International Journal of Korean History (Vol.17 No.1, Feb.2012) 67

Establishing the Rules of Engagement: American Protestant Missionaries, the U.S. Legation, and the Chosŏn State, 1884-1900

Paul S. Cha*

Introduction

The phrase “unequal treaties” and term extraterritoriality are evocative, conveying more than simply the stale concepts that treaties are unequal or that foreigners are not subject to local laws. Indeed, observing that nearly alltreaties are inherently unequal, Dong Wang, a scholar of China who has written extensively on the topic of unequal treaties and popular historical memory in China, has noted that during the twentieth century the phrase unequal treaties and term extraterritoriality have served both to refer to China’s history of past humiliation and as a clarion call for various socio-political mobilization projects in the country. 1 Likewise, these concepts hold a degree of symbolic meaning in Korea. In particular, they often refer to the weakness of the Chosŏn government during the “open ports” period, paint a picture of rapacious Western and Japanese nations hungering to devour the peninsula, and serve as harbingers of Korea’s pending colonization and division. To a degree, all of these characterizations are accurate and have advanced our understanding of late-nineteenth century Korea. Two drawbacks of these images and characterizations, however, have been a slowness to interpret this period

* Assistant Professor, Samford University 68 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ in a manner that paints the Korean state in terms other than fundamental weakness or decay, and the tendency to view Westerners and other foreigners as simply exploitive actors. The purpose of this article is to begin the process of going beyond simply casting unequal treaties as symbols of the Chosŏn(Joseon) government’s weakness or the imperialist deigns of foreigners.2 Although the signing of the unequal treaties set a framework of relations that favored foreign powers over Chosŏn Korea, how these relationships would actually be prosecuted and how citizens or subjects of these nations would be received on the peninsula involved a process of contestation. In order to demonstrate this process, this article focuses on how American Protestant missionaries and the Chosŏn state engaged in a struggle to define the terms of their relationship during the late nineteenth century. This article examines Americans because they represented the largest percentage of the missionary community in Chosŏn Korea during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, from 1884 to 1910, more than two-thirds of all Protestant missionaries in the country were American. 3 These missionaries were unlike most other groups of foreigners coming to the country during the late nineteenth century. Unlike merchants and traders, missionaries aimed to settle down in Chosŏn Korea as many spent years if not decades in the country. They traversed the countryside, created complex networks of relations, and became integral parts of many local communities. Furthermore, missionaries specifically attempted to spread a religion that the Chosŏn government had banned since the start of the nineteenth century. For these reasons, missionaries often became embroiled in conflicts with local officials and these conflicts often involved unequal treaties and extraterritoriality. The issues of the missionaries’ links to imperialist powers and of their activities in the political realm have been problematic for scholars of Christianity in Korea. Early scholarship generally minimized these points by focusing on the fact that the imperialist power in Korea was Japan and by arguing that American missionaries had maintained a policy of Paul S. Cha 69 separation of church and state.4 In contrast, more recent scholarship has increasingly criticized missionaries by pointing out that they had been active in political affairs and had intimate ties to American imperialism. These scholars have generally argued that missionaries turned to unequal treaties and extraterritoriality not only to secure a foothold in the peninsula, but also to wrest from the Chosŏn state religious freedom and the right to evangelize.5 Revisionist scholarship on the missionaries’ involvement in the political realm has served as an important corrective to studies that have either ignored this facet or overly praised the activities of these early missionaries. However, in general, these studies have assumed that missionaries operated from a position of strength and that they viewed the right to proselytize mainly as a religious issue.6 As this article will argue, these two assumptions are problematic. To begin with, early missionary activities on the peninsula are best described as having been cautious, as missionaries were wary that a mis-step might harm their fledgling efforts. Furthermore, they lacked any real power to coerce concessions from either local officials or the central state. Secondly, when acting in the political sphere, missionaries brought forth not abstract notions of religious freedom or their allegiance to a heavenly kingdom but instead their rights as guaranteed by treaty laws and principles of rational governance. For these reasons, the conflicts between missionaries and the Chosŏn government represented more than clashes over notions of religious freedom; they represented contests to define the proper rules, or laws, governing how missionaries as foreign residents would be received by the Chosŏn state. Stated differently, missionaries and the Chosŏn government contested both spoken and unspoken rules governing their engagement. What follows below is first a discussion of the necessity to view missionaries as “citizens” when examining their involvement in the political sphere. Although they came to Korea for a religious purpose, when missionaries entered the political realm to contest rights, they did so as citizens believing that they were entitled to certain legal “rights.” Not 70 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ unexpectedly, conflicts arose between the Chosŏn government and missionaries. To offer concrete examples of these conflicts, this article examines two major clashes: the P’yŏngyang (Pyeongyang) Persecution (1894) and the Taegu (Daegu) Incident (1900). These two episodes help establish the presence of Americans in the interior. Scholars of Christianity typically refer to the P’yŏngyang Persecution as a major event that proved the power of Christianity to the Korean populace and as one major reason why so many in the P’yŏngyang area converted after 1894.7 But, the significance of the P’yŏngyang Persecution and the Taegu Incident extends beyond the issue of demonstrating the power of Christianity. These contests were struggles between missionaries and the Chosŏn state to define the grounds on which their relationships would proceed. As this article will demonstrate, missionaries were not as powerful, nor the Chosŏn government as weak, as is commonly believed.

Missionaries as “Citizens”

Since these missionaries went to Chosŏn Korea to engage in a specifically religious endeavor, many scholars and casual observers have viewed the missionaries’ political activities as a violation of the principle of “separation of church and state.” But, although missionaries were certainly motivated by religion, it is equally important to realize that when they entered the political realm, they consciously did so as private citizens. In arguing for religious freedom and advancing their mission, rather than relying on religious arguments, missionaries claimed rights that they were supposedly entitled to as defined by treaty laws. Thus, when approaching missionaries and politics, the issue of religion must be set aside, though not completely ignored. To start with a recap of conventional interpretations of early American Protestant missionary activities in Korea, missionaries entered the peninsula soon after the signing of U.S.-Chosŏn Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1882). The first was Horace N. Allen, who arrived Paul S. Cha 71 technically as a medical doctor attached to the U.S. legation in 1884. Though his treatment of Min Yŏngik, wounded during the Kapsin (Gapsin) Coup of the same year, had won Allen the good favor of the court, Christianity and evangelism were still strictly forbidden. Thus, missionaries primarily engaged in educational and medical work, and, as outlined by the treaty, remained restricted to Seoul or one of the treaty ports. Missionaries supposedly chafed at these restraints and probed for ways to secure the right to both practice and spread Christianity. They challenged these restrictions through a creative manipulation of the British-Chosŏn treaty of 1883 and the French-Chosŏn treaty of 1886. The former had included clauses allowing British subjects to travel outside of treaty ports with valid passports for the purpose of trade and to establish places of worship for British subjects. The latter had secured for French subjects the right to travel in the interior for the purpose of “teaching.” Because the U.S.-Chosŏn Treaty had included a Most Favored Nation clause, American missionaries likewise had the right to travel in the interior and engage in “teaching.”8 Thus, starting after 1886 they secured passports and proceeded to engage in month(s) long trips into the interior, where they sold religious tracts, provided medical services, and quietly evangelized. Importantly, while missionaries may have been permitted to travel in the interior and practice religion, evangelism was still illegal and the government bans on Christianity for Korean subjects were still in place. Thus, the activities of missionaries in the interior represented transgressions of Chosŏn regulations and a challenge to local governance. But, while local officials may have been angered at this situation, because of extraterritoriality they were unable to directly challenge those missionaries who made forays into their territories. The picture of missionaries abusing treaty law to advance their religious endeavor has posed a theoretical knot for a number of scholars of church history as they have struggled to reconcile any positive work these foreigners may have accomplished with their links to imperialism.9 One prominent scholar of Christianity in Korea summed up the activities of missionaries in the following manner: 72 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~

When missionaries acted upon their religious convictions and thereby violated Korean laws, they should have been subject to the Korean court. Missionaries also had no right to interfere with the Korean authorities’ rule over their subjects. Even when their followers were assaulted purely on the ground that they were Christian . . . Following Christian ideals, the missionaries’ and their Korean adherents’ attitudes should have been such that the consequences of their religious convictions would be cheerfully accepted.10

Undergirding this critique of how missionaries “should have” behaved is an assumption that while perhaps motivated by benevolent purposes, the doctrine of “separation of church and state” mandated non- interference in the political realm. In other words, missionaries to Korea supposedly transgressed their Christian ideals and their “religious convictions” by meddling in the political sphere. Viewed more broadly, scholars of Christianity and missions have struggled to understand the relationship between church and state and to explain the ways that missionaries, not only in Korea but throughout the world, have justified their forays into the political sphere.11 Offering a manner in which to theorize this problem is Michael McConnell. To begin with, he has noted that for all societies adhering to the principle of “separation of church and state” there is always an issue of “citizenship ambiguity” for members of a religious community.12 In short, they are members of a heavenly kingdom and an earthly one. However, McConnell points out that for most these two identities exist on top of one another. Stated differently, in general, for most of the time religious adherents are able to transition from one identity to another seamlessly. In pointing out this overlap, McConnell reminds us that Christians are not barred from the political realm as individuals. Indeed, recent scholarship on the concept of “separation of church and state” in the United States has demonstrated that historically many of the early proponents were Protestants who never thought that this notion prevented them from acting Paul S. Cha 73 in the political sphere as private citizens.13 When they entered the political realm, missionaries often did so as private citizens seeking to claim their political rights. For example, Samuel Moore was a missionary who would become best known for his work with the paekchŏng(baekjeong).14 In 1900 he wrote to Horace Allen, who at the time was in charge of the U.S. legation. Moore requested a letter of introduction to Kojong. Allen rejected this request on the basis that this would be meddling in the affairs of Korea. In response, Moore retorted:

As I understand our laws U.S. citizens have a right to live in any country and to engage in any occupation they like--even to meddling in politics or advising the King . . . I beg to say that I know of no law which allows any such interference with personal liberty as is attempted by this communication, and if there is such law I shall be glad to be so informed.15

Although Allen was a former missionary, who continued to communicate with the secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions while heading the U.S. legation, Moore cited his status as a citizen of the United States rather than making reference to any notions of Christian solidarity. Regardless of his personal religious views or any professional connections he may have shared with Allen, Moore claimed that he possessed the right to engage in activities so long as they were legal because he was a U.S. citizen and not because he was a missionary. In sum, the observation that missionaries were private citizens when they entered the political realm at first glance may not appear startling. Yet, there exists a strong tendency to evaluate missionary activity based on their religious mission and to find their interference in politics as a transgression of their “Christian ideals.” However, although they were clearly motivated by religion, when missionaries entered the political arena they did so not as “Christians” but as private citizens. Maintaining this perspective will bring into clearer focus how they approached both 74 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ the U.S. legation and the Chosŏn state at the turn of the century.

Extraterritoriality and Citizenship

The Unequal Treaty System refers to a series of treaties imposed by Western imperialist nations on countries like China, Japan, and Korea during the nineteenth century. These treaties were unequal because although they did not fully render non-Western nations to the status of a colony, they imposed stipulations that interfered with their sovereignty. Of these stipulations, extraterritoriality was particularly damaging and has come to symbolize for many activists and scholars the inherent inequality of the Unequal Treaty System. For instance, Yang Hongsŏk has argued that this treaty clause was a coercive tool that undermined the integrity of the Chosŏn state and damaged Korean culture.16 In levying this criticism, Yang critiqued a convention in the field that has viewed the U.S.-Chosŏn Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1882) as relatively less unequal and more favorable to the Chosŏn state than other treaties signed at the time. In brief, the secondary scholarship has viewed China, Russia, and Japan as the aggressive powers on the Korean peninsula. In contrast, the typical explanation of U.S. imperialism holds that until the second half of the 1890s, the United States was relatively limited in its desires to gain territory outside of the boundaries of North America, focusing instead on its “manifest destiny” to occupy the whole of the continent. While it did patrol the waters of the Pacific during the second half of the nineteenth century and played a role in opening Meiji Japan (1854) and Chosŏn Korea (1884), the U.S. largely refrained from colonizing either country. Furthermore, compared to its European counterparts, the United States was much more passive in terms of securing special privileges or rights. However, the United States’ acquisition of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War (1898) marked a turning point in U.S. imperialism. Riding a surging crest of nationalism, the American public became increasingly interested in expanding the United States’ influence Paul S. Cha 75 in the Pacific. Reasons cited by scholars for this turn have included the need for economic markets and a growing belief in America of a moral imperative of the “white man’s burden” to spread civilization to the “benighted peoples” of Asia.17 But, although the United States may have become an imperialist nation, in general its focus in Asia was not on Korea but the Philippines. Thus, the United States’ imperialist imprint on Korea was far less than either China or Japan.18 In contrast, through a careful examination of how the U.S. legation actually deployed extraterritoriality in its struggle with the Chosŏn government, Yang Hongsŏk has argued that the American government’s application of this treaty clause was no different from other imperialist countries. In advancing his argument, Yang specifically focused on how missionaries took advantage of extraterritoriality and the Most Favored Nation clause of the treaty to establish and grow aggressively their Christian project.19 The portrayal of missionaries as manipulating political levers in order to advance their agenda is undergirded by two problematic assumptions. First, it assumes that missionaries occupied a position of strength vis-à-vis the Chosŏn government as they were able wrest concessions from local officials. But, at least initially missionaries were extremely unsure of their security in the peninsula and were concerned that a mis-step might permanently damage their efforts. This fear, to great extent, was based on the bloody anti-Catholic persecutions that occurred during the nineteenth century. Missionaries were aware of this history and wary of potential crackdowns. 20 In addition, when the first Protestant missionaries officially stationed in Korea arrived, they did so under adverse conditions. Although Allen may have gained the favor of the court for his timely treatment of Min Yŏngik, in the aftermath of the Kapsin Coup those officials who had advocated progressive reforms were removed from positions of power and missionaries feared potential backlashes. In fact, shortly after the Kapsin Coup, Horace G. Underwood and Henry Appenzeller, who respectively belonged to the Presbyterian and Methodist missions of the United States, both arrived in Korea. On being informed of the political uncertainty and dangers in the capital by 76 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ the U.S. Minister in charge of the legation at the time, Appenzeller decided to return to Japan and wait until the situation had settled.21 The feelings of insecurity at least partially account for why missionaries cleaved to a relatively conservative strategy of evangelism during the early years of their presence in the peninsula.22 In hindsight it appears as though missionaries interacted with the Chosŏn government from a position of strength. But, at the time they were unsure of their position in the country. The second problematic assumption has been the view that missionaries and the U.S. government were a single entity. The conventional interpretation has argued that extraterritoriality ostensibly placed missionaries outside the jurisdictional control of the Chosŏn government. Thus, the enforcement of Chosŏn law relied on the U.S. legation. However, even when missionaries engaged in an illegal activity, U.S. consular authorities, who stood in unity with them, refused to act according to the wishes of Chosŏn officials. This conventional interpretation, however, simplifies a complicated relationship between the U.S. legation, missionaries, and the Chosŏn government. First, while perhaps sharing some goals in common, the U.S. legation and missionaries represented competing interests. To conceptualize this situation, I suggest that an examination of Charles Tilly’s observations on the formation of citizenship in the West will prove to be fruitful. Tilly has argued that in Western countries the category and concept of “citizenship” developed through a protracted struggle between states and societies. The pressures of state-making, or rather war-making, required that rulers increase their capacities to secure vital resources. However, they faced a number of competitors in the form of such actors as local elites and the church. Through a process of coercion and negotiation, rulers were able to increase their capacities to extract wealth, conscript labor, and wage war. However, securing these resources often required that rulers offer certain privileges or concessions in return.23 Through this process the concepts of citizenship, laws, and rights developed. Describing these concepts, Tilly wrote: Paul S. Cha 77

Citizenship designates a set of mutually enforceable claims relating categories of persons to agents of governments. Like relations between spouses, between co-authors, between workers and employers, citizenship has the charter of a contract: variable in range, never completely specifiable, always depending on unstated assumptions about context, modified by practice, constrained by collective memory, yet ineluctably involving rights and obligations sufficiently defined that either party is likely to express indignation and take corrective action when the other fails to meet expectations built into the relationship.24

State and society represent competing interests. Citizenship, laws, and rights all imply contest and struggle. Thus, the view of missionaries and the U.S. legation as acting in unison must be tempered. In fact, missionaries often commented that the greatest impediment to their efforts in Korea was notthe Chosŏn government but rather the U.S. legation.25 Missionaries were citizens who were bound to the U.S. legation through a series of mutually assumed obligations. On the one hand, this relationship was fundamentally unequal as missionaries were subordinate to government authorities. On the other hand, a discourse of rights and mutual obligations provided space for both missionaries and U.S. officials to make claims against the other.26 One missionary, stationed in China, described this relationship by stating: “we [missionaries] are citizens of our native lands. If we have rights and immunities, we also have duties and responsibilities. But our governments also have responsibilities and rights with regard to us. The relation is mutual.”27 This bond of mutual obligations between citizens and their respective governments had developed over an extended period of time in the West. In contrast, the appearance of missionaries, as well as other Americans, in Korea required that the grounds governing their interactions with the Chosŏn state be determined in a relatively compressed period of time. There was no “collective memory” shared between missionaries and the Chosŏn 78 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ government, and each carried a set of “unstated assumptions” concerning what should be the basis of their relationship. These conflicting assumptions led to clashes. Most missionaries recognized that the Chosŏn state was a sovereign country with its own particular laws and customs.28 In fact, they often attributed their success in the country to their “careful” approach of not contravening the laws of the land or interfering in judicial proceedings on behalf of converts. 29 Even while making these statements, however, missionaries carried certain assumptions concerning the proper relationship between a state and society. Although missionaries recognized that Chosŏn was a sovereign state with its own set of laws, they nevertheless believed in the existence of a set of mutual obligations between them and the Chosŏn government. In short, as I will outline in more detail below, missionaries believed that they were entitled to certain rights. This created a somewhat contradictory situation where missionaries declared support for the Chosŏn government and yet, at times, engaged in activities that undermined it.

Making Claims

Lydia Liu, a scholar who primarily focuses on China, has observed how both international law and the rhetoric of equality figured into the creation of unequal relations between the British and Qing empires during the nineteenth century. In short, the British fixated on what it perceived to be the Qing’s unequal treatment of British officials, merchants, and subjects. The British government drew on international law and the language of the equality of nations to justify multiple acts of aggression against the Qing state.30 In a similar fashion, missionaries in Korea drew on the concept of equality and fairness to advance their rights when levying certain claims on the Chosŏn government. For example, scholars have widely documented that the first newspaper printed in pure native Korean script, Tongnipsinmun (Dongnipsinmun; The Independent), started publication in Paul S. Cha 79

1896. Less known is that one year later Horace Underwood started to publish Kŭrisŭdosinmun(Keuriseudosinmun; The Christian News], which was also written in pure native Korean script. In 1898, Underwood approached the U.S. legation to assist him in negotiating a fair postal rate. The editors of Tongnipsinmun had apparently secured a special postal rate of 3 sen per pound. Underwood claimed that this was an unfair advantage and had approached the post office for the same rate. It refused, however. When he first made his request, the post office was not a part of the Universal Postal Union. 31 However, in 1898, the Great Han Empire became a signing member of the Postal Union. Seizing this opportunity, Underwood approached the U.S. legation and claimed that Postal Union regulations required the post office offer him the same rate given Tongnipsinmun. 32 Korean postal officials, in the end, agreed to offer Underwood the same rate. In this instance, this conflict had little to do, at least on the surface, with religion. Underwood’s understanding of fair market principles, international law, and the rights he was entitled to claim from the Great Han Empire prompted this conflict. This episode brings to the fore an important dynamic between missionaries, the U.S. legation, and the Chosŏn government. Unequal treaties may have given missionaries access to the country, but they did not simply place missionaries in positions of dominance over the Korean officials. On his own, Underwood failed to secure his demand for being granted the same postal rates as the Tongnipsimun. Key in this dispute was the intervention of the U.S. legation. Only when he turned to the U.S. legation with the argument concerning the Great Han Empire’s entry into the Postal Union did Underwood achieve his objective. To view this conflict between Underwood and postal officials from a different perspective, the phrase unequal treaties and term extraterritoriality conjure images of powerful foreign nationals operating outside the jurisdictional control of the Chosŏn state. While not without merit, this emphasis on separation has led to a practice of overlooking how unequal treaties and extraterritoriality in fact informed the contest to define the rules of engagement between missionaries and the Chosŏn 80 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ government. To begin with, extraterritoriality placed the U.S. legation in a position to act as a third-party adjudicator mediating disputes between missionaries and Chosŏn officials. Shedding light on the significance of this situation is R. Bin Wong’s observations on state-society relations in the Western context. He notes that one assumption that undergirds disputes that arise between a state and society is a belief in the existence of a neutral and objective third-party observer who is able to judge the relative merits of each side’s claims. In most instances, this observer is either imaginary or weak.33 In the case of late nineteenth century Chosŏn Korea, though missionaries were foreign nationals who enjoyed extraterritoriality rights, from a structural perspective their interactions with the Chosŏn state functioned in terms of relations between a state and society. Furthermore, when missionaries and the Chosŏn government laid claims against each other, the U.S. legation occupied the position of Wong’s third-party observer. In this manner, rather than simply separation, extraterritoriality played a role in allowing the U.S. legation to influence how its citizens should be received in the country. Instead of being a weak or invisible observer, the U.S. legation occupied a position of relative strength. For example, the U.S.-Chosŏn treaty agreement included a clause that made the Chosŏn government responsible for the safety of American citizens in the country. Missionaries, or more specifically the U.S. legation, often lodged complaints concerning the lack of safety and the problem of theft. In one case, in 1888, rumors started to circulate that missionaries were collecting babies in order to eat their flesh and drink their blood for various profane rituals. In attempting to quell the anti-Christian fervor of the “Baby Riots,” the U.S. legation in Seoul sent a memorandum to King Kojong requesting that he issue a proclamation concerning the fallacy of these rumors. Before posting his proclamation, the Chosŏn court sent a draft to the U.S. legation. The legation responded:

We have perused the draft and cannot approve of it as it seems to fail in removing unjust suspicions from men's minds. We have, Paul S. Cha 81

therefore, consulted together and prepared the draft proclamation which we now enclose for Your Excellency's perusal, in the hope that Your Excellency will substitute it for that submitted to us, and cause it to be issued without delay and extensively posted.34

Relatively speaking, the original request to the court was benign. The U.S. legation simply requested that the Chosŏn government issue a declaration that would ensure the safety of foreigners, in general, and missionaries, in particular. What was shocking was the legation’s rejection of the court’s first proclamation and decision to submit their own. Moreover, uncertain of the Chosŏn government’s resolve to stem the anti-Christian riots, the U.S. sent military forces to Seoul to ensure peace. As the resolution to this situation reveals, power was implicit in the relationship between the U.S. legation and the Chosŏn government.35 The U.S. legation was able to “get things done” because it could apply force. The importance of this power, however, extended beyond simply being able to secure particular material gains. This power allowed the U.S. legation to be an effective third party mediator between the Chosŏn state and missionaries when disputes arose between the two. Missionaries were subordinate to the U.S. legation. Likewise, the Chosŏn state needed to go through the U.S. legation when conflict arose with American citizens. While the U.S. legation may have leaned in favor of missionaries, missionaries still needed to justify the righteousness of their claims. Thus, when entering the political sphere, missionaries did not rely on abstract notions of religious freedom. Instead, they turned to laws and their legal rights as defined by the U.S.-Chosŏn treaty. Tying their claims to this document, missionaries advanced their vision of their rightful place in Chosŏn society. In a similar manner, the U.S. legation did not simply side with missionaries. The rhetoric of equality and rational law cut two ways. The U.S. legation applied these concepts to justify their demands that the Chosŏn government change policies. But Chosŏn officials could also use the same principles to demand action from the U.S. legation. One episode capturing this dynamic and process concerned a property 82 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ dispute involving Homer Hulbert. According to treaty law, Americans were permitted to purchase property in treaty ports and Seoul. The procedure was for the purchaser to submit the deed and receipt of purchase to the U.S. legation. The legation would then forward them to the Foreign Affairs Officefor inspection. If the foreign ministry found the sale satisfactory, the Foreign Office would affix its seal to the documents and return them to the U.S. legation, which would return them to the purchaser. In 1888, the Foreign Affairs Officewrote the U.S. legation requesting that it revoke a deed in possession of Hulbert. The Korean official explained that on further inspection it had been discovered that the seller of the property was not the actual owner. In response, Hugh Dinsmore, who was in charge of the legation, wrote:

I [Hugh Dinsmore] am sorry to be under the necessity of declining to comply with Your Excellency's request. Under the laws of my country I would not be authorized to do as you request. Moreover, as shown by the deeds in Mr. Hulbert's possession, bearing the seal of Your honorable and high office, it would mean that Mr. Hulbert has a good title to the property in question and that he should be placed in possession of it. That question should be fairly solid by a court of competent jurisdiction and the right of the question ascertained without prejudice to either of the parties. If Mr. Pyon has been unjustly defrauded of his house it should be restored to him and I would not wish to have one of our citizens to get property which rightfully belongs to another. But it should not be forgotten that our citizen has paid his money for a house to a Korean subject who claimed to be the owner, and that the Korean government acting through the Office of which you are at this time the honorable President, declared to the world by its seal that the house is the property of Mr. Hulbert.36

In this instance, the Foreign Office went through the U.S. legation because of extraterritoriality and requested that Hulbert’s deed be revoked Paul S. Cha 83 since the sale was fraudulent. However, the significance of extrate- rritoriality was not simply that Hulbert existed outside the jurisdictional control of the Chosŏn state. In fact, in practice Hulbert partially operated within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Chosŏn government. For example, in regards to the purchase of property, Hulbert abided by the procedures established by both the U.S. legation and the Chosŏn government. More important than whether Hulbert fell under the full and direct control of the Chosŏn state, however, was the manner in which extraterritoriality afforded the U.S. legation an opportunity to “teach” its counterpart how a civilized country with modern laws operated. To view this differently, James Hevia has demonstrated how the British deployed both soft and hard power in its attempt to teach the Qing government, and Chinese society at large, lessons on how to properly engage other nations on an equal and rational footing.37 Similarly, Dinsmore used this property dispute between Hulbert and the Chosŏn state as an opportunity to teach his Korean counterpart how a “modern and civilized” country, based on the rule of law, operated. At same time, Dinsmore did not simply dismiss the Chosŏn government’s request that the deed be revoke. Instead, he indicated that any fair resolution to this situation needed to accommodate both the Korean who had been defrauded of his property and Hulbert, who had followed the proper legal procedures. In other words, although Dinsmore may have been partial to having Hulbert retain ownership over the property and may have viewed the Chosŏn state scornfully for not diligently ensuring that the sale was legitimate, he was nevertheless bound by principles of equality and fairness to see the property returned to its rightful owner. In fact, Dinsmore interestingly called on the existence of an imaginary third-party observer, who would have supposedly ruled in favor of Hulbert’s right to the property in a court of law. Dinsmore’s creation of a mythical objective judge indicates that he felt a need to buttress his argument since this property clearly needed to be returned to its rightful owner. To recap, the existing literature has conventionally argued that 84 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ missionaries were Christians who were singularly focused on evange- lizing and thus turned to the U.S. legations to advance their religious interests. The problem with this position is two-fold. To begin with, missionaries were not simply Christians, but they were also citizens who held certain expectations concerning the proper duties to be performed by a state. Focusing on solely the missionaries’ religious orientation overlooks the fact that when they clashed with the Chosŏn government, they brought forth issues of how a rational state was to act. Their concerns extended beyond simply creating the most ideal conditions for the practice of Christianity to include the demand that the Chosŏn government act in a rational manner. Secondly, missionaries and the U.S. legation were two distinct bodies. The former had to convince the latter to intercede on their behalf. Missionaries based their claims against the Chosŏn government on the rights guaranteed by treaty laws. Through these confrontations not only were missionaries and their legation contesting for specific gains, but they were also contesting the grounds and principles on which their relationships would proceed with the Chosŏn state. Yet, the rhetoric of equality and rationality could always be manipulated by the Chosŏn government, which could cite legal statues and laws in order to apply pressure on the U.S. legation and missionaries. This situation often resulted in U.S. officials or missionaries creating strained interpretations of treaty laws or advancing awkward arguments to refute the claims of Chosŏn officials.

Missionary Residence in the Interior

P’yŏngyang Persecution

One of the first major conflicts between the Chosŏn government and missionaries was the P’yŏngyang Persecution (1894), which concerned the issue of residence in the interior. Since the missionaries ultimately emerged victoriously, scholars generally hold that at this point the power Paul S. Cha 85 of Christianity was proven in the eyes of Koreans. This fact, coupled with the carnage surrounding the Battle of P’yŏngyang, during the Sino- Japanese War, supposedly prompted many to flock to the church after 1896. Thus, the P’yŏngyang Persecution occupies a place of importance in the story of Christianity’s development in the peninsula.38 However, while religion was involved, issues deeper than religious freedom or the right to evangelize in the interior were being contested. To begin with, the early Protestant missionaries to Korea largely refrained from open evangelization or itinerating outside of treaty ports and Seoul. As noted above, this was in part because the political situation in the aftermath of the Kapsin Coup, which made open proselytization a potentially dangerous affair. But, through largely the work of John Ross and MacIntyre, Scottish missionaries working on the Manchurian side of the Yalu River, Korean Christian communities did form in areas north of the capital. From one of these communities, in 1886, a group of Koreans came to Seoul requesting that a missionary be sent to their hometown for the purpose of administering baptism. Because of the restrictions on Christianity, missionaries at first refrained from traveling north. In 1887, however, after several such requests, Horace Underwood made the decision to apply for a passport and to venture into the Korean interior. This journey north marked the start of a new missionary strategy that relied on working from base stations and travelling to the various Christian communities that would arise all over the peninsula. However, strategic factors, both economic and logistical, dictated that stations outside of Seoul or treaty ports needed to be established.39 Both Methodist and Presbyterian missionaries eventually settled on P’yŏngyang because of the city’s historical importance and proximity to the capital.40 By late 1893, Methodists and Presbyterians had set up shop in the city. At the time, the bans on proselytization and the purchase of property outside of treaty ports or Seoul were still in effect. In order to deal with the latter problem, the Methodist and Presbyterian missions purchased property held in the name of their Korean helpers. To the missionaries, it appeared as though in the initial stages the governor of the province and 86 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ missionaries were on amiable terms. For example, William Hall, who was a medical missionary with the Methodists, remarked that the provincial governor, Min Pyŏngsŏk, had originally been hostile to his presence. Yet, after viewing the diligence with which he treated his patients, Min supposedly had a change of heart, and appointed some guards to ensure Hall’s well-being. 41 Of course, Hall was probably wrong in his assessment. The posting of guards was more likely an attempt to prevent an international incident from the aggressive crowds that would sometimes gather around Hall when he ventured out or as a means to keep tabs on Hall’s movement. These explanations would seem more likely given that on 10 May 1894, the governor suddenly ordered the arrest of those Korean Christians assisting missionaries in the city. Shortly after being notified of the arrests, Hall dispatched a message to his superiors in Seoul, who then contacted the U.S. legation. Although Hall was working for the American Methodists, he was technically a Canadian, and hence a British subject. Thus, the British consul took point in demanding the release of the arrested Koreans. He was assisted by John Sills, who was in charge of the U.S. legation.42 Together they demanded that the Foreign Office ensure the release of the imprisoned Koreans and threatened that the British were willing to deploy troops to P’yŏngyang. The Foreign Office in turn ordered Min to released the prisoners, but he at first refused, as he seemed adamant to exercise his power to have them punished for having allowed missionaries to reside illegally in the city. Indeed, rather than being immediately released, the imprisoned Koreans were sentenced to death. While the Foreign Office was able to eventually secure the temporary release of the imprisoned Koreans, the issues of missionary residence outside of the treaty ports, the legality of evangelism, and the ultimate fate of these Koreans who had been arrested remained unresolved. Scholars typically view the events surrounding this incident in terms of an abuse of treaty rights for the sake of religious freedom and suggest that missionaries attempted to extend extraterritoriality to cover their Korean helpers. 43 A closer examination of the actual arguments advanced by Paul S. Cha 87 missionaries and their relationships with their foreign legations challenges this interpretation, however. To begin with, while it is apparently true that many converts would later erroneously believe that Korean Christians enjoyed extraterritoriality rights, Protestant missionaries proactively attempted to disabuse them of this belief and upheld the importance of adhering to established laws. Along these lines, missionaries did not attempt to extend extraterritoriality to their converts as a part of the P’yŏngyang Persecution. As noted, while the British and U.S. legations were able to avert the execution of these arrested Koreans and secure their temporary release, the fundamental issues concerning residence in the city, proselytization, and these Koreans’ ultimate fate were undetermined. In fact, both the British and American legations initially appeared to hesitate in demanding the release of these Koreans. Missionaries responded by claiming that treaty regulations had been followed and no laws had been broken. For example, Samuel A. Moffett, who was in charge of the Presbyterian interests in the city, crafted a carefully worded explanation to Sills concerning the situation. Moffett maintained that though missionaries had provided the funds for the purchase, at no time did they claim ownership and that the proper procedures had been followed, by a Korean, for the transaction. Moffett further stated that he only stayed at the property as if it was an “inn” during his itineration trips. In short, he stressed that missionaries had a right to travel in the interior with a valid passport and that the letter of the law had been observed in regards to the purchase of the property.44 Since no law had been broken, Moffett and the other missionaries held that the arrest of the Korean Christians was unjust.45 To further convince their legations to intervene on behalf of the imprisoned Korean Christians, missionaries broached the issue of their right to employ workers.46 According to treaty laws, U.S. citizens were permitted to employ Koreans, and certain treaty clauses restricted how local officials could arrest or try Koreans employed by missionaries. For example, local officials could not arrest Korean workers who were on missionary property without the permission of the owner. The logic of 88 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ these types of clauses, on the part of Western nations, was that without such provisions local officials might attempt to apply pressure indirectly on foreigners through the arrest of their native employees. Missionaries attempted to manipulate these treaty provisions to secure the release of their imprisoned employees by suggesting that their arrest had been the result of these Koreans associations with Westerners. Writing of the missionaries’ position on the issue, Moffett reported:

On the subject of Christianity it is evident from the position of the legations as to our having no treaty right to preach the Gospel (Mr. Gardienr [sic. Gardner] so stated in letter to Dr. Hall) that we can look for no protection for the native Christians. Leaving them to the care of Him who cares for us all we will confine ourselves just now to seeking protection for our employees and the preservation of our right to employ them. . . You will find us ready to obey all laws and treaty provisions in every respect and ready to make reparations wherever and whenever we may contravene them but at the same time ask that all our rights be carefully guarded and that so far as possible all privileges granted to other nations be secured for us.47

Missionaries were willing to live according to the laws of the land and suffer the appropriate consequences when laws were transgressed. More specificially, they were willing to allow Korean Christians suffer the consequences of adhering to Christianity. However,missionaries aggressively petitioned to have their “rights” and “privileges” protected. In this case, this specifcally meant their right to employee Koreans. In short, they were not seeking protection for all the Korean Christians being targeted by P’yŏngyang officials, but rather they attempted to stretch interpretations of the right to employ Koreans to protect only a subset of those Koreans arrested in P’yŏngyang. Significantly, the missionaries’ arguments concerning their right to employ Koreans and their right to travel in P’yŏngyang were only partially effective. On the one hand, the British and U.S. legations Paul S. Cha 89 couched their arguments against the Foreign Office in terms of the right of missionaries to employ Korean Christians. On the other hand, neither British nor American officials were willing to argue that the missionaries possessed a right to reside in P’yŏngyang. Lacking the support of their legations, the missionaries resigned to give up their foothold in the city.48 The situation, however, suddenly changed with the outbreak of the Tonghak Uprising of 1894 and Sino-Japanese War. According to assessment of one missionary, the Chosŏn government, needing international support, decided to punish those officials responsible for the arrest and to force Min to pay an indemnity.49 Furthermore, after the Sino- Japanese War, missionaries silently returned to P’yŏngyang. The P’yŏngyang Persecution’s significance extends beyond simply proving the power of Christianity in the eyes of Koreans as the existing scholarship has conventionally emphasized. To begin with, rather than being guaranteed consular support, missionaries needed to convince their legations to intervene on their behalf. The argument that they were only staying at their purchased property as if they were staying at an inn was a feeble one, and neither the British nor American legation would allow missionaries to use this line of reasoning to remain in P’yŏngyang. Secondly, the missionaries’ turn to the argument that these Korean Christians fell under the protection of treaty law, because of their status as employees, signaled weakness and not strength. Moffett and other missionaries realized that their claims against the Chosŏn government and arguments in regards to their right to occupy P’yŏngyang were flawed. Their turn to emphasizing their right to employ Koreans was a strained interpretation of treaty law. The missionaries ultimate victory and return to the city was a result of the disruption caused by the Sino-Japanese War and was not an indication of the missionaries’ power.

The Taegu Incident (1900)

The P’yŏngyang Persecution failed to settle conclusively the question of missionary residence in the interior. This issue would only become 90 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ more pressing as an increasing number of foreigners pushed into the interior of the peninsula after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Japanese merchants were particularly aggressive in setting up residences outside of treaty ports as they attempted to gain direct access to local producers of crops and other goods. 50 The penetration of missionaries and other foreigners into the interior stood in tension with another process: the attempts at state-making and the centralization of state power through the Kabo(Gabo) and Kwangmu(Gwangmu) reforms. Indeed, viewed more broadly, throughout the period from 1884 to 1900, government officials and reformers sought to institute a number changes as they strove to reposition the state and reform society in order to meet the challenges of operating in the world capitalist system. Importantly, scholars have demonstrated that the forced opening of Chosŏn Korea at the hands of the Japanese in 1876 did not spark this reform movement as a growing inefficacy of the Chosŏn state to respond to issues of governance had prompted many scholar-officials to seek means of reinvigorating the state as early as the late-eighteenth century. 51 Nevertheless, after the forced opening of the peninsula, the question of how to assimilate Western technology and state-craft became a pressing one. It was also a controversial issue as competing platforms led to such bloody outcomes like the Kapsin Coup and political incidents like Kojong’s flight to the Russian legation in 1897. In short, the period 1884 to 1900 was one of great flux in Chosŏn Korea and witnessed tremendous changes to the central state. In fact, the Chosŏn state officially ended with the establishment of the Great Han Empire in 1897. Representing a declaration of equality of King Kojong with the Qing emperor, the Great Han Empire sought to reassert the strength of the monarchy by centralizing power in the hands of EmperorKojong. Against this backdrop, the number of conflicts between missionaries and local officials concerning the purchase of property outside of treaty ports multiplied after 1894. Of these complaints, the situation in Taegu was the most significant because Horace Allen—who was in charge of the U.S. legation at the time—decided to make the events in this city the basis Paul S. Cha 91 of his protest for all other similar conflicts in the Great Han Empire. The events of this incident are as follows. The Northern Presbyterian missionaries of the United States had established a base station in Taegu, in 1897. Following the practice established in P’yŏngyang, in early 1900 they purchased a piece of property in the name of a Korean helper. Later that year, Kim Yongho—the governor of North Kyŏngsang(Gyeongsang) province and also acting magistrate of Taegu—sent a complaint to his superiors in Seoul concerning this purchase as he accused the missionaries of building a church.52 In turn, the Foreign Affairs Office lodged a complaint with the U.S. legation. Allen responded that the building was not a church and, pointing out that the land in question had been purchased in the name of a Korean, he maintained that treaty law had been properly observed.53 This was not, however, the end of the conflict. In November of 1900, police officers appeared at the residence of James E. Adams, who was in charge of the Presbyterian mission station in the city. Without permission they entered and arrested his Korean assistant, Kim Taegyŏng. Prompting this arrest was a dispute with a local tile maker. In the fall of that year, Kim had made a contract to purchase roof tiles on behalf of the missionaries. Missionaries started to apply pressure on the tile-maker when, they would later claim, he refused to honor the contract. In response, the tile-maker complained to local officials, who apparently believed that these tiles were intended for the construction of a church. After the arrest of Kim, the missionaries went to the jail and successfully secured his release after presenting a contract for the tiles and arguing that in fact they were the aggrieved party. Kim’s freedom, however, was short-lived as he was arrested again in December. This time he was also severely beaten. The missionaries sought a meeting with the governor, Hong P’ilchu, but Hong refused to grant them an audience or allow them to sit in on Kim’s trial. Eventually, Hong ruled in the favor of the missionaries and forced the tile maker to refund about half of the money he had received as a deposit for the tiles. But, as for Kim, the governor found him guilty of having “aided foreigners” and ruled that the beating he had suffered in prison was justified.54 92 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~

Allen used the events in Taegu to make the case for the missionaries’ right to reside in the interior. In general, he advanced a two-pronged argument: the inherent “reasonableness” of the purchase of property through a Korean proxy and the violation of treaty law by the local governor. In terms of the former, he revived the line of reasoning missionaries had first advanced during the P’yŏngyang Persecution. He first noted that American citizens had the right to travel in the interior with valid passports. He reasoned that that on these trips, travelers would, at least occasionally, have to reside at an inn. He then pointed out that as Westerners, Americans possessed certain dietary and sanitary needs. Thus, he concluded that there was nothing odd or inherently illegal about missionaries requesting a Korean to secure a place “suitable” for their needs. Furthermore, Allen also pointed out that there were other nationals, in particular Japanese, in Taegu who had in fact blatantly purchased property in their own names. Consequently, he viewed the singling out of missionaries to be arbitary, unreasonable, and unfair. He insisted that if amendments were not made, then he would have to bring this unequaltreatment of Americans to the attention of the U.S. State Department.55 In regards to treaty violations, Allen zeroed in on the arrest of Kim on the premises of Adams. First, according to section nine of article three of the U.S.-Chosŏn treaty, Korean officials were not permitted to enter any domicile and make an arrest where an American citizen was residing without either receiving consular permission or the permission of the American citizen. In the case in Taegu, this procedure was not followed. Secondly, he pointed to section eight of article three of the same treaty. He claimed that according to this stipulation the missionaries should have been permitted to observe the trial. Finally, and most importantly, he pointed to section one of article nine of the treaty, which permitted American citizens to employ Koreans. In this instance, the governor convicted Kim on the charge of assisting missionaries in their contracting of the clay tiles.56 Allen maintained that the governor’s judgment was in blatant violation of the provisions set out in the treaty. Paul S. Cha 93

Ultimately, the Great Han Empire was unable to defend its right to punish those Koreans who acted as proxy owners for missionary property or to stem the influx of missionaries into the interior. These failures, however, should not lead us to conclude that the Korean state was utterly weak or unable to mount a strong offensive in defense of its own position. Stated differently, focusing on the missionaries’ success in wresting the right to the interior distracts attention from changes in the manners in which the central government engaged the U.S. legation and missionaries. Indeed, it should be noted that the Taegu Incident took place in the context of multiple complaints issued by the local officials concerning the illegal residence of missionaries in the interior and that Allen found himself under great strain from dealing with these complaints. For example, Samuel Moffett, who was in charge of the Presbyterian’s interests around P’yŏngyang, wrote Allen in 1901 requesting assistance in dealing with the anti-missionary activities of local officials. In response, Allen remarked that difficulties in handling similar disputes throughout the peninsula prevented him from aiding Moffett.57 Evidently, the great number of complaints forwarded by missionaries to Allen prevented him from directly intervening in every single case. Thus, Allen’s decision to focus on the events in Taegu takes on special significance. What distinguished Taegu from other cases were the arrest of Kim Taegyŏng on Adams’ property and Hong P’ilchu’s conviction of Kim on the charge of aiding foreigners. These two acts were clear violations of treaty law and offered Allen the best chance of winning his argument. Stated simply, the issue of residency in the interior and the arrest of Kim involved two distinct matters. But, Allen combined these two issues because he realized that his argument in regards to residence in the interior was weak. In order to understand the difficulty Allen faced in advancing his argument, the state-making efforts of the Korean state must be considered. To begin with, state-making encompasses more than merely overhauling the formal structures of government. As Patricia Thornton has demonstrated in regards to China, state-making also includes increasing the central government’s right to control and expand the boundary 94 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ between state and society. Historically, in the case of China since the eighteenth century this has been achieved through a disciplining of local officials, who are the physical representation of the state at the local level and thus represent the edges of the central government.58 By defining what types of activities local officials were permitted to engage in, the central government was defining its relationship with society. Controlling local officials entailed a necessity to teach them what was legal and the proper procedures to be followed. One goal was to ensure a uniformity of practice and action. In the case of Korea during the late-1890s, controlling local officials and creating a uniformed system of governance from the center to various localities was no small task. As scholars have noted, although the Kabo reformers only remained in power for a few short months, within that span of time they had passed around 200 edicts. Moreover, many of these were revoked or revised by the Kwangmu reforms, and thus this period was one of flux. Indeed, two different governors oversaw the events in Taegu cited above. This changing of local officials was not an anomaly at the time. A quick perusal of the Official gazette [Kwanbo] or newspapers such as The Independent reveals that officials were appointed, dismissed, or reassigned with frequent regularity during the second half of the 1890s. It was under these conditions that the central government needed to inform and train local officials of the nature and extent of their responsibilities. Because, ultimately, the Japanese established first a protectorate over Korea, in 1905, and then colonized the country, in 1910, there has been a tendency to view the Kabo and Kwangmu reforms in terms of failure. More recent scholarship, however, has suggested a need to revaluate this stance. For example, Yumi Moon has recently demonstrated that the Ilchinhoe was a populist organization that formed during the second half of the 1890s with the aim of limiting the growth of state power.59 Her study indicates that the power of the central government had increased enough to provoke local elites to mobilize to protect regional interests. Similarly, the events surrounding the Taegu Incident suggest that perhaps Paul S. Cha 95 the central government was somewhat effective in instituting reforms and centralizing power. To begin with, although sharing certain similarities with the events in P’yŏngyang, the post-1894 complaints of local officials of missionary residence possessed an important difference. Simply put, officials like Kim Yongho were careful in couching their complaints in terms of treaty regulations. In fact, after 1896, official complaints concerning illegal residence shared much in common as they were largely similar in form and content. First, they referred to an edict to prevent the illicit sale of property. Secondly, they cited treaty law that allowed foreigners to reside in a ten li zone from treaty ports.60 Thirdly, they noted that foreigners were living outside the ten li zone. Finally, these reports stated that the officials were attempting to enforce compliance with treaty laws, albeit with little success.61 The increase in the number of reports indicates that the central government had identified stemming illegal residence in the interior as a point of emphasis and the uniformity of reporting indicates that the state was successful in training local officials. Viewed from the perspective of international relations, state-making efforts appear to have been a failure since Japan in the end colonized the peninsula. However, viewed from the perspective of restructuring the bureaucracy, controlling local officials, and creating a uniform structure of law across the peninsula, the efforts at state-making appear to have been more effective than has been previously discussed. These officials were well-informed of their “rights” and couched their arguments using the language of treaty of law as they sought to assert their “claims” to regulate missionaries. This expansion of power of the Great Han Empire and growing efficacy with which officials cited legal statues are indicated by Allen’s difficulty in refuting the argument that missionaries were violating the principle of residence in the interior at the turn of the century.

Conclusions

Because the first decade of the twentieth century ultimately ended with 96 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~ the colonization of Great Han Empire, there has been a tendency to cast the efforts of Korean reformers in terms of failure or weakness. In step with this practice, many scholars often cite unequal treaties and extraterritoriality as having created a situation that doomed the Chosŏn state to its fate. The danger in this line of reasoning is to assume a teleological narrative of what was inevitableto come. In addition, the discourse of failure has prevented scholars from considering manners in which the central government was able to effectively reformulate state- society relations and increase its ability to govern. This article has argued that though the imposition of unequal treaties greatly limited how the central state could respond to foreign nations, they did not define the Chosŏn state’s relationship with other powers. The contours of these relationships took shape through successive clashes involving the interpretation of the meaning of treaty laws and contesting what constituted rational or fair governance. Stated differently, more so than the simple act of contracting an unequal treaty, the application of treaty law and the attendant contesting of when and how it was appropriate to apply them transformed unequal treaties into a system that was truly unequal. To demonstrate this process, this article has focused on the contest between missionaries, the U.S. legation, and Chosŏn officials as they each attempted to advance their own vision of the proper relationship between the three. While missionaries recognized that the laws and customs of Chosŏn were different than in the West, they believed that they had a right to be treated on a rational basis. Through their successive conflicts with the Chosŏn government, American missionaries and the U.S. legation were, in effect, attempting to instruct Koreans how a rational government should act. At the same time, however, I point out that the Chosŏn state required lessons not necessarily because it failed to comprehend Western diplomacy, but because it challengedWestern interpretations and assumptions. Paul S. Cha 97

Notes :

1 Dong Wang, China’s Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 1-4, 9-11. 2 One difficultly in dealing with late nineteenth century Korea were the tremendous changes occurring to various social and political institutions at the time. For example, the mid-1890s Kabo Reforms led to a flurry of changes aimed at overhauling the Chosŏn bureaucracy. Many of these reforms were overturned or altered by the subsequent Kwangmu Reforms, which aimed to recentralize power in the hands of the monarchy. Representing this centralization of power was the establishment of the Great Han Empire, in 1897. In short, the political system of Korea underwent significant changes during the 1890s. In this article, although I have attempted to differentiate between the Chosŏn state and the Great Han Empire, at certain points “Chosŏn” or “Korea” have been used as more general terms. 3 Dae Young Ryu, “Understanding Early American Missionaries in Korea (1884-1910): Capitalist Middle-Class Values and the Weber Thesis,” Archives de sciences sociales des religions 46e Année, no. 113 (Jan-Mar., 2001), 373-4. 4 Min Kyŏngbae, Han’gukkidokkyohoesa (A history of Christian churches in Korea) (Seoul: Taehankidokkyosŏhoe, 1972). Echoing this line of reasoning was Yi Manyŏl. However, Yi emphasized that missionary policy came to emphasize the issue of separation of church and state because of the political turmoil of the 1890s in Chosŏn Korea. In short, he argued that missionaries feared that their involvement in political affairs might spark anti-Christian activities and have a negative impact on their movement. See Yi Mayŏl, “HanmalKidokkyoinŭiminjokŭisikhyŏngsŏngkwajŏng” (Process of the development of the national consciousness of Christians during the Hanmal period), Han’guksaron1 (1973), 335-405. 5 Dae Young Ryu, “Treaties, Extraterritorial Rights, and American Protestant Missions in Late Joseon Korea,” Korea Journal 43, no. 1 (Spr. 2003): 174- 203. See also Dae Young Ryu [TaeyŏngRyu], KaehwagiChosŏnkwa Miguksŏn’gyosa[American missionaries and Chosŏn during the enlightenment period] (Seoul: Han’gukkidokkyoyŏksayŏn’guso, 2004). 6 Dae-Young Ryu, “The Origin and Characteristics of Evangelical Protesta- 98 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~

ntism in Korea at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” Church History 77, no. 2 (June 2008), 377.Ryu argues that missionaries were able to transplant their conservative brand of Christianity to Korea because of their power and their occupation of “positions of superiority.” 7 Han’gukKidokkyoyŏn’guso, ed., Han’gukKidokkyoŭiyŏksa I (A history of Korean Christianity) (Seoul: Kidokkyomunsa, 1989), 252. Hereafter Han’gu- kkidokkyoŭiyŏksawill be abbreviated as HKY. 8 Ryu, “Treaties, Extraterritorial Rights, and American Protestant Missions in Late Joseon Korea,” 179-83. 9 Kim Yunseong, “Protestant Missions as Cultural Imperialism in Early Modern Korea: Hegemony and its Discontents,” Korea Journal 39, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 205-234. 10 Dae Young Ryu, “Treaties, Extraterritorial Rights, and American Protestant Missions in Late Joseon Korea,” 202-3. Emphases added. 11 For a classic study on the tensions underlying the dual-identities of missionaries, see William R. Hutchinson, Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). For studies that specifically examine missionaries in Korea, see Elizabeth Underwood, Challenged Identities: North American Missionaries in Korea, 1884–1934 (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 2003); and Donald N. Clark, Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950 (Norwalk, CT: Eastbridge, 2003). For a study that examines why missionaries in Korea strove to secure religious freedom even though this required them to enter the political realm, see Jang Sukman, “Protestantism in the Name of Modern Civilization,” Korea Journal (Winter 1999): 187-204. 12 Michael McConnell, “Believers as Equal Citizens,” in Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 90-110. 13 Scholars have recently started the process of revising our understanding of the development of “separation of church and state” in the United States. For two important interpretations, see Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church and State (NY: New York University Press, 2002), and Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State: A Theologically Liberal, Anti-Catholic, and American Principal (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Paul S. Cha 99

14 The term paekchŏngrefers to the lowest social class of Chosŏn society. Included in this class were those who engaged in activities associated with death, such as butchers and tanners. For more on Moore’s work with the paekchŏng, see Martha Huntley, Caring, Growing, Changing: A History of Protestant Missions in Korea (NY: Friendship Press, 1984), 66-80. 15 Samuel Moore, Letter to Horace N. Allen, 14 August 1900, The Annual Report and Letters of the Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of the America, 1886-1947, copied and complied by Han’gukKidokkyoyŏksayŏn’guso. Hereafter this source will be abbreviated as ARFMPCUSA. 16 Yang Hongsŏk, “Kaehanggi (1876-1910) Han-Miŭikanŭich’ioepŏpkwŏnsary epunsŏk” (An analysis of extraterritoriality cases between the United States and Korea during the open ports period (1876-1910)), Tonghakyŏn’gu24 (Winter 2008), 83-113. 17 This issue of what sparked this turn in the 1890s towards imperialism in the United States remains open to debate. For studies that examine the importance of the need to release pent up socio-economic and cultural pressures in American society during the nineteenth century, see Richard Hofstadter,ed., The Paranoid Style in American Politics (NY: Knopf, 1965); Thomas J. McCormick, China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967); Walter LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). 18 For a classic interpretation of the United States’ imperialist interests in the Pacific and how U.S. interests intersected with those of Japan, see Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). For more recent accounts of U.S. interests in Korea and foreign policy making, seeJongsukChay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990); and Seung-young Kim, American Diplomacy and Strategy and Toward Korea and Northeast Asia (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 19 Yang, 96-7. 20 Samuel A. Moffett estimated that during the Pyŏngin Persecution (1866) the government killed nearly 20,000 Catholics. While this figure is much higher than what scholars currently estimate, it does indicate that Moffett, as well as 100 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~

other missionaries, were both aware of the history of anti-Christian persecutions and had a real fear that such a crackdown could occur again. Samuel Moffett, Letter to Ellinwood, 18 March 1890, ARFMPCUSA. 21 HKY, 185-6. 22 The first Protestant missionaries stationed in Chosŏn Korea largely refrained from open evangelism. They chose instead to engage in medical and educational work. 23 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 24 Charles Tilly, “A Primer on Citizenship,” Theory and Society 26:4 (Aug., 1997), 600. Emphases added. 25 Horace G. Underwood, Letter to Ellinwood, 26 May 1889, ARFMPCUSA. 26 Scholars of church-state relations have long noted that by the late nineteenth century, the state had successfully occupied a position of dominance vis-à-vis the church. See James E. Wood, Jr., “Christianity and the State,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 35:3 (Sept., 1967), 257-270 27 R. H. Graves, “The Missionary as a Citizen and as an Ambassador of God,” TheChinese Recorder (May 1901), 242. 28 One aspect of the Protestant missionary movement in Korea during the late nineteenth century was the missionaries’ insistence that they had maintained a strict policy of separation of church and state. They often commented, with a degree of pride, how they had taught their converts to submit to the legally constituted authorities, even if this meant having to endure “unfair” customs or practices. At first glance, this appears to be at odds with their forays into the political realm. However, I suggest that this apparent contradiction is explainable if we keep in mind that missionaries believed themselves to be “citizens” who could claim legal rights. 29 Arthur Brown, Report of a Visitation of the Korea Mission of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (NY: The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, 1902), 6. Also see Min, 22-3. 30 Lydia Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 31 The Universal Postal Union, formally the General Postal Union, was created in 1874 by the signing of the Treaty of Bern. The purpose of this organization and treaty was to create a standardize system of international post. 32 Ku Han’gukoegyomunsŏ[Diplomatic documents of the Late Chosŏn dynasty: Paul S. Cha 101

America, II] (hereafter KHOM), vol. 10, compiled and edited by KoryŏTaehakAseaMunjeYŏn’guso (Seoul: KoryŏdaeMinjokMunhwaYŏn’guso, 1991), 355-6, 367-8, 375-6. 33 R. Bin Won "Citizenship in Chinese History," in Michael P. Hanagan and Charles Tilly, eds., Recasting Citizenship (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999). 34 Quoted from Sung Deuk Oak, ed., Sources of Korean Christianity, 1832-1945 (Seoul: Institute for Korean Church History, 2004), 278. 35 Owen Denny argued that the source of these rumors were Yuan Shikai, who wasResident-General in Chosŏn at the time. Denny claimed that Yuan was upset that the U.S. Legation had refused to acquiesce to Yuan’s demand that it recognize Qing and Chosŏn’s traditional (subordinate) relationship. See Kirk Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910 (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 170-71. 36 KHOM, vol. 10, 353. 37 Hevia, op. cited. 38 HKY, 247-53 39 For a colorful account of some of the difficulties faced by missionaries during these trips, see Lilias Underwood, Fifteen Years Among the Top-knots (Boston: American Tract Society, 1904), 38-59. 40 Samuel Moffet, Letter to Ellinwood, 19 April 1892, ARFMPCUSA. Not all missionaries were eager to establish a base outside of Seoul. William Swallen disagreed with this attempt to secretly purchase property. He preferred to stay in the treaty ports and train native Koreans to evangelize in the interior. Despite personal misgivings, however, he accompanied Samuel Moffett and Graham Lee, Presbyterian missionaries charged with opening a station in P’yŏngyang, in their efforts to secure a house. See William Swallen, Letter to Ellinwood, 22 May 1893, ARFMPCUSA. 41 Rosetta Sherwood Hall, The Life of Rev. William James Hall, M.D.: Medical Missionary to the Slums of New York, Pioneer Missionary to Pyong Yang (NY: Press of Eaton and Mains, 1897), 254-255. 42 Hall was a Canadian and had signed on with the American Methodist mission board because of a desire to go to Chosŏn. At the time, the Canadian Methodist mission board lacked a presence in Korea. 43 Ryu, “Treaties, Extraterritorial Rights, and American Protestant Missions in Late Joseon Korea,” 193; and Yang, 101. 102 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~

44 Moffett did admit that on the point of evangelization, the missionaries had engaged in an illegal activity. However, he asserted that since no charges on these grounds had been brought levied, this was an inconsequential issue. Moffett, Letter to Sills, 25 May 1894, ARFMPCUSA. 45 Daniel Gifford, Letter to Ellinwood, 12 May 1894, ARFMPCUSA. 46 Gifford, Letter to Ellinwood, 13 August 1894, ARFMPCUSA. 47 Moffett, Moffett to Sills, 25 May 1894, ARFMPCUSA. Emphases added. 48 Gifford, Letter to Ellinwood, 17 May 1894, ARFMPCUSA. 49 Graham Lee, “General Report of the Pyeng Yang [P’yŏngyang] Station,” (1894), ARFMPCUSA. 50 For an examination on how Japanese merchants penetrated the interior of Korea and disrupted the Korean economy, see Ha Wŏnho. Han’gukkŭndaekyŏngjaesayŏn’gu(A study in modern Korean economic history) (Seoul: Sŏsinwŏn 1997). For more on extraterritoriality in regards to Japan, see ChŏngKusŏn, “Kaehanghu (1876-1894) Ilbonŭich’ioepŏbkwŏn haengsawaHan’gukŭitaeŭng” (Japan’s exercise of “extraterritorial rights” and Korea’s response during the open ports period)Han’gukkŭn-hyŏndaesayŏn’gu 39 (Winter 2006), 37-76 51 For a relatively recent account of the Kabo Reforms and this effort to reform the state, see Wang Hyŏnjong, Han’gukkŭndaekukkaŭihyŏngsŏngkwa Kabokaehyŏk(Formation of the modern Korean state and the Kabo reforms) (Seoul: YŏksaPip'yŏngsa, 2002). 52 Kaksatŭngnok15 (Collected records of each Chosŏn dynasty government office), (Seoul: Kuksap’yŏnch’anwiwŏnhoe, 1981- ), 615-6. 53 KHOM 11, 783-786. 54 KHOM 12, 56-64. 55 KHOM 11, 784; and KHOM 17, 57. 56 KHOM 11, 784. See also KHOM 17, 57. 57 Horace Allen, Letter to Moffett, 8 May 1901, ARBFMPCUSA. 58 Patricia M. Thornton, Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence, and State- Making in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007). 59 Yumi Moon, “The Populist Contest: The Ilchinhoe Movement and the Japanese Colonialization of Korea, 1896-1910,” (PhD. Diss., Harvard University, 2005). 60 One li is approximately one-third of a mile or one-half of a kilometer. Paul S. Cha 103

61 See, for example, Kaksatŭngnokvol. 25, 266-7, 282-3, 336-8. See also Kaksatŭngnokvol. 36, 2, 26, 33-4, 41-42, 47-8, 52-9, 62-6, 90.†

Submission Date: 2011.8.15. Completeion Date: 2011.11.23 Accepted: 2012. 1.20. 104 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~

Establishing the Rules of Engagement: American Protestant Missionaries, the U.S. Legation, and the Chosŏn State, 1884-1900

Paul S. Cha

This article revisits the issues of extraterritoriality and unequal treaties during the “open ports” period. These two concepts typically conjure images of coercion and of separation between the Chosŏn government and foreigners like missionaries. While not denying the existence of coercion, this article directs focus to how American Protestant missionaries, the U.S. legation, and the Chosŏn state engaged in a contest to define the terms of their relationships during the “open ports” period. To begin with, missionaries were unlike most other groups of foreigners coming to the country during the late nineteenth century. Unlike merchants and traders, missionaries aimed to settle down in Chosŏn Korea as many spent years if not decades in the country. They traversed the countryside, created complex networks of relations, and became integral parts of many local communities. Furthermore, missionaries specifically attempted to spread a religion that the Chosŏn government had banned since the start of the nineteenth century. For these reasons, missionaries often became embroiled in conflicts with local officials and these conflicts often involved unequal treaties and extraterritoriality. The conventional wisdom holds that missionaries, disgruntled over the lack of religious freedom, called on unequal treaties and extraterritoriality to have the U.S. legation intercede on their behalf to win from the Chosŏn state the right to proselytize. This interpretation, however, simplifies a complex relationship between American missionaries, the U.S. legation, and the Chosŏn state. First, Paul S. Cha 105 while they may have shared some common interests, missionaries and U.S. officials represented two distinct groups possessing two distinct sets of objectives. To convince the U.S. legation to intercede on their behalf, missionaries needed to base their claims on specific laws rather than abstract notions of religious freedom. Secondly, the significance of unequal treaties and extraterritoriality was that they allowed the U.S. legation to play a role in mediating disputes between missionaries and the Chosŏn government and “teaching” the latter how a “civilized” and “modern” government operated. In this manner, rather than simple separation, extraterritoriality and unequal treaties played an important role in determining the rules of engagement between foreigners like missionaries and the Chosŏn state. To demonstrate this process and dynamic, this article examines two disputes: the P’yŏngyang Persecution (1894) and the Taegu Incident (1900). Taken together, these two disputes played an important role in securing the “right” of missionaries to reside outside of treaty ports. The conventional interpretations of these two events has been that they proved the power of Christianity to the Korean populace and was one major reason why so many in the P’yŏngyang area converted after 1894. This article demonstrates, in contrast, that the significance of the P’yŏngyang Persecution and the Taegu Incident extends beyond the issue of demonstrating the power of Christianity. These contests between missionaries and the Korean state represented a struggle to define the grounds on which their relationships would proceed. As the term “contest” suggests, this article will demonstrate that missionaries and the U.S. legation were not as powerful nor the Chosŏn government as weak as is commonly believed.

Key-words: extraterritoriality, unequal treaties, American Protestant missionaries, Chosŏn government, P’yŏngyang Persecution, Taegu Incident, state-making, Kabo and Kwangmu Reforms 106 Establishing the Rules of Engagement: ~

<국문초록>

1884-1900년 미국 선교사, 미국 공사, 조선정부 사이의 활동수칙 설립에 대한 연구

Paul s. Cha (Samford University 조교수)

이 논문은 개항기 치외법권과 불평등조약관한 문제를 재고찰하는 것이다. 이 두 용 어는 조선정부와 선교사와 같은 외국인 사이의 강압과 분리의 이미지를 상기시킨다. 강압이 있었음을 부정하지 않지만, 이 논문은 개항기 미국 선교사, 미국 공사, 조선정 부가 그들의 관계를 규정하기 위해 어떻게 경합했는지를 보여주는 것에 초점을 둔다. 19세기 후반에 조선에 들어온 상인들, 무역업자들과 달리, 선교사들은 조선에 정착하 려고 했다. 이들은 지방 곳곳을 다니며 복잡한 관계망을 만들고 지방공동체의 일부로 완전히 편입되었다. 더욱이 선교사들은 조선정부에서 19세기 초부터 금지한 종교마 저 전파시키려했다. 이런 이유로 선교사들은 종종 지방관료와 충돌에 휘말리고 이런 마찰은 종종 불평등조약과 치외법권 문제와도 연루되었다. 일반적 견해는 종교적 자유의 부재에 대해 불평하는 선교사들은 치외법권과 불평 등조약을 통해 미국 공사가 조선정부로부터 선교할 수 있는 권리를 획득할 수 있도록 요구했다는 것이다. 하지만 이러한 해석은 미국 선교사, 미국 공사, 조선정부의 복잡 한 관계를 단순화 한 것이다. 첫째, 미국 선교사와 미국공사가 비슷한 이해관계를 가 지고 있었지만, 그들은 그들 각자 별개의 목적을 가지고 있는 두 집단이었다. 미국 공 사의 개입을 설득하기 위해 선교사는 애매한 종교적 자유에 대한 관념이 아닌 구체적 인 법률을 근거로 제시해야 했다. 치외법권과 불평등조약은 선교사와 조선정부의 갈 등을 미국 공사가 중재할 수 있는 중요한 근거가 되었다. 또한 조선정부에게 "문명화" 되고 "근대화"된 정부가 어떻게 운영되는지 가르쳐 주는 역할을 담당 할 수 있었다. 이런 방식으로 치외법권과 불평등조약은 선교사와 조선을 단순히 분리시키는 것이 아니라, 이 조선과 선교사과 같은 외국인 사이의 활동수칙을 정하는데 중요한 역할을 하였다. 이 역동적인 과정을 논증하기 위해 평양기독교 박해사건(1894)과 대구사건 (1900)을 다룰 것이다. 이 두 사건은 선교사들이 개항장 이외의 지역에 거주할 수 있 는 권리를 획득하는 것에 중요한 역할을 했다. 이 두 사건에 대한 기존의 해석은 조선 인들에게 기독교가 얼마나 영향력이 있었는지 보여주는 사건이며, 이로 하여 1984년 Paul S. Cha 107

이후 평양에서 많은 사람들이 개종하는 주된 이유라는 것이다. 이와 반대로, 이 논문 은 이 두 사건이 단순히 기독교의 영향력을 보여주는 것이 아님을 설명하는 것이다. 선교사들과 조선정부의 경합은 그들의 관계가 어떤 형식으로 가야하는지를 규정하기 위한 투쟁을 보여주는 것이다. 경합이라는 말이 제시하듯 이 논문은 선교사와 미국 공사가 그렇게 강한 권력은 가지고 있지 않았을 뿐더러 조선 정부가 흔히 생각하듯 약하지 않았다는 것을 증명할 것이다.

주제어: 치외법권, 불평등조약, 미국 개신교 선교사, 조선정부, 평양기독교 박해사건, 대구사건, 국가 만들기, 갑오개혁, 광무개혁