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Artificial Intelligence Beyond the Philosophy of Mind View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship Repository RETHINKING MACHINES: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BEYOND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND BY DANIEL JOSE ESTRADA DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014 Urbana, Illinois Doctoral Committee: Associate Professor Jonathan Waskan, Chair Associate Professor Daniel Korman Emeritus Professor Steven Wagner Associate Professor Andrew Arana Abstract Recent philosophy of mind has increasingly focused on the role of technology in shaping, influencing, and extending our mental faculties. Technology extends the mind in two basic ways: through the creative design of artifacts and the purposive use of instruments. If the meaningful activity of technological artifacts were exhaustively described in these mind-dependent terms, then a philosophy of technology would depend entirely on our theory of mind. In this dissertation, I argue that a mind-dependent approach to technology is mistaken. Instead, some machines are best understood as independent participants in their own right, contributing to and augmenting a variety of social practices as active, though often unrecognized, community members. Beginning with Turing’s call for “fair play for machines”, I trace an argument concerning the social autonomy of nonhuman agents through the artificial intelligence debates of the 20th century. I’ll argue that undue focus on the mind has obscured the force of Turing’s proposal, leaving the debates in an unfortunate stalemate. I will then examine a network theoretic alternative to the study of multi- agent complex systems that can avoid anthropocentric, mind-dependent ways of framing human- machine interactions. I argue that this approach allows for both scientific and philosophical treatment of large and complicated sociotechnical systems, and suggests novel methods for designing, managing, and maintaining such systems. Rethinking machines in mind-independent terms will illuminate the nature, scope, and evolution of our social and technological practices, and will help clarify the relationships between minds, machines, and the environments we share. ii To Internet iii Acknowledgements This dissertation was a collective effort. The students and faculty at the University of Illinois, Illinois State University, and Johns Hopkins’ Center for Talented Youth provided important material and intellectual support for these ideas. My mom, dad, and the rest of my family have never failed to be supportive of my eccentricities; responsibility falls squarely on their shoulders. Kyle Broom, Alex Spector, Kirk and Meghan Fisher, Joe Swenson, Shawn Dingle, Harmony Neal, Justin Remhof, Lally Gartel, Patrick O’Donnell, and Todd Kukla have each helped to nurture these ideas on late nights around warm fires, and the results bear the mark of their distinctive hands at work. Jon Lawhead deserves special recognition for being a lightning rod to my negative charge. Becca Spizzirri deserves a castle, in a park, in the rain. New York, 2014 iv Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction: Rethinking Machines ................................................................... 1 Chapter 2: Artificial Intelligence beyond the Philosophy of Mind ...................................... 9 Chapter 3: Lady Lovelace and the Autonomy of Machines ................................................ 53 Chapter 4: The Organization of Technological Networks ................................................... 86 Chapter 5: Gaming the Attention Economy ....................................................................... 113 References ................................................................................................................................ 136 v Chapter 1 Introduction: Rethinking Machines 1.1 A prelude on machine participants “…but basically machines were not self-moving, self-designing, autonomous. They could not achieve man's dream, only mock it. They were not man, an author to himself, but only a caricature of that masculinist reproductive dream. To think they were otherwise was paranoid. Now we are not so sure. Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.” - Donna Haraway1 I have a complicated relationship with my phone. No other object occupies as much of my time and focused attention. The other objects I use regularly, like my keys and wallet, usually just sit idly on the dresser when I’m home; but my phone stays within arms reach all day, whether I’m awake or asleep. After my glasses, my phone is the first thing I grab for in the morning and the last thing I put down at night; but unlike my glasses, my phone is a recurring object of attention throughout the time between. The computer in my office is where I do most of my work and play, but the computer stays in my office if I’m doing anything else, whereas my phone always stays with me. When in use, my phone occupies some of my most significant cognitive resources (my hands and my visual field) to the exclusion of just about everything else-- a risky proposition if I’m doing anything dangerous like driving a vehicle. My phone is a paradigm case of what Borgmann (1987) called a “focal thing”: it provides a “center of orientation”2 around which my daily habits and practices revolve. And I’m not alone. According to a recent Pew survey, of the 90% of Americans that have cell phones (and 58% that have smart phones): ● “67% of cell owners find themselves checking their phone for messages, alerts, or calls — even when they don’t notice their phone ringing or vibrating. 1 Harraway, D. (1991). 2 Borgmann, A. (1987). 1 ● 44% of cell owners have slept with their phone next to their bed because they wanted to make sure they didn’t miss any calls, text messages, or other updates during the night. ● 29% of cell owners describe their cell phone as “something they can’t imagine living without.”3 These figures are surprising; a decade ago, no single object filled a comparable role in the lives of so many people. The growth of the cell phone over that time has reoriented the daily habits of millions of users, generating an ecosystem of social conventions, normative practices, and novel dangers in its wake. And the cell phone is but one of dozens of reorienting technologies (personal computers, Internet, WiFi) introduced in just the span of my short lifetime. These technologies, the product of decades of research in science, engineering, and industrial design, provide the infrastructure around which we organize our lives and coordinate our activities. More than anything else, these technologies account for the distinct ebb and flow of contemporary life that distinguishes it from the culture of generations past. The story of technological change is the story of human social reorganization around ever-changing focal objects. But this is not the story of technology we typically tell ourselves. Traditionally, we think of the cell phone as a tool, and the role it plays in my life in terms of the purposes to which it is put. With the tool I can call my mom, or check the time or my email, or perform a variety of other tasks. The tool is employed instrumentally in the pursuit of these tasks; unless the tool malfunctions, it will dutifully execute my intentions. On this view, the tool cannot itself have an organizing influence on my life, because its behavior is entirely derived from my intentions as its user. Therefore, technological change must be the result of changing human intentions, and not the other way around. To think otherwise would imply the tool had some agency independent of my instrumental use. Ascribing such properties to machines would be “paranoid”, as Haraway says, a mockery of our own autonomy. In A Cyborg Manifesto, Haraway launches an attack on this traditional view, anticipating a world 3 Smith, A. (2012). 2 where the deep philosophical distinctions between humans and machines erode at both ends: by machine agents that play increasingly active roles in our social lives and by a science that systematically calls into questions our own sense of autonomy. In the 30 years since Haraway’s call-to-arms, this “leaky distinction” between humans and machines has only become more problematic. Today, a diverse collection of machines perform uncountably many functions in the service of both public and private life. Increasingly, these machines function as semi-autonomous agents contributing to our activities in self-directed ways, sometimes through adaptive responses to environmental conditions. My cell phone doesn’t just execute commands at my request; it also executes a variety of other commands, most of which I know nothing about, and which might be only indirectly related to my uses. For instance, my phone knows from my email that I have a flight to Chicago this evening, and automatically collects some public transportation routes to the airport so they’ll be available should I need them. When I miss my bus, my phone uses GPS tracking to automatically detect the change and adjust my travel schedule accordingly. To top it all off, I can retrieve this information
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