency efforts. While strategy requires London (or Washington for that matter). French, stating that “despite our insti- a clear alignment of ends, ways, and Ucko and Egnell do not believe tutional [counterinsurgency] heritage,” means, “strategy making for Bara and that the United Kingdom’s Ministry of the study of small wars “[has been] for Helmand was marked by the failure Defence has fully grasped the formidable relegated to a position of almost com- to grasp the nature of the campaign, tasks inherent to modern warfare, nor plete institutional irrelevance.”1 This is to adapt once new realities came to the has it adapted sufficiently for stabilization now reinforced by a new assessment of fore, and to resource these efforts, both missions. They find it clear that civilian British operations, Counterinsurgency politically and financially, to achieve a elites are not embracing the necessary
124 Book Reviews JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 2 changes in government to support even Cited by Andrew Mackay, “Helmand new audiences. Stoker’s biography is 2007–2008: Behavioural Conflict,” inBritish a respectable role for the country in the also the result of a fruitful collabora- Generals in Blair’s Wars, ed. Jonathan Bailey, most likely of scenarios. Richard Irons, and Hew Strachan (Burlington tion with Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, the What makes Ucko and Egnell’s VT: Ashgate 2013), 261. first historian to publish a biography in work unique and invaluable is its take 3 See the chapter titled “Cracking On: English about Clausewitz’s formidable on future missions and its evaluation of British Military Culture and Doctrine” in Frank wife and intellectual partner, Countess Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military options for British policy planners. Given Marie von Brühl. Together, Stoker Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven: the reduced resources and the experi- Yale University Press, 2011). and Bellinger mined a treasure trove of ences of the last decade, they concisely recently rediscovered correspondence examine the merits of scaling down between Carl and Marie held in Germany British contributions to niche invest- by the couple’s descendants. Stoker ments, employment of more indirect sprinkles this correspondence throughout approaches, and greater burden-sharing his work, and it provides great value in with regional organizations. The authors understanding Clausewitz as he confides are doubtful that these approaches will his innermost thoughts to his soulmate, meet British political objectives, noting the woman who took his unfinished work that “strategic abstinence and ‘strategic and had it published. The author also selectivity’ are options fraught with a dif- uses Clausewitz’s own histories as well as ferent type of risk, particularly for a state those of his contemporaries (including with global expeditionary ambitions or Antoine-Henri de Jomini) to inform his when alliance commitments come into work, including recent English transla- play.” Given the U.S. ambitions and its tions of Clausewitz’s work such as that of role in the world, American strategists the Waterloo campaign by Christopher should take serious note of Ucko and Bassford. In addition to these primary Egnell’s conclusions. sources, Stoker uses the most recent and This is a serious and objective schol- cutting-edge Napoleonic scholarship on arly analysis of British strategic and key campaigns by Alexander Mikaberidze operational performance. The United and Michael Leggiere. States needs a similar assessment, as its Finally, there is the issue of accessibil- leaders and key decisionmakers have ity for new audiences. Stoker states that been less willing to come to grips with its his purpose for the book is to answer the own shortfalls in the council chambers of question “How did it come to be writ- government. Hopefully, someone in the ten?” The reader learns that from the age United States will take up the challenge Clausewitz: His Life and Work of 11 until his death in 1831 at the age of of writing a similar book about U.S. stra- 51, Clausewitz served first and foremost By Donald Stoker tegic performance. as a soldier. This speaks to the book’s ap- Oxford University Press, 2014 Because of its objective analysis and peal to military professionals. Stoker has 354 pp. $27.99 solid scholarship, Counterinsurgency in made Clausewitz more accessible to the ISBN: 978-0199357949 Crisis is recommended to professionals military professionals of today by putting in the transatlantic community interested Reviewed by John T. Kuehn him into the context of his times as a in strategic studies, civil-military rela- long-serving soldier—including his disap- tions, military history, and contemporary pointments, frustrations, and personal conflict. JFQ onald Stoker, a professor of experiences with cold, heat, thirst, and strategy and policy at the Naval danger—providing additive credibility D Postgraduate School, has written and a human dimension. Readers meet a Dr. F.G. Hoffman is a Senior Research Fellow what could be labeled a military biogra- human Clausewitz who felt pain, hunger, in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National phy of Carl von Clausewitz. One might and loneliness, experienced setbacks, and Defense University. reasonably ask why a biography of the struggled with chronic ailments such as Prussian general and military theorist is gout and arthritis throughout his life. necessary, given Peter Paret’s towering Readers will also discover in detail Notes intellectual biography Clausewitz and Clausewitz’s participation in some of the the State (Princeton University Press, most famous campaigns of the French 1 Alexander Alderson, “Counter-insurgency: 1985). and Napoleonic wars, including Russia Learn and Adapt? Can We Do Better,” The British Army Review, no. 142, Summer 2007. The answer is threefold: new sources, in 1812 and Waterloo in 1815, as well as new scholarship, and accessibility for some of the more obscure battles. These
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 125 include formative experiences fighting the Kriegsakademie (the Prussian mili- is where it is on mine. This book is abso- limited and even irregular war as an tary academy) in Berlin. Stoker suggests lutely essential for military and security adolescent in the 1790s, and serving as a that Clausewitz, his life-long desire for a professionals, and deserves as broad an de facto chief of staff to a multinational major accomplishment in war and com- educated readership as possible. JFQ corps in the little-known northwestern bat stymied, turned to his meisterwerk German theater in 1813. Readers will as an outlet. Clausewitz, as one of the find of particular interest the chapter Prussian reformers, could do little else Commander John T. Kuehn, USN (Ret.), Ph.D., is the Major General William Stofft Professor titled “The Road to Taurrogen (1812),” in the reactionary political environment of Military History at the U.S. Army Command which serves as the median of the book. that prevented him—and his mentor and General Staff College. His latest book is Stoker argues, correctly in this reviewer’s Gneisenau—from exerting real influ- Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns (Praeger, 2015). assessment, that Clausewitz’s greatest ence in the Prussian military and state. historical triumph was achieved as an of- Stoker argues that this, in fact, resulted ficer in the Russian army at this obscure in a far greater and lasting triumph: Lithuanian village where he served as an “The fame Clausewitz hoped to win for agent for the Prusso-German uprising himself—with sword in hand—he won against Napoleon in the wake of the di- with his pen” (287). Stoker also manages sastrous Russian campaign. to skillfully avoid becoming mired in the It is, however, Clausewitz’s great major Clausewitz “controversies,” while intellectual triumph, On War, that still making the reader aware of them and permeates the book, as well it should. adding value to those debates. For exam- Stoker does a commendable job of inter- ple, on the issue of just how finished On weaving and referring to the evolution War really was, Stoker writes, “In reality of Clausewitz’s key ideas on war, includ- we simply don’t know how complete On ing friction (48, 101), center of gravity War truly is, and this is a question that (100), and defense, including the idea of cannot be definitively answered because “political defense” (97). All of this oc- we know that Clausewitz never finished curs against the backdrop of Clausewitz’s the book” (264). Readers can draw their life as a professional soldier who, at the own conclusions. My own position is that same time, was developing into a impres- had Clausewitz died at the ripe old age of sive military intellectual, historian, and 80, the manuscript would still have been theorist. For example, Stoker highlights sitting in his closet unpublished. Had Clausewitz’s early writing on the rela- he outlived his devoted wife, Marie, we tionship between war and policy in his might never have seen it. treatise Strategie in the period between Although a very well-written book, Prussia’s wars with France from 1796 there are a number of discontinui- until 1806. The Clausewitz revealed here ties. For example, the larger historical Superforecasting: The Art is the original ends-ways-means guru, narrative of the Napoleonic wars at and Science of Prediction and this emerges in spades in the writing times becomes desynchronized with By Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner that Stoker highlights. Furthermore, if a Clausewitz’s role in those events. This is Crown Publishing Group, 2015 man is to be judged by the character and especially true later in the book when the 352 pp. $20.51 esteem of his closest friends, Clausewitz reader is taken back in time as the allies ISBN: 978-0804136693 ranks high in this regard due to Gerhard prepared to drive on Paris in 1814, to von Scharnhorst and August Neidhardt the summer of 1813 when Clausewitz Reviewed by Michael J. Mazarr von Gneisenau, two giants of German assumed the role of chief of staff to the military history whom Stoker portrays as corps of General Count Ludwig von virtual foster fathers to Clausewitz. Wallmoden-Gimborn observing Marshal hilip Tetlock has worked for With the end of the Napoleonic Louis-Nicolas Davout in Hamburg. decades on the problem of judg- wars in 1815, Stoker moves into the However, these problems fade when P ment in national security affairs. endgame of the book, the lengthy penul- one considers the totality of what Stoker He became justly renowned for his timate chapter titled “The Sum of It All has accomplished in his book. For those book Expert Political Judgment: How (1813–1831),” which provides readers readers who want a clear and up-to-date Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princ- an excellent precis of Clausewitz’s major biography of Clausewitz as a soldier— eton University Press, 2006), which ideas as outlined in On War. Stoker does without myth and without excuse—I can demonstrated, among other things, this against the backdrop of the historical think of no better title to have on the that foreign policy experts were no framework of Clausewitz as director of bookshelf right next to On War, which more accurate in their forecasts than
126 Book Reviews JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 “monkeys throwing darts.” Tetlock’s This conflation speaks to a core as- the rigor and quality of judgments. As somewhat alarming finding led to a sumption of the project—and a third his superforecasters suggest, exacting series of intriguing questions: Just how possible objection. Tetlock is a numbers procedures do tend to improve results. good can judgment become? Can we guy, interested in quantifiable results They ask well-designed, critical questions do better than the “experts”? from probabilistic analysis. This is helpful and apply careful analytical methods. This innovative line of research to a certain extent. For complex, ambigu- Furthermore, they ultimately find ways to laid the foundation for a new book, ous national security decisions, however, understand issues more thoughtfully and Superforecasting: The Art and Science of it is not clear how far that is. Tetlock is accurately than people who ignore such Prediction, co-authored with journal- explicit about this distinction—between methods on the way to a far more im- ist Dan Gardner. It surveys techniques linear or deterministic choices and thor- precise guess. Tetlock’s efforts have also used by the most successful individuals oughly complex ones. He refers to the demonstrated hopeful ways to put think- and teams in Tetlock’s Good Judgment analytical challenges of “the butterfly dy- ers together in teams that self-correct Project (GJP), a series of forecasting namics of nonlinear systems” and uses the their own analytical errors, rather than tournaments in which participating common metaphor of clouds and clocks exacerbate them. analysts, many from careers far removed to distinguish mechanisms whose vari- In this sense, Tetlock’s work comple- from national security, make predictions ables and causal relationships are known ments the insight of such scholars as on key issues: Will oil prices fall below from an unfolding complex system. He Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, Robert $30 a barrel within a year? Will Japan de- downplays the difference, however, de- Jervis, and many others who have been cide to place troops on a disputed island scribing the hard-and-fast distinctions as warning for decades about the risks of in the next 6 months? The questions deal “false dichotomies.” Yet the problem of simplified and often biased cognitive with discrete issues and are precise, asking which strategy will best deal with Russia is patterns. And it is only a small leap from about a particular event or choice. They a fundamentally cloud-like enterprise, and Tetlock’s findings to the context of also are framed within a specific period of no forecasting-style probability exercise is complex national security judgments: time, from 1 month in advance to 1 year. likely to furnish an answer that is objec- An intuitive, emergent choice informed Tetlock has found that some people tively better than others. by and willing to take seriously the results do in fact perform far better in such This is very likely one reason why se- of rigorous analysis will have a better contests than others—repeatedly, reliably, nior leaders are so resistant to structured batting average, even if the final judg- and controlling for other variables. Top efforts to improve decisionmaking. At ment remains unavoidably subjective and GJP forecasters beat a control group by the end of the day, what they are doing is impressionistic. 60 percent in the first year and by 78 educated guesswork—and they know it. If we are to take seriously this line of percent in the second. As Tetlock states, The most decisive factors in their choices thinking about thinking, it becomes clear they even “outperformed professional are norms, values, political consider- that future U.S. administrations that are intelligence analysts with access to clas- ations, and bureaucratic constraints that serious about the quality of their judg- sified data.” One could quibble with the cannot be assigned precise values. As a ments no longer have any excuses. They approach. The narrowest interpretation result, most such officials ascend to high ought to create more formalized decision of these findings, for example, might office having built, usually over a long analytical processes designed to maximize not be that surprising. Confronted with period of time, a well-honed, experience- the rigor and accuracy of even complex precise questions dominated by a handful based intuition that they trust more choices. of known variables, forecasters who give than any analytical method. (Tetlock This could involve, for example, an exceptional care to facts and probabilistic recognizes this and cites research that effort to build—probably on the base of guidelines such as base rates will surely do demonstrates how in real decisionmaking a specialized unit in the National Security better than more casual dart throwers. settings, “these educated, accomplished Council (NSC)—both the habits of mind The project also risks equating fore- people reverted to the intuitive.”) and specific techniques and tools charac- casting with “judgment.” Tetlock himself Despite these concerns, Tetlock’s teristic of superforecasting groups. Some admits that “foresight is one element of research—thoughtful, innovative, and questions or principles would be inte- good judgment, but there are others.” arriving amid a tsunami of evidence about grated into all interagency processes and Judgment ultimately is about what to do, the risks to senior leaders of cognitive policy documents, while some techniques and it is not guaranteed that people who bias and thoughtless heuristics—demands would be applied to particular decisions, excel at one will be good at the other. to be taken seriously. More than that, depending on their issue or character. Someone who excels at using probabilis- it invites the U.S. Government to get Over time, paralleling Tetlock’s emphasis tic methods to guess at the future price more serious about the process of mak- on outcomes, the effort could track the of corn might fail miserably at integrating ing national security decisions. Among accuracy of various sub-judgments, that the multiple strategic and political impli- other things, Tetlock’s research is one of is, discovering where they were right and cations of a complex security choice. the first large-scale empirical efforts to where wrong, and looking for consistent demonstrate the clear value of enhancing patterns.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 127 This would be tremendously difficult to organize. Senior officials have little New from interest in being forced through analyti- cal gymnastics to reach conclusions that NDU Press can never be proved better than intuitive for the Center for Strategic Research guesswork. Moreover, they will often lack Strategic Perspectives 19 the time needed to undertake anything Understanding Putin Through a more than a cursory process. A senior Middle Eastern Looking Glass director for analytic methods at the NSC, by John W. Parker however, could help shape the design of The resur- options papers, push groups to consis- gence of tently ask the right questions, warn top Russian influ- decisionmakers about encroaching bias, ence in the and introduce more formalized decision Middle East techniques when time is available. The has surprised idea would not be to build an intricate, Moscow as highly theoretical process, but to take much as any elements likely to be present in any policy other capital. process—background papers, options Russia has done better than the papers, interagency dialogues, Cabinet- Kremlin and its Middle East experts level meetings—and supercharge their feared when the Arab Spring began. analytical rigor. Despite Moscow’s deep involvement There seems little doubt that for- in the Ukrainian crisis, Russia is now malizing such methods in the national in a stronger position with national security process, at least in slimmed-down leaderships across the Middle East versions appropriate to the pace of deci- than it was in 2011, although its sionmaking, would avoid the occasional stock with Sunni Arab public opin- disaster and create insights that generate ion has been sinking. new opportunities. At a minimum, now The Western reaction to Russian that research such as Tetlock’s has made actions in Ukraine has given Putin clear the potential value of formally rigor- a greater incentive to work toward ous thinking, it would seem irresponsible a more significant Russian profile in not to find out. JFQ the Middle East. As Moscow sees it, this impulse by Putin is being recip- rocated in the region. Dr. Michael J. Mazarr is Acting Director of the No outside power may be up to Strategy, Resources, and Doctrine Program in the Arroyo Center and a Senior Political Scientist at a controlling role in the region any RAND. longer. But realism restrains all sides from believing that Russia is any- where close to eclipsing the major role the United States still plays in the Middle East.
Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu
128 Book Reviews JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Relief supplies from USAID unloaded off Marine Corps UH-1Y Venom from Joint Task Force 505 in remote area of Nepal during Operation Sahayogi Haat (U.S. Marine Corps/Hernan Vidana)
his article completes a trilogy Interorganizational on interorganizational coopera- T tion—with a focus on the joint force perspective. The first article dis- cussed civilian perspectives from across Cooperation III of III the U.S. Government and their chal- lenges in working with the military and The Joint Force Perspective highlighted the potential benefits of enhancing unity of effort throughout the government.1 The second article By James C. McArthur, Cara Allison Marshall, Dale Erickson, E. Paul presented humanitarian organization Flowers, Michael E. Franco, George H. Hock, George E. Katsos, Luther perspectives on interfacing with the L. King, William E. Kirby, William M. Mantiply, Michael E. McWilliams, A. Christopher Munn, Jeffrey K. Padilla, Elmer L. Roman, Raymond E. military and served to illuminate the Vanzwienen, and Jeffrey P. Wissel potential value of increased candor and cooperation as a means to develop mutually beneficial relationships.2 In Colonel James C. McArthur, USMC, is Chief of the Joint Doctrine Division on the Joint Staff. Ms. Cara this final installment, the discussion Allison Marshall is a Director at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy. Mr. Dale Erickson focuses on how the joint force might is a Fellow in the Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the assess and mitigate the issues raised by National Defense University. Colonel E. Paul Flowers, USA, is a Director at OSD Personnel and Readiness. Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Franco, USA, is a Staff Officer at OSD Policy. Lieutenant Colonel George the first two articles through applica- H. Hock, USAF, is a Branch Chief at Air Force Special Operations Command. Colonel George E. Katsos, tion of the joint doctrine development USAR, is a Strategist on the Joint Staff. Lieutenant Colonel Luther L. King, USAF, is a Division Chief at process.3 This article also explores how U.S. Special Operations Command. Commander William E. Kirby, USN, is a Staff Officer at U.S. Pacific Command. Mr. William M. Mantiply is a Branch Chief on the Joint Staff. Lieutenant Colonel Michael joint doctrine can assist in developing E. McWilliams, USMC, is a Deputy Division Chief on the Joint Staff. Mr. A. Christopher Munn is a Unit and sustaining the relationships that Chief at OSD Intelligence. Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey K. Padilla, USCG, is a Planner at Coast Guard are essential for building effective and Headquarters. Mr. Elmer L. Roman is a Director at OSD Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics. Mr. Raymond E. Vanzwienen is a Planner at U.S. Transportation Command. Commander Jeffrey P. Wissel, cooperative processes in the operational USN, is a Staff Officer at U.S. Southern Command. environment. Although the authors
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 129 accept that cultures and missions vary the importance of developing and main- the joint force carries out certain func- widely among different types of orga- taining relationships with all civilian tions, which in turn prepare successive nizations, we suggest there is a mutual organizations. generations of warfighters to carry out benefit to be achieved from deep The term policy also needs clarification and improve on best practices employed understanding of not only one’s own in the context of civilian policy or military in different operational environments. organization but also each other’s per- strategic documents that influence joint Policy acknowledges joint doctrine but spectives, methods, and structures. doctrine. Unless otherwise stated, use also provides an authoritative source for of the term policy here refers to civilian required actions—goals or objectives— Background policy. Lastly, we address the difference or specific prohibitions, which guides In the first two articles, we merged between the political and military use of the joint force to carry out operational the terms for civilian-led departments, the term doctrine. Civilians in the politi- functions in a legal and ethical manner, agencies, organizations, and groups into cal sphere often use the term doctrine to ultimately driving joint doctrine develop- one single term: organizations. The sole describe a political policy (for example, ment. Policy and joint doctrine work purpose for consolidating these terms the Truman Doctrine, Monroe Doctrine, together constructively to inform and was to provide a simple, consistent the responsibility to protect doctrine). assist DOD with joint force develop- expression to capture the entirety of This distinction may cause confusion ment and risk management assessments. nonmilitary personnel. The trilogy’s when communicating with the joint Despite their separate and unique pur- title also prompted discussion among force about joint doctrine, which the poses, policy and joint doctrine offer the authors regarding the nuances military uses to describe the documenta- critical synergies during the development between coordination, collaboration, tion and maintenance of best practices of standardization (for example, termi- and cooperation.4 Coordination is a term used for guiding commanders and their nology, command relationships) and commonly used within the Depart- staffs for the employment of military commonality across DOD. ment of Defense (DOD) and is often forces. Policy and joint doctrine each play Lack of agreement normally occurs misunderstood as synonymous with unique roles in providing the objectives during the development of joint doctrine, both collaboration, which is akin to an and frameworks under which organiza- as various subject matter experts can interagency approach to command and tions conduct operations. Accordingly, often be unfamiliar with the joint doc- control, and cooperation. Within the comprehension of the appropriate roles trine and policy development process and larger government, coordination may of policy and joint doctrine is essential the different role that each contributor imply the presence of a hierarchical to understanding how and why differ- plays. As joint doctrine plays a prominent relationship where the higher author- ent organizations adapt to real world role in influencing joint force develop- ity directs coordination among organic conditions. ment, many incorrectly assume that since and external organizations. This pros- civilian policy also influences joint force pect often causes concerns for civilian Policy and Joint Doctrine development, that policy is synonymous organizations, particularly when the Advancement of interorganizational with joint doctrine. The fact is they are military is involved. Therefore, espe- cooperation is directly impacted by dissimilar; policy can provide an impetus cially within diplomatic circles, the term the relationship between joint force for new practices, while joint doctrine collaboration is frequently used instead. development and policy development. provides a historically influenced and vet- Collaboration is more acceptable within Since the joint force is admittedly not a ted repository of joint force best practices the government since it implies the one-size-fits-all solution to U.S. foreign that serves as a starting point for the existence of parallel organizational policy issues, the joint force must conduct of military operations. There is a processes working toward a common develop policies and new joint doctrine great potential for disagreement between solution. However, to some humanitar- to shape and evolve today’s warfighters civilian organizations and DOD during ian organizations, when this term is to embrace interorganizational coop- development of crisis response options in used in the context of working with the eration as a core competency of the situations where the joint force perceives U.S. or other military organizations, future force. As such, the Joint Staff J7 that the desired investment of resources it creates a risk of blurring perceptions Joint Force Development Directorate and preferred outcomes on the part of of impartiality, which humanitarian performs five functions: joint doctrine, policymakers are at odds with the military organizations consider essential for their joint education, joint training, joint courses of action. In these instances, operations. For those organizations, the lessons learned, and joint concept an understanding of the relevant joint term most commonly used is coopera- development.5 This article focuses pri- doctrine provides policymakers with tion. Since the U.S. military can benefit marily on the role of joint doctrine and a common foundation from which to from communicating and information its relationship with other joint force discuss appropriate concepts and levels sharing with any civilian organization, functions. of risk. the authors chose to use the term inter- The fundamental purpose of joint On the other hand, institutionally organizational cooperation to highlight doctrine is to formally capture how speaking, DOD planning in the absence
130 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation III of III JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 of established joint doctrine can be chal- Figure 1. Examples of Policies That Drive Workforce Execution lenging. For example, in 2011, the U.S. Overarching Policies military’s involvement in preventing a po- National Security Strategy tential mass atrocity in Libya underscored Presidential Directives the lack of joint doctrine specific to the Civilian Workforce Military Workforce unique challenge. As a result, the joint • Organizational Strategic Plans, • Unified Command Plan Priorities, and Cross-Agency Priority • National Defense Strategy force defaulted to the closest concepts Goals Internal to U.S. • Quadrennial Defense Review available even though they were inad- Government • Quadrennial Reviews • Strategic Planning Guidance equate to the particular situation. Despite • Embassy Mission Resource Plans • National Military Strategy prior recognition of the joint doctrine • Country Development Strategies and Plans • Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan gap, the adaptation of mass atrocity doc- • National Strategy for Homeland • Directives, Instructions, and trine into joint doctrine was developed Security Memoranda subsequent to and as a direct result of • National Response Framework 6 actual policy developments. While joint Overarching Policies doctrine is clearly influenced by policy, it • International Conventions, Protocols, and Statutes also requires frequent updates to remain • Charters, Resolutions, and Declarations relevant. Due to its sheer size, no other External • Treaties to U.S. U.S. Government organization operates Government • Institutional Policies and Strategic Plans with the same scope or scale as DOD; • Frameworks and Guideline Documents joint doctrine provides a standing frame- • Organizational Mandates • Foreign Government Defense and Diplomatic Strategies and Plans work for DOD organizations to function and from which to adapt over time. An understanding of the interplay in the Doctrine-Based and Rules- effort—in this case, through rules-based roles of policy and joint doctrine is critical Based Workforces workforces. to ensuring effective adaptation within Interoperability between doctrine and In contrast, while civilian policies can the joint force. rules-based workforces offers a means outline workforce approaches to achieve New challenges in the future operat- to produce military and civilian leaders objectives (figure 1), joint doctrine ing environment will require increased who understand interorganizational serves a greater role for the military in interorganizational cooperation to better cooperation and how to coordinate and defining operational forces. Within the align joint force capabilities with national build synergy. The authors presume for U.S. Government, the DOD operational policy decisions. The ability to integrate this discussion that most organizations workforce known as a “joint force” de- joint doctrine with civilian activities, or are values-based—that is, they are made ploys under the authority of a combatant to at least have a fundamental under- up of morals, attributes, or principles commander, whose operational forces standing of civilian policy and procedure that guide mission selection, strategic are primarily organized as a joint force development, will help reduce planning, planning, objective identification, and or can also be a single-Service force to execution, and acquisition timelines decisionmaking. These values-based meet specific operational objectives. The when assessing courses of action and organizations conduct activities guided remaining DOD organizations exist to implementing them. Policy can argu- by their organizational policies as support the joint force, either via logis- ably be viewed as easier, faster, and more implemented by their strategic docu- tics, management, and support functions responsive to short-term requirements, ments, mandates, and administrative or by the “organize, train, and equip” yet policy—just like joint doctrine—is norms. Strategic documents gener- functions of the Services. Depending on not infallible since it too can be forced ally guide both civilian and military mission requirements and the operational to adapt to real-world conditions. As organizational objectives, while policy environment, a joint force may contain a the joint force develops its courses of documents determine the operational range of functional capabilities provided action from a doctrinal foundation, ad rules that impact routine business. For by multiple Services. The joint force hoc policy creation in support of political civilian organizations, these rules can streamlines decisionmaking by establish- course corrections may create unintended take the form of administrative instruc- ing a hierarchical command and control consequences in interorganizational tions, organizational mandates, policies, structure within the joint doctrine frame- cooperation and unity of effort. This fact directives, or other tools as captured in work that also allows sufficient flexibility underscores the need for both politi- figure 1. These civilian organizations to adapt to new challenges; thus, the joint cal and military establishments to work provide certain capabilities for foreign force exists as a doctrine-based workforce. together to align both policy and joint or domestic assistance, and each orga- Despite the advantages of organiza- doctrine for efficient achievement of the nization provides its own workforce to tion and efficiency, a doctrine-based desired strategic endstate. contribute to the whole-of-government workforce such as the joint force has
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 131 Helicopter assigned to USNS Matthew Perry (T-AKE-9) transports personnel to medical exchange during Association of Southeast Asian Nations Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Exercise, hosted by Brunei, June 2013 (U.S. Navy/Paul Seeber) drawbacks. Lengthy planning cycles, a publish comparable doctrine that is rein- is a critical step toward the establishment bureaucratic vetting and staffing process, forced by best practices as compared to of more effective cooperation across and a strong institutional cultural bias the joint force; however, civilian organi- organizational boundaries. This remains toward action may be reasons that civilian zations are nonetheless governed by their a primary challenge for the military as it leaders employ non-DOD organizations own internal rules even if those rules are seeks to incorporate civilian perspectives with security-like capabilities but without not called “doctrine.” These rules, how- into joint doctrine development. doctrine-based constraints. However, ever, are not always intrinsically grounded The basic notion of a workforce the joint doctrine development process is in proven organizational best practices implies a level of standardization and consciously designed to be adaptable. It and could lead to varying interpretations commonality that provides an oppor- provides the means to develop and pro- across organizational components. They tunity to establish effective cooperation mulgate new joint doctrine within 1 year, can be affected by personality-driven across organizational boundaries. While and in the case of existing joint doctrine, planning and cross-organizational acknowledging that doctrine-based and urgent change recommendations can be conflict within a multi-organization rules-based workforces have different incorporated and promulgated in a sig- environment. The cultural contrast be- constraints, there is often a core set of nificantly shorter time frame. tween a doctrine-based and rules-based standards and values that govern both A significant challenge arises when workforce is a principal driver of the workforces. For DOD, identifying this the military seeks to incorporate civilian miscommunication, divergent planning, common set of core values and stan- viewpoints into its joint doctrine develop- and political discord that can plague any dards and integrating a more thorough ment process. Bringing together separate multi-organization endeavor. From a understanding of the systems, processes, frameworks requires an understanding joint force perspective, understanding and cultural dynamics of relevant civilian that, in contrast to military organizations, the organizational rubrics and cultures organizations into joint doctrine will as- civilian organizations may not formally that guide civilian organization activities sist with understanding and developing
132 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation III of III JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 a joint force plan to construct an overall Figure 2. Joint Doctrine Influence government approach to a military opera- tion. Costs, complexity, and the need to support globally integrated operations Civilian Policy Military Operations and Activities combine to necessitate the incorporation and Strategy of civilian perspectives into joint force planning and execution—and, by exten- Military Policy, sion, into joint doctrine. While many, if Strategy, and Planning not most DOD and civilian organiza- pectrum of Joint Force Development tional functions and capabilities may not Past Present Future be interchangeable, they may be interop- Military Advice Joint essons Joint Training Joint Concept erable and in some cases interdependent. earned and Exercises Development Incorporating civilian perspectives into Grounded in Joint Doctrine joint doctrine offers potential benefits Joint Education Joint Doctrine Development of optimizing resources and minimizing redundancies without compromising ef- ficiency or operational success.
Joint Doctrine Influence for strategy development who may be The first phase in the spectrum of Joint doctrine that recognizes the unfamiliar with military core competen- joint force development is the past phase intrinsic value of civilian perspectives cies, capabilities, and limitations. Joint that captures completed or ongoing can ultimately drive interorganizational doctrine links the National Military military operations observations or les- cooperation by striking a balance Strategy to the National Security Strategy sons learned for incorporation into joint between military and civilian influ- and provides a common framework for doctrine. The lessons learned component ences concerning military capabilities military planning. It forms the basis of entails observation, analysis, and transla- (for example, current force structures, the ends-ways-means construct to de- tion of lessons learned into actions that equipment, and resources), capability scribe what must be accomplished, how improve the joint force. For example, development, and resource investment. it will be accomplished, and with what in 2012 the Director of Joint Force Led by the Joint Staff J7, the joint capabilities. Development directed a more aggressive force development process integrates For example, a need for an overarch- path for counterinsurgency joint doctrine documented military Service capabili- ing policy and more organized strategy development: ties to execute assigned missions. For for improving the security sectors of purposes of this article, the spectrum partner nations led to the establish- to guarantee we capture what we’ve of joint force development is grouped ment of Presidential Policy Directive learned about the conduct of counter- into past, present, and future phases, 23 (PPD-23), Security Sector Assistance, insurgency over the last decade and to which respectively provide historical which requires a collaborative approach harmonize joint and service efforts, I’m lessons and experiences, current operat- both within the U.S. Government and directing an accelerated development and ing frameworks, and considerations for between civilian and other military orga- release of JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency adaptation (see figure 2). While civilian nizations and is aimed at strengthening Operations (COIN). This joint publica- governmental policies inform military the ability of the United States to help tion will address the big ideas of COIN . . . policy and strategy development, opera- allies build their own security capacity. providing overarching and enduring guid- tional planning, military operations, PPD-23 implies unity of effort across the ance, while capturing the means by which and joint doctrine development, they government through participation in in- the interagency and others contribute to are also informed by military advice teragency strategic planning, assessment, this critical mission.10 provided by the Chairman of the Joint program design, and implementation Chiefs of Staff that is itself grounded in of security sector assistance. The joint A critical outcome of joint doctrine’s joint doctrine. doctrine–specific outcome of the PPD-23 role in synchronizing multiple efforts Joint doctrine incorporates principles process was the requirement for a Joint across multiple domains and organiza- of joint operations, operational art, and Publication (JP) on security cooperation, tions to ensure unity of effort was also elements of operational design and stan- JP 3-20.8 Lastly, joint doctrine provides captured in DOD support to the U.S. dardizes terminology, relationships, and interagency, intergovernmental, and Agency for International Development responsibilities among the Armed Forces treaty-based organizations with an op- (USAID)-led Ebola response efforts to facilitate solving complex problems.7 portunity to better understand the roles, in West Africa. In that case, existing In addition, joint doctrine provides in- capabilities, and operating procedures processes and policies for dealing with formation to civilian leaders responsible used by the Armed Forces.9 an international health crisis such as a
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 133 regional infectious disease epidemic were and terminology must be consistent and area with sufficient freedom of action to initially not well defined. A fundamental compliant with existing joint doctrine accomplish the mission. Implementing understanding on how multiple civilian language and terminology. Specific event the JOAC currently is a comprehensive, organizations function, to include their training tasks or objectives and UJTLs are multiyear effort managed by the Joint “rules-based approach” and how to both essential elements of standardizing Staff Joint Force Development Directorate incorporate it into DOD joint doctrinal the fundamental tasks that serve to pre- (J7) in conjunction with other Joint Staff framework, is crucial to solving complex pare and maintain joint force capabilities directorates, combatant commands, mili- and dynamic challenges. Integrating civil- at their expected levels of performance. tary Services, and defense agencies. The ian perspectives into joint doctrine will The future phase explores new joint doctrine contribution to the effort provide a more holistic comprehension operational methods, organizational involves potential changes between now of how to plan, coordinate, and build structures, and systems for employment. and 2020 to at least 35 JPs that span all synergy with all stakeholders. The absence or lack of depth of joint doc- joint functions.15 The present phase captures train- trine in a specific situation may indicate ing, exercises, and ongoing military that the joint force has encountered a Finally, similar to joint doctrine, joint operations that reinforce or identify new situation without previous experience.12 education provides the foundation for all tasks to be performed. The Chairman’s In that case, joint concept development phases within the spectrum of joint force Exercise Program Division is responsible aids adaptation by providing solutions development. Joint education is linked for increasing civilian organization par- for compelling, real-world challenges for to joint doctrine in that all U.S. military ticipation through DOD training and which existing doctrinal approaches and education curricula must be doctrine- exercise events and an annual integration joint capabilities are deemed underde- based and should reflect the deliberate, and exercise workshop. Workshop forums veloped. Joint concepts are guided by iterative, and continuous nature of joint provide excellent opportunities for DOD potential future threats and provide the force development.16 Joint curricula and civilian organizations to share ap- basis for joint experimentation, whereas should include approved joint concepts proaches and discuss training events that joint doctrine provides the basis for edu- and the most recent observed lessons enhance readiness, in addition to deep- cation, training, and execution of current from across the joint force.17 The impor- ening relationships, partnerships, and joint operations.13 Approved joint con- tance for military officers to understand overall crisis response preparedness. cepts provide important potential sources their leadership and cooperation roles be- In 2014, civilian organizations had of new ideas that can improve and even- yond warfighting is best captured by the over 200 individuals participate in DOD tually be incorporated into joint doctrine. 50th Commandant of the U.S. Army War training and exercise events. To help Likewise, joint concepts inform studies, College, Major General William R. Rapp: expand the concept of integrating with wargames, experimentation, and doctrine civilian organizations, the Joint Staff J7 change recommendations. developing military leaders who are teamed with the United States Institute An example of joint concepts incorpo- competent in the political environment of of Peace to design an interorganizational rating lessons learned and impacting joint national-security strategy decisionmaking tabletop exercise (ITX). The first ITX doctrine is the Joint Concept for Health is vitally important. It requires a broad in fiscal year 2014 included participants Services, which stemmed from Iraq and revision of talent management among the from 15 U.S. Government organizations Afghanistan combat operations and med- armed Services. Developing strategic mind- and 11 other civilian organizations with ical integration in the early 2000s. The edness goes beyond operational warfighting the purpose of increasing cooperation and medical community’s performance was assignments and simply “broadening” the effectiveness among organizations operat- impressive and contributed to the highest officers by sending them to fellowships or ing in a complex crisis. When planning survival rate during wartime in recorded for civilian graduate degrees, though both such exercises, it is important to include history. Although the military medical are valuable. Assignments that increase the civilian organizations early during the community made significant strides, it did leaders’ understanding of the interagency “joint event life cycle”11 process to ensure not institutionalize the many advances decisionmaking process and of alliance and achievable military and civilian training in medical operations achieved through coalition relations are critical.18 objectives are identified for both entities. collaboration in the war zone. This de- In support of joint training events bate is contributing to the revision of JP Thus, the synergistic value of joint and exercises, a menu of tasks in a com- 4-02, Health Services.14 Another example doctrine and joint education lies in their mon language known as the Universal showing the impact on the joint doctrine ability to serve as a connective link or Joint Task List (UJTL) serves as the hierarchy is the Joint Operational Access common thread through all joint force foundation for joint planning for military Concept (JOAC): development functions and to provide operations. Joint doctrine is directly a common framework for large, com- aligned with the UJTL as each task is the JOAC focuses on the ability to overcome plex organizations—such as the joint currently mapped to a primary JP at its anti-access and area-denial challenges and force—from which to operate and adapt lowest appropriate level. UJTL language project military force into an operational to new conditions in the operational
134 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation III of III JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Haiti’s Minister of Health looks at rash on young Haitian girl during U.S. Army Medical Readiness Training Exercise in Coteaux, Haiti, April 2010 (U.S. Army/Kaye Richey) environment. Given the continued to military operations. As a result, dif- military operations such as major combat importance of whole-of-government ferent organizational approaches to operations in Iraq, to counterinsurgency approaches during all phases of joint integration present distinct challenges in Afghanistan and the Philippines, to hu- operations, there may be substantial value to incorporate civilian perspectives into manitarian assistance in the United States, in joint force sponsorship of an imple- joint doctrine development. Despite this Pakistan, and Haiti, to studying emerging mentation plan on interorganizational challenge, the best interests of the joint regional and global threats. The prevail- cooperation across the U.S. Government force are served by deliberate efforts to ing strategic themes asserted the value to identify gaps and highlight the poten- overcome these challenges and integrate of a deliberate effort by the military to tial benefits of sustained unity of effort civilian participation into joint doctrine identify and consider civilian perspectives across the spectrum of operations. development. during the planning, execution, and tran- In similar fashion to the military sition of operations. Civilian Perspectives and sources for joint doctrine, interor- Four of the DOW themes are particu- Joint Doctrine Solutions ganizational cooperation can inform larly relevant to reinforce the importance During a JP revision or creation, the development of joint and Service- of incorporating civilian concerns into joint doctrine community conducts specific capabilities. In October 2011, military objectives: interagency coordina- an intensive review of potential tasks the Chairman issued a task to ensure tion, understanding the environment, and assembles those tasks into best the Joint Staff captured the experience transitions, and adaption. From these les- practice. Each JP within the joint doc- gained from over the last decade of war sons we learned that: trine hierarchy serves as a framework (DOW).19 In response, the Joint Staff J7 interagency coordination emphasized that provides authoritative, but not reviewed over 400 findings and best prac- •• the difficulty with synchronizing directive, guidance. The joint doctrine tices from 2003 to date and sorted them and integrating civilian and military framework plays a vital role for the joint into strategic themes. The studies in- efforts at the national level, in par- force by integrating capabilities integral cluded information from a wide variety of
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 135 ticular during the interagency plan- during the 2013 revision of JP 3-24.24 the military responded with specialized ning cycle Interorganizational coordination, as a capabilities and significant logistical sup- •• understanding the environment collaborative process led by the Joint port to the lead organization. As a bridge implied assessment of the enemy Staff J5, J7, and the Center for Complex to DOD, USAID recently published threat as well as aspects of both the Operations at the National Defense its new policy on cooperation with the civilian population and friendly forces University reinforced the establishment of Defense Department.25 From a joint •• transitions spoke to the importance a formal interorganizational coordination doctrine perspective, JP 3-29, Foreign of looking beyond near-term military mechanism for joint doctrine revision. Humanitarian Assistance, was designed goals to account for the factors that Second, the Joint Staff recognizes the to assist a joint force commander and will contribute to enduring success of value of more routine socialization of his staff during such operations.26 overarching political objectives joint doctrine with civilian organizations, Building domestic relationships and •• adaption recognized the fact that which are integral parts of a complex trust with local communities, the Federal regardless of the operational foun- global environment. It is imperative for Emergency Management Agency leads dation provided by joint doctrine, the joint force to consider all aspects of U.S. Government relief efforts includ- the realities and conditions on the specific operational environments. While ing defense support,27 while DOD’s ground combined with a “thinking threats to the joint force will obviously be Innovative Readiness Training policy pro- enemy” will require adaption. paramount in any military commander’s vides hands-on training opportunities for mind, consideration of the contribu- military Servicemembers that simultane- As the Chairman originally stated, we tions of nonmilitary organizations that ously addresses medical and construction must “make sure we [the military] actu- routinely operate parallel to the military’s needs of local communities.28 ally learn the lessons of the last decade effort will serve all organizations in the The process category involves de- of war.”20 Therefore, these themes must achievement of their objectives. Proactive veloping an awareness of organizational continually be assessed for integration outreach efforts such as these seek to cultures so that problems associated into joint force development and serve broaden the military’s perspective on in- with duplicative efforts and faulty as- as an enabler to build a more respon- terorganizational cooperation through an sumptions can be minimized through sive, versatile, and affordable force.21 exchange of experiences across multiple interagency cooperation. Memoranda of Underpinning the themes are challenges interagency organizations and profes- agreement (MOA) and understanding to interorganizational cooperation as sional education libraries. (MOU) as well as a “terms of refer- viewed by civilian organizations working The purpose category is centered on ence” are good foundations for shared with the military in three categories—that where to settle higher level policy dispari- processes; however, an institutional-level is, people, purpose, and process. For the ties to align objectives, the importance understanding of civilian organizational most part, the issues raised by civilian of liaisons and advisors in civilian and cultures provides the best cornerstone for organizations were not new, but continue military organizations, and on where successful interaction. DOD’s Promote to be raised with seemingly no resolution. military personnel can best contribute. Cooperation program is one effective The people category speaks to Understanding roles, responsibilities, and means of achieving interagency coop- communication as the cornerstone the operating environment is essential eration through planning.29 Also, the for subsequent successful mission in order for the military to effectively attempt by DOD with the Department of completion. Communication chal- establish and work within a humanitarian State and USAID in 3D Planning Group lenges exist (for example, understanding coordination framework. In humanitar- and Guide development efforts high- doctrine-based and rules-based work- ian and disaster relief situations abroad, lighted the need to bridge cooperation at force terminology as well as civilian USAID is the lead Federal entity for the highest levels of those organizations.30 collaborative and military command U.S. Government efforts. However, they The future challenge for successful inter- relationships22); however, more frequent routinely require military resources to organizational cooperation is to expand or routine contact that includes positive achieve the immediate needs, especially participation mechanisms beyond plan- personal interaction could accelerate the in complex, time-sensitive responses. ning frameworks into areas such as joint process of building interpersonal relation- Following their assessment of a situ- force or civilian workforce development. ships and trust.23 Two ongoing efforts ation, USAID often looks to military The combination of joint doctrine, illustrate tangible approaches through organizations to assist with capabilities education, and training plays a critical which joint doctrine seeks to provide they do not possess, typically in areas role in communication to military lead- solutions for building trust relation- such as airlift and logistics. Over the ers that civil-military relationships must ships among diverse groups of people. past 10 years, this has been the case be more cooperative than competitive. First, the idea for “interorganizational during Operations Unified Assistance Ultimately, there is more to gain from coordination days” originated with in Myanmar, Unified Response in Haiti, cooperation than by stovepiping each the collaboration conducted between Tomodachi in Japan, and most recently organization’s efforts. The establishment military and civilian organizations Sahayogi Haat in Nepal. In each instance, of interorganizational offices within
136 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation III of III JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 combatant commands, such as joint in- teragency coordination groups and joint Figure 3. Initiation and Development Stages interagency task forces within a theater of Initiation Development RFD/RFC operations can benefit all organizations. RFF/FAR/PD Joint Publication Timeline Initial Preparation Stages These organizations provide a focal point
for cooperation and information-sharing Assessment RFF Publish questionnaire Program Distribute Distribute Forward and enhance planning and execution of Directive FD/RFD FD/RFD Coord FC/RFC Draft Siq Draft Approval Adjudication FC/RFC Coord Complete Adjudication actions across the range of military opera- JS J7 completes FD/RFD FD/RFD FC/RFC Due to J7 Coord Coord Complete FAR within 90 days from LA Comments Due Comments tions. The synergy generated through the of RFF suspense Due combination of military capabilities and JS J7 approves, resources with civilian organizations is an disapproves, or modifies 1.5 1.5 the FAR within 30 days 5 months .5 m. 2 months 2 months months 2 months 2 months months 1 month effective whole-of-government approach LA reviews PD; JS J7 FC/RFD FC/RFC FC/RFC FC/RFC Draft that helps break down false barriers and staffs (15 days to prepare FD/RFD FD/RFD FD/RFD Comment Comment Sig Draft Sig Draft Development Prep Staffing Draft Draft Prep Process for staffing); JS J7 Adjudication Preparation Staffing Adjudication achieve objectives. Although the tasks preliminary PD 30 day staffing; 30 day LA J7 LA LA J7 JSDS JSDS J7 JSDS associated with harnessing the capabilities resolving; final PD 17.5-Month Timeline of various entities can be challenging, the 30 day staffing
end results help achieve both political and Revision starts 3.5 years from publication date— * Civilian Organization Opportunities to Participate military objectives. approved PD starts clock There are joint doctrine solutions Key: LA = Lead Agent (author); JS = Joint Staff; JSDS = Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor (Joint Staff lead); TRA = Technical that help fill gaps in routine planning, Review Authority (subject matter expert); RFF = Request for Feedback (assessment); FAR = Formal Assessment Request (recommendations report); PD = Program Directive–Outline; FD/RFD = First Draft/Revision First Draft; JWG = Joint Working training, and coordinating for coopera- Group; FC/RFC = Final Coordination/Revision Final Coordination; CRM = Comment Review Matrix; JSAP = Joint Staff Action tion with civilian organizations. Current Package; JDDC = Joint Doctrine Development Community; JDPC = Joint Doctrine Planner’s Conference revision of several Joint Publications (JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-07, Stability Operations; JP 3-08, Interorganizational Division conducted an intensive effort to nity, which is primarily composed of Coordination; and JP 5-0, Joint obtain feedback from DOD and civilian DOD organizations and has informally Planning31) highlights the need for im- organizations regarding the importance expanded to provide access to civilian proving the degree of institutional-level each placed on individual JPs within the organizations inside and outside the understanding between the military and joint doctrine hierarchy. Efforts such as U.S. Government.33 civilian organizations. For example, JP these seek to identify and build more Joint doctrine is coordinated exter- 5-0 plays a key role in passing on the les- formal coordination efforts with civil- nally during two of the four stages of the sons of an iterative dialogue to planners ian organizations during joint doctrine joint doctrine development process. The at all levels of the military. Systems such development and to provide a means for average life cycle of a JP is 5 years with as the Adaptive Planning and Execution reciprocal joint doctrine reviews of inter- the most influence from civilian organiza- system facilitate that dialogue and its as- organizational documents. tions developed during the initiation and sociated cooperative planning efforts.32 development stages.34 The development of a dedicated Web site Joint Doctrine Within the initiation and develop- to educate military personnel on civilian Development Process ment stages, there are multiple points organizations via the Joint Electronic Joint doctrine provides the critical of entry where civilian organizations Library Web site allows searches of strate- framework by which the military can could influence actual joint doctrine text gic plans, certain policies and frameworks, incorporate civilian perspectives on development (see figure 3). Providing and provides a repository of interorgani- interorganizational cooperation into its feedback during the initiation stage via zational MOA/MOU to build the joint operations. Inclusion of civilian perspec- the request for feedback (RFF) question- force’s awareness of existing relationships tives during the joint doctrine develop- naire ensures that civilian perspectives with civilian organizations. In conjunc- ment process provides civilian organi- will be vetted and socialized early in the tion with these processes, the Joint Staff zations with an opportunity to create joint doctrine development process. The developed a new format for JP 3-08 or- awareness regarding their perceived output from the RFF questionnaire is a ganizational appendices to focus on what roles, capabilities, and organizational formal assessment report, which acts as a a joint force commander should know culture of their expectations, to build guide to structuring the JP that provides about civilian organizations to enhance relationships, and to educate and inform recommended themes and courses of interorganizational cooperation. the entire joint force—from inside the action for the lead author and Joint Staff One final example of joint doctrine institutional level. The joint doctrine doctrine sponsor to use during the writ- solutions involves the proactive so- development process is managed by ing process. Once the initiation stage is licitation of nonmilitary feedback. For the Joint Staff J7 and includes the complete and the process that develops example, the Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine joint doctrine development commu- the JP outline—known as the program
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 137 South Carolina Army National Guard pilots fly over major hurricane escape routes near Beaufort, June 10, 2015, during hurricane evacuation exercise (U.S. Army National Guard/Di Giovine) directive (PD)—is solidified, civilian orga- itary decisionmakers at an institutional the last 15 years, across multiple global nizations have four other recommended level. Military operations require both a geographies, has clearly established and opportunities within the 17.5-month de- clear process for decisionmaking and a reinforced the necessity of effective in- velopment stage to provide perspectives: framework for immediate employment terorganizational cooperation. In light of first draft comments, first draft working capabilities toward mission objectives. ever-increasing fiscal pressures and evolv- group, final draft comments, and final Interorganizational differences and best ing strategic priorities, creative means draft working group. practices emerge daily, and it is critical must be explored that could help both Once the development stage is com- to include their perspectives into the civilian and military organizations main- plete, the JP is staffed for approval and joint doctrine revision process. Joint tain, enhance, and routinize cooperation then is published. doctrine is not static; it is intended to in ways that can best support both sides’ be revised and adapted in accordance goals, objectives, and priorities. JFQ Conclusion with vetted operational experiences. The Chairman is the senior military Civilian employees and military person- advisor to the President and Secretary nel benefit equally from an enhanced Notes of Defense and is legally obligated to understanding of each other’s respective 1 provide “independent” military advice.35 roles and missions. Participation and James C. McArthur et al., “Interorgani- zational Cooperation I of III: The Interagency Joint doctrine provides the foundation contribution to the development of Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly 79 (4th for all military advice and recommenda- each other’s doctrine or rules can assist Quarter 2015), 106–112. tions provided by the Chairman. The in establishing mutual understanding, 2 James C. McArthur et al., “Interorganiza- joint doctrine development process trust, and rapport. tional Cooperation II of III: The Humanitar- st provides civilian organizations with an The vast amount of interorganiza- ian Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly 80 (1 Quarter 2016), 145–152. invaluable opportunity to influence mil- tional operational experiences during
138 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation III of III JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 3 The joint force is unique in that all other 16 CJCSI 5120.01C, A-6. tion (APEX) Overview and Policy Framework Department of Defense elements support it. 17 JP 1, VI-5. (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, May 29, Throughout this article the term joint force is 18 William E. Rapp, “Civil-Military Rela- 2015). used to describe U.S. military forces. tions: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy 33 CJCSI 5120.02D; CJCSM 5120.01, 4 Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interorga- Making,” Parameters 45, no. 3 (Autumn Joint Doctrine Development Process (Washing- nizational Coordination, revision first draft 2015), 25. ton, DC: The Joint Staff, December 29, 2014), (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 19 Decade of War, Volume 1: Enduring Les- B-1. 10, 2014), 13. The following terms are a range sons from the Past Decade of Operations (Suffolk, 34 Ibid., B-6–B-23. of interactions that occur among stakehold- VA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis 35 Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary ers. There is no common interorganizational Division [JCOA], Joint Staff J7, 2012). Presidency, Civil-Military Friction and Presi- agreement on these terms, and other stake- 20 Ibid., v. dential Decision Making: Explaining the Bro- holders may use them interchangeably or with 21 Ibid., 2. ken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies Quarterly varying definitions. Dictionary definitions are 22 3D Planning Guide Diplomacy, Develop- 43, no. 1 (March 2013), 134–137. provided as a baseline for common understand- ment, Defense: Pre-decisional Working Draft ing. Collaboration is a process where organiza- (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, tions work together to attain common goals July 31, 2012), 47–55; George Katsos, “Com- by sharing knowledge, learning, and building mand Relationships,” Joint Force Quarterly 63 consensus. Be aware that some attribute a (4th Quarter 2011), 153–155; “Multinational negative meaning to the term collaboration Command Relationships,” Joint Force Quarterly as if referring to those who betray others by 65 (2nd Quarter 2011), 102–104; and “The willingly assisting an enemy of one’s country, United Nations and Intergovernmental Orga- especially an occupying force. Cooperation is nization Command Relationships,” Joint Force the process of acting together for a common Quarterly 66 (3rd Quarter 2012), 97–99. purpose or mutual benefit. It involves working 23 David Grambo, Barrett Smith, and Rich- in harmony, side by side, and implies an associa- ard W. Kokko, “Insights to Effective Interorga- tion between or among organizations. It is the nizational Coordination,” InterAgency Journal alternative to working separately in competi- 5, no. 3 (Fall 2014), 4–5; Bradley A. Becker, tion. Cooperation with other departments and “Interorganizational Coordination,” Insights agencies does not mean giving up authority, and Best Practices Focus Paper, 4th ed. (Suffolk, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the VA: JCOA, Joint Staff J7, July 2013), 1; Alfon- direction of others. Coordination is the process so E. Lenhardt, USAID Policy on Cooperation of organizing a complex enterprise in which with the Department of Defense (Washington, numerous organizations are involved and bring DC: U.S. Agency for International Develop- their contributions together to form a coherent ment, June 2015). or efficient whole. It implies formal structures, 24 JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations relationships, and processes. (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 5 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 22, 2013). United States (Washington, DC: The Joint 25 Lenhardt. Staff, March 25, 2013), VI-3. 26 JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian As- 6 JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations (Washington, sistance (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, DC: The Joint Staff, August 1, 2012). January 3, 2014). 7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 27 JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authori- Instruction (CJCSI) 5120.02C, Joint Doctrine ties (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 31, Development System (Washington, DC: The 2013). Joint Staff, January 13, 2012), A-2. 28 Innovative Readiness Training Web site, 8 JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, revision available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 McArthur et al. 139 Seaman stands force protection watch in 7-meter rigid hull inflatable boat while amphibious transport dock ship USS Ponce (LPD 15) gets under way after port visit at Seychelles, November 2010 (U.S. Navy/Nathanael Miller)
Thoughts on Force Protection
By Richard E. Berkebile
ne of the prime objectives of an directly or indirectly through families Publication (JP) 1-0, Doctrine for the adversary is to inflict damage on or communities and by both lethal Armed Forces of the United States, states O the joint force. With thinking and nonlethal means. For example, in that military operations are most effec- enemies, vulnerability is an inescapable August 2015 the Islamic State of Iraq tive when integrated and synchronized characteristic of conflict, and every and the Levant published the names, in time, space, and purpose.5 This article joint force will have vulnerabilities. photographs, and addresses of 100 U.S. adapts that insight and analyzes the func- Contemporary threats transcend space military personnel and encouraged tion and mission contexts of protection far easier than in the past, and opera- sympathetic individuals to attack them.1 through the lenses of purpose, space, tional protection is not confined to Joint doctrine conceives protection force, and time. lethal threats to formations located in in two contexts.2 The first context is as a hostile environments overseas. With function focused on preserving the joint What Is Protection? modern technology, even individual force’s fighting potential.3 The second JP 3-0, Joint Operations, defines Servicemembers can be targeted is as a mission to protect civilians.4 Joint protection as the “preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, infor- Dr. Richard E. Berkebile is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and mation, and infrastructure deployed or Multinational Operations at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
140 Joint Doctrine / Thoughts on Force Protection JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 located within or outside the boundaries this wording could refer to preservation Conversely, accomplishing the mis- of a given operational area.”6 This defi- of fighting potential as the outcome of sion inherently involves risking at least nition addresses the protection function successfully protecting the joint force.11 part of the force. For example, during sta- in terms of purpose, location in space, More likely, however, it references the bility operations, interaction with people and objects to be protected. Protecting need to prioritize protection capabili- may encourage them to have confidence denotes shielding from injury, destruc- ties so violence can be “applied at the in their security and the legitimacy and tion, or detrimental effect, while protec- decisive time and place.”12 The difference competence of their own government tion is the act of protecting or sheltering between the joint force itself and its fight- primarily and an intervening power from danger or harm. ing potential is nuanced. Contextually, secondarily. Restricting the joint force to Protection does not accomplish some parts of the joint force’s fighting self-protecting operating bases is unlikely political or military objectives in its own potential will matter more. While no to accomplish this. right. It is defensive in nature, but not commander wants to suffer loss of any An example from the 1994 Operation passive. It differs from defending, but the kind, the key is to be able to absorb Uphold Democracy in Haiti illustrates this concepts are related and not mutually the enemy’s blows while continuing to point. Major General David C. Meade, exclusive. In a military context, defensive prosecute the campaign. A vital object USA, commander of Joint Task Force operations are more often associated with of protection is the friendly operational 190 (JTF 190) and the 10th Mountain the maneuver function and more fully center of gravity or its constituent critical Division, took a conservative approach, engage the fires function. In traditional requirements. Assuming that some part keeping Soldiers in protective equipment warfare, protection tends to occur at a of the joint force is the center of gravity, and confining them to operating bases. greater distance from the source of the sufficient damage to it would, by defini- Brigadier General Richard W. Potter, Jr., threat than defense. tion, severely impede or entirely derail the USA, commander of Special Operations achieving of campaign objectives.13 Forces/Task Force Raleigh (TF Raleigh) Purpose JP 3-0 is instructive, stating that “as placed his forces in soft caps and engaged Protection’s military application is the JFC’s [joint force commander’s] with the local population.16 In the short broad. At a fundamental level, militar- mission requires, the protection function term, TF Raleigh was less protected. ies exist to protect the state. For this also extends beyond force protection to In the long term, however, it may have article, however, the vast remit of pro- encompass protection of U.S. noncom- gained better situational awareness and tection is narrowed to two purposes. batants; the forces, systems, and civil developed intelligence sources, leaving its The first is protecting the joint force infrastructure of friendly nations; and members better protected. In contrast, itself.7 To be useful, the joint force must interorganizational partners.”14 Note that JTF 190 may have been ignorant of survive as an effective fighting force. In broadening beyond the force is for mis- developing threats or ceded enemies an other words, the joint force is the essen- sion requirements and necessarily includes opportunity to recruit in uncontested tial object of protection. This is implied nonforce elements. Protecting nonforce civil areas. Alternatively, Major General in the functional focus on preserving elements may be the object of the mis- Meade, fresh from his experience in the joint force’s fighting potential.8 sion or simply a necessary factor for Somalia, may have considered a moder- The other purpose is to protect successfully completing another mission. ately successful enemy attack a risk to the nonforce elements, that is, anything that JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, does entire operation. is not part of the joint force. Nonforce not include the American noncombatant In short, factors that influence the element is an author-invented term ag- caveat and allows for broader protection wisdom of extending protection beyond gregating mission-related nonmilitary of any noncombatant.15 the joint force could include: personnel, equipment, facilities, infor- The defense of nonforce elements Utility of the protected entity. mation, and infrastructure for brevity.9 should not degrade or divert the capa- •• Forces of friendly nations, at-risk These nonforce elements are contingent bilities needed to sufficiently protect the populations, and interorganizational objects of protection. When protective joint force. Sufficient protection is not partners could provide critical capabilities are scarce, nonforce elements necessarily maximum protection. The requirements or capabilities to the must be prioritized based on their value commander must balance acceptable risk joint force. to the campaign or achieving strategic to the force and risk to the mission. The Phase of the campaign. If the domi- outcomes. The joint force is the primary second consideration is not between the •• nate phase concluded successfully military means to provide protection for joint force and nonforce elements, but and if stability is contested, then both nonforce elements and itself. The among the nonforce elements them- joint force survival is at less risk and reverse is generally not true. selves. Their value is determined through may justify extending the protection JP 3-0 does not explain the phrasing analysis of the operational environment. function. “conserving the joint force’s fighting In short, the greater the contribution to Purpose of the campaign. Campaign potential” as opposed to just “conserv- campaign success or strategic outcomes, •• objectives may dictate extension. For ing the joint force.”10 Conjecturally, the more valuable the element is.
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Berkebile 141 Seaman from Riverine Squadron 1 observes members of Royal Thai navy riverine squadron conduct force protection exercise on fishing vessel and patrol boat during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Thailand 2011, Sattahip, Thailand, May 2011 (U.S. Navy/Katerine Noll)
example, during Operation Odyssey JP 3-0 conceives of military opera- domain are specifically described that Dawn in Libya in March 2011, the tions as inhabiting a world consisting of way in JP 3-0.20 The joint force is likely objective was to protect civilians.17 environments, areas, domains, dimen- to focus on an OE that is a subset of the •• Political significance of the nonforce sions, and systems. Doctrine employs global environment. Joint operational elements. If the enemy targets non- operational environment (OE) to describe areas (JOAs), or the spaces in which combatants to achieve a political, or the “composite of the conditions, cir- joint forces conduct operations, could conceivably economic, effect, and cumstances, and influences that affect likewise be synonymous with the opera- if the risk to the joint force is small the employment of capabilities and bear tional environment. However, they are enough, it may require a diversion of on the decisions of the commander.”18 more likely to be lesser included physical resources. Alternatively, nonorganic Operational area (OA) is an overarching spaces within it. Areas of operation are military or interagency capabilities and rather elastic term used to describe subdivisions of JOAs assigned to land could be tasked. several different military spatial delinea- and maritime components.21 Figure 1 tions of physical areas.19 To conceive of is a conceptual depiction of the physical Protection’s Space protection across space, I considered volume of spatial areas. A common reason for protection fail- environments to include at least some Planning protection requires further ures is an attack on an unanticipated element of physical area. (Unpersuaded division of environments and areas into location or domain. It is all too easy readers may substitute area of interest for domains, the venues for fighting. JP for cracks to appear due to poor spatial operational environment for the remain- 3-0 divides space into physical air, land, analysis or faulty assignment of respon- der of the article.) maritime, and space domains and the sibilities. The totality of the protection Conceptually, the joint force opera- information environment.22 The infor- problem requires disaggregating space tional environment could be synonymous mation environment requires further to reveal intricate relationships among with the global environment. Indeed, the elaboration. It contains its own cyber- environments, areas, and domains. information environment and cyberspace space domain and physical, information,
142 Joint Doctrine / Thoughts on Force Protection JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 and cognitive dimensions.23 Figure 2 Figure 1. Physical Volume of Spatial Areas is a modified version of an operational environment graphic found in JP 2-01.3, Global Environment Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.24 Operational If one accepts that the OE is a subset Environment of the global environment, then the information environment transcends the Joint operational environment and is not con- Operational Area tained by the OE, as may be inferred from figure 2. If one further overlays the joint Area of force’s requirement for protection across Operations space, the depiction resembles figure 3.
Protection’s Force Forces execute protection. These forces may include the joint force, residual military forces, or certain civilian governmental, commercial, or private entities. The technologies of the infor- mation age have compressed space and time intervals between battlefields and political outcomes. In particular, the joint force may be vulnerable in the information environment and the cyber Figure 2. Operational Enviroment and space domains well beyond the JOA. As technology compresses space, Information Environment the joint force becomes increasingly Physical Areas and Factors dependent on protection capabilities provided through coordination and Informational Dimension
Space Domain Cognitive Dimension cooperation rather than organic assets. Here, the question concerns the joint Physical Dimension force and its generalized application of protection capabilities. Air Domain Cyberspace Capabilities. Protection can be Land Domain implemented in four primary ways: ac- Hydrology Maritime Domain Cyberspace tive defense, passive defense, emergency Terrain management and response, and fratricide Oceanography prevention.25 JP 3-0 operationalized these in terms of tasks and key considerations— Cyberspace essentially expanded descriptions of the tasks. Each of these ways or tasks implies a need for a corresponding capability to (frequently framed as noncomba- antiterrorism; force health protec- accomplish it. (Doctrine does not align tant evacuation); securing forces, tion (key consideration);27 and tasks and key considerations with any par- bases, joint security areas, and lines critical infrastructure protection (key ticular way.) Discounting the inevitable of communication; and defensive consideration).28 overlap, I reworded protection tasks and countermeasures (counterdeception, •• Emergency Management and aligned them with the four ways.26 Two counterpropaganda, and counter– Response: CBRN consequence key considerations that were not obvi- improvised explosive device). management. ously restated tasks were included. The •• Passive Defense: physical security; •• Fratricide Prevention. personnel recovery task did not align with chemical, biological, radiologi- A close examination of the ways, any of the specified ways: cal, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; tasks, and key considerations disclosed operations security, computer Active Defense: air, space, and missile five important points. First, JP 3-0 sug- •• network defense, information assur- defense; protecting U.S. civilians gests that, at least at the operational ance, defensive electronic attack;
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Berkebile 143 Figure 3. Re uirement for Protection across Space achieve the same effect by creating a seam in conceiving and planning protection. Finally, JP 3-0 is oriented toward Global Environment Operational external threats. Protection, however, Environment also has a vital internal aspect. While fratricide prevention is internally focused, Joint Operational Area it is directed solely against unintentional harm. Contemporary technology and, and-Maritime Domains arguably, political culture increase inter- and AO Maritime AO nal vulnerability to intentional or even Air Domains ambient subversion. Stated differently, “we” could be a credible enemy requiring a corresponding protection task and ca- Space Domains pability. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, marks considerable progress Information Environment Cyber Domains toward addressing insider threats. While it specifically addresses such threats, it is not overarching protection doctrine. The Army supplements joint protection tasks with two additional internally focused ones: employing safety techniques and conducting law and order operations.34 Counteracting internal threats re- level, the scope of the operation is only U.S. Patriot missile batteries were sent quires corresponding capabilities. Some marginally related to the range of nec- to defend Israeli nonforce elements, and could be capabilities in the traditional essary tasks.29 This implies that a full air missions were retasked to perform sense such as technical means to detect range of protection capabilities should Scud suppression even though Israel was espionage. The key to internal force be both considered and available for any neither a party to the conflict nor located assurance, however, may lie buried contingency. in the JOA.30 within the information environment’s Second, domains are not necessarily Third, task descriptions are oriented informational and cognitive dimensions. bounded. Some protection capabilities toward the operational level of war. Only Protection in these dimensions could are executed in more than one domain, one, critical infrastructure protection, is have elements of technical capabilities, while others are executed in a single clearly described at both an operational but it is more likely to require human domain but provide protection in several. and a strategic level.31 A review of the solutions. Both joint force and national protection January 2015 Universal Joint Task List Vulnerabilities. Borrowing from capabilities and responsibilities may cross reveals that a form of the protection tasks Frederick II of Prussia, “he who defends the JOA boundary. Lastly, as conditioned is maintained across all levels of war.32 everything defends nothing.” The joint by proximity, protection need not secure Fourth, JP 3-0 views emergency force has considerably more valuable force and nonforce elements in isolation. management and response narrowly in military and nonforce assets to protect The following example illustrates terms of accompanying damage from than just the friendly center of gravity. protection’s spatial variability. Area missile accidents, health threats, and natural Protection prioritization across domains defense protects targets in land, maritime, disasters.33 Emergency management and and the information environment will be air, and possibly space and cyber domains. response should be expanded to include key. As headquarters, ports, air bases, and reaction to intentional hostile action. In the context of the air and missile transportation hubs are often near urban For example, I categorized CBRN con- defense task, JP 3-01, Countering Air areas, missile defense can protect both sequence management, which is likely and Missile Threats, directs the assem- the joint force and nonforce elements, the result of deliberate hostility, under bling of a critical asset list (CAL) based albeit at varying levels of efficiency. If the emergency management and response. on three criteria: the potential target’s protection priority is high enough, the Additionally, recovery actions in the after- mission criticality, its vulnerability (a de- commander may divert capabilities from math of a conventional attack could easily termination based on susceptibility to and other missions. Military forces of higher be included in a redefined emergency recoverability from attack), and the cred- echelons may also perform the mission. management plan. This does not imply a ibility of the threat.35 A defended asset list During the Southwest Asia campaign of lack of capability to perform emergency (DAL) is then derived by the prioritized 1990–1991, of which Operations Desert management and response but could assignment of available air and missile Shield and Desert Storm were a part, defense capabilities.36 JP 3-31, Command
144 Joint Doctrine / Thoughts on Force Protection JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 CBRN defense specialist Marine radios team during joint training exercise between III Marine Expeditionary Forces CBRNE Ordnance Disposal units at Central Training Area, Camp Hansen, Okinawa, January 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kelsey M. Dornfeld) and Control for Joint Land Operations, requires a brief diversion into strategic For example, the loss or sustained suggests a similar method be used for and tactical protection. disruption of major urban centers, the cyberspace domain.37 The method is Strategic Protection. The need for critical economic institutions or in- sensible as far as it goes. It simply needs strategic protection is continuous. Milan frastructure, governance institutions, to be applied across all domains. In other Vego posits that strategic protection is strategic military capabilities, or vital words, all domain and environment vul- about sources of power.38 National power communications infrastructure would nerabilities require a centralized CAL and may be considered the state’s ability to seriously affect the national psyche or DAL process. exercise “control over the minds and ac- quality of life and, conceivably, national tions of other” people or states.39 Sources survival. Sources of power would gen- Protection’s Time of power, then, are intrinsically valuable erally be outside the OE, except for Protection never rests. Or at least it entities whose protection is in the national homeland or U.S. Northern Command should never rest. But duration is interest. Their vulnerability is elevated (USNORTHCOM) area of responsibility only one aspect of time, and labeling or demoted by current global tensions, operations,40 and the joint force would protection timeless does not end the military campaigns, or enemy capabilities. not be responsible for their protection. discussion. Given vulnerabilities and Even if negligible in a particular cam- For example, USNORTHCOM or- capability scarcity, operational protec- paign, sources of power are always at risk chestrates ballistic missile defense of the tion requires analysis of time’s simulta- from potential enemies. Protection from homeland. With current technology and neity and timing aspects. These aspects strategic surprise is generally the result of likely threats, protection simultaneity and are influenced by level of war and by long-term planning and is implemented at timing coordination is muted for strategic the phasing of operational campaigns. the national level. In a broader sense, stra- protection. Although this article largely examines tegic protection is a necessary component Tactical Protection. Tactical protec- only operational war, the protection of strategic deterrence. tion is local and largely of a self-help function spans all levels. Analyzing time nature. According to Vego, it is unit and
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Berkebile 145 Airmen work in Global Strategic Warning and Space Surveillance System Center at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colorado, September 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Krystal Ardrey) platform focused.41 Tactical protection is Operational Protection. For opera- operational environment, planners must an inherent command responsibility for tional protection, simultaneity and timing anticipate and react to change. Enemy all organizations. Even though accept- are essential aspects of time. Dale C. capabilities will strengthen or weaken, able risk may vary considerably, tactical Eikmeier points out the offensive features and the enemy will adapt. The main ef- protection should occur regardless of of simultaneity: “multiple actions at the fort and relative importance of friendly location in space. Tactical protection is same time and appropriately synchro- forces will likewise change. Variations will not bounded by time, and its planning nized pressure on multiple points . . . of not affect all domains equally. Effective horizons are near term. Risk is higher an enemy’s systems and/or CoG [center protection requires constant attention during times of conflict but is never of gravity].”42 Protection’s simultaneity is and adjustment over time. nonexistent. For example, attacks in the flip side of the coin; it is the prioriti- Phasing is an operational tool used the information environment and cyber zation and synchronization of capabilities to synchronize and sequence timing domain are daily occurrences, although to defend friendly critical vulnerabilities during campaigns.44 Vego observes some international actors may be holding and decisive points across vulnerable do- that there is no operational level of war their most damaging capabilities in abey- mains and the information environment. without active operations45 and that JTFs ance. Tactical protection is intrinsic, but In other words, skilled enemies are likely are only temporary organizations, not units do not have equal capability to pro- to plan multidomain attacks against the permanent. This aligns Phase 0, shaping vide it across domains. Some protection joint force. activities, with combatant commands capabilities must be aggregated at higher Eikmeier also notes, “Timing refers at the strategic level of war. Even so, levels. For example, most units would be to when to apply specific capabilities.”43 operational protection in some form incapable of providing their own air or Protection priorities and requirements begins in Phase 0. Generally, the onset of space defense. are dynamic. As campaigns unfold and military operations is not a total surprise. the global environment impinges on the Tensions build openly in the information
146 Joint Doctrine / Thoughts on Force Protection JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 environment, leading to anticipatory be- •• In Phase 5, capabilities and vul- DC: The Joint Staff, July 12, 2010); JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: The Joint havior by both friendly and enemy forces. nerabilities will decrease in most Staff, November 22, 2013); JP 3-28, Defense The operational impact of a moderately domains. The range of relevant tasks Support of Civil Authorities (Washington, DC: successful Phase 0 attack escalates for will narrow as forces redeploy. As in The Joint Staff, February 19, 2013); JP 3-29, specialized high-demand, low-density Phase 0, terrorist attacks may be a Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Washing- assets and as the size of extant military top concern. ton, DC: The Joint Staff, January 3, 2014); JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations forces, particularly potential joint force Protection is a vital function that (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 22, headquarters, shrinks. transcends space and time. Modern 2007). Protection timing can be roughly il- 5 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the technology is increasing the reach of lustrated using the protection doctrine’s United States (Washington, DC: The Joint threats, allowing them to cross more dominant narrative, in which the joint Staff, March 25, 2013), I-20; JP 3-0, I-1. domains in much less time. The defense 6 JP 3-0 also defines protection in a space force deploys to a host nation that is community needs to think deeply about and shipping context, but including them here threatened by or suffering depredations the concept of protection. A purpose, would not contribute to the overall thesis of from a common enemy: the article. space, force, and time framework is a 7 In the abstract, the joint force could be •• In Phase 0, potential commanders useful supplement to the function and synonymous with the entire national military are focused on protecting forces mission contexts of protection doctrine. establishment. It is more likely a subset of all from terrorist actions and cyber Operational protection requires compre- military forces organized in a joint task force. 8 threats. Commanders are not rou- hensive planning across operational areas, JP 3-0, III-29; Protection Joint Functional Concept: Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Depart- tinely charged with protection of domains, and phases. It does not occur in ment of Defense, June 3, 2004), 7. nonforce elements. While a preemp- isolation. Coordination with appropriate 9 It also allows for the possibility that per- tive attack by a conventional force headquarters beyond the OE and tactical sonnel, equipment, facilities, information, and cannot be ruled out, commanders forces within the OE is necessary. JFQ infrastructure may not be an exhaustive list. and protection planners must remain 10 See Universal Joint Task List, available at
JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 Berkebile 147 27 Ibid., III-34. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., III-30. 30 The 1993 version of JP 3-0 uses the term Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision joint operations area. It is unclear if the term (to be signed within 6 months) was used in 1990–1991. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support 31 JP 3-0, III-34. 32 Universal Joint Task List. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations 33 JP 3-0, III-29. 34 Army Doctrine Reference Publication JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations 3-37, Protection (Washington, DC: Headquar- JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence ters Department of the Army, August 2012), 1–3. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations 35 JP 3-68, III-20. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction 36 Ibid., III-21. 37 JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint JP 3-07, Stability Land Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 24, 2014), II-21. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination 38 Adopted from Vego, VIII-95. JP 3-41, CBRN Consequence Management 39 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Na- tions: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordinance Disposal (Caledonia: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 26. JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations 40 Doctrine defineshomeland as the United States, its territories, and the surrounding wa- JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations ters and airspace (JP 3-16, I-2). This includes Guam. For this article, references to the home- JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore land exclude Guam but include Puerto Rico JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water and the Virgin Islands. Hawaii is part of the homeland but is in the U.S. Pacific Command area of operation (except for missile defense). JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) 41 Vego, VIII-96–97. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security 42 Dale C. Eikmeier, “From Operational Art to Operational Plans: A Joint Planning Primer,” JP 3-14, Space Operations Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2012, 44; JP 3-0. 43 Eikmeier, 45. JP 3-34, Engineer Operations 44 JP 3-0, III-36. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery 45 Vego, VIII-95. 46 Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps JP 3-61, Public Affairs Warfighting Publication 3-33.5,Insurgencies JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and Countering Insurgencies (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, May 13, 2014).
148 Joint Doctrine / Thoughts on Force Protection JFQ 81, 2nd Quarter 2016 NEW from NDU Press Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War NDU Press, 2015 • 488 pp.
This volume began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well.
The volume begins with an introduction that addresses the difficulty of learning strategic lessons and a preview of the major lessons identified in the study. It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surges themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decision- making, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries.
The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior offi- cers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.
Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/LessonsEncountered.aspx JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY ONE, 2ND QUARTER 2016
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