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Experience, Reality and Representation Experience, Reality and Representation On the Implications of a Maximally Non-Deflationary Phenomenal Realism Jason Peter Whatley B.A. (Hons) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Tasmania April 2015 ! Authority of Access This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. ""! Declaration This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis contain any material that infringes copyright. iii Acknowledgements Firstly, I’d like to thank those whose help manifests in some way in the content of this thesis. Most importantly, I’d like to thank my primary supervisor James Chase. It has been a joy and a privilege to discuss my ideas, and philosophy in general, with somebody possessed of so much knowledge and insight. This thesis has benefited immensely from his input. I’d also like to thank my secondary supervisor Graham Wood for several enjoyable conversations and for his comments on various draft chapters. It was also helpful to be able to discuss my ideas with fellow Launceston campus postgraduates Bonnie Britton, Nicholas Clements, Tony Kerr, Michael Kidd and Miriam Roser. I am also grateful to my friend Richard Barker, who provided some much needed technical assistance and support. Just as many people have supported me in other ways, not least my partner Mairi Ward, who I thank for her love and patience. I doubt that I could have done this without her emotional support. I thank my parents Julie and Peter Whatley for the same reason, and also for their practical support, having provided Mairi and I with a dwelling for the earlier part of the project. My thanks extend to Mairi’s parents, Ian and Jenny Ward, for doing the same for the later part of the project. (Ian and Jenny also deserve to count among those cited earlier inasmuch as I have discussed this thesis with them on several occasions). I also thank my sister Carley Whatley and her partner Peter Rogers. "#! Abstract This thesis is dedicated to uncovering the conceptual and metaphysical entailments of a form of phenomenal realism I call Robust Realism. I argue that a maximally non-deflationary phenomenal realism of this kind constitutes the only principled form of resistance to Daniel Dennett’s eliminativist strategy. I also argue that while Robust Realists constitute a minority within the philosophical community, the deflationist majority have reason to be interested in the results of such a project, as it promises a way beyond the dialogical impasse marking the current qualia debate. I begin by arguing that the definitive commitments of Robust Realism entail a thesis regarding the constitutive nature of phenomenal property instances, that their constitutive nature is exhausted by their experienced nature. From here, I argue that spatiotemporal inclusion and causal interaction, the two principal means of forging a metaphysical connection between experiences and a metaphysically real world, aren’t available to Robust Realists. I then argue for a thesis regarding the nature of relations, roughly, that relations necessarily implicate their relata. This thesis forms the basis for my case against the nascent Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program, and combines with other considerations to constitute a case for the impossibility of the kind of transcendentally real representation of phenomenal properties that Robust Realism is founded upon. #! Table of Contents Chapter 1 ................................................................................................................................... 1! 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1! 2. The Real Dennett on Real Seeming .................................................................................. 3! 3. Arguments Anyone? .......................................................................................................... 8! 3.1 Integrate or Die: Dennett’s Quinean Imperative ....................................................... 10! 3.2 Better Than Reasons: Justification by Acquaintance ................................................ 11! 4. Role-Theoretic Essentialism: Kantian Themes ............................................................... 12! 4.1 Epistemic Essentialism: Classical Sense-Data Theory ............................................. 16! 4.2 From Explanans to Explanandum: Qualia’s Qualitative Essence ............................. 20! 5. Reductivism and Dennettian Dissolution ........................................................................ 25! 6. In for a Penny, In for a Pound ......................................................................................... 31! 6.1 The Dennettian Dissolution of Depth ........................................................................ 33! 6.2 Qualia as a Synthesised Noumenal Backdrop ........................................................... 40! 6.2.1 The Cognitive-Phenomenological Revolution ................................................... 43! 7. Robust Realism ............................................................................................................... 50! 8. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 53! Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................................. 54! 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 54! 2. Dennett and Otto Return ................................................................................................. 56! 2.1 Is Phenomenology More Certain Than Judgement? ................................................. 58! #"! 2.2 Is the Concept of Qualia Arrived At Theoretically? ................................................. 63! 3. Diaphanous Experience and the Fall from Eden ............................................................. 65! 4. The Genius Jones: Theoretician or Zen Master? ............................................................. 66! 4.1 The Schism ................................................................................................................ 68! 4.2 Tough Talk and Tipping Points ................................................................................. 71! 5. Calling Your Opponent’s Bluff ....................................................................................... 79! 6. Seeking Inconsistency ..................................................................................................... 83! 7. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 84! Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................................. 85! 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 85! 2. The Perils of Descriptive Phenomenology ...................................................................... 86! 3. Conceptual Analysis: A Less Perilous Path .................................................................... 90! 4. The Constitution Thesis .................................................................................................. 92! 5. Appeals to Ignorance ....................................................................................................... 95! 6. Chalmers’ Panprotopsychism: Problematic Intuitions .................................................... 97! 7. The Revelation Argument ............................................................................................. 105! 7.1 The Intellectualist Interpretation ............................................................................. 107! 7.2 The Phenomenal Interpretation ............................................................................... 109! 8. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 114! Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................................... 115! 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 115! #""! 2. McGinn on Consciousness and Space ........................................................................... 117! 3. Phenomenal vs Causal Criteria ..................................................................................... 121! 4. Standard Temporal Dimensions and the Constitution Thesis ....................................... 125! 5. NSSD and NSTD: An Appraisal ................................................................................... 129! 6. Cosmopsychism and Decomposition ............................................................................ 134! 7. Intransitive Co-Consciousness .....................................................................................
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