Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Religion and Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conﬂict

Series editor: Professor John D. Brewer Institute for the Study of Conﬂict, Queen’s University Belfast, UK Series advisory board: John Braithwaite, Australian National University, Hastings Donnan, Queen’s University Belfast, UK, Brandon Hamber, University of Ulster, UK, Ian McAlister, Australian National University, William Mishler,Universityof Arizona, UK, Barbara Misztal, University of Leicester, UK, Orla Muldoon,Uni- versity of Limerick, Ireland, Clifford Shearing, University of Cape Town, South Africa.

Titles include:

John D. Brewer, David Mitchell, Gerard Leavey EX-COMBATANTS, RELIGION AND PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND The Role of Religion in Transitional Justice Denis Dragovic RELIGION AND POST-CONFLICT STATEBUILDING Roman Catholic and Sunni Islamic Perspectives Sandra Milena Rios Oyola RELIGION, SOCIAL MEMORY AND CONFLICT The Massacre of Bojayá in Colombia

Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–137–29935–2 hardback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding Roman Catholic and Sunni Islamic Perspectives

Denis Dragovic University of Melbourne, Australia © Denis Dragovic 2015 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2015 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–1–137–45514–7 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. To my wife, Dijana, thank you for your eternal patience This page intentionally left blank Contents

List of Figures and Tables ix

Series Editor’s Preface x

Preface and Acknowledgements xiv

Note on Transliteration xvii

Introduction 1

1 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 9 How states fail 10 Religion and post-conflict statebuilding 12 Religion and legitimization 16 Religion, legitimacy and legal validity 19 Religion, legitimacy and justification of rules 21 Religion, legitimacy and expressions of consent 25 Religion and institutional effectiveness 29 Security 30 Basic services 43 Conclusion 47

2 Roman Catholic View of the State 51 Roman Catholicism 54 The Church’s changing view of the state 55

3 Salvation as the Catholic Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding Imperative 60 The Catholic Church and state legitimacy 62 Legal validity 63 Justiﬁcation of rules 63 Expressions of consent 65 The Catholic Church and public security 67 The Catholic Church and basic services 69 Conclusion on Roman Catholicism 74

4 Sunni Islam and the State 77 Schools of Sunni Islam thought 79 Jurisprudence 80 Theology 81 vii viii Contents

5 Justice as the Sunni Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding Imperative 84 Sunni Islam and state legitimacy 90 Legal validity 91 Justiﬁcation of rules 95 Expressions of consent 97 Sunni Islam and public security 99 Sunni Islam and basic needs 103 Conclusion on Sunni Islam 105

6 Bosnia and Herzegovina 109 Religion and state legitimacy 112 Religion and public security 121 Religion and social capital 123 Religion and civic values 127 Religion and basic needs 129 Theology and statebuilding 131 Sunni Islam 132 Catholicism 135 Conclusion 138

Conclusion 143

Notes 153

Bibliography 178

Index 190 Figures and Tables

Figures

1.1 Religious institutions and post-conﬂict statebuilding 48 6.1 Percentage trust (‘a lot’) in various institutions of BiH 111

Tables

1.1 Religious institutions and legitimization 29 1.2 Types of beneﬁcial social capital 34 5.1 Requirement to migrate 89 6.1 Religion’s standing in the Bosnia and Herzegovinian community 111 6.2 Summary of religious contribution to legitimizing the state 122 6.3 Religious magazines’ monthly circulation ﬁgures 128 6.4 Summary of religious contribution to public security 130 6.5 Summary of religious contribution to basic needs 132 6.6 Theological impetus 138

ix Series Editor’s Preface

‘Compromise’ is a much used but little understood term. There is a sense in which it describes a set of feelings (the so-called ‘spirit’ of compromise) that involves reciprocity, representing the agreement to make mutual concessions toward each other from now on: no matter what we did to each other in the past, we will act toward each other in the future differently as set out in the agreement between us. The compromise settlement can be a spit and a handshake, much beloved in folklore, or a legally binding statute with hundreds of clauses. As such, it is clear that compromise enters into conflict transformation at two distinct phases. The first is during the conflict resolution process itself, where compromise represents a willingness amongst parties to negotiate a peace agreement that represents a second-best preference in which they give up their first preference (victory) in order to cut a deal. A great deal of literature has been produced in Peace Studies and International Relations on the dynamics of the negotiation process and the institutional and governance structures necessary to consolidate the agreement afterwards. Just as important, however, is compromise in the second phase, when compromise is part of post-conflict reconstruction, in which protagonists come to learn to live together despite their former enmity and in face of the atrocities perpetrated during the conflict itself. In the first phase, compromise describes reciprocal agreements between parties to the negotiations in order to make political concessions sufficient to end conflict; in the second phase, compromise involves victims and perpetrators developing ways of living together in which concessions are made as part of shared social life. The first is about compromises between political groups and the state in the process of statebuilding (or re-building) after the political upheavals of communal conflict, and the second is about compromises between individuals and communities in the process of social healing after the cultural trauma provoked by the conflict. This book series primarily concerns itself with the second process, the often messy and difficult job of reconciliation, restoration and repair in social and cultural relations following communal conflict. Com- munal conflicts and civil wars tend to suffer from the narcissism of minor differences, to use Freud’s phrase, leaving little to be split halfway and compromise on, and thus are usually especially bitter. The series

x Series Editor’s Preface xi therefore addresses itself to the meaning, manufacture and management of compromise in one of its most difficult settings. The book series is cross-national and cross-disciplinary, with attention paid to interpersonal reconciliation at the level of everyday life, as well as culturally between social groups, and the many sorts of institutional, interpersonal, psychological, sociological, anthropological and cultural factors that assist and inhibit societal healing in all post-conflict societies, historically and in the present. It focuses on what compromise means when people have to come to terms with past enmity and the memories of the conflict itself, and relate to former protagonists in ways that consolidate the wider political agreement. This sort of focus has special resonance and significance for peace agreements, which are usually very fragile. Societies emerging out of conflict are subject to ongoing violence from spoiler groups who are reluctant to give up on first preferences, constant threats from the outbreak of renewed violence, institutional instability, weakened economies, and a wealth of problems around transitional justice, memory, truth recovery and victimhood, amongst others. Not surprisingly therefore, reconciliation and healing in social and cultural relations is difficult to achieve, not least because interpersonal compromise between erstwhile enemies is difficult. Lay discourse picks up on the ambivalent nature of compromise after conflict. It is talked about in a common sense in one of two ways, in which compromise is either a virtue or a vice, taking its place among the angels or in Hades. One form of lay discourse likens concessions to former protagonists with the idea of restoration of broken relationships and societal and cultural reconciliation, in which there is a sense of becoming (or returning) to wholeness and completeness. The other form of lay discourse invokes ideas of appeasement, of being compromised by the concessions, which constitute a form of surrender and reproduce (or dis- guise) continued brokenness and division. People feel they continue to be beaten by the sticks that the concessions have allowed others to keep; with restoration, however, weapons are truly turned into ploughshares. Lay discourse suggests, therefore, that there are issues that the Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict series must begin to problematize, so that the process of societal healing is better understood and can be assisted and facilitated by public policy and intervention. This second book in the Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict series explores the contribution of religion to compromise and peace- building, and in particular its role in re-building the post-conflict state. Religious peace-building is largely an academic interest nurtured in the xii Series Editor’s Preface post-Cold War period. This might appear paradoxical, for this period witnessed the tragic intensification of religiously motivated violence; and with it the significant growth of academic interest and research on the connection between religion and conflict. The balance was bound to shift, however, as academics, researchers and practitioners focused on the reverse side of the same Janus face: religion as a site of reconciliation and compromise rather than of conflict. Religious peace-building is now a burgeoning field. The popularity of this new field is partly to be explained by the relevance of inter-faith dialogue between the Abrahamic religions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam to the growth of Islamic extremism and as the conflict in the Middle East rumbles on to negatively affect global security and international affairs. Another influence is the increasing direction of transitional justice studies towards religious studies, theology, morals and ethics in its concern with topics like truth recovery, social justice, atonement strategies, memory and reparation. The interest of theologians, for example, in the meaning of political forgiveness is matched by the significant involvement on the ground of religious actors and faith-based organizations in a variety of truth recovery mechanisms across the world. A third reason for the growth of religious peace-building as an intellectual concern is cultural. The religious peace-building literature is overwhelmingly dominated by US-based scholars, and the USA as a cultural space promotes the practice of religious peace-building as a form of conflict resolution and an intellectual interest in mapping the field. Unlike Europe, the USA has never experienced religious violence and has no cultural or folk memory of holy war. It can therefore be more read- ily seen as part of the solution rather than as part of the problem. The USA also separates church and state, thus having no one religion domi- nating politics or the public square; and there is a high level of religious observance, as against the European trend. This encourages people in the USA to take religion seriously and facilitates them to see it as having a positive role in society and politics. Therefore, it is not only US political, international and strategic interests after the end of the Cold War that explains the growth of this new field; as a cultural space the USA is more inclined to see religion as capable of playing a positive role in conflict resolution and peace-building. It is usual to consider religious peace builders as having interests and expertise in the second process of compromise that I have identified here, in relation to individuals, groups and communities who are rebuilding society and learning to live together after conflict. The difficult Series Editor’s Preface xiii task of re-building communal bonds and restoring relationships often lends itself to religious precepts, values and practices around forgiveness, atonement, justice, reconciliation and healing. Dealing with the legacy issues arising from past violence, especially for victims, can be thought of as particularly suited to the pastoral skills of faith-based actors. Nation re-building at the grass roots level after conflict also seems relevant to the largely local focus of religious actors and faith-based organizations. The bottom-up nature of the nation-building project is consistent with the communal ties and grass root spaces in which religious peace builders usually operate. For all these reasons, religion seems to have quite specific roles in the promotion and development of post-conflict compromise. What is special about this particular book in the series is its attention to the role of religion in the first process of compromise, that between political groups and parties in a process of statebuilding. Statebuilding at the institutional level and nation building at the community level are two different aspects of peace-building. This book is unique because it explores the role of religious precepts, values and practices in creating legitimacy for the post-conflict state and in intro- ducing effective institutional reform of the state. The focus on religious contributions to statebuilding at the top rather than to nation building at the bottom makes this a new and exciting contribution to the religious peace-building literature. What is especially noteworthy is its interface between theory and practice. The author combines close hermeneutical analysis of the religious precepts, values and practices in Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam as they relate to statebuilding after conflict, with a thorough and detailed analysis of their use in the empirical case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one concrete example. He both illuminates an empirical instance of post-conflict statebuilding and contributes to our theorization of religious peace-building. As Edi- tor I warmly welcome this new addition to the Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict series.

John D. Brewer Preface and Acknowledgements

My interest in religion and its possible role in post-conflict statebuilding began while in Najaf, Iraq. As the head of a field office for an international NGO I was in the Shia holy city on 29 August 2003 when a car bomb exploded two miles away at the shrine of Imam Ali. It turned out to be one of the deadliest then and since, killing 125 people including Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a leading cleric. As my security and that of our staff and projects were tied to our relations with the community and their religious leaders I began to visit those senior clerics who had chosen to remain. The first cleric I met was Ayatollah Muhammad Said al-Hakim, who was very kind in his praise of our work and spoke highly of us to others. Another cleric, Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir, was animated during our meeting, as he believed me to be a CIA agent sent to plan his assassination. After two hours of discussions, including explaining how the international aid system works and why I thought myself a neutral actor despite receiving funds from the US government, we parted ways with him calling me a brother. The hostile welcome became a promise to lend his support to our efforts. True to his word, he spoke of the sanctity of our work during Friday prayers as did al-Hakim. At one point I had a scheduling clash—a delayed meeting with a young, relatively junior cleric overlapped with the arrival of the newly appointed Coalition Provisional Authority representative to Najaf, Ambassador Robert Ford. Looking back I chose poorly, leaving Moqtadr al-Sadr’s office after waiting for nearly an hour, at which point I headed out to meet with Ambassador Ford. The agenda, determined by the professional statebuilding set present at the meeting, focused on the progress in the physical and institutional rebuilding of the state apparatus in Najaf. I took the opportunity to ask whether the newly appointed representative to Najaf would be meeting with the Ayatollahs of the city. The reply was an emphatic ‘No’. His instructions were clear. His role was to support the central state apparatus by strengthening its influence in the governorate. Living in and amongst the community, to me the view seemed to be naïve, disconnected from Iraqi society and its authority structures, an opportunity lost. After nearly three years of living in the ‘red zone’ of Iraq, a year in Sudan, a return to Iraq and some work with the United Nations in

xiv Preface and Acknowledgements xv the West Bank, among other postings, it became apparent to me that not engaging with religious leaders in Iraq was not a contextual, calculated move but rather an inexplicable, systematic omission. Perceived as axiomatic this view was not unique to a particular mindset—the neo- con preaching the virtues of secular democracy or the less travelled bureaucrat—but ranged across the board, including being embraced by diplomatic officers, international policy advisors, United Nations staff and even some NGO aid workers. The responsibility for the persistence of this view cannot solely be placed at the feet of practitioners. Little thought had been put into how engagement with religious representatives should be undertaken, what benefits could be gained and, critically, whether religious leaders would even agree to contribute their substantial resources and legitimacy to the statebuilding effort. In other words, academics too had either overlooked or dismissed this relationship. A few implied a role and implicitly acknowledged religion’s presence, but invariably stopped short of naming and engaging with it. Once I decided to engage on a scholarly basis with this topic another challenge arose—finding an appropriate place to undertake the research. When it comes to religion most universities have transitioned from teaching theology or divinity to embracing the idea of religious studies. The former embraces and builds from fundamental foundations such as the gift of grace, the afterlife and the power of Jesus’ sacrifice to redeem man in the eyes of God (and similar concepts in other religions). The latter treats such beliefs as myths whose practices need to be explained within cultural, historical or political constructs within this temporal world. In this view, whether God is real or not does not matter. But from my experiences in deeply religious (Islamic) societies such as Najaf and Khartoum I realized that to understand the politics of religion, reason must come second to revelation, no matter how irrational or illogical this may seem within our modern world. This is because the scriptures offer knowledge that no human ideas can displace, not only on how to live one’s life but also in some cases on how states and societies should be structured. The only academic discipline that adequately engages with religion in such a way is theology. Problematically, though, not only are theology departments in Western universities near extinct, but those that remain have chosen to isolate themselves within their own spiritual sphere as if the challenges faced by the world are only those of the world (a situation that has made it all the more difficult for Western scholarship to understand Islamic fundamentalism). Nevertheless a few remain. It was in Scotland xvi Preface and Acknowledgements that I found an appropriate home for this research and am grateful for the resources available at the University of St Andrews that made this possible. In addition, many thanks are due to my advisor, a Chilean former Catholic priest, anthropologist of East African tribes and scholar of Christian–Buddhist dialogue, Professor Mario Aguilar. I hope that this research contributes in some small way to the recent re-engagement with religion by policy makers, practitioners and academia. Note on Transliteration

The transliteration system used in this book is that of the International Journal of Middle East Studies published by Cambridge University Press. Regarding the use of the terms ‘God’ and ‘Allah’, I have chosen to refer to the Abrahamic god using the term ‘God’, whereas when speaking within the context of Islam I refer to the same God using the Arabic term ‘Allah’. For quotations in English of the Qur’an I use Yusuf Ali’s work and for the Bible the New International Version.

xvii This page intentionally left blank Introduction

Shortly after arriving in Iraq in May 2003, Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, began preparations for the drafting of an Iraqi constitution. The initial plan was for Iraqi and US leaders to select the writers of the constitution, for a constitution to be drafted and sovereignty handed over. But in June of 2003 a cleric residing far from the centres of authority in Baghdad and Washington gave a religious opinion on the matter. The fatwa stated that any drafting would have to be undertaken by Iraqi representatives following a general election.1 Initially this view was ‘underestimated by the Bush administration’, then it became apparent that the ‘Americans were in denial’, said one Iraqi member of the Governing Council.2 FormonthsBremerrefused to recognize the influence of the religious leader, Ayatollah Sistani, on post-conflict statebuilding efforts. Instead, the Americans thought they could work around the fatwa, recruit other religious figures to counter Sistani, appeal to reason and explain the difficulties of organizing an election in such a short period of time, and eventually even offer a comprise by suggesting partial elections. This was not enough. ‘It was very difficult, if not impossible, to disregard the fatwa of Ayatollah Sistani,’ explained Yass Khudier, an Iraqi member of the commission tasked by the Governing Council to find a solution.3 In November, after six months of planning for the drafting of the constitution, the US administration amended its strategy explicitly acknowledging the guidance given to them by the highest Shia religious authority in Iraq. Even this shift though, riding on the perception that it was a ‘Bush-Sistani pact’ failed to assuage Sistani as the proposal retained a controlling roll for the United States and the unelected Governing Council. Rebuffed for a second time the Bush administration had to redesign its strategy again, this time proposing a democratically elected body to draft the constitution in line with Sistani’s original June 2003

1 2 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding demand, which was eventually implemented through the election of a Transitional Assembly in January 2005. No matter what secular division of religion and the state Bremer had envisaged for the future of Iraq, his handpicked Governing Council made it clear that it could not ignore the clerical establishment. In this case Bremer, empowered with absolute authority, backed by an occupying military and touted by the media as a pro-consul, did not have de jure authority within the social construct of Iraq, which could only be given by the subtle but firm religious figure of Ayatollah Sistani. Despite Sistani’s critical and high profile challenge to the predominant secular paradigm within which international state builders operate neither scholars nor policy makers have adequately considered how to engage with religious leaders. International post-conflict statebuilding in its modern, post-colonial context is a recent development that emerged from the Cold War era consensus of limiting coordinated international intervention to peacekeeping. Over the past two decades the international community has been involved in post-conflict statebuilding through various collective mechanisms including United Nations sanctioned endeavours such as those in East Timor, Afghanistan or Bosnia and Herzegovina, coalitions of the willing forays such as in Iraq, or regional efforts for example in Kosovo and the Solomon Islands. Scholarship of post- conflict statebuilding has a similarly recent past emerging over the last two decades from within the field of peace-building and subsequently developing into a widely recognized sub-field as well as a centre of policy research. In part this scholarly interest has come as a result of limited success in guiding conflict ridden states from war to a sustainable peace. According to a 2005 United Nations report, half of all peace- building efforts revert to conflict within five years.4 Essential to successful peace-building, it is generally agreed, are at the very least minimally functioning state institutions—a goal requiring effective post-conflict statebuilding. The scholarship that focuses upon this endeavour is considerable, to which this book hopes to contribute in some small way. It does so by proposing a model that can guide the rethinking of the role of religious institutions in post-conflict statebuilding. The model identifies theoretical mechanisms through which religious institutions can contribute to post-conflict statebuilding. Draw- ing from the theologies of Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam the book then reflects upon why they would, of their own accord, lend their considerable legitimacy and resources. The book diverges from traditional approaches such as rational choice theory that suggest Introduction 3 religious institutions act to maximize membership or assets, and instead embraces a teleological view recognizing the importance of belief structures in understanding a religious institution’s motivations. It embraces salvation as a hermeneutical key to outline a Roman Catholic theology of statebuilding while drawing upon the concept of justice for Sunni Islam. Keeping a close eye upon the application of theory, the book considers the particularistic nuances of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unique historically and culturally influenced religious practices, structures and theologies to suggest the ability and willingness of the two religions’ institutions to contribute to their country’s statebuilding. This book is not a reflection upon the place of religion as it influences individuals involved in post-conflict statebuilding or of religious institutions as peacemakers, but rather how these powerful institutional actors can contribute to the specific task of post-conflict statebuilding. In the few instances where this has been considered, largely emanating from the US national security sector, religious institutions are instrumentalized as tools for achieving a political or military end.5 This ad hoc approach fails to grasp the importance of different structures and practices of a religion, and second, makes the mistaken presumption that religious institutions see common purpose with the concept of a liberal peace. Instead, to fully appreciate the role of religion one must turn the tables, so to speak, and consider how religious institutions can contribute to post-conflict statebuilding so as to instrumentalize the state for their own theological purposes. Rather than doing this in a way that begins and ends only with the secular within the religious we must understand each religion’s specific cosmological paradigm. In other words, in seeking to understand how religious institutions can contribute to post-conflict statebuilding, we must equally reflect on why they would contribute their considerable resources. It would be wrong to simply presume that the state is a required element of achieving every religion’s telos. To take one prominent example, for Haredi Orthodox Jews building the state of Israel independent of the Messiah’s intervention is contrary to their religious beliefs and even argued by some as the work of Satan.6 Historically originating in Western Europe the process that led to the creation of states fed into the subsequent formation of societies—a process that is often, but wrongly, conceived in reverse order. This process, in which the state’s boundaries determined the shape of a society, was subsequently imposed through Western colonialism on other parts of the world. The result included borders that were often drawn in such ways as to divide social groups and traditional sources of authority. 4 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

To counter the resulting anomie, the new states needed to create within their borders a cohesive sense of community (nation building) and new centres of authority (statebuilding). Broadly speaking, today’s failed states are a reflection of the setbacks faced in achieving either or both. While religion has been extensively discussed in the context of Western European historical nation building, and in some cases within the context of historical statebuilding, in modern, post-Cold War international statebuilding literature religion has been largely ignored. This is, in part, because the dominant model for statebuilding embraced by post-colonial states and the international community was for a considerable time and continues, within many circles, to be modernization theory. Relevant in this case is that modernization theory ties development with a displacement of religion from the public sphere. Despite having been widely debunked, a point I discuss in Chapter I, this theory continues to shape policy towards international post-conflict statebuilding and, implicitly, perspectives on the role of religion. In some of these perspectives a role for religion is inferred, but rarely do scholars dare mention its name. Francis Fukuyama has suggested that the ‘legitimacy of the actions of a democracy are not in the end based on democratic procedural correctness but on the prior rights and norms that come from a moral realm higher than that of the legal order’.7 Despite his book largely being focused on advocating the importance of establishing a state’s institutional legitimacy, Fukuyama does not seek to answer where one can find the ‘moral realm higher than that of the legal order’. At other times religion is noted but mistakenly analysed. In the United Nations Development Programme report, The Ties That Bind, an important study of the role of social capital in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, participation in the category of ‘religious, welfare organisation/association’ was measured.8 In this way religious organizations were included within this important post-conflict statebuilding study, but only those institutions fitting secular constructs, namely religious charities. Institutions such as mosques and churches that serve much more prevalent and powerful social capital formation roles were ignored. It shouldn’t be a surprise then that among policy planners the acknowledgment of a role for religion is equally lacking. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recognized that she did not initially appreciate the importance of religious actors for US foreign policy because of the traditional secular-focused training of diplomats.9 It would be fair to say that religion has been so marginalized from the Introduction 5 public sphere that it is difficult for Westerners to comprehend its importance let alone acquiesce to finding a place for its inclusion. But religious institutions can be a source for Fukuyama’s ‘moral realm’, they do build ties that bind within traditional societies and they can be valuable interlocutors with state builders. This book responds in three parts to this gap in the literature. First, by developing a theoretical framework through which to consider how religious institutions can contribute to post-conflict statebuilding; second, by beginning the endeavour of reflecting upon the theological impetus of why religious institutions would consider contributing their legitimacy and resources to post-conflict statebuilding; and last, by applying these insights to the particular post-conflict statebuilding context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first part requires drawing upon current research that suggests that legitimacy of power and/or effective institutions are critical to success. Requiring a workable understanding of legitimacy I draw upon David Beetham’s research which suggests that legitimacy comprises three aspects—legal validity, justification of rules and expressions of consent.10 For state authorities to attain legitimacy each of these three aspects needs to be present. Lacking one, regardless of the strengths of the others, can lead to a legitimacy deficit and potentially state failure. Alongside legitimacy, effective institutions are suggested to be a necessary component of successful post-conflict statebuilding. Based upon personal experience over the past decade of having been involved in three different post-conflict statebuilding efforts (in East Timor, Iraq and South Sudan) I draw upon research that suggests two measures of effective institutions are particularly critical—security and the provision of basic needs. Together, legitimacy, security and basic needs constitute what I call the primary order elements of post-conflict statebuilding. With this understanding of what is required for success, the potential impact, if any, of religious institutions can then be considered by assessing how their activities impact the primary order elements. This approach sees religion as more than a set of doctrines or beliefs, as Scott Thomas has suggested liberal modernity views it, but rather as being integrated into the social fabric itself.11 In this way religious liturgies, authority structures, congregational activities, moral teachings and charitable activities influence post-conflict statebuilding. Through this process of aligning a religious institution’s particular characteristics with post-conflict statebuilding imperatives, an understanding of how religious institutions may influence post-conflict statebuilding begins to develop. 6 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

But showing how these religions may contribute does not necessarily lead to knowing whether they would choose to lend their considerable resources. The few scholarly instances that do reflect upon the motivations that drive religious institutions to act do so within secular constructs. Social transformation for the purpose of a theological goal such as salvation is ignored. The following chapters diverge from these approaches by engaging with the same questions through the theology of Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam, not in a critical or comparative effort, but rather to provide a sufficient foundation from which contextual analysis of particular post-conflict statebuilding cases can be considered. In this way the allocation of a religious institution’s resources, including its legitimacy, is in part influenced by a religion’s theology. As such, the theological views of outsiders, theologians and scholars are less relevant than the views of the clergy and other officials within the institution. Current scholarship, on the contrary, suggests that rational choice models, among other decision making theories, dictate the actions of religious institutions. Religious producers, they suggest, seek to maximize members, resources or some other determi- nant of institutional success. In the case of post-conflict statebuilding this would suggest that an institution’s participation in strengthening the state would only occur if it were to gain rewards such as official status and standing in society for its clergy, financing through government taxation or the return of formerly confiscated property. These drivers may well be prominent in particular cases, but such an approach does not offer a complete picture. Instead, it creates only a limited understanding as what is presumed to be a secular and rational decision to maximize resources could also be a means to another end. For example, are efforts to rebuild war damaged churches driven by ethno-religious politics or a salvific paradigm that requires consecrated places of worship? It is important to remember that what is dismissed as irrational and therefore excluded from secular consideration, for instance the grace of God or the uncreated nature of the Qur’an, is not irrational in the decision-making processes of religious institutions if considered through a broader theological paradigm. The role each religion assigns to a stable state within its theology as well as separately to each of the three primary order elements can then be used to understand its motivation or even obligation to act. Or alternatively, to present it in a formulaic fashion, the marginal benefit that each additional degree of stability contributes to achieving God’s will, balanced against the potential theological costs such as being co-opted by the state, secularization of society or the emergence of an unjust Introduction 7 system, is suggestive of the degree to which a religious institution could be expected to support state strengthening efforts. Reflecting upon the role of the state in God’s plan is a very broad endeavour even when limited by the concept of post-conflict statebuilding. To make this effort manageable I have chosen to work with only one of the many potential teloi within Christianity and Islam, namely, salvation and justice respectively. They were chosen for their overwhelming prominence within each religion’s belief systems. These two religious ‘goals’ are used as hermeneutical lenses through which I reflect upon the professed theology as it relates to post-conflict statebuilding. This reflection will not lead to a new interpretation or the siding with one or other view, but rather I am looking to identify key theological markers upon which attitudes towards participating in the post-conflict statebuilding endeavour may pivot. These viewpoints are formed as the professed theology is put into practice, influenced along the way by culture, tradition, politics and other social factors. The interpretation a religious institution favours or the degree of emphasis it places upon particular aspects of its professed theology will in turn be indicative of how it apportions its resources towards the primary order elements of post-conflict statebuilding. Any further development of a theology of post-conflict statebuilding within these two religions would require engaging with the same topic through other hermeneutical lenses such as Christ’s social gospel or reflecting upon salvation in Islam. The nature of the two religions studied also requires adopting different methodologies. For Roman Catholicism, a tightly structured hierarchical institution, I draw upon Second Vatican Council documents as primary source material with additional referencing to subsequent constitutions and papal encyclicals. They are chosen for the reason of the infallible standing of conciliar teaching and the global perspective of papal encyclicals. These documents in and of themselves build upon the past 2000 years of Church teaching creating a contemporaneous magisterium that is rooted in the scriptures, Church fathers and preceding conciliar and papal teachings. Islam on the other hand has no universal institution, which leads to a varied and multifaceted doctrine depending upon the exegete. In an effort to maintain epistemological consistency I focus upon the particular schools of Islamic jurisprudence and theology that dominate in the case study country of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely, Hanafi jurisprudence and Maturidi theology, though these two schools are also dominant in most countries of the former Ottoman Empire. Although 8 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding the focus is upon theology, the interrelated nature of certain dimensions of post-conflict statebuilding requires tentatively delving into Islamic jurisprudence. As Maturidi theology has received scant attention in the English language with very little relevant material, my work on Islam is more dependent upon original exegesis than its Roman Catholic counterpart. I reach back to the Qur’an and hadiths, draw upon classical scholarship and review current works to develop an understanding of post-conflict statebuilding that I suggest would be consistent with Hanafi/Maturidi views. Drawing all of these elements together in the final chapter I apply this model to the context of post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. The case study is not an examination of what role religious institutions played in that country, but rather an opportunity to apply the framework and theologies developed in earlier chapters within a particular context. A fundamental aspect of this book’s argument is that even so-called universal religions are not practised uniformly in all cultural contexts. This view necessitates a context specific analysis for any application of the proposed model. As such Chapter 6 examines the particular structures and practices of Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina and suggests how they may uniquely impact post-conflict statebuilding. In this chapter I also engage with the contextual nuances within each religion’s operant theology to consider how their interpretations may affect the motivation for contributing to post-conflict statebuilding. By aligning theological imperatives with institutional characteristics a picture emerges of the willingness and ability of religious institutions to contribute to post-conflict statebuilding. This is because religion’s teloi act as institutional mission statements influencing decision making processes such as the allocation of resources to differing objectives including, potentially, those that can contribute to legitimizing and strengthening the state. How effective any religious action in support of post-conflict statebuilding could be depends upon contextual characteristics of the institution, including its structure, resources, practices and operant theology. With the development of a new framework for understanding the potential role of religious institutions in post-conflict statebuilding, practitioners and policy makers will be better equipped to engage with religious institutions in the success of an endeavour they may all share in common. 1 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

In considering the role of religious institutions in post-conflict statebuilding it is not unreasonable to ask whether this line of enquiry remains relevant. The prescriptive nature of Western foreign policy towards developing countries and its recurring liberal agenda suggests that it isn’t. Built upon the foundations of modernization theory from the 1950s and 1960s international development and statebuilding policies are largely efforts aimed at replicating Western modes of progress in which there was no formal role for religion. Lant Pritchett et al. refer to this phenomenon in the development context as ‘isomorphic mimicry’, in that aid agencies replicate Western institutions without allowing unique indigenous systems to develop organically.1 Religion, as understood through modernization theory or isomorphic mimicry, is seen as unnecessary or even an inhibitor to progress. Yet countries that have been variably labelled as fragile or failing states seem to suggest otherwise. By cross tabulating the World Bank’s list of fragile and failed states to data available in the Gallup World View database (2006–2010) on average 91 per cent of populations within fragile states consider religion to be important in their daily lives compared to 12 per cent in Sweden, 30 per cent in the United Kingdom or 64 per cent in the United States. Religion is not only important to people in fragile states, but the institutions of religion are also highly trusted—80 per cent of people in the World Bank’s list of fragile states have confidence in religious institutions compared with only 48 per cent having confidence in their government. These religiosity figures can be explained theoretically. The work of Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart reinforces the somewhat axiomatic view that declining levels of existential security increase religiosity.2 While religious market theory argues that with a liberalization of the supply of religion demand should increase.3 In failed or failing states

9 10 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding one or the other of these theoretical conceptualizations is present. In post-conflict statebuilding environments in which violence is ever present and the religious market has been liberalized (proactively or inadvertently) both conceptualizations are present. In such situations, theoretically at least, we should see a substantial uptick in religious beliefs, values and activities which the limited data available seem to support. In post-conflict Iraq religiosity increased following the 2003 invasion during which the United States allowed religious freedom previously constrained by the secular Ba’ath party and existential insecurity concurrently increased as a result of the deterioration of the security situation.4 Similarly for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which saw an upsurge in religious activity since the fall of communism that has included a period of increased existential insecurity and liberalized religious markets.5 Despite these empirical and theoretical indications suggesting the importance of religion in post-conflict environments, academics, policy planners and practitioners haven’t sought to find a place for religious institutions in post-conflict statebuilding. In this section I begin to respond by considering the mechanisms through which religious institutions can lend support to critical aspects of post-conflict statebuilding.

How states fail

There are two mechanisms by which states are suspected of failing— institutional failure and legitimacy failure. Institutional failure in which the offices of the state cease to deliver services is popular in policy journals. Helman and Ratner wrote in Foreign Policy that failed states are those ‘whose governmental structures are overwhelmed by circumstances’.6 Rotberg’s article in Washington Quarterly begins with, ‘Nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people.’7 Early indicators of potential state failure through an institutional failure model would include Afghanistan post 2003 when the Kabul government could not effectively enforce its authority beyond the capital city, and Columbia at the peak of the drug wars when the state controlled only portions of its territory. Some scholars have lamented the influence of institutionalism at the expense of legitimacy, as a key component of successful post-conflict statebuilding.8 Bruce Gilley defines legitimacy failure, as opposed to institutional failure, as the receding endorsement of the state by citizens at a moral or normative level.9 The response by political elites in a legitimacy failure scenario is to expend more resources on maintaining Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 11 power rather than governing, leading to a reduced effectiveness of the state apparatus, which in turn further decreases legitimacy and eventually may lead to an attempted overthrow. By this process the state will still witness a deteriorating failure of institutional capacity, but the difference between legitimacy failure and institutional failure is that the primary driver pulling the state downwards is illegitimacy as opposed to what could otherwise independently weaken institutions such as reduced financing or inaccessibility to certain areas. State legitimacy should be distinguished from its corollary associated with the process of nation building, without which, the justification for the state’s very existence, as opposed to its institutional structures, is questioned. A very clear example of legitimacy failure is the collapse of Ghaddafi’s Libya in 2011 (and similarly Tunisia). Despite the provision of services and human development indicators showing consistent upward trends, with some indicators leading the rest of Africa, Ghaddafi’s regime suffered from a crisis in legitimacy that eventually led to his overthrow. Alternatively there are those who see them both as two sides of one coin, in effect intertwined with one another, sometimes acting separately and sometimes together. For example, legitimacy may be popularly endowed through democracy, but if a political stalemate emerges then the delivery of services slows, weakening both the functionality of institutions and the legitimacy of an otherwise effective and legitimate state apparatus. Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 2010 elections is an example of this where the inability for the legitimately elected representatives to reach a critical political compromise contributed to economic stagnation and slowed the delivery of critical state functions. The breaking of the political stalemate prevented a continuing weakening of the state. One critical shortcoming of these approaches is that they place the relationship between the government and the governed in a closed circuit in which the state and the people are the only actors, suggesting a dialectically negotiated social contract alone ensures a stable state. The implication is that a democratically elected (legitimacy) government and/or one that is able to provide for its people (institutional) would lead to a stable state. Yet there are examples such as Hamas in the Gaza Strip that show that even with a legitimating process (democratic victory in 2006) and a relatively functional institutional structure (the main reason for the rejection of Fatah) the government and the governed are not the only actors who influence stability. In the case of Hamas, elements of the international community dismissed the election results which led to an inhibitive isolation. Similarly, were Somaliland within a closed 12 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding circuit relationship it would be in a far different situation from where it currently is. The neighbouring instability and unwillingness among foreign countries to recognize its independence continues to dramatically weaken the territory. This suggests that external actors, those outside of the government-governed relationship, also play roles in strengthening or de-stabilizing states. These can include foreign states and non-state actors such as the less widely considered religious institutions. This book builds upon the position that both effective institutions and legitimacy are required for successful statebuilding but diverts from traditional discourse by emphasizing the potential of non-state actors that can contribute by focusing on one such group, religious institutions.

Religion and post-conﬂict statebuilding

Religion remains a much neglected actor in the study of international relations despite the past decade seeing new research emerge that has seen a ‘resurgence’ of religion and its ‘return from exile’.10 Four reasons appear prominently for why religion has for the past several decades been left out of the study of international affairs.11 Firstly, that it is due to the origins of social science and specifically in its rejection of religion and other primordial societal constructs. Secondly, the study of international relations is heavily biased to view the world through Western perspectives, which do not see a place for religion in modern states. Thirdly, the field of international relations is heavily influenced by the use of quantitative methodologies that make it difficult to consider things that may not be easily measured such as religion. Lastly, the dominant paradigm within international relations theory, realism, does not see a place for religion other than as an instrument through which power is gained and wielded. Similarly, in a field related to post- conflict statebuilding, international development, Alan ver Beek found that any discussion of spirituality appeared to be a taboo.12 This sentiment appears to be similarly present among practitioners. The head of the NGO (non-governmental organization) Division within the Swiss Agency for International Cooperation described it as a ‘mental taboo’ after organizing a conference on the topic in which participants ‘consistently evaded questions about the significance of religion’.13 In addition to these findings my own experience as a practitioner has been that there is a fear among the international community of engaging with religious leaders. Whether this is based upon a perception of responsibility for the preceding conflict or a reluctance to challenge the status quo thinking, either way both positions are unjustified. Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 13

As a result religious institutions, when included in theoretical conceptualizations, have been de-spiritualized leading them to being largely modelled as a civil society or lobby group, a concern that was reinforced by Pope Francis in his first mass when he warned of the Roman Catholic Church becoming a ‘compassionate NGO’.14 To give just one example, a religion’s transcendental nature and its concomitant ability to enshrine higher order values and shape societal mores through its institutions are critically overlooked. Instead, its representative institutions such as the Catholic Church or the great Islamic seats of learning are placed within academic constructs alongside Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund and K Street lobbyists or, in the terminology of international relations, as being no different to other non-state actors. The scholarly field of post-conflict statebuilding, much like that of international relations and its practitioners, has also ignored religious institutions. Writing in the Third World Quarterly, Alina Menocal rightly highlights the importance of ‘[o]ther [non-state] institutions, actors and alternative sources of authority’15 in her study on post- conflict statebuilding as does the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011, which notes ‘Governments that have restored confidence of stake- holders and citizens have typically mobilized non-state actors to deliver results rather than doing everything themselves.’16 What I found to be typical in post-conflict statebuilding literature is that it ignores religious actors. In the sentences following Menocal’s reference to the importance of other institutions she goes on to define them as ‘tribal authorities, the private sector, civil society and supranational institutions like the UN and the EU’. The World Bank report includes ‘communities and community organizations, traditional institutions of justice, the domestic private sector, NGOs, regional organizations, international donors, the international private sector’. Religious institutions are presumably either ignored or to be found within one of these categories, either of which would be a problematic conceptualization. In an effort to overcome this shortcoming I will be considering how religion as it is represented through its institutions can be brought into post-conflict statebuilding theory. For this purpose, throughout this book, agency is placed within religious institutions (group agency) as opposed to other religious actors such as God, individual clerics, believers or independent preachers.17 In particular I focus upon institutions that are significant and spiritually authoritative within a territory and primarily engage with the spiritual needs of a local community of believers within a national or transnational faith, denomination or sect. This limitation intentionally omits local minority religions that may not have sufficient standing and 14 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding resources to act alongside state builders at a national level. It also separates political groups from social groups such as most religious charities. It would include religious institutions such as Al Azhar University (in its capacity as a seat of Islamic learning), religious orders such as the Jesuits and Shia Islam’s seminaries (hawza) and religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite in most cases being local these religious institutions act within a context of failed or failing states that increasingly engage international actors, actors such as other states, international organizations and culturally or ethnically bonded social groupings. This internationalization of the failed state environment within which a local religious institution operates makes the recent revival of the study of religion in international relations pertinent to this book.18 In this regard the interaction between local religious institutions and the international arena operates in two directions. Local religious institutional involvement (as opposed to religion more broadly) within a particular post-conflict statebuilding context can feed back into the international order at the inter-state and global level by influencing transnational actors and states in a bottom-up manner, which may be of particular interest to scholars of international relations and religion. Alternatively, in the reverse direction and relevant to this book, international actors can influence the actions of local religious institutions. In this direction, influence can take many forms ranging from a state blocking the transfer of resources (i.e. terrorist designation) to transnational religious bodies influencing a local religious institution’s decision making. In recent times within international relations theory such linkages between religion and international actors have been variously problematized with outcomes that are shaped by the adopted paradigm and in particular whether states are the critical units in international relations or not.19 This approach would suggest that within those paradigms that emphasize the predominance of states (realist, neo-realist) and those that add alongside the dominance of states international institutions (liberalism, pluralism or liberal institutionalism) such authorities would be in a position to limit the resources available to local religious institutions. This could be by controlling financial transfers between religious congregations, limiting the movement of clergy and even the transmission of ideas as and when deemed in their interest. Such a view would place limitations on the agency of a religious institution and call into doubt the value of studying religious institutions independently. But as this chapter will endeavour to show, the mechanisms through which local religious institutions Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 15 may contribute to post-conflict statebuilding largely do not depend upon resources controlled beyond the borders of failed or failing states. I will argue that some of their most powerful assets are endowed in the institution and located within the borders of a state such as legitimacy, a repository of values and the ability to mobilize community solidarity. In this way foreign states may well influence local religious institutions in accessing some material resources but it cannot be said that they are dependent upon their good will or that they can be wholly constrained by them. This widely held but misplaced emphasis upon the international component of post-conflict statebuilding has problematically skewed post-conflict statebuilding research towards focusing upon foreign interventions at the expense of local solutions. Alternatively there are some theories that question the dominance of states as units of international relations and see strong cross bor- der societies steeped in the importance of ‘ideas, norms, identity and culture’20 (constructivists, English school). Such perspectives already allow considerable space for considering international influence upon domestic religious institutions. This could be through, for example, the methodology adopted by clerics for the interpretation of their scriptures. For transnational hierarchical religions such as the Roman Catholic Church this can easily be seen through the imposition of new doctrines. But it could also include informal or ad hoc mechanisms of influence such as the coming together of Islamic scholars at international conferences or voluntary participation in seeking common ground within and between religions. As such, regardless of whether a strong or weak state paradigm is adopted, the study of how religious institutions can contribute to post-conflict statebuilding and why they would from a theological perspective must be firmly grounded at the local level while taking into account, when relevant any external influences. This focus upon the local is embraced throughout this book in acknowledgement of the vast differences in how religions are practised in various cultures and countries, including within similar faith traditions, and in the process intentionally eschews meta-narrative generalizations that speak of ‘religion’s’ role in international relations. It does so because of the view that to understand what role religions play in international relations theory we must first understand how religions interact within the sub-components of the international order such as failed or failing states. In beginning to contribute towards such an effort in the following section I borrow theories from the political and social 16 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding sciences, accompanied by nuanced adaptations, to develop a framework to consider how religions can interact with the critical priorities of post-conflict statebuilding.

Religion and legitimization

The risk of de-legitimization for transitional authorities or governments during post-conflict statebuilding endeavours does not begin on some arbitrary date when new authorities replace the old, but reaches back to encompass the process through which the entire endeavour occurred. Pre-emptive military action, weak legal justification for intervention and the imposition of foreign laws, systems and structures all contribute to de-legitimizing authorities brought to power through such means. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq some theorists have rightly asked whether breaking liberal principles to hope for liberal outcomes is the right approach.21 To be in a position to answer such questions requires deconstructing the somewhat nebulous concept of state legitimacy into its tangible constituent components. Such an effort began with the work of Max Weber. His definition of a state remains the basic starting point for most socio-political analyses. In Politics as a Vocation he wrote that, ‘A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.’22 Regrettably, this oft repeated line is as far as most post-conflict statebuilding scholars go. Importantly, though, Weber goes on to ask, ‘If the state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest?’23 Weber provides three distinct inner justifications or as he calls them, ‘basic legitimations of domination’— tradition, charisma and legality. In the past, prior to its recent revival, legitimacy was wrongly dismissed as a ‘smokescreen’ for other forces such as self-interest, coercion and power struggles.24 Some attempts were even made to abandon the concept altogether on the basis that it is a by-product of an effective system.25 For those who stand by the concept of legitimacy, as understood to mean a state that ‘rightfully holds and exercises political power’,26 it is suggested to be acquired through various mechanisms. It can be conferred by the citizen to the state through nationalism or democracy, the constitution, ideologies such as Indonesia’s Pancasila or simply through participation within the state structure by signing up to the military, reporting crimes or paying taxes that would otherwise be easy Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 17 to avoid. With so many disparate interpretations of legitimacy being embraced by scholars, a more comprehensive approach is required. David Beetham’s work, The Legitimation of Power, provides what I suggest to be a sufficiently robust framework for this purpose. It is thorough enough to counter other understandings of legitimacy either directly, by responding to the works of other authors on legitimacy such as Weber and Seymor Lipset, or for those that came since its publication, indirectly, through its original comprehensiveness. As such I have chosen Beetham’s conceptualization to work through the possible relationship between religious institutions and legitimacy and to that end I provide a more detailed discussion of his work here. In Beetham’s comprehensive 1991 study of the legitimacy of power he identifies three aspects to legitimacy: legal validity, justifiability of rules and expressed consent. Neither one alone suffices to endow power with legitimacy, rather the three work in tandem. Where Weber saw three sources of legitimacy and in turn three different types of legitimacy, Beetham sees a single legitimacy with three aspects to it. By combin- ing the three into a single idea of legitimacy Beetham is suggesting that all three components are necessary for power to be endowed with legitimacy. Beetham’s distinction precludes single sources of legitimization such as hereditary structures of authority imbuing legitimacy, as could be suggested from Weber’s work. Beetham’s amalgamation of legitimacy into a single unit avoids the all too evident pitfall made clear in the years following the publication of Max Weber’s 1919 lecture when charismatic leaders such as Mussolini and Hitler came to power through the support of the people. Beetham would argue that the ‘gift of grace’, as Weber describes charisma, does not on its own, without consideration of legality, or justification, suffice to bestow legitimacy. Similarly, in today’s world it would be wrong to consider nationalism or democracy sufficient in and of themselves to bestow legitimacy. Importantly though, Weber did take the first step in moving away from Enlightenment philosophers’ perspectives of a universal value system against which the legitimacy of an authority could be judged. He empowered the people of the day with the right to bestow legitimacy by adding that it is the ‘belief’ in legitimacy that matters as opposed to adherence to a fixed, abstract concept of legitimacy. Beetham then borrowed from Weber, while retaining elements of earlier philosophers, by suggesting that legitimacy must be ‘justified in terms of people’s beliefs.’27 In this way he recognized Weber by incorporating the importance of people’s perspectives on the legitimacy of an authority, but also 18 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding acknowledged the philosophers by placing these views in the light of a broader set of beliefs or values against which they should be justified. An alternative but problematic view of legitimacy was propounded by Seymour Lipset, writing circa 1959, at a time when McCarthyism and Communism were proving to be polarizing centres of propaganda. He identified legitimacy as the result of an effort, ‘to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society’.28 Legitimacy, thus described, is characterized by its disempowerment of the individual, an approach that regresses from Weber’s important development of recognizing the role of the people in legitimizing the state. Possibly reflecting the times, it appears Lipset saw legitimacy as being a function of the efforts undertaken by those in power. Applying his approach in post-conflict statebuilding environments today would see legitimacy solely sourced from within the political classes or from international actors without adequate recognition of the role played by the people’s belief in a state authority structure’s legitimacy, which appears to be the current view of the post-conflict statebuilding fraternity which has proven to be wholly inadequate. At first glance the importance of belief by the people in the legitimacy of an authority appears to have little place for religion. But religion’s omission appears not to be a function of its role, or suggested lack thereof, but rather a self-imposed censorship by scholars that only makes its omission more prominent. As an example, in Francis Fukuyama’s 2004 book, State-Building, he writes that the ‘legitimacy of the actions of a democracy are not in the end based on democratic procedural correctness but on the prior rights and norms that come from a moral realm higher than that of the legal order’.29 Despite having dedicated most of his book to emphasizing the importance of legitimacy and institutional order, Fukuyama does not even dare mention where that ‘moral realm higher than that of the legal order’ can be found. Bruce Gilley similarly notes that, ‘The moral justification of state power (as opposed to its legality or consent) is particularly important because that power underwrites the laws and rules that govern so much of the rest of social and economic life.’30 Yet, despite his theoretical and ana- lytical consideration of legitimacy, he fails to reflect on the potential source of the ‘moral justification’. Furthermore, while Gilley recognizes that the citizen judges the government on its adherence to the community’s ‘shared principles, ideas and values’, he does not ask what these principles, ideas and values are and where they come from.31 Religion is only one potential influencing source of societal mores, but it is an Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 19 important one that should be openly discussed without fear, bias or prejudice.

Religion, legitimacy and legal validity According to Beetham, for authority to gain legitimacy it must conform to a set of rules (legal validity) both in the process of acquisition of power and in how it wields power. In the context of post-conflict statebuilding the rules by which the acquisition of authority can be judged may be found in domestic laws, a constitution, international treaty obligations, United Nations (UN) resolutions or local customary laws. An example can be seen in the case of the search for legitimacy in the lead up to the 2003 war in Iraq. A strongly worded UN resolution repeating concerns of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities had been agreed to, but with preparations for war already started the United Kingdom was facing criticism over the weak basis upon which it had built its justification for war so it, ‘pushed forcefully for a new resolution hop- ing it would provide enough legitimacy to ward off critics’.32 The UK government realized the importance of grounding military intervention in a more robust legal framework than the coalition had at the time. Controversially, the invasion continued without the additional, much needed, legitimacy of a UN resolution authorizing force, which subsequently created substantial problems for the post-conflict statebuilding effort by, in part, having a limited number of states involved in the coalition of the willing. As far as how an authority exercises its power, legal validity is of particular interest to legal scholars, constitutionalists and ‘rule of law’ specialists. This view is given form in the post-conflict statebuilding context through activities such as police training, human rights monitoring, judicial training, legislative reform across various sectors and support to parliaments. Religious sources have historically played a prominent role in contributing, if not even determining, what the laws are upon which legality is to be determined. Among today’s states it is Islamic sharia law through which religion continues to be used as a source of law. Whether the body of laws are taken directly from sharia, or sharia serves as a source of legal principles that shape laws suggests whether Islam can be used to legally validate authority structures and their actions. When seen as a direct source of laws, Islam becomes an important measure of legal validity, otherwise as a body of principles it is a source of justification of rules. In finding a place for Islam as a source of legal validity, tensions emerge that can be seen in the recent Egyptian constitutional debate 20 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding between moderate and traditionalist factions. Salafi members of the constituent assembly tasked with writing the post-Mubarak constitution advocated for a literalist interpretation of the revelations requiring laws to abide by ‘the commandments of Islamic Sharia’ while the mod- erates were pushing for ‘the principles of Islamic Sharia’, the latter of which prevailed in the December 2012 approved constitution and the subsequent 2014 revision, though with a reaffirmed commitment to sharia within a newly placed preamble. The debate then extended to who held the responsibility of interpreting these ‘principles’ which was initially proposed to lie with scholars at Al Azhar University, then in a subsequent draft shifted to the Supreme Constitutional Court, before returning to Al Azhar (Association of Senior Scholars) in the 2012 version. A year later the interpretive role for Al Azhar was removed entirely shifting the responsibility back to the Supreme Constitutional Court in the 2014 constitution. A similar debate over sharia serving as a direct body of laws or a source of principles occurred between US authorities in Iraq and Iraqi leaders.33 The United States was firm in its demand that Islam serves as ‘a’ source of principles among others while the Iraqis were seeking it to be ‘the’ source of principles. The result was that while the United States got its way in the constitution and Islam was included as ‘a foundation source of legislation’ (article 2) in a subsection immediately below it states, ‘No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.’ It was not until December 2010 that this subsection was interpreted by the Federal Supreme Court to mean the ‘settled rulings’ of Islam. Unlike the Salafi in Egypt who had proposed a separate ‘supreme court to monitor whether laws and decisions conform to Sharia’, one which would work apart from the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, in Iraq, the authority to judge the Islamic nature of laws lies with the Federal Supreme Court. Problematically though, despite the constitution demanding the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court to ‘be made up of a number of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars’, no such law appears to have been enacted according to Haider Ala Hamoudi and as such the experts in Islamic jurisprudence have not yet been incorporated into the operation of the court.34 Alternatively religions without codified laws have more subjective approaches. In such cases the legality of actions by an authority are still judged by clerics or scholars but in a more subjective manner. An example of such an instance is the Bishops Conference of Bosnia and Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 21

Herzegovina determining the Dayton post-conflict peace agreement to be ‘unjust’ based upon an evaluation of its impact as opposed to any breach of law, a ruling that I discuss further in Chapter 6. Interrogating the concept of legal validity in the post-conflict statebuilding context can raise some contentious questions. Can international interventions breach the law to attain authority and then embrace the law to legitimize their authority? Or what will be the effect upon the rule of law if international authorities wield power in a way that breaches the law. Offering an answer to these questions at this stage would be problematic as the way in which I posed them is suggestive of a single, universal source of law. It is possible that what one group considers legal will be seen as illegal by others. Determining legal validity requires agreement on the sources of law used to adjudicate the legality of action. During the post-conflict statebuilding phase, laws may be sourced from different places. Identifying the multiple sources of legal validity and judging which are most appropriate to the people is a critical decision in assessing the perception of an authority’s legitimacy and requires an understanding of the means by which the community justifies its rules.

Religion, legitimacy and justification of rules Beetham argues that legal validity needs to be set against a body of beliefs that form the basis of societal mores which both the dominant and subordinate groups abide and value.35 Such a justification of rules requires that power is derived from a valid source of authority such as could include tradition, divine command, scientific doctrine or popular will (democracy can be both an expression of consent and a source for justification of rules in the form of, for example, voting to amend a constitution). Whichever of these it may be, they constitute the highest source of val- idation for society’s rules and system of law. As a result the legitimacy of the political authority is contingent upon such a set of values. While moral philosophers have considered these issues they have been ignored by the international post-conflict statebuilding community based upon an axiomatic, but misplaced, presumption of the universality of Western mores. This has led to the omission of any consideration that other value systems may motivate people to develop attitudes and laws which in turn shape their convictions towards the state’s legitimacy differently than would be presumed through the lens of Western mores. Such a commonly misplaced presumption can lead to the imposition of a higher source of authority that is not grounded within the society, and therefore not embraced by the society. The result can be that in an 22 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding effort to establish legitimacy, state builders inadvertently create an even greater deficit of legitimacy. These particularistic values can come from various sources that have been referred to by some as ‘higher law’. But as the source of justification, the term ‘higher law’ is misleading in that it suggests a legalistic construct. The type of source material being referenced here is often amorphous and requires interpretation sometimes taking the form of parables or allegories, myths or legends as opposed to clear and distinct injunctions. In this case the term ‘values’ is more appropriate, which is why I suggest an alternative term and one that I use here- after, ‘higher order values’. In the West for millennia, the scriptures were the source of higher order values but Western Enlightenment thinkers began a critical shift away from revelation towards natural rights. This shift displaced the Bible as the source of higher order values in favour of various alternatives that have been philosophically conceptualized in the form of amongst others, utilitarianism, Marxism and social contract ideals. More recently these have been challenged as Western constructs that do not reflect the mechanism through which values are determined in other societies. This challenge has led to alternative outcomes such as the Asian Values movement (Bangkok Declaration) and the efforts of Islamic countries culminating in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. In practice a variety of justification of rules systems have been used as frameworks against which contemporary legal validity can be judged. In South Africa the constitution references universal norms found in international treaties against which the courts judge the legitimacy of the government’s actions. In Jordan it is the King who arbitrates the procedural legitimacy that democracy affords the government of the day, and rules against them if they contradict traditional tribal values. In Iran it is the Guardian Council that assesses laws passed by the parliament against their conformity to Islamic principles. In Indonesia the national ideology of Pancasila served as a source of higher order values. In China and Libya the writings of Mao (Little Red Book)andGhaddafi(Green Book), respectively, guided the development of laws.36 Other largely philosophical efforts have been made based upon for example Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism or Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. All of these examples of higher order values are rooted in belief structures or philosophies derived from sources other than the will of the people living in the country at the time. By drawing upon higher order values, authorities gain a stamp of greater moral authority. Legitimacy is transferred to the state authority as it appears compliant within an Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 23 already legitimized (usually particularistic) framework. Problematically, few state failure or post-conflict statebuilding scholarly works look to higher order values for a source of legitimacy. Even when societies have the same sources of higher order values there is no reason to assume consistency in how power is wielded. Beetham notes how, as a source of higher law, religion has been used to support both monarchical and republican systems of government and in another example how different higher law systems, including religion and tradition, have been used to reinforce the same set of gender rules. To respond to this apparent shortcoming in which the higher order values appear malleable to the whims of established power, Beetham introduces the second element of justification of rules, namely justifiable rule content. He then answers the remaining question, what drives a society to choose one or the other structure? It is in the interest of the dominant society to ensure that the structure that endows it with the right to rule, largely found within the source of higher order values, remains in place. To achieve this it is incumbent upon the dominant group to ensure that its rule provides for its own common interest and that of the subordinate group. Once circumstances change and it becomes evident that an alternative structure of division can better provide for the common interest of a new dominant and subordinate group then a change will occur. The erosion of the dominance of the aristoc- racy in Europe, Beetham argues, was one such instance in which the changing nature of the economy and the state provided opportunities for a better common good, but for the then dominant group to remain would have required a new skillset that no longer resided exclusively with that group.37 The implication for state builders is that to acquire legitimacy, nearly always at the expense of an existing system, the new structure of division being introduced must be shown to be able to better serve the common interest of both the newly appointed dominant group and the subordinate groups (which could include remnants of the former dominant group). This view has been reached through another route by making the case for recognizing the changing composition of the dominant and subordinate groups through a peace building perspective. Attempting to address the root causes of conflict by prescribing ‘solutions’, according to Susan Woodward is the wrong approach.38 Peace is better served by identifying the winners and losers of the changed circumstances as a result of a proposed international intervention and creating a response tailored to minimize disenfranchisement. Under- standing within which group religious institutions fall will help us to 24 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding grasp whether their interests and likely actions will be to support the new structures as members of the dominant or to withhold lending their legitimacy, having been displaced into the new subordinate group. More so than any other of Beetham’s three aspects of legitimacy, the case for considering higher order values is witnessing a decline of attention, largely as its most common historical sources—tradition and religion—are being displaced by various movements such as republican- ism or secularism. But much has been said about the dire consequences to society of a loss of higher order values (without necessarily tying it to the displacement of religion). Emile Durkheim’s concept of anomie is one such example of the consequences of its weakening source. Moral foundation theory, within the field of moral psychology, is a recent attempt to reflect upon the importance of moral foundations in various cultures including trying to understand what is common and similar to morality across different cultures. In circumstances in which religion is considered an authoritative source of higher order values it can form the basis upon which positive law can distinguish between what is just and right. A recent post-conflict statebuilding application of religion as a body of higher order values can be seen in the Afghan constitution. Article 3 of the constitution stipulates that ‘no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.’ Article 119 outlines the oath that members of the Supreme Court must swear which includes: ‘to attain justice and righteousness in accordance with tenets of the Holy religion of Islam’. In this example, Afghanistan adopted a civil law system per se rather than sharia law, but by enshrining Islam as a source of higher order values it gave the law and those who operate within it additional legitimacy, effectively creating a religious legal structure, while abiding by international liberal norms. Alternatively, it need not be the case that the source of higher order values is codified, but simply that society accepts a body of belief that comes with its own inherent value system. Beetham also noted within the justification of rules aspect the normative relationship between the dominant and subordinate and the importance of the common interest (in social psychology referred to as system justification theory). Most religions have some sort of affirmative view on the importance of an authority structure—a dominant group. Some religions have an ascriptive basis for division, while others advocate a meritocratic approach. The Hindu caste system is an example of an ascriptive division of dominant and subordinate.39 In a study of the caste system from 1500 to 2000 Susan Bayly says that the caste Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 25 and jati systems are ‘best seen as composites of ideals and practices that have been made and remade into varying codes of moral order over hundreds or even thousands of years’.40 These moral orders allow dominant groups within authority structures to justify a particular social construct. According to Rao and Ban this was done by perpetuating ‘an ideology where upper castes justify the hierarchy because they internalize the belief that their inherited high status is inevitable as the result of the fruit of efforts in past lives, while lower castes similarly internalize the justification of their low status’.41 The Catholic Church diverges from a deterministic, ascriptive perspective by suggesting in its recent magisterium that, ‘Those who are suited or can become suited should prepare themselves for the difficult, but at the same time, the very noble art of politics.’42 This suggests a meritocratic view that recognizes the importance of a dominant group but does not prescribe who it should comprise.

Religion, legitimacy and expressions of consent Borrowing from Weber’s concept of ‘belief’ by the people, Beetham notes that adherence to a set of rules (legal validity) is not enough unless there is evidence of consent by the people—an acknowledgement by the subordinate for the dominant to wield authority. Evidence of consent is most often expressed through democratic elections but in times of fluctuation it can also be found in other forms such as mass rallies, representative acknowledgement, or in some societies, acts of allegiance. Its provenance in the post-conflict statebuilding field reaches back to decolonization efforts on the part of the European powers to transition authority to local leaders. While in the past this has included returning power to traditional leaders (i.e. Saudi Arabia and Jordan), today democracy is seen as the only legitimate mechanism for eliciting evidence of consent for a new authority. Democracy specialists in the international development community and foreign policy scholars have been the main proponents of this aspect of legitimacy. Organizing elections and election monitoring have become critical responsibilities of international state builders in post-conflict environments. But direct expressions of consent, alone, can lead to outcomes contrary to national and international mores that in turn create oppos- ing legitimizing forces. Slobodan Milosovic, democratically elected in 1990 and then re-elected, albeit in a flawed election in 1992, rode to power on a Greater Serbia platform. He had gained legitimacy for his policies through elections yet he lost legitimacy by breaching international laws and was eventually indicted by the International Criminal 26 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Court. An alternative example is the overthrow of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Despite being democratically elected only a year earlier, the mass mobilization of protesters in the months leading up to the coup in July meant that the means of legitimization had been transferred from the ballot box to the streets. There was no clearer sign of this than a few weeks later when General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi called on Egyptians to take to the streets to give him a mandate to tackle ‘violence and terrorism’, a responsibility that the elected authorities no longer were entrusted to undertake.43 In some cases alternative forms of expressions of consent other than democracy can create a temporary legitimacy for state builders. Australia’s intervention in the Solomon Islands, unlike in other contemporaneous interventions that sought and in some cases received approval through the UN or regional bodies, was partially legitimized through a Solomon Islands parliamentary act. The 2003 Facilitation of International Assistance Act was an expression of consent by Solomon Islands’ parliamentarians ostensibly representing their community. While contributing to the legitimacy of the mission, relying upon political intermediaries for consent increases the risk of false legitimacy in which the state builders become beholden to a political faction in government or alternatively the political faction becoming a proxy of the foreign forces. Religious institutions with high standings in their communities can also have a legitimizing effect through expressions of consent. Their influence is not limited only to mass mobilization on the streets or at the ballot box as is often seen through oppositional roles, but instead it can also extend to three direct means of legitimization, what I have designated as—direct acknowledgement, direct association and direct participation. Direct acknowledgement of authority represents the explicit establishment of a formal relationship between the religious institution and state authority. It occurs when a religious institution officially recognizes its interlocutors through a formal instrument such as concordats that are negotiated between the Catholic Church and states. In this way some of the lustre of the Catholic Church’s legitimacy is passed onto a state authority through its formal and public engagement at an international level. Direct association is when there is an implicit relationship exhibited publicly between religious authorities and the state. Legitimacy in this way is transferred through the state authority’s association with a popularly legitimate institution. To give one example: In 1990 the Croatian Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 27 parliament proclaimed a new president, Franjo Tudjman. Walking from parliament to the main square, he stopped only to pray at an altar of the Virgin Mary, then in the central square where crowds had gathered to mark the historic moment, Tudjman from one side and Cardinal Kuharic from the other, climbed onto the stage and stood side by side with only a baby’s cradle between them.44 The message was clear, the spiritual and temporal were uniting for the infant nation. Lastly, direct participation, I define as existing when clergy have formal decision making authority in the governance of the state. This occurs, though with markedly different levels of influence, in Iran through the positions of Supreme Leader, half of the Guardian Coun- cil and the entire Assembly of Experts, as well as in the United Kingdom by way of the 26 seats assigned to the Anglican bishops in the House of Lords. In a study of the latter’s voting patterns between 1979 and 1987, Francis Bown found the bishops’ influence minimal with only one instance being found to have changed the outcome of a division in the House. Nevertheless, he writes, ‘Perhaps for a government—particularly a conservative government—what matters about the Lords Spiritual is their ability to sustain or withdraw a degree of legitimacy.’45 Con- versely, in the case of Iran the positions reserved for religious authorities are influential and more powerful than those derived through popular elections. In addition, but less directly, social movement theory offers another way that religious institutions can contribute to legitimacy. Through the process known as ‘frame realignment’, or what John Rawls has referred to as ‘overlapping consensus’, ideas grounded in religious or cultural legitimacy can be borrowed, transferring existing expressions of consent from religious sources to secular agents who adopt these concepts. For example, the legitimacy of religious teaching against the abuse of power can be borrowed to fight corruption by framing a secular government’s anti-corruption programme within a religious context using familiar and respected terminologies or symbols.46 An example of frame realignment is how in Indonesia, despite it being a predominantly Islamic country and each of its leaders Muslims, there is a belief among the Javanese that power has a spiritual essence, given to chosen people, known as wayhu. As a result Jonathon Fox describes how Indonesia’s presidents have ‘sought to create the impression that they [have] wayhu’.47 By acknowledging the existence of wayhu Indonesians express consent in the authority of those who possess it. Former presidents had borrowed that expressed consent to garner themselves with its legitimacy. Another example of frame alignment is when secular 28 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding governments embrace or regulate religion in an effort to enhance their legitimacy by engaging with already legitimized religious institutions. Colin Beck ascribes this mechanism to the emergence of political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa.48 Indigenous state builders, he claims, embraced religious symbolism early in their country’s nation- hood to legitimize their authority. I would suggest that none of these frame realignment examples would exist were they based upon limited or controversial expressions of consent. In other words had religious or spiritual beliefs not been widely and positively held in esteem among the Javanese or Muslims of North Africa and the Middle East then the state authorities would not have attempted to draw upon them for legitimacy. On the contrary, only because these symbols, ideas and values were already so widely legitimized did the state seek to borrow their legitimacy. Borrowing legitimacy from religious institutions may not always be as straightforward as it may appear that I am suggesting. In cases where the emergent state encompasses multiple and largely equally distributed faiths among the population or in cases where the preceding conflict became embellished with a religious hue then any attempt at benefit- ing from religion’s legitimacy is fraught with dangers. This is not to say that there is no way forward in such cases. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the negotiation of the 2006 Basic Agreement with the Catholic Church, despite it being the smallest of the three main faith’s in the country, strengthened the state’s as well as the nation’s legitimacy among the Catholic population. It could be argued that it even strengthened the perception of the state’s legitimacy among non-Catholics also as others (particularly the Muslim population) would have seen the Catholic Church’s recognition of the nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the current boundaries as reducing the likelihood of continuing sepa- ratist sentiment that could lead to a renewal of conflict. Importantly, though, the agreement was wisely promulgated 11 years after the peace, much sooner and it could have reignited religious tensions, but with over a decade having passed after the war it reinforced the state’s objectives of entrenching the status quo borders. Conversely, neighbouring Croatia, which is a predominantly Catholic state, whose war of independence was not fought along religious divides, signed its agreements with the Vatican in 1996 and 1998, following very quickly after the end of the war in 1995. The table below summarizes the methods I have suggested by which religious institutions can contribute to each of Beetham’s three aspects of legitimacy. It’s important to note that despite Beetham arguing that Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 29

Table 1.1 Religious institutions and legitimization

Beetham’s requirements for How religious institutions may legitimacy contribute to legitimization

Legitimization Legal validity Religion serves as a direct source of law of authority OR The religion as practised within the country has a tradition and system for arbitrating the legality of political activities Justification of rules Higher order The religion is recognized as a source of values higher order values. The benefit in this case is that a higher order set of values exist, regardless of how it is interpreted AND Dominant/ The religion’s doctrine reinforces the subordinate new (post-conflict) dominant and subordinate relationship within society Expressions of By what means Direct association consent are religious Direct figures engaging acknowledgement with authority? Direct ANY OF participation Indirectly (frame realignment) for an authority to attain legitimacy it must meet all three aspects, it must be remembered that alongside the legitimizing potential of religious institutions there are other state legitimizing relationships on- going simultaneously. This means that for a religious institution to contribute to an authority’s legitimization the institution would not need to be able to contribute to all three aspects of legitimacy (Table 1.1).

Religion and institutional effectiveness

Two key deliverables are widely cited in state failure and post-conflict statebuilding literature as crucial for the governing apparatus to ensure the provision of, namely, security and the delivery of basic services. Others have suggested adding law making and policy development,49 economic growth50 or civil freedoms,51 though the case for these as being critical appears weak. The making of laws and policies is very 30 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding different from their successful application, which requires at the very least basic human needs being met as well as stability. Economic growth, while necessary for failing states to make the transition out of fragility, unless adequately distributed, can be a destabilizing factor in the immediate post-conflict aftermath, while a lack of civil freedoms has not hampered many high growth states. Instead, I prefer to identify these as lower order elements below those that I call primary order elements of post-conflict statebuilding, namely, security and basic service provision, with the third being the already discussed legitimacy.

Security Despite broad consensus that the provision of security is a critical element in the post-conflict period, little effort has been made to define it. While missing in post-conflict statebuilding literature, attempts at defining security can be found in practitioner and policy oriented research. Problematically, though, these reports are targeted at foreign audiences, defined in such ways as can be useful to foreign military and police forces as opposed to how local communities may see these concepts. This shortcoming then leads to a biased analysis that inherently preferences foreign actions at the expense of local solutions. For example, the document, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, developed by the United States Institute of Peace and the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute defines a ‘safe and secure environment’ as one that allows for ‘people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence’.52 The best way to achieve an environment without large-scale violence is by sending foreign police and military personnel, an option that has deliv- ered limited or no sustainable success.53 But security in the context of post-conflict statebuilding is more than the prevention of ‘systematic or large-scale violence’, it also extends to the protection against government appropriation of land, domestic violence, police brutality and abuse of power, environmental vandalism, intimidation, land dispute settlement, localized crime and social disorder, among others. Such an extended definition requires active participation by local security forces (which may take many years to reconstitute, train or build from scratch) and/or non-state actors, the latter of which can contribute immediately through their widespread presence. This non-state involvement is a fundamental aspect of security according to a 2007 OECD (Organi- zation of Economic Co-operation and Development) report that claims that as many as 80 per cent of the people in today’s fragile states rely upon non-state actors for various forms of security and justice—a rarely Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 31 acknowledged source of public security.54 Similarly, a World Bank review notes that ‘of the 78 assessments of legal and justice systems undertaken by the Bank since 1994, many mention the prevalence of traditional justice in the countries looked at’, problematically, though, ‘none explore the systems in detail or examine links between local level systems and state regimes’.55 As I am considering the role of religious institutions in post-conflict statebuilding I engage with a sub-component of the broader concept of security, namely, public security. Public security includes, for example, ensuring an ordered response to the settling of debts, minor corruption or abuse of power, localized power struggles, domestic violence and petty theft. This aspect of security cannot be met by foreign military and police contingents who can only impose an exogenous layer of security.56 Knowledge of the local culture, language and customs is critical to establishing a stable and secure environment and in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction, before local policing is effectively (re-)established, only non-state authorities can provide this. Depending upon the country and society included in this group are tribal, traditional and religious leaders. When not engaged as proxies for the state, there are three main mechanisms through which religious institutions can contribute to public security, (1) adjudication and mediation of disputes; (2) building social ties that bind society; and (3) establishing and socializing civic values.

Adjudication and mediation of disputes Beginning with the adjudication and mediation of disputes, in the context of post-conflict statebuilding, non-state systems are of particular importance for two reasons. Firstly, detention facilities are more likely to be truncated, ineffective or even non-existent in the early stages of post-conflict statebuilding. As such customary law systems that largely do not rely upon imprisonment are particularly salient.57 Secondly, following the end of a conflict retribution is a strong motivator of violence. Customary systems often focus upon reconciliation in contradistinction to civil or common law which focuses upon punishment (and in some cases rehabilitation).58 In this vein Desmond Tutu described African customary justice as being more ‘restorative rather than retributive’.59 The reach of customary justice systems varies: The basis of law in ‘much of rural Eritrea’, encompassing 80 per cent of the population remains customary law;60 in neighbouring Ethiopia even though the constitution limits customary and religious institutions to private and family matters Zeleke has shown that they nevertheless extend their remit into the criminal sector because in part people prefer them;61 in Sierra Leone 32 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

85 per cent of the population falls under the jurisdiction of customary law and overall an estimated 80 per cent of Africa.62 Despite acknowledgement by the OECD and reports from the World Bank (as noted earlier) customary law remains largely in the domain of anthropologists rather than being found within post-conflict statebuilding literature. This omission is also reflected in practice among the community of practitioners involved in the rule of law in transition- ing states. Religion and religious actors play varying roles, depending upon the society, in the application of customary law. Abu Nimer considers this by separating tribal laws from those based upon sharia and those derived from cultural or traditional practices that are partly influenced by sharia.63 Focusing on the Arab world he argues that it is not only within nomadic tribal societies, but also rural and even some urban areas in which these dispute resolution systems operate.64 The fragile and failed states of Yemen and Somalia offer examples of how Islamic groups can contribute to public security. R. B. Serjeant, an Arabist and specialist in Yemeni culture described the customary legal system in that country as ‘tribal anarchy’.65 This ‘anarchy’ that exists beyond the boundaries of each tribe means that disputes involving different tribes- men can escalate into conflict. Serjeant identifies the system’s need for arbiters to establish a secure neutral place for mediation between tribes. Of these arbiters he wrote, none is ‘more acceptable than the member of a house upon which Allah has conferred some superior and supernatural quality—for who can quarrel with God’s authority?’66 Similarly, across the Red Sea in Somalia, a state that has been widely considered as failed since 1991, the role of religious customary law in providing for public security is most evident in the dispersed predecessors of what became in 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). After the collapse of the government in 1991, at a time when no state entity was able to provide security, Islamic courts emerged. The genesis of these courts in the early nineties was based upon an organic need for law and order, in particular with regards to business transactions.67 Overtime they began to oversee a wider judicial system, which according to Mantzikos they managed effectively, in what was for all intents and purposes a failed state environment.68 The Islamic courts generally received public support during this period, and then in 1999 they began to assert their authority culminating seven years later in the regional system of Islamic courts banding together to form a rival government to compete with the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa. Between 1998 and the Ethiopian incursions in 2006 it is widely acknowledged that the UIC Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 33 had restored law and order to southern Somalia.69 Despite misrepre- sentation suggesting the UIC was a terrorist front, according to the US government’s Congressional Research Service the leadership of the UIC throughout this period remained in the hands of religious scholars and professors.70 Although limited in geographic scope these examples show how religious actors contribute to the administration of justice, a critical component of public security. That the very nature of such systems is that they eschew coercion through force makes them a potentially critical factor for stability in states where there is no monopoly of force. The key questions to consider in applying this theoretical framework to a particular context are: (1) what role does customary law play in society; (2) to what degree is religion a constituent part; and (3) is the religious mediation and arbitration system dependent upon other actors’ enforcement?

Building social ties that bind society The second mechanism that I suggest non-state actors can contribute to public security is social capital. The relationship between social capital and public security is through its impact upon crime. It is based upon an axiomatic proposition that the stronger the ties that bind a community together the lesser the crime rate will be. Broadly speaking the proposition rests upon the idea that social capital increases the probability of arrest by reinforcing civic engagement, community engagement and social controls, and secondly, that social capital increases the cost of crime (in the sense of an individual’s choice to pursue it through an increased value of reputation and potential social sanctions against criminal activity). Current research has interrogated this relationship further by considering, firstly, whether the positive elements of strong community ties outweigh the benefits that tight knit communities might offer criminal groups; secondly, if social capital does contribute to reducing crime, to what degree; and thirdly, do all types of social capital contribute equally to reducing crime? In response to the first question, research by Buonanno, Montailio and Vanin suggests that on balance, as best as can be measured, there remains an overall inverse relationship between social capital and crime even after taking into consideration the potential benefits criminal groups gain.71 Empirical research by Akcomak and ter Weel has responded to the second question by suggesting that ‘the inclusion of social capital explains about 10 per cent of the total variation in crime rates’, which, relative to other standard determinants that explain about half of the variations, 34 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding suggests it is of a ‘substantial magnitude’.72 Beyerlein and Hipp con- cluded through empirical research that a particular type of social capital known as ‘bridging capital’ contributes to reducing crime, while another type, ‘bonding capital’, actually increases crime.73 Civic organizations help build bridging capital, they suggest, by giving a setting through which intercommunity links can be built. Despite these studies being undertaken in stable Western states, the suggestion that strengthening bridging capital can substantially improve public security would appear to be robust enough to be applicable, with contextual consideration and pending further research, in post-conflict statebuilding environments. For religious institutions to contribute to improving public security by way of reducing crime they would be required to exhibit a capacity to build either bonding or bridging capital depending upon the bonded group profile of the society. Recent research on the evolution of civ- ilizations now tends towards the view that early religions emerged as a means of strengthening social bonds among ever increasing groups of non-related people.74 Participation in religious practices served as a means for strangers to express an intention to cooperate with the norms of a society. It was only later that moral values emerged as a core component of religion. Today, morality is an important aspect of most religious beliefs, which is discussed in the following section, but religion remains a vibrant means of social bonding. Understanding what role religion plays in such group bonding is critical to determining the type of religious social capital that will contribute to stabilization. Within heterogeneous religious communities, bonded by religion, bridging capital would reduce crime but bonding capital could lead to increased crime (top left hand corner of Table 1.2). But in religiously bonded homogenous states, building bonding capital would deliver a similar impact to bridging capital in religiously bonded heterogeneous states, as crime is reduced when the barriers between groups are reduced (bottom left hand corner of Table 1.2).

Table 1.2 Types of beneﬁcial social capital

Religiously bonded Other basis of bonding societies (tribal, class, geographic)

Heterogeneous religious Religious bridging Religious bonding and profile across the state capital bridging capital Homogenous religious Religious bonding Religious bonding capital profile across the state capital Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 35

Any detailed consideration of how religions inﬂuence social capital must begin by responding to bonding and bridging capital separately, and secondly, each religion should be considered through aspects that I identify as inﬂuencing social capital, namely, their liturgy, congregational activities and teaching, as I do in the following section.75

Bonding capital. Both Islam and Christianity have a communal liturgy that has a theological element which rewards the faithful spiritually for coming together in prayer. Such a coming together is what Putnam sees as building an associational life and enhancing the community’s bonding capital.76 These elements serve to reinforce Graham and Haidt’s three binding (as opposed to individual) moral foundations (loyalty, respect, sanctity) that are present in all societies.77 Jesus said in Matthew 18:19: ‘For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I among them.’ In Hebrews 10:25 the author warns the community not to give up meeting together for the purpose of worshipping God. The Qur’an has a disputed and very tangential reference to communal prayer, nevertheless, it has become a tradition among Muslims supported by at least one hadith: ‘If there are three men in a village or in the desert among whom prayer is not offered (in congregation), the devil has got the mastery over them. So observe (prayer) in congregation, for the wolf eats only the straggling animal.’78 These sacred words form the justification for communal prayer in these faiths. It needn’t have been this way, prayer could have been an individual undertaking as Jesus suggests in Matthew 6:5–6, ‘And when you pray, do not be like the hypocrites, for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and on the street corners to be seen by others ...But when you pray, go into your room, close the door and pray to your Father, who is unseen.’ In Islam the Bourguiba regime in Tunisia discouraged group prayers and instead suggested individual prayer as being sufficient.79 Despite these opportunities for divergence, Islam and Christianity embraced a liturgy that brings together the community in prayer on a regular basis. Bonding capital can also be strengthened through congregational activities. These activities can include prayer groups; classes during which the faith is taught; feast, martyr and saints days and celebrations to break fasts. In traditional societies, in particular in rural areas, these events may be undertaken together as a community including people of other faiths. Examples of events that bring religious communities 36 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding together include iftar, the breaking of each day’s fast during Ramadan, and among Christians the celebration of a locality’s patron saint. Teaching to live a social life within bonded groups can also be sourced from the scriptures as well as from religious doctrine. Within the teachings of both Islam and Christianity there are suggestions of implicit or even in some cases explicit preferences for a religiously bonded group. Such divisions within society could hamper strengthening bonding capital if the de facto group boundaries do not overlap with the divinely prescribed boundaries. This could be in circumstances where ethnicity or nationality are the basis of a bonded group while religious teaching precludes certain members within this ethnically or nationally bonded group. For example, the state of Israel creates a different bonded group from that of the nation of the Israelites which is a religiously bonded group. In Islam the broadest category of what could be argued to be taught as the basis of a bonded group would be dar al-Islam, a concept that is not found in the Qur’an but in a hadith that has subsequently been fleshed out by the various schools of jurisprudence.80

Bridging capital. Bridging capital, being the component of social capital that operates between different bonded groups, can potentially be strengthened in post-conflict environments through the liturgy depending upon how the conflict evolved. For countries that saw sectarian differences exacerbate or drive a conflict the liturgy is an unlikely source for bridging capital. For instance, in Iraq where the bonded groups are Sunni and Shia, bridging capital would need to reach across the Sunni– Shia divide. Although theologically there is no reason that prevents Iraqi Sunnis and Shiite from praying in each other’s mosques there is a visible difference in the way their prayer is practised—Sunnis wrap their arms around their torso when praying, Shia do not, the Shia may use a stone below their forehead when genuflecting, the Sunni do not. Under tense sectarian circumstances such highly visible differences would dissuade groups coming together in prayer and building bridging capital through the liturgy. Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the bonded groupings were largely separated along the axis of Serbian Orthodox–Muslim– Roman Catholic. As within Islam, there are visible differences in the way prayer is practised between the Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular how adherents cross themselves. Serbian Orthodox Christians clasp the thumb, index and middle finger of the right hand together when making the cross and intone ‘Holy Spirit’ when the hand is on the right breast with ‘Amen’ Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 37 being said as the hand reaches the left shoulder. Croatian Catholics use the open right hand bringing the four fingers with the thumb lowered together and move first to the left shoulder then right while intoning ‘Holy Spirit’ before moving the hand to the centre and saying ‘Amen’. Unlike in Islam, the spiritual benefits of interdenominational attendance at mass are complex and contested. A Catholic, according to Canon Law, can receive certain sacraments from an Eastern Ortho- dox Church ‘whenever necessity requires it or true spiritual advantage suggests it’, and importantly, ‘for whom it is physically or morally impossible to approach a Catholic minister’.81 Catholic priests can administer certain sacraments to members of the Eastern Orthodox Churches if they seek it and are properly disposed.82 But according to at least one interpretation of Orthodox doctrine, members are not allowed to receive communion from non-Orthodox churches.83 And neither of the Christian faiths are likely to seek spiritual satisfaction from within a mosque. These theological viewpoints limit the likelihood of adherents of different religiously bonded groups building bridging capital through religious liturgies. Alternatively though, in religiously homogenous post-conflict statebuilding environments, such as Afghanistan or Cambodia where the bonded groups are divided along tribal, ethnic or political lines, the liturgy can potentially have a positive impact in bringing these groups together. In such situations religious celebrations can bring different groups together under the sanctity of their faith that may not otherwise come together. Engaging with religious leaders to lead such events can be a mechanism through which bridging capital can be strengthened. Congregational activities in both heterogeneous and homogeneous religious societies can reach across faith groups and contribute to building bridging capital. In the former Yugoslavia Bringa notes how in some villages the Muslims and Christians would participate in each other’s feast days and even coordinate the usage of common facilities during overlapping religious celebrations.84 This coordination and interaction helped these communities to build bridges between them. Alternatively, the status associated with significant congregational symbols such as an old church or an important mosque within a disparate community can also have the power to bring people together across different cultures and denominations. The influence of teaching in building bridging capital varies considerably across the faiths. The body of sources is extensive and depending upon the interpreter different messages for inter-religious relations can 38 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding be derived ranging from advocating violence to encouraging peace. In addition, much research has been undertaken on the role of religion and peace-building from which detailed scriptural emphasis can be found on the importance of peaceful relations, which in turn can be used to strengthen bridging capital.85 As such, I will only draw upon the most prominent specific mention within Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam of how relations between religiously bonded groups should be treated and suggest that further contextual study is required. For Roman Catholics, teaching on the standing of other religions and nature of Christian relations across religious divides has been codified in the Second Vatican Council document, Nostra aetate.86 It is best known for its shift in stance towards Jews who prior to its promulgation were considered by the Church as collectively responsible for Jesus’ death fos- tering a centuries long animosity towards the Jewish community. This document moved the Church away from this view by suggesting that Jews of subsequent generations cannot be held responsible for the sins of those who called for Jesus to be crucified. This document also encourages rapprochement with the Islamic faith: ‘[T]his sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom.’87 While for other faiths it simply offers a qualified acknowledgement of their spirituality. In its entirety it encourages respectful relationships with other religions. The document itself draws upon among other Biblical references, Romans 12:18, ‘If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men.’ As Islam allows for a much more dispersed approach to interpreting the sacred texts there are various views of what constitutes proper relations with non-Muslims in situations where communities are bonded by religious belief. These range from textual literalists such as the Salafists who emphasize the differences, to the more moderate interpretations of Islamic liberals who emphasize similarities.88 The positions taken up by both groups can be grounded in the Qur’an. In sura 2:256, a Meccan period sura, it states, ‘There is no compulsion in religion’, laying a basis for peaceful relations between different religious groups. Seem- ingly supportive of this sentiment the Medinan period sura 49:13 states, ‘We ...made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other),’ and to the Christians and Jews it calls for understanding, ‘Say: “O People of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: That we worship none but Allah,” ’ (3:64). But the concept of abrogation (naskh)89 suggests to some that Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 39 under circumstances of contradiction between the meaning of different passages the chronologically latter revelation prevails. On the matter of relations with non-Muslims, Ibn Salamah (d. 1019) claimed the ‘sword verse’ (9:5) abrogated 124 prior verses:

But when the forbidden months are past, then ﬁght and slay the Pagans wherever ye ﬁnd them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practise regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.

Though others saw it differently, al-Suyuti (d. 1505) identiﬁed only 19 abrogated verses while Abu Muslim denied naskh altogether.90 The adop- tion of abrogation as an exegetical tool is the basis of one of the many exegetical battle lines that separate Muslim conservatives from liberals as well as divide the ranks of Islamic scholars. Religion’s contributions to establishing public security through the strengthening of social capital are complex and wrought with the danger of acerbating tensions between different groupings. Simply strengthening social capital, as most literature advocates, can counterproductively lead to reinforcing pre-existing destabilizing divisions within the society. Once aware of the lines of social division and the type of social capital that would positively contribute, as I outlined in Table 1.2, leads then to the question of whether the religion, as practised, is capable of contributing to that type of social capital. This, I suggest, can be done by considering their liturgy, congregational activities and teaching as it contributes to bonding and bridging capital.

Establishing and socializing civic values The third mechanism for non-state actors to strengthen public security is by reinforcing and socializing conducive norms. Not only is there the direct impact of socializing citizens through the inculcation of civil norms but establishing a set of common civic values also prevents what Emile Durkheim called anomie,asocietyinwhichthere is a feeling of alienation, disconnect and mismatched social mores that can undermine stability and the rule of law. Creating a consensus around what a society’s civic norms are and educating citizens of this standard can be the responsibility of governments, but I would argue that there is also a role for non-state actors, especially those that are repositories of cultural norms. Stromseth et al. rightly argue within the context of post-conflict statebuilding that, ‘The rule of 40 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding law is as much a culture as a set of institutions, as much a matter of habits, commitments, and beliefs of ordinary people as of legal codes.’91 They draw upon research that suggests that people obey the law because of its perceived morality, legitimacy and fairness.92 In most post- conflict statebuilding environments these aspects of the legal system are likely to have been weakened or compromised requiring reconsti- tuting. Problematically though, Stromseth et al. note that international post-conflict statebuilding efforts that engage with the rule of law rarely adopt activities that can contribute to the development of such a culture.93 Despite their suggestion that this is largely a factor of the specialists who don’t conceptualize their role as agents of social change it is equally as much an issue that culture cannot be changed in any meaningful way by external actors.94 Engaging with religious institutions to aid in the reconstitution or strengthening of a rule of law culture can play a substantial role in contributing to public security in post-conflict environments. Religious institutions have a long history of their values being embraced by society and continue today to be sought out for commentary on their positions on moral issues. But as with legitimacy, there appears to be either a cognizant aversion or a negligent omission of the role of religion in acculturating the rule of law in the post-conflict statebuilding context as I could not find any studies that suggest this possibility. Despite references by scholars of rule of law to the morality of laws or people’s beliefs, religion is a glaring omission. For example, in the above mentioned work by Stromseth et al. despite an entire chapter focusing on creating rule of law cultures they don’t discuss religion and, notable by its absence, the culture inherently imbued through the practice of Islamic fiqh and sharia law. Though hotly disputed, there has been considerable research in the context of church–state relations within Western countries on religious values and social order. The 1983 work of Tittle and Welch summarizes the affirmative position based upon research garnered from within the United States:

The fundamental idea is that social order rests on collectively held values ...To the extent that people internalize moral commitments reﬂecting consensual values, they will probably not contemplate deviance, or if they do consider rule breaking, moral revulsion or potential feelings of guilt will restrict action. Religion presumably aids internalization by linking supernatural sanctions to moral precepts, many of which correspond to behaviour norms of the Religion and Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding 41

larger society. Moreover, participation in religious activities and institutions continually reinforces and strengthens internalized moral commitments—therefore, according to functional thinking, religious training and active participation should be highly predictive of conformity to social rules—at least those social rules which religious groups deﬁne as having moral components.95

Furthermore, relevant to post-conflict statebuilding, they write that ‘when secular moral guidelines are unavailable, in flux, or have lost their authority and hence their power to compel, the salience of religious proscriptions is enhanced’ (emphasis added).96 More recently, various experiments by social psychologists show that the belief in an omniscient God improves social behaviour, though, in some countries the replacement of religion with secular institutions including the courts, police and mechanisms for enforcing contracts have replaced religion’s omniscience and therefore its role in the community as a facilitator of social good will.97 As this book is based upon the presumption that the reach of law enforcement has been greatly diminished following the collapse of state authority within post-conflict statebuilding environments, religious values can be especially effective in contributing to social order. Importantly, though, as noted above, only ‘those social rules which religious groups define as having moral components’, are applicable. This requires a theological understanding of the world view of different religions, a course of study which I undertake later. Frame realignment was discussed earlier as a means of conveying expressions of consent. It can also be seen as a theoretical mechanism through which to understand how entrenched values such as those related to the rule of law are borrowed and retooled for other purposes. In Seyyad Nasr’s detailed consideration of Islam and state power that focuses on Malaysia and Pakistan, he notes that leaders in those countries drove the introduction of Islamic values into governance to meet the state’s purposes, namely economic growth and state hegemony. Nasr goes on to describe how Malaysia’s then prime minister, Mohammad Mahatir, inculcated Islamic values:

The government promoted the values of justice, honesty, efﬁciency, dedication, diligence, and self-discipline as Islamic values for government administration as well as entrepreneurial activity. In the early 1980s seminars for government administrators advocated hard work in the context of Islamic belief and practice.98 42 Religion and Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding

Prime Minister Mahatir was attempting to orchestrate an Islamic ‘disciplinary revolution’ that drew upon religious values.99 Gregory Starrett refers to this mechanism as ‘functionalizing Islam’. In his study of Egypt he found a similar approach in that the importance of Islam’s ideas, symbols and the concept of ‘true’ Islamic behaviour are no longer measured within the education system by their spiritual value, but rather by their utility to perform social work including ‘fulfilling the police functions that Europeans attributed to education’.100 If led by foreign state builders, attempting to overtly ‘functionalize’ religion will undoubtedly lead to counterproductive outcomes, but engaging with religious institutions can give them the opportunity to become involved if there is a mutual interest in a successful post-conflict statebuilding outcome. The other way that religious institutions can acculturate rule of law during the post-conflict statebuilding phase is directly as teachers of moral values related to public life such as those of the Ten Command- ments that relate to social interaction: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not steal; and Not bear false witness. This approach requires an understanding of how teaching and preaching is undertaken in religions as much as the theology. In Abrahamic religious traditions the weekly sermon is the main mechanism through which religious values are conveyed to believers. Within Islam the scope for the topic of the Friday sermon (khutba in Arabic) is largely open to the imam leaving the possibility for discussion on topics related to the rule of law and an opportunity to contribute to public security from the minbar though in some countries a state institution dictates the topic of the Friday prayer. In most Christian denominations the topic of the homily is drawn from the scriptural readings of the day—a set of readings identified within the lectionary which revolve through most of the Bible over a period of three years. In the Catholic tradition the topic of the homily is specifically limited to a topic emanating from that day’s mass.101 While the two readings, psalm and Gospel recitation are fixed, limiting the scope of topic for the sermon, other aspects of the mass can be rich sources of inspiration such as the creed and the Eucharist. Although this allows for some leeway it is nevertheless far more limiting than the Muslim tradition. This limited opportunity for a Catholic cleric to engage on matters related to the rule of law, unless he can build a relevant homily from the readings, restricts the potential impact that weekly sermons can have in acculturating the importance of the rule of law. There are other mechanisms through which religious values are shared with the community including: religious publications, public commentary and public events. Any Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 43 case study should consider the extent of a religious institution’s reach into the public sphere through each of these mediums. Having suggested that current scholarship recognizes the role religion can play in stabilizing societies but that post-conflict statebuilding literature has ignored it, I identified two mechanisms through which religious values contribute to security in the post-conflict context. Reli- gion as a repository of rule of law values can influence post-conflict statebuilding, indirectly, when other institutions borrow their values, rituals and symbols (frame realignment) or directly, by way of preaching and teaching. Which is the most appropriate and effective will depend upon the particular post-conflict statebuilding context, with consideration of the standing of the institutions relative to the religion being an important determining factor.

Basic services Basic services are the second priority aspect thought to be integral to preventing institutional failure. The provision of basic services is the most likely to receive substantial funding among the broad set of aid related activities in post-conflict settings. This is probably one reason why the RAND Corporation found that there was ‘no mission whose overall success was compromised by inadequacies in this aspect of its operation’.102 This is not to say that there are no challenges in the delivery of basic services, but being a sector with a substantially more developed set of actors (longer institutional histories, access to multiple financing sources and often rooted in the very societies in crisis) above and beyond those of other aid sectors (rule of law, democracy and so on) and its success in raising funds from both public and private sources has seen a very robust and successful response to most emergencies. Nevertheless, its relative success should not divert scholarly attention from interrogating its mechanisms and reflecting upon the role of religious institutions. The provision of basic services has variably been defined in post- conflict statebuilding literature as welfare, social services or basic needs. Within scholarship and in practice there is a clear division between humanitarian relief and development. These are distinguished by their content and, in the post-conflict statebuilding context, their relative priority. Recognizing the urgency for the state to provide tangible lifesaving support to its people, humanitarian relief is second only to security in a hierarchy of priorities while longer term development comes in sixth.103 As such, while acknowledging the importance of longer term development the focus of this book will be on the higher priority of humanitarian relief. The aid industry’s standard for humanitarian agencies 44 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding providing basic services, Sphere Standards, lists lifesaving priorities (what I suggest matches the term ‘basic services’ in post-conflict statebuilding literature) as being, water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; and health action.104 Unlike with the provision of security, where local non-state actors have largely been ignored by state builders, for the provision of basic services they are seen as critical partners who can even lead the overall effort. Two mechanisms in particular stand out: facilitating, through international partnerships, material foreign assistance, and secondly, local non-state actors can contribute through the mobilization of internal resources. Different partnership mechanisms exist for the facilitation of foreign assistance by local non-state actors, some being on an ad hoc basis, others through a permanent relationship. Examples include foreign NGOs establishing locally registered charitable arms, churches partnering with churches or new community representative groups being elected to interact with foreign entities. In East Timor the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) led NGO implemented shelter-building project that I was involved in asked the community to identify those in need with the guidance of our staff, and then we provided the raw materials while families and the community built the houses. An important differentiation needs to be made between the state delivering basic services and the state ensuring the delivery of basic services. From the perspective of post-conflict statebuilding, I take the view that the latter is sufficient. It is not necessary that the state apparatus alone delivers basic goods and services to prevent failure, but rather that it ensures an environment such that goods and services are being deliv- ered by authorized agents (as opposed to any agent, which could lead to legitimacy failure). Such alternate actors could come from the private and civil sectors as well as religious communities. Looking initially beyond the specific circumstances of post-conflict statebuilding, religious institutions play a prominent role in the delivery of basic services in developing countries. In Tanzania 13 per cent of health dispensaries, 22 per cent of health centres and 40 per cent of hospitals are run by traditional Christian churches (Catholic, Lutheran and Anglican).105 In Malawi 37 per cent of healthcare services are provided by religious institutions while in Nigeria the figure is as high as 60 per cent.106 In Rwanda 40 per cent of health services are provided by religious organizations.107 Together, the Caritas associations of the Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 45

Catholic Church manage 5558 hospitals around the world and 17,763 health dispensaries, mainly in Africa and Latin America.108 Material humanitarian assistance mobilized by religious institutions has been the focus of considerable scholarship. The most recent being Matthew Clarke’s contribution which provides a basic introduction to the provision of developmental and humanitarian needs through the lens of five different faith traditions (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism).109 His work begins by reviewing the stated goals of each religion (as opposed to their theology)110 and then when considering the mechanisms for the provision of assistance he does so from the perspective of faith-based organizations associated with each religion as opposed to the religious institutions themselves. Clarke explains diagrammatically the different ways in which faith based organizations and secular NGOs can be perceived or defined.111 Of the six types presented, the one that is relevant to this book is what he has defined as the vector model. Caritas and some locally registered Islamic charities are examples of this model in that they are in some form of official association with or subordinate to a religious institution. For example, the Catholic Church has locally registered charitable entities in developed and developing countries (SCIAF, CRS, Caritas Rwanda, Caritas Polska in Scotland, the United States, Rwanda and Poland respectively) that operate under the auspices of their local Bishops Conference. For Caritas organizations, the Vatican’s Pontifical Council Cor Unum oversees, alongside the Secretariat of State, matters pertaining to international donor assistance. As to the degree of influence of the Episcopal Conference or the Vatican it varies between the national agencies depending upon the size of the agency (larger operations receive more episcopal attention) and the source of funding (direct Vatican funding tends towards greater control by the Holy See). In other instances religious institutions manage resources and distribute aid directly without relying upon a separately structured organization. Having a faith based organization that is a subsidiary of a religious institution or a religious institution delivering aid directly is not in any way indicative of whether the organization/institution will contribute more or less to the provision of basic needs than other models of aid delivery. Instead an assessment of the organization’s capacity would be more informative. The ability of the group to scale up activities as the need and resources become available is not a given, nor are internal systems and personnel equally capable of managing small sums as with large sums of project funds. For most charitable organizations government stipulated reporting and audit requirements impose restrictions 46 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding that require considerable additional resources to be able to scale up operations. For others an inability to adequately account for expenditure to members or donors will preclude further donations. Understanding the capacity of the vector model charitable group prior to the post-conflict period would be suggestive of its ability to contribute during the peace to meeting the basic needs of the population. Community solidarity is an alternative, much under researched, source of basic needs. Whereas external humanitarian assistance most often comes in the form of material resources, community solidarity is of a different nature. Societies within the borders of a post-conflict statebuilding environment have in most cases themselves been affected by the preceding and sometimes on-going conflict leaving them unable to provide substantial material or financial support. Instead, the support provided from within a community comes in more intangible forms such as local knowledge, capacity to mobilize and solidarity. Practically speaking, in the case of food, redistribution rather than new provisions; for health, educating prevention rather than focusing upon a cure; and for shelter, it could be the opening of homes, churches and mosques. The extent and capacity of community support is varied and contingent upon the local context. Listing some religious inspired examples here can illustrate the diversity of potential modalities of this alternative approach. In the health sector, sermon guides are one example being developed for Christian and Muslim faith leaders on various topics, mainly revolving round health issues.112 These guides base each topic upon a relevant passage from the Qur’an or Bible and expand on key health messages through the delivery of the sermon. For example, the sermon guide for malaria prevention and treatment aims at conveying six key messages that focus on controlling its spread. The Muslim version is based upon the hadith in which Prophet Mohammad was said to have taught that ‘your body has a right over you’, suggesting that we must protect our bodies. A suggested Christian sermon is based upon 1 Corinthians 6:19–20 in which the body is described as a temple of the Holy Spirit and as such should be cared for. These mechanisms for dispensing health messages, while not providing material support, can improve health outcomes by improving knowledge, attitudes and practices among the community. During the early stages of post-conflict statebuilding, when government services are weakened or non-operational, the reinforcement of important health messages can be critical, in particular in countries with lower health awareness levels. Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 47

Conclusion

This chapter has drawn upon a diverse body of research to suggest mechanisms through which religious institutions may be able to contribute to post-conflict statebuilding in addition to which specific examples were given. The resulting framework is shown in diagrammatic form in Figure 1.1. Viewing it from left to right, post-conflict statebuilding is composed of three primary order elements—legitimacy, security and basic services. There are other important sectors that can contribute to successful post-conflict statebuilding including good governance, economic development, democracy and development, but they are secondary in importance to the three primary order elements. These three primary order elements buttress the state against potential legitimacy or institutional failure, the two means by which states can fail. International NGOs, civil society, foreign militaries and tribal leaders, as shown under ‘Institutions and Actors’, may each have specific mechanisms through which they contribute to the three primary order elements. The framework developed in this chapter and shown below, though, shows only those specific to religious institutions. These mechanisms comprise legitimization of power, mediation and adjudication of disputes, building social capital, teaching religious values, engaging community solidarity and providing humanitarian assistance. Because of differing characteristics in the way religious institutions are structured they exhibit different capacities to legitimize state authorities. To varying degrees religious institutions could contribute to each of David Beetham’s three aspects of legitimacy. As a direct source of a body of law, religion, in particular Islam, can provide legitimacy when authorities act within its rules. In countries that do not directly adopt religious codes, religion can still serve as a source of higher order values against which the laws can be judged to be just or not. This can be achieved directly through such means as a repugnancy clause in a country’s constitution or informally as a source of societal values. The existence of dominant and subordinate groups within the state also needs to be justified. Religions range in their degree to which they delin- eate a preferred division between these groups. Hinduism has a very clear and ascriptive doctrine while Catholicism embraces a meritocratic view. Once in power the exercise of authority needs to be tempered against abuse of the subordinate group by serving the common interests of both the dominant and subordinate classes—a concept with a long tradition in both Christianity and Islam. Lastly, religion can contribute to legitimacy through expressions of consent. Whether directly 48 Theology Scripture Doctrine Laws Liturgy Tradition NGOs Customs traditional traditional Religious institutions constitutions peacekeepers United Nations regional powers occupying forces occupying community groups groups community international treaties structures democracy Contributing to legitimacy Contributing • Legal validity of rules • Justification • Expressions of consent Providing humanitarian Providing assistance Strengthening solidaritycommunity Adjudication and mediation of disputes Building social capital Socializing civic values Legitimacy Basic needs Public security Public Secondary Order: • Governance • Economic development • Democracy • Development Primary order elements Mechanisms of religious institutions Institutions and actors Divine motivators

Religious institutions and post-conflict statebuilding State Building State Figure 1.1 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding 49 by way of acknowledgement, participation or association or, indirectly, by way of frame realignment, religion’s legitimacy can be transferred to authority structures. Security was identified earlier as one of the three primary order elements of post-conflict statebuilding. Despite the critical role that military and police contingents play in creating safe environments, religion along with other traditional power structures can play supporting roles. The relative importance of non-state actors’ involvement in security is emphasized by an OECD report that suggests that as many as 80 per cent of people living in fragile states rely upon non-state actors for security and justice.113 In such environments religious institutions can act as mediators or adjudicators of breaches of social norms, especially in environments where the state sponsored rule of law has broken down. Examples of religious intervention in the security sector have included robust involvement in the case of the UIC of Somalia or morally authoritative intervention in the form of informal courts in Ethiopia. Both approaches, depending upon the circumstances, are viable mechanisms through which religious institutions may contribute positively to public security. In some countries, religion, by the nature of its position in society, can also play a role in strengthening bonding or bridging social capital and in the process reducing the barriers to reporting crime and increasing the cost of criminal activity. This is especially the case at the community level where foreign contingents are unable to penetrate successfully. Lastly, I argued that the values that religions teach can directly influence civic values, acculturating society to the rule of law or they can be co-opted by state builders to encourage public security. The third primary order element of post-conflict statebuilding, the provision of basic services, is largely, but not exclusively, dependent upon foreign resources. Financial transfers alone, though, are not sufficient to ensure effective support of the population’s basic needs. A charitable organization’s operational capacity to manage resources effectively is critical in determining whether additional resources will equate to improved humanitarian outcomes. In addition to mobilizing material humanitarian assistance, religious institutions can draw upon domestic community support to rally non-material means of assistance such as redistribution of resources and health and hygiene education. Together, this research on the potential role of religious institutions in post-conflict statebuilding has shown that they can play a role in all three of the critical primary order elements. Importantly, though, religious institutions will not be able to respond equally in every country and in every situation. In countries where religion does not have a high 50 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding degree of legitimacy its ability to legitimize the state may be negligible, or in countries where the path to failure has led to a fractionalization of society only certain characteristics of religious institutions will be useful in rebuilding the social capital required to contribute to public security. Even when endowed with all the necessary resources of legitimacy and institutional assets the motivation for a religious institution’s involvement may vary. On the far right of the framework under the heading ‘divine motivators’ are characteristics within religious institutions that give shape and impetus to their actions. Understanding how religious institutions contribute to the three primary order elements does not tell us why, if at all, they would engage and when they would. With- out an understanding of why religious institutions would engage in the delivery of basic services, contribute to public security and lend their legitimacy, international state builders and academics are wrongly left with treating religious institutions as any other secular institution. In other words, to put it somewhat crudely, the question that I will seek to answer in the following section is whether the state structure is required to achieve God’s will? Having identified the means through which religious institutions can contribute we must understand why they would chose to, for which theology can contribute in part to our understanding. 2 Roman Catholic View of the State

Earlier I outlined the mechanisms that religious institutions have at hand to support the three primary order elements of post-conflict statebuilding—legitimacy, public security and basic services. These contributions are important as they target what political scientists and international relations scholars have identified as being the two most common mechanisms by which states fail—legitimacy deficit and institutional failure. Scholars that have more broadly considered the relationship between religion and legitimacy have largely done so within the confines of political science. Social science, meanwhile, offers theories that can be used to consider how religious institutions mobilize resources to respond to public security and deliver basic services. Both disciplines lead to an approach that instrumentalizes religion—making it a tool, or a means to a statebuilding end. In this section I reflect on how our understanding of post-conflict statebuilding would change if the means and ends were reversed, in other words, that statebuilding becomes a means to a religious end. So rather than seeing statebuilding as, for example, Khadiagala does, namely for the purpose of ‘returning the state to the centre of political life’,1 I will consider religion as being the aspirational centre of people’s lives and statebuilding as the means to achieving a religious end. Very little attention has been paid to the decision-making processes of religious institutions. The presumption has been that religious groups act as a consolidation of individuals leading to the embrace of models such as rational choice, various utilitarian measures or behavioural theory. This may be largely as a result of the type of religious institutions prevalent in the United States—charismatic varieties of Protestantism. But I find this insufficient in understanding how religious institutions decide particular courses of action. Firstly, rational choice theory or

51 52 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding utilitarian approaches, when applied to analysing decision making, require agreement on what is rational or what is the common yard- stick by which to measure utility. Without such foundational agreement the best intentioned of considerations can lead to very different decisions. In endeavouring to understand this, the historical debates that emerged during the Enlightenment are critical as it is at this stage that what defines reason and rationality was firmly grounded in the temporal world. In considering how religious institutions allocate resources we must consider how they understand reason. In the Christian sphere this begins with the work of Thomas Aquinas and his effort at bridging Aristotelian logic with divine revelation connecting man, through natural law, with the revealed law and ultimately divine law. Enlightenment thinkers such as Immanuel Kant broke this relationship by identifying the autonomy of man in their ability to reason independent of divine support. This diversion led us to relativism and the idea of culturally defined rationality.2 Building upon this current view, relativism’s bracketed approach of embracing emic norms could similarly be applied to understanding how certain groups make decisions, in particular religious institutions that are cultural settings in and of themselves, at least for their decision makers. The culture of the Roman Catholic Church and Islamic institutions makes the application of Enlightenment rationality based upon individual autonomy inappropriate as neither man nor religious institution are deemed autonomous. Liberal rationalism may be used to explain the actions of individual clergy within a particular cultural context, but when considering the religious institution, in other words group agency, acknowledgement of the institution’s culture is required and any interpretation of its actions must begin from an epistemological point within. This argument has been forcefully made by Alasdair MacIntyre who identified four traditions of rationality, one, particularly relevant to this chapter being the Augustinian, which is characterized by its methodology of an, ‘obedience to divine authority as disclosed in scripture, mediated by Neoplatonic thought’.3 Working from this perspective requires embracing a religious institution’s culture, its methodology and epistemology—in other words engaging with theology. Problematically for post-conflict statebuilding, within the overarching and reinvigorated field of religion and international relations this approach is largely neglected or even actively dismissed because it is argued, ‘the contexts in which we study religion do not require us to understand religion’s nature’ but only the actions that subsequently emerge onto the field of international relations.4 Such an approach is short sighted as without an understanding of Roman Catholic View of the State 53 the decision-making processes the possibilities of the actions that the plethora of religions and their interpreters can decide upon are near infinite. Waiting idly by until some action becomes relevant to scholars serves little purpose in the politics of international relations other than from a post facto historical perspective. Recognizing the importance of understanding how decisions trans- late into actions requires embracing theology which can help develop an understanding of how religious authorities see the role of the state, which in turn would influence their allocation of resources. This can be done by identifying, or where necessary extrapolating, those teachings that are relevant to the post-conflict statebuilding framework developed earlier. I am not suggesting or presupposing that every unit of each religious institution abides by its doctrine chapter and verse, but rather that a religion’s universal doctrine can serve as a starting point followed by consideration of how culture, history or tradition influences the local interpretation of doctrine within a particular context. The second weakness of scholarly approaches to gaming religious institutions is that they ignore the religious in religious institutions. Institutional theorist Richard Scott notes,

[I]nstitutional theory reminds us that interests are institutionally defined and shaped. Institutional frameworks define the ends and shape the means by which interests are determined and pursued. Institutional factors determine that actors in one type of setting, called firms, pursue profits; that actors in another setting, called agencies, seek larger budgets; that actors in a third setting, called political parties, seek votes.5

Religious institutions primarily seek neither profits, nor larger budgets, nor votes but their own particular theological ends. These ends in turn influence the kind of society the religious institution would contribute its resources towards sustaining. How these religious ends, their teloi, interact with the priority post-conflict statebuilding ends, namely the primary order elements, suggests the likelihood of religious institutions lending their resources to the post-conflict statebuilding effort. As an abstract example, a religion that favours the spiritual over the temporal and advocates asceticism as a form of spiritual purity is unlikely to contribute to the provision of basic needs. Or alternatively a religion that has as its central telos the fulfilment of God’s will in the unifying of a nation of people is unlikely to legitimize a state whose borders divide them. To understand how a religion’s telos influences 54 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding post-conflict statebuilding requires delving into the theology of each religion and then, as I do in Chapter 6, examining how it is practised in the social and cultural contexts of a particular society.

Roman Catholicism

For Catholicism this approach begins by seeking to understand what role in Christian teleology the institution of the Roman Catholic Church (referred to in the remainder of the book as the Church) is envisaged to play and in turn what support it can expect to receive from the state. In undertaking this process I use a bracketed approach to identify a series of professed doctrines that once under the influence of social, cultural, traditional or political pressures can lead to varying and sometimes even contradictory practised theologies. As Pope Paul VI makes clear, the magisterium does not offer universal solutions to social problems, but instead the Christian communities themselves must, ‘analyze with objectivity the situation which is proper to their own country, to shed on it the light of the Gospel’s unalterable words and for action from the social teaching of the Church’.6 In other words this chapter’s work looks at the Church’s institutional doctrine, which once interpreted by its clergy who live and operate in their particular cultural settings may lead to a deviation or even dismissal of the central conclusions that I make. Nevertheless, it remains a critical exercise as this will serve as a baseline of sorts from which the practised theology within particular contextual settings can be better understood. This approach will require temporarily displacing political and social science theories with political theology and reframing post-conflict statebuilding discourse through the lens of Church doctrine. As this potentially encompasses a substantial body of work I will focus solely upon the most prominent and relevant teaching for contemporary post-conflict statebuilding, namely the Second Vatican Council and recent papal encyclicals. Any subsequent effort to apply this work to a specific country context would require further research in locally and culturally relevant sources of ecclesial teaching such as the Bishop’s Conference. These encyclicals upon which this book draws upon have been described as a ‘set of fundamental guidelines’,7 source of ‘principles for reflection’, ‘criteria of judgment’ and ‘directives for action’,8 for leaders of the Church. They are important but not dogmatic. On the other hand the documents of the Councils of the Catholic Church, such as Gaudium et spes, Lumen gentium, Dignitatis humanae and Nostra aetate, as well as those ‘conciliar’ promulgations derived outside of a Council such as Fidei depositum Roman Catholic View of the State 55

(which includes the entire Catechism of the Catholic Church)9 are guided by the work of the Holy Spirit and as such are of a higher order. They are doctrine and are treated as such in the following discussion.10 In reading Catholic social doctrine it isn’t always apparent how the spiritual—grace, sin, atonement, salvation and so on—play a role in the temporal world. Instead, the encyclicals engage with matters such as peace (Pacem in terris), socio-economic life, political community (Gaudium et spes), religious freedom (Dignitatis humanae) and international development (Populorum progressio, Sollicitudo rei socialis, Caritas in veritate) through reason or by simply stating positions as axioms. Charles Curran provides an example of this situation by referring to the for- mulation of peace in Pacem in terris. Peace, according to the encyclical, is possible if it is based upon ‘truth, built according to justice, viviﬁed and integrated by charity and put into practice by freedom’.11 Curran questions why peace isn’t explained in terms of Jesus’ teaching or the role of grace.12 This dependence upon reason helps to convey a speciﬁc message in a form that can appeal to all of humanity including non- Christians. But by reinforcing the distinction between the temporal and spiritual worlds it lends an appearance to its commentary of being contextual, time bound and isolated from God. As I am focused upon the decision makers within the Church, the clergy, we must unabashedly engage with the religious and spiritual to examine the impetus for the Church’s political engagement. That being said, the changing social and political context in which a particular document was developed can help contextualize its meaning and provide guidance in its interpretation. In response to the latter the following section provides a broad overview of the Church’s evolving views of the state (as opposed to the more commonly discussed state’s views towards the Church) over the past century before I engage with the religious and spiritual.

The Church’s changing view of the state

The first encyclical in the modern era tailored to the question of the state was Leo XIII’s Immortale dei written in 1885. It came at a time of international peace yet considerable civil unrest within Europe. The rise of nationalism began to challenge the established norms of a divine right to rule accorded to emperors and kings. As the right of the nobility was being threatened, so too was the authority of the Church and even its very existence as a peer to states on the international stage. During the period 1871–1929, beginning with the unification of the Italian states and continuing through the First World War, the papacy for the first 56 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding time since 330 C.E. had no authority over territory or viable armies. Known as the ‘Roman Question’, the challenge of what to do with the papacy was not solved until Mussolini signed the Lateran treaty in 1929 providing the Vatican with land and formal status. It is within the political context of the Roman Question and the Church’s loss of a traditional source of influence that Immortale dei was written on the relationship between the Church and state, ‘the two societies’. It begins by noting that the Church, despite misperceptions, is not the enemy of the state or against governments. Instead, the Church being the link between man and heaven and there being an element of the sacred within the temporal, must continue its spiritual work protected by the state. In turn the state benefits by working alongside the Church as the Church ‘adds to it permanence and lustre’13 as well as providing a guiding moral teaching that because of its divine provenance cannot be deceived from the truth. While Pope Leo contributed to the magisterium with a long list of encyclicals on Church and state relations that began to move the Church away from its ties to the state, it was left to Pope Pius XI (1922–1939) to initiate, implement and enforce a practical shift in the relationship. Pius urged that the Church remove all support to political parties because he saw them as being transient and unreliable. While allowing Catholic laity to participate in politics he did not want the Church and its priests involved. John Courtney Murray saw Pius’ reign as providing a major break in the way the Church related to the state. His ‘liquidation of the temporal power of the papacy, his injunctions to the clergy to retire from party politics, and his dissolution of Catholic political parties, are all indicative of a new phase in the eternal problem of the relations between spiritual and temporal’.14 In what would prove controversial in the years to come, the magisterium left unaltered the views expressed in Immortale dei on the specific form of government the state authority should adopt.15 Adher- ing to this position led to the most recent shift in the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state in the decades following the Second World War. The prior perspective of the Church towards political authorities had been of neutrality toward the form of government: ‘So long as the policies of those governments did not infringe systematically upon the corporate rights of the Church to religious freedom, libertas ecclesiae, and to the exercise of its functions as mater et magistra, the Church would not question their legitimacy.’16 This led to the Catholic Church in the early twentieth century withholding judgement on the state and its actions,17 limiting its purported interest to Roman Catholic View of the State 57 the salvation of Christian souls. The repercussions of such a policy— interaction with fascist states—became self-evident during and after the Second World War. There is no evidence that the problematic relationship between the Church and the state was a compelling reason for Pope John XXIII to call for a council. Nevertheless his 30 year diplomatic career with the Church spanning the Second World War, the ending of colonialism and the emergence of the Cold War would have made him a keen observer of international relations, the spreading of democracy and the potential impact this would have upon the Church’s relationship with states. The Second Vatican Council that he called was intended to recognize the ‘new age’; Pope John XXIII wanted a Council that would mark this transition between an older era (post-Tridentine) and the new. Regarding relations with the state the effort at aggiornamento (updat- ing) can be neatly seen in the radical shift in perspective of the prepara- tory committees leading into the Council and the subsequent product emerging from the Council. The first draft on the topic was titled, ‘The duties of the Catholic state with regard to religion.’18 Yet by the close of the Council one of the most influential documents for the relationship of the Church to the state, including ‘Catholic’ states, Dignitatis humanae, called upon countries to ensure freedom of religion. The age of the instrumentalization of the state for the purposes of Catholicism was over. Casanova describes this shift in another way; instead of emphasizing libertas ecclesiae and the associated state centric view the Church recognized libertas personae.19 Samuel Huntington has credited this shift away from legitimizing authority to recognizing the rights of individuals through the work of the Second Vatican Council as being a critical contribution to the wave of democratization that subsequently spread throughout the world during the seventies and eighties.20 The state now offered only one of many means through which the Church’s goals could be effected. The change in audience and approach can be seen most evidently by the shift in the targeted audience in papal encyclicals, moving away from addressing solely the clergy and sometimes believers to reaching out instead to ‘all men (and women) of good will’. In 1967 Pope Paul VI defined the relationship between the Church and the state based upon similar sentiments found within Gaudium et spes in a way that has largely been consistent since:

Founded to build the kingdom of heaven on earth rather than to acquire temporal power, the Church openly avows that the two powers—Church and State—are distinct from one another; that each 58 Religion and Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding

is supreme in its own sphere of competency. But since the Church does dwell among men, she has the duty ‘of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel’.21

This position has become the common understanding, with the caveat that allows for direct involvement when ‘basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make such judgments necessary’.22 Working in this new direction of speaking directly to all men of good faith and being concerned for their basic rights saw popes Paul VI and John Paul II engage directly with matters related to the temporal well- being of man. Pope Paul continued the emphasis upon the spiritual vocation of the Church, but argued that as it lives within the temporal world it must engage with the temporal and contribute to it. Pope John Paul II expanded upon this by emphasizing human rights, justice and overall human dignity, especially of the poor. It may be argued from this new direction taken by the two post-Conciliar popes that the Church no longer saw a role for the state. One could even be mistaken in reading the encyclicals and presuming that the Church even saw the state as part of the problem. Pope Benedict XVI subtly but substantially diverged from his predecessors, returning, correctly in my view, to a social doctrine that sees the state as an important force for potential good. Benedict’s theological re-engagement of the Church in a more overt manner into the political dimension reaffirmed the importance of the state to the Church’s mission. In addition, for the first time Pope Benedict engaged with the modern concept of statebuilding in Caritas in veritate, referring to the process as a ‘key factor’ in development.23 Considering the challenges that were being faced at the time in Iraq, namely an emerging civil war, and in Afghanistan, a rapidly failing state, this was a bold position to take. Importantly, for the Church’s role in post-conflict statebuilding he flagged in the encyclical a willingness to contribute and an astute reading of the place for the Church: ‘[T]he support aimed at strengthening weak constitutional systems [such as failed and failing states] can easily be accompanied by the development of other political players, of a cultural, social, territorial or religious nature, alongside the State.’24 In this way he joined with the chorus of voices that have criticized the state institutional strengthening approach that exclude non-state actors. Then further into the encyclical he explains that the Church and other religions can ‘offer their contribution to development only if God has a place in the public realm’.25 This could be read as an either–or threat, but I would suggest that it was meant as a statement of fact, namely Roman Catholic View of the State 59 that without the presence of God within the Church its involvement in the public sphere would reduce it to no more than a secular institution unable to uniquely contribute to development, a refrain repeated by Pope Francis as noted earlier.26 Despite Pope Benedict positioning the Church alongside secular ‘political players’, he saw it as retaining a special, divinely gifted, capacity. Only through the grace of God can the Church’s unique contributions be brought to bear in the state’s ‘cultural, social, economic and particularly its political dimensions’ in support of development.27 What these contributions are and how they are brought to bear is not expanded on by Pope Benedict, but instead form the heart of this book. 3 Salvation as the Catholic Post-Conflict Statebuilding Imperative

What differentiates Christian political theology from secular politics and its limiting theoretical models mentioned earlier is that to be a Christian is to acknowledge an alternative authority, namely that of Christ’s sovereignty and with this the possibility of eternal life. Christ’s atoning for man’s sins through His sacrifice re-established the covenant with God and opened the way to salvation and eternal life. Such a conceptualization places the end goal outside of the framework of traditional political and social science models making them inadequate to fully integrate the impetus for religious institutions in post-conflict statebuilding. Secular theoretical models such as the realist school in international relations, conflict theory in social science or rational choice theory in economics place agency with man who operates towards an end within this temporal world. Catholic theology similarly acknowledges the agency of people in this temporal world, but places their actions as the means to another end—salvation and eternal life in heaven. The desire for eternal life according to the Church’s doctrine is not only innate to our being,1 but also according to the Bible, God desires ‘all people to be saved’ (1 Timothy 2:4) and ‘not wishing that any should perish’ (2 Peter 3:9).2 The Church as a part of the Body of Christ and a servant of God is acting to fulfil God’s desire through its presence and actions. As it is only in Christ that man can attain salvation, then the Church must be considered differently from other civil society actors as it offers tangible outcomes that no other secular institution can. Understanding this worldview, within which the reality of salvation is ever present, provides a theoretical basis from which I have chosen to begin to reflect upon the Catholic Church’s potential interest in post-conflict statebuilding.

60 Salvation as the Catholic Statebuilding Imperative 61

Embracing the view that facilitating salvation is the Church’s primary role, suggests a very different impetus for its involvement in post-conflict statebuilding efforts than secular paradigms would accord the Church. Gill and Keshavarzian, to give just one example of a secular theory, suggest that the Catholic Church acts in a way aimed at maximizing institutional resources so as to increase adherents.3 This view would suggest that a religious institution’s involvement in post- conflict statebuilding would be based upon a cost–benefit analysis as measured against increasing assets and membership with the underlying religious belief system only influencing the form and intensity of the process. Such views neatly distil religious organizations into bodies resembling civil associations with membership or growth as measures of success, but by doing so mistake a critical aspect of the nature of religion’s engagement with society. It is not primarily the quantity of members that drives the Church but rather the quality, for want of a better word, of humanity under its care. In some cases such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as I will argue in Chapter 6, ‘increasing membership’ (theologically speaking spreading the Gospel), is of a low priority relative to other aspects of the Church’s mission. Instead the type of society is more important, in particular whether it is maximizing its ability to contribute to God’s wishes for all people to be saved. As such, to put it somewhat crudely, the critical variable is not members gained but rather, in the case of the Catholic Church, souls saved. The Church can achieve this goal by engaging in the post- conflict statebuilding process. Pope Pius XI noted in his encyclical Quadragesimo anno that, ‘the whole scheme of social and economic life is now such as to put in the way of vast numbers of people most serious obstacles which prevent them from caring for the one thing necessary, namely, their eternal salvation.’4 In this view, the social order we live within has become an obstacle to man’s attainment of eternal life. In conflict settings where the social and state infrastructure is dismantled or destroyed the obstacles are all the more substantial. For this reason the Catholic Church is spurred to support post-conflict statebuilding, but only in such a way that it reduces societal circumstances that divert man from doing good or those that induce us to do evil. Although salvation takes the preeminent role as an overarching driver for the Church’s involvement, it is not the only theological imperative. An eschatological view that seeks societal changes could be argued, and may be practised in some countries, one built around, for example, the idea from Gaudium et spes that, 62 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

While we are warned that it proﬁts a man nothing if he gain the whole world and lose himself, the expectation of a new earth must not weaken but rather stimulate our concern for cultivating this one. For here grows the body of a new human family, a body which even now is able to give some kind of foreshadowing of the new age.5

Along a similar theme, in Caritas in veritate, Pope Benedict wrote, ‘Man’s earthly activity, when inspired and sustained by charity, contributes to building of the universal city of God.’6 The earthly city, he teaches, becomes, ‘to some degree an anticipation and a prefiguration of the undivided city of God’.7 These perspectives suggest an emphasis upon social transformation and collective responsibility rather than a relatively individualistic salvific telos. Another possible driver can be taken straight from the Gospels, that is the Commandment to love thy neighbour, from which each of the three aspects of post-conflict statebuilding could be justified. Such a Christological view along with the eschatological perspective for the Church’s involvement in post-conflict statebuilding is equally legitimate. They may even be a community’s primary motivator with a favoured body of selected doctrine and theology or a particular religious figure embraced as representative of that telos such as the Virgin Mary. But in reviewing the magisterium I have found salvation to repeatedly emerge as the most prominent and consistently present overarching objective of the Church in its discussions of the state and its function in society and as such pursue it further in this chapter.

The Catholic Church and state legitimacy

The Church teaches that for the common good of society ‘every human community needs an authority to govern it’.8 In addition Pope John XXIII wrote that, ‘Human society can be neither well-ordered nor prosperous unless it has some people invested with legitimate authority to preserve its institutions and to devote themselves as far as is necessary to work and care for the good of all.’9 In this manner the Catholic Church acknowledges the importance of the state and the need for an authority, but there is no suggestion of any salviﬁc or broader theological beneﬁts stemming from a particularly legitimate authority. On the contrary, in some cases, as will be shown below, the Church accepts illegitimate authorities. As such the legitimacy of a state, all things being equal, does not contribute to the spiritual endeavour and as a result the Church is not compelled to contribute proactively to its legitimization. Salvation as the Catholic Statebuilding Imperative 63

But reﬂecting upon how the three aspects that constitute legitimacy relate to salvation will shed light on the likelihood that the Church indirectly contributes to legitimacy in the pursuit of its responsibilities.

Legal validity Christianity, unlike Islam or Judaism, did not develop a body of laws that extended beyond the clergy. In addition, the teachings of Jesus are predominantly moral, formulated through parables as opposed to definitive injunctions. This situation saw the Catholic Church, even during its theocratic heyday, eschew the development of a canon for temporal affairs, but nevertheless continue to wield its influence during the development of secular laws and even participated in the evolution of these laws. Despite the Catholic Church not having developed in recent times a body of positive laws against which legal validity can be assessed, it can still become involved indirectly in this aspect. The Church engages with legal validity when it acknowledges the importance of positive laws and emphasizes that man is bound by conscience to abide by them.10 This approach doctrinally recognizes the laws of authorities even when an authority itself is illegitimate as long as such an authority’s laws contribute to the common good.11 The common good, for the Church, is what is best for man to attain salvation. In this way the Church is motivated to acknowledge the legal validity of an authority’s laws and its ascension to power when those laws and the authority are judged by Church leaders to positively contribute to the Church’s salvific goals. By embracing such an indirect motivation for engaging with legal validity the Church avoids theocratic revivalism and the imposition of canon law upon the people, yet continues forward with its mission. But such sidestepping can be costly as when it does see opportunity in a new authority, without a juridical basis in its scriptures, its ability to directly validate an authority is severely weakened because of the ad hoc nature of this approach.

Justification of rules Beetham’s justification of rules is the mechanism through which the Catholic Church has historically been most consistently involved in legitimizing authority, in particular in modern times through its social doctrine. At the core of this aspect of legitimacy is the identification of a popularly credible source that justifies the existing or new power structure. Beetham notes that for an authority to be legitimate within this aspect requires that it is compliant with an ‘ultimate source of authority 64 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding and validating basis acknowledged within a society’.12 In other words, it cannot establish its own source of legitimacy but rather must draw upon one that transcends its reign. This thinking is also reflected in Catholic teaching: ‘authority does not derive moral legitimacy from itself.’13 According to the Church, from a doctrinal perspective the moral legitimacy that authority seeks can be derived, first and foremost, from acknowledging and respecting the rights inherent to a human being that flow from his dignity as a creature of God.14 Abiding by these rights is the foundational basis upon which the Church believes moral legitimacy can be claimed by state authorities. In turn the Church’s involvement as a source of higher order values for the state can be ben- eficial to the state as positive laws can be grounded not only in natural law but also divine law so as to better achieve the common good which also encompasses the secular concept of general interest.15 The Church thus finds its place alongside the state not only in establishing and maintaining a narrative that relates man to God, with a place for the state lying in between, but also by being the vehicle through which knowledge of the divine and natural laws, gifted from God, are shared with authorities.16 There is a fine line of distinction on this theological issue that can differentiate positions that clergy take on their role in society. Pope Benedict XVI in both Deus caritas est and Caritas in veritate explains the role of faith as purifying reason (‘Reason always stands in need of being purified by faith’17). Benedict writes that the place of Catholic social doctrine as developed by the Church ‘has no intention of giving the Church power over the State ...Its aim is simply to help purify reason and to contribute, here and now, to the acknowledgment and attainment of what is just.’18 This approach suggests that man’s efforts can best access an understanding of natural law and justice with the guiding hand of the Church which can help purify reason. Gaudium et spes, though, explains that the Church contributes by ‘imparting knowledge of the divine and natural law’ to man in the sense that it is the intermediary source.19 This distinction becomes relevant to justification of rules in that the latter suggests a basis of core principles emanating from the Church from which justification can be sought, which is more in line with Beetham’s proposition and lends itself to the institution of the Church conferring legitimacy on political matters, whereas Pope Benedict’s position suggests that man’s endeavours alone, with only guiding information from the Church (the magisterium), can create a just set of rules accessible without the direct institutional involvement of the Church. In both interpretations, without the Church either Salvation as the Catholic Statebuilding Imperative 65 imparting knowledge or providing guidance, reason alone is lost and cannot fully constitute the right ordering of values. By being the arbiter of the moral framework through which laws are judged to be just or not, the Church can influence the state for its purpose of contributing to God’s will by, for example, shaping the state’s actions in such a way so as to act against the ‘structures of sin’.20 Without the Church’s involvement the Pastoral Constitution, Gaudium et spes, suggests that the legal order can become distorted—good and bad lost without a frame through which to judge them apart—leading to the inevitability of individuals and groups paying heed only to their own interests and not to those of others, an outcome in stark contrast to the Church’s mission.21

Expressions of consent Much has been written on the political activities of the Catholic Church, especially its role in mobilizing people’s expressions of consent.The Catholic magisterium, though, proscribes the clergy from participating in partisan politics directly, limiting their involvement to situations when ‘basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make such judgements necessary’.22 But there are other ways that its doctrine allows for the Church’s consent to be transferred to a political authority as described in Chapter 1. At a diplomatic level the Church can convey its consent by direct acknowledgment of statehood. Through such acts, including the signing of a concordat, the Church legitimizes the interlocutor and recognizes its right to negotiate on behalf of the people within the state. By appearing alongside a state authority in public the Church can transfer its legitimacy by way of direct association. But in some circumstances direct association and acknowledgement may inadvertently undermine legitimacy as the Church’s actions could cir- cumvent the wishes of the people and weaken the possibility of popular expressions of consent/dissent. The relevant question in this instance then becomes whether the Church’s doctrine suggests that it should lead the act of expressing consent, if it deems the state authority worthy, or should it take a secondary role, supporting a system that allows the people to individually express consent (i.e. democracy)? In the recent magisterium it is clear that the Church comes out in favour of democracy as it allows people to fully participate in the political process that forms the society within which they live. Its support, though, is qualified in that only under circumstances in which the conditions for its proper functioning are present.23 Although the Church’s support for democracy is claimed to trace back to teachings that date 66 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding from as early as the sixteenth century on the sovereignty of the people, it wasn’t until Pope Pius XII directly praised the concept in 1944 that its modern manifestation was specifically lauded. Since then it has become a common position within its body of doctrine, though most often indirectly alluded to. For example, ‘Praise is due to those national procedures which allow the largest possible number of citizens to participate in public affairs with genuine freedom.’24 How the Church decides to balance its duties as both a state required to establish diplomatic relations, thereby directly expressing consent, and as a religious institution whose doctrine favours democratic systems, thereby following the people’s expressions of consent, is a chal- lenging conundrum that will undoubtedly be decided on a case by case basis. In post-conflict situations that have roots in a legitimacy crisis resulting from a lack of people’s consent, it is unlikely that the Church will take a vanguard position in expressing consent in opposition to the people’s will. As such any expression of consent on the part of the Church is likely to largely reinforce existing popular expressions making its contribution notable and potentially powerful, but not necessarily transformative in the post-conflict statebuilding context. When the Church does choose to utilize its structures to provide direct expressions of consent it has a strong and powerful set of institutional tools from which to do so. In Chapter 1 the possibility of the lustre of legitimacy being borrowed as an indirect expression of consent through a process known theoretically as frame realignment was discussed. As the agency of this action does not lie with the Church, but rather the state through its actions, I will not discuss it in detail here other than to note a few references of caution within the magisterium against facilitating it. While in some cases it may be in the interest of politicians or the laity to embrace the legitimacy of the Church’s message in advocating for a political cause, the teaching is clearly against this as it states that, ‘no one is allowed ...to appropriate the Church’s authority for his opinion’.25 This is closely tied to the Church’s clear proscription against clergy moving from the pulpit to political office and carrying with them the authority of their vestments.26 There are instances where Church officials actively or inadvertently acquiesce to the state’s needs and allow the Church’s legitimacy to be appropriated, as there are also instances where officials subsequently speak out afterwards in regret. For example, the co-option of religion by the Croatian government in the early nineties initially served both sides but eventually led to a rift. While some clergy looked back on the role of religion as critical to the nation building effort, such Salvation as the Catholic Statebuilding Imperative 67 as the Bosnian Franciscan provincial Tomislav Pervan who said, ‘without the miracle at Medjugorje there would not have been the Croatian independent state existing today, and that it was the Madonna of Medjugorje who put Croatia on the map of world nation-states,’27 others looked back with regret. Speaking on his first visit to Croatia in 1994 the Pope spoke out against idolizing the nation or the state and justifying in their name hatred, discrimination and violence, to which two years later Car- dinal Kuharic´ of Zagreb, who had stood alongside President Tudjman six years earlier celebrating the foundation of the state (described earlier in Chapter 1) responded, ‘If all those in authority had listened to him [Pope John Paul II], each in his place, ...we would have a far better reputation in the world, a clear conscience, and clean hands. As it is we have only demeaned ourselves.’28

The Catholic Church and public security

Within liberal rights-based discourse the prevention of human rights violations creates an imperative to intervene in civil wars and for state builders to establish a minimum level of security. These rights are enshrined in international charters, conventions and declarations which contribute to the making of an international body of universal norms. The gross violation of these norms by some governments has led to a critical shift in the international stance against infring- ing authorities. In this way, humanitarian need began to emerge as a justification for intervention in the 1990s through multinational missions in Iraq (1990–1991), Somalia (1991–1993), East Timor (1999), Sierra Leone (1999) and the former Yugoslavia. Then in the following decade the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) movement began to cover considerable ground in entrenching humanitarian intervention as not only a justification for intervention but also an obligation. The Catholic Church is an active supporter of the secular human rights movement, though in some instances, justifying the same inherent rights through a teleological lens.29 As with the R2P movement, the Church extends its vision of human rights to peace-building and has been recognized for its role in several peace-building efforts, most noticeably the work of the Roman Catholic community of Saint Egidio in Mozambique. But noting the wide variety of mechanisms through which the Church embraces or contributes to human rights and peace- building does not provide guidance on why the Church would involve itself. Understanding the theological imperative can offer an insight into 68 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding what drives the Church’s engagement in particular contexts and not others. While the Roman Catholic Church supports the rights-based movement, I would suggest that its imperative for seeking peace in the form of public security is not driven by it but rather grounded in specific theological views. Pope John Paul II places peace as being concomitant to a respect for life.30 The Pastoral Constitution seeks to strengthen peace for the glory of God.31 Pope John XXIII in the first paragraph of his encyclical Pacem in terris warns that world peace cannot be achieved without adhering to the divinely established order.32 The Catechism of the Catholic Church, in compiling all of these views, considers peace as fundamentally integral to the common good: ‘The common good requires peace, that is, the stability and security of a just order.’33 Here it is necessary that I expand on the meaning of the common good. It is defined in the magisterium as, ‘the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily’.34 Fulfilment can best be understood not in terms of human rights but rather the process of ‘integral human development’, a term used by popes John Paul and Benedict (also referred to as ‘authentic development’ by Pope Paul VI), which is where the Church diverts from the rights-based approach. The Catholic Church’s interest in stability and security in part stems from its teleological understanding of its responsibilities towards establishing structures that facilitate a Catholic view of human development, which Pope Benedict notes, ‘applies to both the natural plane and the supernatural plane’, a view that diverges from the secular in that it also encompasses the spiritual.35 The Church’s efforts to further man’s dignity may well open the path to salvation but it is not a journey of certitude. Both the ‘original sin, which all of us bear from birth as an inheritance from our first parents’, and the personal sin, ‘which each one of us commits when we abuse our own freedom’ threaten to derail individuals from the path to salvation.36 Pope John Paul II notes that it is personal sin that builds structures of sin in society and warns of the consequences to the universal common good.37 The Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace more recently summarized views on this threat:

The consequences of sin perpetuate the structures of sin ...It is thus that they [sin] grow stronger, spread and become sources of other sins, conditioning human conduct. These ...interfere also in the process of the development of peoples, the delay and slow pace of which must be judged in this light.38 Salvation as the Catholic Statebuilding Imperative 69

As such the Church’s concerns for public security lie in large part with an interest in establishing an environment that minimizes the external sinful inﬂuences that distract individuals, potentially divert- ing them away from choosing a path that would bring them closer to God. While taking a different path from the secular liberal rights-based approach, the Church’s understanding of human dignity leads to the same imperative, that of a stable and secure society.

The Catholic Church and basic services

The Church recognized the importance and engaged with the task of organizing charity at an early stage in its history, the first organized Christian charitable mandate being the choosing of the seven in Acts 6:5–6. Pope Benedict XVI noted that charity has been an integral part of the Church’s mission since early history when it ‘became established as one of her essential activities, along with the administration of the sacraments and the proclamation of the word’.39 It wasn’t until the mid- nineteenth century that the Catholic Church shifted towards activities advocating a welfare role for the state in response to what was becoming increasingly flagrant abuses by unfettered capitalism. This concern for the plight of the working poor that inspired Rerum novarum, the first social encyclical of the modern era, has since been reflected upon to consider the changing times by many of Pope Leo XIII’s successors, each with their own perspectives relevant to the pressing needs of the day. Over the years basic needs have consistently been described in the magisterium as, at the minimum, including food, clothing, shelter and medicine.40 Many reasons can be found in the Catholic magisterium to justify supporting other’s basic needs. Pope Benedict XVI noted one of these being a result of having the command of love thy neighbour inscribed in our hearts by the Creator.41 Pope John Paul II reasoned that respecting and loving the sanctity of the image of God that is each human being and embracing the solidarity that is incumbent with such an understanding compels us to support other’s needs.42 Even justifications that may seem secular on the surface, such as the magisterium’s concurrence that basic needs are an inherent right, are justified through the scriptures such as Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI’s moral and ethical imperatives based upon Jesus’ teaching.43 Although framed differently, each of these justifications for charitable action are rooted in the fundamental doctrinal division with Protestantism, namely that for the Roman Catholic, faith without works ‘does not fully unite the believer to Christ and does not make him 70 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding a living member of his Body’.44 ‘Works’ in this sense is the manner in which people live their lives in relation to others. Pope Benedict XVI develops this relationship between salvation and works, in the form of charity, via love for thy neighbour in his encyclical Deus caritas est.45 He uses Matthew 25:31–46 to emphasize the importance of the selfless, giving type of love (agape) that measures a man’s worth at the time of judgement. In these Biblical verses Jesus is seen sitting in judgement praising those who gave water to the thirsty, food to the hungry, shelter to strangers and succour to the sick. He says to them, ‘[W]hatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.’46 These acts of charity by the righteous opened to them the King- dom of Heaven, while those who did not show selfless charity to others were condemned to eternal punishment.47 Each of these exhortations begins and ends with individual relationships and in particular the merit due to the one giving, which may make virtuous the giver but does not require the institutional Church’s involvement in alleviating poverty. None furthers our understanding of the theological justification for the institution of the Church becoming involved. Quite the contrary, the Gospels teach that ‘blessed are you who are poor’ (Luke 6:20) and that ‘the last will be first and the first will be last’ (Matt 20:16) suggesting a favourable disposition towards the poor. So what compels the Church, as an institution, to become involved in raising out of poverty those who find themselves in a spiritually preferential position because of their poverty? Pope Benedict XVI appears to respond to this lack of doctrinal grounding through an extensive section in Deus caritas est entitled, Charity as a responsibility of the Church. He begins by acknowledging that charity ‘is first and foremost a responsibility for each individual member of the faithful’, but then goes on to say that it is the responsibility of the ‘entire ecclesial community at every level’.48 Why is it a responsibility of the institution? Because, he writes, ‘As a community, the Church must practise love. Love thus needs to be organized if it is to be an ordered service to the community’49 (italics added). So the role of the Church is to organize the delivery of charity, which implies a pragmatic perspective grounded in the temporal world. But then he reaches the conclusion that charity from within the Church is a ‘truly spiritual office’.50 In doing so Pope Benedict draws upon Acts 6:2–4 to justify the Church’s role in the provision of aid:

So the Twelve gathered all the disciples together and said, ‘It would not be right for us to neglect the ministry of the word of God in order to wait on tables. Brothers and sisters, choose seven men from among Salvation as the Catholic Statebuilding Imperative 71

you who are known to be full of the Spirit and wisdom. We will turn this responsibility over to them and will give our attention to prayer and the ministry of the word.’

But his source of authority for justifying the spirituality of the Church’s charitable offices, it would seem, is based upon the apostles’ expediency rather than any divine spiritual calling for the institution such as administering the sacraments. Acts 6:2–4 explain a pragmatic decision made by the apostles to divide the responsibilities of prayer and charity as opposed to a spiritual imperative to institutionalize the act of charity.51 Instead, in reflecting upon the Church’s imperative within God’s plan for its involvement in the provision of basic needs, I would suggest that we need to shift the focus away from the value of alms-giving (and its organization or facilitation) and instead to the burdens of abject poverty upon an individual’s spiritual development. The critical question becomes, do the extremely poor whose actions and thoughts are wholly preoccupied by a concern for personal and familial survival, without the circumstances or energy to fully participate in the economy of salvation, have equal opportunity to access eternal life? Such circumstances should be distinguished from those in which people willingly renounce all worldly goods, as Jesus called upon his followers to do, and choose to live in relative poverty. The references to the virtue of poverty in the Bible are all associated with an individual choice to pursue Christ’s example and to live a life of relative poverty (see for example Luke 14:33; Mark 8:35; and Luke 21:4). Pope Paul VI appears to be the first and only pope to tackle this vexing question in Populorum progressio. This encyclical made a marked shift in the magisterium’s views on development, moving away from the generally held position then and regrettably the still widely held position now, which defines international development as simply requiring better redistribution of resources. Pope Paul VI dispensed with relative measures of wealth and embraced an absolute terminology of minimum human development. This approach drew a fixed line defining what lay below the dignity of man. In the encyclical Paul notes that more important than development experts advising on the elimination of poverty are wise men who can find a way to a new humanism that will help us appreciate higher values such as love, friendship, prayer and contemplation.52 Such humanism is what is required to take man away from less human conditions (defined in part as those who lack the bare necessities of life)53 towards truly human conditions. 72 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

This process begins with the rise out of poverty. It progresses to an awareness of other people’s dignity, an active interest in the common good and a desire for peace. Only then, Pope Paul seems to suggest, can man begin to acknowledge God after which ‘ﬁnally and above all, there is faith’.54

What are truly human conditions? The rise from poverty to the acquisition of life’s necessities; the elimination of social ills; broadening the horizons of knowledge; acquiring reﬁnement and culture. From there one can go on to acquire a growing awareness of other people’s dignity, a taste for the spirit of poverty, (l8) an active interest in the common good, and a desire for peace. Then man can acknowledge the highest values and God Himself, their author and end. Finally and above all, there is faith—God’s gift to men of good will—and our loving unity in Christ, who calls all men to share God’s life as sons of the living God, the Father of all men.55

Relevant to the issue at hand is that he appears to be suggesting that less than human conditions include poverty, but I would propose that in this regard he refers to what would be better described as absolute poverty. This can be inferred from the emphasis upon participation in society as a critical part of spiritual development, as suggested by the number of social rather than individual descriptors in the above paragraph (‘culture’, ‘other’s dignity’, ‘common good’ and ‘peace’). Poverty allows for participation in society, absolute poverty does not. Without an opportunity to engage socially Pope Paul sees the materially poor as being equally in a less than human condition as those in moral poverty who are ‘crushed under the weight of their own self-love’.56 This association of material poverty with moral poverty can only be justified if it is compared in terms of how both types of poverty stifle spiritual growth—once again suggesting absolute poverty as opposed to its relative or self-imposed form. Poverty, formulated in this way, is seen as an impediment to the human vocation that must be overcome before moving to a closer communion with God through faith. This serves to justify the Church’s acceptance of wrong doing by the poor in an effort to survive.57 Such an understanding of abject poverty shifts the focus away from the giver and the salvific value of the act of giving onto the Church as an institution that is able to free the absolutely poor to participate in the economy of salvation. Pope Paul’s position is seemingly related to what Pope John Paul II called the ‘preferential option for the poor’. Pope John Paul II saw the Salvation as the Catholic Statebuilding Imperative 73 positive side of poverty: being unburdened by material concerns allows more easily for the spiritual poverty Jesus spoke of when he said, ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.’58 But this view of poverty, unburdened by material concerns is better associated with relative or a chosen poverty which is different to the abject poverty that does not allow even the engagement with society that Pope Paul spoke of. This view, of two different types of poverty, would explain why reference to the ‘Scale of Values’, the section in Populorum progressio I quoted above, is a notable omission from Pope John Paul’s commem- oration of the encyclical in his Sollicitudo rei socialis. Instead, the closest doctrinal position that attempts to answer the same question, what of the abject poor whose lives are preoccupied with daily survival, can be found in Gaudium et spes in which it teaches that poverty prevents people from ‘acting on their own initiative and responsibility’.59 Presumably extreme poverty would compound the impediment to people acting on their own initiative and taking responsibility. But even Gaudium et spes does not then continue to connect this to it being an impediment to salvation. Such an extrapolation, as I have made, correlates with the importance the magisterium places upon free will to find one’s own path to redemption: ‘Endowed with intellect and free will, each man is responsible for his self-fulfilment even as he is for his salvation.’60 For this reason it is incumbent upon the Church to contribute to raising out of abject poverty as many people as possible so as to allow them to participate in the economy of salvation as God willed ‘all people to be saved’ (1 Timothy 2:4). While Pope Paul VI’s teachings as I have described them would require an emphasis upon humanitarian aid regardless of who delivers it, embracing approaches that focus upon lifting people out of abject poverty so that they can freely participate in the economy of salvation, other theological priorities could lead to alternative allocations of assistance. The guiding document for bishops sees an evangelical reason for the Church to be active in performing charity. The Church’s acts of charity, it states, inspire others to follow Christ. Charity by the Church acts ‘to bear witness to the Gospel, to inspire people to listen to the Word of God and to convert hearts’,61 which helps it meet one of its critical missions—spreading the word. Prioritizing evangelism in this way would lead the Church to directly delivering community-based development assistance that would allow for its long-term engagement with the people. Alternatively, focusing upon human dignity as could be inferred from the concept of being born in the image of God would shift the development approach more towards structural 74 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding changes in society and a focus on human rights. All of these are valuable, but only one contributes to basic needs, a primary order element of post-conflict statebuilding, namely the theological view espoused in Populorum progressio. The breadth of possible motivations for the Church’s engagement with the delivery of basic needs requires understanding the theological priorities of the Church in a particular location which can in turn help to inform how a diocesan office or Bishop’s Conference may direct their Caritas agencies to act.

Conclusion on Roman Catholicism

The Church’s involvement in the temporal world has long been theologically justiﬁed within the Catholic magisterium. Doctrinal statements afﬁrming the Church’s position in this regard have been repeatedly made, for example:

This council regards all the true, good and just elements inherent in the very wide variety of institutions which the human race has established for itself and constantly continues to establish. The council afﬁrms, moreover, that the Church is willing to assist and promote all these institutions to the extent that such a service depends on her and can be associated with her mission.62 [italics added]

But in this chapter’s review of the Church’s magisterium I have attempted to show that at least in the case of failed or failing states the Roman Catholic Church is more than just ‘willing to assist’, as suggested above, but she has a vested interest to assist in the successful outcome of post-conflict statebuilding processes. The Church’s interest is not only one of a common humanity or human rights as may engage other secular groups. As a part of the Body of Christ its actions anticipate the spiritual beyond the temporal. Any consideration of the Church’s interests must therefore take this expanded view into account. Originally this temporal world was seen as distinct from Christian life and disinterested in authority during the early Christian period but then the Church subsequently shifted to embracing the responsibilities of shepherding man’s salvation by engaging directly in the temporal administration of the state. The long period of Christendom came to an end in the early twentieth century when the Church disengaged from the political and eventually circumvented the state altogether by reaching out directly ‘to all men of good will’. Today, the Church’s formal Salvation as the Catholic Statebuilding Imperative 75 position on its relationship with the state is one of two spheres ‘distinct, yet always interrelated’.63 Its interrelated interests overlap in the post-conflict statebuilding context when considering the Church’s telos of salvation. By engaging with the state the Church can better meet this divinely ordained responsibility that stems from God’s desire for ‘all people to be saved’ (1 Timothy 2:4). This salvific impetus is further driven by the Church’s separate interests, to varying degrees, in each of the three primary order elements. Positioning itself to legitimize a state is in the Church’s interest as it would allow it to influence policies that could serve its salvific responsibilities, but there is no particular theological value to a legitimate state in and of itself. Instead, authorities that recognize the dignity due to man for being created in the image of God attain a moral legitimacy ordained by the Church. Such legitimacy, though, can be tested by the manner in which power is wielded and if it does not serve the common good. In such cases the Church is unlikely to lend its legitimacy to authority by expressing consent. Peace, or its post-conflict equivalent, security, is an imperative of the Church as the structures of sin within a failed state are such that the Church’s telos of meeting God’s wish that all people are saved can be made near insurmountable. These structures of sin can be contested by focusing upon the common good for which peace is a critical component as it allows for integral human development. Lastly, I argued that charity as a theological virtue applies to individuals, not institutions. What compels the Church to institutionally organize charitable giving is its interest in reducing the incidence of absolute poverty (as opposed to relative poverty) because it precludes the des- titute from participating in the economy of salvation, which is contrary to God’s will. This political theology approach of considering the role of the Church in post-conflict statebuilding has avoided the instrumentalization of the Church at the hands of secular authorities who, by formulating a role through secular constructs, undermine any justification or imperative for its full engagement. I believe that Pope Benedict XVI in Caritas in veritate suggested exactly this through his warnings against a love that is without Truth,64 as would be the case when instrumentalizing religion for a purported but limited good. This, Pope Benedict saw, would amount to no more than a hollow act of sentimentality lacking in true impact. Such an act, without the ‘social conscience’ which the Church can give would lead to development serving only ‘private interests and the logic of power’.65 76 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

By reviewing the Catholic Church’s magisterium we can see that Catholic theology could view the process of post-conﬂict statebuilding as a means or a tool to further its own ends. As the Second Vatican Council promulgated, ‘The Church herself makes use of temporal things insofar as her own mission requires it.’66 This does not undermine the value of the Church’s involvement but it does establish a common interest in engagement that meets the unique missions of both state builders and the Church. In this way the Church is ready to engage with the political for the purposes of both temporal well-being and spiritual salvation. 4 Sunni Islam and the State

Understanding the role of the state in Islamic theology requires beginning with an understanding of the basis upon which Allah chooses who will be taken to paradise and who will be sent to hell—a much disputed topic in early Islamic theological circles. The debate revolved, in part, around the– power of man’s reason. Of the early schools of theology the Mu tazili argued that through rational thinking man could make the right choices in life and Allah was then obliged to take with– Him those who had chosen well as He Himself is rational. The Ash ari disputed this and argued that man can only know right and wrong by way of revelation and even if we were to abide by the laws revealed to man Allah has no obligation to save those who lived accordingly. A third school, Maturidi, took the middle ground and argued that revelation guides man and reason helps to bring clarity to its meaning. In addition, they disagreed with there being any obligation upon Allah to accept those who lived righteously, but they believed in His wisdom and that there would be some rhyme and reason to the choices that He made. While– Maturidi thought has largely stayed true to its foundations the Ash ari school softened its stance on some issues becoming, by the fourteenth century, less– distinguishable on this matter from the Maturidi view.1 As for the Mu tazili—differentiated by their positions on free will, the Qur’an’s creation, use of metaphorical interpretation and primacy of reason—once the most prominent school of theology and favoured by the Abbasid court—it lost– adherents in part due to its intolerance towards others. Today the Ash ari school dominates Sunni jurisprudence and theological teaching. Even though Maturidi theology is nominally the more widely spread school due to its close relationship with the Hanaﬁ school of jurisprudence it is largely overlooked by both Muslims and non-Muslims. To give just one example, as of 2013 only

77 78 Religion and Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding three books written in English appear in a Library of Congress keyword search for ‘Maturidi’ while only one, a study of tenth-century– scholarship, in the British Library. Despite the prevalence of Ash ari scholarship and its dominance in Islamic theological circles, to maintain epistemological consistency with the case study in Chapter 4, I will largely, but not exclusively, focus upon Maturidi thought. Between these two remaining schools there are some theological com- monalities on which to build. It can be said that a modern Sunni view is of an inscrutable and omnipotent Allah who gifted insights into His desires for humanity through the revelation of the Qur’an. With this gift from Allah a cognizant person is left only with the choice of whether to abide by the guidance enumerated within the Qur’an and by the living Qur’an, the Prophet Mohammad, or not.2 This shift in the path to salvation away from the Catholic view that favours a human capacity to ﬁnd the right path with God’s grace ‘educating’ man, to an Islamic view in which the right path has already been shown, leaving only the choice (‘Let there be no compulsion in religion’ 2:256)3 of either taking it or turning our backs to Allah, is the base theological position which I build on in this chapter. Having the Qur’an to show us the straight path leaves the only purpose of life within an Islamic paradigm as being to abide by His will, in other words, worshiping Allah as best as one can in the way that He so desires.4 As the Qur’an is comprehensive, dealing with rituals, relationships and laws, among other things, then worship becomes more than a limited action such as prayer, but rather a way of life that includes embracing a particular social structure and worldview. This would then suggest a different latent potential for the state than would a secular paradigm or even other religions. An Islamic theological perspective leads to a view of the state as an indispensable tool through which its institutions can play a direct role in furthering Allah’s will. The trajectory of Islam’s development followed a very different path to that of Christianity. While Jesus lived under an empire, Mohammad established one. Christianity emerged from within an entrenched and established Roman Empire which had administrative, judicial and political structures. Islam on the other hand was forged from within a nomadic tribal environment. As such, one of the Prophet’s early acts following the migration from Mecca to Medina (hijra) was to establish an authority structure that governed the daily lives of the community. Whereas Christianity’s early challenges were purely theological, having the luxury of a functional state structure that concerned itself with the temporal, Islam’s primary focus following the hijra was to establish a way of living, a framework that over time became known as sharia. Sunni Islam and the State 79

Problematically in some Western scholarship this critical period upon which political Islam is based, is misread. The scholarly method of conceptualizing Prophet Mohammad’s teachings (hadith) as head of the Medina Community is often suggested to be reactions to the environment of the time. While possibly correct historically, theologically it is misleading. Anthony Black, a political historian, writes, ‘Islam ...was designed by Mohammad and his followers to overcome blood feud and tribalism among the Arabs.’5 In this effort he was driven, according to Black, ‘by his own sense of moral mission’.6 The point of departure for such approaches is of Mohammad, the man, establishing a governance structure upon the basis of the political and natural environment within which he lived and through his own volition. The implication is that the subsequent hadiths are contextual as opposed to universal and that the Qur’an is just a book rather than a divine gift universal across time and place. This is a fundamental contradiction of the most basic belief of Muslims, namely that Prophet Mohammad was the living Qur’an and the Qur’an itself was uncreated. We must begin from the view that the Prophet lived his life perfectly in accordance with the Holy Book and that according to most theological schools, the Qur’an being uncreated meant that it had existed before time and alongside Allah. As such, a correct bracketed theological reading would understand Allah as omniscient and therefore knowing of the historical trajectory forthcoming to the Arabs, and choosing to place the revelation within such a context from within which His preferred theological interpretations would subsequently emerge. In attempting to develop an understanding of Islam’s view of post-conﬂict statebuilding we must ensure to do so from within such a theological paradigm, one that explains history as opposed to attempting to use history to explain the theology. This begins with seeing the two primary sources for theology and jurisprudence as being divine (Qur’an) and divinely guided (Mohammad).

Schools of Sunni Islam thought

Broadly speaking the study of Islamic theology began to develop as the emerging empire found a need for its laws to be grounded in Islamic principles. Pious Muslims who were knowledgeable of their religion initially drew upon their own traditions of Islam, namely those passed down from the Companions and shaped by a cultural context, to establish laws. By the ninth century some began turning exclusively to the texts to seek guidance on what the law’s right course of action should be. This approach led to the development of methodologies for 80 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding reasoning through cases and the subsequent establishment of Islamic jurisprudence. From among these scholars there emerged four Imams, each referred to as a mujtahid, who subsequently, posthumously, became eponyms for the schools of jurisprudence that were to coalesce around either geographical centres of learning (Abu Hanifa d. 767 CE, Kufa, Iraq, and Maliki ibn Anas d.– 795 CE, Medina, Saudi Arabia) or an individual’s teachings (al-Shafi i d. 828 CE and Ahmad ibn Hanbali d. 862 CE). As Islamic jurisprudence began to develop, the need emerged organically to tackle what would be considered theological questions since the legal matters that were being reflected upon required a greater understanding of Allah’s intentions.

Jurisprudence Although I am focused upon the theological concept of the state, Islamic jurisprudence dialectically influences its views and vice versa. The evolution and points of divergence between the schools of jurisprudence dovetail with critical issues considered by the two main schools of theology. As such the following is a brief summary of the four schools of jurisprudence and how they differ from one another. Islamic jurisprudence is the scholarly interpretation of the sources for the purpose of developing laws. The sources include the Qur’an and hadiths to which– were added, with varying degrees of emphasis, consensus (ijma¯ ) and the hermeneutical tool of analogy (kiyas). In addition, with further variations among the different schools, other sources are included such as the law of earlier prophets, the opinions of the Companions, personal judgement and public welfare. The degree of emphasis that is placed upon sources other than the Qur’an and hadith, and how hermeneutical tools are used, is largely the differenti- ating factor among the four schools. For example, broadly speaking, the school largely followed in Saudi Arabia,– Hanbali, does not accept either metaphor or analogy, while the Shafi i school, prominent in South East Asia and East Africa, accepts only analogies that could be directly developed from the Qur’an (as read without allegories or metaphors) and the motive can be seen as analogous. The Hanafi school, followed in countries that emerged from the Ottoman Empire, allows for the interpretation of Qur’anic passages allegorically and so are more accepting of a broader use of analogy. Al-Maturidi, having been taught by Hanafi scholars, was more accepting of interpreting verses– as metaphors which then influenced his theology, while al-Ash ari had embraced a Hanbali view and, as such, was less accommodating. Added to these four schools is the relatively Sunni Islam and the State 81 recent phenomenon of lay and individual interpretation of the original texts. These are the television preachers and popular authors who interpret the scriptures without qualification and outside any school of jurisprudence. As I am particularly focused upon religious institutions I do not reflect upon this latter group. As the Qur’an does not elaborate on the type of state authority that is most suitable to man, the acceptance of different exegetical tools can lead to considerable variations in understanding what the Qur’an suggests on this matter. How these different jurisprudic views impact post-conflict statebuilding will be discussed in the subsequent sections on legal validity and justification of rules. When doing so I will focus upon the Hanafi and Maturidi schools around which I will reference others in contradistinction but will not pursue their line of thought in detail.

Theology Debates suggestive of a reflection on theology began to emerge following the first civil war in the late seventh century. The initial political conflict that precipitated divisions was the dispute over the succession to the leadership of the Islamic community (umma). The first three Caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, were chosen with continued unity but upon Uthman’s assassination (tribal machinations), Ali, cousin and son- in-law to Prophet Mohammad through his only surviving child, Fatima, was deemed by some to be the rightful successor. Contesting this claim was Mu’awiya, the governor of Syria, who received support from Prophet Mohammad’s Quraysh tribe. The division led to contentious battles, political polarization and eventually the schism within Islam between Shia and Sunni. Although not at the time evident, subsequently and occurring separately within some of the camps, the ulama began to reflect upon theological issues with a prejudice that in part sought to legitimize post facto any outcome. An example of this is the view of Mu’awiya’s supporters who, after having gained the upper hand, argued that Allah’s will was the outcome that eventuated because being omnipotent another outcome could not have otherwise occurred.7 This line of thinking eventually led to a theological basis for a theory of state legitimacy that was based upon de facto control of authority. Such a view held that Mu’awiya was in power because he held power, and to rise up against him would have been against the will of Allah—a view that was subsequently developed by many prominent scholars in the post-classical period and is discussed further below. Eventually, further questions such as free will, predestination and the consequences of sin were considered in relation to the emerging political divisions within 82 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Islam leading to the three– prominent– schools of Islamic theology already noted—Maturidi, Ash ari and Mu tazila. Despite the political conﬂict that had, in part, led to theological discussions on the role of authority there was no debate on the relationship between Islam and the state. Instead, for the ﬁrst few centuries there was a continuation of the structures by which Prophet Mohammad had led the Medina Community. The state apparatus was an extension of the Caliph, who was the vicegerent of the Prophet, responsible for administering justice which itself meant applying the sharia. There were some who held that among believers there would not be a need for authority as the Qur’an was enough, but these were few and their sects did not emerge dominant.8

Maturidi theology The primary focus of this book for the purpose of the subsequent case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the school of theology that formed around its eponym, Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 944 CE), who lived on the outer fringes of the Islamic world in the eastern– province– of Samarkand. Mustafa Ceric´ argues that whereas the Ash ari and Mu tazila theological views, both centred in Baghdad, polarized people to favour nuanced views, al-Maturidi, being on the fringes, clashed with other religions that in turn moderated his theology as did his affiliation with the Hanafi school. In describing al-Mutaridi’s work Mustafa Cericwrites´ that he was focused upon ‘restoring the Islamic doctrine after the erosion which was started by an inundation of groundless tradition and was spread by an arrogance of pretentious rationalism.’9 Al-Maturidi had sought a middle ground that allowed for a theological methodology that 10 included both scripture– and divinely– gifted reason. While the Ash ari and Mu tazila schools largely overlapped chronologically, where in part the former was defined in opposition to the latter, the Maturidi position only emerged as a school per se in historical and scholarly texts after the rise– of the Ottomans. By this time, though, the extreme positions of the Mu tazila school had– been discredited and discarded (Shia Islam embraced parts of the Mu tazila doctrine) leaving only two schools alongside those who dismiss the importance of theology altogether. To– illustrate the theological differences between the Maturidi and Ash ari schools on some main points, for the purpose of providing 11 context, I have summarized the work of Montgomery Watt. Accord-– ing to Watt, on the role of professed faith and pious acts, the Ash ari value both equally while the Maturidi stand by the belief that faith, Sunni Islam and the State 83 both professed and believed, first and foremost establishes cause to be 12 counted among the community– of believers. On the punishment of sins after judgement day the Ash ari view is that Allah’s will is beyond our comprehension and so He may well chose to see even believers remain in Hell for eternity. The Maturidi believe that not even grave sins (apart from polytheism) can remove a believer from within the community, which would preclude being committed to Hell for eternity as one of Allah’s servants would intercede on behalf of a believer. As for free will, the fundamental question that determines man’s freedom– to embrace the faith and choose one’s own path, the classical Ash ari position favours the view that Allah chooses how we act and as such our– salvation is predestined.13 The Maturidi-Hanafi and post-classical Ash ari views are less consistent on this matter and stretch from the belief that man has a choice in his actions, the outcome of which Allah– already knows, to a lightly guiding hand version of post-classical Ash arism. 5 Justice as the Sunni Post-Conflict Statebuilding Imperative

Earlier I argued how salvation could be seen as the primary theological driver for the Catholic Church to involve itself in supporting post- conﬂict statebuilding. Within Islam I have not found any suggestion in the Qur’an that would indicate that Allah wants all, or even most, people to enter Paradise. Nor have I found others who have put forward a credible case that argues any numerical preference. Quite the contrary, in some passages it becomes evident that Allah foresees a majority not entering Paradise (see for example 17:62–63; 32:13). It seems that there is a widely held presumption that Allah desires all of humanity to enter Paradise, but this view is not based on any scriptural foundation in the Qur’an or hadith. In fact, how many will be chosen is left indeterminate. In Articles of Belief of Najm Ad-din Abu Hafs An-Nasaﬁ,byastudent of al-Maturidi whose text continues to be used as a basis for educating Sunni Muslims, it is noted that Prophet Mohammad made a special assurance for ten of his Companions to be welcomed into Paradise.1 Other than the ten Companions, prophets and possibly martyrs and children there is no expressed view on who or how many Allah wants saved. Quite to the contrary, MacDonald even notes a heretical sect that believed that after all of mankind had passed into Hell or Paradise that Allah would destroy both places and all their inhabitants, and remain alone as He had been before He had created the universe.2 As such we are left with knowing that there is a purpose: ‘Not for (idle) sport did We create the heavens and the earth and all that is between!’ (21:16),3 but not knowing whether the purpose of the heavens and the earth is nothing more than ‘idle sport’ for some humans or full of purpose for all.4 The relevant conclusion that can be made is that this lack of insight into Allah’s preference for us after the Last Day, for the time being, leaves aside salvation as the primary theological purpose that the state can serve in the

84 Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 85 interest of the faith. This is not to say that Islam does not have room for soteriology, but rather that for Sunnis (as opposed to Sufism which is replete with such concerns) what is of relevance is how to live a life that fulfils Allah’s wishes for humanity, leaving concerns of who will be saved to Him. Instead, for the purpose of positioning my argument it is important to recall that the Islamic narrative is premised upon a view that Allah had previously given knowledge to man on how we should live by way of the earlier prophets including through the Torah and Gospels. But man had repeatedly failed to abide by this guidance.5 The deliverance of the Qur’an in the form of unblemished divine words that included laws which were described in a way that for the Muslim community at that time were beyond contention in their meaning, removed the possibility of transgression as a result of tahrif (alteration or distortion) that had dogged the Jewish and Christian communities. As such, the Arab community that formed around the Prophet was uniquely blessed to have had Allah’s wishes directly given to them. Preeminent among these is that He desires justice and belief. Regarding justice, Khalid Blankinship states that it is stressed in the Qur’an far more than doctrine and ritual.6 According to Majid Khadduri, except for the belief in the existence of one God (tawhid), no other religious moral principles are more emphasized in the Qur’an and the traditions.7 The Sunni theologian Said Nursi places justice as having equal status with the belief of divine unity and prophethood.8 This view led classical Islamic scholars to identify maintaining the faith and justice as the primary concerns of the caliph/imam.9 Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328 CE) suggested that within the social contract relationship between ruler and the ruled, justice is the most important of all aspects.10 A contemporary scholar, Ibrahim Kalin, writes, ‘The ultimate goal of Islam is to create a moral and just society, in which individuals can pursue a spiritual life, and the toll of living collectively, from economic exploitation and misuse of political authority to the suppression of others, can be controlled to the greatest extent possible.’11 In the modern political context this has translated into justice being a common epithet of Islamic political parties (Freedom and Justice Party, Egypt; Justice and Development Party, Turkey; Prosperous Justice Party, Indonesia). Justice in the Islamic tradition includes not only legal justice but also other forms such as social justice as well as an inner and transcendental justice. Khadduri notes that all classical scholars, regardless of school, saw justice as an ideal which man should attempt to realize.12 How justice is to be achieved was and remains a point of contention. 86 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Justice through this understanding becomes more than adherence to law. It could even be argued that it is contrary to the concept of a code of laws as each decision is unique and dependent upon broader circumstances. The Qur’an’s story of Moses and the Bondsman (18:66–82) explains this point. In this parable Moses joins a divinely sent Bondsman on his journey during which the Bondsman damages a boat, kills a child and acts seemingly without purpose. When Moses accuses his companion of what could be termed injustice, the Bondsman explains that they are matters beyond his understanding. At the end of their journey the Bondsman explains each act. The boat was damaged so that it would not be taken away by the approaching forces of the king who was requisitioning all serviceable boats and leaving the fishermen with no means to earn a livelihood. The young child was killed as he was to grow up into wickedness and disbelief and his parents did not deserve to suffer such a fate but instead deserved a purer and more compassionate child. The seemingly random act of repairing a wall without asking for recompense was done because under it there was buried treasure due to two orphans who owned the wall. Without omniscient knowledge, as only Allah has, man, as with Moses, is unable to judge what is true justice. Belief, as the alternative emphasis within Islam, if considered as the theological driver for Islamic involvement in post-conflict statebuilding would lend itself towards an emphasis upon da’wa or proselytizing. This is a valid direction to pursue but due to the current secular nature of international post-conflict statebuilding justice is the more likely theological driver to deliver mutually acceptable activities. From the perspective of state builders, justice, understood in its broader sense is a core function of all modern states. Through its institutions the state arbitrates between right and wrong on matters in dispute (judiciary, parliament), distributes wealth from the rich to the poor (taxation, social security, healthcare) and protects the weak from the strong (police, defence forces). The authority by which modern states do this has been discussed in Chapter 1 under the rubric of legitimacy. Thus a state endowed with legitimacy becomes one of Islam’s most powerful agents for the implementation of Islamic justice within its borders. A government not enacting Allah’s will by pursuing Islamic justice is not utilizing its potential theological utility. That is why in two recent post-conflict statebuilding cases, Iraq and Afghanistan, the constitutions provide for clauses that not only ensure that no laws transgress Islamic laws, the so called repugnancy clauses, but also, for example, judicial officials pledge an oath to uphold the tenets of Islam.13 These aspects Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 87 within the constitution ensure that to the fullest degree possible, considering the circumstances of a secularist Western occupation in both countries, the state would still be structured in such a way as to contribute to Allah’s will through the concept of justice. Though in some circumstances, such as states with a minority Muslim population and those that don’t embrace Islamic governance principles, the state, as a tool for pursuing Islamic principles, may not be a viable option. Instead, a different approach is required to appreciate the role of the state. Such an approach requires a return to theology, beginning with the concept of free will. Within the two main schools of theology, views on one’s ability to freely act has largely coalesced around the position that such power lies with man.14 With the power to act upon Allah’s wishes lying with man then it is incumbent upon man, as vicegerent of Allah, to actively implement His will and pursue the transformation of this world into a just one (as opposed to passively accept its transformation). This immense challenge includes answering such vexing questions relevant to post-conflict statebuilding as whether contributing to building a state that may embrace a non-Islamic power structure is conducive to achieving the Islamic telos or is contrary to Allah’s will? The prominent jurisprudential debate within Islam surrounding the doctrinal acceptance for Muslims to reside in non-Muslim polities is a useful starting point from which to tackle this question and the broader consideration of Islamic institutional involvement in minority or heterogeneous Muslim states. The first point to acknowledge is that there is considerable disagreement over whether a Muslim is compelled to migrate away from a state considered to be within the dar al-harb (land of war as opposed to dar al-Islam, the land of Islam) or not, and if not, what the burdens are upon the believer who remains. By comparing what is required for Muslims to remain with the primary order elements of post-conflict statebuilding we can begin to see in which areas Muslim communities and their institutions may be religiously compelled to contribute. Andrew March has surveyed the scholarship and suggests that in defence of remaining there are three practical, commonly used, arguments: (1) the environment allows a believer to live safely and fulfil the tenets of Islam, (2) a believer can establish or maintain a foothold through which Islam can spread, and (3) considering the lack of a Caliphate anywhere in the world the alternative option of all Muslims migrating to the few Islamic states that are in existence is not practical.15 Once the justification for remaining is met then there are differing opinions on the community’s obligations. The most commonly held 88 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding obligations are that Muslims must (1) avoid aiding and strengthening non-Muslims if at the expense of Muslims, (2) commit to spreading the faith and (3) endeavour to establish a political authority for their own community.16 In addition and of particular relevance is that various Islamic scholars argue against undertaking actions that may undermine the interests of the larger Islamic community notwithstanding the three requirements for remaining.17 Each of these three matters (acceptability to remain, a communal risk versus individual reward approach and obligations upon those who remain) then proceed into further quagmires of complex debate. I would argue that these criteria can be grouped into two basic imperatives, either the post-conflict state becomes Islamic, making it a part of the dar al-Islam, or it is transformed from a failed into a stable state. Regarding the latter, taking for example the argument to remain based upon an environment that allows a believer to live safely, it would be dependent upon a stabilized state. Basing a case to remain upon the claim that other Islamic countries are overwhelmed and unable to provide support would depend upon sufficient basic needs being available within the home state. Meeting the obligation of spreading the faith would be dependent upon a stable and legitimate authority that would allow such freedoms. Not to undermine the interests of the broader Islamic community would necessitate contributing to the wider society’s interests, which would include stabilizing and building a viable state. As can be seen, without successful post-conflict statebuilding, a state that remained of the dar-al-harb (as defined by the ulama) would require Muslims to emigrate. The table below summarizes the argument that for Muslims to remain within a failed or failing state there is an Islamic imperative to either contribute to the state becoming a part of the intermediary identification, if not a part of dar al-Islam, or for there to be successful post-conflict statebuilding. The former can be achieved, depending upon the school of jurisprudence, by entrenching aspects of Islamic practice such as the sharia into personal law, which is represented by arrow (1). The latter can be achieved by supporting the post-conflict statebuilding process as represented by arrow (2). A combination of both in which Islam finds a larger role in the state than under the previous regime (i.e. through a repugnancy clause in the constitution) and the international post-conflict statebuilding efforts were alleviating the failed state characteristics that were threatening the legal justifiability of an Islamic community is represented by arrow (3) (Table 5.1). Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 89

Table 5.1 Requirement to migrate

Successful post-conflict Persistently failed statebuilding state

Dar-al-harb Requirement to migrate Must migrate depends upon (2) interpretation of dar-al-harb Intermediary Allowed to stay (3) Requirement to migrate designations depends upon interpretation of hijra (1) Dar al-Islam Allowed to stay Allowed to stay

In this section I have attempted to show that attaining justice within this world is one of the primary messages within the scriptures. But justice understood as Allah’s will is beyond the understanding of man as we lack the omniscience to judge the outcomes of our actions. In such a case, abiding by the gift of the Qur’an and hadiths is the best way to move closer towards achieving this goal. When the state is guided by Islam it can be a powerful tool in this regard as it controls significant levers of authority through which it can contribute to transformative justice. But not all post-conflict statebuilding efforts will contribute towards an Islamic power structure. In some cases such as in states with minority Muslim populations or secular post-conflict statebuilding efforts a non-Islamic authority is likely to emerge. Such circumstances require consideration of what religious imperative would encourage Islamic institutions to lend their legitimacy and resources to the post-conflict statebuilding effort. In this regard I identified the legal justification for Muslims to remain in a non-Islamic state or failed state and the conclusion that doing so requires either Islamization or a successful post-conflict statebuilding outcome. Problematically, for this model, despite the emphasis upon justice in Islam it does not appear prominently within the scholarly framework that lists legitimacy, security and basic needs as the primary order elements of successful post- conflict statebuilding. So while a modern state can be seen as a tool for attaining Allah’s will in the long term, it does not necessarily flow that what is required for successful post-conflict statebuilding (primary order elements) will automatically be supported by Islamic institutions. The following section is a theological reflection upon whether independent of the overarching post-conflict statebuilding effort it may be pleasing to 90 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Allah for religious institutions to contribute to any of the primary order elements in and of themselves. It does so with no pretence of proposing a new interpretation of the scriptures or siding with one or other tradition. Instead, by identifying those theological and jurisprudential debates within Sunni Islam that may impact the primary order elements of post-conﬂict statebuilding guidance can be developed in aid of subsequently interpreting the religious motivation within a particular context for Sunni institutions to contribute towards post-conﬂict statebuilding.

Sunni Islam and state legitimacy

Before proceeding to reflect upon the possible theological imperatives for an Islamic religious institution to confer legitimacy upon a state authority it is important to acknowledge that such an ability is dependent upon the religion having a recognized, preferably national, institutional structure. It is important for both ensuring the consistency of its message and maximizing its impact. Problematically in this regard, Sunni Islam was established as a community of believers without a divinely ordained hierarchy and without assigned spiritual functions such as the Christian churches of various denominations through which the sacraments are administered and God’s grace is conveyed. In some countries Sunni Islam has a recognized and registered body headed by a grand mufti that is acknowledged by government authorities as the representative of the Sunni ulama, but with no divinely appointed responsibilities. The Sunni Islamic community headed by a grand mufti is not the only institution of influence in Sunni countries. In Egypt other than the Grand Mufti there is Al Azhar University headed by a Grand Sheikh/Imam and the Association of Senior Scholars which under an earlier constitution had a formal role in governance. Other religiously influential institutions include the Tablighi Jamaat of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; Al-Qubaysiat of Syria; and Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiya of Indonesia. Although not formally constituted as institutions, movements that can take on institutional characteristics can over time develop around individuals just as the early schools of jurisprudence evolved around their eponyms. In this form some of the most influential people within Sunni Islam are the Turkish preacher Fethullah Gullen, the Saudi scholar Sheikh Salman Al-Ouda, Akhtar Raza Khan of India and Yusuf al-Qaradawi of Egypt, though none could be considered as institutions in their own right. Or alternatively, and counted among the most legitimate of Islamic institutions, there are the Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 91 monarchies that are seen as the defenders of the faith, and in particular the House of Saud. It has been argued that the high degree of legitimacy (both spiritual and temporal) of the monarchies within Islam was what ensured their countries’ minimal upheaval during the Arab Spring (apart from in Bahrain).18 Another source of authoritative legitimacy in Sunni Islam are the heads of the mystic brotherhoods, the Sufi sects that are found throughout the world. In some countries these various authoritative voices of Islam overlap, sometimes in harmony other times in opposition, while in other countries there may only be one institution speaking for Islam. The lack of a doctrine that acknowledges a divine role for an institution strengthens individual imams as well as grass-roots organizations and government appointees but at the expense of the potential influence of a unified collective of clerics. Even were there to emerge a majority position on an issue, without a doctrinally established authority structure there is no way to enforce compliance upon the minority. As a result it could be argued that there is mutual benefit to both the state and the majority faction among the ulama for imams to be sanctioned by the government, which is the case in many Islamic countries. The risk is that such a dependence upon the state for internal discipline can weaken the institution’s legitimacy as power is seen to lie outside of its structures, while nonetheless strengthening the state’s legitimacy. Returning to the question of the Islamic interest in legitimizing a state authority, as with other religions, the impetus to do so is largely motivated by the possibility of influencing state policies. In doing this the institution can entrench Allah’s gifts of guidance, the Qur’an and sunnah, as legal codes or moral frameworks and raise man’s interpretation of His telos as the state’s purpose. While the immediate political motivation is influence, a theological reflection of Beetham’s three aspects of legitimacy, legal validity, justification of rules and expressions of consent, can shed light on Islam’s views on the mechanisms of legitimization.

Legal validity From an Islamic theological perspective, positive law does not necessarily equate to just law in the sense that the Qur’an refers to it, as the laws themselves may be unjust relative to what natural law or the sharia would demand. Allah demands that ‘when ye judge between man and man, that ye judge with justice’ (Qur’an 4:58). He does not say ‘according to the law’. For example, abiding by UN resolutions authorizing the establishment of a transitional authority may suggest legal validity but 92 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding will not necessarily be morally acceptable or compliant with sharia or fiqh law. As such, a UN resolution is not in and of itself representative of justice and does not necessarily meet Islamic conceptions of legal validity. If not through a UN resolution, then what constitutes a just ascension to power within Islamic theory? The rightly guided Caliphs, the Rashidun, each ascended to leadership through various consensual mechanisms. Subsequently and all the way through to the twentieth century any change in leadership has been either through dynastic transition or force (not necessarily their own) neither of which necessarily lacks legal– validity as– one would presume. Al-Ghazali (1058–1111 CE), of the Shafi iandAshari schools, wrote of two traditional ways by which one could accede to leadership of the umma, through designation by the prophet or by appointment from the previous imam, but to this he added a third way, designation by the possessor of power, a method particularly relevant to post-conflict statebuilding. Albert Hourani suggests that al-Ghazali’s writing extends to any temporal power, in that as long as their justice is not contrary to sharia law any ruler is better than none.19 This has been a consistently held view within Islam and one that would suggest that in the post-conflict statebuilding environment international state builders have legitimacy if they bring stability to a country, assuming their reign is not contrary to sharia—hence the need for repugnancy clauses in constitutions. Conversely Mohammad Kamali, echoing modernist scholars such as Muhammad Rashid Rida, writing in today’s context appears to disagree.20 He refers to the commonly referenced phrase in the Qur’an, ‘those charged with authority among you’ (4:59) and suggests that it refers to the community as a whole. ‘An imposition of power from outside the Muslim community’, such as I would suggest comes, albeit temporarily, through the post- conflict statebuilding process, Kamali it seems would argue, ‘cannot therefore be in conformity with the Qur’anic vision of leadership’.21 By this interpretation foreign state builders in Muslim countries cannot impose authority structures, instead authority must come from within the Muslim umma or through consensus be accepted by the community. Al-Ghazali’s justification was applied in the modern era to support dicta- torships in the Middle East while the latter view, as expressed by Kamali, can be seen reflected in Ayatollah Sistani’s position in 2003 on the Coalition Force’s authority to develop the Iraqi constitution (see Intro- duction). Which of these is embraced by the ulama in the context of post-conflict statebuilding depends upon the particular circumstances with both positions strongly supported by the scriptures. Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 93

As for how power is wielded, to reflect upon this issue theologically we must begin with the question, how is man to ‘judge with justice’ (4:58)? This requires knowing what is right and wrong, good and– evil, and importantly the process by which this is determined. For Ash arites it is through scriptural tradition as Allah is the creator of all things, what He deems to be good is good and what He deems to be evil is evil and everything will follow from there. For man to understand what He deems to be good and what is evil, man must draw upon the divine gift of the Qur’an and sunnah. Reason only serves to extend from this foundation subordinate judgments. Reason alone cannot differentiate correctly between those actions of man that may reasonably appear ‘evil’ or ‘good’ because man lacks sufficient wisdom to see their repercussions in ad infinitum and how they play out within Allah’s plan. Within Maturidi thought goodness has an objective existence; as such man’s ability to reason allows us to reach an approximate alignment between what is truly good and what is truly evil even without the aid of revelation. But with the divine gift of the scriptures goodness can be known with certainty. This theological debate over good and evil has largely not been taken– forward into the arena of public discourse for centuries. The Ash arite view dominates Islamic thought from which scholars have built a jurisprudential view on the legality of how power is wielded. Within the international post-conflict statebuilding environment, which has– been built upon a philosophical foundation of reason, the classical Ash ari position would be less likely to align with post- conflict statebuilding views on the legality of how power is wielded than would a Maturidi position. As such the school of theology embraced by scholars in a particular society would be indicative of whether there could be an aligning of the ulama’s views on the legality of how power is wielded with those of the international state builders (this is presuming that state builders abide by Western liberal principles). Any further consideration on the legality of how power is wielded cannot offer any value by way of further generalizations until considered within a particular context at which point two questions can be helpful for further reflection. The first question that arises in an attempt to reflect on the legal validity of contemporary post-conflict statebuilding authorities is whose interpretation of Islam is the justness of action to be measured against. It is important to note that in addition to Allah’s law as it was transcribed by Mohammad (sharia), a body of laws that are quite limited in their breadth relative to the challenges faced in today’s world, there is a second body of law (fiqh)that first began to be developed within the schools that coalesced around 94 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding the early and great Islamic legal scholars, the mujtahids.Thisbodyof law is an extrapolation of the scriptures through the use of exegetical techniques and various sources to arrive at rulings beyond what is offered by sharia. By the very nature of this process there was an early acknowledgement of the fallibility of such scholars, meaning that their work could only at best be described as the probable intent of Allah. As such the veracity of the earliest interpretations by a mujtahid lies in whether he ensured, when performing ijtihad¯ (independent reasoning), that he expended his best effort. If this requirement was fulfilled, then even without consensus among other jurists such a ruling became valid, a legal precedent among the community and within that school. The concept of fallibility and probability worked against dogmatic certainty and encouraged respect for a diversity of opinions as no one could claim certainty of knowledge but Allah. This approach is supported by a reference in the hadith that suggests a reward for those who expand upon Allah’s law alongside another that explains that the mul- titude of opinions that have emerged as a result of the many mujtahids is a mercy of Allah.22 Together with Qur’anic passages that are interpreted as accepting positive law, the view was taken that Allah accepts the law as developed by legal scholars.23 Based upon this understanding it is necessary then for the purposes of this book to reflect upon who is considered a mujtahid in today’s terms within a particular society, or in other words who is allowed to authoritatively interpret the scriptures. There are different applications of the term, ijtihad¯ , depending upon the ideological perspective within Sunni Islam. For conservatives, alternatively referred to as traditionalists (Salafis) or revivalists (Wahhabis), the doors are closed upon the interpretation of the original scriptures as the consensus of early mujtahids made their decisions infallible. Today’s conservative jurists then build upon the work of the mujtahids by refor- mulating contemporary challenges in terms of earlier decisions and in the case of rare instances requiring new insights they hesitantly undertake ijtihad¯ . Some fundamentalists and all liberal (modernist) Islamists, conversely, are re-engaging with the direct interpretation of the scriptures and the use of reason but each leading to very different outcomes. The second question that arises when reflecting on the legal validity of how power is wielded by contemporary post-conflict statebuilding authorities is a Sunni institution’s ability to convey its legal opinion. As discussed in the introduction to this section, despite the legal validity of each scholar’s ruling the possibility of multiple and contrary views are Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 95 to be expected. As such the transfer of legitimacy through the voicing of legal validity can be negated if a plethora of contrary opinions emerge. Knowing who holds authority to override another scholar’s interpretive authority can help us to understand how and to what extent any ruling on legal validity can be propagated. The single most common organization for Sunni ulama is an officially sanctioned or popularly established association headed by a grand mufti. This structure emerged after the disassembling of the Ottoman Empire that saw the leadership of Islamic scholarship shift from heads of schools of jurisprudence within the Empire representing their different followers to a single representative of the Islamic community within a territory. A grand mufti may in some cases have interpretive authority over other muftis, but in general his role is to deal with issues that are often related to state policy such as may include aspects of post-conflict statebuilding. Contrary to popular opinion, historically within Islam there was a strong tradition of a formal separation between ‘church and state’ though patronage networks often blurred the lines. The separate centres of authority between the scholar and the state began to develop during the Umayyad Caliphate and continued, with few exceptions, through to the late twentieth century when state authorities co-opted Islam to bolster their legitimacy. Such relative independence strengthens jurists’ legitimacy, an idea that is suggested in an often quoted but spurious hadith, ‘The worst of scholars is he who visits princes and the best of princes is he who visits scholars.’24 Although not a formally educated scholar, Osama bin Laden, criticized the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia for this same reason when the Mufti consented to the Oslo Peace Accords by reminding him that, ‘The forefathers of our umma and their successors have set a good example, and one of the most prominent characteristics of these righteous scholars [Imam Malik and Abu Hanifa] was the way they dissociated themselves from sultans.’25 Under circumstances where this tradition of a distinct and independent role for Islamic scholars remains true to tradition and the above mentioned hadith, the possibility for Islam to provide a legitimizing role through legal validity is far greater than in those countries where Islam has been co-opted by a government. In such countries where scholars remain independent, Islam can be a powerful contributor to legitimacy through legal validity.

Justification of rules In the preceding section I showed Islam to have a robust legal tradition with sources and mechanisms that can under certain circumstances serve the purpose of judging the legal validity of a new authority. Its 96 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding challenge in conferring legitimacy was the dispersed nature of potential institutional structures along with its co-option by governments. Asso- ciated with legal validity, as David Beetham explained, is the importance of being able to justify those rules against what I have called higher order values that transcend the reign of particular authorities. In the tenth century al-Maturidi appears to have been one of the early Islamic thinkers who conceptualized the importance of having a higher order set of values. In his major theological work, Kitab al-Tawhid,hewrote that prophets are necessary when there is ‘apparent mutual dispute among people as each one of them claims to be right and to be more correct. Whereas it is generally agreed that there is no one to arbitrate among them and to show them how to be united in their hearts and to integrate their words.’26 Al-Maturidi goes on to explain that in such a situation, left to its own devices, corruption and mutual annihilation are inevitable. In Islamic legal traditions higher order values are first and foremost to be understood as divine. The concept of a divine set of values, in some cases clearly enunciated in the form of laws, firmly fixes legislative authority with Allah while the temporal leaders are executors of Allah’s will, in effect the executive branch with limited leeway in developing laws. As discussed earlier, in the historical context the process of elabo- rating upon Allah’s will through the writing of positive laws largely lay with a body of legal scholars who, despite in some circumstances being dependent upon patronage, largely operated outside of government. By basing their work upon earlier rulings, each of which could be traced through to the earliest of the great mujtahids, legal scholars were able to justify their work within the higher order set of values that is Allah’s will as represented by those early, fallible, but probable interpretations. This legitimizing process of tracing the genealogy of a ruling back to its transcendent origin through generations of scholars has been assaulted in recent times. In Egypt, Gregory Starett suggests, ‘Authority is now more a characteristic of products themselves (sermons, lessons, advice, books, magazines, cassette tapes, computer software) than productive processes (apprenticeship, certification, jurisprudential skill). Who the producer is—when that can be determined—is less important than the marketability of what he has to say.’27 Another to comment on the decline of the institutional scholars’ place in Islamic society is Francis Robinson:

New claimants to authority have come forward with none of the ﬁnely-honed skills of traditional scholarship, indeed, for growing Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 97

numbers of Muslims Islam has become a matter of individual conscience, individuals have come to interpret the faith for themselves. No one knows any longer, as the saying goes, ‘who speaks for Islam’. There is in fact, a crisis of authority.28

These unregulated religious preachers who dispense fatwas without scholarly training threaten to breach the very purpose of the aspect of justiﬁcation of rules, namely that it is a set of values that transcends generations. Although the Qur’an remains a higher order source, that there is so much dispute in its interpretation undermines its value in this regard. Today’s Islamic preachers’ who turn directly to the scriptures dispense with more than a 1000 years of scholarship developed by the four schools of jurisprudence creating a lost opportunity to draw upon an established and widely acknowledged and therefore powerful source of higher order values.

Expressions of consent In Islam the concept of consent is closely related to consensus. His- torically, mechanisms such as the shura and bay’a, rooted in various pre-Islamic customs, conferred legitimacy by way of an expression of consent.Ashura council (such as the Loya Jirga) was used in Afghanistan to select Hamid Karzai as the legitimate interim president in 2002. Bay’a ceremonies are still used by the monarchy in Morocco. Neither of these mechanisms that were embraced within Islam engages with religious institutions but rather largely involves tribal structures. Though, consensus within Islamic religious circles does play an important role that can indirectly influence leadership structures. Without a hierarchical structure, doctrine is prone to be interpreted variously by Islamic scholars potentially leading to innumerable inter-– pretations. To ameliorate this problem the concept of consensus (ijma¯ ) was developed. Based upon a hadith in which the Prophet is reported to have said that the community will not agree upon an error, scholars reached the conclusion that for matters related to the interpretation of the revelations it was the community of scholars that would be required to reach consensus to establish doctrine.29 Despite debates over what constituted ‘consensus’, how many would suffice and in what manner was it to be sought and over the concept of ‘community’ (who constituted the community), over time doctrinal positions emerged that were widely accepted as orthodox within each of the schools.30 The importance of consensus among religious scholars has been greatly weakened in modern times. Today, because of the proliferation of 98 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding voices in Islam, consensus is no longer a popularly sought after necessity. Efforts at establishing consensus on certain matters, nevertheless, do continue. One of the most prominent of such efforts is the Amman Message first issued in 2004. It is claimed to be ‘the first time in over a thousand years that the community has formally and specifically come to such a pluralistic mutual inter-recognition’ and as a result the Message is ‘religiously legally binding on Muslims’.31 If consensus is achieved, whether at a global level such as with the Amman Message, within a school of jurisprudence such as among a particular school’s scholars or at a local level, each with diminishing binding force, the ruling has greater legitimacy than without any consensus. Without some degree of consensus the strength of a ruling is only as strong as the scholar’s standing. Theologically, though, consensus ensures that the influence of the ruling is greater than the sum of its parts. A universally acclaimed ruling such as the Amman Message has the mark of divine imprimatur, while consensus within a school ties it to the great mujtahids. It is through consensus that I would suggest Islamic institutions can most effectively contribute to this aspect of legitimacy. When religious scholars within a territory reach a consensus on the legitimacy of a mechanism of ascension to authority or on an aspect of how power is wielded then such a decision carries greater weight upon believers under that body than a secular consensus would suggest. In concluding this reflection upon legitimacy, the imperative for an Islamic religious institution to lend its authority can be found in the opportunity to position itself as an arbiter of legitimacy. In such a position it can most effectively contribute to Allah’s will of transforming this world into a just world. Recognizing the imperative to position itself as an arbiter of legitimacy leads to questioning how Islamic theology and jurisprudence view each of the three aspects through which legitimacy can be effectively conferred. For legal validity the Qur’an as Allah’s will and the hadiths as the Prophet’s sayings offer themselves as a robust and powerful body of laws against which to judge the legal validity of the ascension to power. In this regard a central question is whether the exegete understands legitimate authority as coming only from within a community or is any authority that prevents chaos legitimate? How power is wielded requires further consideration that can be guided by understanding against whose interpretation of Islam is ‘justness’ measured and what is the religious institution’s ability to convey its opinion once a view is taken? Without agreement, voices that seek to adjudicate on the legality of a new state structure can be severely weakened. This is because Islam’s robustness as a source of higher order Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 99 values is dependent upon its ties to centuries of scholarship within the hermeneutical confines of a school of jurisprudence. The current manifestation in the form of unregulated exegesis and ijtihad¯ is rapidly weakening its ability to serve as a justification of rules. An institution’s discipline in adhering to one of the historical schools of jurisprudence is indicative of a stronger capacity for Islam to provide a powerful source of higher order values as opposed to when authority to interpret the scriptures has been devolved to individuals. As for expressions of consent, Islamic scholars have through the mechanism of consensus a potentially divinely sanctioned means of suggesting justness. As it is said that Prophet Mohammad’s community shall not agree on an error, the ability, once consensus is achieved, to express consent to a particular mechanism of ascension to authority or in approval of how power is wielded can provide a very strong boost to legitimacy. The central consideration in this case is whether the religious institution is representing a consensus among the community on the legitimacy of the authority and if so how is it being expressed? Contrary to common calls for the unbridling of Islam from the past, for the very limited purposes of post-conflict statebuilding, I would argue that a return to the past would be more effective. A return to the past in which the schools of jurisprudence serve as ordered institutions of Islam would allow for consistency of authoritative opinion, consensus among scholars and a reconnection with higher order values which together could then contribute to a powerful legitimizing force. Seeking to understand an institution’s views on these religious matters will help to judge the potential motivation for supporting the post-conflict statebuilding process.

Sunni Islam and public security

Unlike the Catholic Church’s concept of original sin, in Islam man does not have a ‘wounded nature inclined to evil’.32 Instead man is considered innately good. Nevertheless, humans can be led astray by jinn, evil spirits who tempt man into committing acts of sin, or alternatively guided by angels.33 It is alongside the non-believers that the jinn stand while the angels guide the believers.34 Conceptualizing the state as a force for restraining man’s sinful nature would be wrong as no temporal structure can inhibit the spiritual jinn. This is not to say that there are no temporal temptations that can lead man astray, but rather that the source of temptation is spiritual rather than innate to our nature. To overcome the efforts of these spiritual tempters man must revert to Allah and His agents, angels, for support. 100 Religion and Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding

The first implication of this cosmology is that a just world can be achieved on Earth as man’s nature is innately good and if left alone without external influences emanating from either the temporal or spiritual worlds man could live in a state of goodness. As we do not live in such a state and instead are exposed to temptations that lead us away from the straight path, then man requires the ability to judge correctly between the voices of the angels and those of the jinn as well as not being led astray by other humans who choose wrongly. The revealed Qur’an and the example set by the Prophet Mohammad are the two critical sources of guidance upon which man can begin to judge. In an effort to aid in this individual endeavour the community can act by expelling those who do not accept Allah’s gift of revelation, or secondly, mitigate the negative influence of those who willingly or mistakenly chose to accept the temptations of the jinn. The former represents a highly unlikely scenario in international post-conflict statebuilding and I will not discuss it further. As for the latter, the identification of those who mistakenly or knowingly embrace the temptations of the jinn is not possible since they are unidentifiable by man. What is left, instead, is for the community to enforce a system that minimizes the ability of those influenced by the jinn to lead others astray. In a post-conflict situation the temptations to act in such a way as to breach the teachings of– the revelations and those that reason (or revelation alone for the Ash ari) tells us are wrong are all too present. Not only are there temptations but also, as discussed earlier, within conflict situations the ability to practise the tenets of Islam may well be restricted, which in and of itself further distances man from Allah. That is why much has been written by early scholars on the importance of authority, regardless of its character, when threatened by the alternative which is anarchy or civil war. The theological reasoning for a stable state is supported by a passage in the Qur’an which makes clear that it is Allah’s will that the Islamic community lives in peace and security:

Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will ...change (their state), after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and peace. (24:55)

But importantly, this reference in the Qur’an alongside my teleology of justice suggests that peace and stability is a description of a just end state which Allah desires, as opposed to a standalone goal in and of itself. In other words peace and security is just a transitory waypoint on Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 101 the path towards justice. This can in part be seen by the repeated references in the Qur’an to justice being more important than life: being persecuted is worse than killing to protect against it (2:191, 217), Allah using combat to prevent a corrupt world (2:251). Security and stability result from justice in contradistinction to Catholicism in which I argued it was a temporal goal in and of itself by which the state could contribute to mitigating the structures of sin in an effort to facilitate the ultimate goal of salvation. Through an Islamic theological view, instability can be seen as an accepted consequence of a broader and more important process that sees society moving towards becoming a just society. There is a faction of Islamic scholars focused upon advocating peace- building who would argue to the contrary, that peace is an objective in and of itself. Their view is that Allah desires peace and therefore man should seek its actualization, which would suggest within the context of post-conflict statebuilding an unquestioning imperative to contribute towards stabilization. To quote one telling statement from such an argument, ‘When conflicts erupt and destroy human relationships, restoring them is essential if justice is to be served.’35 The critical difference is that in this view peace is a key component of what determines an outcome as a just outcome. The suggestion being that without a conflict ending there can be no justice. I disagree. If we know, for example, that by achieving peace, polytheism, the unforgivable sin, will prevail, without further contextual information I cannot see how this could be argued to serve justice. Justice and belief in the one God are the primary concerns to which all others are secondary, none of which is essential, not even peace. Peace as a goal in and of itself is not based in any particular theology or school of jurisprudence but most often identified through a selective reading of Qur’anic passages. From a theological perspective this view is further weakened by its understanding of justice as measured by man rather than Allah. A view of peace being critical to justice is constrained by man’s limited knowledge and foresight. There are cases as highlighted by the parable of Moses and the Bondsman (18:65–82) noted earlier, or in the following verse, ‘But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not’ (2:216), in which what appears to be unjust to man (fighting in the case of this verse) may contribute to a greater justness from Allah’s omniscient perspective. While it could be argued that there can be no justice without peace in the short span of man’s measure, through Allah’s timeless view the so-called 102 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

‘justice’ served by an inopportune peace may lead in time, conversely, to a weakening of true justice within this world. The main point here is that peace is not necessarily the primary means by which Allah’s justice can be achieved. Assuming that peace is a preeminent objective would wrongly lead to the presumption that Islamic institutions would always be supportive of a state builder’s efforts at building a stable and secure state. The vitality of the alternative view, that justice as an end can justify violent means, is evidenced by the number of scholar’s fatwa that support violence against what is, for example, perceived to have been an illegal invasion of Iraq, what is perceived to be an illegal occupation of Palestinian lands and what was perceived to be an affront to Islam to have had US military bases in Saudi Arabia.36 As for who is responsible for facilitating the progress towards a just society, at first glance it would seem that the responsibility for creating a society structured according to divine revelation, including minimizing the impact of those who have succumbed to the influences of the jinn, lies with the rulers of a community and their institutions, namely the state. To achieve this with regards to public security, the state could draw upon the tools of justice available to it which includes prisons, courts and the police. In fact in the Qur’an it explicitly acknowledges such a responsibility, ‘Of those We have created are people who direct (others) with truth. And dispense justice therewith’ (7:118).37 But it is not only the state alone that is responsible for the dispensation of justice. It is the responsibility of all believers, ‘O ye who believe! stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor’ (5:8).38 This shared responsibility for justice engages religious institutions and communities under certain circumstances to participate in establishing a secure and stable society, but only if it is seen to be contributing towards Allah’s justice. Differences emerge when reflecting upon religious motivations for Islamic institutions to contribute to public security in the degree of emphasis placed upon peace as an end in and of itself or a means to an end, namely justice and to what degree the community (including religious institutions) is burdened with the responsibility of delivering justice as opposed to those in authority (i.e. the state). These questions highlight the tensions that are suggestive of the direction an Islamic institution would take towards contributing to building public security and cannot effectively be answered other than through a particular case study. Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 103

Sunni Islam and basic needs

Poverty and the needs of the poor is a recurring theme within the Qur’an and in Islam more generally. There are several different perspectives on poverty. In the Qur’an ‘God commands justice and beneficence (ihsan)’ (16:90), the beneficiaries of which include, ‘parents, close rela- tives, orphans, the needy and travellers’ (2:215). As a means of achieving this He prescribes the practice of zakat. The benefits of helping others can be great to the alms-giver: Allah tells Prophet Mohammad that the teaching to the Jews was correct, ‘if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people’ (5:32). Jamal Krafess suggests that the variety of reasons for undertaking charitable acts includes, ‘a way of receiving Allah’s assistance, atoning for sins, escaping punishment, thanking Allah for his mercies and bringing a donor closer to paradise on the Day of Judgement’.39 From these examples it can be seen that discussions on poverty are largely focused upon the way believers should lead their lives vis-à-vis the poor as opposed to explaining the theological character of poverty. In other words, is the teleological value of poverty simply to serve as a means for the alms-giver to win Allah’s favour? Understanding the theological objection to poverty will allow for a reflection upon the imperative for Islamic institutions to contribute to rebuilding the state through the provision of basic needs. To gain an understanding of the theological character of poverty we can go to a hadith in which the Prophet spoke of the need to help one- self rise out of poverty. ‘The upper hand is better than the lower one, the upper being the one which bestows and the lower one which begs.’40 In another hadith it is recorded that Prophet Mohammad said, ‘It is better for anyone of you to take a rope (and cut) and bring a bundle of wood (from the forest) over his back and sell it and Allah will save his face (from the Hell-Fire) because of that, rather than to ask the people who may give him or not.’41 In other words, particularly blessed are not the poor in Islam, which may offer a compelling motivation for individuals to do all that they can to extricate themselves from poverty, but doesn’t shed light on why an institution would be compelled to contribute, as we recall that there is no indication that Allah wants all, some or virtually no one to be saved. In identifying what would motivate an institution to act to reduce poverty, the first step would appear to be to argue the sanctity of life and the threat against it that extreme poverty makes. This approach though does not help in explaining the institutional imperative for reducing poverty as human life is not necessarily sacrosanct to Allah (that life 104 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding is divinely created does not suggest that the loss of life is particularly displeasing to Allah, as was shown in the earlier story in which the Bondsman decided to kill the child knowing that it would be replaced with another ‘better’ child (18:66–92) as well as other references in the Qur’an).42 Instead, to begin in this endeavour we need to return to the concept of justice. As Allah’s vicegerent on Earth it is man’s responsibility to reflect His will upon this Earth. While understanding His will is beyond our ability (‘I know what ye know not,’ 2:30), aspiring to reflect His way is not. One suggested means of reflecting His way is by understanding justice as conceptualized through the 99 names for Allah that are known to man. Aspiring to live Allah’s names that include for example, ‘The Gentle’, ‘The Wise’, ‘The Leader’, ‘The Very Merciful’ and ‘The Honest One’, as well as transforming the world into a reflection of these names is one way of working towards justice. The challenge then becomes one of balance between His names. The Sunni theologian Said Nursi provides an example of a mother who tends to a crying child by giving him chocolate, in this way showing mercy, but too much mercy can also be unwise, yet both Mercy and Wisdom are two of Allah’s names.43 In the field of poverty alleviation this same conundrum is a focus of concerns over the creation of dependency and more broadly is reflected in the adage, give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a life- time. Finding the right balance between giving an abjectly poor society food (humanitarian/basic needs) and teaching them to grow their own (development) is just one reflection of the tensions evident in endeavouring to meet Allah’s justice. Simply providing food aid and other basic needs on a continuous basis without reflecting upon its effect upon dependency is unjust as it undermines those people’s chances of living dignified self-sufficient lives in the future. Alternatively, expecting the abjectly poor to help themselves if they don’t have the energy or assets with which to rise out of poverty is equally unjust as many will be unable to do so for reasons beyond their own control (see 4:98). Poverty then becomes a reminder of the disequilibrium within the world created by man– having fallen to temptation by way of his own free will (both Ash ari and Maturidi views). This view is reflected in the predominance of Islamic charities that focus both on the provision of basic needs as well as involving themselves in socially transformative actions. Contributing to rebalancing the inequities creates an imperative for Islamic religious institutions to engage with the provision of basic needs. Some Sunni theologians such as Said Nursi suggest that changing our social structure to better reflect Allah’s will can only come about Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 105 by changing how individuals live their lives, implicitly minimizing the potential role of the state.44 I would suggest that even within such a construct the state can hasten the rebalancing of inequity (even if seen solely as an internal individual struggle) by drawing upon its authority, which includes the ability to adopt redistributive and pro-poor policies. For this reason it would be in the interest of Islamic institutions in seeking redistributive justice to contribute to building an effective state authority. The end of poverty in this view will only ultimately be achieved when global society is based upon Islamic insights. Such an interpretation is not too dissimilar from some Protestant Christian denominations’ views of the millennial reign of Jesus during which only then will there be peace and harmony. Within the immediacy of post-conflict statebuilding the theological imperative for Sunni religious institutions is to ensure that the trajectory of the state and its policies is headed in the right direction as opposed to simply providing humanitarian assistance without further concern. This may mean ensuring that those elected into government embody Islamic values and support the establishment of institutions such as the zakat and wak. f or under other circumstances it could be an opportunity to push state authorities to adopt sharia law. The emphasis is then on structural changes that tend to align with secondary order elements as opposed to the primary order element of basic needs. As such, the state can be a powerful tool in facilitating into this world a form of social justice, but it may not necessarily be the case that the Islamic institution will see the provision of basic needs as a religiously grounded imperative.

Conclusion on Sunni Islam

The Amman Message that lays claim to be the first genuine global consensus among Islam’s ulama in more than 1000 years attempted to identify the role that Islam and its scholars should play in the wider community. In relation to this book, it proclaims that the Islamic nation must ‘affiliate with and participate in modern society, and to contribute to its elevation and progress, helping one another with every faculty [to achieve] good and to comprehend, desiring justice for all peoples’.45 In part this can be done, it continues, by ‘[p]roviding for human rights and basic liberties, ensuring life, dignity and security, and guarantee- ing basic needs; administering the affairs of society in accordance with the principles of justice and consultation’.46 The responsibilities of the religious scholars in this endeavour include leading people to partake 106 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding in their roles and reaffirming priorities as reflected by the principles of Islam. The widespread consensus of the Amman Message among the ulama and its binding ruling on the importance of the Islamic nation engaging with modern society reaffirms the need for Islamic institutions to engage in post-conflict statebuilding. To understand how and when Islamic religious institutions would engage in post-conflict statebuilding, in particular, possibly even when contributing to the secularization of a state, requires a step away from a jurisprudential perspective that dominates current Islamic scholarship and instead a step towards taking a broader view of the spirit of Islam by way of theological reflection. Islamic theology is a largely neglected if not mistakenly dismissed source of insight into political Islam. This is especially the case within Western scholarship in which few articles or books draw upon theological perspectives to better understand today’s global challenges. In an attempt to make a small contribution to remedying this shortfall this section began by considering what is the inherent telos for man within the Islamic narrative. Justice, not in the sense of law, but equilibrium or the middle path being representative of Allah’s will, was argued to be the primary overarching goal for Muslims alongside belief. Justice in this sense is comprehensive. It includes all aspects of life on Earth extending beyond the limited scope of personal or criminal justice into, for example, social justice and environmental justice. By embracing a broader understanding of justice a legitimate and stable state becomes a potential means of contributing to its achievement. The first consideration that needed to be addressed is generally framed as a legal question, though it has theological consequences, namely, whether it is permissible within Islam for Muslims to remain in non- Islamic governed countries. This question is fundamental to this book’s thesis as international post-conflict statebuilding efforts are likely to be led by secular institutions leading to partially or even largely secular governance structures. The general consensus is that it is permissible based upon limited criteria, which if met in turn demand certain obligations. The fulfilment of these prerequisites to remain was shown to be dependent upon either the Islamization of a state or successful post-conflict statebuilding. An example of the latter being that to remain in the dar al-harb requires being able to practise Islam safely, which is dependent upon a degree of public security. Remaining based upon limited alternative options to migrate to other countries would require sufficient basic needs in the home country relative to those other places. To avoid undermining the interests of the Islamic community by distancing Justice as the Sunni Statebuilding Imperative 107 themselves from the interests of the broader community would require participating in the common interests of society and contributing to the overall post-conflict statebuilding endeavour. Alternatively, this chapter also considered whether any of the three primary order elements in and of themselves were mechanisms by which Allah’s will could be achieved regardless of their association with post-conflict statebuilding. The concept of legitimizing the state is widely held to be an imperative, as from classical times Islamic scholars have noted that without the state the alternative would be chaos. By seeking to legitimize the state, Islamic institutions position themselves as arbiters of legitimacy in such a way that it can be granted as easily as it can be withdrawn. But such pragmatic incentives for action may not necessarily align with Islam’s views on the mechanisms by which a state can be legitimized. To determine what is legally valid requires knowing within a particular context who has authority to interpret and how they would interpret the different rulings within Islam by means of legitimate ascendance to authority in the context of international post-conflict statebuilding. Two examples were given to illustrate the potential differences: al-Ghazali argued in the twelfth century that an authority was legitimately enthroned if they prevented chaos, while Kamali writing in the modern era suggests that the Qur’an in 4:52 implies that any authority must come from within the community. In the context of international post-conflict statebuilding these two views could stand in contradiction. Whereas the former allows for foreign authority the latter would only do so if the community gives consent or is represented. Legitimating the state can also be achieved by finding a justification of the rules (of the state authority’s laws) within Islam’s higher order values. This would be in the interest of Islam as it would allow it to entrench itself as the measure against which laws are judged to be fair and just ensuring that authorities will tend closer towards the Islamic telos. Lastly, Islamic institutions can express consent through the established religious practice of seeking consensus. Universal consensus, a concept which is defined differently by the various schools of jurisprudence, would offer divine imprimatur on a ruling, but is an unlikely option to be sought on matters related to particular post-conflict statebuilding cases. More localized consensus, while lacking the certainty of not ruling in error, would nevertheless still have a greater impact than would the sum of the individuals proclaiming a ruling. Security and stability, as a post-conflict application of the concept of peace, is an important component of the telos of Islam but only as far as 108 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding it contributes to justice. Peace when it is sought at the expense of justice, in the form of governance structures that are contrary to the spirit of Islam, is not a worthy exchange. This is because fundamental to Islam and contrary to Christianity, a just world can be achieved on Earth as man’s nature is innately good. As Allah’s vicegerent it is imperative upon man to pursue the manifestation of Allah’s will in such a manner. While understanding Allah’s will is beyond man’s ability, attempting to assess the likelihood of particular actions contributing to it through the use of revelation and reason is thought to lead to a probable approximation of His will. As such within Islamic theology there cannot be an automatic assumption of an imperative for peace as justice may well be best served by allowing a conflict to play out. Lastly, the reflection upon the imperative for the Islamic institution to muster its resources to provide basic needs is complex. While Islam is clear on the importance of alms-giving, reminding adherents of the value of giving to others it is not as clear if poverty is an impediment to the Islamic telos. I argued that the provision of basic needs is valuable when it contributes to a greater purpose of reconfiguring the world’s structures towards a more just system. Without reflection upon the broader consequences, the provision of basic needs can reinforce unjust structures or undermine on-going rebalancing efforts. There are different interpretations of how a just system can be achieved, whether by individuals living just lives or through society enforcing a just system, either way I argued the state has a role to play. The state can facilitate this individual or communal effort by reflecting in its politics Islamic values. This chapter has sought to provide a broad overview of Islamic perspectives on post-conflict statebuilding. Along with the consolidation of Roman Catholicism’s stance on statebuilding in earlier chapters, this book has offered guidance rather than conclusive positions attributable to either religion. This is because local aspects such as history and culture influence the way a religion’s theology is interpreted. As such the following chapter applies the framework developed earlier and draws upon the theological guidance provided here to consider how the institutions of Sunni Islam and Roman Catholicism in Bosnia and Herzegovina could contribute to the post-conflict statebuilding effort. 6 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been, to varying degrees, under the tutelage of international state builders since the General Frame- work Agreement for Peace (Dayton Peace Agreement) was signed on 14 December 1995 following nearly four years of war. Since then the international community has been involved in the establishment and maintenance of the state apparatus through various mechanisms including bilateral aid, development projects, mandated responsibilities, and, unusually considering the period of time, direct authority as is vested in the Office of the High Representative, other individuals and international organizations. This direct and continuous involvement by international state builders included engaging with religious institutions. But without much said or written on this topic and no scholarship to draw upon outreach to religious institutions was understandably ad hoc, embraced by some, eschewed by others. It is not surprising then that these efforts were described to me by religious leaders as insincere and thought to be largely public relations efforts. This book begins to respond to the ad hoc nature of the engagement by applying the framework I developed in Chapter 1 to build a better understanding of the potential role of religious institutions. In this section I draw upon this framework to consider how the particular structures and practices of two religious institutions in BiH, the Roman Catholic Church and the Islamic Community, could conceivably engage with the post-conflict statebuilding endeavour. In addition I reflect upon their theologies to suggest nuanced variations to the views on post-conflict statebuilding developed earlier and how these differences could impact their motivation in supporting the post-conflict statebuilding effort.1 While considering how and why the religious institutions of BiH could contribute to post-conflict statebuilding, I do not present a case

109 110 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding of whether they did or did not, other than where it adds light to the original question. As such the primary focus is a search for the particularistic traits that differentiate the religions from what are often, wrongly, presumed to be universal characteristics. The historical role of religion in governance within the region of today’s BiH suggests that the nearly 50 years of communist rule, in which religion was absent from public affairs, was the exception to a centuries long tradition of religious involvement to which today’s society has in some ways returned to. This historical role of religion was first entrenched through the Ottoman millet system (religiously defined communities for the purpose of state administration), which was designed as a means of delegating the management of local level state affairs including collecting taxes, distributing state land for cul- tivation, maintaining order and managing the court systems. In these millets, for nearly 400 years, administration was undertaken at a local level with clerics and lay people being jointly responsible for matters in a village. Reinforcing this view of a specific role for religious leaders, the Austro-Hungarian constitution for BiH of 1908 was based upon proportional representation of the three dominant religious groups at the time. In this constitution the Senate had fixed seats allocated to religious leaders, with each of the following holding a seat: the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Sarajevo, the Reisu-l-ulama, the muftis of Sarajevo and Mostar, the four Serbian Orthodox bishops, the Roman Catholic Archbishop, the two diocesan bishops and the two provincials of the Order of St. Francis. This religio-political structure acknowledged the community’s divisions along lines of faith, an approach that continued until the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921, then for a 50-year period was supressed but was subsequently revived in the Dayton peace agreement’s constitution of 1995.2 The relationship between religion and the state in BiH today is uniquely shaped by this historical and cultural experience as are the religious institutions themselves. Acknowledging that the return of religion to the public sphere is not an aberration or a short-lived psychological response to the horrors of war, but rather a return to a cultural norm, allows for a bracketed reflection upon the place of religion in influencing the three primary order elements of post-conflict statebuilding—legitimacy, stability and security and basic needs. Today, while religious institutions no longer play a formal role in governance they continue to be prominent actors in society. Their influence, whether stemming from their divine origin or association with ethnic groups, is reflected in various polls. As a proxy for legitimacy, levels of trust show religious institutions to be among the Bosnia and Herzegovina 111

30 Percentage 20

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 Religious institutions Courts National government

Figure 6.1 Percentage trust (‘a lot’) in various institutions of BiH

most legitimate in BiH.3 The following ﬁgure shows the trust held in religious institutions relative to other critical government institutions (Figure 6.1).4 This trust is actively expressed by such indicators as shown in the following table (Table 6.1):5

Table 6.1 Religion’s standing in the Bosnia and Herzegovinian community

Percentage attending religious services at least 45% for both 1998 and 2001 once a month Percentage active in a church or religious 14% (1998) organization Percentage that accept the influences of 24% (2001) religious leaders in determining their vote during elections Percentage believing religious institutions give 48% (2001) answers to moral problems Percentage believing religious institutions give 27% (2001) answers to social problems Percentage believing that religious leaders 6% (2001) should influence the government 112 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Religion and state legitimacy

Bruce Gilley, largely building upon Beetham’s framework, began a process of measuring legitimacy in 72 countries, including BiH. Drawing upon results stemming from nine questions taken from a variety of sources, Gilley ‘measured’ legitimacy and found BiH languishing in 61st place.6 The Failed States Index 2013, too generously in my opinion, places BiH in 83rd place out of 178 countries for its legitimacy.7 Reflecting on the shortcomings of legitimacy in BiH requires that both the path which led to the establishment of the post-Dayton state as well as the manner in which authority was wielded by the power holders (both elected representatives and international officials) be considered. Reflecting on the legitimacy of authority holders in BiH I will continue to work within the framework and definitions of legitimacy as developed by David Beetham. To review Chapter 1, Beetham identified three interwoven aspects of legitimacy that contribute to an overall conceptualization of an authority’s legitimacy. These three aspects were legal validity, which considers the legal basis upon which authority is gained as well as upon which it is wielded; justification of rules considers the higher order values that are being used to justify the set of rules adopted by the authority as well as the mutual benefit that the dominant–subordinate division provides to society; and expressions of consent, which encompass a variety of mechanisms through which the people’s consent can be gauged to have been accorded to the particular authority, these can be in the form of elections, mass mobilization, through intermediaries or even simply consensual interaction with the government. These three components comprise a framework within which consideration of the legitimacy of the BiH post-conflict statebuilding case can be undertaken. The state’s legitimacy shortcomings stretch across all of Beetham’s aspects of legitimacy including legal validity in that the constitutional process was driven by the imperative of peace over and above the adherence to any legal due process. The source of higher order values serving as the state’s justification of rules are largely not those held by the population, but rather tie the country into international norms not vali- dated through domestic processes. An overwhelming majority of people within one region democratically and transparently do not show expressions of consent to participate in the state as constructed by Dayton. The expression of consent aspect is further eroded as a result of the constitution never having been put to the people by way of a referendum. Bosnia and Herzegovina 113

The theoretical review in Chapter 1 suggests that if religious institutions held a reserve of legitimacy in their own right they could contribute to the legitimization of the state in some of these aspects. In BiH this is evidently possible as shown through the trust in religious institutions figures presented earlier. I will begin with considering how Islam could contribute to legitimizing the state through Beetham’s aspect of legal validity.Asnoted in Chapter 4, to consider legal validity through the lens of an Islamic institution requires firstly asking by whose interpretation of Islam is the legality of the state assessed and how much religious authority does that body have. In the case of BiH, unlike most Sunni Islam societies, there is a strong and consolidated legally incorporated organization known as the Islamska Zajednica (IZ), translated into English meaning the ‘Islamic Community’. First established under the laws of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1882, IZ’s current constitution of 1997 suggests that it is a body that is the ‘sole and united community of Muslims in Bosnia- Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own’.8 Jurisprudentially it is officially committed to the Hanafi school and implicitly to Maturidi thought. This commitment to one school of jurisprudence embracing all Muslims within its territory (BiH and associations in Croatia, Slovenia and Sanjak) is enumerated in its constitution and forcefully embraced by the senior leadership.9 Structurally the IZ consists of jamats (communities of at least 100 households), majlises (groups of at least seven jamats in one munici- pality or city), muftiluks (districts overseen by a mufti of which there are eight in BiH), the Riyasat (main executive body of the IZ which is responsible for the appointment of Imams) and the Reisu-l-ulama (president of the Riyasat and grand mufti). Overseeing this structure is the Council of the Islamic Community (legislative body) alongside which stands the Constitutional Court. Within the Constitution of the IZ it states that the task of interpreting Islamic teaching and issuing fatwas lies with the muftis, though the Reisu-l-ulama (grand mufti) has the right to suspend any ruling if he deems it contrary to sharia law (Article LIX). This strict line of authority is in many other countries being threatened in the twenty-first century by self-proclaimed individual authorities. In BiH this threat also became present in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the form of Salafists who freely proclaimed fatwas on a wide range of matters. In response, to reinforce its authority in ruling on religious matters the IZ established the Fatwa Council in 2005. 114 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

This 120-year-old unity of authority, reinforced by the addition of a Fatwa Council, ensures that the rulings are unlikely to be undermined through contradiction by other muftis. In addition, and importantly, the IZ is completely separate from the government. Appointments of imams, muftis and other ofﬁcials, including the Reisu-l-ulama, are made through electoral procedures involving, at the lowest levels, all members of the umma (see Chapter 7 of the constitution). This structure recalls the hadith, ‘The worst of scholars is he who visits princes and the best of princes is he who visits scholars.’10 The clear and strong hierarchical lines of authority, broad community-based structure, together with the separation between the state and Islam, suggests a powerful source of authority on legal rulings. Having a clearer picture of who interprets Islam, and through what authority within the context of BiH, allows us now to return to the legal validity, according to the Islamic Community, of the ascension to power of the Dayton authorities. Were the IZ to abide by the interpretation of al-Ghazali, as discussed in Chapter 4, it would suggest the process of ascension to power was legal as the international community’s intervention ended the chaos. But those adopting the view as expressed by Kamali, who suggested that authority must come from within the community, would infer that based upon the very limited levels of authority that arise from the people the Dayton state lacks legality. Despite the apparently high level of potential inﬂuence that the IZ could wield in legitimizing the state by ruling on its legal validity, the ulama did not assess and rule on the legality of the Dayton process nor its constitution. In 2006 the Riyasat passed a resolution encouraging work to revise the Dayton constitution, but without any commentary on the original.11 When I asked senior Islamic leaders why a formal Islamic scholarly process was not pursued the general response can be said to have been one of initial surprise at the idea of undertaking such an exercise (‘that’s a good question’ was one initial reaction), followed by various responses suggesting a reluctance within the context of BiH’s religious circumstances to draw upon Islam to rule on state matters. ‘We accept the government as it is,’ suggested Mufti Smajkic.´ 12 Or alternatively, former reisu-l-ulama Ceric´ explained that in BiH the science of Islamic jurisprudence is eschewed for the art of ethical and moral living.13 When asked why this was the case Fikret Karciˇ c,´ professor of Islamic law and head of the Constitutional Court for the IZ, suggested that it was a historical legacy. In the past the authority of Islam within the region was sought to legitimize the state and its actions by the Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians and the Kingdom of Bosnia and Herzegovina 115

Yugoslavia, but during the socialist period the state did not want religion to play any such role. As many Islamic scholars are of the Yugoslav generation, the ulama have withdrawn and stayed outside of the public sphere. But he sees it as a ‘missing element’ among Muslim scholars of BiH, ‘unfortunately our Bosnian Muslim scholars have not been dealing with that.’14 Karciˇ c´ added that regardless of the legality of Dayton’s ascension, once signed by the people’s representatives it became a contract, a concept that holds a prominent place in Islamic jurisprudence. Even the Bonn Powers15 accorded to the High Representative by way of the international community’s interpretation of the Dayton Constitution constitutes, according to Karciˇ c,´ a contractual obligation that is required to be fulfilled. As such both Dayton and the Bonn Powers would be seen as legal, in his opinion, were they to be considered through the lens of Islamic law. As to the legality of how power is wielded in the context of BiH, I suggested– in Chapter 4 that the particular Islamic school of theology (Ash ari or Maturidi) would be indicative of the scholar’s position vis-à-vis Western international norms. Maturidi thought, being the dominant school in BiH, gives a prominent place for reason in and of itself as being able to loosely interpret between right and wrong. This emphasis upon reason aligns its jurisprudence more closely with the philosophical underpinnings of the mainly Western European post- conflict statebuilding effort (EU, NATO, OSCE). Despite there being no formal ruling by the IZ on how power was wielded, as opposed to disputes over particular decisions, the dominance of Maturidi theology suggests less likelihood of dispute over basic fundamentals and therefore a greater likelihood of supporting the legality of those state– actions which abide by Western norms. This would be unlikely were Ash ari theology dominant, a school of thought that suggests reason alone cannot approximate what Allah intended to be good and what He deems evil, in which case the Qur’an serves a larger role in guiding judgements. As for the Roman Catholic Church in BiH, it is structured according to canon law in that provinces align with territories, in this case the borders of the country. Within the Province of BiH there are four dioceses. The Archbishop is seated in the archdiocese of Vrhbosna with bishops in two of the three other dioceses, Banja Luka and Mostar-Duvno (Trebinje-Mrkan is administered by the Bishop of Mostar-Duvno). Its organizational structure is hierarchical, disciplined and robust. The main issue potentially weakening the authority of the Church in BiH is the historical role of the Order of St Francis. In Bosnia and in particular 116 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding in Herzegovina the Franciscans were historically the dominant body. Upon the conquest of Bosnia by the Ottomans, Sultan Mehmed II issued a ferman in 1463 assigning protection and freedom specifically to the Franciscans as opposed to Catholic clergy in general. It was not until 1881, three years after the Austro-Hungarian annexation, that Pope Leo XIII called for the re-establishment of diocesan authority from within Bosnia and for the return of parish priests. This process had not been fully accomplished by the 1990s leaving seven parishes within the Dio- cese of Mostar-Duvno still in the hands of the Franciscans. The full handover was completed by the early 2000s, though in the 2011 Pastoral Letter from the Bishops Conference it suggests that the ‘disagreement’, without providing more details, is yet to be settled.16 This division of authority is not simply an internal bureaucratic matter. There appears to be a widely held view among Muslims that the Franciscans are pro-BiH while the ‘Catholics’ are pro-Croatia. That the apparitions at Medjugorje are strongly supported by the Franciscans but not acknowledged by the Vatican has further divided loyalties among believers. The tension between the diocesan priests and the Franciscans has a long history including physical confrontations, accusations of spying and diocesan bans on parish sponsored pilgrimages to the Medjugorje shrine. In recent years two Franciscans were suspended from their ministries by the Vatican, one of whom was laicized while the other is waiting resolution, in part on matters related to their actions in supporting the Medjugorje message. Such public and private divisions can lead to a weakening of authority within the hierarchy and laity. Despite the clarity within the Roman Catholic Church on how the scriptures are interpreted, not being a jurisprudic religion limits its ability to confer legitimacy, through legal validity, upon the Dayton state structures. Instead, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Catholic Church’s theological position is that man abides by the laws of the government (Romans 13:1–13), even in situations ‘where citizens are oppressed by a public authority overstepping its competence, they should not protest against those things which are objectively required for the common good.’17 But how has the hierarchy interpreted the common good over the nearly 20 years since the Dayton peace? Peace, during the war years, was the sole measure of common good with Church leaders in BiH vociferously calling for an end to the war. The signing of the peace agreement, I would suggest, changed the measure of the common good away from peace and towards justice. Only weeks after the initialling of the peace agreement the Church criticized it by noting its potential unjustness: ‘[W]e seriously fear that a truly Bosnia and Herzegovina 117 lasting, firm and just peace can be achieved on the basis of this accord.’18 Since then the uncertainty of whether it would be unjust has extended to a certainty that it is ‘unjust’ and in addition that the manner in which it has been applied is ‘unjust’.19 As the measure of the common good shifted from peace to justice and the Dayton state was seen as unjust then it can be surmised that through this aspect of legitimacy the Church would not consider the current structures legally valid. In its pronouncements on the unjustness of the peace agreement the Church does not frame its argument within the context of its magisterium, but rather it appears to rely upon the belief that the community will presume that the Church’s stance on a topic is grounded in the sources of Catholic doctrine (Bible, teaching of the patristic fathers or the subsequent magisterium). In other words it appears that the Church in BiH has assumed the responsibility of interpreting the legal validity of political actions against its higher order values, rather than educating others on these values and guiding them in their application. I introduced in Chapter 3 these alternative views as being represented by Pope Benedict’s teaching in Caritas in veritate where he saw the Church as ‘purifying reason’ and the Second Vatican Council’s document Gaudium et spes in which the Church is ‘imparting knowledge’.20 The Church’s role, according to Pope Benedict’s 2005 papal encyclical, is to help ‘purify reason’ through its insights into divine and natural law. He noted on this matter that,

The Church’s social teaching ...recognizes that it is not the Church’s responsibility to make this teaching prevail in political life. Rather, the Church wishes to help form consciences in political life and to stimulate greater insight into the authentic requirements of justice as well as greater readiness to act accordingly, even when this might involve conﬂict with situations of personal interest.21 (Italic added)

Christian theology through this view finds its place as a source of justification of rules from which individual and collective political consciences can be ‘stimulate[d]’ to reach a better understanding of the common good. In such a case the Church becomes an advisor, interpreter or interlocutor with politicians and decision makers. The alternative view within the recent and relevant magisterium is espoused by the Second Vatican Council through Gaudium et spes in that the Church’s role is in ‘imparting knowledge of the divine and natural law’.22 In this case the Church is an intermediary between God and decision makers, an independent voice in political affairs, in effect a lobbyist for God. 118 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Based upon a review of commentary on critical political issues by prominent Bosnia and Herzegovinian Church leaders, in particular statements emerging from the highest episcopal authority, the Bishops Conference, between 1996 and 2000, I would suggest that the Church leaders tend towards an approach of ‘imparting knowledge’ rather than stimulating or ‘purifying’ the reasoning of political decision makers. Considering the earlier quoted figures of the high levels of trust in religious institutions it would appear that the Church in BiH has successfully positioned itself not only as the source, but also interpreter of higher order values, and in the process establishes a powerful platform from which to legitimize the state. To fully consider justification of rules we need to also encompass the direct working of God’s grace and how this impacts the faithful. As faith enables reason, according to Pope Benedict, political leaders without faith are weakened by the lack of the Holy Spirit’s guidance.23 Such a theological understanding leads to a fear, as expressed by the Franciscan priest, Brother Svetozar, when he told me, ‘I am afraid of non- believers ...we have leaders who do not believe.’24 In his view, without the guiding hand of God’s grace, flowing through the Holy Spirit, man is weaker. Political leaders will not necessarily make the best decisions unless aided by the Holy Spirit. This is not a unique position held by a few clergy, 22 per cent of people in BiH do not trust ‘at all’ people who do not believe in God.25 Either through the Church’s work in forming a conscience grounded in a higher order set of values or directly through the work of the Holy Spirit, Christian theology has secured a place in Bosnia and Herzegovinian politics by emphasizing its role in understanding the true meaning of common good in the form of justice. It could be argued that as with legal validity the position the Church takes on the justness of state authorities would make this aspect of legitimacy potentially act negatively upon post-conflict statebuilding efforts. I would disagree. The importance of higher order values is in their existence. That there is a moral body of values against which laws can be judged is critical to legitimizing an authority. How these values are used affects the aspect of legal validity. That they are there regardless of how they are applied provides a positive impact upon legitimacy. Were the Church to seek to undermine a state’s legitimacy then it would be best for it to withdraw its narrative from the public sphere as a valid source of higher order values. As such, in the context of BiH the Church has fully utilized its unique narrative and substantial authority to establish itself as an arbiter of what constitutes legitimate political actions and by doing so it provides a positive legitimizing effect. Bosnia and Herzegovina 119

I suggested in Chapter 5 that for Muslims Islam can serve as a powerful source for the justification of rules only when a clear link can be made between the rules and the Qur’an and hadith through the great mujtahids. Since solutions to the many challenges faced by society today cannot be found directly in the Qur’an and hadith, scholarly interpretation is required. If the linkage between the divine scriptures and the interpreted ruling is not solid then its actual and perceived righteousness is weakened, undermining the system as a source of justification of rules. This is the basis of the so called ‘crisis of authority’ discussed earlier. In BiH this issue appears to have been acknowledged and is being forcefully addressed by the leadership of the IZ by emphasizing the importance of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. By adhering to a single school of jurisprudence there is a direct and comprehensively considered lineage of rulings. The IZ through the Riyasat and speeches of the Reisu-l-ulama emphasize this point by reinforcing that schools of jurisprudence are not simply historical remnants of Islam but relevant components of how the faith is practised today. Hanafi jurisprudence provides a source of higher order values reaching back to the divine word giving Islam in BiH its strength as a justification of rules. A hur- dle to strengthening Hanafi jurisprudence as a source of higher order values applicable to political issues appears to be the scholarly preferences of the Bosnia and Herzegovinian ulama. According to Karciˇ cthey´ are mainly focused upon the study of heritage, they don’t appreciate the importance of providing immediate Islamic perspectives on present issues.26 So while the structural elements exist for the IZ to be a powerful source of legitimizing the state through justification of rules the current situation is such that many clerics have chosen not to pursue it. Expression of consent in this context is the measure of a religious institutions’ public support of the state authority. This aspect of legitimacy draws from both a religious institution’s ability to express consent along with the strength of its authority when it does. In the context of the Balkans, religious leaders hold influential positions in society giving them the ability to directly and indirectly confer legitimacy through expressions of consent. I suggested in Chapter 1 that a religious institution can confer legitimacy through four mechanisms: direct acknowledgement, direct participation and direct association; and indirectly through the concept of frame realignment. For the Catholic Church its efforts can best be noted through actions that reflect direct acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the new state authorities. The Vatican established its official and public position on the legitimacy of the state early during the conflict. It established diplomatic relations in 1992, in the following year an Apostolic Nuncio was 120 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding posted to Sarajevo, in 1994 its regional administrative provinces were realigned to match national boundaries, the Basic Agreement was con- cluded in 2006 and a Military Ordinariate was established in 2011. In addition statements of support for the country’s right to independence and legitimacy as a state were made regularly through the public media by the senior clergy immediately following the Vatican’s formal recognition in 1992. For the IZ, unlike the Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church, as of 2013 it is yet to sign an agreement with the government outlining its formal relationship. Beyond such an agreement there are no other formal mechanisms which the IZ can wield to express direct acknowledgement. But the IZ, as an institution, can directly acknowledge the state’s legitimacy through statements. The potential impact of such statements is enhanced as a result of the institution’s highly democratic structure.27 The broadly representative, locally engaging and transparent mechanism for selecting senior office holders creates a sense of ownership of decisions and a high degree of legitimacy when the institution seeks to directly acknowledge the authority within the state, which it did regularly during and after the war. During the war and early post-conflict years the relationship between religious institutions and political parties was a powerful example of legitimization through direct association, the second form of what I proposed as mechanisms of expressions of consent. The IZ was closely associated with the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Catholic Church with the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH). But following the peace both religious groups slowly dis- tanced themselves to varying degrees. This early predisposition to show direct association was as a result of the nationalistic approach to politics in which parties represented religio-ethnic groups, which in turn meant that the believers of a religion largely overlapped with the supporters of a political party. This direct association decreased over time as the number of overtly Bosniak and Croat political parties increased and as the religious institutions’ expectations of their partners were not met, the latter being particularly true, according to Muhamed Salkic,´ in the case of the IZ–SDA relationship.28 It appears that religious figures continue to associate with political candidates but indirectly—in an attitude representative of all clerics interviewed, Mufti Smajkic´ told me, ‘We have the trust of the people. We live among the people more than the politicians. If the people seek a recommendation we give it.’29 As for the third mechanism of directly expressing consent, direct participation, section 14 (c) of the 2004 law of the Freedom of religion and Bosnia and Herzegovina 121 legal status of churches and religious organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina prohibits a ‘church or religious community and their officials’ to ‘participate formally in any political institutions’.30 In a few limited instances religious institutions do undertake formal roles such as in the Brcko District where representatives of religious communities participate in the working commission on education, meeting every month with the international Supervisor; and in Tuzla, where they take part in the Council of Citizens.31 Borrowing a religious institution’s legitimacy indirectly, through the process of frame realignment, in which political actors claim religious symbols or language as their own has occurred with both religions. This can be seen most prominently when religion is instrumentalized by political actors. Religion can also be instrumentalized by international state builders. Almost universally among those clerical interlocutors interviewed, they lamented their faith’s instrumentalization by international state builders. Unlike interactions with national political institutions, the engagement with international actors was not seen as honest or transparent. Mufti Smajkic´ noted that international officials would only ‘come when there were problems’.32 A Catholic theologian told me that they would ‘force’ clerics into talks that were not genuine and in a way which was demeaning to them and counterproductive.33 Cardinal Puljic´ wrote, ‘For hours they would talk with me, after which they would continue according to their own ideas.’34 In the Pastoral Letter Fruits of the Past—A Pledge for the Future the bishops of BiH refer to the general instrumentalization of their faith by stating their intention for the future of ‘steadily removing all political attempts to misuse the Church and its representatives’.35 As has been argued in this section, the historical, cultural and structural influences acting upon each religious institution have created differing capacities for each to contribute to legitimizing the state. In an effort to succinctly summarize the status of each religious institution’s potential to confer legitimacy to the state I have included in the table below a subjective category, ‘Ability to contribute’. In one instance, that of the Catholic Church’s views of the Dayton state structures as ‘unjust’, this suggests a negative but low impact (Table 6.2).

Religion and public security

As discussed in Chapter 1 there are several factors that contribute to stability and security, including structural and functional elements such as effective legal systems, transparent governance structures and effective 122 Religion and Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding

Table 6.2 Summary of religious contribution to legitimizing the state

Legal validity Justiﬁcation of Expression of rules consent

Catholic Not a juridic Positioned itself Mechanisms Church religion, as such as the sole for direct has only a weak interpreter of acknowledgement potential to Catholic theology and direct determine legal and a voice on association. None validity. Through political issues for direct the lens of pertaining to participation. common good its Croats but by judgement is that doing so limited BiH lacks legal its utility to validity, hence a non-Catholics. negative impact. Ability to Low∗ Medium High contribute ∗As applied it has a negative impact. Islamic Has an established By strongly Highly structured community historical emphasizing a institution precedent of Bosnian Islamic allowing for direct ruling on the legal tradition and the association but no validity of importance of mechanisms authority. Existing Hanaﬁ school of for direct Fatwa Council jurisprudence the acknowledgement which could make IZ presented its or participation. such a ruling. But theology as a it never did. tailored higher order source. But it has no formal role in society. Ability to Medium Medium Medium contribute

law enforcement. From a post-conflict statebuilding perspective these are in large part dependent upon the strength and effectiveness of state institutions. In the case of BiH, four years of war devastated its institutions explaining why rule of law indicators continue to remain drastically lower than those of other former Yugoslav republics. But the war alone does not explain why after 17 years of peace, international support and higher per capita aid transfers than any European country under the Marshall Plan36 ($14 billion of aid between 1996 and 2007),37 including substantial policing support, there remains little sign Bosnia and Herzegovina 123 of improvement. I suggest that international attention was focused dis- proportionately upon the state sector elements of institutional policing while overlooking the importance of other elements that can contribute to public security, in particular the role of non-state actors. As a part of the community, religious institutions can play a role through the adjudication and mediation of disputes, creation of social capital and the transmission of civic values. In the cultural context of BiH, religious institutions do not participate in the adjudication and mediation of disputes but they do play a very prominent role in contributing to the constituent elements of social capital and normalizing positive civic values. Measuring the degree to which religious institutions contributed to each of these in BiH relative to other institutions is beyond the scope of this book. Instead, I reflect upon the profile of each religious institution in BiH to suggest how their structures and practices influence their ability to contribute to them and in turn to public security. Institutions with expansive grassroots representation, a theology tolerant towards others and opportunities for non-denominational outreach activities would suggest a positive potential to contribute to bridging social capital and indirectly public security. Similarly, an expansive set of resources to disseminate values and clerics with platforms from which their voices can be heard would be suggestive of a potential role in contributing to public security.

Religion and social capital Some work has been undertaken towards measuring levels of social capital in BiH. These efforts, though, fail in two critical areas that are in both cases related to the methodology required to adequately consider religion. In a comprehensive study of social capital in BiH the United National Development Programme report, The Ties That Bind, found that BiH has, ‘an unusually low level of social trust compared to other countries in the region’.38 One of the key findings of the UNDP team was that BiH ‘has a web of localised strong ties rather than a broader and more integrative pattern of weaker but wider-spanning ties incorporating members of other communities, ethnicities or social classes’.39 Even among common ethnicities the levels of trust (specific or particular trust) is relatively low with only 21 per cent trusting others in their own ethnic group.40 But along with previous studies undertaken by the World Bank, Balkan Analysis Group and Oxford Research Interna- tional, the UNDP report neglects two critical elements in considering the social capital deficit and its potential for reconstitution. Firstly, history is given insufficient consideration. For example, the Ties That Bind report 124 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding appears to suggest that history began after the breakup of Yugoslavia and that as such the normative levels should align with other countries in the region. This exhibits an unjustified presumption that social capital levels are ahistorical. A mistake that led the authors to suggest a course of action that focused on a rejuvenation of presumably withered or dormant state-wide societal structures that I suspect never existed at the presumed levels and certainly not uniformly throughout BiH. The second critical methodological shortcoming is the role of religious institutions as a contributor to social capital. The UNDP report notes the low levels of active participation (10.5 per cent) in ‘associations’ but misleadingly suggests that its research included religious groups. In reviewing its methodology it is clear that religious congregations and other spiritually inspired social associational activities were not included in this category despite consensus among scholars of social capital that formal religious groups are important generators of social capital.41 As such, to begin to remedy the latter of the two shortcomings identified above (the former would require a separate historical study) the following section begins by assessing the predominant theological understandings of the preferred relationship between non-believers and believers. The doctrinal views embraced by a religion within the context of BiH, which is a religiously heterogeneous society with communities bonded by religion, can be suggestive of whether a religion’s contributions towards social capital will be positive (strengthen bridging capital) or negative (strengthen bonding capital). In addition to a review of the theology I will also survey non-denominational volunteering opportunities offered by each religious institution. Such activities are thought to be significantly associated with increased involvement in building bridging capital which has been suggested to contribute to a reduction in crime. Lastly, I will build upon the suggestion that those faiths that have an emphasis upon the life to come or the other world are less likely to contribute to non-liturgical congregational activities. The theological teaching by both religions in BiH on the correct relationship between different religious groups generally follows the views that I outlined earlier. Neither religious group preaches in theologically aggressive terms about the other such as a future condemned to the eternal fires of hell for non-believers. Quite the contrary, very little effort is made to ‘save the souls’ of others through evangelizing or proselytizing. Religious belief is seen as an inherited characteristic, an ethno-religiosity, rather than a conscious act of faith in a particular belief structure that one can be convinced to adopt. In this regard the Bosnia and Herzegovina 125 clearest ecumenical statement on inter-religious relations is the ‘State- ment of Shared Moral Commitment’ signed by the leaders of the Islamic Community, Roman Catholic Church, Serbian Orthodox Church and Jewish Community. It states that the religious signatories,

[R]ecognise that our churches and religious communities differ from each other, and that each of them feels called to live true to its own nature. At the same time, we recognise that our religious and spiritual traditions hold many values in common, and that these shared values can provide an authentic basis for mutual esteem, cooperation and free common living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.42

While the theological position of each of the religions does not antago- nize the other, little action in the form of inter-religious outreach such as voluntary charitable work is undertaken at a grass-roots level. In BiH, as with other parts of the former Yugoslavia, there is a very low participation rate in formal volunteering (as opposed to informal altruistic actions).43 Husnija Kamberovic´ has suggested that this is a legacy from the communist era when volunteering was compulsory and associated with the state as opposed to a social or spiritual endeavour.44 As such, it could be expected that there would be few avenues for structured non-denominational volunteering within religious institutions. At first glance this appears to be the case with the Catholic Church. In a review of the ten associations and movements listed on the Archdiocese of Vrhbosna webpage under the section ‘The Church in Society’, only four had missions allowing for non-denominational community engagement.45 Of these, two, Katoliˇcki skauti and Milosrdno srce, were only established in 2010 and 2011 respectively. The third, while including within its mission an aspect of humanitarian engagement,isrestrictedtomemberswhohavetocommittoaparticular monthly regime of Catholic spiritual activities. Pokret Fokolara,achapter of the international Focolare Movement, could be considered as the only organization of the ten in existence throughout the post-conflict period that has a mission which could contribute to building bridging capital and be open to members of the congregation interested in volunteering. Reinforcing this view of a limited official effort to develop volunteering, an internal survey undertaken by the Archdiocese of Vrhbosna asked questions regarding social and charitable activities. Of the 153 parishes to whom the survey was sent, 75 did not answer this question (presumably there being no social or charitable activities), while those that did, in response to the question of the number of volunteers, 126 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding ten parishes had between 1 and 10 regular volunteers while only four parishes had between 60 and 100.46 While the methodology and specific questions asked in the survey are unclear, it can be suggested from the data reported that there is very little focus in the parishes upon the importance of organizing social and charitable volunteering opportunities. Whether as a consequence or in concert with the survey, Bishop Komarica of Banja Luka and president of the national Caritas body (Caritas BC BiH), in what I found to be the only example of a senior cleric publicly focusing upon the topic of volunteering, made a statement in the form of a message to his diocese, on 10 December 2010.47 In this statement he called upon Christians to volunteer in their parishes and abide by Jesus’ lead when he taught, ‘whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me’ (Matthew 25:40). As the president of Caritas BC BiH, Bishop Komarica represents the largest group affiliated with the Catholic Church that supports structured non-denominational social and charitable volunteering. In a review of the Caritas BC BiH annual reports from 2007 through to 2011 I found volunteering to feature increasingly prominently in project designs. Developing Caritas’s volunteer capacity is also noted in its strategic plan, which is reflected in a two-year project beginning in 2010 that includes a manual to help develop volunteering within parish level Caritas organizations.48 Two new associations established specifically for charitable work in the archdiocese of Vrhbosna; questions on volunteering being asked in a survey of parishes; the Bishop of the Banja Luka diocese encouraging volunteering in a pastoral letter; and a new Caritas project aimed at developing the capacity of local parish Caritas’ to encourage volunteering, all during 2010 and 2011, suggest that a concerted effort is being made by the Church to encourage volunteering.49 The Islamic Community has far fewer structured and institutionalized opportunities, this is not to say that it is not involved in the provision of social and charitable services, but rather that it does not do so in a formalized way that engages the congregation to volunteer directly through the IZ. The Islamic Community does raise funds for charitable needs as well as make in-kind contributions of food stuffs, especially during Eid celebrations, but partners with other organizations or works through officials to dispense the donations and largely on a sectarian basis, which contributes to bonding capital but not bridging. The general lack of institutional structures facilitating volunteering greatly inhibits both religion’s capacity to contribute to public security through the building of social capital. That the Catholic Church appears Bosnia and Herzegovina 127 to be aware of this and working to develop such a capacity bodes well for its future potential to contribute. When it comes to preaching on the afterlife in both the Catholic and Muslim instances there was either a balance if not a focus on how to better live this life as opposed to the life to come. Among Muslim interlocutors, sayings such as, ‘Work in this life as if you will live forever and work for the other as if you will die tomorrow,’ were used to convey the sense that it is not the tradition in BiH for imams to focus upon the life to come. In an article written by Mustafa Ceric´ he similarly notes the importance of both lives, ‘Humanity lives neither in a pure spiritual world without matter, nor in a pure material world without spirit. The secret of success is that the person unites in the self these two values: spirit and body. In other words, the purpose of one’s life is in the activity of spirit, and that is faith, and in the activity of his body, and that is hard work.’50 As for Catholicism, its basic doctrinal position of faith and works prevents it from becoming overly disassociated from the temporal. This would suggest that in both religions’ cases their theologies are not an impediment to engaging in activities that contribute to building bridging capital.

Religion and civic values Post-conflict statebuilding can be strengthened by imbuing values that shape a community’s views on important issues affecting public security such as corruption, inter-communal relations, crime and the role of the government. Religious institutions can contribute by spreading values that reinforce secular efforts, drawing from their body of moral teachings and building upon their public platforms. This can most commonly be through weekly clerical sermons and various forms of media. The number of clerics within a country is one indicator of the potential impact a religious institution may have. A high ratio of clerics per believer would suggest a more targeted message. BiH ranks 18th in the world for the number of Catholic priests per believer with a priest present for every 740 Catholics.51 Muslims are less well served with 1330 imams throughout the country amounting to one cleric for every 1193 Muslims.52 Despite there being one-third fewer believers that each Catholic priest must reach out to, relative to international figures available for other Catholic countries’ the imam-to-Muslim figure for BiH is relatively high suggesting that both religions are institutionally well equipped with human resources to disseminate moral values. Another manner in which values are disseminated is through the religious press. Varying over the years in BiH there are generally speaking 128 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Table 6.3 Religious magazines’ monthly circulation ﬁgures

Print Title Circulation

Glasnik Rijaseta Islamske Zajednice u BiH (Muslim) 1800 (1999) Preporod (Muslim) 26,000–30,000 (1999) Novi Horizonti (Muslim) 2500 (1999) Saff (Muslim) Figure unavailable53 Bosanska Sumejja (Muslim) 5000 (1999) Naš Ognijišta (Catholic) 15,000 (2011) Radosna Vijest (Catholic) 3000 (1999) Crkva na Kamenu (Catholic) 9000 (2000) Svjetlo Rijeciˇ (Catholic) 8000–10,000

four major Catholic religious magazines and five that are focused towards Muslim readers. Circulation figures are not in all cases publicly available but through interviews and correspondence the circulation figures were collected (Table 6.3). As can be seen from Table 6.3, relative to a population of three and a half million people religious publications are extensively read. Sup- porting my data the magazine of the Archdiocese Vrhbosna notes that 38,000 copies of Catholic religious publications were printed monthly in the year 2000.54 Taking either source, with an estimated population of half a million believers, there is a substantial penetration rate within the Catholic community of 25 per cent (assuming a copy is available to the entire family).55 Because the Muslim publication Saff did not provide circulation figures, but knowing them to be high, I can only surmise that the penetration rate for Muslim magazines would be similar to that within the Catholic community. For the Islamic Community, spreading religious values is an important task as suggested by the Reisu-l-ulama, ‘The main duty of the IZ is to promote the values of family life, the solidarity in the community, and the moral responsibility.’56 This is also reflected in its constitution, ‘The aim of the IZ is being achieved by promoting good and preventing evil.’57 In response to being asked whether civic responsibilities are introduced during the Friday sermon, known in BiH as the hutba, Mufti Smajkic´ replied, ‘This isn’t the number one theme, but I build it into other themes, such as if it is a national day or close to the national day, then a smaller part of the sermon or the direction of the sermon is used to encourage such things.’58 The imam of Mostar, Salim Dedovic,´ noted that IZ does try to develop a positive picture of society and the Bosnia and Herzegovina 129 government during Friday prayers in a positive affirmation of life and in the process affirming the government’s role in the process.59 Mustafa Ceric´ similarly said that the role of the Islamic Community, which he led for 20 years, was to influence ‘members when they go to parliament to pass laws that are appropriate or to the spirit of what are our moral attitudes, which means Islam’.60 For Catholics, similarly, imparting their values to society is an important role particularly of the hierarchy, but unlike in other formal agreements with the Holy See, in which the spreading of moral values to citizens of the state is specifically delegated to the Church, the BiH Basic Agreement does not allocate such responsibility.61 Instead, moral teaching (as applied to civic issues) can be seen as a part of the Church’s responsibility towards contributing to the common good. This view is reinforced through the only research that has surveyed the content of sermons. Undertaken in 1997, this survey of Franciscan nuns and friars through Croatia, BiH and the diaspora, asked what the main topic of the parish priest’s sermons were after the war. Of the 244 that responded 18.6 per cent suggested ‘defence of Croatia and Catholic religion’; approximately 69.4 per cent responded themes related to the common good such as ‘forgiving enemies’, ‘peace’, ‘cohabitation with other religions’ and ‘hope and optimism’; while ‘religious themes’ were spoken of 9 per cent of the time.62 The lack of extensive structured mechanisms through which religious institutions can contribute to non-liturgical voluntary activities greatly hinders the likelihood of either religious institution being able to contribute to public security. In contrast, the high number of clerics, popular magazines and what appears as an institutional commitment towards building civic values would suggest a strong ability to contribute to public security (Table 6.4).

Religion and basic needs

There are few examples in which post-conflict statebuilding efforts failed as a result of a failure for the provision of basic needs to the people. This is especially true of BiH. More so than for many other conflicts, humanitarian needs were overwhelmingly catered for by the international community, a part of which were religious charities. On the other hand religiously driven community solidarity played a much smaller role as the level of expectations of this middle income country was not conducive for religious institutions to contribute through this mechanism. 130 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Table 6.4 Summary of religious contribution to public security

Social capital Religious values

Catholic Tolerant theological view of Extensive press that reaches Church other religions. Very few substantial numbers of non-liturgical congregational readers. Relatively high activities that contribute to attendance rates at Sunday bridging capital. Equal focus mass with a large number of on this life and the after-life. priests. Ability to Low but growing (possibly High contribute negative) Islamic Tolerant theological view of An extensive network of community other religions. Very few mosques and imams, non-liturgical congregational substantial number of activities that contribute to publications with wide bridging capital. Equal focus readership. on this life and the after-life. Ability to Low (probably negative) High contribute

Domestically the Catholic Church was involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance through its Caritas organizations while the IZ worked alongside ‘Muslim’ NGOs. The degree to which these groups were able to provide assistance in the context of BiH where community solidarity is not a viable option was dependent in large part upon its institutional capacity and access to international resources. Institutionally, Caritas is structured through a tried and tested operational partnership structure that holds a key aspect of Catholic teaching at heart—the idea of subsidiarity. Each diocese can establish a Caritas organization that may, in collaboration with others, come together to form a national organization under the auspices of the Bishop’s Con- ference. In BiH this took the form of the dioceses of Mostar-Duvno and Trebin-Mrkan establishing a Caritas in 1982, the diocese of Banja Luka establishing a Caritas in 1986 and of the Archdiocese of Vrhbosna re-establishing a Caritas in 1990. Caritas Bishop’s Conference Bosnia and Herzegovina (Caritas BC BiH) was then formed in 1995. Abiding by the idea of subsidiarity the statute of Caritas BC BiH does not co-opt operational authority but rather assumes the responsibility for coordination between the three Caritases, collates and publicizes information, provides representation on national issues at a national level and promotes charity work. In addition to a robust national structure the Caritas international network, one of the largest international aid associations Bosnia and Herzegovina 131 in the world, provides through international partnerships considerable financial and technical resources. Such partnerships may also include other Caritas members extending their direct operations in the country of an existing Caritas. Based upon my experience of managing humanitarian aid operations, the operational structure, delegation of authority, establishment of oversight bodies and mechanism for international partnering, as developed by the Catholic Church for its Caritas operations in BiH, is a highly effective structure and appropriate for the purpose. The Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, unlike the Catholic Church, does not have an official humanitarian arm. While there are ‘Muslim’ organizations such as Merhamet, Sumejja and Mladi Muslimani, the former being the main humanitarian organization within the Muslim community, the Islamic Community does not have a unit dedicated to humanitarian operations nor authority over any of these NGOs. Instead the IZ, occasionally through the jamats,raises humanitarian support as required and in particular during religious events such as Eid al Adha. It is also involved in fund raising for charitable causes including international disasters. As the Islamic Community does not have any direct ability to contribute to the provision of basic needs its potential to contribute to this primary order element in supporting the post-conflict statebuilding endeavour is limited to fund raising from among its congregations and then partnering with other NGOs. While operating as a donor rather than implementer can be effective, without institutionalized international ties it is unlikely that the IZ could consistently raise sufficient funds to make a tangible impact upon the basic needs of the communities as well as adequately provide financial and programmatic oversight (Table 6.5).

Theology and statebuilding

Both Sunni Islam and Roman Catholicism are universal religions. Although the fundamental aspects of each religion are largely settled, for various reasons including cultural, historical or even geographical ones, they are sometimes nuanced in particular ways with an emphasis upon certain elements or slightly different interpretations of relevant aspects within their theologies. The theological drivers that motivate religious institutions to contribute to the post-conflict statebuilding endeavour cannot be conclusive without an understanding of these particularistic elements. In this section I reflect upon the specific contextual aspects of these two religions’ embraced theologies as they relate to the state 132 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Table 6.5 Summary of religious contribution to basic needs

Humanitarian assistance

Catholic Church Extensive, established and highly professional international humanitarian network that provides substantial funding and technical support to local chapters. Ability to contribute High Islamic community No humanitarian arm. Only mechanism to involve itself is through limited fund raising and then onward ﬁnancing of humanitarian NGOs. Ability to contribute Very Low

within the context of BiH. While largely reﬂecting their religion’s theological views on post-conﬂict statebuilding as developed earlier, they do emphasize particular strands above others and even in a few cases take a position in contradiction to what I suggested to be the norm.

Sunni Islam Within BiH, Sunni Islam is practised differently from that in the Arabian Peninsula, Indonesian archipelago or South Asia. It has been inﬂuenced by the community’s unique history and culture, a point recognized within the constitution of the IZ, when it notes that its ‘organs’, ‘institutions’ and ‘activities’ derive from the Qur’an, Sunnah and the ‘Islamic traditions of the Bosniaks’.63 Whereas the ﬁrst two sources are universal, forming the foundation of my earlier work, the third source is particular to the cultural setting requiring additional elucidation. The leading specialist on this topic, Fikret Karciˇ c,´ explains what this Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks is:

Sunni Islam interpreted through Maturidi school of theology and Hanafi school of law and corresponding Sufi orders; belonging to the Ottoman Islamic cultural zone; survival of ‘islamized’ practices of the inhabitants of pre-Ottoman Bosnia; influence of Islamic reformist movement known as islah and tajdid during the period between last decades of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century which provided theoretical justification for modernization of the Bosnian Muslims; institutionalization of Islam in the form of the Islamic Community, united and centralized now self-governed administration of Islamic affairs in this country and experience of manifestation of Islam in a secular state.64 Bosnia and Herzegovina 133

The earlier chapter on Islam engaged with Maturidi theology and Hanafi jurisprudence in an effort to maintain epistemological consistency for this section’s focus upon BiH. As the history of the Islamic community and its practices has been summarized and other source material referenced this leaves from Karciˇ c’s´ list an understanding of the nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars of the islah (reform) and tajdid (renewal) movements and their particular influences upon relevant aspects of the Islamic view towards the state in BiH. The writings of the reform movement scholars engage with one of the critical preliminary questions that I suggested needed to be answered, which is whether a post-conflict state was considered a part of dar al-Islam and if not what are the obligations upon Muslims. Based upon the scholarship on this issue I took the view that for the Muslim community to remain there needed to be either a successful post-conflict statebuilding effort or an affirmation of the state being a part of the dar al-Islam (or in an intermediary position). In the case of BiH this question has been asked following tumultuous historical changes over the past centuries—in particular after the 1878 Congress of Berlin when BiH came under a Catholic state’s auspices for the first time in 400 years and after the post-World War II communist take-over when the remaining elements of Muslim autonomy were eliminated. The reform era ijtihad¯ on this topic was undertaken by two scholars from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Bosnian Mehmed Teufik Azapagicand´ Egyptian Mohammad Rashid Rida. Both, contrary to the ruling of the shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul at the time, advocated that it was preferable to remain.65 The former based his ruling upon the inevitable consequence of migration weakening Islam in Bosnia and the latter upon the basis that Muslims could continue to practise Islam even under the new rulers. But since the mid to late twentieth century, according to Karciˇ c,´ these questions haven’t been asked or addressed by the younger generation of Muslim scholars as if they have lost their significance.66 I presented the same question to a practising Imam of this younger generation, hafiz Fahrudin Haseljic,´ Imam of Novi Travnik and a lecturer on the relevance of the hijra (migration) to today’s world. He argued that the hijra is still required of those who face the same conditions which pushed Prophet Mohammad to leave Mecca, namely, prohibition from practising Islam. But in BiH, he explained, this is not the situation. From my interviews and based upon a lack of any debate on the country’s potential lapse into the dar al-harb Ihavesurmisedthattheulamado not see a jurisprudential reason to migrate, but this does not suggest that the concept of hijra has been forgotten as was highlighted by the levels 134 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding of attendance Haseljic´ received during his lectures. Engaging with this topic in an effort to understand whether the community lies in breach of its obligations can provide insights into how the Islamic Community sees its role in post-conflict statebuilding. Based upon Andrew March’s work the obligations for Muslims once they choose to remain (as they clearly have in BiH) outside of the dar al-Islam include ensuring the maintenance of certain social conditions which are in part the responsibility of the community as a whole. March summarized these as (1) avoiding aiding and strengthening non- Muslims if at the expense of Muslims, (2) committing to spreading the faith and (3) endeavouring to establish a political authority for their own community. Imam Haseljic´ argued that these are not seen as primary concerns relating to the concept of hijra but rather are either fundamental (spreading the faith) or contextual obligations depending upon political circumstances. Whether contextual or fundamental, in the case of BiH, spreading the faith is constitutionally protected while the establishment of an authority for their own community could be said to have been achieved and is being maintained through the IZ, leaving only the first, avoiding aiding and strengthening non-Muslims. Because of the popular and political conflation of the term Bosniak, an ethnic identity marker, with Bosnian Muslim, a religious designation, I would argue that even the first obligation, avoiding aiding non-Muslims at the expense of Muslims is being actively practised. This is being achieved through the internationally accepted mechanism of popular politics whereby the numerically dominant Muslims overwhelmingly vote for Bosniak political parties that in turn protect the interests of their religio-ethnic group. As such from an Islamic jurisprudential perspective, BiH has an environment which allows the Muslim community that has chosen to remain to fulfil its obligations. While there are few scholars who would argue that BiH is a part of dar al-Islam, its current status is nevertheless favourable towards Islam, lying somewhere within the intermediary designation area (see Table 1). Whether the IZ actively engages with the concept of hijra or pursues these favourable conditions for other reasons, the result is that the state, as it is structured, allows Muslims to meet their jurisprudential obligations. Looking forward, jurisprudentially the IZ has a vested interest in maintaining the post- conflict statebuilding endeavour on its current course to avoid the potential regression of BiH into the dar al-harb. Another critical theological question I identified is the doctrinal aspect towards non-believers. In the case of Islam the critical question was how Muslim scholars interpret relevant Qur’anic revelations as Bosnia and Herzegovina 135 there are mixed messages regarding relations with non-Muslims. I noted in Chapter 5 how the concept of abrogation leads some to take a more strident view of relations with non-Muslims. In BiH this concept is recognized but with some caveats. In some cases an alternative hermeneutical approach, systematic interpretation, is being used in which the exegete collates verses to interpret the meaning of selected themes. This approach places an emphasis upon predominant underlying principles rather than relying upon the most recently revealed relevant verse. For example, Karciˇ c´ explains that on relations between believer and non-believer that systematic interpretation leads to an understanding that ‘the basic rule is peace, war is exceptional’ and even when considering war it ‘is limited by a number of pre-conditions’.67 Similarly, in an interview with Salih Colakoviˇ c´ former head of Bosnia and Herzegovinian Muslims, academic and retired member of the federal parliament, he quoted verses from the Qur’an including 49:13 to emphasize that conflicts are not because of religion but because of a lack of understanding of religion or evil against religion. Another caveat used in exegesis in the scholarly traditions of BiH is that verses should be distinguished between those that are to be held as general principles and those which are contextually specific. Within the context of BiH, living within a state that is multi-ethnic suggests the relevance of the Meccan period in which multiple faiths lived together over and above the more recent Medinan verses when the Prophet led a homogenous community. Using these hermeneutical approaches would suggest a dominant theme of tolerance to others, a theme that is not abrogated by later confrontational verses as the earlier suras are more contextually appropriate. This approach would lead to embracing verses such as ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion’ (2:256); ‘If it had been thy Lord’s will, they would all have believed, – all who are on earth! wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe!’ (10:99); ‘We ...made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other)’ (49:13); and ‘Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes – from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them’ (60:8). This hermeneutical approach suggests that Bosnian Muslims must accept the multicultural society that they currently live within.

Catholicism As for the Roman Catholic Church in BiH, its contextual nuances are no less important in the post-conflict statebuilding context. Through 136 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding the process of undertaking this research scholars unfamiliar with the Catholic Church in the Balkans suggested that a study of religion and the state through Catholic theology would be incomplete without a reflection on liberation theology. This may be the case in certain areas of Latin America in which the grassroots movement of liberation theology emerged independently from, and sometimes in conflict with, the Church, but not in South Eastern Europe. Drago Pilsel, an Argentinian Croatian, former Franciscan and a prominent political theologian, writes that ‘in Latin America, Liberation Theology wants to liberate poor people from any kind of oppression ...Here, in the Balkans, the focus is more on humans being enslaved.’68 The enslavement that Pilsel speaks of is not as much one of poverty but enslavement to an ethnic ideal that limits individuals from growing spiritually. Pilsel’s identification is as much a criticism of the Church and its on-going cor- roboration in supporting religio-ethnic constructs as it is a critique of wider society. In the Balkans the ‘universal’ (Catholic) Church is often, instead, paired exclusively with an ethnicity, namely, Croat. This religio- ethnic construct helped the nation building process in Croatia as the country was predominantly Catholic. But in the case of BiH, a doctrine that ties religion to ethnicity within a multi-ethnic state undoubtedly leads to the weakening of nation building efforts. As for post-conflict statebuilding, the impact of religio-ethnicity depends upon how the Church wields its authority. It would appear, based upon my research outlined above, that the international elements of the Church, such as the Vatican and Caritas structures, contributed positively at a very early stage by lending legitimacy to the state as well as routing resources to provide for the people’s basic needs, contributing to two primary order elements. But at the national level the religio-ethnic theology adopted by the leadership has led the Church to focus upon political issues that favour the ethnic at the expense of the religious.69 In this vein, one common but misplaced criticism is the Church’s allocation of substantial resources to the reconstruction and building of Churches. This criticism uses religio-ethnic terminology by suggesting that the rebuilding was purely for political reasons, namely, an effort to lay ethnic claims to geographic spaces through the instrumentalization of sacred religious symbols. I see such criticisms as lacking an understanding of the primary purpose of a church. If salvation is real and the Church’s role in administering the sacraments critical to it, reconstitut- ing holy spaces such as churches for this to occur is a critical obligation. It then follows that the locations in which churches will be (re-)built will be those in which they either existed prior to the war in anticipation Bosnia and Herzegovina 137 of returns, or in those places where the Catholic population has fled increasing the demand for the sacraments. In this case, accusations of focusing on the ethnic rather than the religious are not valid. Instead, the Church’s religio-ethnic influenced narrative most strongly diverts from its universal theology in its choice of political issues that its leaders prioritize. The primary concern of the Bishop’s Conference in the political arena since the end of the war has been the right of returns, in particular for Croat/Catholics. It is true that more than either of the other two peoples, the Croats have not returned to their homes. The Church’s view has been that insufficient political effort to facilitate the conditions conducive for return has been made by the state and the international community, which over the years has fuelled accusations of prejudice against Croats/Catholics. The criticisms were made in the early years following the peace and continued to be reit- erated through to most recently in the December 2011 Pastoral Letter, Fruits of the Past—A Pledge for the Future.70 A justification given to me by Catholic theologians for the Church’s support of a specific group over and above the entire population is that the Church endeavours to provide protection to the vulnerable and those who seek or need protection, which in this case are the displaced Croats. The terminology of justice, though, is misleadingly used to justify this order of prioritization. I suggest ‘misleadingly’ as it is a form of political justice or man’s justice, which while important, is not of the same order of importance as God’s justice. This, I would suggest, is the case as in no measure can it be said that the displaced are in a spiritual wilderness. The vast majority are in a Catholic country, Croatia, where they are able to practise their faith, receive the sacraments and live their lives in a manner that facilitates spiritual growth and contributes to their integral development. Were this not the case then the Church hierarchy’s political position would be theologically justifiable. From a post-conflict statebuilding perspective the problem is that this hierarchy of priorities that places the return of a particular ethnic group to their homes above and beyond other critical issues facing all Bosnia and Herzegovinians, regardless of ethnicity, suggests a lowered commitment by the Church towards the state. This prioritization of the ‘ethno’ over the ‘religio’ can weaken the impact of the Church’s activities upon efforts to consolidate the state. This would not be the case were the Church to draw upon its theology in support of other political challenges that are faced by all citizens regardless of their religion, such as corruption, which I would argue is a more likely cause of the low rate of returns. In other words, there are many ways to deal with the 138 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding

Table 6.6 Theological impetus

Theological inﬂuences on motivation to support post-conﬂict statebuilding

Catholic Church International centres of authority support the state. Local authorities’ focus on the right of returns reinforces an ethno-religious approach that weakens impetus to support post-conﬂict statebuilding. Willingness to contribute Medium Islamic Community Current state structures are in line with jurisprudential obligations of Muslims providing an impetus to support the status quo. Willingness to contribute High issue of returns, but it appears that the Church chooses to do so in a way that reinforces its religio-ethnic biases. The very real potential were the Church to take a truly national stance, responding to the needs of all ethnicities, is exhibited by the standing among Muslims of the Franciscans whose opinions continue to carry weight outside of their constituency in contradistinction to that of the diocesan hierarchy.71 Until such time as the diocesan hierarchy within BiH disassociates itself from its religio-ethnic associations its impetus for contributing to strengthening the state will remain weak (Table 6.6).

Conclusion

In this chapter I built upon the view that particularistic aspects of a religion, namely how it is practised and its theology flavoured, influences the religious institution’s ability and willingness to contribute to the post-conflict statebuilding endeavour. In the case of BiH, history has contributed to shaping both religions in such ways that distinguish them, in some cases markedly, from the way they are practised in other countries. For Sunni Islam, that there is a unified, hierarchical and culturally influenced authoritative body is relatively unique and arguably un-Islamic! For the Catholic Church its wilful association with a neighbouring country has created a religio-ethnic interpretation of a religion that is otherwise practised as universal. In both cases these particularistic aspects have meant that their abilities to influence post- conflict statebuilding as well as their willingness to do so cannot be generalized. Bosnia and Herzegovina 139

As such this chapter returned to the framework developed earlier in this book to apply its approaches in determining the Church’s ability and willingness to contribute to post-conflict statebuilding. Beginning with Beetham’s three part construct of legitimacy I argued that the Roman Catholic Church was unable to influence in any substantial way the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the state through legal validity as the religion itself is non-juridic. Nevertheless, Church leaders extended their remit in a manner that expanded their ability to contribute to legitimizing the state by engaging with the justness of the Dayton Agreement. In this case, though, the leaders chose to judge the state ‘unjust’ and in the process delegitimized it.72 Its willingness to engage so directly with the political is representative of the Church’s view of its role in translating its higher order values into the political sphere. The Catholic leaders in BiH have positioned the Church into the role of presenting itself as the sole interpreter of its theology in as much as the Second Vatican Council suggested, namely, by taking on the role of ‘imparting knowledge’. In this regard the Church empowered itself in a way that it could potentially contribute to the post-conflict statebuilding endeavour by being an independent voice in the political realm, but then weakened its influence by continuing to embrace a religio-ethnic approach that distances itself from non-Catholics. As for expressing or withholding consent, the Vatican’s international instru- ments and ability to amend administrative structures are powerful tools in conveying legitimacy. In this case by engaging at an early stage in amending treaties and international boundaries, the upper echelons of the Vatican hierarchy took the opportunity to provide a high level of legitimacy to the infant state at a critical period. Locally, the Church’s choice to pass judgement on the Dayton structure and its embrace of the role of ‘inpart[ing] knowledge’ has forcefully positioned the Church in engaging with the issue of legitimacy. That the local leadership chose to embrace a religio-ethnic narrative while its external arms and Franciscan brothers tended towards the opposite direction, created an overall mixed potential towards legitimizing the state. For the Islamic Community its institutional ability to confer legitimacy is more consistent than that of the Catholic Church. As a jurisprudic religion Islamic scholars can rule on the legal validity of a state authority as they have throughout history and continue to do so in some countries, but in the case of BiH, the IZ chose not to. Mustafa Ceric,´ former head of the Islamic Community, has ascribed this to the manner in which Islam is practised in BiH as being more of an art rather than a legal science, maintaining more of an ethical and moral status as 140 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding opposed to a legal one.73 As a source of higher order values, Islam, in the manner it is practised in BiH, is consistent with what is required for the justification of rules—having a single source of interpretation, adherence to one school of jurisprudence and a hierarchy of authority. But unlike in other countries, there is no formal (constitutional) role for Islam as a source of values, which detracts from it fully realizing its potential in contributing to the legitimacy of the state. Lastly, while the IZ is highly structured and disciplined, ensuring a consistent ‘Islamic’ voice and ability to express consent, it does not have any formal mechanisms through which to directly acknowledge the state nor does it have a participatory role in governance, instead it is left only with the mechanism of direct association. In each of these three aspects of legitimacy the IZ has the potential to adjust its approach so as to be in a position to be able to confer greater legitimacy to the state, but as it currently stands it has a moderate ability to convey legitimacy. In the particular circumstances of BiH, religious institutions do not play a role in the adjudication or mediation of disputes, instead they can contribute to public security by strengthening bridging capital and civic values. Problematically, though as latent social capital builders, neither institution for most of the post-conflict period has endeavoured to establish opportunities for their congregations to participate in building bridging capital through non-denominational social activities despite both embracing a theological interpretation of their scriptures, one that encourages engagement with other communities. The result is that the type of social capital most likely being built is counter-productive to public security in heterogeneous religiously bonded societies. In the case of the Catholic Church it appears that there is active effort under way to change direction and build its capacity to facilitate non-sectarian volunteering. On the other hand the mechanism through which both religious institutions have a strong existing institutional potential to contribute to public security is the spreading of moral values. Extensive church and mosque networks along with a widely read print portfolio that reaches at least 25 per cent of Catholics and a suggested similar figure for Muslims allows for the spreading of important messages in support of post-conflict statebuilding. For the provision of basic needs there is a stark difference between that which the Catholic Church can provide through its humanitarian arm, Caritas, and what the Islamic Community can offer. While the former has a long established unit under the auspices of the Bishops Confer- ence and formalized links with the international Caritas movement, access to fund raising and standing expertise, the IZ has no established Bosnia and Herzegovina 141 mechanisms for humanitarian operations. Its only means for contributing to the basic needs of the people is through local fundraising, which is unlikely to produce sufficient resources, or international donations, andisonanadhocbasis. As for their motivations, I have argued that both religions could find reason to support the post-conflict statebuilding effort from within their beliefs. This was premised, though, upon particular approaches to the exegesis of their sacred scriptures. In the context of BiH, Islam’s ability to influence society in the direction of Allah’s will can best be achieved through strengthening a functioning state, especially as it is associated with the dominant religio-ethnic political grouping. Possibly, because of the Bosniak’s historical memory of the precariousness of being in power, a more balanced hermeneutical approach is embraced by Islamic leaders and scholars, one which emphasizes respect for other nations and the importance of cohabitation with other people. On the other hand, the Catholic Church has embraced aspects of its theology that appear contrary to its universalistic teaching, in particular adopting a religio-ethnic approach to identity. This could also be a reaction to the circumstances of being a minority and the need to consolidate a sense of community. Nevertheless, such a position has resulted in a political theology that could potentially work counter to state builders’ efforts as it is not supportive of the type of activities that are required to strengthen a state. This section’s discussion of mechanisms and motivations has shown variations in the ability of the two religious organizations to contribute to post-conflict statebuilding. The Catholic Church is particularly strong in its ability to spread moral values conducive to enhancing public security, to provide basic needs and publicly express consent to the state’s authority structures. That these international and national structures allow it to contribute to the post-conflict statebuilding process does not necessarily ensure that its leadership uniformly chooses to do so as appears to be the case. The Islamic Community has a consistent capability to contribute to legitimizing the state. Its contribution to public security is similar to that of the Catholic Church in that its ability to build bridging capital is low while its capacity to spread moral values is high. It fails, though, to offer a substantial contribution to the provision of basic needs. These institutional circumstances, while being based upon historical legacies, are not set in stone. Engaging with religious leaders to enhance their contribution to building the state can be achieved through the support of existing strengths or efforts to change a religion’s institutional aspects that are not fully realizing 142 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding their post-conflict statebuilding potential. To do this requires, as I have argued, an understanding of the religion’s theologies and in particular the contextually favoured aspects or their particular hermeneutical methods that together influence the institution to work either for or against the post-conflict statebuilding endeavour. In this case helping to build the volunteering capacity of both religions and working with the Islamic Community to help establish institutionalized linkages with foreign sources of humanitarian expertise and resources would be two areas that would be welcomed as they are mutually of interest to both state builders and religious leaders. Other more politically sensitive options could also be pursued such as engaging more forcefully with the Franciscans who eschew religio-ethnic paradigms, or within the Islamic Community encouraging non-sectarian charitable partnerships, but the likelihood of success would be much lower. Conclusion

The recurring failure of the international community to guide states, from collapse to stability, recognized as a one-in-two chance over a period of five years, calls for further research, especially in areas that have been neglected or ignored to date.1 Through this book I have attempted to respond by looking at one non-state actor, religious institutions, and how its efforts if focused upon the same objectives can lighten the burden upon the state apparatus giving it room to recover and rebuild. Despite religious institutions playing a major role in the lives of people living in fragile and failed states, engaging with them appears to have been a no-go zone to date, a topic on which the literature is hesi- tant, practitioners dismissive and policy makers wary of being out of step with their constituencies. Only the military had the courage to question the prevailing wisdom, but understandably in a manner that instrumentalized religion, treating it as a latent tactical asset to be wielded by the battalion commander. In response this book has sought to break new ground by engaging unabashedly with the religious, drawing upon the field of theology as much as political and social science to find a role for religious institutions in post-conflict statebuilding. This is because were we to engage with religious institutions only through political and social science models it would risk diminishing them to those elements which fit within the parameters of existing generic models. Such processes lead to religious institutions being considered as political actors, placed alongside advocacy groups, lobbyists and transnational organizations. Alternatively, they may be seen as a social grouping acting as would clubs, sporting associations or charities. These categorizations are problematic as they tend to project temporal bound rational decision making processes to religious institutions. Instead I made the case

143 144 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding that any measure of the rational must include the spiritual, requiring in this instance engaging with theology to determine each religion’s boundaries for what constitutes ‘rational’ decision making. For most, including specifically Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam, their theologies require the inclusion of the spiritual in any measure of rational action, including such tangible risks and rewards as eternal punishment and salvation. Even objectives that appear temporal, such as maximizing membership or seeking influence with the government, should also be considered as potential means to spiritually rational (as best as man can understand rationality considering only an omniscient God knows what is truly rational) ends such as meeting God’s will for humanity. In other words, to engage with religion in post-conflict statebuilding we must begin from a foundation that acknowledges an alternative and expanded cosmological view. The challenge then becomes one of finding common ground between state builders’ temporal and religious institutions’ spiritual goals. This begins by asking the question of why a religious institution would lend its legitimacy and considerable resources to the post-conflict statebuilding endeavour. To answer this question I built on the work of recent theologians, such as William Cavanaugh, who criticize limiting religion to the temporal realm of secular politics.2 But where I diverge is in the understanding of the role of the state. Cavanaugh sees the state as offering an alternative salvation in competition with a Christian’s life to come, one in which the state offers humanity the promise of an ever lasting peace. Instead, I place religious teleologies, in this case salvation and justice, as a goal for religious institutions while the state as a means towards achieving such ends. This upending of conventional wisdom, by having religion instrumentalize the state, leads to a very different perspective of what motivates religious institutions to act in supporting post-conflict statebuilding. From a theological perspective the different teleologies of Islam and Christianity are not personal matters of interest only for individuals, as Western secularism would suggest. In Islam, as Allah’s will for justice can be achieved on Earth, man’s responsibility, as His vicegerent, is to work towards its achievement with the Qur’an as a guide. Islamic institutions could seek to contribute to post-conflict statebuilding to a degree proportional to the state’s potential to contribute to achieving Islam’s telos, that is in large part achieving Allah’s will for His justice. Although this calculation is never able to reflect His true will, as man’s limited knowledge can never understand the full consequences of one’s actions, through revelation and reason Islamic scholars can approximate what Conclusion 145 would be His desire and as such seek its attainment. In countries that are unlikely to emerge as Islamic states or in the case of minority populations, Muslim communities may not necessarily be empowered to transform their society into a just society. Even in such cases I argued that other religious obligations continue to require of them to contribute to post-conflict statebuilding. These would begin with an Islamic jurisprudential view of the right for Muslims to remain in a particular country under its new post-conflict authority structures. Remaining outside of the dar al-Islam, which is interpreted differently depending upon the school of jurisprudence, requires in all cases particular conditions that I argued go hand in hand with successful post-conflict statebuilding. This becomes a powerful imperative for Sunni Islamic institutions to contribute to post-conflict statebuilding. There may also be instances when a religious institution may not choose to actively engage in post-conflict statebuilding, but nevertheless in the process of carrying out its other religious duties it contributes to the primary order elements critical to successful post-conflict statebuilding (legitimacy, public security and basic needs). In the case of Sunni Islam I showed that authorities can be deemed legitimate when the alternative is chaos, but by another interpretation they are only legitimate if they are chosen from among the community. Understand- ing what the prevailing interpretive tradition is within a society will help us to understand whether its religious institution will be likely to accept the international post-conflict statebuilding effort. Public security, or peace, contrary to the arguments of some Islamic scholars, I suggested should not be viewed as a primary objective for Islamic leaders. Instead, justice is the predominant objective, in particular Allah’s justice, to which peace is only desirable if it is a by-product of justice and not at the expense of it. In this way it would be wrong to presume that every Islamic institution has an interest in stabilizing a post-conflict state as the state itself may well not reflect what Allah has expressed as being just. Lastly, I asked the theological question of what role poverty plays within Allah’s plan for man. Framing the question in this way shifts the focus away from the value of alms-giving and instead towards the poor and in particular, to paraphrase a Christian teaching, whether blessed be the poor. In Sunni Islam, I would contend, there is no spiritual value to being poor. It is neither encouraged nor praised; instead its presence is a reminder of the extent of worldly injustice. Working to alleviate poverty becomes a theological imperative when considered through the lens of justice. As such the most appropriate response is not necessarily the provision of basic needs. A better approach would be to bring about a just 146 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding system, which inherently, due to the state’s extensive authority, requires engaging with the post-conflict statebuilding process but through secondary order elements. Because of Sunni Islam’s view that the provision of basic needs and establishment of public security are by-products of the successful pursuit of justice, Sunni Islam’s theology is not necessarily aligned (depending upon how it is interpreted) with the primary goals of state builders. In Christianity, true Godly justice is not possible without the return of the Messiah. Some Christian theologians such as Miroslav Volf go so far as to say that in attempting to achieve a form of God’s justice on Earth, ‘a final reconciliation’ in Christian terminology, would be the work of the antichrist.3 Without perfect information and knowledge we can only create more injustice by imposing a concept of justice that is not genuine justice. The focus for man according to Volf is to simply realize the ‘resources required to live in peace in the absence of the final reconciliation’.4 Instead of seeking justice, I argued that for Christianity the primary telos is individual salvation. Through Jesus’ bodily sacrifice humanity’s redemption in the eyes of God was made possible. This gratuitous act established a new purpose towards which humanity should strive. The Church notes that in this endeavour, ‘[E]arthly goods and human institutions according to the plan of God the Creator are also disposed for man’s salvation and therefore can contribute much to the building up of the body of Christ.’5 The Church’s legitimacy, its network of priests and media holdings, as well as its extensive charitable assets, are therefore all at the disposal of man’s salvation. For the Church to share its legitimacy in support of a state it would need to be evident that the state could contribute to the common good, a concept that includes weighing the contribution not only to the temporal but also to spiritual well-being. This body and spirit view of the common good is the critical difference between secular rights-based views of the role of the state and Christian approaches. Building from such a broader cosmological view also means that the imperative to seek public security should encompass consideration of what lies beyond the temporal. Aligning with secular rights-based approaches, peace is valued in Christian theology, but for different reasons including the sacredness of the body (being created in the image of God) and Jesus’ call for us all to become peace makers. But striving for peace, unlike with Islam, is also in and of itself a temporal goal that should be sought as it minimizes the structures of sin that draw people away from the path towards salvation. Conclusion 147

As for the provision of basic needs, arguably the most prominent of Church activities in post-conflict statebuilding environments, the imperative for the Church to involve itself, counter-intuitively I would say due to its widespread presence, is undefined and largely unexam- ined. While helping the poor facilitates an individual’s path to salvation there is little evidence to suggest that as an institution the Church should seek to minimize poverty. In other words, what is the theological value of poverty? While the ‘poor’ or the ‘poor in spirit’ are ‘blessed’ according to the Gospels, diluting any institutional reason for the Church to engage with alleviating poverty, abject poverty, I argued, inhibits people from participating in the economy of salvation and is a blight against God’s plan (Luke 6:20 and Matthew 5:3). Being prevented from seeking integral development is contrary to God’s desire for all humans to be saved (1 Timothy 2:4 and 2 Peter 3:9) and gives cause for the Church to contribute to the provision of basic needs. Such a theological view is a compelling motivator for the Church to provide humanitarian support to the poorest which most often includes those in post-conflict statebuilding environments. These theological perspectives, while not necessarily held universally, suggest that the Roman Catholic Church’s doctrines are likely to motivate engagement with all three of the primary order elements of post-conflict statebuilding. But even were the theological interpretations by Roman Catholic and Sunni Islam institutions to compel engagement in post-conflict statebuilding it does not necessarily suggest that their involvement would be effective. Understanding how particular religious structures and practices can strengthen the fragile or failed state can provide an insight into the degree to which a religious institution can contribute to post-conflict statebuilding. Based upon the range of religious practices and unique institutional structures this can be an overwhelming task. In response, I produced a theoretical framework through which to bring these disparate elements together in an academically grounded and practically manageable way. In proposing such a framework, I built on the current literature on the critical elements required for successful post-conflict statebuilding, what I called the primary order elements, namely, legitimacy, security and basic needs. To understand how to strengthen each one we need to borrow from various political and social science theories. David Beetham’s deconstruction of legitimacy was used to consider how religious institutions can contribute to legitimizing the state, specifically how their practices and structures could be utilized towards strengthening his three aspects of legitimacy—legal validity, justification of rules and 148 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding expressions of consent. Religious institutions that are able to strengthen all three of these aspects of legitimacy are powerful potential sources of legitimization for the state. For public security, being limited in their ability to raise military or police forces, religious institutions cannot contribute through enforcement but instead can lend support indirectly by adjudicating and mediating disputes, building social capital and spreading religious values that each in their own way buttress a society. The efficacy of an institution in being able to stabilize public security is dependent upon how suited its structures and practices are to contributing to these mechanisms. The last of the three primary order elements, basic needs, was paired with humanitarian assistance and community solidarity, two mechanisms through which religious institutions can contribute considerably. These were argued to be dependent upon a religious institution’s interconnectedness internationally to access material support and their influence within the affected communities to build a sense of solidarity. This theoretical framework was shown diagrammatically in Chapter 1. Generally speaking, my research suggests that Roman Catholicism’s highly structured and disciplined hierarchical institution tends towards a strong potential to legitimize authority by being able to express a unified consent. That it has a robust, tried and much tested moral framework developed over nearly 2000 years, ultimately grounded in God’s teaching, allows it to lend its narrative as a source of higher order values against which a state’s laws can be judged to be moral giving them an added sense of legitimacy. Its weakness in contributing to legitimizing a state authority is that it is a non-juridic religion. Without a clear set of laws its ability to adjudicate on the legality of a new state’s authority or how these authorities wield power is weakened. Sunni Islam on the other hand is practised as a juridic religion and, as such, laws are sought from its teachings including on issues related to the legitimacy of state authorities. Though, without a clerical hierarchy and no theological role assigned to an institution its dispersed centres of authority, sometimes aligned, sometimes in opposition to each other, weaken its ability to express consent on particular instances of post-conflict statebuilding. But as a source of values against which a state’s laws can be measured just, Sunni Islam has the potential to offer a powerful narrative. This narrative is most effective when it builds upon the long traditions of Islamic classical scholarship and the schools of jurisprudence as it then provides a consistent interpretation of the divine word and the actions of the divinely guided. The relatively recent Conclusion 149 revival of independent ijtihãd, prominent among liberal and fundamen- talist movements alike, only serves to weaken collective institutional voices of Islam. The Catholic and Sunni theological views that motivate engagement in post-conflict statebuilding and the strengths and weakness of the mechanisms by which they contribute are by no means consistent universally. They are only what I suggest to be the underlying picture, where particular interpretations or nuanced readings of doctrine can lead to alternative motivators as can historically or culturally influenced institutional structures and practices. Any contextual application requires building from this foundational work by seeking to understand the specific religious nuances within a particular society that may influence how their religion is practised and its theological views of the state. I undertook such research in BiH. The impact that religious institutions in BiH could have had based upon their practices, structures and theologies, ranged from highly positive to marginally negative. For state builders, knowing which religious activities to seek to dissuade, which to support and which to potentially fund is critical to long-term strategic engagement with religious institutions. Had the international community a framework to assess the potential role of religious institutions its stance may not have been as ad hoc and negligent as it appears to have been. In addition accusations of favouritism that have dogged the international community and put distance between it and religious leaders could have been minimized had there been a plan, grounded in robust research, for engaging with each of the three major religious groupings. This is not to suggest a better way of instrumentalizing religion, but rather by understanding the ambitions of religious institutions state builders can be better informed in how to engage in partnership with some religious endeavours while eschewing others. When engagement is sought it needs to be undertaken in a balanced manner. Excluding religion altogether, as is currently largely the case, can leave the state weaker, lacking a potential source of support and it can even contribute to destabilization when a powerful actor is excluded from the process. Alternatively, instrumentalizing religion by bringing it into the public sphere for a secular purpose can create mistrust, disillusionment and resentment while legitimizing a potential oppositional force that could subsequently work towards weakening the state. Despite this evident need for a balanced approach, problematically very little guidance is provided from within academia in which there is an entrenched aversion to engaging with religion in post-conflict 150 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding statebuilding. I noted in various parts of this book how prominent academics from a range of fields implied a unique role for what appeared to be religion but avoided naming it as if it had become an unmentionable topic. There is a similar hesitation on the part of Christian theologians to engage with statebuilding as there has been a chequered past whenever Christianity has engaged with the state collaboratively. Villa-Vincezo provides a brief history of this and notes that ‘This concern has legitimately resulted in a hesitation by theologians to move beyond what they regard as legitimate forms of liberation theology to a theology of nation-building.’6 In this regard the Second Vatican Council’s teaching of the state as a partner for the Church should encourage those theologians to overcome their hesitation as; ‘The more that both fos- ter sounder cooperation between themselves with due consideration for the circumstances of time and place, the more effective will their service be exercised for the good of all.’7 For Islamic scholars the relationship between the modern state and religion has come to the fore more recently with little consensus on what the right balance is. In many Muslim countries there is support for Islam to play a ‘major’ role in politics but the variety of models are numerous and it is too early to boast the sustainability of any one in particular.8 This book has only taken a tentative step towards this long and controversial process of a theological consideration of the role of the state by embracing two hermeneutical keys, salvation and justice, among many other possibilities through which the imperative for a religious institution to contribute can be reflected upon. More work needs to be done in this regard to gain a fuller understanding of other theological lenses through which religious leaders can consider their role in post-conflict statebuilding. Similar to academics, practitioners appear to have an aversion to engaging with religion. Problematically, in addition to this ‘mental taboo’ there is no natural constituency within international organizations or development agencies that would take the lead in engaging with religious leaders.9 Taking the critical post-conflict statebuilding activity of legitimacy as an example, ensuring that the new structures and authorities have legal validity is represented by the rule of law fraternity, while the aspect of expressions of consent by democracy specialists, neither of which engage with religion. Furthermore, engaging a society’s values as a source upon which to justify the laws, Beetham’s justification of rules, and ensuring that there is ownership over them, a task that religion can play a major role in, has no organizational constituency. This Conclusion 151 can be explained in large part by the mistaken presumption that the Western secular liberal democratic model can provide a solution to the challenges that face less developed states regardless of culture or their developmental phase. One responsibility of such a group, were it to exist, would be to give voice to ensuring that the new state structures focus first and foremost on the common good. While an uncontroversial statement in and of itself, the problem emerges when a decision needs to be made as to whose measure of common good is to be used. State builders need to ensure that their authority and the new authorities they help to establish are grounded in a measure of justification that is embraced by the people of that country.10 In this endeavour maybe it is time for practitioners to follow in the footsteps of former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair, who had an ‘envoy to the faith communities’ by assigning each Special Representative of the Secretary General, lead Ambassador and major donors involved in post-conflict statebuilding an ‘envoy to the faith communities’. Such a position could be tasked not only with matters related to the state’s legitimacy, but also with working to engage religious institutions in contributing to public security and include them in humanitarian coordination. Or alternatively, to ensure religious institutions are adequately engaged at the international post-conflict statebuilding level, religious representation should be sought at forums that discuss these matters such as the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Even though this forum, as with many others, purportedly includes ‘civil society’, it would be fairer to describe it as secular NGO representation, which is hardly representative of the major religions. By engaging religious leaders at such forums a different perspective will be heard, one that may not necessarily see eye to eye with other voices at the table, but will be widely shared by the people in the societies and states whose futures are being considered. Most critically in some specific situations, such as in the crisis in Syria, practitioners should seek to engage with religious communities. Syria, being a religiously bonded society in which religion plays a substantial role, engaging with the representative leaders and institutions of the Sunni, Alawite, Druze and Christian populations would be critical to any post-conflict statebuilding effort. Yet recruitment for staffing positions and strategy planning has not sought or included any engagement with religious specialists. These are just some prominent examples of how consideration of religion could be structurally integrated into international post-conflict statebuilding efforts. Any such effort, though, 152 Religion and Post-Conflict Statebuilding should be undertaken judiciously. As noted in Chapter 1, heterogeneous societies bonded by religion can lead to polarization. Religious actors perceived to have been associated with warring parties may be emboldened by engagement in the statebuilding process to the detri- ment of broader peace-building efforts. Similarly, transitional justice may be undermined if official engagement with religious actors provides a cloak of political protection that prevents the pursuit of justice. This book opens a new chapter in research on post-conflict statebuilding by showing the potential role a critical and powerful actor, religious institutions, can have in certain post-conflict situations. Despite Western attention focused upon recreating failed states in our own secular image, uncannily reflecting the Christian concept of imago Dei, we must accept that religion plays an important role in the lives of many, in particular within failed or failing states. Finding a place for religious institutions will not only improve the likelihood of success it is also an important way of acknowledging the voice of the people who will have to live with the consequences of the state structures that are being built ostensibly for their own good. Notes

Introduction

1. For an English translation of the fatwa see Andrew Arato, “Sistani v. Bush: Constitutional Politics in Iraq,” Constellations 11, no. 2 (2004): 174. 2. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “How Cleric Trumped U.S. Plan for Iraq,” Washington Post, 26 November 2003. 3. Ibid. 4. Koﬁ Annan, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” (United Nations General Assembly, 2005), 31. 5. Cf. Knox Thames, “Attaining Sustainable Security Through Civic Space for Religious Actors,” Small Wars Journal (2012). See also, Matthew Yandura, “Voices of Moderate Islam,” IO Journal 3, no. 1 (2011). 6. Ravitzky traces the scriptural basis of anti-Zionism to “the primeval myth of the children of Ephraim, who went up from Egypt prematurely, ‘trans- gressed the End and the oath’, and fell by the sword.” It is also rooted in the oaths that the Jewish people were made to swear—according to the Midrash and the Talmud—that ‘they not force the End’. Aviezer Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism (Chicago; London: Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1996). 22. As for the association of Satan to the establishment of the Jewish state, this view was most strongly supported by Rabbi Teitelbaum. See ibid., 45. 7. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Cornell University Press, 2004). 156. 8. Nicola Nixon et al., “The Ties That Bind: Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in National Human Development Report 2009, ed. Armin Sirco (Sarajevo: United Nations Development Programme, 2009). 9. Thames, “Attaining Sustainable Security Through Civic Space for Religious Actors”. See also Thomas F. Farr, “America’s International Religious Freedom Policy,” in Rethinking Religion and World Affairs, ed. Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan and Monica Duffy Toft (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 10. David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, Issues in Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). 11. Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of Inter- national Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century,ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, Culture and Religion in International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 105.

1 Religion and Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding

1. Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock and Matt Andrews, “Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure,” in Working Paper 234 (Center for Global Development, 2010).

153 154 Notes

2. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 3. See for example Rodney Stark and Laurence R. Iannaccone, “A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the ‘Secularization’ of Europe,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33, no. 3 (1994). 4. Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 384. This view coincides with my own personal experience while living in Iraq through this period. 5. Ana Hacic-Vlahovic, “(De)Secularization in Bosnia-Herzegovina: An Exam- ination of Religiosity Trends in a Multi-Ethnic Society,” Amsterdam Social Science 1, no. 1 (2008). 6. Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy, no. 89 (1992): 5. 7. Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 1. 8. Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, “Statebuilding Without Nation-Building? Legiti- macy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach,” Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding, 3, no. 1 (2009). 9. Bruce Gilley, “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries,” European Journal of Political Research 45, no. 3 (2006): 502. 10. Jack Snyder, ed. Religion and International Relations Theory, Religion, Culture and Public Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 1. 11. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Rela- tions, Culture and Religion in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 9–10. 12. In 2000, in a search of papers published in three leading development studies journals between 1982 and 1998, ver Beek found very few references to the role of spirituality or religion in development, which led him to refer to ‘spirituality’ as a ‘development taboo’. Quoted in Carole Rakodi, “Working Paper 66: Inspirational, Inhibiting, Institutionalized: Exploring the Links between Religion and Development,” in Religions and Development Research Programme (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2011). 13. Anne-Marie Holenstein, Role and Significance of Religion and Spirituality in Development Co-operation (Bern: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2005). 5. 14. “Pope Francis warns Church could become ‘compassionate NGO’ ” BBC News (2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21793224. 15. Alina Rocha Menocal, “State Building for Peace: A New Paradigm for Inter- national Engagement in Post-Conflict Fragile States?” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 10 (2011): 1720. 16. Sarah Cliffe and Nigel Roberts, “World Development Report 2011: Con- flict, Security, and Development,” ed. Bruce Ross-Larson (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 131. 17. List and Pettit present an extensive discussion of existing literature on ‘group agency’, they offer a critique of gaming institutions as the consolidation of individual motivations and present a credible group agency theory. While some religious institutions such as the Catholic Church clearly meet their criteria as having group agency it is less clear with less organized religious groups such as can be found within Sunni Islam. In considering Notes 155

Sunni Islamic communities or those of other religions such as Protestantism I would suggest that the first step should be to determine whether a group has agency according to List and Pettit’s definition or if it is a ‘mere collection’ of individuals. The latter of which would become problematic in assessing the ability of an ‘institution’ to follow through consistently with its teleological motivation. Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 18. This revival largely began with the publication of Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds., Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Since then the academic spot- light has sharpened on the need to find a place for religion within scholarly research on international affairs. These efforts have included Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Rela- tions: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-first Century.Snyder,Religion and International Relations theory. Timothy Fitzgerald, Religion and Politics in International Relations: The Modern Myth (New York: Continuum, 2011). Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred C. Stepan, and Monica Duffy Toft, eds., Rethinking Religion and World Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 19. Alternatively, some scholars have opted to suggest that religion does not fit easily into existing international relations theories because of their non- political ends and as such new constructs need to be developed. See for example Timothy Samuel Shah and Daniel Philpott, “The Fall and Rise of Religion in International Relations: History and Theory.” In Religion and International Relations Theory, ed. Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 52. 20. Snyder, Religion and International Relations Theory, 14. 21. For example see Beate Jahn, “The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democ- ratization, Intervention, Statebuilding (Part I),” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1, no. 1 (2007). 22. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Anthropological Research on the Con- temporary, http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/ Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf. 23. Ibid. 24. References to the decline of legitimacy as a favoured concept can be found in Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). xii. 25. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power: 34. 26. Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy:3. 27. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power: 11. 28. Lipset does add a second element, political system’s effectiveness, alongside legitimacy, which closely resembles Beetham’s ‘common interest’ component of the justification aspect of legitimacy. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 86. 156 Notes

29. Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century: 156. 30. Gilley, “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries,” 510. 31. Ibid., 502. 32. Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007) 44. 33. Caleb Elfenbein, “Establishing Religion in Iraq: Islam and the Modern State,” Comparative Islamic Studies 3, no. 1 (2007). 34. Haider Ala Hamoudi, “Religion and Law in Iraq: A Noteworthy Federal Supreme Court Opinion,” JURIST 2011. 35. For a summary of scholarship on how these social mores arise, whether biological or social, rational or arational, see Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order (London: Profile Books, 1999). 36. Utilitarianism has been expanded upon in the context of legitimacy recently by Lasswell and McDougal. Legitimacy through this view is based upon the extent to which it serves the greatest good for the greatest number of people. For a summary of this perspective see Bart M. J. Szewczyk, The EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Powers, Decisions and Legitimacy (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2010). 15. 37. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power: 80. 38. Susan L. Woodward, “Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions,” Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding 1, no. 2 (2007). 39. See Baghda-Vad-Gita 18:47 for scriptural inference of the caste system. 40. V. Rao and R. Ban, “The Political Construction of Caste in South India,” Development Research Group (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 7. 41. Ibid., 4. 42. Gaudium et spes, (1965). no. 75. 43. Hamza Hendawi, “Egypt’s Army Chief Seeks Mandate to Fight Violence,” Huffington Post, 30 July 2013. 44. Described from reporting of the official Catholic newspaper, Glas Koncila, no. 23 (10.6.1990), p.8 in Maja Brkljaciˇ c,´ “Croatian Catholic Church Imagines the Nation,” Balkanologie V, no. 1–2 December 2001, http:// balkanologie.revues.org/index668.html. 45. Francis Bown, “Influencing the House of Lords: The Role of the Lords Spiritual 1979–1987,” Political Studies 42, no. 1 (1994): 119. 46. For a more extensive discussion on this topic with case studies see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 47. Fox and Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations: 37. 48. C. J. Beck, “State Building as a Source of Islamic Political Organization,” Sociological Forum, 24, no. 2 (2009): 341. 49. Jack A. Goldstone, “Pathways to State Failure,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 4 (2008): 285. 50. A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, 1 December 2011; Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, “State Failure, State Collapse, and State Notes 157

Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies,” Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2002): 760; Goldstone, “Pathways to State Failure,” 285. 51. Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Rebuild- ing Weak States,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005). 52. United States Institute of Peace and Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009). 9. 53. For a review of reports on the success of international security and justice programmes see Eric Scheye, “Redeeming Statebuilding’s Miscon- ceptions: Power, Politics and Social Efficacy and Capital in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States,” Journal of International Peacekeeping 14, no. 3/4 (2010). 54. Cliffe and Roberts, “World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development,” 155. 55. Leila Chirayath, Caroline Sage and Michael Woolcock, “Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality of Justice Systems,” Back- ground Paper for the “World Development Report 2006: Equity and Develop- ment” (2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/ 477383-1118673432908/Customary_Law_and_Policy_Reform.pdf. 56. Some argue that an exceptionally large and well equipped intervention force can fully replace an indigenous policing effort. See James Dobbins et al. The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Monica: RAND Cor- poration, 2007), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557. 25. East Timor could be argued to be one such case in which the police contingents were substantial and dispersed throughout the country but based upon personal experience, having lived in East Timor during this period, I would suggest that their effectiveness in enforcing pubic security was limited and instead it fell upon non-state actors to maintain law and order. 57. An example of such a system can be found in Ethiopia as described by Daniel Mekonnen, “Indigenous Legal Tradition as a Supplement to African Transitional Justice Initiatives,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 10, no. 3 (2010), http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ajcr/ajcr_2010_3.pdf. 58. For a review of the literature comparing the two systems see R. B. G. Choudree, “Traditions of Conflict Resolution in South Africa,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 1, no. 1 (1999), http://www.accord.org .za/downloads/ajcr/ajcr_1999_1.pdf. 59. Quoted in Mekonnen, “Indigenous Legal Tradition as a Supplement to African Transitional Justice Initiatives.” 60. Ibid. 61. Meron Zeleke, “Ye Shakoch Chilot (the court of the sheikhs): A Traditional Institution of Conflict Resolution in Oromiya Zone of Amhara Regional State, Ethiopia,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 10, no. 1 (2010), http: //www.accord.org.za/downloads/ajcr/ajcr_2010_1.pdf. 62. Chirayath, Sage and Woolcock, “Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engag- ing with the Plurality of Justice Systems”. 63. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2003). 92. 64. Ibid., 98. 158 Notes

65. R. B. Serjeant, Customary and Shari’ah law in Arabian Society (Hampshire: Variorum, 1991) III 12. 66. Ibid. 67. Brett Morash, “Union of Islamic Courts ...An Opportunity Lost for Sta- bility in Somalia,” in 43rd Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Political Sci- ence Association (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Northeastern Political Science Association, 2011). 68. Ioannis Mantzikos, “An African Version of the Taliban? The Islamic Courts Union in Somalia (2006) and the Taliban Afghanistan (1996),” Comparative Islamic Studies 4, no. 1–2 (2008): 118. 69. Morash, “Union of Islamic Courts ...An Opportunity Lost for Stability in Somalia.” It is also worth noting that there is little evidence that law and order was restored through extreme punitive measures. See Ted Dagne, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace” (2010), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/139249.pdf. 70. Morash, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace.” 71. Paolo Buonanno, Daniel Montolio and Paolo Vanin, “Does Social Capital Reduce Crime?” Journal of Law and Economics 52, no. 1 (2009): 163. Note that the type of crime considered in this research was property crime (car theft, robbery and common theft) as opposed to violent crime. 72. I Semih Akcomak and Bas ter Weel, “The Impact of Social Capital on Crime: Evidence from the Netherlands,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 42, no. 1–2 (2012): 324. 73. Kraig Beyerlein and John R. Hipp, “Social Capital, Too Much of a Good Thing? American Religious Traditions and Community Crime,” Social Forces 84, no. 2 (2005). 74. Ara Norenzayan, “The Idea That Launched a Thousand Civilisations,” New Scientist, 17 March 2012, 42–44. 75. The terms ‘congregation’ and ‘liturgy’ will be used despite common associations with a Christian speciﬁcity. Their meaning in the context of this book is adopted from the secular non-denominational deﬁnition as generally representing a gathering of people to worship and for the latter the prescribed customs associated with that worship. 76. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). 77. See Jesse Graham and Jonathan Haidt, “Beyond Beliefs: Religions Bind Indi- viduals Into Moral Communities,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, no. 1 (2010). 78. The tangential reference is found in 62:9. Goitein explains the etymol- ogy of the Arabic word for Friday as meaning ‘day of assembly’ which was known as the market day preceding the Jewish Sabbath. That people were gathered in public on such a day is suggestive of a desire for public worship. S. D. Goitein, Studies in Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966). 118–119. The quoted hadith is from “Partial Transla- tion of Sunan Abu-Dawud, Book 2: Number 0547,” Center for Jewish– Muslim Engagement, University of Southern California, http://www.cmje .org/religious-texts/hadith/abudawud/002-sat.php#002.0547. 79. See John R. Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How the Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts (New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 34. Notes 159

80. In the Hanafi school of jurisprudence dar al-Islam is considered a territory in which certain regulations and observances are practised. These include for example, Friday prayers, Eid prayers, application of Islamic law at the veryleastonpersonalmatters.FikretKarciˇ c,´ The Bosniaks and Challenges of Modernity: Late Ottoman and Hapsburg Times (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999) 113. Alternatively, in a more radical reading of the divisions is Sayyid Qutb’s in which he sees only two types of societies, ‘the Islamic society and the jahili [wilfully ignorant of Islam] society’. Esposito notes that in this perspective, the wilful ignorance or active opposition to true Islam ‘surrounds’ the true Muslim, and for that person, ‘the battle is continuous and jihad continues until the Day of Judgement’. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, “Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue.” In Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, ed. Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (Washington, DC: Palgrave MacMillon, 2003), 240. 81. Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994). no. 842. 82. Ibid., no. 843. 83. For a full explanation see the reasoning offered by John Matusiak, “Questions and Answers: The Divine Liturgy—Receiving Communion,” Orthodox Community of America, http://oca.org/questions/divineliturgy/ receiving-communion. 84. Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 85. See for example Ronald G. Musto, The Catholic Peace Tradition (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986). For Islam, see Qamar-ul Huda, Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010). 86. Another critical document is, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dominus iesus (2000). 87. Nostra aetate (1965). No. 3. 88. Ubayd Allah Sindhi is an example of a universalist who minimizes the differences between faiths and argues that as they all see the same reality then they can all agree on moral norms rooted in their own traditions. This view placed him in the minority of Indian scholars who believed that one could have an Indian identity that derived from either the Hindu or Muslim traditions. See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Consensus and Reli- gious Authority in Modern Islam: The Discourses of the Ulama,” in Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies, ed. Sabine Schmidtke and Gudrun Krämer, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 162 ff. 89. John Burton has written an extensive study on the concept of naskh,reviewing its origins, different approaches used, critical cases that it is applied to and the exegetical rules used by different groups. For the purpose of this book it is important to note that there is no single agreed approach to dealing with perceived conflicting suras in the scriptures. Furthermore, there is no agreement on whether only the Qur’an can abrogate a verse in the Qur’an or the sunnah can be used to abrogate the Qur’an, or vice versa the Qur’an can abrogate the sunnah. In this case, awareness of the diversity of 160 Notes

approaches and contextual study in the way a particular community applies the concept of naskh is critical to suggesting the possible impact a religious institution will have on social capital. John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990). 90. Muhammad Abdel Haleem, “Interpreting the Qur’an; Qur’an 3:7, 2:106, 16:101, 31:20.” In Communicating the Word: Revelation, Translation, and Inter- pretation in Christianity and Islam, ed. David Marshall (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). To aid in the understanding of the breadth of scholarly perspectives on Islam and conflict Mohammed Abu- Nimer has identified three distinct groups: those who focus on the study of war and jihad; those who study war and peace; and those who study peace building and non-violence. Each of these three places a different emphasis upon aspects of the Qur’an leading to different interpretations of normative inter-religious relations. Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice: 11–47. 91. Jane E. Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights?: Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 310. Their work on this topic com- prising a hefty chapter in their book is a worthy contribution to the field written from the perspective of foreign intervention. 92. Ibid., 310–11. 93. Ibid., 314. 94. Others suggest that it is the result of a lack of knowledge by donors who are responsible for funding. Piron sees donors as ‘blind to their [traditional non-state authorities] existence and relevance.’ See Laure-Helene Piron, “Time to Learn, Time to Act in Africa,” in Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge, ed. Thomas Carothers (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 291. 95. Quoted in Heather Marquette, “Corruption, Religion and Moral Devel- opment,” in Religions and Development Research Programme (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2010), 9. 96. It should be noted that their finding had the further caveat that religion played a role on issues that are not already condemned by society as a whole and furthermore that motivation was perceptibly strongest among religious groups in the minority among a community of atheists with the apparent driver of distinguishing one’s faith through moral faith- fulness to their beliefs. The latter finding has the potential impact for post-conflict statebuilding of being particularly powerful in communities of mixed religions. Ibid., 9, 11. 97. Norenzayan, “The Idea That Launched a Thousand Civilisations,” 44. 98. Nasr, The Islamic Leviathan: 110. See also Kikue Hamayotsu, “Islam and Nation Building in Southeast Asia: Malaysia and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective,” Pacific Affairs 75, no. 3 (2002). 99. For an explanation of a disciplinary revolution see Philip S. Gorski, “The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia,” American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 2 (1993). 100. Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) 62. Notes 161

101. Specific Catholic guidance on the topic of the homily is provided in the General Instructions of the Roman Missal, section 65. 102. Dobbins et al., The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building. xxx. 103. Ibid., xxiii. 104. Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response,ed.Sphere Project (Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing, 2011). 105. Maia Green, Claire Mercer, and Simeon Mesaki, “The Development Activ- ities, Values and Performance of Non-Governmental and Faith-Based Organizations in Magu and Newala Districts, Tanzania,” in Religions and Development Research Programme (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2010). 106. Richard Batley and Claire Mcloughlin, State Capacity and Non-State Service Provision in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (Birmingham: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, 2009), 15. 107. Ildephonse Fayida et al., Christians and Muslims Promoting Maternal and Infant Health: A Sermon/Khutbah Guide Based on the Holy Bible and the Holy Qur’an, ed. Sarla Chand, Ignace Singirankabo, and Kathy Erb (IMA World Health, 2009), vii. 108. Data as of 31 December 2009: Agenzia Fides, “World Mission Day: Catholic Church Statistics,” The Vatican Today, 21 October 2011. 109. Matthew Clarke, Development and Religion Theology and Practice (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011). See also Gerrie ter Haar, ed. Religion and Develop- ment: Ways of Transforming the World (London: Hurst & Co., 2011). 110. For a critique of Clarke’s book regarding the difference between stated goals and theology see Denis Dragovic, “Development and Religion: Theology and Practice,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 3 (2012). 111. Clarke, Development and Religion Theology and Practice 14–17. For the definition of faith-based organizations Clarke quotes from the Religion and Development Program literature. 112. See the work of IMA World Health and its sermon guide on maternal and infant health, Centre for Interfaith Dialogue together with IMA World Health sermon guide on malaria. Both are available through the IMA World Health website. Another example of religious practices used as a basis of preventive health education is the borrowing of the Islamic practice of ablution before prayer to emphasize the importance of cleanliness. 113. Cliffe and Roberts, “World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development,” 155.

2 Roman Catholic View of the State

1. Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy: 157. 2. See for example, Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982). 3. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988). 349. 4. Nukhet A. Sandal and Jonathan Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities (New York: Routledge, 2013). 9. 162 Notes

5. W. Richard Scott, “The Adolescence of Institutional Theory,” Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 508. 6. Pope Paul VI, Octogesima adveniens (1971). No. 4. 7. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est (2005). No. 27. 8. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis (1987). No. 8. 9. Despite Fidei depositum being promulgated in 1992, nearly 30 years after the close of the Second Vatican Council its claim to constitutional status is explained in section two, ‘It can be said that this catechism is the result of the collaboration of the whole Episcopate of the Catholic Church ....The achievement of this catechism thus reflects the collegial nature of the Episcopate: It testifies to the Church’s catholicity,’ Pope John Paul II, Fidei depositum (1992). 10. Hastings notes the evolving terminology of conciliar documents concluding that there is little implied difference between constitutions, decrees or declarations. See Adrian Hastings, A Concise Guide to the Documents of the Second Vatican Council. Vol. 1 (Darton: Longman & Todd, 1968) 22. 11. Quoted in Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching, 1891–Present: A Histor- ical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univer- sity Press, 2002) 28. 12. Ibid., 32–33. But Curran wrote these views prior to 2005 when Pope Benedict XVI began to use a more metaphysically structured argument for his social encyclicals. 13. Pope Leo XIII, Immortale dei (1885). No. 17. 14. Quoted in Leslie Griffin, “The Integration of Spiritual and Temporal: Con- temporary Roman Catholic Church–State Theory,” Theological Studies 48, no. 2 (1987): 230–31. 15. Pope Leo XIII, Immortale dei. nos. 4, 47. 16. José Casanova, “Globalizing Catholicism and the Return to a ‘Universal’ Church.” In Transnational Religion and Fading States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). 17. A papal position of neutrality re-emerged in the early nineteenth century and by the First World War became what was referred to as ‘absolute impartiality’. Through such a view public moral determinations on justice between warring states was eschewed as it was seen as a breach of neutrality. See Charles R. Gallagher, “The Perils of Perception: British Catholics and Papal Neutrality, 1914–1923.” In The Papacy Since 1500: From Italian Prince to Universal Pastor, ed. James Corkery and Thomas Worcester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 18. Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, History of Vatican II. Vol. 1: Announcing and Preparing Vatican Council II Toward a New Era in Catholicism, Vol. 1 (Maryknoll, NY: Leuven: Orbis: Peeters, 1995), book. 296. 19. José Casanova, “Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad.” In Powers of the Secular Modem: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors (Stanford: Stanford Univer- sity Press, 2006), 26. Casanova defines the shift as from a ‘state-oriented to a civil society—oriented institution’. 20. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twenti- eth Century, The Julian J. Rothbaum distinguished lecture series (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 21. Pope Paul VI, Populorum progressio (1967). No. 13. Notes 163

22. Gaudium et spes. No. 76. 23. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate (2009). No. 41. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., no. 56. 26. In Pope Paul VI’s Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii nuntiandi he warns the Church of the temptation to ‘reduce her mission to the dimensions of a simply temporal project’. If this were to occur the Church’s initiatives would be driven by the political and social order, open to monopolization and manip- ulation. This is why the Church must not forget the full theological meaning of its message. Pope Paul VI, Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975) no. 32. 27. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate, no. 56.

3 Salvation as the Catholic Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding Imperative

1. Lumen Gentium (1964). No. 10. 2. See also Matthew 18:14 and John 6:39 and for references relating to the Church and this goal emanating from Second Vatican documents: ‘[T]he Church has a single intention: that God’s kingdom may come, and that the salvation of the whole human race may come to pass.’ Gaudium et spes. No. 45. ‘The Church was founded for the purpose of spreading the kingdom of Christ throughout the earth for the glory of God the Father, to enable all men to share in His saving redemption.’ Decree on the Apostalate of the Laity (1965) No. 2. 3. Cf. A Gill and A Keshavarzian, “State Building and Religious Resources: An Institutional Theory of Church-State Relations in Iran and Mexico,” Politics and Society 27, no. 3 (1999). 4. J. Brian Benestad, Church, State, and Society: An Introduction to Catholic Social Doctrine, Catholic Moral Thought (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011) 8. 5. Gaudium et spes. No. 39. 6. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate. No. 7. 7. Ibid. 8. Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church: no. 1898. 9. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris (1963). No. 46. 10. This is qualiﬁed though in that only when authority is exercised ‘within the limits of the moral order and directed toward the common good—with a dynamic concept of that good—according to the juridical order legitimately established or due to be established.’ Gaudium et spes. No. 74. 11. Ibid. ‘But where citizens are oppressed by a public authority overstepping its competence, they should not protest against those things which are objectively required for the common good.’ 12. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power: 70–71. 13. Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church: no. 1902. 14. Ibid., nos. 1700 and 930. 15. Pope John XXIII, “Mater et Magistra,” (1961), no. 217. See also Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris: no. 51. 16. Gaudium et spes. No. 89. 164 Notes

17. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate. 56. 18. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 28 (a). 19. Gaudium et spes. No. 89. 20. Regarding ‘structures of sin’ see Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis. 21. Gaudium et spes. Nos. 36–7. Reinforcing the risk of excluding higher order values Pope John XXIII in Pacem in terris dismisses the view that, ‘the will of the individual or the group is the primary and only source of a citizen’s rights and duties, and of the binding force of political constitutions and the government’s authority.’ Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris: no. 78. 22. Gaudium et spes. No. 76. 23. Nell-Breuning in contributing to the commentary on the Second Vatican Council notes that ‘the Council certainly does not want to impose, with impetuous zeal, juridical and political structures on peoples among whom the necessary conditions for their functioning have yet to be created,’ though, he notes, an all-out effort must be made to create these conditions. Oswald von Nell-Breuning, “Part II, Chapter IV: The Life of the Political Community.” In Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II: Volume V; Pas- toral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (London: Burns & Oates, 1967), 321. See also Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris: no. 68. For an additional reference to the need for countries to reform political institutions and shift towards participatory forms of governance, see Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis: no. 44. The Catechism references Gaudium et spes when suggesting a preference for a democratic style system. Gaudium et spes. No. 74. 24. Gaudium et spes. No. 31, 75. 25. Ibid., no. 43. 26. Canon Law 285 §3, “Clerics Are Forbidden to Assume Public Offices Which Entail a Participation in the Exercise of Civil Power.” 27. Quoted from Feral Tribune, no. 739, 16 November 1999, in Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 173. 28. Quoted in Gerard F. Powers, “Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Peace in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia,” Religion in Eastern Europe 16, no. 5 (1996). 29. Cf. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris: nos. 60, 63, 143, 44. Gaudium et spes. No. 26, 29. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis: no. 26. Pope Benedict specifically noted the importance of R2P in the international system. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate. No. 67. For a Christian ethical discussion of the R2P movement see the subsequent debate between Reed and Glanville in Journal of Religious Ethics. Response by Reed to Glanville: Esther D. Reed, “Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of Religious Ethics 41, no. 1 (2013). 30. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis: no. 26. 31. Gaudium et spes. No. 76. 32. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris: no. 1. 33. Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church: no. 1909. 34. Ibid., no. 1906. Similar in Mater et magistra the common good is implied to entail, ‘all those social conditions which favour the full development of human personality’, Pope John XXIII, “Mater et Magistra.” 35. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate. No. 18. Notes 165

36. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004). No. 116. 37. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis: no. 36. 38. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church: nos. 119, 68. For earlier writing on this topic see Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis: no. 36. See also Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church: no. 1888. 39. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 22. 40. Basic needs have been variously defined within the magisterium as: ‘Food, clothing, health, work, education and culture, suitable information, right to establish a family and so on’, or ‘food and clothing, housing, health care, basic education, employment and special assistance’. Catholic Church, Cat- echism of the Catholic Church: no. 1908 and 2288. Or alternatively: ‘food, clothing, shelter, medicine, rest and social services’, Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris: no. 11. Basic needs differ from longer term development. For a religious perspective on some long term development issues such as care of the environment see Clarke, Development and Religion Theology and Practice. 41. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 31. In addition the Catholic Church’s charity, Caritas Internationalis was established upon the basis of: ‘A new command I give you: Love one another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another.’ John 13:34. 42. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis: nos. 33, 40. 43. Cf. Ibid., no. 9. See also Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate. No. 27. Follow- ing in the footsteps of Christ is an important way that Christians see charity relating to salvation, see for example John 14:1–2 ‘whoever believes in me will perform the same works as I do myself.’ 44. Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church: no. 1815. 45. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 15. 46. Matthew 25:40. 47. See also Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church: no. 1033. 48. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 20. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., no. 21. 51. This section within Acts relating to the appointment of the seven begins by relating the complaints made by the Greek speaking Jewish disciples whose widows were not receiving sufficient support. This led to the impartiality of the apostles being questioned. See John Roberts Dummelow, ed. ACom- mentary on the Holy Bible by Various Writers (London: Macmillan, 1913). 825. Though, others saw this moment as an issue of organizational failure rather than a lack of impartiality that could nevertheless aggravate if not handled well. Ajith Fernando, Acts, ed. Terry Muck. The NIV Application Commen- tary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995). 226. See also C. K. Barrett, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, V 1: Preliminary Introduc- tion and Commentary on Acts 1–14, ed. J. A. Emerton, C. E. B Cranfield, and G. N. Stanton, International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994). 303. Either way, the response, namely the identification of seven disciples to lead charitable giving, is reactionary, it is aimed at preventing an emerging division between the disciples. Ajith Fernando in his commentary of this verse notes that the Apostles did not respond by talking about 166 Notes

the importance of spiritual sustenance relative to earthly food, but rather ‘There was a genuine problem ...Thus the apostles made an administrative decision.’ Fernando, Acts. Similarly, in another commentary the decision is described as ‘the Apostles, finding the distribution of charity too great a burden for them’, which reinforces the view of a pragmatic decision rather than a spiritual calling. Dummelow, A Commentary on the Holy Bible by various writers. This is not to dismiss the importance of charity or to imply a two-tiered structure, one of spiritual calling the other material, as Fernando makes clear, but rather that it being a pragmatic decision does not allow us to find within it a spiritual justification for the Church’s involvement in the distribution of charity. 52. Pope Paul VI, Populorum progressio. No. 20. 53. Ibid., no. 21. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. ‘What are less than human conditions? The material poverty of those who lack the bare necessities of life, and the moral poverty of those who are crushed under the weight of their own self-love.’ Ibid. 57. Gaudium et spes. No. 69. Proverbs 6:30. In addition Paul VI raised the right of authorities to appropriate property for the common use when it can be better used by those facing hardship which John Paul II reinforced. See Paul VI, Populorum progressio. No. 24. See also Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis: no. 7. 58. Matthew 5:3. 59. Gaudium et spes. 63. See also Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Com- pendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church: no. 182. ‘The principle of the universal destination of goods requires that the poor, the marginalized and in all cases those whose living conditions interfere with their proper growth ....’ 60. Cf. Pope Paul VI, Populorum progressio. No. 15. 61. Congregation for Bishops, “Apostolorum Successores,” (2004): nos. 194, 96, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cbishops/documents/ rc_con_cbishops_doc_20040222_apostolorum-successores_en.html (date accessed: 11/10/2014). It is important to distinguish here between proselytizing and being an example of the love of God that the Church represents through its charitable works. Pope Benedict XVI emphasized this point when writing, ‘Charity, furthermore, cannot be used as a means of engaging in what is nowadays considered proselytism ...Those who practise charity in the Church’s name will never seek to impose the Church’s faith upon others. They realize that a pure and generous love is the best witness to the God in whom we believe and by whom we are driven to love.’ Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 31 (c). 62. Gaudium et spes. No. 42. 63. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 28 (a). 64. Christiansen explains that Benedict differentiates truth in the common understanding with Truth, with a capital letter, to refer to knowledge about human existence. Drew Christiansen, “Metaphysics and Society: A Commen- tary on Caritas in Veritate,” Theological Studies 71, no. 1 (2010): fn. 4. 65. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate. No. 5. 66. Gaudium et spes. No. 76. Notes 167

4 Sunni Islam and the State – 1. For a discussion of topics in which the Ash ari school has seen its position shift see Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı’s views on takl¯ıf, gabrˇ and qadar: A Note of the Development of Islamic Theological Doctrines,” Arabica 16, no. 1 (1969). 2. See 3:4, 5:48, 25:1. 3. See also 10:99. 4. See for example Qur’an 51:56. 5. Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001). 6. Ibid., 210. 7. Another prominent example is of the Kharijite who fought on the side of Ali during the battle of Siffin but were frustrated when Ali chose to settle the battle through negotiations rather than—as the Kharijite believed to be just—through fighting so as to allow Allah to choose a successor. Ali’s decision to favour peace talks suggested to Kharijite observers that he held a theological position that questioned Allah’s omnipotence which was deemed unacceptable and hence justification for their breaking with Ali. 8. Patricia Crone, “Ninth-Century Muslim Anarchists,” Past & Present 167, no. 1 (2000): 15. 9. Mustafa Ceric,´ Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abu Mansur Al-Maturidi (d. 333/944) (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995). 45. 10. Ibid., 70. 11. W. Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Oxford: Oneworld, 1998). 314–16. 12. Ceric´ takes this further by explaining that it is not simply faith regardless of the way one lives one’s life, which would be a Murji’ite position, but instead that faith required a heartfelt assent rather than simple acknowledgment and that ‘it is not conditioned by good deeds but may, as a result, produce good ones’. This debate over faith and deeds is reminiscent of the protestant reformation and its claims of sola fida against the Catholic view of faith and works. Ceric,´ Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abu Mansur Al-Maturidi (d. 333/944): 204. 13. This became a nuanced view over– the centuries. Ansari argues that it was only due to the conflict with the Mu tazili that this initial position was taken but by the fourteenth century it had shifted towards the Maturidi view that Allah created the power within man to act and it was man’s will that then triggered the creation by Allah of all actions. See Ansari, “Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı’s views on takl¯ıf, gabrˇ and qadar: A Note of the Development of Islamic Theological Doctrines,” 75–76.

5 Justice as the Sunni Post-Conﬂict Statebuilding Imperative

1. For an English translation of the Articles of Belief see Duncan B. Macdonald, “The Faith of al-Islam,” The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures 12, no. 1/2 (1895): 117. 168 Notes

2. Ibid., cf. 21. Though this would seem contrary to 3:107. 3. See also 44:38. 4. Sura 10:103 taken out of context could be suggested to indicate otherwise. That is, as it is Allah’s will that the faith be spread then it is His will that all of humanity be saved because, ‘In the end We deliver [save] Our messengers and those who believe.’ But this should be taken in context. Verse 99 in the same sura states, ‘If it had been thy Lord’s will, they would all have believed.’ This suggests that had Allah wanted all saved He would have made provision for all to become believers but He did not will it so. 5. See for example 2:109; 3:110, 5:13, 6:91. 6. Khalid Blankinship, “The Early Creed,” in The Cambridge Companion to Clas- sical Islamic Theology, ed. T. J. Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 35. 7. Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). 10. – 8. Colin Turner, “Bediuzzaman and the Concept of Adl: Towards a Nursian Ontology of Divine Justice,” Asian Journa of Social Science. 38, no. 4 (2010): 563. 9. H. A. R. Gibb, Stanford J. Shaw, and William R. Polk, Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, 1962). 158. 10. Mohammad Hasim Kamali, “The Ruler and the Ruled in Islam: A Brief Anal- ysis of the Sources.” In Justice and Rights: Christian and Muslim Perspectives: A Record of the Fifth “Building Bridges” Seminar held in Washington, DC, 27–30 March 2006, ed. Michael Ipgrave (Washington, DC: Georgetown Uni- versity Press, 2009). 5. In addition Kamali sees justice as the ‘overriding goal and objective of Islam.’ Ibid., 8. 11. Ibrahim Kalin, “Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic Tradition,” in Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam, ed. Qamar-ul Huda (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010). 6. 12. Khadduri, Majid. The Islamic Conception of Justice. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984: 193. 13. In the Iraqi constitution the repugnancy clause is in Article 2, for Afghanistan it is Article 3 and related to the oath to uphold Islam see Article 119.– 14. The Ash ari school shifted to a view that held that Allah controls instinc- tual responses while man is responsible through free will on actions that are cognitively developed. For further discussion see Ansari, “Taftaz¯ an¯ ¯ı’s views on takl¯ıf, gabrˇ and qadar: A Note of the Development of Islamic Theological Doctrines.” 15. March adds to the list one commonly used spiritual argument, namely that the duty to migrate is to be understood as spiritual, that is to avoid sin and sinners. I find such an argument entirely inconsistent with the Qur’an, hadiths and how Islam has been practised historically unless one adopts– allegorical tools to interpret the Qur’an’s verses which resembles a Mu tazila approach and as such I will not reflect upon it further. Andrew F. March, “Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non- Muslim Liberal Democracies,” American Political Science Review 101, no. 2 (2007): 242. Notes 169

16. It may appear that contributing to the post-conflict statebuilding process of non-Muslim states is contrary to the first obligation. The analogy that I draw upon to argue that it is acceptable is the much debated argument over whether it is acceptable to fight to defend a non-Muslim state. This debate revolves round the issue of whether a Muslim should fight in a non- Muslim state against a non-Muslim adversary (fighting against a Muslim adversary is generally seen as apostasy). In most cases defending a non- Muslim state is seen to be acceptable and March goes through this in some detail outlining all of the cases under which it is acceptable including that it raises the positive profile of Islam, it prepares Muslims for war and that it avoids creating targets out of the Muslim community. I would suggest that the same arguments of the acceptability of defending a non- Muslim state can be made in favour of contributing to building non-Muslim states. The basis of a contextual examination would have to include, firstly, that the benefits outweigh the costs to the Islamic community in that state, and secondly, that it does not serve the advance of unbelief. Ibid., 246–50. 17. Ibid. 18. For both an expansive Islamic justification of monarchy based upon the revelations and a limited argument for its religious legitimacy contributing to avoiding upheaval see The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Center, The Muslim 500: The 500 Most Influential Muslims 2011 (Amman: National Press, 2011), http://themuslim500.com/download. 9–20. 19. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 14. 20. Rida suggested that those in authority included ‘the rulers and the governors, the ulama, the military commanders, and all those leaders and notables to whom people turn in need and in matters concerning the public interest’. He also outlined the conditions that had to be met for rulers to be obeyed which included, ‘that they be from amongst us; that they not contravene a command of God or the [most authoritative of] the reported teachings of the Prophet ...; that they be unconstrained in their discussion on the matter [in question] and in their agreement on it; that what they do agree upon is itself a matter of public interest and one that “those in authority” do have the requisite authority and knowledge to rule on ...’ Quoted in Zaman, “Consensus and Religious Authority in Modern Islam: The Discourses of the Ulama,” 157. 21. Kamali, “The Ruler and the Ruled in Islam: A Brief Analysis of the Sources,” 6. 22. Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006) 120. 23. Ibid., 120–21. 24. This saying is not found in the ‘Authentic Six’ collections of hadiths but is often referenced by Muslims and Islamic scholars. 25. Osama Bin Laden and Bruce B. Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005) 12. 26. Quoted in Ceric,´ Roots of Synthetic Theology in Islam: A Study of the Theology of Abu Mansur Al-Maturidi (d. 333/944): 206–07. 27. Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics and Religious Transformation in Egypt: 232–33. 170 Notes

28. Francis Robinson, “Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 19, no. 3 (2009): 340. 29. Prophet Mohammad said as narrated by Abu Malik al-Ash’ari in Sunan Abu Dawood, Book 37, Hadith 14 . Available at http://sunnah.com/abudawud/37/ 14. Accessed on 12 October 2014. 30. Abdullah Ali argues that there has not been true consensus in the way it is commonly understood since the time of the Companions. After which the Islamic empire had expanded to such a degree that it was impossible to have true consensus. As a result a division between explicit and implicit consensus emerged in that the latter was acknowledged if there was no response by a mujtahid who was reasonably presumed to have been aware– of the issue at hand. But some schools of jurisprudence (Ali notes Shafi i in this instance) don’t acknowledge implicit consensus and as such there is a very limited body of closed rulings within their teachings. See Abdullah bin Hamid Ali, “Scholarly Consensus: Ijma‘: Between Use and Misuse,” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 12, no. 2 (2010). Others including Muhammad Iqbal and Rashid Rida, took a different tack and expanded beyond the realm of scholars the idea of consensus into one of a consultative assembly. Muhammad Rashid Rida, the early twentieth century modernist scholar, foresaw a consultative body that may have included the elected. Quoted in Zaman, “Consensus and Religious Authority in Modern Islam: The Discourses of the Ulama,” 158. Further complicating matters, there is disagreement over what content can be considered– by the concept of consensus. Historically the view was that ijma¯ was an exegetical tool for the legal schools to adjudicate on matters of fiqh, but reformist scholars such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida extended it to considerations of public interest. Ibid. 31. The Amman Message (The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2009). vii. Interestingly only Ashari theology is mentioned, while Maturidi was excluded. When asked why, Mustafa Ceric,´ the Bosnia and Herzegovinian scholar, cleric and author of one of the few books in English on Maturidi theology who was a signatory of the Message hesitantly suggested that it was mainly an Arab focused document and that there remains much distrust of Maturidi theology among some traditional scholars. Mustafa Ceric,´ “personal interview,” (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 January 2013). 32. Catholic Church. Catechism of the Catholic Church. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994: no. 407. 33. To avoid any implication of a dualist nature I bring the reader’s attention to the Qur’an in which Allah reminds man that even the jinn were created by Him, ‘Indeed I have only created Jinn and human beings in order to worship me.’ Qur’an 51:56 34. It is Satan’s task to lead man astray, ‘I had no power over you, but to call you.’ (14:22). See also for jinn’s assignment to the unbelievers 41:25 and 43:36. For the angel’s role alongside believers see 41:30. 35. Huda, Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: xviii. Another book that similarly emphasizes the non-violent nature of Islam is Abu- Nimer, Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice. 36. Though in the introduction to the Amman Message King Abdullah went out of his way to state that ‘the ends do not justify the means in this religion’. But Notes 171

this statement is made within the context of extremism and I suggest that it was not meant to be absolute otherwise the concept of Islamic just war theory, to mention just one example, would amount to nought. The Amman Message. The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2009. 10. 37. See also discussion of nasiha (moral advice) and whose responsibility is it to convey and enforce it in Talal Asad. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Rea- sons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 214–23. – 38. See also 3:104, 4:135; 5:8. Some early Mu tazili writers (Hisham al-Fuwati and Abbad ibn Sulayman) argued for the community to take law and order into their own hands completely, eliminating the role of any authority. I have not found any evidence that this thought was embraced by the Maturidi school. Crone, “Ninth-Century Muslim Anarchists,” 17. 39. Quoted in Ajaz Ahmed Khan, Ismayil Tahmazov, and Mamoun Abuarqub, Translating Faith into Development, (Birmingham: Islamic Relief, 2009), 4. 40. Prophet Mohammad said as narrated by Ibn ‘Umar in Sahih Muslim, Book 24, Hadith 32. Available at http://sunnah.com/bukhari/24/32. Accessed 12 October 2014. In the Qur’an verse 13:11 suggests the same message. 41. Prophet Mohammad said as narrated by Az-Zubair bin Al-‘Awwam in Sahih Bukhari, Book 24, Hadith 74. Available at http://sunnah.com/bukhari/24/74. Accessed 12 October 2014. A fuller explanation on Islam’s position towards self-reliance can be found at Khan, Tahmazov and Abuarqub, “Translating Faith into Development.” 42. Also see 2:178, 6:6, 6:131, 6:137, 6:15, 10:13, 10:24, 11:60, 11:68, 11:82, 11:94, 17:16, 22:2, 23:44, 39:7. Although I suggest that there is no indication that individual lives are sacrosanct to Allah, the Qur’an is clear on its injunctions against man, as opposed to Allah, taking other lives unless under speciﬁc prescribed circumstances. 43. Turner, “Bediuzzaman and the Concept of ‘Adl: Towards a Nursian Ontology of Divine Justice,” 567. 44. For an expansion of his views see discussion on the Third Sphere within ibid., 578. 45. The Amman Message 12. 46. Ibid., 14.

6 Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. I eschew the common abbreviation of ‘Bosnia’ for the country as it is constituted of two regions, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia is largely Muslim, while Herzegovina largely Catholic. Catholics repeatedly expressed to me their concern that the abbreviation of the country’s name to Bosnia reinforced concerns of continued marginalization. Nevertheless, in referring to the region in its historical context I use the term that was used by the ruling elite at the time, which in most cases was Bosnia and may or may not have encompassed Herzegovina at the time. 2. Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Ottoman Ruling Group and the Religions of Its Sub- jects in the Early Modern Age: A Survey of Current Research, ” Journal of Early Modern History 14, no. 3 (2010). 172 Notes

3. In both 2006 and 2010 surveys by the EBRD religious institutions topped the most trusted list followed by the police but considerably ahead of the judiciary, parliament and government authorities. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Life in Transition: After the Cri- sis,” EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/special/bih_ lits2.shtml. Gallup polling similarly suggests religious institutions are the most trusted, as per Table 6.1 above. 4. Gallup, “Balkan Monitor, Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans,” (Gallup, 2012). 5. Original data collected through the World Values Survey, calculated and presented by the Association of Religion Data Archives, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Public Opinion,” Pennsylvania State University, http://www .thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_28_5.asp#S_2. Of which 30 per cent of Muslims attend prayers at least once a week. James Bell et al., “The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity,” (Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2012). 6. Gilley’s work, while statistically viable, should not be considered robust for country specific assessments as the accumulation of answers to nine questions cannot provide more than a cursory outline of the view of legitimacy in a particular country. In particular, while backed by theoretical reasoning, the weighting given to each of the three characteristics of legitimacy was according to Gilley ‘a simple intuitive solution’. (page 510) Gilley, “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries,” 513. 7. “The Failed States Index 2012 Interactive Grid,” Fund for Peace, http://www .fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2012. 8. Article VIII and I respectively, Islamic Community, Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: Islamic Community, 1997). 9. Regarding Hanafi school of jurisprudence see the fatwa issued on 13 Decem- ber 1993 by the Reisu-l-ulama Mustafa Ceric´ available from Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, Rezolucija Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini o tumacenju islama i drugi tekstovi (Sarajevo: El – Kalem, 2006) 13. Riyasat resolutions in support of the Hanafi school are from 27 March 2006 and 7 November 2006, both available at the Riyaset website. For Maturidi theology, see Fikret Karciˇ c´ article, ‘What Is the Islamic Tradition of Bosniacs’ in ibid., 51. Web version available at Fikret Karciˇ c,´ “What is ‘Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks’?” Islamic Community, http://www.rijaset.ba/english/ index.php/template/latest-news/222-what-is-islamic-tradition-of-bosniaks. 10. See footnote 350. 11. Riyaset, “Rezolucija o ustavnim promjenama i tumacenjuˇ islama,” Islamic Community, http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=195:rezolucija-o-ustavnim-promjenama-i-tumaju-islama&catid= 235&Itemid=223. 12. Seida Smajkic,´ “Personal Interview,” (Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10 October 2012). 13. Ceric,´ “Personal Interview.” 14. Fikret Karciˇ c,´ “Personal Interview,” (Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 November 2012). 15. The Bonn Powers is an authority given to the High Representative (HR) by the Peace Implementation Council in 1997 allowing the HR to, among other Notes 173

powers, remove public officials and enforce binding decisions even against local legislators. 16. Vinko Puljic´ et al., “Fruits of the Past – A Pledge for the Future: A Pastoral Letter of the Bishops on the 130th Anniversary of the Restoration of Regular Diocesan Hierarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” In Stanje Katoliˇckih Župa na podruˇcju Bosne I Hercegovine Izmeðu 1991 i 2011 Godine, ed. BK BiH (Sarajevo: Bishops Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011), 31. 17. Gaudium et spes no. 74. 18. Vinko Puljic´ et al., “Open Letter to the Signatories and Witnesses of the Dayton Accord: The Peace Accord Contains Some Odd Contradictions and Fatal Insecurities, 8 December 1995.” In In Defence of the Rightless: A Collection of Documents of the Bishop of Banja Luka and the Bishop’s Ordinary Written the War Years of 1991–1995, ed. Aleksander Ravlic´ (Sarajevo: Bishop’s Ordinary of Banja Luka, 1997). 19. Puljic´ et al. “Fruits of the Past – A Pledge for the Future: A Pastoral Letter of the Bishops on the 130th Anniversary of the Restoration of Regular Diocesan Hierarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 33. 20. See discussion in Chapter 3. 21. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 28(a). 22. Gaudium et spes. No. 89. 23. Pope Benedict XVI, Deus caritas est. No. 28. 24. Svetozar Kraljevic,´ “Personal Interview,” (Medjugorje, Bosnia and Herzegovina 7 October 2012). 25. Average results from 2006 through to 2012 from Gallup, “Balkan Monitor, Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans.” 26. Karciˇ c,´ “Personal Interview.” 27. Each jamat sends two or three elected representatives to the majlis assembly, which itself elects the president and executive members of the board. Non-ex officio members of the Riyasat are elected by the Council of the Islamic Com- munity. The reisu-l-ulama is also elected by an assigned list that includes the executive members of the majlis boards. As for the assembly governing the IZ, the Council of the Islamic Community, it is elected through a system of electoral districts with each jamat having two representatives voting for their representative and no more than one third of representative positions can be held by employees of the IZ. 28. Muhamed Salkic,´ “Evolucija organizacije Islamske zajednice od 1990 do 2011,” in Islamska Zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini: Dvije decenije Reisu-l- uleme Dr. Mustafe Cerića, ed. Aziz Kadribegovic,´ Ahmet Alibašic,´ and Ekrem Tucakovic´ (Sarajevo: Centre for Advanced Studies, 2012), 74. 29. Seida Smajkic,´ “Personal Interview.” 30. Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organ- isations in Bosnia and Herzegovina Law No. 28. Available at http:// host.uniroma3.it/progetti/cedir/cedir/Lex-doc/Bos_l-2004a.pdf. Accessed on 12th October 2014. 31. Patrizia Poggi et al., “Local Level Institutions and Social Capital Study,” (Sarajevo: World Bank, ECSSD, 2002), 80. 32. Seida Smajkic,´ “Personal Interview.” 33. B008, “Personal Communication,” (Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 October 2012). 174 Notes

34. Vinko Puljic,´ “Primao sam ih i danju i veceri,ˇ ali ucinakˇ je bio malen (28 July 2001, Glas Koncila),” in Kardinal od Vrhbosne, ed. Zarko Ivkovic, et al. (Sarajevo: Styria, 2010). 35. Puljic´ et al., “Fruits of the Past – A Pledge for the Future: A Pastoral Letter of the Bishops on the 130th Anniversary of the Restoration of Regular Diocesan Hierarchy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 36. Gordon Bardos, “Bosnian Lessons,” The National Interest, July 16 2010. 37. Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western, “The Death of Dayton,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 5 (2009). 38. Nixon et al., “The Ties That Bind: Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 19. 39. Ibid., 39. 40. Ibid., 40. 41. The authors appear to suggest that religious congregations were included by listing in the table within the main body of the document the percentage of surveyed respondents acknowledging membership to a ‘religious, welfare organisation/association’ of which only 2.5 per cent of the population considered themselves members. This starkly contradicts the World Value Survey which showed that 29.5 per cent (1998–2001) of people attended a service at least once a week or in the case of Gallup polling 51.1 per cent (2009). Clariﬁcation can be found on page 125 buried in the annexes of the UNDP report where the questionnaire is included. The question makes clear that it refers to ‘religious charities’ as opposed to any other form of religious congregation or spiritual movement. For information on religious congregations as a source of social capital see Corwin Smidt, Religion as Social Capital: Producing the Common Good (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2003). In addition, Putnam writes that, ‘faith communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America.’ Quoted in ibid., 2. 42. Mustafa Ceric´ et al., “Statement of Shared Moral Commitment,” Bosnian Institute, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/junaug97/moralcom.cfm. 43. Nixon et al., “The Ties That Bind: Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 65. 44. See for example ibid., 66. 45. Archdiocese Vrhbosna, “Udruge i pokreti na prostoru Vrhbosanske nadbiskupije,” http://vrhbosanska-nadbiskupija.org/crkva-u-drustvu/udruge. 46. Ilija Orkic,´ “Urednikova Rijec-Memorija,”´ Vrhbosna CXXIV, no. 3 (2010): 185. 47. Bishop Komarica, “Poruka biskupa Komarice za Nedjelju Caritasa,” Diocese of Banja Luka, http://www.biskupija-banjaluka.org/propovijedi.html. 48. For strategic plan see Caritas Bosna i Herzegovina website, “Caritas BK BiH: Strateški plan,” Biskupske Konferencije Bosne i Hercegovine, http://www .carbkbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=55&Itemid= 71&lang=hr. For further information on the project (Regional Development of Parish Social Ministry and Voluntary Work – PSM) see Caritas: Annual Report for 2010 (Sarajevo: Bishop’s conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010). 54. 49. It should be noted, though, that 2011 was declared the Year of Volunteering by the European Union and it was recognized as a ten year celebration after Notes 175

the first International Year of Volunteering in 2001. The Church’s impetus may have been in response to these and the effort’s sustainability could be short lived for this reason. 50. Mustafa Ceric,´ “Islam: A Declaration of European Muslims,” (Zagreb Mosque: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2006), http://www.rferl.org/ articleprintview/1066751.html. Salih Colakovic´ made the same point by noting that in the Qur’an it asks Allah to give us good on this world and the next, but indicatively this world is mentioned before the next. The future world is built upon the actions on this one, noting that in the Qur’an it says that this world is the field upon which the next world grows. Salih Colakoviˇ c,´ “Personal Communication,” (Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 October 2012). 51. Global information was collated by David M. Cheney using official figures available in the Vatican’s Annuario Pontificio (2004). The tabulated country data is available at David M. Cheney, “Statistics by Country, by Catholic Population,” http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc1.html. Additional calculations were undertaken by the author to sort per believer figures. Eight Middle Eastern countries were excluded from the list which may prejudice the overall world ranking. 52. Number of imams available from Glasnik, ed. Mehmedalija Hadžic´ (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u BiH, 2011) 179. Per Muslim calculation based upon 40 per cent Muslim population of BiH in 2012. CIA, “CIA World Factbook,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/bk.html. 53. Repeated requests were made through various channels to get a circulation figure but all efforts were rebuffed. 54. Vinko Puljic´ et al., “Sredstva Društvenoga Priopcavanja´ u Službi Evangelizacije,” Vrhbosna no. 4 (2000): 413. 55. This is based upon an average family size of 3.3 based upon the 2007 House- hold Budget Survey. An earlier census in 1991 produced a household size of 3.4. I have used the 3.3 figure. 56. Mustafa Ceric,´ “120th Anniversary of the Office of Reis ul-ulema,” (Sarajevo: Islamic Community, 2002). 57. Article VII, Islamic Community, Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 58. Seida Smajkic,´ “Personal Interview.” 59. Salem Dedovic,´ “Personal Communication,” (Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15 October 2012). 60. Ceric,´ “Personal Interview.” 61. See Basic Agreement with Government of Slovakia (2000) Article 2 (2) ‘The Holy See guarantees that the Catholic Church will utilize all appropriate means for the moral formation of the citizens of the Republic of Slovakia.’ 62. The remainder were ‘something else’ and ‘no response’. Neven Duvnjak, “Rezultati Socioreligijskog Istrazivanja U Franjevackim Provincijama Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine,” Crkva U Svijetu 34, no. 2 (1999): 244. 63. Islamic Community, Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 64. Fikret Karciˇ c,´ “Main Trends in the Interpretation of the Shari’a in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000–2005.” In Copenhagen University Islam Lecture Series 176 Notes

(Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 2010) 2. I asked Karciˇ cregarding´ the official position of the IZ on his definition of the ‘Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’ to which he explained that although he wrote it in his capacity of scholar the extended five page article was included in a book published by the IZ on the Riyasat’s position on the accepted approaches to the interpretation of the Qur’an and as such it is widely considered as the accepted official position. “Personal Interview.” The book being, Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, Rezolucija Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini o tumacenju islama i drugi tekstovi. The text is also available in English from the IZ’s website under the title, ‘What Is “Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks’?” 65. Karciˇ c,´ The Bosniaks and Challenges of Modernity: Late Ottoman and Hapsburg Times: 109–18. 66. Karciˇ c,´ “Personal Interview.” 67. Ibid. 68. Drago Pilsel, “Political Theology – The Theology of National Anti-Myth,” ed. Tomislav Žigmanov, Divided God and Intercultural Dialogue (Ljubljana: Dijaški dom Ivana Cankarja (DIC) and KUD Pozitiv, 2008), http://www.pozitiv.si/ dividedgod/. 52. 69. During my field research I noted that priests used ‘Croat’ and ‘Catholic’ inter- changeably in conversation, Sunday homilies and public pronouncements. In defence of this position, Catholic theologians I interviewed in Mostar referred to the Second Vatican Council document Dignitatis humanae and its emphasis upon the right of peoples to maintain their cultures and the Church’s responsibility to protect these rights, the breach of which is a sin. B008, “Personal Communication.” 70. An early example is the 1997 statement from the Bishop’s conference, Puljic´ et al., “Sredstva Društvenoga Priopcavanja´ u Službi Evangelizacije,” 103. 71. This commitment to the Bosnia and Herzegovinian people that the Franciscans are widely associated with has also led to the diocesans referring to the Franciscans as ‘papucari’ˇ (transl. slipper carrying people) in that they respond to the needs of the Muslims in a similarly perceived problematic manner as a man who is overly responsive to a dominant wife. 72. The Provincial Minister of the Franciscan Province of Bosna Srebena between 2000–2009, Brother Mijo Džolan, similarly saw Dayton as not just. Mijo Džolan, “Personal Communication,” (Medjugorje, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 October 2012). 73. Ceric,´ “Personal Interview.”

Conclusion

1. Annan, “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all,” 31. Other research falls between a ﬁfth and a third of a chance. For a review of this literature see Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, “End- ing Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies,” International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 1 (2008): 5. 2. William T. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination (London: T & T Clark, 2002). This approach is being championed by the Radical Orthodoxy movement. Notes 177

3. Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996) 109. 4. Ibid. 5. Pope Paul VI, Christus dominus, (1965) no. 12. 6. Charles Villa-Vicencio, A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation-Building and Human Rights, Cambridge Studies in Ideology and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 21. 7. Gaudium et spes. No. 75. 8. In many countries there is an interest for religion to play a role. Research from the Pew Research, Global Attitudes Project, found that in five out of six Muslim countries surveyed there was majority support for a ‘major’ role for Islam in politics (Egypt 66 per cent, Pakistan 62 per cent, Turkey 64 per cent, Tunisia 84 per cent, Lebanon 61 per cent and Jordan 31 per cent). “Most Muslims want democracy, personal freedoms, and Islam in political life,” Global Attitudes Project (2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most- muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/. 9. For reference to ‘mental taboo’ see Holenstein, “Role and Significance of Religion and Spirituality in Development Co-operation.” 10. An example of conflicting views between the international community and the people is the case of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts. The former was supported by the UN and the United States while the latter had much wider support among the people. See Morash, “Union of Islamic Courts ...An opportunity lost for Stability in Somalia.” Bibliography

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abrogation, see naskh Bosnia and Herzegovina, 112, adjudication of disputes, see 114–15, 134 mediation Egypt, 19–20, 90 Afghanistan, 2, 10, 24, 37, 58, 86, 97 Iraq, 1, 20, 86, 92 Al Azhar University, 14, 20, 90 Croatia, 26, 28, 66–7, 116, 129, 137 Al-Ghazali, 92, 107, 114 customary justice, see legitimacy Al-Qubaysiat, 90 Amman Message, 98, 105–6 dar al-harb, 87–9, 106, 133–4 anomie– ,4,24 dar al-Islam, 36, 87–9, 133–4, 145 Ash ari, 77–8, 80, 82–3, 92–3, 100, da’wa,86 104, 115 Dayton Peace Agreement, 21, 109–10, Australia, 26 112, 114–17, 121, 139 Dedovic,´ Salim, 128 Beck, Colin, 28 democracy, 21–2, 25, 47, 57, 65, 150 Beetham, David, 5, 17, 19, 21, 23–5, Deus caritas est, 64, 70 28–9, 47, 63–4, 91, 96, 112–13, Dignitatis humanae, 54–5, 57 139 Benedict XVI, Pope, 58–9, 62, 64, Egypt, 19–20, 26, 42, 90, 96 68–70, 75, 117–18 constitution, see Constitution, Egypt Bishops Conference, 20, 45, 116, 118 Ethiopia, 31, 32, 49 Black, Anthony, 79 Blankinship, Khalid, 85 fatwa, 1, 97, 102, 113 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2–5, 7–8, Fatwa Council, Bosnia and 10–11, 28, 36, 61, 82, 109–42 Herzegovina, 113–14, 122 legitimacy, 112 Fidei depositum,54 Bremer, Paul, 1–2 ﬁqh, 40, 92–3 Francis, Pope, 13, 59 Caritas, 44–5, 74, 126, 130–1, 136, 140 Franciscans, see Order of St Francis Caritas in veritate, 55, 58, 62, 64, 75, Fukuyama, Francis, 4–5, 18 117 Catholic Church, see Roman Catholic Gaudium et spes, 61, 64–5, 73, 117 Church Gilley, Bruce, 10, 18, 112 Cavanaugh, William, 144 Ceric,´ Mustafa, 82, 114, 127, 129, 139 Hadith, 35–6, 46, 79–80, 94–5, 97, Clarke, Matthew, 45 103, 114 Colakoviˇ c,´ Salih, 135 Haseljic,´ Fahrudin, 133–4 common good, 23, 62–4, 68, 72, 75, Hinduism, 24 116–18, 122, 129, 146, 151 Hourani, Albert, 92 community solidarity, 15, 46–7, humanitarian assistance, 45–8, 105, 128–30, 148 130, 132, 148 Constitution, 16, 19, 21–2, 47, 58 Afghanistan, 24, 86 Immortale dei, 55–6 Austro-Hungarian, 110 Inglehart, Ronald, 9

190 Index 191

Iraq, xv–xvi, 1–2, 5, 10, 16, 19–20, 36, higher order values, 22–4, 47, 64, 67, 86, 92 96–7, 99, 107, 112, 117–19, Islam 139–40, 148 institutions, 90, 98, 107, 113 Libya, 11, 22 interpretation of scriptures, 80–1 Lipset, Seymor, 17–18 migration, 87–9, 133–4 Lumen gentium,54 peace-building, 102 poverty, 103–5 March, Andrew, 87, 134 state, 82, 95, 100, 102 Maturidi theological differences within, 82–3 Al-Maturidi, 80, 82, 84, 96 Islamic Community of Bosnia and theology, 77–8, 81–3, 93, 104, 115, Herzegovina, 113–14, 119, 122, 132–3 125–6, 128, 131–2, 134, 139–41 mediation, 31–3, 123, 140 Dayton Peace Agreement, 114 Menocal, Alina, 13 inter-religious relations, 125 millet, 110 Riyasat, 113–14, 119 Miloševic,´ Slobodan, 25 Islamic jurisprudence, 7–8, 20, 77, modernization theory, 4, 9 80–1, 95, 97–9, 107, 113–15, 119, Mohammad, Prophet, 46, 78–9, 81, 133, 140, 145 82, 84, 92–3, 99–100, 103, 133 Islamska Zajednica, see Islamic Moses, 86, 101 Community Muhammadiya, 90 Murray,– John Courtney, 56 Mu Jesus, 35, 38, 55, 63, 69–71, 73, 105, tazila, 82 126, 146 Nahdlatul Ulama, 90 John Paul II, Pope, 58, 67–9, 72–3 naskh, 38–9 John XXIII, Pope, 57, 62, 68 Nasr, Seyyad, 41 Judaism, xiii, 45, 63 nation building, 4, 11, 66, 136, 150 Jews, 3, 38, 85, 103 Norris, Pippa, 9 Nostra aetate, 38, 54 Kalin, Ibrahim, 85 Nursi, Said, 85, 104 Kamali, Mohammad, 92, 107, 114 Kamberovic,´ Husnija, 125 omission of religion, 12, 18, 21, 32, Karciˇ c,´ Fikret, 114–15, 119, 132–3, 135 40, 52–3, 79 Karzai, Hamid, 97 Order of St Francis, 67, 116, 118, 129, Khadduri, Majid, 85 136, 138–9, 142 Komarica, Bishop, 126 Osama bin Laden, 95 Krafess, Jamal, 103 Ottomans, 114, 116, 132 Kuharic,´ Cardinal, 27, 67 Pacem in terris, 55, 68 legitimacy Paul VI, Pope, 54, 57–8, 68, 71, 73 direct acknowledgement, 26, Pervan, Tomislav, 67 119–20, 122 Pilsel, Drago, 136 direct association, 26, 65, 119–20, Pius XII, Pope, 66 122, 140 Pius XI, Pope, 56, 61 direct participation, 26–7, Populorum progressio, 55, 71, 73–4 119–20, 122 primary order elements, 5–7, 30, frame realignment, 27–8, 41, 47–50, 51, 53, 75, 87, 89–90, 107, 66, 121 110, 136, 145, 147–8 192 Index

Quadragesimo anno,61 Shia, xv, 1, 14, 36, 81–2 Sistani, Ayatollah, 1–2, 92 Reisu-l-ulama, 110, 113–14, 119, 128 Smajkic,´ Mufti, 114, 120–1, 128 Religion social capital, 4, 33–9, 47–8, 50, authority structures, 24, 90 123–6, 130, 140, 148 co-option by government, 7–8, 42, Sollicitudo rei socialis, 55, 73 58–9, 66, 75, 116, 121, 129, 150 Solomon Islands, 2, 26 diplomacy, 4 Somalia, 32–3, 49, 67 evolution of, 34 Starrett, Gregory, 42 freedom of, 78, 120 Stromseth, Jane, 39–40 inhibiting progress, 9 peacebuilding, 38, 124–6, 135 Tablighi Jamaat, 90 resurgence in academia, 12, 14 tahrif,85 telos, 3, 7–8, 53, 62, 75, 87, 91, 106–8, 144,146 Taymiyya, Ahmad Ibn, 85 universality, 8, 53, 110, 131 religious markets theory, 10 ulama, 81, 88, 90–3, 95, 105–6, 110, Rida, Muhammad Rashid, 92, 133 114–15, 133 Roman Catholic Church United Kingdom, 9, 19, 27, 151 charity, 44–5, 69–73, 75, 129–30 United Nations, xv–xvi, 2, 19 concordat, 26, 28, 120 United States, 1, 9–10, 20, 30, 40, 51 interpretation of doctrine, 25, 54–5 inter-religious relations, 38, 125 Vincezo, Villa, 150 Volf, Miroslav, 146 Salaﬁ, 20, 94, 113 volunteering, 124–6, 140, 142 salvation Christianity, 55, 57–8, 136, 144, 146–7 Watt, Montgomery, 82 Islam, 78, 83–4 Weber, Max, 16–17, 25 secondary order elements, 105, 146 Woodward, Susan, 23 sharia, 19–20, 24, 32, 40, 78, 82, 88, 91–4, 105, 113 Yemen, 32