DIAGNOSING NAZISM: U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 1920-1933 A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Robin L. Bowden August 2009 Dissertation written by Robin L. Bowden B.A., Kent State University, 1996 M.A., Kent State University, 1998 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2009 Approved by Mary Ann Heiss , Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr. , Members, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Kenneth R. Calkins , Steven W. Hook , James A. Tyner , Accepted by Kenneth J. Bindas , Chair, Department of History John R. D. Stalvey , Dean, College of Arts and Sciences ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………..………………………………………………iv Chapter 1. Introduction: U.S. Officials Underestimate Hitler and the Nazis……..1 2. Routine Monitoring: U.S. Officials Discover the Nazis…………......10 3. Early Dismissal: U.S. Officials Reject the Possibility of a Recovery for the Nazis…………………………………………….....57 4. Diluted Coverage: U.S. Officials Neglect the Nazis………………..106 5. Lingering Confusion: U.S. Officials Struggle to Reassess the Nazis…………………………………………………………….151 6. Forced Reevaluation: Nazi Success Leads U.S. Officials to Reconsider the Party……………………………………………......198 7. Taken by Surprise: U.S. Officials Unprepared for the Success of the Nazis……………………...……………………………….…256 8. Conclusion: Evaluating U.S. Reporting on the Nazis…………..…..309 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………318 iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation represents the culmination of years of work, during which the support of many has been necessary. In particular, I would like to thank two graduate school friends who stood with me every step of the way even as they finished and moved on to academic positions. David Settje and Kelly Selby not only provided examples of how to make it through the process, but also helped me maintain my sanity. David showed me how fun it could be to vent about graduate school and obsess about Cleveland sports teams; and that both activities are infinitely more bearable with a good dose of humor. Kelly spent countless afternoons offering encouragement over coffee. I am also thankful for the help I received from the members of my committee. Dr. Steven Hook and Dr. James Tyner both encouraged me to reexamine my work from different perspectives. Dr. Kenneth Calkins graciously took time from his retirement to serve on my committee and share his knowledge of German history. As always, Dr. Clarence Wunderlin persuaded me to consider the broader context of my work. Most importantly, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Mary Ann Heiss. Both of us began this project believing that I would be writing a dissertation on the U.S. denazification program in Germany, but her prodding to fully understand American perceptions of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis prior to the program dramatically altered my approach. Without her guidance and good humor, this dissertation would not have been written. I truly appreciate the time and effort she invested. iv None of this would have been possible without my family. My parents, Robert and Barbara, and my sister, Rae Ann, have all followed their own career paths in education. Their support and understanding made it possible for me to pursue my own. Finally, I would like to thank Priscilla Rice. Every time the stress got to be too much, I could join in on the home improvement project of the moment. Whether it was putting in floor joists, breaking out exterior walls to create doorways, or moving stacks of bricks from one side of the yard to the other, the physical tasks were a welcome respite from thinking and writing about American perceptions of National Socialism. I could not have finished this without her encouragement and support. v Chapter 1 Introduction: U.S. Officials Underestimate Hitler and the Nazis I More than a decade before Adolf Hitler became the last chancellor of the Weimar Republic in 1933 U.S. officials had begun their evaluation of his National Socialist movement. American perceptions of Hitler and National Socialism began developing during the infancy of the Nazi Party in the economic and political turmoil of postwar Germany. World War I had not only destroyed the German Empire and its military but had also left a delicate political and economic situation in its wake. As the nation struggled to reenter world affairs, widespread German dissatisfaction with the postwar settlement created an unstable, and at times turbulent, environment. In this chaotic atmosphere of the 1920s, official U.S. perceptions of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party began to form. While American officials had identified the National Socialist German Workers‘ Party (NSDAP) and Adolf Hitler no later than 1922, they soon disregarded the potential of the party and its leader after a failed coup d‘état in November 1923. From their first contact with the party, U.S. observers accurately reported the basic tenets of the National Socialist program: extreme nationalism; anti-Semitism; opposition to the Treaty of 1 2 Versailles; and the desire to establish a dictatorship. They were also acutely aware of the actions of its paramilitary organizations, particularly the SA (Sturmabteilung). Yet, throughout the 1920s U.S. policymakers never believed that the party and its leader had the ability to become more than a mere nuisance to Germany‘s legitimate political parties. When the Nazis began experiencing electoral success in the 1930s and eventually propelled themselves into becoming the largest party in the Reichstag, American observers begrudgingly acknowledged the need to reevaluate their stance. Even then, however, they proved unable to accurately assess the Nazi Party‘s strength. An understanding of how agents of the U.S. government viewed Hitler and the Nazis during the interwar period helps illuminate the inability of the United States to accurately evaluate the popularity and determination of the party and its leader. In the United States, the conservative Republican administrations of the 1920s and early 1930s pursued a foreign policy of independent internationalism that emphasized economic interests.1 They also directly linked commercial success to the political situation in Germany, convinced that a stable democratic government there would serve U.S. commercial needs. Many policymakers failed to identify the National Socialists as a threat to the young democratic regime in Germany. As the National Socialist movement grew in power, U.S. officials struggled to assess its goals and overall strength. Any 1 For general discussions of the link between U.S. economic interests and foreign policy, see Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 125-45; John M. Carroll, ―American Diplomacy in the 1920s,‖ in Modern American Diplomacy: Revised and Enlarged, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc, 1996), 61-79; H.W. Brands, The United States in the World: A History of American Foreign Policy, vol. 2, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 90-101. Jeffrey J. Matthews argues that perhaps independent internationalism would better be understood as conservative and sometimes reactionary internationalism. Jeffrey J. Matthews, Alanson B. Houghton: Ambassador of the New Era (Lanham, MD: SR Books, 2004), 3-4. 3 evaluation of how the Nazis would then affect Germany and German-American relations suffered as a consequence. This dissertation is a three-pronged study of the development of U.S. views of National Socialism from the origins of the NSDAP to Adolf Hitler‘s ascent to the chancellorship in 1933. Part one examines U.S. policymakers‘ assumptions about the Nazi Party from its infancy through its failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. Developing in the reactionary hotbed of Bavaria, the NSDAP was just one of dozens of extremist right- wing organizations that formed in the wake of German dissatisfaction with the postwar settlement. Initially, American observers paid close attention to the growing party, marking it as a potentially strong movement with a leader in Adolf Hitler who could conceivably develop into Germany‘s Benito Mussolini. The failed coup d‘état in late 1923, however, completely altered American perceptions. With Hitler in prison and the party temporarily banned, U.S. observers believed that the Nazis had proven themselves to be both incompetent and unable to truly become a factor in German politics. The second prong of the study examines U.S. policymakers‘ failure to recognize that Hitler and the NSDAP were successfully reorganizing and restructuring their approach in order to reenter the political discussion in Bavaria and to expand their presence beyond the state, despite their predictions to the contrary. When American observers did report on the party they once again expounded on its basic tenets as if the dispatches of the early 1920s covering much the same ground no longer existed. For the most part, they described the Nazi Party and its members as nuisances to legitimate 4 political parties struggling to operate in the complex and chaotic German political situation. It would take Nazi electoral success in 1930 to change the American approach. Part three explores how American observers responded to a revitalized party led by a legitimate presidential candidate in the 1930s. As the German government floundered, the NSDAP continued to make gains at the polls, eventually becoming the largest party in the Reichstag. Concurrently, Adolf Hitler increased his national profile by finishing second in the 1932 presidential election. He then began working behind the scenes to maneuver himself and the party into a dominant role in the government. Throughout this period, U.S. officials reluctantly acknowledged that the party had not only grown in size and strength but had also positioned itself to play a role in the German government. Yet, the same officials struggled to understand the appeal of the party and badly underestimated Adolf Hitler. Current scholarship has failed to explicate American perceptions of National Socialism prior to 1933.