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Durham E-Theses The world without knowledge: The Theory of Brain-Sign CLAPSON, PHILIP,JOHN How to cite: CLAPSON, PHILIP,JOHN (2012) The world without knowledge: The Theory of Brain-Sign, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3560/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk The world without knowledge: The Theory of Brain-Sign Philip Clapson Abstract This thesis proposes the theory of brain-sign should replace the theory of consciousness, and mind generally. Consciousness is first described, and it is evident there is neither a consistent account of it, nor an adequate rationale for its existence beyond its (tautological) self- endorsing characterisation as knowledge. This is the target of the critique. Human history and human self-appraisal have assumed knowledge as an (ontologically) intrinsic facet of human make-up, and human disciplines (of ‘thought’) have relied upon it. On the modern supposition that the universe is purely physical, it is widely assumed that science eventually will demonstrate that consciousness, and thus knowledge, are physical. But it is shown here (theoretically and empirically) that as theories of the physical universe, consciousness and thus knowledge are prescientific, incoherent and unmotivated. Nevertheless, there is a brain phenomenon requiring explanation. That explanation is given here by a new account: the theory of brain-sign. Brain-sign is developed as a scientific theory, i.e. directly from the physical universe, and with a fundamental biological role as the communication mechanism for (apposite) organisms in dynamic (i.e. uncertain or imprecise) collective operation. The grounding principle is that the brain is an action organ, not a knowledge organ. The detail and structure of brain-sign is expounded, and its success is contrasted with the inadequacy of consciousness. Humans, and other organisms, are placed in the physical world, and in the context of evolutionary theory. Thus brain-sign theory founds an approach to brain science, but with the result that human self-conception alters fundamentally, as does the relation between the organism and its disciplines, including science itself. Brain-sign theory shows why there ever was a theory of consciousness, or indeed a theory of anything. However, from the nature of our being in the world, it also demonstrates it cannot claim to be true. 2 The world without knowledge: The Theory of Brain-Sign Philip John Clapson PhD Thesis Department of Philosophy, Durham University 2011 3 4 The Theory of Brain-Sign Contents Acknowledgements 11 Preface 13 1.0 Introduction 17 2.0 What is consciousness? 28 2.1 The fundamental premise: knowledge 29 2.2 The I, self or ego 31 2.3 Interlude 33 2.4 Inner and Outer 33 2.5 Conscious experience 34 2.6 Illumination 40 2.7 Consciousness, the unconscious & non-conscious 42 2.8 Intentionality 44 2.9 Memory 46 2.10 Imagination 48 2.11 Feeling, sensation and mood 50 2.12 Free Will 51 2.13 Summary 52 3.0 What is wrong with consciousness? 54 3.1 Representation and correspondence 54 3.1.1 Representation from Descartes to the Empiricists 55 3.1.2 Locke’s absence of justification 59 3.1.3 The problem of covariance and misrepresentation 60 3.1.4 Slezak’s critique 61 3.1.5 Slezak’s unintended destruction of consciousness 65 3.2 Illumination 69 3.2.1 The illuminating topic of colour 69 5 3.2.1.1 The evolutionary factor 71 3.2.1.2 Rey, Ross, and the unacknowledged end of mentalism 74 3.2.2 Summary 77 3.3 Empirical findings 77 3.3.1 The consciousness structure 78 3.3.2 The breakdown of the brain phenomenon 81 3.3.3 Milner and Goodale: Two visual streams of the brain 82 3.3.4 Language 87 3.3.4.1 Language and neuroscience 88 3.3.4.2 Language and action 91 3.3.5 Libet 95 3.4 Summary 96 4.0 The predicament, & the mentalist error of knowledge 97 4.1 Prelude to the predicament 97 4.1.1 The predicament exposed 99 4.1.2 The predicament considered 100 4.1.3 The predicament and free will 104 4.2 Bennett & Hacker, and the ontological issue in neuroscience 105 4.3 Paul Churchland’s connectionist knowledge 110 4.4 Conclusion 116 5.0 Introducing the theory of brain-sign 118 5.1 Dualism lies not in ourselves but in our theories 118 5.2 A brief encounter with history 120 5.2.1 Pragmatism 121 5.2.2 Phenomenology 125 5.2.3 Summary 133 5.3 The scientific model of brain-sign: What biological problem is to be solved in the brain? The super-organism 135 5.3.1 Preliminary orientation – the natural and scientific dispositions 135 5.3.2 The grounds of the biological model 137 6 5.3.2.1 The literature confusion 137 5.3.2.2 Communication supersedes the individual 139 5.3.2.3 Communicative modalities – the biological differentiation 142 5.3.2.4 Signification – static and dynamic communication 142 5.3.2.5 Signification of affective states and reference in the literature 143 5.3.2.6 Static communication 143 5.3.2.7 Dynamic communication 146 5.4 Advantages of the brain-sign account 148 5.4.1 The explanation of explanation 151 5.4.2 Direct reduction to the physical 151 5.4.3 Separation of scientific questions 152 5.4.4 Evolutionary continuity 152 5.4.5 Dissolution of the inner and outer conundrum 153 5.5 The integral nature of brain-sign 153 6.0 Characterising brain-sign 155 6.1 The natural and scientific dispositions 155 6.2 Brain-sign and the virtual array 156 6.3 The instantaneous nature of the physical universe 158 6.4 Our dual nature: Causality and communication 160 6.5 Removing the need for causal conscious representation 164 6.5.1 The connection between brain models 167 6.6 Introduction to two fundamental elements of brain-sign: categories-of-the world & categories-of-interaction 167 6.7 The content of brain-sign 171 6.8 Control and duration 173 6.9 Subject, self, ego 176 6.10 Memory and imagination reinterpreted as physical states 179 6.11 The scientific explanatory power of brain-sign theory vs. mentalism 184 6.12 Development of categories-of-the-world and -interaction 187 6.12.1 The ontological contrast of brain-sign categories vs. mental states 187 7 6.12.2 The general contrast of categories-of-the-world and -interaction 188 6.12.3 What mental state terms are as brain-sign categories 191 6.12.4 Simulation theory and theory theory 192 6.12.5 Brain-sign eliminates the subjective/objective distinction: Consider pain 194 6.12.6 Brain-sign terminology will not replace mental terminology generally 195 6.12.7 The question of terminology 195 6.13 Music 197 6.14 What do deficit and illusion show? 202 6.14.1 Deficit 202 6.14.2 Illusion 203 6.15 Conclusion 205 7.0 Language 207 7.1 Preliminary considerations 207 7.1.1 The general situation 207 7.1.2 The relevance of Saussure 208 7.2 The literature on language 210 7.2.1 Thinking and communication 210 7.2.2 Chomsky’s approach to thought 214 7.2.3 Thought via meaning and understanding 216 7. 3 The social factor & learning language 218 7.4 Lieberman’s attack on Chomskian language 221 7.5 Language as action 224 7.5.1 How language functions 227 7.5.2 Communication with animals 226 7.5.3 Intelligence lies in action 226 7.6 The operation of language 227 7.6.1 Neural collectivity 228 7.7 The nature of language, and our fundamental limits as biology 229 7.8 A recreational coda 232 8 7.8.1 A review of the two forms of joke explanation 235 8.0 The organism without consciousness. Science and other human disciplines. 237 8.1 Theories (leading to a consideration of science) 237 8.1.1 First stage: Current misrepresentation of the nature of the problem 240 8.1.2 Second stage: A current status in the Philosophy of Science 242 8.1.3 Third stage: Uniting in review stages one and two 245 8.1.4 The resolution of the science question 247 8.1.5 Error 249 8.1.6 Adjunct topics 250 8.1.6.1 Realism/Instrumentalism 252 8.1.6.2 Thomas Kuhn 252 8.2 Afterword 255 9.0 Considering ourselves 256 9.1 Light 258 9.2 Our reality (by contrast with mentalism) 258 9.3 Transparency; opacity 261 9.4 Heaviness; lightness 263 9.5 The absence of memory 266 9.6 What reflection really is 266 9.7 The brain is an alien 268 10.0 Conclusion 272 10.1 Summary 272 10.2 Future work 274 Bibliography 280 9 The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
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