Topoi DOI 10.1007/s11245-013-9174-y The Virtues of Ingenuity: Reasoning and Arguing without Bias Olivier Morin Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Abstract This paper describes and defends the ‘‘virtues Ingenuity is the use of reasoning to gather information of ingenuity’’: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philos- and to solve problems. This paper is about its virtues,in ophers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in the both senses of the term: the things that ingenuity is good practice of using reasoning to solve problems and gather for, and the qualities that it takes to be good at it. The information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less important philosophical tradition, particularly since Bacon and uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent revival of rhet- Descartes, has praised detachment, freedom from pre- oric and argumentative approaches to reasoning (in psy- judice, and objectivity, in terms that may sound quaintly chology, philosophy and science studies) has highlighted excessive today. The celebration of ingenuity often went the virtues of persuasiveness and cast a new light on some along with a demotion of other uses of reasoning. Con- of its apparent vices—bad faith, deluded confidence, con- viction, or persuasion—the use of reasoning to change firmation and myside biases. Those traits, it is often argued, other people’s minds—was one of them. Conviction and will no longer look so detrimental once we grasp their ingenuity arguably require different dispositions: a con- proper function: arguing in order to persuade, rather than vincing argumentation benefits from a sensitivity to other thinking in order to solve problems. Some of these biases people’s views and feelings, and from a certain firmness may even have a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen of belief, which may not serve individual cognition. These in this light, the virtues of ingenuity may well seem rhetorical virtues were all but forgotten by the champions redundant. Defending them, I argue that the vices of con- of ingenuity. viction are not innocuous. If generalized, they would Things have changed. The last few decades have seen a destabilize argumentative practices. Argumentation is a reappraisal of the persuasive side of reasoning. Social common good that is threatened when every arguer pursues psychologists (Billig 1996; Mercier and Sperber 2011), conviction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside philosophers (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Rorty biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for nor 1996) as well as economists (McCloskey 1998) and soci- explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a collapse ologists of science (Shapin and Schaffer 2011) have of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect, humility or revived an argumentative view of thought that could also honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues that specifically be found in ancient rhetoric. Reasoning, they claim, is attach to the practice of making conscious inferences. social and argumentative through and through. In this light, the whole Enlightenment plan to change the way reasoning Keywords Virtue epistemology Á Argumentative theory is used—to focus it on ingenuity rather than persuasion—, of reasoning Á Objectivity Á Rhetoric Á Argumentation would appear misguided. This paper is a defense of the virtues of ingenuity. It tries to take into account the good points raised by this argumentative turn. While agreeing that reasoning is social & O. Morin ( ) and argumentative, I will argue that this does not make Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, 30–34, Frankel Leo´ utca, 1023 Budapest, Hungary ingenuity redundant: on their own, the virtues of conviction e-mail: [email protected] cannot sustain a healthy practice of public reasoning. 123 O. Morin The first part will describe different virtues and vices she will not hesitate to defend the permissibility of infan- associated with conviction and ingenuity. That part draws ticide, in some cases.1 on recent work in virtue epistemology (Zagzebski 1996; Ms. L. realizes that condoning infanticide in some cases, Roberts and Wood 2007). Part 2 lays down the case against or even contemplating the possibility, would disqualify her. the virtues of ingenuity. In line with a rhetorical revival in Whatever sound arguments she might summon would be philosophy and sociology of science, some authors have no match for the audience’s outrage. She decides to find claimed that debates may not benefit much from detach- reasons to dissociate the two issues, should opponents ever ment, lucidity, or thoroughness. Even better, their absence raise that objection. Having done so, she can free her mind could prove beneficial: a deluded self-confidence brings from a disturbing thought, and keep her opponents from strength and focus to discussions, by forcing everyone to creating a polemical diversion. sharpen their arguments. Parts 3 and 4 defend the virtues of The story does not say whether the philosophers’ argu- reasoning against these charges. Part 3 argues that argu- ment entails the permissibility of infanticide. It may or it mentation is a hybrid activity: It is concerned with inge- may not. nuity as much as conviction. An argumentative practice What if it does? Then Ms. G. made a winning move, and cannot survive if every arguer prefers to persuade others, Ms. L. took a risk. Ms. G. made a breakthrough in her rather than change their own views. Reasons need sellers, ethical research. Ms. L.’s opponents may accuse her of bad but they need buyers as well. Part 4 argues that delusion faith: she tried to sell them an argument whose conse- and bad faith have a purely negative impact on the practice quences appear much stronger than the permissibility of of argumentation, a practice that would not exist if it relied abortion. on the virtues of conviction alone. What if it does not? Then Ms. L. made the winning move, and Ms. G. took the risk. Ms. G. was lead astray on a slightly disreputable path. At best, she lost her time. At worse, she 1 The Virtues of Reasoning may have given false arguments to an unjust cause. Ms. L., on the other hand, was deft enough to disregard an irrelevant 1.1 Two Thinkers issue that would have muddled her message. Both decisions—to investigate the permissibility of Imagine two thinkers, Ms. L. and Ms. G. infanticide, or to dodge the issue—are risky. The costs and G. is a philosopher, L. is an activist. Both reason about benefits, however, are not the same for Ms. G. and for Ms. abortion. Both of them have come to think that it is morally L. Their goals are different. Ms. G. does not care to per- permissible, and the argument they have developed to show suade anyone that abortion is permissible (or not). She it is exactly the same. In short, they hold that even if wants to build a coherent ethical system with far-ranging embryos were conscious human persons, there would be no implications, the more challenging the better. Ms. L. is not obligation for mothers to sacrifice an important part of their trying to generalize her view on abortion to solve other lives to them, should they refuse to do so. Ms. L. and Ms. ethical problems. She is defending abortion against pas- G. may or may not be right. For some interlocutors, their sionate opponents. Ms. G. and Ms. L. are engaged in two argument will raise a disturbing implication. If abortion is different cognitive activities. Each of them has a distinct permissible regardless of the psychological or moral status way of exploring the way propositions and representations of the embryo, what keeps L. and G. from condoning relate, and support one another. They exemplify different certain cases of infanticide? virtues of reasoning: the ‘‘scholarly virtues’’ of ingenuity, L. and G.’s argument may authorize several answers to and the ‘‘lawyerly virtues’’ of conviction. that question. This story does not tell whether their line is compatible with an absolute condemnation of infanticide. 1.2 A System of the Virtues The point is: neither G. nor L. can know the answer for certain without investing a great deal of intellectual Virtues have been defined as ‘‘deep and enduring acquired resources into the issue. Should they do so? It depends. excellences of a person, involving a characteristic moti- To Ms. G., a connection between abortion and infanti- vation to produce a certain desired end and a reliable cide means either that her argument on abortion is wrong, success in bringing about that end’’ (Zagzebski 1996 or that killing babies is permissible—two challenging p. 137). The virtues of reasoning that this paper discusses results. She starts looking closely at the reasons why her differ from intellectual virtues as traditionally construed views could render infanticide permissible. If she finds out that she was wrong, she will simply give up on her claims 1 For a real example of what G.’s argument might be, see Giubilini about abortion. Should her conclusion go the other way, and Minerva 2012. 123 Reasoning and Arguing without Bias (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1106b—Aristotle 2004a), something. Conviction is often contrasted with persuasion: in two respects at least. whilst conviction is thought to rely on logically sound First, the virtues of reasoning are not (or not merely) arguments, persuasion often describes those varieties of cognitive skills or faculties. They have a crucial motiva- influence that do not rely on reasoning at all (but rely on tional component that is absent from intellectual virtues as other tools—such as incentives, emotional mechanisms, defined by most virtue epistemologists since Aristotle etc.), or that rely on defective reasoning (sophistry, (Annas 2003). In this I agree with some virtue epistemol- superficial rhetoric). This paper makes no such distinction, ogists (Zagzebski 1996; Fricker 2007: 72–83; Roberts and and the words ‘‘persuade’’ and ‘‘convince’’ are used Wood 2007) and with many psychologists, who have interchangeably.