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The Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel 2018/19

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The Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel 2018/19 HMS The Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center is engaged המרכז לחקר מדיניות ואסטרטגיה ימית in research on maritime strategy as part of Haifa University's Mari Poli Str Resear Center effort to lead the Israeli national research in maritime and sea science. The Center conducts academic research in the areas of regional security and foreign policy, the movement of goods, people and ideas, law, energy and the environment – all while MARITIME STRATEGIC EVALUATION examining their impact on the national security of the State of FOR ISRAEL 2018/19 Israel. Chief editor: Prof. Shaul Chorev The 'Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel, 2018-2019', Edited and produced by: Ehud Gonen reviewed the main changes in the maritime domain globally as well as regionally (East Mediterranean) The 'Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel' included action plans and policy Israel 2018/19 recommendations for decision makers which, in the opinion of the authors, can help Israel strengthen the sea component of for Israel's national security and promote the sea-related economy as a growth engine (blue growth) for the Israeli economy. The report was writen by researcher fellows from Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center at the University of Haifa, and researches from the University of Haifa who have a unique knowledge of these subjects. The Maritime Strategic Evaluation Evaluation Maritime Strategic The 9 789657 437773 HMS המרכז לחקר מדיניות ואסטרטגיה ימית Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center MARITIME STRATEGIC EVALUATION FOR ISRAEL 2018/19 Chief editor: Professor Shaul Chorev Edited and produced by: Ehud Gonen March 2019 Thanks and appreciations The Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center wishes to thank Dov (Berle) Shafir for his generous support which made possible the writing of this document. The Maritime Strategy Evaluation report, including the insights and recommendations included in it, are based on the personal experience and professional judgment of the authors, but do not necessarily represent the official position of the Center or of the Haifa University. Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center University of Haifa 199 Abba Hushi Avenue Har Hacarmel, Haifa 3498838 Tel: 04-8288757 Email: [email protected] Website: http://poli.haifa.ac.il/~hms Translated by: David Simmer, Yaakov Lappin Graphic design: Noga Yoselevich, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Haifa © All rights reserved by the Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center ISBN 965-7437-77-3 Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center The center is developing knowledge in maritime strategy, focusing on Israel's maritime surroundings: the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The center does so in five core areas: (1) regional security and foreign policy, (2) the mobility of goods, people and ideas, (3) law, (4) energy (5) and the environment. The center was established in response to the of rising significance of the maritime domain both globally and in our region: the emerging strategic maritime competition between the United State and China, the expansion of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and the crucial role of the seas in the international economic system both as a source of economic activity as well as serving as the world's main trade route. Our immediate environment saw a similar rise in the significance of the seas including the oil discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean, the evolution of the Israeli navy into a national strategic arm, Israel's total dependence on sea trade, and the growing realization that future development of national infrastructure may have to be done in the sea as land is becoming scarce. 4 Content Executive Summary 6 Global Developments in the Maritime Domain 15 Shaul Chorev The Naval War against the Houthis in Yemen 83 Eyal Pinko Strategic Implications of China's "Belt and Road" Initiative in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea for Israel and its Allies 92 Eyal Hayut and Ehud Gonen The Activity of the Russian Navy in 2018 the Middle East 96 Ido Gilad The Russian Northern Sea Route – Declarations and Reality 118 Tzevy Mirkin The Geopolitical Implications of the Trade War: a Theoretical Discussion 128 Nitzan Feldman Future U.S. Naval Capabilities 137 Seth Cropsey The Maritime Domain Policy: From Awareness to Reality 142 Ram Erez Developments in the Natural Gas Sector in Israel 155 Elai Rettig A Comparison of Oil and Gas Offshore Strategy between Norway and Israel 163 Amnon Portugaly An Update Regarding the Marine Areas Law, 5778-2017 Currently Under Review by the Economics Committee in Preparation for the Second and Third Reading in the Knesset 178 Orin Shefler A Defense Strategy for the Energy Facilities in the Maritime Environment: The Case of the Security Threats to the Dor Facility 198 Nir Zarchi Developments in the Construction of Artificial Islands and Floating Platforms during the Past Year 206 Moti Kalmar, Ehud Gonen The Activity in Israel’s Ports 212 Arie Gavish Where to for Israeli Shipping? 229 Arie Gavish, Zeev Leshem and Arieh Rona 5 The Strategic and National Implications of General Cargo and Bulk Shipping – Foreign trade as the mainstay of Israel’s economy and the importance of general and dry bulk cargo 238 Yoni Essakow Marine Pollution: Source, Response and Prevention 254 Galia Pasternak The Effect of the Jellyfish Proliferation – Ramifications on the National Level 269 Tamar Lotan Profession Naftali Heinz Wydra / An Exhibition in his Memory 280 Ido Gilad Summary of the Strategic Evaluation and Policy Recommendations 285 Shaul Chorev The Authors (according to the order of the chapters) 296 6 Executive Summary This is the fourth Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel published by the Maritime Policy & Strategy Research Center since 2016 when the Board of Haifa University approved the establishment of the Center. The Center’s goal is to carry out research in regional security and foreign policy, the movement of cargo, people and ideas, law, energy and the environment, and to analyze their effect on Israel’s national security. The Center has set itself the goal of carrying out academic research as part of Haifa University’s effort to take a leading role in maritime research on a national level, alongside its desire to become a knowledge center for policy makers, public leaders and the Israeli public. An additional goal is to become part of the public discourse by publishing policy papers, organizing conferences and conduct media interviews. The Center also collaborates with leading think tanks in the maritime domain worldwide, as well as being involved in the training of young researchers in the field of maritime strategy. One of the objectives of the Center is to publish the annual Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel which focuses on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, though it also includes a review of global developments and trends in the maritime domain that are likely to have an influence on the Eastern Mediterranean region and on Israel in particular. The Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel includes recommendations to various policy makers, primarily those in Israel. In 2017, Haifa University approved the integration of the Wydra Institute for Shipping and Ports as a division within the Center, in the recognition of the importance of shipping and ports to Israel’s security, in the broadest sense of the term. In the 2018-2019 academic year, an academic program was introduced for a graduate degree in Political Science with a minor in National Security and Maritime Strategy in the Department for International Relations within the School for Political Science. The program adds another layer to the commitment that Haifa University has taken on itself to take a leading role in maritime studies in the framework of the Mediterranean Sea Research Center. The goal of the program is to provide its participants with knowledge, analytical tools and new research paradigms, as part of the adoption of a broad, multi-disciplinary approach that combines economic, social, environmental and technological dimensions, as derived—at least in part—from the emerging globalized world. These are closely tied to the maritime domain which is becoming an increasingly important component of Israel’s resilience and security. 7 The importance of the maritime domain as a component within Israel’s resilience has not yet gained sufficient recognition among the State’s leaders or in Israeli public opinion. This is not a phenomenon that is unique to Israel and even in the US, which has a vigorous maritime tradition, it is felt that before formulating a maritime strategy it is necessary to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.1 In the case of Israel, the main characteristics that require the attention of leaders and the public are the following: Israel’s unique geostrategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean; the high proportion of the population that lives near the Mediterranean coast; the discovery of offshore gas fields; Israel’s complete dependence on seaborne trade (imports and exports); the growing share of desalinized water within Israel’s water supply; and the sea as the only possible location for new infrastructures and the evacuation of existing hazardous facilities from population centers. These characteristics have essentially made Israel into a “land island” that is totally dependent on the sea. Despite its growing dependence on the sea, the lack of maritime awareness in general leads to reactive policy, as occurred in the case of the natural gas discoveries within Israel’s maritime territory and
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