This work originally appeared in:

Dennett, Daniel C. "Self-Portrait." A Companion to the , edited by S. Guttenplan. 236-244, Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1994.

This is Daniel C. Dennett’s final draft before publication. It has been modified to reflect the pagination of the published version of the work.

capitulation has just been completed, with a separate volume devoted to each half: The Intentional Stance (1987a) is all and only about content; Explained (1991a) presupposes the theory of content in that volume and builds an expanded theory of consciousness.

BEGINNINGS AND SOURCES

Self Portrait Although quite a few philosophers agree by Daniel C. Dennett that content and consciousness are the two main issues confronting the philosophy of S. Guttenplan, ed., mind, many - perhaps most - follow tradition A Companion to the in favouring the opposite order: consciousness, Philosophy of Mind, they think, is the fundamental Blackwell Press, Oxford, 1994 phenomenon, upon which all intentionality ultimately depends. This difference of perspective is fundamental, infecting the intuitions with which all theorizing must begin, and it is thus the source of some of the deepest and most persistent disagreements in the field. It is clear to me how I came by my renegade vision of the order of dependence: as a graduate student at Oxford, I developed a deep distrust of the methods I saw other philosophers employing, and decided that before I could trust any of my intuitions about the mind, I had to figure Dennett, Daniel C. In my opinion, the two out how the brain could possibly accomplish main topics in the philosophy of mind are the mind's work. I knew next to CONTENT and CONSCIOUSNESS. As the title nothing about the relevant science, but I of my first book. Content and Consciousness had always been fascinated with how (1969) suggested, that is the order in which things worked - clocks, engines, magic they must be addressed: first, a theory of tricks. (In fact, had I not been raised in · content or INTENTIONALITY - a phenomenon a dyed-in-the-wool 'arts and humanities' more fundamental than consciousness academic family, I probably would have - and then, building on that foundation, a become an engineer, but this option would theory of consciousness. Over the years I never have occurred to anyone in our have found myself recapitulating this basic family.) So I began educating myself, always structure twice, partly in order to respond with an eye to the curious question of how to various philosophical objections, but the mechanical responses of 'stupid' more importantly, because my research on neurons could be knit into a fabric of activity foundational issues in cognitive science led that actually discriminated meanings. me into different aspects of the problems. Somehow it had to be possible, I assumed. The articles in the first half of Brainstorms since it was obvious to me that DUALISM (1978a) composed in effect a more detailed was a last resort, to be postponed indefinitely. theory of content, and the articles in the So from the outset I worked from the second half were concerned with specific 'third-person point of view' of science, and problems of consciousness. The second re- took my task to be building - or rather

236 sketching the outlines of - a physical structure foundation of everything I have done since that could be seen to accomplish the then. As I put it in Brainstorms (1978a), puzzling legerdemain of the mind. At the brains are syntactic engines that can mimic time - the mid-60s - no one else in philosophy the competence of semantic engines. (See also was attempting to build that structure, the thought experiment - a forerunner of so it was a rather lonely enterprise, and Searle's Chinese Room - about being locked most of the illumination and encouragement in the control room of a giant robot, in I could find came from the work of a 1978b.) Note how this point forces the few visionaries in science and engineering: order of dependence of consciousness on Warren McCulloch, Donald MacKay, intentionality. The appreciation of meanings Donald Hebb, Ross Ashby, Allen Newell, - their discrimination and delectation - is Herbert Simon, and J. Z. Young come to central to our vision of consciousness, but mind. Miller, Galanter and Pribram's 1960 this conviction that I, on the inside, deal classic, Plans and the Structure of Behaviour, directly with meanings turns out to be was a dimly understood but much appreciated something rather like a benign 'user illusion'. beacon, and Michael Arbib's 1964 What Descartes thought was most primer, Brains, Machines and Mathematics, certain - his immediate introspective grasp was very helpful in clearing away some of of the items of consciousness - turns out to the fog. be not even quite true, but rather a metaphorical Given my lack of formal training in any by-product of the way our brains science, this was a dubious enterprise, but I do their approximating work. This vision was usually forgiven my naïveté by those tied in beautifully with a doctrine of Quine's who helped me into their disciplines, and that I had actually vehemently resisted as although at the time I considered myself an undergraduate: the indeterminacy of driven by (indeed defined by) my disagreements radical translation. I could now see why, as with my philosophical mentors, Quine famously insisted, indeterminacy was QUINE and RYLE, in retrospect it is clear 'of a piece with' Brentano's thesis of the that my deep agreement with both of them irreducibility of the intentional, and why about the nature of philosophy - so deep as those irreducible intentional contexts were to be utterly unexamined and tacit - was unavoidably a 'dramatic idiom' rather than the primary source of such intellectual an expression of unvarnished truth. I could security as I had. also see how to re-interpret the two philosophical The first stable conclusion I reached, after works on intentionality that had had I discovered that my speculative forays the most influence on me, Anscombe's always wandered to the same place, was Intention (1957) and Taylor's The Explanation that the only thing brains could do was to of Behaviour (1964). approximate the responsivity to meanings If your initial allegiance is to the physical that we presuppose in our everyday mentalistic sciences and the third-person point of view, discourse. When mechanical push this disposition of the issues can seem not came to shove, a brain was always going to just intuitively acceptable, but inevitable, do what it was caused to do by current, satisfying, natural. If on the other hand local, mechanical circumstances, whatever your starting point is the traditional philosophical it ought to do, whatever a God's-eye view allegiance to the mind and the might reveal about the actual meanings of deliverances of introspection, this vision can its current states. But over the long haul, seem outrageous. Perhaps the clearest view brains could be designed - by evolutionary of this watershed of intuitions can be processes - to do the right thing (from the obtained from an evolutionary perspective. point of view of meaning) with high reliability. There was a time, before life on earth, when This found its first published expression there was neither intentionality nor consciousness, in Content and Consciousness (1969, §9, but eventually replication got 'Function and Content') and it remains the under way and simple organisms emerged. 237

Suppose we ask of them: Were they conscious? alike. The tactic did not work for many Did their states exhibit intentionality? thinkers, who continued to harbour the It all depends on what these key terms hunch that I was leaving something out; are taken to mean, of course, but underneath there was, they thought, a special sort of the strategic decisions one might sensitivity - we might call it animal consciousness make about pre-emptive definition of terms - that no thermostat or fancy lies a fundamental difference of outlook. robot could enjoy, but that all mammals One family of intuitions is comfortable and birds (and perhaps all fish, reptiles, declaring that while these earliest ancestors insects, molluscs … ) shared. Since robotic were unconscious automata, not metaphysically devices of considerably greater behavioural different from thermostats or simple and perceptual complexity than the simplest robotic toys, some of their states were of these organisms are deemed unconscious nevertheless semantically evaluable, These by this school of thought, it amounts to organisms were, in my terms, rudimentary some sort of latter-day vitalism. The more intentional systems, and somewhere in the one learns about how simple organisms intervening ascent of complexity, a special actually work, the more dubious this hunch subset of intentional systems has emerged: about a special, organic sort of sensation the subset of conscious beings. According to becomes, but to those who refuse to look at this vision, then, the intentionality of our the science, it is a traditional idea that is unconscious ancestors was as real as intentionality about as comfortable today as it was in the ever gets; it was just rudimentary. seventeenth century, when many were horrified It is on this foundation of unconscious by Descartes's claims about the intentionality that the higher-order complexities mechanicity of (non-human) animals. In developed that have culminated in any event, definitional gambits are ineffective what we call consciousness. The other against it, so in later work I dropped the family of intuitions declares that if these tactic and the nomenclature of 'aware1' and early organisms were mere unconscious 'aware2' - but not the underlying intuitions. automata, then their so-called intentionality My accounts of content and consciousness was not the real thing, Some philosophers have subsequently been revised in of this persuasion are tempted to insist that rather minor ways and elaborated in rather the earliest living organisms were conscious major ways. Some themes that figured - they were alive, after all - and hence their heavily in Content and Consciousness lay rudimentary intentionality was genuine, dormant in my work through the 70s and while others suppose that somewhere early 80s, but were never abandoned, and higher on the scale of complexity, real consciousness, are now re-emerging, in particular the and hence real intentionality, theme of learning as evolution in the brain emerges. There is widespread agreement in and the theme of content being anchored in this camp, in any case, that although a distributed patterns of individually ambiguous robot might be what I have called an intentional nodes in networks of neurons. The system, and even a higher-order truth is that while I can fairly claim to have intentional system, it could not be conscious, seen the beauty, and indeed the inevitability, and so it could have no genuine of these ideas in Content and Conciousness intentionality at all. (see also Dennett. 1974), and to In my first book, I attempted to cut have sketched out their philosophical implications through this difference in intuitions by proposing quite accurately, I simply couldn't a division of the concept of consciousness see how to push them further in the scientific into awarenessl, the fancy sort of domain, and had to wait for others - consciousness that we human beings enjoy, not philosophers - to discover these ideas for and awareness2, the mere capacity for themselves and push them in the new directions appropriate responsivity to stimuli, a capacity that have so properly captured recent enjoyed by honey bees and thermostats philosophical attention. My own recent dis- 238 cussions of these two themes are to be found free will and the task of reconciling in Dennett (1986, 1987b, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, mechanism and responsibility (1973). The 1992a). details, however, grew out of my reflections on practices and attitudes I observed to be CONTENT: PATTERNS VISIBLE FROM THE ubiquitous in . INTENTION AL STANCE Both Allen Newell (1982) and David Marr (1982) arrived at essentially the same My theory of content is functionalist (see breakdown of stances in their own reflections FUNCTIONA LISM): all attributions of content on the foundations of cognitive are founded on an appreciation of the functional science. The concept of intentional systems roles of the items in question in the (and particularly, higher-order intentional biological economy of the organism (or the systems) has been successfully exploited in engineering of the robot). This is a specifically clinical and developmental psychology, 'teleological' notion of function (not ethology, and other domains of cognitive the notion of a mathematical function or of science, but philosophers have been reluctant a mere 'causal role', as suggested by David to endorse the main metaphysical LEWIS and others). It is the concept of function implications of the theory (see COGNITIVE that is ubiquitous in engineering, in the PSYCHOLOGY; DEVELOPMENTAL design of artefacts, but also in biology. (It is PSYCHOLOGY). only slowly dawning on philosophers of In particular, I have held that since any science that biology is not a science like attributions of function necessarily invoke physics, in which one should strive to find optimality or rationality assumptions, the 'laws of nature', but a species of engineering: attributions of intentionality that depend on the analysis, by 'reverse engineering', them are interpretations of the phenomena - of the found artefacts of nature - which are a 'heuristic overlay' (1969), describing an composed of thousands of deliciously complicated inescapably idealized 'real pattern' (1991d). gadgets, yoked together opportunistically Like such abstracta as centres of gravity and but elegantly into robust, self-protective parallelograms of force, the BELIEFS and systems.) These themes were all DESIRES posited by the highest stance have present in Content and Consciousness, but no independent and concrete existence, and they were clarified in 'Intentional Systems' since this is the case, there would be no (1971) when I introduced the idea that an deeper facts that could settle the issue if - intentional system was, by definition, anything most improbably - rival intentional interpretations that was amenable to analysis by a arose that did equally well at certain tactic, which I called the intentional rationalizing the history of behaviour of an stance. This is the tactic of interpreting an entity. Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy entity by adopting the presupposition that it of radical translation carries all the way in, is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally as the thesis of the indeterminacy of radical designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding interpretation of mental states and agent. No attempt is made to confirm or disconfirm processes. this presupposition, nor is it necessary The fact that cases of radical indeterminacy, to try to specify, in advance of specific though possible in principle, are analyses, wherein consists RATIONALITY . vanishingly unlikely ever to confront us is Rather, the presupposition provides leverage small solace, apparently. This idea is deeply for generating specific predictions of behaviour, counterintuitive to many philosophers, who via defeasible hypotheses about the have hankered for more 'realistic' doctrines. content of the control states of the entity. There are two different strands of 'realism' My initial analysis of the intentional that I have tried to undermine: stance and its relation to the design stance and physical stance was addressed to a traditional (1) realism about the entities purportedly philosophical issue - the problem of described by our everyday mentalistic 239

discourse, what I dubbed out without marked foundations or thresholds FOLKPSYCHOLOGY (1981) - such as or essences. Here is an easily avoided beliefs, desires, pains, the self; paradox: every mammal has a mammal for (2) realism about content itself - the idea a mother - but this implies an infinite genealogy that there have to be events or entities of mammals, which cannot be the that really have intentionality (as case. The solution is not to search for an opposed to the events and entities that essence of mammalhood that would permit only behave as if they had us in principle to identify the Prime intentionality). Mammal, but rather to tolerate a finite regress that connects mammals to their Against (1), I have wielded various arguments, non-mammalian ancestors by a sequence analogies, parables. Consider what that can only be partitioned arbitrarily. The we should tell the benighted community of reality of today's mammals is secure people who speak of 'having fatigues' where without foundations. we speak of being tired, exhausted, etc. The best known instance of this theme in (1978a). They want us to tell them what my work is the idea that the way to explain fatigues are, what bodily states or events the miraculous-seeming powers of an intelligent they are identical with, and so forth. This is intentional system is to decompose it a confusion that calls for diplomacy, not into hierarchically structured teams of ever philosophical discovery; the choice between more stupid intentional systems, ultimately an '' (see ELIMINATIVISM) discharging all intelligence-debts in a fabric and an 'IDENTITY THEORY' of . of stupid mechanisms (1971, 1974, 1978a, fatigues is not a matter of which 'ism' is 1991a). Lycan (1981) has called this view right, but of which way of speaking is most homuncular functionalism. One may be apt to wean these people of a misbegotten tempted to ask: are the subpersonal components feature of their conceptual scheme. real intentional systems? At what Against (2), my attack has been more point in the diminution of prowess as we indirect. I view the philosophers' demand descend to simple neurons does real intentionality for content realism as an instance of a disappear? Don't ask. The reasons common philosophical mistake: philosophers for regarding an individual neuron (or a often manoeuvre themselves into a thermostat) as an intentional system are position from which they can see only two unimpressive, but not zero, and the security alternatives: infinite regress versus some of our intentional attributions at the highest sort of 'intrinsic' foundation - a prime levels does not depend on our identifying a mover of one sort or another. For instance, lowest-level of real intentionality. Another it has seemed obvious that for some things exploitation of the same idea is found in to be valuable as means, other things must Elbow Room (1984): at what point in evolutionary be intrinsically valuable - ends in themselves history did real reason-appreciators, - otherwise we'd be stuck with a real selves, make their appearance? Don't vicious regress (or circle) of things valuable ask - for the same reason. Here is yet only as means. It has seemed similarly another, more fundamental, version: at obvious that although some intentionality is what point in the early days of evolution 'derived' (the aboutness of the pencil marks can we speak of genuine function, genuine composing a shopping list is derived from selection-for and not mere fortuitous preservation the intentions of the person whose list it is), of entities that happen to have unless some intentionality is original and some self-replicative capacity? Don't ask. underived, there could be no derived intentionality. Many of the most interesting and important . There is always another alternative, features of our world have emerged, gradually, which naturalistic philosophers should look from a world that initially lacked them on with favour: a finite regress that peters - function, intentionality, consciousness, 240 morality, value - and it is a fool's errand to

try to identify a first or most-simple instance they are not paradigms of the sort of cognitive of the 'real' thing. It is for the same reason element to which one can assign a mistake to suppose that real differences in content in the first instance. If one starts, as the world must exist to answer all the questions one should, with the cognitive states and our systems of content attribution events occurring in non-human animals, permit us to ask. Tom says he has an older and uses these as the foundation on which brother living in Cleveland and that he is an to build theories of human cognition, the only child (1975b). What does he really language-infected states are more readily believe? Could he really believe that he had seen to be derived, less directly implicated in a brother if he also believed he was an only the explanation of behaviour, and the chief child? What is the real content of his mental but illicit source of plausibility of the doctrine state? There is no reason to suppose there is of a language of thought. Postulating a principled answer. a language of thought is in any event a The most sweeping conclusion I have postponement of the central problems of drawn from this theory of content is that content ascription, not a necessary first the large and well-regarded literature on step. (Although a few philosophers - especially PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES (especially the Millikan, Robert STALNAKER, Stephen debates over wide versus narrow content, White - have agreed with me about large 'de re versus de dicto' attributions, and what parts of this sweeping criticism, they have Pierre believes about London) is largely a sought less radical accommodations with disciplinary artefact of no long-term importance the prevailing literature.) whatever, except perhaps as history's most slowly unwinding unintended reductio CONSCIOUSNESS AS A VIRTUAL MACHINE ad absurdum. By and large the disagreements explored in that literature cannot My theory of consciousness has undergone even be given an initial expression unless more revisions over the years than my one takes on the assumptions I have argued theory of content. In Content and Consciousness are fundamentally unsound (see especially the theory concentrated on the role of 1975b, 1978a, 1982, 1987b, 1991d): language in constituting the peculiar but strong realism about content, and its constant definitive characteristics of human consciousness, companion, the idea of a LANGUAGE and while I continue to argue for OF THOUGHT, a system of mental representation a crucial role of natural language in generating that is decomposable into elements the central features of consciousness rather like terms, and larger elements (our kind), my first version overstated the rather like sentences. The illusion that case in several regards. For instance, I went this is plausible, or even inevitable, is slightly too far in my dismissal of mental particularly fostered by the philosophers' imagery (see the corrections in 1978a, normal tactic of working from examples of 1991a), and I went slightly too fast - but 'believing-that-p' that focus attention on not too far! - in my treatment of colour mental states that are directly or indirectly vision, which was unconvincing at the time, language-infected, such as believing that even though it made all the right moves, as the shortest spy is a spy, or believing that recent philosophical work on colour has snow is white. (Do polar bears believe that confirmed, in my opinion. But my biggest snow is white? In the way we do?) There mistake in Content and Consciousness was are such states - in language-using human positing a watershed somewhere in the beings - but they are not exemplary or brain, the 'awareness line', with the following foundational states of belief; needing a term property: revisions of content that for them, I call them opinions (How to occurred prior to crossing the awareness Change your Mind', in 1978a; see also line changed the content of consciousness; 1991c). Opinions play a large, perhaps even later revisions (or errors) counted as postexperiential decisive, role in our concept of a person, but tamperings; all adjustments of 241

content, veridical or not, could be located, in philosophical assumptions about the denizens principle, on one side or the other of this of human phenomenology turn out to postulated line. The first breach of this intuitive be simply wrong, in spite of their traditional but ultimately indefensible doctrine obviousness. occurred in 'Are Dreams Experiences?' For instance, from the perspective provided (1975a), in which I argued that the distinction by this model one can see more between proper and improper entry into clearly the incoherence of the absolutist memory (and thence into introspective assumptions that make QUALIA seem like a report, for instance) could not be sustained good theoretical idea. It follows from the in close quarters. Related arguments Multiple Drafts model that 'inverted spectrum' appeared in 'Two Approaches to Mental and 'absent qualia' thought experiments, Imagery' (in 1978a) and 'Quining Qualia' like the thought experiments (1988), but only in Consciousness Explained encountered in the propositional attitude (1991a) and 'Time and the Observer' literature (Twin Earth, what Pierre believes, (Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992) was an beliefs about the shortest spy), are fundamentally alternative positive model of consciousness misbegotten, and for a similar sketched in any detail, the Multiple Drafts reason: the 'common sense' assumption of model. 'realism' with regard to the mental items in The best way to understand this model is question - beliefs, in the first instance, in contrast to the traditional model, which I qualia, in the second - is too strong. call the Cartesian Theatre. The fundamental work done by any observer can be characterized OVERVIEW as confronting something 'given' and taking it - responding to it with one The intermediate ontological position I interpretive judgment or another. This recommend - I call it 'mild realism' - might corner must be turned somehow and somewhere be viewed as my attempt at a friendly in any model of consciousness. On amendment to Ryle's (1949) tantalizing but the traditional view, all the taking is deferred unpersuasive claims about category mistakes until the raw given, the raw materials and different senses of 'exist' (see especially of stimulation, have been processed in 1969, ch. 1; 1991d). What do you various ways and sent to central headquarters. get when you cross a Quine with a Ryle? A Once each bit is 'finished' it can Dennett, apparently. But there is a novel enter consciousness and be appreciated for texture to my work, and an attitude, which the first time. As C. S. Sherrington (1934) grows primarily, I think, from my paying put it: attention to the actual details or the sciences of the mind - and asking philosophical The mental action lies buried in the questions about those details. This base brain, and in that part most deeply camp in the sciences has permitted me to recessed from outside world that is launch a host of differently posed arguments, furthest from input and output. drawing on overlooked considerations. These arguments do not simply add In the Multiple Drafts model, this single another round to the cycle of debate, but unified taking is broken up in cerebral space have some hope of dislodging the traditional and real time; the judgmental tasks are intuitions with which philosophers previously fragmented into many distributed moments had to start. For instance, from this of micro-taking (Dennett and Kinsbourne, vantage point one can see the importance of 1992). Since there is no place where 'it all evolutionary models (1969, 1974, 1978a, comes together', no line the crossing of 1983, 1984a, 1990b, 1991f) and, concomitantly, which is definitive of the end of preconscious the perspective of cognitive processing and the beginning of science as reverse engineering (1989, 1991, conscious appreciation, many of the familiar 1992a), which goes a long way to over- 242 coming the conservative mindset of pure anomalies (1991a; Dennett and Kinsbourne, philosophy. The idea that a mind could be a 1992). I take these to be the real, as opposed contraption composed of hundreds or thousands to artefactual, problems of mental representation, of gadgets takes us a big step away and I encourage philosophers of from the overly familiar mind presupposed mind to contribute to their solution. by essentially all philosophers from Descartes to the present. BIBLIOGRAPHY Something else of mine that owes a debt to Quine and Ryle is my philosophical style. 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