Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics
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mr05_Article 1 3/28/05 3:25 PM Page 9 Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XLIII (March 2005), pp. 9–64 Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics ∗ COLIN CAMERER, GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, and DRAZEN PRELEC Who knows what I want to do? Who knows what anyone wants to do? How can you be sure about something like that? Isn’t it all a question of brain chemistry, signals going back and forth, electrical energy in the cortex? How do you know whether something is really what you want to do or just some kind of nerve impulse in the brain. Some minor little activity takes place somewhere in this unimportant place in one of the brain hemispheres and suddenly I want to go to Montana or I don’t want to go to Montana. (White Noise, Don DeLillo) 1. Introduction such as finance, game theory, labor econom- ics, public finance, law, and macroeconomics In the last two decades, following almost a (see Colin Camerer and George Loewenstein century of separation, economics has begun 2004). Behavioral economics has mostly been to import insights from psychology. informed by a branch of psychology called “Behavioral economics” is now a prominent “behavioral decision research,” but other fixture on the intellectual landscape and has cognitive sciences are ripe for harvest. Some spawned applications to topics in economics, important insights will surely come from neu- roscience, either directly or because neuro- ∗ Camerer: California Institute of Technology. science will reshape what is believed about Loewenstein: Carnegie Mellon University. Prelec: psychology which in turn informs economics. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We thank partici- Neuroscience uses imaging of brain activity pants at the Russell Sage Foundation-sponsored confer- ence on Neurobehavioral Economics (May 1997) at and other techniques to infer details about Carnegie Mellon, the Princeton workshop on Neural how the brain works. The brain is the ultimate Economics December 8–9, 2000, and the Arizona confer- “black box.” The foundations of economic ence in March 2001. This research was supported by NSF grant SBR-9601236 and by the Center for Advanced Study theory were constructed assuming that details in Behavioral Sciences, where the authors visited during about the functioning of the brain’s black box 1997–98. David Laibson’s presentations have been partic- would not be known. This pessimism was ularly helpful, as were comments and suggestions from the editor and referees, and conversations and comments from expressed by William Jevons in 1871: Ralph Adolphs, John Allman, Warren Bickel, Greg Berns, Meghana Bhatt, Jonathan Cohen, Angus Deaton, John Dickhaut, Paul Glimcher, Dave Grether, Ming Hsu, David I hesitate to say that men will ever have the means Laibson, Danica Mijovic-Prelec, Read Montague, Charlie of measuring directly the feelings of the human Plott, Matthew Rabin, Antonio Rangel, Peter Shizgal, heart. It is from the quantitative effects of the Steve Quartz, and Paul Zak. Albert Bollard, Esther feelings that we must estimate their comparative Hwang, and Karen Kerbs provided editorial assistance. amounts. 9 mr05_Article 1 3/28/05 3:25 PM Page 10 10 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIII (March 2005) Since feelings were meant to predict behav- drug consumption limits pleasure from ior but could only be assessed from behavior, future consumption of other goods (dynam- economists realized that, without direct ic cross-partial effects in utility for commod- measurement, feelings were useless inter- ity bundles) and how environmental cues vening constructs. In the 1940s, the con- trigger unpleasant craving and increase cepts of ordinal utility and revealed demand. These effects can be approximated preference eliminated the superfluous inter- by extending standard theory and then mediate step of positing immeasurable feel- applying conventional tools (see Douglas ings. Revealed preference theory simply Bernheim and Antonio Rangel 2004; David equates unobserved preferences with Laibson 2001; Ted O’Donoghue and observed choices. Circularity is avoided by Matthew Rabin 1997). assuming that people behave consistently, The radical approach involves turning which makes the theory falsifiable; once back the hands of time and asking how eco- they have revealed that they prefer A to B, nomics might have evolved differently if it people should not subsequently choose B had been informed from the start by insights over A. Later extensions—discounted, and findings now available from neuro- expected, and subjective expected utility, science. Neuroscience, we will argue, points and Bayesian updating—provided similar to an entirely new set of constructs to under- “as if” tools which sidestepped psychological lie economic decision making. The standard detail. The “as if” approach made good economic theory of constrained utility maxi- sense as long as the brain remained substan- mization is most naturally interpreted either tially a black box. The development of eco- as the result of learning based on consump- nomics could not be held hostage to tion experiences (which is of little help when progress in other human sciences. prices, income, and opportunity sets But now neuroscience has proved change), or careful deliberation—a balanc- Jevons’s pessimistic prediction wrong; the ing of the costs and benefits of different study of the brain and nervous system is options—as might characterize complex beginning to allow direct measurement of decisions like planning for retirement, buy- thoughts and feelings. These measurements ing a house, or hammering out a contract. are, in turn, challenging our understanding Although economists may privately acknowl- of the relation between mind and action, edge that actual flesh-and-blood human leading to new theoretical constructs and beings often choose without much delibera- calling old ones into question. How can the tion, the economic models as written invari- new findings of neuroscience, and the theo- ably represent decisions in a “deliberative ries they have spawned, inform an econom- equilibrium,” i.e., that are at a stage where ic theory that developed so impressively in further deliberation, computation, reflec- their absence? tion, etc. would not by itself alter the agent’s In thinking about the ways that neuro- choice. The variables that enter into the for- science can inform economics, it is useful to mulation of the decision problem—the pref- distinguish two types of contributions, which erences, information, and constraints—are we term incremental and radical approach- precisely the variables that should affect the es. In the incremental approach, neuro- decision, if the person had unlimited time science adds variables to conventional and computing ability. accounts of decision making or suggests spe- While not denying that deliberation is part cific functional forms to replace “as if” of human decision making, neuroscience assumptions that have never been well sup- points out two generic inadequacies of this ported empirically. For example, research on approach—its inability to handle the crucial the neurobiology of addiction suggests how roles of automatic and emotional processing. mr05_Article 1 3/28/05 3:25 PM Page 11 Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec: Neuroeconomics 11 First, much of the brain implements role in economics and other social sciences “automatic” processes, which are faster than (e.g., law, Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe, conscious deliberations and which occur and Vernon Smith 2004). Indeed, a new area with little or no awareness or feeling of effort of economics that has been branded “neu- (John Bargh et al. 1996; Bargh and Tanya roeconomics” has already formed the basis Chartrand 1999; Walter Schneider and of numerous academic gatherings that have Richard Shiffrin 1977; Shiffrin and brought neuroscientists and economists Schneider 1977). Because people have little together (see also Paul Zak, in press).1 or no introspective access to these processes, Participating in the development of a shared or volitional control over them, and these intellectual enterprise will help us ensure processes were evolved to solve problems of that the neuroscience informs economic evolutionary importance rather than respect questions we care about. Stimulated by the logical dicta, the behavior these processes authors’ own participation in a number of generate need not follow normative axioms such meetings, our goal in this paper is to of inference and choice. describe what neuroscientists do and how Second, our behavior is strongly influ- their discoveries and views of human behav- enced by finely tuned affective (emotion) ior might inform economic analysis. In the systems whose basic design is common to next section (2), we describe the diversity of humans and many animals (Joseph LeDoux tools that neuroscientists use. Section 3 1996; Jaak Panksepp 1998; Edmund Rolls introduces a simplified account of how cog- 1999). These systems are essential for daily nition and affect on the one hand, and auto- functioning, and when they are damaged or matic and controlled processes on the other, perturbed, by brain injury, stress, imbal- work separately, and interact. Section 4 dis- ances in neurotransmitters, or the “heat of cusses general implications for economics. the moment,” the logical-deliberative sys- Section 5 goes into greater detail about tem—even if completely intact—cannot implications of neuroeconomics for four top- regulate behavior appropriately. ics in economics: intertemporal choice, deci- Human behavior thus requires