Topoi DOI 10.1007/s11245-013-9174-y

The Virtues of Ingenuity: Reasoning and Arguing without Bias

Olivier Morin

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract This paper describes and defends the ‘‘virtues Ingenuity is the use of reasoning to gather information of ingenuity’’: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philos- and to solve problems. This paper is about its virtues,in ophers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in the both senses of the term: the things that ingenuity is good practice of using reasoning to solve problems and gather for, and the qualities that it takes to be good at it. The information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less important philosophical tradition, particularly since Bacon and uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent revival of rhet- Descartes, has praised detachment, freedom from pre- oric and argumentative approaches to reasoning (in psy- judice, and objectivity, in terms that may sound quaintly chology, philosophy and science studies) has highlighted excessive today. The celebration of ingenuity often went the virtues of persuasiveness and cast a new light on some along with a demotion of other uses of reasoning. Con- of its apparent vices—bad faith, deluded confidence, con- viction, or persuasion—the use of reasoning to change firmation and myside biases. Those traits, it is often argued, other people’s minds—was one of them. Conviction and will no longer look so detrimental once we grasp their ingenuity arguably require different dispositions: a con- proper function: arguing in order to persuade, rather than vincing argumentation benefits from a sensitivity to other thinking in order to solve problems. Some of these biases people’s views and feelings, and from a certain firmness may even have a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen of belief, which may not serve individual cognition. These in this light, the virtues of ingenuity may well seem rhetorical virtues were all but forgotten by the champions redundant. Defending them, I argue that the vices of con- of ingenuity. viction are not innocuous. If generalized, they would Things have changed. The last few decades have seen a destabilize argumentative practices. Argumentation is a reappraisal of the persuasive side of reasoning. Social common good that is threatened when every arguer pursues psychologists (Billig 1996; Mercier and Sperber 2011), conviction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside philosophers (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Rorty biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for nor 1996) as well as economists (McCloskey 1998) and soci- explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a collapse ologists of science (Shapin and Schaffer 2011) have of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect, humility or revived an argumentative view of thought that could also honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues that specifically be found in ancient rhetoric. Reasoning, they claim, is attach to the practice of making conscious inferences. social and argumentative through and through. In this light, the whole Enlightenment plan to change the way reasoning Keywords Virtue epistemology Á Argumentative theory is used—to focus it on ingenuity rather than persuasion—, of reasoning Á Objectivity Á Rhetoric Á Argumentation would appear misguided. This paper is a defense of the virtues of ingenuity. It tries to take into account the good points raised by this argumentative turn. While agreeing that reasoning is social & O. Morin ( ) and argumentative, I will argue that this does not make Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, 30–34, Frankel Leo´ utca, 1023 Budapest, Hungary ingenuity redundant: on their own, the virtues of conviction e-mail: [email protected] cannot sustain a healthy practice of public reasoning. 123 O. Morin

The first part will describe different virtues and vices she will not hesitate to defend the permissibility of infan- associated with conviction and ingenuity. That part draws ticide, in some cases.1 on recent work in virtue epistemology (Zagzebski 1996; Ms. L. realizes that condoning infanticide in some cases, Roberts and Wood 2007). Part 2 lays down the case against or even contemplating the possibility, would disqualify her. the virtues of ingenuity. In line with a rhetorical revival in Whatever sound arguments she might summon would be philosophy and sociology of science, some authors have no match for the audience’s outrage. She decides to find claimed that debates may not benefit much from detach- reasons to dissociate the two issues, should opponents ever ment, lucidity, or thoroughness. Even better, their absence raise that objection. Having done so, she can free her mind could prove beneficial: a deluded self-confidence brings from a disturbing thought, and keep her opponents from strength and focus to discussions, by forcing everyone to creating a polemical diversion. sharpen their arguments. Parts 3 and 4 defend the virtues of The story does not say whether the philosophers’ argu- reasoning against these charges. Part 3 argues that argu- ment entails the permissibility of infanticide. It may or it mentation is a hybrid activity: It is concerned with inge- may not. nuity as much as conviction. An argumentative practice What if it does? Then Ms. G. made a winning move, and cannot survive if every arguer prefers to persuade others, Ms. L. took a risk. Ms. G. made a breakthrough in her rather than change their own views. Reasons need sellers, ethical research. Ms. L.’s opponents may accuse her of bad but they need buyers as well. Part 4 argues that delusion faith: she tried to sell them an argument whose conse- and bad faith have a purely negative impact on the practice quences appear much stronger than the permissibility of of argumentation, a practice that would not exist if it relied abortion. on the virtues of conviction alone. What if it does not? Then Ms. L. made the winning move, and Ms. G. took the risk. Ms. G. was lead astray on a slightly disreputable path. At best, she lost her time. At worse, she 1 The Virtues of Reasoning may have given false arguments to an unjust cause. Ms. L., on the other hand, was deft enough to disregard an irrelevant 1.1 Two Thinkers issue that would have muddled her message. Both decisions—to investigate the permissibility of Imagine two thinkers, Ms. L. and Ms. G. infanticide, or to dodge the issue—are risky. The costs and G. is a philosopher, L. is an activist. Both reason about benefits, however, are not the same for Ms. G. and for Ms. abortion. Both of them have come to think that it is morally L. Their goals are different. Ms. G. does not care to per- permissible, and the argument they have developed to show suade anyone that abortion is permissible (or not). She it is exactly the same. In short, they hold that even if wants to build a coherent ethical system with far-ranging embryos were conscious human persons, there would be no implications, the more challenging the better. Ms. L. is not obligation for mothers to sacrifice an important part of their trying to generalize her view on abortion to solve other lives to them, should they refuse to do so. Ms. L. and Ms. ethical problems. She is defending abortion against pas- G. may or may not be right. For some interlocutors, their sionate opponents. Ms. G. and Ms. L. are engaged in two argument will raise a disturbing implication. If abortion is different cognitive activities. Each of them has a distinct permissible regardless of the psychological or moral status way of exploring the way propositions and representations of the embryo, what keeps L. and G. from condoning relate, and support one another. They exemplify different certain cases of infanticide? virtues of reasoning: the ‘‘scholarly virtues’’ of ingenuity, L. and G.’s argument may authorize several answers to and the ‘‘lawyerly virtues’’ of conviction. that question. This story does not tell whether their line is compatible with an absolute condemnation of infanticide. 1.2 A System of the Virtues The point is: neither G. nor L. can know the answer for certain without investing a great deal of intellectual Virtues have been defined as ‘‘deep and enduring acquired resources into the issue. Should they do so? It depends. excellences of a person, involving a characteristic moti- To Ms. G., a connection between abortion and infanti- vation to produce a certain desired end and a reliable cide means either that her argument on abortion is wrong, success in bringing about that end’’ (Zagzebski 1996 or that killing babies is permissible—two challenging p. 137). The virtues of reasoning that this paper discusses results. She starts looking closely at the reasons why her differ from intellectual virtues as traditionally construed views could render infanticide permissible. If she finds out that she was wrong, she will simply give up on her claims 1 For a real example of what G.’s argument might be, see Giubilini about abortion. Should her conclusion go the other way, and Minerva 2012. . 123 Reasoning and Arguing without Bias

(Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1106b—Aristotle 2004a), something. Conviction is often contrasted with persuasion: in two respects at least. whilst conviction is thought to rely on logically sound First, the virtues of reasoning are not (or not merely) arguments, persuasion often describes those varieties of cognitive skills or faculties. They have a crucial motiva- influence that do not rely on reasoning at all (but rely on tional component that is absent from intellectual virtues as other tools—such as incentives, emotional mechanisms, defined by most virtue epistemologists since Aristotle etc.), or that rely on defective reasoning (sophistry, (Annas 2003). In this I agree with some virtue epistemol- superficial rhetoric). This paper makes no such distinction, ogists (Zagzebski 1996; Fricker 2007: 72–83; Roberts and and the words ‘‘persuade’’ and ‘‘convince’’ are used Wood 2007) and with many psychologists, who have interchangeably. This is not to say that the distinction is claimed that solving certain problems requires dispositions pointless. The goal of this paper, however, is not to draw a over and above mere cognitive capacities (Stanovich and normative boundary between legitimate or illegitimate West 2000; Ennis 1996). forms of influence (a task on which much has been done Second, most of them are neither purely deliberative nor already). purely epistemic, although some of them may incorporate Ingenuity and argumentation can thus be seen as one some aspect of prudence, others some aspects of intellec- single faculty (reasoning) used in the first case as a means tion, etc. They all have to do with reasoning, i.e., the of understanding, as an instrument of influence in the practice of exploring relations (entailment, contradiction, second. The two purposes may overlap or conflict. support, compatibility) between thoughts, in oneself or in The following typology (Fig. 1) is proposed to clarify one’s interlocutors (reasoning and its uses are further my argument. It is not meant to capture deep psychological characterized in Sect. 3). Reasoning may be used to form regularities, although I do think that such regularities can true representations, but this is not the only (or the most be found (see Sect. 1.3). Psychologists specializing in interesting) use we can make of it—therefore, the virtues of critical thinking or in reasoning have proposed several ty- reasoning are not epistemic in the strict sense of that pologies, often inspired from questionnaires, to capture term—they do not necessarily aim at the formation of interpersonal differences in ‘‘thinking styles’’ (Ennis 1996; justified true beliefs. Sa´ et al. 1999; Kruglanski and Webster 1996). The list proposed here is much less inclusive than theirs.2 1.2.1 Reasoning, as a Means of Understanding and as a Means of Influence 1.2.2 Detachment/Sensitivity

Conviction and ingenuity each belong to a wider family of Persuading an audience demands some attention to that social and cognitive practices that need not involve audience’s opinions. Those same opinions may distract reasoning. someone who simply wants to solve a problem. The icon of Ingenuity can be seen as one form of understanding detachment in philosophy is, of course, Socrates, with his (Riggs 2003). ‘‘Understanding’’ so construed is somewhat ostensive indifference to public opinion, his habit of broader than the acquisition of knowledge, or justified true freezing in mid-conversation to think something over, and beliefs. I subscribe to Riggs’ opinion that ‘‘[w]e are not his final plea in front of the Athenian tribunal. Socrates collectors of random or trivial truths. Nor does the acqui- could have convinced the jury (he eventually lost by a sition of knowledge exhaust our epistemological pursuits’’ rather narrow margin of 60 votes out of 501), had he not (p. 214). In this spirit, the aim of ingenuity will be alienated them by demanding a reward for his services to described, quite broadly as ‘‘information acquisition and the city. Like Ms. G. (the philosopher in our example), problem-solving’’, and the virtues of reasoning will be Socrates was undaunted by the predictable reactions of his studied as intellectual virtues in a broad sense (following audience. such authors as Zagzebski or Roberts and Wood). Under- In contrast, Ms. L. takes never loses track of her audi- standing need not involve reasoning—in other words, it ence’s feelings, thus showing sensitivity. Sensitive con- may take many other forms beside ingenuity. Vision is a viction has its heroes, just like detachment. Zhou En Lai way of gathering information that often requires no con- knew one or two things about argumentation, from the scious inference. debating team variety (he won awards as a student) to the Likewise, conviction is a form of the broader practice of more dangerous kind. During the Civil War, he persuaded ‘‘influence’’: changing the beliefs and desires of others. The Chang Kai-shek’s top general to turn up against his master. varieties of influence may include coercion, the use of incentives, subliminal manipulation, seduction, etc. What 2 For instance, Ennis’ list (1996) includes a disposition to ‘‘Care sets conviction apart is the fact that it relies on the rea- about the dignity and worth of every person’’, and a ‘‘concern about soning capacities of its targets, to change their mind about others’ welfare’’. 123 O. Morin

Fig. 1 The virtues of reasoning (Presentation inspired by McCloskey 2010)

The volte-face did not pay and the general ended up in reasoning as an individual activity rather than a dialogic prison, his army dismantled, his officers killed. Zhou did one (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). A second not care: he had worked out a spectacular reconciliation reason is that, even in argumentative contexts, they favored with Chang (in a few days of conversation). Still, the another virtue: thoroughness. general’s former army was outraged. Some of his men forced into Zhou’s home to kill him. An unarmed Zhou 1.2.3 Thoroughness/Strategy simply persuaded them to walk away. Zhou’s ability to put himself in his interlocutor’s shoes proved crucial in his When investigating the connections between the permis- dealings with Mao Zedong. Twice at least, Zhou managed sibility of abortion and the permissibility of infanticide, to moderate disastrous policies, while retaining Mao’s Ms. G. is thorough: she follows the implications of her trust. Twice at least, he came close to breaking point and ideas to whatever interesting conclusion they may lead. had to self-criticize his way back to power. Though he lost Russell’s attitude towards what became known as ‘‘Rus- many relatives and friends at the hand of politicians he had sell’s paradox’’showed thoroughness. Apparently, Russell many reasons to despise, Zhou retained the ability to see stumbled upon the problem while trying to refute Cantor what the world looked like in their eyes. The task was (Coffa 1979). Whether it was a real issue or not was not complicated by the fact that his main interlocutor was often obvious to him, but he nevertheless decided to bury his as rational and predictable as a suicide bomber (on all this, refutation in a file-drawer. At that point, no one knew that see Wilson 1984). the puzzle of self-including sets had the potential to destroy To philosophers trained in the Enlightenment tradition, a system that Russell had spent decades building. Had he Zhou’s sensitivity may seem less than genuinely virtuous. chosen to dismiss it, few if any people would have noticed. Socratic detachment serves as the reference. Yet Zhou truly Yet he went ahead. exemplified a form of excellence in reasoning. It required, Conviction requires a different kind of focus. Persuaders not just prudence and courage, but a remarkable ability to are not interested in the complete set of interesting infer- use some actions and ideas to justify other actions and ences they may draw from a given set of premises. They ideas in the eyes of someone else. are merely concerned with those their interlocutors will Still, our prototype of excellent reasoning is detached. find cogent. They must restrict their exploration of the One can see at least two reasons for that. One is the fight space of reasons and implications accordingly. Ms. L. that Early Enlightenment thinkers like Bacon or Descartes knows that her case for the permissibility of abortion will led against the medieval and jesuitic practice of disputa- not be easy to make, and she does not burden herself with tio.3 In their wake, philosophical moderns redefined the useless risk of venturing an opinion of infanticide: she fights the fight that she can win. 3 See Bacon, New Organon (aphorism 71). Descartes on disputations: ‘‘Et je n’ai jamais remarque´ non plus que par le moyen des disputes qui se pratiquent dans les e´coles, on ait de´couvert aucune ve´rite´ qu’on ignoraˆt auparavant : car pendant que chacun taˆche de vaincre, Footnote 3 continued on s’exerce bien plus a` faire valoir la vraisemblance qu’a` peser les ne sont pas pour cela par apre`s meilleurs juges. ‘‘(Descartes 1824: raisons de part et d’autre ; et ceux qui ont e´te´ longtemps bons avocats 206–207). 123 Reasoning and Arguing without Bias

Early Enlightenment figures were nearly unanimous in argument, based on a state-of-the-art model of Earth tem- their praise of what Locke called ‘‘unbiased indifferency’’.4 perature, had been confirmed or re-discovered by many The public image of science was shaped by this discourse. others. (Darwin himself stealthily retracted a wrong-headed As Stephen Shapin (2009) documents, detachment almost refutation.) Yet, in this case, firmness arguably did research defined the popular image of the scientist, at least until the a favor. first half of the twentieth century. He cites as an example Importantly, Kuhn did not commend conservatism to Max Gottlieb, a medical scientist who mentors the hero of everyone. Engineers, in his view, did not have to be par- Sinclair-Lewis’ widely read Arrowsmith. Here is Gottlieb’s ticularly firm in upholding the scientific dogma of their morning prayer: day. Tesla and Edison were quick to embrace fanciful theories—but they did no harm. They were not the ones in God give me unclouded eyes and freedom from haste. charge of updating the scientific tradition. Edison and Tesla God give me a quiet and relentless anger against all were just asked to be ingenious: to produce devices that pretense and all pretentious work and all work left would immediately work, not to defend ideas that made slack and unfinished. God give me a restlessness sense in the scientific culture as a whole (Kuhn, op. cit.: whereby I may neither sleep nor accept praise till my 238–239). observed results equate my calculated results or in pious glee I discover and assault my error. (ÁÁÁ) 1.3 The Virtues and Vices of Reasoning are (Partly) (cited by Shapin 2009, p. 62) Inherent Personal Dispositions 1.2.4 Lucidity/Firmness Philosophers and psychologists from the Situationist school have voiced strong doubts about the psychological reality Max Gottlieb was praying for God to give him the strength of virtues, understood as fixed psychological dispositions to ignore positive and negative opinions from outside, but possessed by persons (Doris 2002). Character traits, the he also asked something else: the ability to correct one’s critics argue, are not reliable enough to warrant the claims mistakes with ‘‘pious glee’’. Glee is what Socrates claimed of virtue theorists. They remark that honesty, courage, or he felt whenever his view were refuted (which was suspi- generosity can be suppressed (or elicited) in most people, ciously rare) (Plato, Gorgias, 458a—Plato 1987). Gottlieb depending on the situation. Whether virtue theorists should did not ask for mere thoroughness (the will to follow care about this objection is a debated point. Some estimate inferences to all their relevant conclusions), but also for that virtues need not take the form of fixed personal traits. lucidity—the will to go against his own opinions, and They may depend on specific social contexts and institu- update his beliefs as he acquired new information. tions (Peterson and Seligman 2004, chapter 2). On the Firmness can be defined as the opposite of lucidity: the other hand, virtue psychologists do need to demonstrate capacity to resist updating certain beliefs. It was, perhaps, some inter-individual consistency in honesty or generosity: the first virtue of conviction to get rehabilitated in philos- how well does my honesty in a given situation predict my ophy, when Thomas Kuhn showed that a disregard for honesty in the future? If the answer is ‘‘not much’’, it contrary evidence could foster scientific progress in some makes little sense to speak of honesty as a personal quality. cases (Kuhn 1977: 225–239). Paradigms, he argued, should Fortunately, it may not be necessary to take a stance in enjoy a favourable handicap when faced with contrary this debate here. The psychological case for the virtues of arguments. Darwin and his followers held firmly against reasoning is relatively clear-cut. As far as lucidity, thor- Lord Kelvin’s refutation of natural selection, although oughness and detachment are concerned, there is massive Kelvin had made quite a convincing case that the earth evidence that individuals differ in important and reliable could not be ancient enough for evolution to be true. His ways. Stanovich and West (1998—exp. 1 and 2) demon- strate the existence of ‘‘enormous’’ and robustly correlated 4 :‘‘(…) as a lover of truth, and not a worshipper of my own doctrine, inter-individual differences across seven different reason- I own some change of my opinion, which I think I have discovered ing tasks. Those inter-personal differences cannot be ground for. In what I first writ, I with an unbiassed indifferency accounted for by differences in cognitive capacities alone, followed truth, whither I thought she led me. But neither being so vain and a substantial share of the variability is predicted by the as to fancy infallibility, nor so disingenuous as to dissemble my mistakes for fear of blemishing my reputation, I have, with the same subjects’ performance on questionnaires designed to probe sincere desire for truth only, not been ashamed to publish what a their ‘‘cognitive style’’: ‘‘factors such as dispositions severer enquirer has suggested. ‘‘(Essay concerning human under- toward premature closure, cognitive confidence, reflectiv- standing, chap. XXI, § 72 —Locke 1706). (Locke is discussing ity, dispositions toward confirmation bias, ideational gen- Descartes’ concept of indifferency, a central piece of the Cartesian conception of free will.) See also Section 34 of Locke’s Conduct of erativity, and so on.’’ (Stanovich and West 2000: 664). the Understanding, a user’s guide to the virtues of ingenuity. Responses to different ‘Open-Mindedness’ questionnaires 123 O. Morin display a substantial internal consistency (see Peterson and which he defines as a combination of universalism (science Seligman 2004 for a review), can be correlated between has no nationality), communism (‘‘property rights in sci- questionnaires (ibid.), and predict behavior in ecological ence are whittled down to a bare minimum’’), disinterest- argumentative tasks (Sa´ et al. 2005). The critical thinking edness (‘Do No Fraud’) and organized skepticism. That last community has come to the same conclusion: stable dis- trait (rather rapidly sketched by Merton) may correspond to positions and habits (as distinct from mere cognitive abil- the virtue of lucidity. The other three traits, however, are ities) underlie good argumentation (Ennis 1996). Open- not specifically intellectual virtues. Universalism, com- minded subjects (who, though a minority, are not so rare) munism and disinterestedness would promote the common show a robust tendency to outperform others on a range of good in many spheres of activity that have little to do with tasks (Stanovich and West 2000). Certainly, measures of reasoning, or indeed with intellectual pursuits of any kind: open-mindedness or critical thinking skills are diverse, and it would be generally beneficial, for instance, if nations may mix measures of ingenuity with less relevant features, could freely share water in a spirit of disinterested co- but the consistency that they exhibit puts the burden of operation. Such public goods have little to do with the proof on the Situationists’ shoulders. quality of reasoning. James Watson’s self-portrait in The Double Helix 1.4 The Virtues of Reasoning are Sui Generis (Watson 2012) illustrates the dissociation between the Intellectual Virtues virtues of ingenuity and merely civil virtues. Watson wants to beat Linus Pauling in the race for DNA; in so doing he How do these virtues relate to other virtues? I would upsets many colleagues—notoriously including Rosalind venture to say that they are sui generis virtues of reasoning, Franklin, whose crucial data he uses without her knowl- in that they attach specifically to the practice of drawing edge or consent, while indulging in misogynistic slander- conscious inferences. In this, they differ from the ‘‘civic ing. Yet he does possess some virtues of ingenuity. He virtues’’ of scientists (as studied by sociologists like Steven proposes several models for DNA that are thrashed by Shapin), from ‘‘civil virtues’’ in conversation (Rorty 1994), various colleagues without Watson so much as arguing or from Merton’s ‘‘scientific ethos’’ (Merton 1942/1996). back—even in one case where all textbooks agreed with The virtues of conviction resemble Amelie Rorty’s him.5 ‘‘civic virtues’’ (Rorty 1994). Rorty’s tact and respect,in particular, resemble what I called sensitivity: 2 One Case Against Ingenuity … respect (…) requires explaining ourselves to [others] in terms they can understand. It not only Many anti-rationalist authors have attacked the virtues of involves responding to their challenges but also pre- ingenuity or declared them redundant. This paper will deal senting considerations to address their concerns, with another class of worries, one that is suggested by a concerns that they may not themselves have articu- growing body of argumentative approaches to science, lated and that we may not share. reasoning and public affairs (McCloskey 1998; Billig 1996; (Rorty 1994: 309) Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969), with a focus on Yet in other places, Rorty’s respect also implies an Mercier and Sperber’s ‘‘argumentative theory of reason- inclination to be persuaded by others. Such a propensity is ing’’. These approaches are quite diverse, but they share an quite absent from sensitivity as defined in this paper. ambition to treat the persuasive uses of reasoning as Inwardly at least, good persuaders are firm. They need not functional rather than pathological. They do so by have any special esteem for the people they are trying to emphasizing the social and argumentative character of persuade. Likewise, there is nothing particularly respectful reasoning. One of their target is an individualistic view of about the virtues of ingenuity (detachment being a case in problem-solving, a`laDescartes or Bacon. ‘‘Good science’’, point). They are not norms of polite conversation. the slogan goes, ‘‘is good conversation’’ (McCloskey 1998: Perhaps the virtues of reasoning could be linked with 162): a lively debate of skilled persuaders is much preferable intellectual humility (Roberts and Wood 2003; Merton to a collection of ingenious individuals. 1996a)—but then again, I doubt it. Intellectual humility may In this light, the lawyerly virtues deserve some reha- be one form of lucidity, but not all acts of humility are lucid. bilitation. What is more, some vices of conviction may also Gogol, who destroyed his life’s work because he believed it need to be reappraised. Before seeing why, let us take a to be worthless and inspired by Satan, was intellectually humble, in a way—but do we want to call him lucid? 5 (On Watson’s intellectual virtues, see Haack 2003 pp. 109 sq.; on Another set of virtues that fails to capture the essence of Watson’s intellectual vices see Shapin 2009, Robert Roberts and Jay ingenuity, is Merton’s ‘‘scientific ethos’’ (Merton 1996b), Wood 2007). 123 Reasoning and Arguing without Bias closer look at the vices of conviction, and their impact on evaluating other people’s reasons in a lucid way, and reasoning. The following discussion roughly follows updating our beliefs accordingly. The problem is, we are Mercier and Sperber’s recent review. They take another not always so willing. Reasoners often obey the demands look at psychological findings that had sometimes been of conviction before those of ingenuity: they will ‘‘look for interpreted as indicating a lack of rationality, and show that reasons to justify an opinion they are eager to uphold’’ they can be described as functional features of persuasive (Mercier and Sperber 2011). Such motivated reasoning is reasoning. clearly a form of delusion, since it prevents reasoners from considering arguments that may help them update their 2.1 How the Vices of Conviction Affect Reasoning views for the better.

2.1.1 Bad Faith 2.1.3 The ‘Myside Bias’

First, people are exceedingly sensitive to the opinions of Lastly, there are also many reasons to think that we are too others; as a result, they will take decisions that they can strategic in our search for arguments. I mean that our justify rather than decisions that would truly satisfy them. search for reasons is unduly restricted to reasons that might One may call bad faith (in the Sartrean sense of mauvaise serve as arguments for our view or counter-arguments to foi) this excessive concern for the public justification of others’ views. This tendency corresponds to what is one’s choices, since it arguably prevents us from choosing sometimes called the myside bias, in the narrowest sense of more authentic options. In common parlance, bad faith also that term (Wolfe 2011). It is often (and confusingly) refers to hypocrisy; negotiation theory uses the phrase to associated with the confirmation bias, a much broader term describe negotiations where one of the parties is just pre- that usually denotes a lack of lucidity mixed with a lack of tending to negotiate but has no intention to yield anything. thoroughness. Nickerson defines the confirmation bias as Bad faith in that sense is a vice of sensitivity in two ways. ‘‘the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are First, an individual of bad faith is too concerned with what partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in his interlocutors may think to be sincere with them. Sec- hand’’ (Nickerson 1998). The myside bias only has to do ond, the desire not to yield to other’s arguments may with the ‘‘seeking’’ part. indicate an excessive concern for one’s own reputation If conviction is your sole purpose, there is nothing (excessive, that is, as far as pure ingenuity is concerned). wrong with bad faith, delusion, and the myside bias. They can help. (Arguably, they also backfire.) The vices of 2.1.2 Delusion conviction are not deficient forms of conviction, they just stand in the way of other uses of reasoning (I follow Many reasoners are prey to a firmness of views that Amelie Rorty’s definition: a virtue becomes vicious when sometimes borders on delusion. This impaired capacity to it blocks the proper aim of other virtues—Rorty 1994: revise our beliefs when faced with fresh evidence is called 307). by various names in the psychological literature, from If and when conviction is the name of the game, delu- ‘‘belief perseverance’’ to ‘‘overconfidence’’. While par- sion and bad faith are functional; but what about ingenuity? tiality in seeking evidence is a vice of strategy, interpreting fresh evidence in ways that are partial to one’s own views 2.2 Perhaps, the Virtues of Conviction are all We Need is a form of firmness that can prove excessive. To cite only some of the evidence mentioned by Mercier and Sperber Two possibilities should worry any defender of the virtues (2011) in their discussion of motivated reasoning (Sect. of ingenuity. First, we may not need to add anything to the 4.1.), we discount data offered by an experimenter if the psychology of the argumentative reasoners that have just data would favor a conclusion we dislike. When arguing been described (skilled reasoners who suffer from delusion, with editors, scientific reviewers discount a paper’s strong bad faith, and a myside bias), to make them ingenious. The points and focus on its weaknesses. Partisans of the death second possibility is that some of the vices of argumenta- penalty massively discount arguments against it. Oppo- tive reasoners may in fact help them solve problems and nents do the opposite. More generally, people are more acquire informations. If these two claims are true, the likely to scrutinize arguments when they go against their virtues of ingenuity are at best redundant, at worst noxious. initial position. In all those cases people prioritize con- Both claims are plausible. viction over ingenuity. Our argumentative reasoner may not need the virtues of Importantly, such delusions need not impair people’s ingenuity at all, because in some contexts, he gets all the capacity to evaluate arguments. The argumentative theory lucidity, detachment or thoroughness that he needs from insists that, if we want to do so, we are quite capable of the conversation around him. His interlocutors will provide 123 O. Morin counter-arguments to his views, which he is quite capable We can agree with them, at least, on one thing: ecological of using to update his beliefs (that is, if he thinks they need ingenuity is possible. This should worry the champions of updating). If the conversation around him aggregates a ingenuity. sufficient variety of viewpoints, it can help him see all the Why? Because argumentative reasoners fail to possess sides of the arguments that he had failed to consider the ‘‘scholarly virtues’’. Thoroughness requires ingenuity because of his myside bias. The only thing that a lively and in the production of reasons. Detachment cannot come civil conversation may fail to provide is detachment—the from considering other people’s opinions. And, most capacity to judge independently of other people’s views. importantly, lucidity is not simply an ability—there is a But given the importance of society and reputation in motivational component to it—a readiness to let an argu- human life, one may question the relevance of such a ment change one’s mind, for instance. The argumentative disposition. reasoner is like a corrupt judge. If the state gave him strong Perhaps, argumentative reasoners are ecologically incentives to do his job properly, he would examine your ingenious. Their psychological dispositions incline them case with impeccable fairness. But every so often he is towards the vices of conviction, but in the context of bribed. He is no less discerning for that, but his goal argumentation this does not matter much: the conversation changes: he will pronounce you guilty before having seen compensates for those flaws. Ecological rationality is made your file. He might not open your file. If he opens it, he will possible by psychological dispositions that share some only look at the evidence in your favor, and then he will not traits with classic rationality, without being quite as so much take it in, as use it to support the decision that he demanding. Those dispositions can mimic rationality in has already come to. most contexts (Simon 1996: 51–85; Gigerenzer 2000: The corrupt judge lacks something. If that something 59–76). Likewise, ecological ingenuity would be made can be dispensed with, then the virtues of ingenuity are in possible by the fact that argumentative reasoners are not trouble. entirely deprived of the virtues of ingenuity. If, and when, they evaluate arguments with the intention of gathering 2.3 In Collective Reasoning, Private Vices Could information (or of solving problems), they do so lucidly, Breed Public Prosperity thoroughly, and with detachment. Otherwise they could never profit from the conversation around them. Some defenders of argumentative views seem willing to go There is a downside. Ecological ingenuity only works in even further: they actually praise excessive firmness, sen- a conversation that is rich and tolerant enough to include a sitivity and strategy. great variety of viewpoints. How often is that the case? (…) from our point of view, the rhetorical value of a Sunstein (2009) documents dozens of cases of collective statement is not destroyed by the fact that the argu- reasoning where a relative homogeneity of beliefs results in ment appears to have been built post hoc (that is, after polarization. Each individual myside bias reinforces similar an intimate decision had been made), or by the fact beliefs in others, sometimes causing impressive departures that the argument is based on premises that the orator from common opinions. Those results are spectacular, but does not share. (…) it is legitimate, when one has not unintuitive. Many groups of arguers do not present a acquired a certain opinion, to try and make it more sufficient variety of viewpoints to avoid polarization. In firm for one’s self, but above all, to strengthen it those cases, a lack of thoroughness will harm collective against attacks that may come from outside. It is problem-solving. True, there are exceptions. Most of these, normal that one should consider all the arguments however, are elaborate institutional inventions: fair trials, one could use to strengthen one’s opinions.6 scientific debates, democratic politics. They were designed (Perelman & Tyteca, §9) (or evolved) precisely as attempts to avoid the negative effects of the vices of conviction. The presence of com- The most interesting defenses of the vices of conviction peting viewpoints in such debates is a design feature—we are the ones which show how, in argumentation, private cannot assume that it reflects a state of nature. Outside these institutions of debate, there are, of course, strong 6 disagreements, but dissent can arguably not be voiced as ‘‘(…) de notre point de vue, la valeur rhe´torique d’un e´nonce´ ne saurait eˆtre annihile´e par le fait qu’il s’agirait d’une argumentation easily. For one thing, dissenting people may not want to que l’on estime baˆtie apre`s coup, alors que la de´cision intime e´tait talk with one another unless an institution forces them to do prise, ou par le fait qu’il s’agit d’une argumentation base´e sur des so (on the adverse consequences of conflict for open dis- pre´misses auxquelles l’orateur n’adhe`re pas lui-meˆme. (…) il est cussion, see Hardin 2002). le´gitime que celui qui a acquis une certaine conviction s’attache a` l’affermir vis-a`-vis de lui-meˆme, et surtout vis-a`-vis des attaques Some defenders of argumentative views are much more pouvant venir de l’exte´rieur; il est normal qu’il envisage tous les optimistic about the availability of pluralistic conversations. arguments susceptibles de la renforcer. ‘‘. 123 Reasoning and Arguing without Bias vices may breed public prosperity.7 This theme underlies of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so many argumentative views of science, in the wake of motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and Kuhn’s rehabilitation of firmness. Amelie Rorty’s, for allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used instance: reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances tra- Normal science is, for instance, served by training ditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning scientists to follow a conservative epistemic policy, does exactly what can be expected of an argumen- one that makes them susceptible to self-deceptive tative device (…) denials of evidence contrary to dominant theory. (Mercier and Sperber 2011—abstract) (Rorty 1994: 224) To let other people’s reasons interfere with one’s choi- The notion that some measure of delusion is a normal ces is a definition of bad faith; neglecting to search for part of the scientific mindset was made popular by soci- counter-arguments constitutes the myside bias. Lastly, ologists of science. Bruno Latour, in his ethnography of the motivated reasoning prevents people from considering French Conseil d’E´ tat, argues that scientists lack the kind counter-arguments—motivated reasoners will ignore them, of dispassionate detachment that judges possess. Why? or they will argue against them instead of evaluating them Because scientists have other scientists arguing back, if (Mercier and Sperber 2011 Sect. 4.1.) A delusive failure to they go too far, while a judge is often the sole and ultimate revise some beliefs must be the result. authority on a given matter (Latour 2004: 207–255).8 This If Mercier and Sperber are right, these downsides are is in line with a view, common even among orthodox more than compensated by the positive impact that rea- philosophers of science, that the division of cognitive soning biases have on conversation. What, then, would labor, in ‘‘allowing (…) scientists to depart from the high- remain of the virtues of ingenuity? Some view the ethos of minded goals of individual rationality (and act on baser the clear-sighted inquirer as just one more rhetorical tool motives), might actually help the community’s pro- (Perelman & Tyteca §6, §96). For some, it is a rhetoric that ject’’(Kitcher 1990, p. 14). is all the more pernicious for denying its rhetorical nature Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reason- (Frye cited by McCloskey 1998: 60). Others agree that the ing offers a sophisticated version of this argument, when vices of conviction have significant drawbacks, but those they claim that ‘‘in group settings, reasoning biases can drawbacks are nothing that civil virtues—honesty, become a positive force and contribute to a kind of division thoughtfulness, humility—cannot remedy. Here is how of cognitive labor’’ (2011, p. 73). What are those biases? psychologist Jonathan Haidt sums up the argumentative They are often grouped under the label ‘‘confirmation theory of reasoning: bias’’. I think we can easily recognize some of them as being vices of conviction: (…) the confirmation bias is a built-in feature (of an argumentative mind), not a bug that can be removed Skilled arguers (…) are not after the truth but after (from a platonic mind). (…) Each individual reasoner arguments supporting their views. This explains the is really good at one thing: finding evidence to sup- notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not port the position he or she already holds, usually for only when people are actually arguing, but also when intuitive reasons. We should not expect individuals to they are reasoning proactively from the perspective produce good, open-minded, truth-seeking reasoning, 7 The view that intellectual vices may cancel each other out is particularly when self-interest or reputational con- common among students of intellectual virtues. Woods and Roberts cerns are in play. But if you put individuals together (2007: loc. 2645 sq.) argue, for instance, that the intellectual vices of a in the right way, such that some individuals can use brilliant, but impatient and dominating scientist may balance opposite their reasoning powers to disconfirm the claims of vices in his team (excessive conservatism and laziness, for instance) (Hookway 2003 makes a similar point, as well as Rorty 1996). In such others, and all individuals feel some common bond or cases, opposite vices would cancel each other. Here, I focus on the shared fate that allows them to interact civilly, you notion that identical biases in individuals may create virtuous can create a group that ends up producing good rea- collective dynamics. soning as an emergent property of the social system. 8 Latour’s reasoning offers interesting similarities with Kuhn’s (Haidt 2013 loc. 218) discussion of firmness in the sciences (op. cit., 1977). As we saw, Kuhn did not see firmness in upholding the scientific consensus as a In what follows, I would like to show that an argu- virtue in everyone: engineers, in his view, have a right to neglect tradition, because what they produce is not ideas that time will mentative view of reasoning, properly understood, must eventually test, but designs that must work here and now. In a similar nuance this view. Argumentative reasoners (even when vein, Latour notes that judges need to be ingenious because their blessed with civil virtues) cannot sustain a stable practice decision is likely to be final, and will (in most cases at the Conseil of argumentation. Their vices of conviction play no useful d’E´ tat) not be corrected later. 123 O. Morin role in collective ingenuity. The reason, in short, is that Reasoning can serve problem-solving in two ways: as a argumentation is a hybrid practice. It requires a balance of means of combining representations to yield other repre- virtues. sentations, and as a means to test ideas for consistency. The first form is heuristic: it aims at generating new ideas. Its prototype would be the activity of a geometer trying to 3 Some Uses of Reasoning arrive at a given conclusion by combining a set of axioms. Ms. G. is engaging in heuristic reasoning when she tries to Following Mercier and Sperber, reasoning will be charac- work out challenging implications from her work on terized as any conscious thought process in which a thinker abortion. The Cartesian method of reasoning is 100 % represents entailment or support between representations. heuristic, since it is supposed to work only by drawing Reasoning is thus a psychological faculty whose proper consequences that cannot be doubted (their premises being domain is relations such as contradiction, entailment, certain). Yet, as modern defenders of the rhetoric tradition support, mutual compatibility, etc. Reasoning thus char- insist (in particular Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969), acterized is a rather narrow phenomenon, much narrower a critical use of reasoning (the second form) exists as well. than ‘‘thought’’ or ‘‘inference’’. An inference may be In that case, reasoning works as a crash-test for ideas that unreasoned in two ways: one can make it without being may or may not come from reasoning. aware of making it, or one can be aware of making the One can also distinguish two modes of conviction: a inference, without knowing why—in other words, without heuristic one, concerned with finding arguments for a given being aware of the relations that bind different represen- position, and a critical one, that consists in debunking tations together. arguments made against a given position. What distin- The virtues of ingenuity are virtues of reasoning first and guishes critical conviction from critical ingenuity is that foremost: they have to do with a capacity to judge how a critical persuaders should only invest in destroying argu- representation is or is not entailed by another, how con- ments (as opposed to learning anything from them). When sistent a set of representations may be, etc. Thoroughness is critical ingenuity fails to find an inconsistency with a given required to detect hidden inconsistencies or discover argument, it takes the argument in: it uses it to update one’s unexpected implications. Detachment is needed to confront understanding of the world. If critical conviction fails to implications or inconsistencies that one’s audience may not find fault with an argument, on the contrary, it will simply notice or care about. Lucidity is required to accept infer- move on to demolish the next one. The argumentative ences that may threaten one’s former opinions. The virtues reasoners described in Sect. 2 possess skills that are of conviction are also forms of excellence in the exercise of appropriate for critical conviction (including a capacity to reasoning, but differ from ingenuity in one crucial respect: evaluate arguments fairly), but their proneness for delu- the reasons we consider are not our own but those that sion, bad faith and the myside bias stand in the way of both would look plausible to others.9 individual and collective ingenuity. This characterization does without two important fea- tures that ingenuity often possesses in the Enlightenment 3.2 Reasoning as a Hybrid Practice tradition, where ingenuity is supposed to be individual and heuristic. In practice, all four modes of reasoning are likely to min- gle. The development of industrial scientific research in 3.1 Reasoning: Individual Versus Collective, Heuristic American pharmaceutical firms is a case in point (Shapin Versus Critical 2009: 94 sq.). The firms started to hire scientific researchers because they needed specialists to deal with Using reasoning to solve problems may be a public activ- such bodies as the Food and Drugs Administration. Those ity, but it is mostly thought of as a solitary venture. A scientists hired to respond to the FDA’s critiques originally departure from this individualistic conception is one of the served a persuasive purpose. It made sense to ask scientists most important contributions of argumentative views. One what governmental reactions to such or such a product can follow Mercier and Sperber, who cite results showing might be, and anticipate costly procedures. This work of that, when subjects have to solve logical puzzles as a group pre-emptive legal control was quite similar to the task of (rather than individually) their performance is much improved, because those who guess right easily convince 10 Just like ingenuity may be collective, conviction might be others. This is a clear instance of collective ingenuity.10 individual. Persuaders are typically distinct from their target, but there may be such a thing as solitary self-conviction. A smoker who forces herself to think of all the unpleasant consequences if smoking 9 There is, of course, not much that is original here (cf. Aristotle is not exactly pondering whether to stop smoking. In a sense, she is Rhetoric 1.1., 1355b—Aristotle 1991). trying to bring a recalcitrant brain to follow her decision. 123 Reasoning and Arguing without Bias the FDA itself. As the scientists became increasingly Reasons, in the argumentative theory, are like quality knowledgeable about the medicines’ effects and side- labels. Like labels, they serve partially competing ends: effects, this allowed them to evaluate drug projects not just producers use them to sell their products, and consumers to from the perspective of the FDA, but from that of the buy better quality products. Obviously, the objectives of industry as well (critical ingenuity). Eventually the better sales and better quality are compatible only to a knowledge they had used to smooth the relations between point. Beyond that point, the use of labels is unstable—they the firms and the government proved very useful in will not be produced, or they will not be trusted. Likewise, devising new drugs—closing the loop from critical con- argumentation cannot be a stable practice unless a concern viction to heuristic ingenuity without quitting their job. for ingenuity balances the search for conviction. The only For an individual instance of hybrid reasoning, consider reason why people listen to arguments is because it may Tom Hagen, from Mario Puzo’s series The Godfather.As further their understanding of some relevant matter. the only non-Italian figure of the clan, and the legal vitrine Argumentation is impossible without a practice of collec- of an illegal group, Hagen’ hybrid status is a major theme tive ingenuity (or without people at least believing that of the series. He exemplifies the duality of reasoning. He is, they are engaged in such a practice). No walkies, no first of all, the lawyer of the family. In that capacity, he talkies. defends it in Senate hearings. His true position within the In other words, argumentation only makes sense clan is more specific, but similar in spirit: he is the con- because participants chiefly use it to acquire information sigliere, the dedicated go-between in charge of diplomatic or to solve problems. Those participants may be some- dealings with other Cosa Nostra families, and chief advisor what peripheral to the conversation (as happens when we to the Don. As lawyer and as consigliere, Hagen uses listen to a political debate where participants are really conviction to rebuke accusations and to advance Corleone trying to convince us, and not their interlocutors). Still, interests, but that is not all: he also advises the family on its their presence is essential. The motivation to persuade illegal activities. Hagen generally provides conservative others, on the other hand, is not essential to the stability guidance: he tries to prevent actions that he may not be of the practice. Quite the opposite. There is nothing able to defend (in court, or in negotiations with other contradictory with a debate of altruistic, ingenious argu- clans). As he tries to make the Corleone cause easier to ers, where each participant would be motivated to move argue for, he is most keenly aware of the legal or diplo- the conversation towards better solutions, and let the matic risks and opportunities offered by different moves. chips fall where they may. There is something of a This is precisely what makes him a good Mafia Don—a contradiction in a debate where nobody (not even function that he happens to fulfil for a while. peripheral participants) could ever be made to accept any People like Tom Hagen may need, above all, an addi- argument. tional virtue of reasoning, the Aristotelian skill of mediete: Some argumentative theories would say as much, but the ability to steer a course between two extremes. ‘Tom they may have a problem. Hagens’ need not seek the virtues of ingenuity or convic- tion, but they do need to avoid the excesses of both. 4 What the Virtues of Ingenuity Bring 3.3 Argumentation is a Form of Collective Ingenuity to Argumentation

How does argumentation fit in all this? I contend that The problem is: There is nothing in the psychology of argumentation is similarly hybrid. Arguers are not the argumentative reasoners that drives them specifically Bertrand Russels that the classical Enlightenment view towards ingenuity. Argumentative reasoners are capable of depicts. Neither are they like Zhou En Lai. Less gloriously, changing their mind in response to others’ arguments. But perhaps, they are Tom Hagens—they need to combine the they have no specific drive to use this ability. They readily virtues of conviction with those of ingenuity, without fail to evaluate other people’s reasons; they decide to giving in to the vices of either. invent elaborate counter-arguments instead of considering Argumentation, this suggests, is not served well when them. Or they accept favourable arguments as a matter of most arguers put the demands of conviction above every- course, and scrutinize only those that oppose their views. In thing else. The two functions of reasoning are like the two short, nothing prevents them from behaving as pure critical parts of a walkie-talkie system: the point of having a talkie persuaders. This does not mean conversation may not is that others use a walkie, and vice versa. In the case at occasionally change their mind. (They may switch to hand, what ‘walkies’ seek in others’ arguments is infor- positions are easier to argue for.) Such changes, however, mations and solutions to problems— i.e., ingenuity. would happen only in the interest of conviction.

123 O. Morin

4.1 What Argumentation Does not Explain About Our serve as a kind of ‘‘press secretary’’ of the mind. Our main Biases goal in many conversations is to project an image of coherence, confidence, and competence, for others but also Why should people put the interests of conviction above for ourselves. As a result, collective ingenuity will have to those ingenuity? Argumentative views of reasoning are take second place to egotic concerns. To put this in the sometimes interpreted as defending two positions: language of vices and virtues, delusion, bad faith and the myside bias would come from pride. In a similar spirit (but a. An argumentative view implies that people should with very different arguments) Adam Piper (1988) argues prioritize conviction over ingenuity. that ‘‘pseudorationality’’ , the tendency to rationalize away b. Therefore, an argumentative view explains why they dissonant experiences, stems from a drive to maintain one’s do so: it explains bad faith, myside biases, and various image as a coherent mind: ‘‘we have a deeply ingrained, delusions. motivationally effective aversion to rational unintellegi- Position (a) is a misinterpretation. Most argumentative bility, because it threatens the rational coherence of the self views reject it (Mercier and Sperber 2011: 94 sq., as having that experience’’ (p. 301). Thus the urge to justify McCloskey 1998: 160 sq.). Argumentation is a hybrid ourselves to others would come from a desire to appear practice: it cannot be sustained if everyone wishes to be a coherent. persuader above all. In both these views, it should be stressed, the drive to The status of position (b) is not so clear. It is worth persuade does not explain the vices. Protecting one’s insisting, therefore, that the argumentative nature of rea- reputation, or one’s self-esteem, is not the same thing as soning does not account for bad faith, delusion, overcon- persuading others. Conviction can be a humbling task. fidence, motivated reasoning, belief perseveration, etc. It One might have to persuade people that they have won an does not tell us what makes some people shut their ears and argument (even when they haven’t). Sometimes it is argue every objection away. Mercier and Sperber’s argu- essential to appear not to win. Thus, when Tom Hagen mentative theory, for instance, is in my view best seen as convinces Frank Pentangeli to commit suicide (in treating reasoning, in good Humean fashion, as a purely exchange for Corleone protection for his clan after his instrumental faculty—a gun for hire.11 People will lucidly death) he offers only vague suggestions. Pentangeli is evaluate arguments when they have no axe to grind. allowed to believe that he won a good bargain. Being Otherwise, they will be biased. This tells us very little persuasive and scoring points in a conversation are two about the motivations that compel us, sometimes, to use different things. reasoning for conviction rather than ingenuity, rather than Whether the vices of conviction are born for pride or the other way round.12 originate elsewhere does not matter much for the point If argumentation does not explain bad faith, delusion, made here. Suffice it to say that an argumentative view of and the myside bias, what might? Many students of argu- reasoning is no argument for the view that people should mentative disagreement have suggested that a concern for put conviction first, and no explanation for the fact that our reputation or self-image may explain why we cling to they so often do so. our views when faced with cogent counter-arguments (Haidt 2013; Kurzban 2012; Piper 1988). Robert Kurzban 4.2 The Argumentative Case for Being Ingenious (2012) argues that the main function of consciousness is to To summarize, argumentative reasoners do lack something: 11 The expression is Herbert Simon’s (1983: 8). a motivation to put ingenuity first. Most argumentative 12 This personal intepretation is, I think, both coherent and charitable. views do not say that we are exclusively moved by con- Mercier and Sperber attribute a variety of contradictory motivations viction. On the other hand, they do focus on the persuasive to reasoners, depending on the context. The abstract tells us that uses of reasoning, to the point where some readers end up ‘‘Skilled arguers (…) are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views’’, and many readers have found this a reason to thinking that conviction and ingenuity are at least equally conclude that the argumentative theory puts a premium on conviction important for argumentation. rather than ingenuity. However, Mercier & Sperber often make what In fact the two motivations are not equally valuable. An looks like the opposite claim. In the ‘‘normal context’’ of argumen- excessive focus on conviction may harm, even destroy, the tative reasoning, ‘‘people (…) disagree but have a common interest in the truth’’(2011, p. 65). It is not clear exactly what motivations an practice of argumentation, while the reverse is less likely. argumentative context should trigger—a preoccupation for truth, or a Argumentation would collapse if every arguer pursued tendency to disregard the truth. The answer seems to be that it all conviction only. It would remain stable if people merely depends on people’s motivations : on whether or not they have ‘‘an wanted to engage in collective ingenuity regardless of axe to grind’’ (see Mercier and Sperber 2011, section 6). Why people may or may not want to grind that axe is left unspecified by the whether the process ended up in persuading others or not. theory. True, their arguments may be much less vivid, much less 123 Reasoning and Arguing without Bias accessible in that case, but the practice itself would not be no amount of civility can change this. Reasoners who fail jeopardized. Argumentation is collective problem-solving, to be thorough will let themselves be guided by the with the occasional benefits of influencing others—not the assumptions of those around them. Institutions of plural- other way round. istic debate were invented to counter this problem, but The hybrid character of reasoning also makes ingenious outside of these, people are prisoners of parochial opin- motivations more valuable. Collective ingenuity has side ions. Reasoners lacking in detachment will similarly fail benefits for individual reasoning (in the form of critical to reap the benefits of public argument: they will prefer ingenuity). They have been theorized since Aristotle convincing solutions to satisfactory ones. A lack of (Aristotle, Sophistic Refutations p. 175a—Aristotle 2004b): lucidity, at first, may not be strongly felt, but delusion is a lucid appraisal of other people’s reasons may help us like inflation. In the long run, overconfidence debases evaluate our own thoughts. Persuasive reasoning does not argumentation. Inflated arguments are not worth paying have such wide-ranging benefits; on the contrary, the attention to—and deluded arguers are unable to revise argumentative theory of reasoning shows how a disposition their beliefs anyhow. to put conviction first can harm individual ingenuity. The consequences for argumentation are worrying. Admittedly, ingenuity has vices as well. Critics of Lucidity, thoroughness and detachment are, after all, scientism and of the ‘‘engineering mentality’’ have dominant only in a minority (albeit a quite substantial denounced at length the obscurity of callous technicians, one—Stanovich and West 2000). Methods for ‘‘debiasing’’ the over-reach of political extremists, the folly of thinking people have yielded mixed (though not hopeless) results that certain issues can be ‘‘solved’’ as though they were (Lilienfeld et al. 2009). Socrates’ bliss is not within the jigsaw puzzles (McCloskey 1998; Hayek 1955; Gambetta reach of everyone. Some doubt that it can be acquired at and Hertog 2009). Those vices are most threatening in all. This seems to imply that argumentation is doomed. minorities—experts, avant-gardes, activists—insulated Although I do think that fruitful argumentation is less from the broader conversation. Argumentative approaches stable or natural than some might assume, this paper should are right to stress the limits of isolated reasoners, and the not end on a pessimistic note. perils of impoverished diversity of opinions in a group. The heroic cases of ingenuity that we have come across Yet, just like a balanced conversation offering a rich may be too remote to emulate, but we can be satisfied with collection of views can redeem the vices of conviction, less ambitious goals. One such goal is moderation—Tom the vices of ingenuity may be mitigated in many Hagen’s skill. Reasoning and argumentation, I have conversations. argued, are hybrid practices, best served by a mix of ingenuity and conviction. We need not cultivate the virtues of both, just avoid most of their vices. 5 Conclusion Furthermore, domain-specific ingenuity, some studies suggest (Kruglanski and Webster 1996), is easier to reach While commenting on Enlightenment rationalists and the than across-the-board ingenuity. Perhaps this is not so way they praised detachment, thoroughness and lucidity, worrying: we could rein our biases in in some domains Deirdre McCloskey notes that this tradition was ‘‘not much only, and give in to bad faith when, say, talking about more than an appeal to be honest and thoughtful’’ (1998: football or food. Thomas Kuhn suggested such a selective 145). I have tried to show that praising the scholarly virtues allocation of the virtues of reasoning when he commended implies more than that. firmness to scientists, but not to engineers. Being honest and thoughtful, perhaps, is not the point. One other realistic goal is ecological ingenuity. Current Some authors (as diverse as Jonathan Haidt, Amelia scientific institutions could find better ways of promoting Rorty, or Stephen Shapin) argue that our propensities for it: scientists who try their best to refute their own precious delusion, bad faith and myside bias can be countered by results (like Bertrand Russell did) are hardly rewarded at civility. When trust and respect prevail in a discussion, all. Concerns are rising that current institutions promote when participants are humble, open-minded, intellectually superficially persuasive results which fail to withstand fair, then the vices that often come with conviction can do further scrutiny (Ioannidis 2012, see also Merton 1996b). little harm. They may even be used to serve a greater In this context, the old-fashioned rhetoric of the Enlight- good. If this view is correct, we should not care much enment may be more relevant than it seems. Norms of good about being systematic or clear-sighted. Less specific reasoning are not just for show: the norms that people virtues should suffice: be honest, be thoughtful, and do explicitly endorse are reflected in their way of thinking, what you will. especially in their vulnerability to the myside bias (Baron This paper proposes a different view: collective rea- 1995; Stanovich and West 2000). Bacon and Descartes’ soning without the virtues of ingenuity is vulnerable—and ingenuity-mongering may have been excessive, but its 123 O. Morin cultural significance was deep13: The vices of persuasion Locke J (1706) An essay concerning humane understanding. Awnsham & are not in our genes, nor are they demanded by the practice J. Churchill McCloskey DN (1998) The rhetoric of economics. University of of argumentation. Ingenuity is not praised in vain. Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin McCloskey DN (2010) The bourgeois virtues: ethics for an age of commerce. 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