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View / Open 322 F948.Pdf THE $ m ê È CENTER >ARîï, Ì9||§|9% A STUÌSr OP POLITICAL CATHOLICISM igy BRUCE BRAiPORO FRÍE ■ • - A THESIB ' ■ ■ 1 • presented fco thö Department of Hi s tpiy ' and thè Graduate school of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of ■ • ■ Master of Arts . ' . Juñe Í9Í0 APPROVED* J'wy r' •1 (Adviser i W the The ''(Por the Coin^Wöliy CHAPTER I • THE CHARACTER OF THE CENTER PARTÍ* 1871*1911+ . The role of thé Catholic Center Party in Gorman history is a controversial Subject whose rudiments only caá be treated in this paper*. The Center Party *s character has alternately been damned and praised but Seldom written about with dispassion and often with misunderstanding* The Center has been called a party devoid of political principles* opportunist* confessional* ultramontane} , while on the other hand it has. been credited with exerting, a moderating, influence during”the period of thè' Weimar Republic and with being a stáuñch defender Of the iS&nstitutipni and thè ideals of .'¿apùblicanisSu Come have accused the Center of yielding to Hitler with the selfish desire to perpetuate itself at the expense Of the Republic} yet defenders Of the Center have pictured political Catholicism as one of Hitler>3 staunchest foes* The origin of the Center Party is rooted in Bismarck’s fight with the Catholic Church whioh a Catholic representative*: Rudolph Virchow* designated the Kulturkampf* But the seeds of religious hatred are buried deep in German history* "No other party has been so deeply and lastingly affected ty the religious' cleavage that took placó in Western Europe in the sixteenth century as the German •• the 2 i people ôîâoag itfhem It tool- Its ris© *> * * It •raTlouS periods la German Me t e r y ih© F r © # stoni or -Gabholid éeaesiiMtlaa has- stigmatised the other as feeing ^opposed to th© Ger* œ tradition#* ' fbs ^%hoii% proud of #e; traditions oí ih& Ho# toman ES^Irs'f OOiiiâ. not forget thabth© Frotsst'qnt. FpiaoSo^allloä: m M ì m m m and  d © h , M è fought against the ismpire* m © Protestant o©ljfMst<Äl; psriôsllcàll5?.' m t lf«rä the familiär Srtt*#tMXid ©Odas« aátiofto w M o h Merged the Gerann CatMlicö.trlth being 0foreign dorai* ©g#s# âhd {,^td#£öl©bf':a: I M Protestants regardai tho large Catholic »ladri# oongyogatod .la- ■Ssuthmë«iôr&. GOfnsu# ©ad la¡. Silesia ne ©a tbreat to óeteea uní# and te Germany*© poouUar gultur* Ihe- tattle of Sederi brought shudders of fes?©Md|ö§ to Osman Gath* olios- end their apprehensions were confirmed # the Kulturkampf» Äfh© fact that the Itöo&mi. Gat hol io Gharoh io in à minori# la thè Goman Empir© espiólas in the first last©no® it© presene© as h politisai forcö:<^^ Iteligioas distrust, m m m à M t h geographical partioulsrist seatissèat òhi soiliiileà # the öiemrek ©yste% pro*- äuöod the center f a r # of 1671# Rshooforth* thè öhurph regarded itself as persecuteà m i n o r i # , d a d its fâeabQre' n e t © r forgot the diSoriMaatioas it tuffò rod under the Bouei of ïîûixeaaoliora« The Center far# capitalised on the m t m H m t r©dll# that ®ar#fdife , waltear, Garlan, Hitler- and the gi^iftiins. (hoMoat ahead and ward, i^é, trans.« i$rr W Ü # • ' "v’’’ g- Robert Herndon fife# the German Hmoire.- -Between $®-© sors ile« u m t í m m à " Fife, G©rsna tapiro# i 3 rallies the faithful to thé side of the Church, Even after'the; Weimar Constitution brought religious ¿quality to Germany’s Catholics thé: Center never disregarded the contingency of another Kulturkampf* , • . The Church fought the Kulturkampf with the only political means available to it under the Constitution, byapplitica'l party supported by a militant minority• unified by fear, strengthened by martyrdom and determined upon a moral crusade for religious and social equality. Long before Bismarck had '’unified” Germany a truly unified Catholic population lay organized and ready for use as a political weapon* Hundreds Of thousands of Catholios were organized in various religious and social organizations, acutely conscious of their peculiar posi­ tion in relation to Prussia and of their dormant power*. It was principally due to one man* Ludwig Windthôrst, that this latent power was fprged into a powerful political instrument, Windthorst m s the George Washington of German political Cathol­ icism, His: name recurs again and again in the Center farty literature during the Weimar Republic, He m s a North G o m a n aristocrat who had been a Hanoverian minister before 1866, and he never forgot Prussia*e seizure of Hénover or the man who had been responsible for the out­ rage* He hàtèd 3ismarck and the Prussian statè with bitter resent­ ment^ but he was an extremely flexible man* His diplomacy and clever opportunism soon characterized the party he led* In 1870 he met with Bavarian Catholio leaders and laid plans for the representation Of Catholic interests in the Reichstag, Thé following year their suc­ cessful candidates made their entry into the Prussian Landtag and the k Reichstag* These deputies were called the "Getter Rraktion" for two reasons: because of their position In the center of the Reich* : stag: and because of their policies»: They were to the- right ,of the ... Liberals in questions of religion and education*,, but ’to the left of the Conservatives in questions of foreign policy, treatment of min». oritles* and.in supremacy of the military power and state, power ) generally. : t ■ ' ...... The real victor in the clash of the Catholic Church with the ; German Empire has been frequently disputed.; Arthur Rosenberg contends that Bismarck won his point when he drew the Center Party to the support of the govorrmienbi* but in Center Party literature the defeat of Bismarck’s program is ono of the "glorious chapters” in the centerfs annals» ,R* H» Fife expresses,the opinion that it is an idle question as to whether Biomarok really carried through hie program or whether like Henry IV he was forced to "go to Ganossa.” Fife contends that actually the Kulturkampf ended in a compromise*, "because Bismarck saw that, to prolong the Conflict would Irretrievably weaken the state* not merely in its attitude toward foreign foes, but also in its ability to deal with economic questions and meet the rising socialist danger," Another writer sees the Kulturkampf as an invented legend which the Center Party has exploited to keep the ' • L 1 .^'r • ' ^ ■ Arthur Rosenberg* The Birth of the German Republie, 1Q71-1918 (London: H* Milford Ltd»*'\93^V"trans>'ly' Ian F* D. Morrow)»p.''1^. Hereai^er cited as Rosenberg* Birth; ofathe German, Republio* 2 , : ' ’ ' Fife* German Empire* p# 2 QI4.* J ngood CStholi'éè* in éoìid supporti behind thè poiitlciens òf thè. ' 1 Center* RegardlèSS of vihioh hiStorieal intefpretation One aay accèpt* thè iaportànt fact is that. thè Center glorified thè resulta l’ -òM' thè gùlturkacipf oe a clear-cut viotofy fór politicai Cathollpism over frusàian aitèmpté to limii thè sphére of thè Church* ?Jhether thè. Kulturksjnpf wae a nyth òr a grave coniliet* thè majority of Germariy*©. Cathello© vere convinoed that thè rlghtf of thè Churéh •were threatenéd and that thè oziateneo of a peliti©al party to represent Catholio interest© was easential to thè soourity of thè Churéh^ Johannes Schàuff’s important ©tatistioai study upon thè Support givén thè Center Party by Germany *e Cathòiics reveala a 2 de ci de d fiuotaatiòn in thè icyaliy afforded it frani 1871 to Ì92Uf In 1871| 57f2 per opnt of Gèfmen patholicS aupportéd thè Centerj in 18?hf 35 per centi in 1831* 86*5 per cent} but by 1912* thè percentagè bnd dropped to §1* per cent* In I92I4. thè .peroéntage of Catholio men Vòting for thè Center was 51*3» Sohauff*s statistica clèarly indicate thè Mlliagnese of thè Gennan Cathòiics to support thè Church whon ìt waa in danger, but to grow indìfferent v/hen thè %èrnhard Menne, The Case of Dr»; Brining (London» HutohinSon and Company* Ltd** trauaT W B i H E t z g W a i d ) . p . 10» hereafter cited . as Mennê* Dr», B.ruMng* % eè Johannes Sohauff,. pie deutsohen gatholiken und die Zentnaoe» partei, ctne politisch-ètatis^jsohi?'1^ni^èhojHung der,'Reïcfôtàgsmhî' ' 8eît"l87l (Cologne» Badheia verlagy l9ê8)iP Üb^ortunatoly. ëchauff'e statistics only cover thé elections from 1871 until ,1921}}, Emil Ritter* a prominent Catholio publicist* reports that' Sohauff estimated that by 1928 only. 39 per cent of Catholics eligible to vote voted for the CenterEmil Ritter*' per WSg des .polltisohen Katholigjsmus in Deutsche land (Breslau« BergSladt' VeVlag» 19^U}| p« idr a more readily ' ' available account of how Germany ’s Catholios voted see John B. Mason* "How the Center Party Votes*" Commonvreal» XII (193Q} J7Î|*576* The title of Mr*. Mae ©a ’ © art id © should road, "How the German Catholic’s vote** ' 6 threat lé'ssétted* The Center recognized this fact end continued to warm the Catholic electorate throughout its history of another poo* sible Kulturkampf, ■ ' Rfter Bismarck had concluded negotiations with the Vatican to the satisfaction of both parties* the intransigent leaders of the Center still were not appeased• Bismarck had completely ignored them to negotiate directly with the curia» The leadership of the Center -Was principally drawn from the Westphalian* Bavarian* and Rhineland gentry* Their interests were primarily agrarian* They were autocratic* patriarchal and remained rigidly conservative until the threat of the Scoiai Democratic Party among the Catholic working«» men caused them to alter their policies* if not their sentiments* In its, social composition the center during the period of the Kulturksaapf as in the time of- the'/ Weimar Republic was heterogeneous.
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