DOCSLIB.ORG

LCS-Israel Brochure

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
LCS-Israel Brochure LCS-I Littoral Combat Ship-Israel or 115M in length and approximately supporting the U.S. Navy CNO’s LCS-I is the very first international This ship is fast. It can move SATCOM LCS-I is the next generation surface 3000 tons displacement LCS-I has “1000 ship navy” in the Global War variant of the U.S. Navy’s ship. in quickly to conduct special ▲ Israeli Industry Harpoon (16) combatant for the Israeli Navy. the size and reconfigurable space Against Terror. This exciting opportunity brings operations in the littoral or brown ESM LCS-I leverages the U.S. Navy’s necessary to provide anti-air, anti- the Israeli Navy and our national waters of Israel’s coastlines. LCS- ● Boeing ▲ Israeli Industry newest class of surface combatants surface, anti-submarine and anti- LCS-I is the world’s most modern defense programs to the global I is a true surface combatant: it Barak VLS - LCS to meet the challenging missile warfare capabilities and to surface combatant equipped with the forefront providing Israeli industry reliably performs in deep blue water ▲ Israeli Industry Barak FCR (2) operational requirements of the support special operations. latest in advanced technology and tremendous growth potential in the and enables our participation in joint ▲ Israeli Industry Israeli Navy. Cooperation with solutions. The ship will empower international marketplace. and coalition operations. The U.S. Mk 41 VLS the U.S. Navy on LCS provides Why We Need LCS-I our sailors to combat terror, protect Navy Lockheed Martin-LCS ship our homeland, conduct blue LCS-I will help the Israeli ● Lockheed Martin FCR commonality with US and Coalition was designed to be scalable, with an ■ International Industry LCS-I provides area air defense forces and significantly reduces water missions at sea, as well as Navy accomplish significant open architecture combat system. for the Israeli Navy protecting acquisition and life cycle costs and participate in joint and coalition advancements in defense and This architecture enables rapid, SRLU (4) our sailors and our shores by risks. operations. protection of Israel and our low-risk integration with key Israeli ▲ Israeli Industry pushing the fight well off of Israel’s allies. LCS-I provides Israel the sensors and weapons. The result is coastline. Leveraging the U.S. LCS-I is our platform of choice. Typhoon Gun (2) LCS is a groundbreaking surface opportunity to build up our naval an unmatched surface combatant Navy’s LCS seaframe design and A cost efficient solution for our ▲ Israeli Industry combatant; with the speed (more capability in cooperation with the leveraging the best of breed in Electronic Warfare than 40 knots), maneuverability Combat Management System, country, LCS-I offers multi-mission United States improving security System Israeli, U.S. and international war- CIWS and flexibility to operate in all sea LCS-I will be fully interoperable capability and reconfigurable space for Israel, the United States and our ▲ Israeli Industry fighting systems. ● United Technologies states and operational scenarios. At with U.S. and allied forces, fully for the Israeli Defense Force to allies around the world. Mk 32 SVTT quickly adapt to future threats. ■ BAE MFR (4) ▲ Israeli Industry ● Lockheed Martin LRLU Mission Capabilities ▲ Israeli Industry MBAT ▲ Israeli Industry Combat Management System/Command and Control U.S. Navy’s LCS Seaframe ▲ Israeli Navy C2 ● Lockheed Martin Special Operations LCS-I partnership color key ● Lockheed Martin (COMBATSS-21) ▲Israeli Systems ● United States Systems ■ Other International Products Intelligence, Anti-Terrorism / Surface Surveillance and Force Protection Warfare Reconnaissance Features Benefits Features Benefits •Multi-mission surface combatant capability. •Provides Israeli Navy with area air-defense, anti-air, anti-surface, anti- •Semi-planning monohull with a steel hull and •Maximum sprint speed >40 kts. missile and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. aluminum superstructure. •Enhanced lethality and defense capability. •Provides for rapid and effective deployment of special forces for littoral •Superior maneuverability and survivability. •Excellent damage survivability and agility at high speeds. and counter-terrorism operations. Maritime •Shallow draft, expanded littoral access. •Expands number of accessible ports. Interdiction / •Reduces safe haven for enemy small craft. • Leverages world class Israeli industry products and capabilities (for example; Homeland Interception •Allows closer to shore debark-embarkation for special forces. •Broad Israeli industry participation in the Defense combat system. ADIR radar, Barak missile, Typhoon gun). Operations • Enables Israeli industry maintenance capability and commonality across the IDF. • Positions Israeli industry for participation in LCS international. •Leverages U.S. Navy Lockheed Martin LCS •Reduces life cycle costs of the LCS-I. Increases interoperability with the ship design, ship builders and combat system. U.S. Navy. Shared investment with the U.S. Navy enables reduced costs • • • Integrated Israeli Navy and Lockheed Martin Leverages the best capabilities of the Israeli Navy and U.S. Navy to maximize LCS-I Proven core combat system performance in for upgrades and sustainment. Command and Control (C2) system performance. Mine Warfare U.S. Navy and international navies. • Reduced development cost and risk. Leverages proven and certified U.S. (COMBATSS-21). Open architecture, flexible • Provides for low cost integration of new systems and capabilities for future growth. Navy combat system core to maximize Israeli Navy capability. combat management system. • C2 system capabilities can expand as Israel and the U.S. add additional capabilities. • Israeli Navy life cycle support capability. Our Solution: LCS-I LCS-I provides anti-submarine LCS-I features significant Israeli warfare and support of Special industry participation including; Littoral Combat Ship - Israel Our needs are very specific: Israel Forces operations. LCS-I detects Elbit Systems, Israeli Aircraft requires a solution designed to submarines through its sonar suite Industries; Elta Systems and defeat growing asymmetric threats, and destroys these enemy threats MBT Missile Systems, NESS participate in special operations and through an ASROC launch from Technologies and Rafael Armament help in joint missions. While not the MK 41 Vertical Launch System. Development Authority. Lockheed significantly larger than our current LCS-I’s large flight deck and Martin and the U.S. Navy have Sa’ar 5; LCS-I provides tremendous extensive hangar provide for flexible demonstrated the capability to growth in war-fighting capabilities special operations through launch integrate Israeli systems into the and enables critical protection of and recovery of unmanned vehicles. U.S. Navy’s LCS design. Through our naval fleet. LCS-I is designed The Waterborne Mission Zone, LCS-I Israeli industry is well to grow over time to meet the needs or WMZ, is capable of handling positioned to play a major role in of the Israeli Defense Force. As the wide variety of manned and the international success of the LCS an example, the MK 41 Vertical unmanned surface vehicles currently platform. Launch System (MK 41 VLS) in use by the Israeli Defense Force provides the flexibility over time to such as Rafael’s Protector unmanned LCS-I is the solution our people integrate new missiles to address surface vehicle or helicopters up to and our sailors deserve. The world changes in threats and operational and including an SH60. is watching—so are the terrorists requirements. LCS-I addresses our and our enemies—let’s make technical requirements and provides By leveraging the U.S. Navy’s LCS the right choice by investing and a cost effective solution for Israel. design, shipbuilding capability and safeguarding Israel’s future with combat system integration, the LCS- LCS-I … LCS-I offers unprecedented Anti-Air I is an affordable ship for the Israeli Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Missile Defense Force. It will continue to Warfare (AMW) for the Israeli benefit our country via the U.S. Defense Force. The LCS-I Multi- Navy’s investment to significantly Function Radar or MFR provides reduce lifecycle costs over the detection of distant enemy aircraft, course of our program. enabling LCS-I to destroy both the . Right technology, missiles in flight and the enemy LCS-I is well down the path to right cost, right time! aircraft shooters. success. The Israeli Navy has selected a top-side design variant Additionally, LCS-I enables critical from the platform study being capabilities for the Israeli Navy conducted by the Israeli Navy, U.S. complementing the existing Sa’ar Navy and Lockheed Martin team. 5 ship’s capabilities. The LCS- The Israeli Navy is also engaging I air and surface tactical picture the U.S. Navy and Lockheed Martin building capability in the Combat in a combat system configuration Information Center leverages phase to define and evaluate multiple sensors from the performance of the LCS-I combat LCS-I MFR, Sa’ar 5, helicopter system. The results of these efforts and unmanned vehicles to provide have validated the feasibility of unprecedented battlespace LCS-I from a capability and life- awareness. cycle cost standpoint. Right Technology, Right Cost, Right Time . ..
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Tightening the Belt and Introspection – Preparing for the Cut in Shekel Aid
    Tightening the Belt and Introspection – Preparing for the Cut in Shekel Aid Saul Bronfeld “The Israeli Navy was always hampered by limited budgets, but achieved smart solutions… It resembles a painter, a poet – [who] creates his greatest art only on an empty stomach.” Brigadier General (ret.) Shabtai Levy1 Introduction The conference at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv on the subject of the defense industries2 can be summarized in two sentences: first, the defense industries are very important to the IDF, the economy, and the country’s outlying areas; and second, a reduction of the shekel component in US aid will have a severe negative impact on Israel’s security, the economy, and the local defense industries. Echoing these statements, most of the speakers at the conference concurred that the reduction in shekel aid was another reason to increase the defense budget for local procurement, and the sooner the better. Brigadier General (res.) Prof. Jacob Nagel, who led the drawn-out negotiations with the American authorities, was the only speaker who argued that the reduction in the shekel aid budget should also prompt some self-reflection on the part of the defense establishment. To illustrate his remarks, he recalled the collapse of Kodak, which failed to identify in advance the changing environment in which it operated. Saul (Sam) Bronfeld is a research fellow at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, IDF Operations Directorate. Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid 95 Sasson Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even, Editors 96 I Saul Bronfeld This article follows Nagel’s argument, and points to a matter that was not raised, but that should be before the budget is reshuffled to deal with an emerging defense-economic problem.
    [Show full text]
  • Arrival of Sa'ar 6 Ships Marks Evolution of Israeli Naval Doctrine
    Arrival of Sa’ar 6 Ships Marks Evolution of Israeli Naval Doctrine by Yaakov Lappin BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,893, January 19, 2021 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The docking of the first of four German-made Sa’ar 6-class Israel Navy warships (dubbed Magen) at Haifa Naval Base marks the arrival of an advanced sea platform that will give Israel new capabilities to defend its critical offshore energy resources against a growing array of precision-guided enemy weaponry. The INS Magen, a German-made Sa’ar 6-class warship, arrived at Haifa Naval Base in early December 2020. It will be joined by the INS Oz in July of this year, and INS Atzmaut and INS Nitzhahon are scheduled to arrive in September and November. The ships are constructed by the German shipbuilder Thyssenkrupp, and the design of the platforms was conducted in close collaboration with Israel Navy engineers. Each platform costs $400 million to produce, with the German government covering one-third of the cost. Israeli onboard combat systems will be installed after the warships arrive in Israel. Ninety-five percent of those systems will be Israeli-made, and many of them will be completely new, designed for today’s threats. The arrival of the Magen at Haifa Naval Base marked the Israeli Navy’s transition into a new combat doctrine that is better suited than its predecessor to the evolving regional threat. Under the new strategy, the Navy will play a significantly greater role in rapidly detecting and engaging enemy targets on shore. The Magen project therefore represents a leap forward in Israel’s naval defense capabilities and an evolved naval strategy concept designed for the 21st century threat landscape.
    [Show full text]
  • The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017
    The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017 Kenneth S. Brower Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 150 THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 150 The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017 Kenneth S. Brower The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017 Kenneth S. Brower © The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002 Israel Tel. 972-3-5318959 Fax. 972-3-5359195 [email protected] www.besacenter.org ISSN 0793-1042 May 2018 Cover image: Soldier from the elite Rimon Battalion participates in an all-night exercise in the Jordan Valley, photo by Staff Sergeant Alexi Rosenfeld, IDF Spokesperson’s Unit The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies is an independent, non-partisan think tank conducting policy-relevant research on Middle Eastern and global strategic affairs, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel and regional peace and stability. It is named in memory of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, whose efforts in pursuing peace laid the cornerstone for conflict resolution in the Middle East. Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author’s views or conclusions. Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy summarize the papers delivered at conferences and seminars held by the Center for the academic, military, official and general publics.
    [Show full text]
  • THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict Between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides Are Preparing for It
    ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Copyright © 2011 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford Table of Contents Executive Summary . iii Acknowledgements . vi The Authors . vii Introduction . 1 Potential Return to Arms . 3 Hizballah Prepares for War . 6 Israel Prepares for War . 14 Conclusion . 20 THE NEXT WAR The Saban Center at BROOKINGS ii Executive Summary ebanon and Israel have enjoyed a rare calm waged between them, and both sides have been in the five years since the August 14, 2006 feverishly preparing for the next war ever since the ceasefire that brought an end to that sum- last one ended. Lmer’s month-long war, the fiercest ever action waged between Hizballah and the Israel Defense Hizballah’s Posture Forces (IDF). Since the end of the 2006 war, Hizballah has under- Both sides drew sharp lessons from the 2006 conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • The Israeli Navy's Strategic Challenges in the 21 St Century
    From Junior Associate to Senior Partner? The Israeli Navy’s Strategic Challenges in the 21st Century by Dr. Eitan Shamir BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,792, November 1, 2020 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel depends on the Mediterranean Sea, and the Israeli Navy bears overall responsibility for safeguarding the country’s strategic, security, and economic assets in and around its territorial waters. For various historical reasons, the Israeli Navy was not originally given the priority afforded to its two brethren services: the ground and air forces. Recent geostrategic trends have altered the security situation of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, however, and this has affected the nature of the threats to Israel's national security. These developments have led to an increasingly important role for the Israeli Navy in securing Israel's national interests. Israel is surrounded on three sides: it has countries to the north, south, and east. Its independence, economy, and security—indeed, its very existence— depends on the Mediterranean Sea. Half the country’s residents live fewer than 30 kilometers from the coastline, and over 98% of Israel’s foreign trade is transported by sea. The Israeli Navy (IN) bears overall responsibility for safeguarding Israel’s strategic, security, and economic assets along the coastline and close to it, as well as farther out to sea in its territorial waters and in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The IN is also responsible for protecting sea lanes to and from Israel, securing maritime transportation and trade, combating marine terrorism, and assisting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in combat.
    [Show full text]
  • Symbolism in the Israel Defense Forces: a Brief Overview
    Symbolism in the Israel Defense Forces: A Brief Overview Zvi Ruder Introduction The Israeli Armed Forces (known as the IDF, or by its Hebrew acronym: ZAHAL) are a great “mixer” of the Israeli society. In this “mixer,” Israel’s different social, ethnic, and political strata are blended and ground together, into a specific Israeli culture. Unavoidably, the resulting mixture reflects important features of this culture, of which the unique Israeli symbolism is a part, both in the historical and religious profoundness of its meaning and in the eclecticism of its elements. The eclectic nature of the IDF symbolism manifests itself in the fact that, just like the rest of the Israeli state and society, it employs three types of symbolic graphic devices that are only loosely related to each other outside the framework of modern Zionist ideology. This Zionist ideology remains, at least officially, a spiritual foundation and the raison d’etreˆ of the State of Israel; however, as is shown in this article, it is not the sole contributor of symbols in Israel in general, and only a relatively minor one in the Israel Defense Forces in particular. The three types of symbols currently in use in the Israel Defense Forces are: 1. Symbols related to the Hebrew Bible (i.e. the five books of Moses called in Hebrew the Torah) and the millennia-old Hebrew and Jewish tradition, especially those associated with the Land of Israel and the period of ancient Hebrew independence. 2. Symbols that reflect Zionist ideology and represent the Zionist move- ment, especially those based on emblems of organizations and institu- tions which conducted the struggle for Israel’s independence before the establishment of the State of Israel in a.d.
    [Show full text]
  • From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza
    From Cast Lead to Protective Edge Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza Raphael S. Cohen, David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, Shira Efron C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1888 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9787-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise): Nir Elias/Reuters; Amir Cohen/Reuters; Abu Mustafa/Reuters; Tsafrir Abayov/AP Photo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report examines the Israel Defense Forces operations in Gaza from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 through Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 to Operation Protective Edge in 2014.
    [Show full text]
  • The IDF on All Fronts Dealing with Israeli Strategic Uncertainty ______
    FFooccuuss ssttrraattééggiiqquuee nn°° 4455 bbiiss ______________________________________________________________________ The IDF on All Fronts Dealing with Israeli Strategic Uncertainty ______________________________________________________________________ Pierre Razoux August 2013 Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non- governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With office in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of the European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-36567-192-7 © Ifri – 2013 – All rights reserved All requests for information, reproduction or distribution may be addressed to: [email protected]. Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27 rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Bruxelles – BELGIQUE Tel : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tel : +32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax : +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] Website : www.ifri.org “Focus stratégique” Resolving today’s security problems requires an integrated approach. Analysis must be cross-cutting and consider the regional and global dimensions of problems, their technological and military aspects, as well as their media linkages and broader human consequences.
    [Show full text]
  • Attack on a Sigint Collector, the USS Liberty (8 CCO)
    TOP SECRET UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Attack on a Sigint Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty (8 CCO) ~O'f ftELEASABLE 'fO t'OftEI8!.- NA'flONAL3 'fHIS f){)Et:Jt.IEN'f E6N'fAINS eot>EW6Kf> MA'fEKIAL Classified by NSA/CSSM 123-2 Review in April 2011 Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-08-2006 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. MDR 51712. TOP SECRET Contents of this publication should not be reproduced, or further disseminated outside the U.S. Intelligence Community without the permission of the Director, NSA/CSS. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Office of Cryptologic Archives and History, T54. i 'fOP SECRE'f UMBRA I UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Special Series Crisis Collection Volume 1 Attack on a Sigint Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty (S-CCO) William D. Gerhard Henry W. Millington NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE 1981 NO'f KELEASABLE 'fO FOKEIGN NA'flONALS 'fOP SHCRE'f UMBRA -- -- --- -~--------...................,...~ UNCLASSIFIED Contents Page Foreword----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- vii Authors' Note------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ix Chapter I POLITICAL-MILITARY BACKGROUND <V>---------------------------------------­ Chapter II CONSIDERATIONS LEADING TO THE SHIP'S DEPLOYMENT (U) ----------------­ 5 The Requirements for Intelligence (U) ----------------------------------------------------­ 5 Technical Collection Factors (U) ----------------------------------------------------------
    [Show full text]
  • If War Comes Israel Vs
    If War Comes Israel vs. Hizballah and Its Allies Jeffrey White Policy Focus #106 | September 2010 If War Comes Israel vs. Hizballah and Its Allies Jeffrey White Policy Focus #106 | September 2010 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2010 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2010 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: An Israeli gunner runs to reload an army artillery piece after it fired toward Lebanon from a position near the Lebanese border in northern Israel, July 2006. (AP Photo/Pier Paolo Cito) Contents About the Author . v Acknowledgments. vii Executive Summary . ix Introduction . 1 1. Rumors of War . 3 2. Israel’s War. 6 3. Hizballah’s War. 21 4. War beyond Israel and Hizballah . 31 5. Uncertainties and Consequences . 41 6. Conclusions. 46 Tables Table 1. Israeli Fighters, Strike Aircraft, and Attack Helicopters . 6 Table 2. Lessons of 2006 for the IDF and Hizballah . 8 Table 3. Israeli Anti-Rocket and Missile Systems. 10 Table 4. Notional Israeli Ground Order of Battle in a Future Lebanon Conflict. 16 Table 5. Reported Hizballah Rockets and Missiles. 19 Table 6. Reported Hizballah SAM Systems. 21 Table 7.
    [Show full text]
  • Marinebladnummer 5, Augustus 2009, Jaargang 119 Uitgave Van De Koninklijke Vereniging Van Marineofficieren
    marinebladnummer 5, augustus 2009, jaargang 119 Uitgave van de Koninklijke Vereniging van Marineofficieren • Verkenningen: Zeeën van toekomst • Inzet patrouilleschepen • DHC: zitten we op het goed spoor? 2 INHOUD nummer 5, augustus 2009, jaargang 119 Drie generaties 3 COLUMN Woudstra Voorzitter KVMO 4 DE MARINEFAMILIE Familie Woudstra 8 CARTOON ARBEIDSVOORWAARDEN 4 9 Is CAO-maatwerk bij Defensie mogelijk? Inzet Holland Klasse 11 REACTIES Patrouilleschepen 12 OPINIE PS: Geschikt of ongeschikt? 16 IN BEELD De 22e Marinierscompagnie 12 18 VERKENNINGEN Zeeën van toekomst Ko Colijn over 24 VERKENNINGEN toekomstscenario’s Het belang van een toekomstvisie 28 REÜNIES 29 KENNIS EN WETENSCHAP Zitten we op het goede spoor? 34 TERUGBLIKKEN MET 18 M. van Noort 36 HISTORIE Het Amerikaanse 400 jaar na Hudson defensiebeleid in de ‘Strategische Pauze’ 41 KVMO ZAKEN 24 Integratie van de MLD in het Defensie Helikopter Commando 29 Het Marineblad is een uitgave van de Koninklijke Vereniging van Marineofficieren en verschijnt 8 keer per jaar marineblad | augustus 2009 KLTZA R.C. Hunnego, voorzitter KVMO COLUMN 3 ISSN: 0025-3340 Redactie Visie en lef Mw. drs. M.L.G. Lijmbach, hoofdredacteur KLTZA R.C. Hunnego Artikelencommissie LTZT 1 F.G. Marx M.Sc., LTZE 2OC ir. W.L. van Norden, KTZE ir. V.C. Rademakers, LTZ2OC Het is een veel gebruikte metafoor: zet een drs. R.M. de Ruiter, KTZ b.d. L.J.M. Smit, LNTKOLMARNS drs. A.J.E. Wagemaker MA kikker in koud water en verwarm het Medewerkers: water langzaam tot het kokend heet is. De Mw. drs. Z. Borgeld, LNTKOLMARNS H.J. kikker heeft niet door dat hij wordt Bosch, LTZ 1 ing.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States Navy and Israeli Navy Background, Current Issues, Scenarios, and Prospects
    The United States Navy and Israeli Navy Background, current issues, scenarios, and prospects Dov S. Zakheim Cleared for Public Release COP D0026727.A1/Final February 2012 Strategic Studies is a division of CNA. This directorate conducts analyses of security policy, regional analyses, studies of political-military issues, and strategy and force assessments. CNA Strategic Studies is part of the global community of strategic studies institutes and in fact collaborates with many of them. On the ground experience is a hallmark of our regional work. Our specialists combine in-country experience, language skills, and the use of local primary-source data to produce empirically based work. All of our analysts have advanced degrees, and virtually all have lived and worked abroad. Similarly, our strategists and military/naval operations experts have either active duty experience or have served as field analysts with operating Navy and Marine Corps commands. They are skilled at anticipating the “problem after next” as well as determining measures of effectiveness to assess ongoing initiatives. A particular strength is bringing empirical methods to the evaluation of peace-time engagement and shaping activities. The Strategic Studies Division’s charter is global. In particular, our analysts have proven expertise in the following areas: • The full range of Asian security issues • The full range of Middle East related security issues, especially Iran and the Arabian Gulf • Maritime strategy • Insurgency and stabilization • Future national security environment and forces • European security issues, especially the Mediterranean littoral • West Africa, especially the Gulf of Guinea • Latin America • The world’s most important navies • Deterrence, arms control, missile defense and WMD proliferation The Strategic Studies Division is led by Dr.
    [Show full text]