Did the U.S. Teach To Hide Its Terror Arms?

VIP Scott Malone P YA't :3 3

MERICAN INTELLIGENCE that was shared with for six years during the Fran-Iraq War may have helped Iraq hide weapons of mass destruction—including most Aof its secret atomic bomb project—from U.S. forces seeking to destroy the arsenals during the . This possibility has arisen in the aftermath of the recent discoveries in Iraq by inspectors that Saddam's deadly stockpile was more than 10 times -- as large as predicted by U.S. intelligence agencies cu ing the Gulf War. By any analysis, what Operation Desert Storm missed in its Gulf War effort to destroy Saddam's se- cret arms caches was staggering—more than 819 Scud missiles, a huge cannon almost 100-feet long resting on a mountainside and aimed at Israel, more than 11,000 chemical shells and three uranium enrichment/hydro- gen bomb component factories, according to U.N. re- ports. "Our failure to cover the Iraqi weapons programs was clearly a significant intelligence failure," former acting CIA operations chief Edward Juchniewicz re- cently concluded. The causes of the U.S. miscalculations are not clear. But numerous former intelligence officials and other specialists in interviews expressed concerns that infor- mation given to Iraq—including photo-reconnnaissance data—as part of the Reagan administration's "tilt" to- ward Saddam to prevent an Iranian victory in the 1980- 88 war could have been used to shelter Saddam's mil- itary might during Operation Desert Storm. On one occasion, Saddam is said to have personally shown one Soviet defense official a U.S. satellite image, according to two former intelligence officials, and asked for help in concealing things from the spy orbiters. The Soviets responded with training in military deception tactics and communications security. According to one of the former officials, the Soviets later provided the United States with some of the details of the tech- niques just before the Gulf War. The long-running U.S. "intelligence liaison" with Iraq was the subject of a recent closed-door debate on the nomination of Robert M. Gates as CIA director. A majority of the Senate Select Committee on Intel- ligence concluded that all intelligence supplied to Iraq was "appropriately sanitized" and thus of little use to Saddam other than helping him in his war with . But not all the senators agreed, and important ques- tions about the scope of the intelligence transfer re- main unanswered. In a report released last week, the panel noted that during the summer of 1986, "CIA staff officers had, on two occasions, shared certain intelligence with the See IRAQ, C4, Ca I Scott Malone is an investigative reporter for PBS's "Frontline," whose documentary, "The Man Who Made the Supergun," will be rebroadcast Nov, 26 G

ny, classified documents, academic studies and closed ties between Iraq and the United Gates' nomination, asserted during the con- interviews with more than 40 former officials

States."

general's report cleared them of any "super-

U.S.' intelligence-gathering methods—per- necessary to counteract the effectiveness of interpreter could devise the countermeasures such coverage." however well-sanitized, it is pretty hard to 1987. "When you give people intelligence, visory negligence" in the program, according may have exceeded the scope of the sharing Did the U.S. Aid Iraq? Iraqis which, at the time it was provided, haps so that counter-measures could be de- risk becomes." management and supervision of the undis- keep the recipient from making certain deduo- signed and implemented. reconnaissance," said another former intelli- National Security Agency from 1984 to liam Odom, director of the super-secret gence official and technical consultant, "a good ity" three months after the fact, in October. port noted, by having the National Security siCrtifinizing the data for minute clues to arrangement which had been authorized.' Council (NSC) grant an expanded "author-

firmation hearings that "there are still impor- tions. And the more you do it, the worse the tant and unanswered questions about [Gates's] 1986. But this did not keep the Iraqis from

LO

when you share intelligence," said Gen. Wil-

However, a review of declassified testimo- 'Anytime you give access to photo-

"Generally speaking, it is always a risk

Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), who opposes

sources,

The problem was taken care of, the re-

ates and acting CIA director Richard

still-secret July 1991 CIA inspector

Kerr maintained in closed session that a

nitude of the problem in the spring [of] 1982. "third countries:" namely and Saudis

ing was of tactical importance." justified launched "Operation Staunch" to stem the in-

eration—there was no formal agreement' "The political decision was made to help [the able Kuwait was next. "The intelligence shar-

paper ... . It was [more of] a hip pocket op- The Iraqis had suffered stunning reversals on in a timely manner, were up to."

Iraqis] help themselves—to show them how partment's] terrorist list," recalled former enemy [was] our friend," said Juehniewicz. vided intelligence to Iraq of what the Iranians, don't recall ever seeing a [particular] piece of Arabia, various officials recalled.

Reagan administration and Baghdad. It also Reagan NSC staff member Howard Teicher. initiated. It was then that the Reagan admin- istration decided to secretly "tilt" toward the U.S. intelligence "liaison" with Iraq began in the battlefield. We were terrified" that vulner- Kemp recalled that "from time to time we pro-

1982, when Iraq was taken off the [State De- raises questions about whether the Soviet mil- they were vulnerable." when Iran began winning the war that Iraq had 1984, it actually started two years earlier, was delivered by CIA operatives through itary may have gained insights into U.S. intel- ligence-gathering methods because Saddam

and analysts adds unsettling details to the sto-

ry of the "intelligence • liaison" between the

then "terrorist" regime of Saddam Hussein. for U.S. policymakers contemplating the na- War era. tion's intelligence activities in the post-Cold shared some U.S.-supplied intelligence with

the Soviets.

In 1983, the Reagan administration publicly

During the first two years, the intelligence

Said former NSC staffer Geoffrey Kemp, "I Said Kemp: "The tilt was absolutely "The basic decision was made March 15,

"The theory [was] that the enemy of our

Although the Senate committee said the

And the episode stands as a cautionary tale

You have to remember the mag-

W

imagery and military matters, the Iraqis'

official and consultant familiar with satellite

according to the Senate Intelligence Commit-

tographs is the subject of some controversy.

Baghdad "on a sporadic basis until [July] 1988

isodes, U.S. intelligence continued to flow to

May 1987 Iraqi attack on the U.S. warship Stark that killed 37 sailors. Despite these ep- surviving even the scandal that erupted with

cret arms-for-hostages deals with Iran and the disclosure of the Reagan administration's se- rative text reports derived from highly-sen- tee's report on the Gates nomination. when the war between Iraq and Iran ended." eral former intelligence officials. naissance of Iranian targets, according to sev- between the event and the intelligence) ac- "almost real-time," (with very little tune tag

cording to sources. The material included nar- sitive electronic intercepts and photo-recon-

could not allow that to happen." Iran was lusting after the Arab Gulf states. We

1986 to much higher quality data delivered in

stop the collapse of Saddarn's military. It was recalled, "the Iraqis took whatever they of-

perfectly clear to us, and to the Israelis, that

ly 1980s, "Sometimes [the intelligence] was gence. Tactical. To keep Tehran out of Bagh- ends against the middle." But, Soghanalian good, and sometimes it was bad. The Iraqis dad. To neutralize Iran, not to strengthen Iraq.

liaison" with Baghdad. The United States re- The only thing the U.S. government did was to felt that they [the U.S.] were playing both

fered dealer Sarkis Soghanalian, who was in constant

wicz said, "was short range tactical intelli- opened its Baghdad embassy and intelligence

November 1984, President Reagan signed a began to flow.

still-secret National Security Decision Direc-

touch with Saddam and his generals in the ear-

tive (NSDD), calling for direct "intelligence

ternational flow of weapons to Iran only. In

According to a retired military intelligence

The liaison proved remarkably resilient,

But the flow of intelligence increased in

T

According to recently convicted Iraqi arms

h

.

e

"

intelligence provided to Iraq, Juchnie-

matenai included actual satellite pho-

still highly classified. Whether the

hat precisely was provided to Iraq is

clined to comment; an NSA spokesman said

rangements. A White House spokesman de- "sanitized," "I've heard that [the photograph]

liaison program. head photograph, although it was somewhat

meters resolution."

comment about U.S. intelligence-sharing ar- out once you opened that Pandora's box."

ings" and that "imagery was shown." there would be "no comment" about the Iraq got down to vehicular size-2 meters to 1.5

question is irrelevant. "What are satellite pho- can find out the altitude and figure out the fo- one packet and it was all hand-drawn. I think cal length. It's not like they couldn't figure it

intelligence-gathering capabilities.

the Iraqis may have been given an actual over- agery from photo-satellites and communica- obtained relates to whether it was actual im- program was "upgraded" in 1986, said: "I saw ellite "orbital parameters" could have easily be- tos if not computer generated diagrams? You

ellite espionage.. rows, author of "Deep Black," a book on sat-

that the Iraqis were given "some line draw- Kuwait in August 1990, U.S spy satellites the Iraqis could glean from it in assessing U.S. physicist in Berkeley with a slide rule can do it,

helped the Iraqis during the Gulf war three ably] were able to work it back so they could they may have showed them the photos, but knowledge of U.S. collection devices employed employ deception. It gave them an enormous they sure wouldn't let them leave with it." come clear to the Iraqis, specialists said. "If a advantage." Gates has testified, "our intelligence assets tions intercepts from eavesdropping appara- appeared years later. "By knowing how we go about it, tus. The more precise the material, the more were shifted away." But when Iraq invaded

the Iraqis certainly can," said William E. Bur-

during the Iran-Iraq war could only have

the layering of [satellite] passes—they [prob-

Soghanalian said recently he is certain that

A CIA spokesman said the agency does not

Former NSC staffer Teicher thinks the

One retired military intelligence official said Juchniewicz, who left the CIA before the

Acting CIA Director Kerr recently testified

Part of the worry about the material Iraq

After the Iran-Iraq war ended in July 1988,

over the region. The nature of sat-

re-

E

launchers. We missed a lot of targets."

program, underestimated the count of the lance-proof. ement of the Iraqi special weapons and weap- Scuds, and more importantly, the number of ons of mass destruction—much of the nuclear jor commands. making them virtually surveil-

received from their own intelligence."

phone] lines worked; they could see the raw

derived from intercepts." said Teicher. And tant, "The U.S. missed virtually every key el- ground hoes are much harder to eavesdrop on information on unit designations .... They could see how radio silence and land [tele-

intelligence reports that went to the Iraqis

one source said, "the words [that] went with tech European-made fiber optic lines to all ma- product and how it contrasted with what they

NSA- signals and communications, the purview of

then they buried their land tines." Under- ets, that they were privy to what Saddam and troops, order of battle scenarios." level of cooperation between Iraqis and Sovi- U.S. espionage collection by analyzing the U.S. than radio or landlines. Saddam even laid high- agencies in the years before the country was usually contained "general numbers of have aided the Iraqis in finding ways to thwart overtaken by internal crisis. The Soviets may knew, particularly [U.S.] intelligence," said

should be prosecuted," said Juchniewicz. provided satellite photographs, not [just] di-

the diagrams" were a major improvement for data. his major arms benefactor, the Soviet Union. the Iraqis. "The extent to which there was agrams." This could have benefited Soviet intelligence

former Pentagon o

the United States supplied photographs. "They

that Saddam shared his U.S. intelligence with

Juchniewicz said that until mid-1986, U.S.

Said Neil Livingstone, a terrorism consul- "I do know they later received information

But after the liaison upgrade that summer,

"It is only reasonable to conclude, given the

"If somebody gave them actual photos they

Some specialists have raised the possibility

interception and decryption of electronic

naissance is signals intelligence (sigint),

ven more sensitive than satellite recon-

ff

icial Frank Ga

ff

ney.