Demographic Transition in Turkey: Landing on to Civilization Once Upon a Time

NÜFUSBİLİM DERGİSİ / TURKISH JOURNAL OF POPULATION STUDIES 2015-2016 37-38: 79-99

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

TÜRKİYE’DE DEMOGRAFİK DÖNÜŞÜM: UYGARLIĞA VARIŞ BIR ZAMANLAR…

AYKUT TOROS*

SUMMARY

This is an article written originally for the opening panel of the 4th Turkish Conference on Demography. Having been asked to talk about the highlights of demography, and of Turkish demography in general, I prepared a speech including a short summary of my memories; a commentary on the phenomenon of Demographic Transition and its dynamics; a discussion the stages of the demographic transition in Turkey and elaboration on some popular concepts in demography. The article below touches upon many demographic issues and aims to promote discussion among Turkish demographers.

KEYWORDS: Demographic transition theory, Turkey, fertility, aging, population momentum

INTRODUCTION

Births high in February, low in November; conception high in May, low in February Considering the cyclical tempo of births, which become determined more and more by a function of human ethics rather than natural law; let me remind the

* Prof. Dr. Faculty of Political Science Girne American University Technopark Building TO203 Girne / TRNC [email protected] Received on/Makale gönderim tarihi: June 24, 2016/24 Haziran 2016 Accepted on/Makale kabul tarihi: February 27, 2017/27 Şubat 2017

79 80 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

readers that the Fourth Demographic Conference [November, 5, 2015] was held in November; a month when births are lowest; as opposed to February when the births are highest as the consequence of high rates of conception in May. Just as they say “April showers bring May flowers” to many couples expecting good news from the nature. Why did I make such an introduction? The answer to this question lies in the following questions. Is flourishing fertile life in May, a pure coincidence, or is it determined by biological abundance of physical products making life easier, (i.e. life opportunities –lop) as well as their impact on physiology of reproduction? In a similar fashion, is adapting to life conditions, rather than “letting the water flow in its own course” thus planning for the consequences of life a behavior of civilized values and norms? As Kiser (ref) once put it, planning is rather a general form of behavior, contagious, once done it has a strong tendency to spread over to other aspects of life transferring life into a more civilized form. Values and norms, vis-à-vis planning and civilization will be a cross cutting theme of this manuscript. How much of a civilized life is lived under the forces of determinism, where an individual does not have any say in it, and how much of it is lived under free will where the individuals can build their decisions on their own choices? The answer lies in the wise words of one world leader. J. Nehru (ref) said, “Life is like a game of cards, the hand that is dealt to you represents determinism, the way you play it is your free will”. Hence, for a planner in general and family planner in particular, the scope of the free will depends upon a) the availability of physical and social environment, and b) the knowledge of the tricks about the game (cards dealt). Only after receiving the cards s/he can make a decision. Demographic transition which is transition to decision based behavior, is embarking from turbulent situations of the pre-transition era, into a more civilized stable situation. The carriers of such flight are values, norms and ethical codes. “Human being” and “being human” are not the same thing. One is biology, the other is sociology, and together they become demography.

Formal and informal population policies are central forces for humanity An individual in a society lives a life circumscribed by a) what is materially supplied by nature, and revised by human touch, plus b) immaterial acquisitions surfaced and developed by human ethics. Thus material and immaterial aspects of culture jointly form the basis of social life. Any phenomenon which involves just two or more individuals is a population phenomenon, the study of which is called demography. Biology of heart and AYKUT TOROS 81

its failure is medicine, not demography, however how many people are having heart attacks is a population issue. Therefore any policy which touches to or affects two or more persons is a population policy. It is almost impossible to think of any policies which do not involve at least two persons. The importance of this population policy does not only stem from this fact, but stems from policies that affect its growth and distribution. Actually distribution is nothing but a dynamic function of differential growth of its components. Similarly “zero growth” is simply nothing but a point on the growth continuum. Within this understanding, it would not be a serious divergence to include factors which influence population size and distribution not directly but through intervening variables. Intervening variables show their effect only through differential distributions. Such an anatomical perspective leads to the conclusion that population policies acquire a central position in formulating, material and immaterial components of civilization.

Ansley’s Bicycle: Suddenly a man appeared on his bicycle At this point, which is the threshold for this paper in entering into the main topic, it would be appropriate to mention two great and humble men, and one is known for his preference of bicycle as a means of transportation, the other preferring city bus to go to work, while their colleagues consumed the opportunity to ride government limos. The first one is Ansley Coale of Princeton Office of Population Research, the other is Nusret Fişek of Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. At the same year of 1963, both were busy launching pioneering population projects, one European Fertility Project, the other 1963 Turkish Population Survey. Both of them were able to transform their institution into a Mecca of demographers, i.e. Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies at Home and Princeton Office of Population Research abroad. We were fortunate to have both of them in our First Turkish Demography Conference held on 21-24 February 1968 in Izmir. I feel genuinely privileged, for becoming a member of demographic profession in which I am surrounded by numerous scholars of exceptional high quality. I wish with all my heart that the scholars in other fields are as lucky as I am. Here I like to name, in recognition of all devoted demographers of the past, Norman Ryder’s promotion of Cohort, as an instrumental concept of understanding, social change, has a founding importance in demographic transition. This is being used extensively in cultural analysis of civilization and awaits further instrumentalization in in-depth analysis of understanding demographic transition. A challenge for the new generation. 82 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

TWO REVOLUTIONS, TWO TRANSITIONS

Structure, background and civil life It is frequently overlooked that, demographic transition of our times is not the first transition through which the population acquired a new structure. In its macro simplicity, one can argue that two major revolutions of human civilization led to a demographic transition. One is the Neolithic revolution, the other is the industrial revolution. Both are similar in reflecting a major demographic transition, but the difference is that vital rates have changed in the opposite direction.

Figure 1. Neolithic revolution Source: Coale, A. J. (1974).

NEOLITHIC REVOLUTION had demographic consequences whose net effect was a slight increase in the rate of population growth. One reconstruction of these events suggests that the death rate (black) increased as a result of greater susceptibility to disease in village life, and perhaps also because agriculture is vulnerable to climatic crises. If the death rate did increase, then it is certain that the birth rate (color) also rose, and by a slightly greater margin. Both vital rates must have fluctuated from year to year, the death rate somewhat more than the birth rate. Even after transition difference between the rates was small.

During the Neolithic revolution, the vital rates have shifted from low to high. Death rates increased because of the settlement of hunters and gatherers into villages (or towns) which increased the number of people within a close proximity to each other. This led to the increased susceptibility to contagious and/or infectious diseases. Birth rates increased because of longer average duration of life in fertile ages per person. Thus age structure changed dramatically, increasing the age pyramid vertically, but keeping the growth rates at zero or very near to zero. Compared to pre-Neolithic era, the world population must have increased, because, the “two square miles” which could support only one person in hunters and gatherers populations of pre-Neolithic era, could support more people using the farming technology of Neolithic era (Figure 1). AYKUT TOROS 83

Figure 2. Demographic transition

Source: American Association of Geographers (AAG) Center for Global Geography Education website.

http://cgge.aag.org/PopulationandNaturalResources1e/CF_PopNatRes_Jan10/CF_PopNatRes_ Jan10_print.html. Last accessed: 10.08.2016.

During the industrial revolution, vital rates have shifted from high to low1 (Figure 2). As is widely known, death rates have declined due to control of the factors leading to death (bad nutrition, bad sanitation, bad care etc.) as well as declining birth rates due to control of fecundity performance leading to lower levels of fertility. So the “second demographic transition”, about which I had the privilage of contemplating discussions with its major author, Ron Lestheage at Office of Population Research (OPR), is not a second major demographic transition process, but actually a third one! How much can the transition continue? The expectation of life increased from thirties to seventies during the demographic transition observed through the industrial revolution. It is doubled. Why should it not double in the future as well? Is it going to stay around 80 years forever? Certainly, there will be more transitions in the future. Why there is a change in behavior: Culture and civilization Culture involves knowledge and capacity to collect, produce and use things from the physical world as well as codifications of ethics created as norms and values of the social life that its members are living. Material and non-material components of a culture are very much related to its production, distribution and consumption functions (pdc model). These functions can be seen at three levels, being the survival level, civil level and pleasure level (scp model). Population structure in society is at the very heart of the “pdc functions” 84 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

crossed with “scp levels”. The relationship between the two models is run and revised through administrative (political) systems, economic systems and normative (articulation of values) systems. Ryder’s perception of a traditional family (instrument of education, avenue of employment channel of credit and social security) and Caldwell’s flow of wealth between generations (from young to old, or from old to young) sets an attractive stage for experimenting these concepts (Caldwell 1978; Caldwell 1982) (referans eklemek lazım).

DYNAMICS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION: SOME MISSED OBSERVATIONS

Civilized behavior Demographic transition is departing from one “pdc” system towards another for satisfaction at “scp” levels. What are the indicators surfacing from such deep changes? How much should that change be in order to be classified as a demographic transition process? During the industrial revolution, a decline of birth rates from 40 or above down to 20 or below and death rates from 30 or above 10 or below is considered satisfactory to meet the requirements to be classified as demographic transition. Frank Notestein (1953) was a pioneering scholar in realization of the demographic process as a transition from one structure into the other. Actually it was only after him, that the term “Demographic Transition” was coined, and frequently used together with “population explosion”. Global administrative concerns of the post war era (World War II) was instrumental in spreading population concerns globally. Soon people everywhere were talking about rapid population growth, some are for, but mostly against it. People who were against rapid population increase, were in favor of population control measures, and promoted control as articulation of a civilized behavior. A cognitive fight expressed itself through using different diction, one after the other; starting with contraception, then birth control, followed by population control, fertility regulation etc. This was a clear indication of an effort to comply respectfully with the morals of a society. Those who favored decline of the vital rates, were actually favoring the “increasing control” of the vital rates. Their social values appreciated and often applaused the norms directed towards “not to live in nature as an animal, but codify behaviors towards civilized life”. Such a normative aspect on the importance of the improvement of the behavioral control, overlooked by the cold facts of the end results. Although one is a reflection of the other, like a woman’s face on mirror, one should be more concerned by the object itself AYKUT TOROS 85

(i.e. her own face), rather than its reflection on the mirror. So the object here is the improvements in the control phenomena. Component parts of a phenomenon are front runners in the analysis Recognition of the “component parts” of a phenomenon is important in its analysis. Usually, the sum is analyzed but the parts are neglected. A well- known example is crude birth rates. The theory of demographic transition is built upon the crude rates. Crude rate is a function of age specific rates matched with distribution of population at each age. Not all ages have the same fecundity level. With the same age pattern of fecundity, populations with higher concentrations in high fecund ages are likely to have higher levels of fertility (under no fertility control), than populations with not so much concentration in high fecund ages. Demographic transition theory, by its nature, is concerned with fertility behavior. Changes in age distribution are not a primary concern to the theory. Fertility decline, (measured and graphed via Crude Birth Rate) because of unfavorable age distribution, means a drastically different thing than fertility decline based on age specific rates. So all the observed declines in crude birth rates do not mean the same thing. Normatively they are different in nature. The following formula explains what is meant here more clearly. Considering a female only population, the crude birth rate can be expressed as: Here f(a) is a fertility variable, however, C(a) is age structure variable. Demographic transition may be accelerated or decelerated by the age structure component of a population (as well as by the fertility component of a population). So far I have not come across to any study separating the effects of these components in analyzing the demographic transition process that they are dealing with. Similar argument holds true with the death rate. Figures mean much by themselves, but they mean more with their background Changes in vital rates observed through demographic transition could not be meaningful in its factorial solicitude. A new look is necessary. Figures themselves are important, but phenomenon itself is more important. Understanding a social phenomenon requires measurement at some level2. A measurement is of no use unless it is compared to something. A kilo does not mean much if there were no other gradation on the scale. A kilo means something if it is compared to a kilo and a half. A change in fertility behavior has to be measured with some kind of an index. A face value of such measurement is not very explanatory, if not taken into consideration with other measured units. Vital rates which gain meaning only after a change cannot be analyzed in its factorial solicitude, but only with reference to 86 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME factors having a direct or indirect effect upon the phenomena. Demographers challenge is to identify factors affecting vital rates and make valid, accurate and precise measurements. Study of demographic transition in various societies often deals with the rates themselves which leaves no or short time for including other factors into analysis. Often income and vital rates are associated, but chronological matchings are overlooked3. Fecundity vs. fertility differentiation Fertility control is actually articulation of the control of fecundity, so that the outcome of it is kept at the desired level. It is like turning on and off a lightbulb, by which one does not control the light, but controls the electricity. If the power is running, then the light is on, if it is cut then the light is off. Controlling fecundity by turning it on and off putting it into action or not, one achieves the desired level or not. Why is this important for a demographer? This is important because many of the customs, by which the members of the culture feeling ashamed or proud of, relate to the control of fecundity rather than the control of fertility. Customs relating to sexual attraction, capsulation and birth, all relate to fecundity and are generally the most known customs. The attitudes toward them, determines how the fecundity potential is being utilized by the individual. Behavior behind the demographic transition is mostly determined by fecundity related values and norms. Those who study fertility change have to keep this perspective in clear sight. Here we observe a flight from pre-transition conditions into post-transition situations. Factors of the flight are the primary concern for a “civilized” social life.

WHAT HAPPENED IN TURKEY

Observation and identification of such a flight in Turkey, like everywhere else, among other factors, is contingent upon how good and how much data we have. Turkish demographers usually confront to the negative assessment of this question. There are certain points that I believe deserves surfacing in the Fourth Demography Conference. Commenting on the weak and strong points of the historical or recent data considered in extracting the process of demographic transition, is definitely within the thematic scope of this conference4. Question of data In my opinion, a belief about lack of historical data in Turkey, is a fallacy. “Registration is an established state tradition among Turkish states”. Books of registration (Tahrir Defterleri) were not exceptions in neither historical AYKUT TOROS 87

nor geographic dimensions. Registration was not a sporadic undertaking, but a system instrumentalizing states responsibilities and services5. “Defter-i Köhne”, “Defter-i Atik”, “Defter-i Cedîd” (The meanings of these sources are “Very Old Books”, “Old Books” and “New Books” respectively) are examples of preference for systematizing the registration services and respectful attitude towards “demographic bookkeeping”. 1286 Military Eligibility Recordings, 1566-1570 General Registration and Land Survey (Selim II), 1608 Census are examples of early Ottoman efforts. Later 1829 Istanbul’s Local Population Registration was so satisfactory that it was enlarged to the National Census of 1831. Ottoman Sultans, like Selim II, Ahmet I, Mehmet II, Abdulmecid, Abdulhamid I, Abdulhamid II were all busy in carrying out registrations, censuses or collecting demographic data. I should also mention that early Ottoman “tahrirs” (notes) make extensive references to Seljuk “tahrirs” of similar heritage. Unfortunately today, they all are waiting to be discovered and identified. So it is very unlikely that we do not lack data. What we lack is funds to make a comprehensive and classified conglomeration of reachable resources; similar to what they did in 700 provinces of Europe in constructing the U.N. Model Life Tables. Historical data are here and need to be discovered by demographers, historians or historical demographers. I leave you with Sabahattin Alpat’s article presented at the first demographic conference, (First of the series of which this conference belongs to) to start your journey in perceiving historical data. This journey will take you (as is known today) through the four phases of data accumulation. The first phase is the Ottoman and pre-Ottoman period, the second one is early republican period, the third stage, is a threshold stage for demographic surveys which embraces four well known surveys4. The last stage (as of today) the era of quinquennial demographic surveys, supporting and complementing population censuses in Turkey. At this point, a special recognition goes to the State Planning Organization (to be the Ministry of Development later) and its undersecretary7, a faithful friend of demography, for the special efforts in developing a governmental system for channeling national funds and making it a permanent survey process, independent of international ties. Chronograph I will propose a new term, a new form of illustration that will serve as a background vision which might be found helpful in understanding the progress of a process over time dimension. I call this “a chronograph” where I group major events according to their topics or themes, call them a family of events, and present each according to their date of occurrence within a band 88 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

Table 1. Quinquennial national surveys: Turkish Treasures Phases of Demographic Surveys of Turkey Phase I: Funding from international donors with substantial contributions from international scholars.6 1968 Survey on Family Structure and Population Problems in Turkey (in collaboration with the Ford Foundation)

1973 Survey on Population Structure and Population Problems in Turkey (in collaboration with the UNFPA) 1978 Turkish Fertility Survey (in collaboration with the UNFPA) Phase II: Funding from international donors with some contributions from international scholars. 1983 Turkish Fertility, Contraceptive Prevalence and Family Health Status Survey (in collaboration with the Westinghouse Health Systems) 1988 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (in collaboration with USAID/US Centre for Disease Con- trol) 1993 Demographic and Health Survey (in collaboration with MOH-MCH/FP and USAID/DHS/Macro International Inc.) 1998 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (in collaboration with MOH-MCH/FP, USAID/DHS/Mac- ro International Inc. and UNFPA) Phase III: Funding from national sources donors with some contributions from international scholars. 2003 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (in collaboration with MoH) 2008 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (in collaboration with MoH, SPO and TÜBİTAK) 2013 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (in collaboration with T.R. Ministry of Development and TÜBİTAK) prepared for each family separately. Here I propose six family of bands each embracing recognized (thesaurus) events on which the demographic process rest upon. Of course not only the list of events, but also the bands themselves could be revised. As the current techniques move towards more intensive GPS or visual cognition, time-wise matching of the major events could be useful. The six family of bands I selected are as follows and presented in the Table 2. 1. Administrative developments 2. Development plans 3. Wars or major armed conflicts 4. Major economic crises 5. New laws and codifications 6. National economic ideologies Building blocks for drawing Demographic Transition graphs in Turkey: Past attempts There have been some attempts to draw the charts of the Turkish demographic transition process. Tremendous amount of effort is needed to locate, clean, adjust and to draw “the three crude curves”. In spite of the difficulties AYKUT TOROS 89

Table 2. The Chronograph of Turkish History during Demographic Transition

involved, many scholars were able to produce high quality work. I have selected three of such works which I believe are good representatives of similar works and cover the different time periods and whose authors did a careful work in using the data. The main purpose here is to use them as building blocks of generating a thematic picture of the phenomena, rather than putting them on a race track of completion.8 These charts are; a). The HUIPS Chart9; b). The Shorter-Macura Chart and c). The Toros Chart The HUIPS Chart mainly uses demographic survey data collected by HUIPS and census data, Shorter-Macura Chart uses mainly census based demographic estimates; and Toros Chart uses Census data, Coale-Demeny Model Life Tables and early demographic surveys data of HUIPS. 90 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

Figure 3. The HUIPS Chart

Source:Ergocmen, Hancıoglu and Unalan, 1995; Hancioglu, Ergocmen and Unalan, 2004; Koc et al., 2009

Figure 4. The Shorter-Macura Chart

Source: Shorter and Macura, 1982 AYKUT TOROS 91

Figure 5. The Toros Chart

Source: Toros, 1995.

The three works together construct the picture of the demographic process from the beginning of the twentieth century; extending to the first decade of the twenty first century is possible, and the results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Estimates10 of vital rates for the years ending with 0 or 5 Year CBR CDR NI 1900 53,0 34,0 19,0 1905 54,0 36,0 18,0 1910 53,0 33,0 20,0 1915 52,0 38,0 14,0 1920 50,0 40,0 10,0 1925 52,0 35,8 16,2 1930 53,0 35,0 18,0 1935 51,0 32,0 19,0 1940 45,6 31,4 14,2 1945 43,1 33,9 9,2 1950 45,9 27,0 18,9 1955 48,2 23,5 24,7 1960 46,8 19,8 27,0 1965 42,9 16,4 26,5 92 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

Year CBR CDR NI 1970 39,0 13,5 25,5 1975 34,5 11,6 22,9 1980 29,3 10,3 19,0 1985 30,6 9,0 21,6 1990 29,1 7,9 21,2 1995 22,6 6,9 15,7 2000 21,8 6,5 15,1 2005 17,9 6,4 13,811 2010 21,6 6,4 15,2 2015 21,4 6,4 15,0

Figure 6. The Demographic Transition in Turkey

Major observations on the essentials of Demographic Transition in Turkey The following five observations summarize the essentials of the Turkish Demographic Transition: AYKUT TOROS 93

• The first is the transition of the death rates that took about 80 years from around 1920s (after the completion of the Turkish Independence War) to the first decade of the twentieth century (around 2000). • The second is the transition of the birth rates which took about 60 years from around late forties (1947; i.e. after the Second World War) to the first decade of the twentieth century (2010) (liberal economic policies) • The third is the period when decline in death rates were faster than the decline in birth rates. • The fourth is the period when Crude Birth Rates declined from above 50 to 20 or below, which is about a decline of 30‰. • The fifth includes Crude Death Rates declining from around 35‰ to around 6‰, which is around 29‰, the absolute declines in both vital rates are very comparable. • The sixth is the period when the Crude Birth Rates are expected to decline more, as the intrinsic rates continue to be stable, but the age structure, will become more unfavorable for fertility (relatively fewer women entering into childbearing ages)12.

FURTHER CONCEPTS TO BE ELABORATED

Before I finish, I would like to dwell a little bit on some topics which need to be revised (or even need to be corrected) among those who work in the field of demography. No baby boom (simply re-gaining pre-crisis trend levels) The Turkish Demographic Transition has not witnessed “the baby boom effect” as many other societies did. Severe crisis conditions, like the Second World War, usually adversely affect the factors favoring fertility, which is followed by a strong jump after the crisis conditions end, which is followed by returning to pre-crisis levels. This phenomenon is based on the “postponement of childbearing”. Births avoided during crisis were made up for after the crisis. Resultingly, first cohorts shrink, then enlarge, creating a big wave through the course of cohort progression, and leads to a “tsunami” (social tsunami). Similar consequences are seen on education, employment, and infrastructure etc. Birth rates which declined to mid-forties during the war, increased to only pre-war levels, after the war. There was no extra compensation of the births averted during the war. Population momentum (stopping distance after putting on brakes) Understanding the transition process involves understanding of built in mechanisms one of which is the “momentum issue”. Completing the 94 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

demographic transition, usually brings in the discussion of consequences of long term zero growth and usually carried to consequences of population decline. For some people it is difficult to understand how a population at replacement level can continue to grow. The growth potential in a population rests in its age structure. The age structure creates a momentum of growth, like a momentum of a car travelling a certain distance until it stops after the brake is put on. During the process of demographic transition, replacement level is reached before the completion of the process where birth and death rates come to stable levels, at low rates. In the past, usually, there was a small surplus of births over deaths, indicating a small growth rate. In contemporary world the process usually reaches to levels where births and deaths are equal and sometimes even there are deficits of births over deaths. Contemporary civilization has to get used to the equalization process of the birth and death rates.

Aging, actually is not aging, but is a decrease in the child population. Demographic transition in Turkey, leads to aging of the population. In fact, “demographic transition” is usually associated with aging. The term is very successful in misleading public opinion. As it is used, it implies that people do not die, but keep on living for many years. This is true but only partly true. With what is called “population aging” the average age of the population does not increase as much by new additions of the members to the upper ages, as much as it does by subtractions of the members from the child ages. This is a change caused by changing age structure, created by limiting members to be added to young ages. So a population ages, not because of the increase in the number of people at upper ages, but because of the decrease in the number of people at young ages. Aging in Turkey seen after the demographic transition, is due to a similar process.

Demographic window of opportunity Advocates of population growth, especially people favoring high fertility, coined a term called “demographic window of opportunity”. They suggest looking at the process through this window. Looking outside this window; what you see is more often than not considered as reason for promoting high fertility. Governments adopt policies to increase fertility by decreasing the utilization of fecundity, through promoting measures hindering control of fecundity. The dynamics of demographic opportunity rests upon the dependency ratios. Dependency ratios (ratio of population at non-working ages to the population at working ages), which might be as high as 0.8 or even higher before the transition, reduce to around 0.4 after the transition. Such a change increases AYKUT TOROS 95 the potential for development. High fertility of the past, is brought to the view from the window, and considered as something which is good. Such a perspective, overlooks to the fact that favorable dependency ratios is a result of decline in the fertility in the recent years. If fertility followed its high rate of the past in the current years as well, then there would not be any change in the dependency ratios. It would continue to be unfavorable as it was in the past. What transforms dependency ratios into a favorable rate is the reduction in the current fertility levels. Once such a favorable structure is achieved, governments must be careful in not eradicating such a situation by increasing current fertility. Increasing fertility spoils up the potentials for investment. The advantages of favorable dependency rates are created by the decrease in the dependent population. In order to sustain the demographic opportunity in Turkey, pre transition dependency rates of around 0.8 should not be restored. Post-transition dependency ratio of around 0.4 should be preserved. Changing the fertility structure and putting it into an increasing track, again, will shorten and spoil the expected demographic opportunity for Turkey. Calculations show that with the current trends the dependency ratio will stabilize around 50% (25% child + 25% elderly) by the year 2040. Suggested threshold dates for different phases The time of the onset of the transition process is an attractive subject of debate. This is true among demographers as well as among other social scientists when it comes to social change. Measurements can be made using high technical and advanced methodologies. The fundamental factor is “behaviors do not change overnight”, and consequently “demographic transition does not occur overnight” This is a process where the members of a society gradually adopt behavior, one after another, where exceptional behavior first become a minority behavior, then minority behavior develops into a majority behavior, and possibly, majority behavior (may) become a universal norm. One important contributor to this debate is the level of homogeneity within the society. Usually all the geographic regions within a country are not at the same level of development. Statistical contributions of the different regions to the national average are not similar. Therefore one region may be at an advanced stage of the process whereas the other may not have started the process yet. National averages in this case, are more mind blurring, then perception purifying. I have thought about demography in Turkey, at times, when Kandıra region had vital rates similar to African countries, whereas Bilecik province (only few kilometers away) had rates resembling Paris and her vicinity.13 More often than not, heterogeneity leads to a famous saying “adding apples and pears together” and does not really show social development. 96 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

Invisibility of normative violations Societies employ various customs to deal with population related problems through adjusting deaths to reach desired demographic situations. The most common known practice is infanticide. Killing babies at infancy is not the only practice. Some tribes in hunting and gathering stage, ask their elderly to hold on a tree branch and shake the tree from below. Those who are strong enough to hold themselves upon the tree, are permitted to live until next year’s ceremony. Those who fall are gone! There is “senilicide”, killing elderly, “invalidicide” killing disabled, probably one can think of many other “cide”s. Today, in many parts of the world such values have changed, but it is difficult to say they are completely eliminated. Priorities might have changed. It is quite common that such behavior becomes less salient, more hidden or more subconscious. Direct killing may not be widespread, but neglect, or “preferential neglect” may not be rare either. Certainly there is an issue which could be named “visibility of normative violations”. Understanding the validity of the process lies in understanding the validity of natural law vis-à-vis ethical codes and the question of visibility. Spiral development of numbers and norms The demographic process is central in the following circular development phases: Type of society, culture, civilization, social behavior, demographic change, social behavior, civilization, culture, type of society. Such development becomes more understandable if the systems are defined by describing organs of the system, the links between the organs and the issue flowing through these channels. The eight phases of this development are named as follows: 1. The society determines the culture 2. Culture defines civilization 3. Civilization prescribes social behavior 4. Social behavior defines demographic changes 5. Demographic changes determine social behavior 6. Behavior defines civilization 7. Civilization determines culture 8. Culture defines type of society The process works through intrinsic values and measured as intrinsic rates. Often, intrinsic rates are obscured from observation through the contamination of crude rates.

THE FINAL WORD

The effects of civilization, works on vital rates through values, norms and ethical codes. For instance, socially acceptable environments for reproduction are AYKUT TOROS 97

determined by values and norms. More often than not, indices which would stand for procreation are not evaluated through their normative connotations. Reduction of I(f) from 0.51 (Shorter) to 0.44 (Toros) show how much the society is transformed with respect to civilization. Pre-transition turbulences, calming down and stabilizing at post-transition stages, indicate how behaviors affecting the vital rates are carriers of society into advanced structures of civilizations.

NOTES

1. Frank Notestein explains demographic transition by a four stage model; Stage 1: Pre-transition; Characterized by high birth rates, and high fluctuating death rates. Population growth was kept low by Malthusian “preventative” (late age at marriage) and “positive” (famine, war, pestilence) checks. Stage 2: Early transition; During the early stages of the transition, the death rate begins to fall. As birth rates remain high, the population starts to grow rapidly. Stage 3: Late transition; Birth rates start to decline. The rate of population growth decelerates Stage 4: Post- transition; Post-transitional societies are characterized by low birth and low death rates. Population growth is negligible, or even enters a decline. 2. Nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio i.e. indicating a difference (or no difference) between the units of observation. 3. Tracing of economic breaking points through the transition process is most likely to shed light on the process: Following is a list of major economic crises observed in Turkey: 1929 World Economic Crisis, 1948 Failure to return to non-war production patterns, 1954 Korean War Invited foreign capital leading to budget deficits, 1958 (Turkish) Anxiety caused by non- repayable foreign debts and declaration of moratorium, 1969 High inflation steered by high imports, 1974 Oil Crisis, 1978 Import and consumption increase led by reduction of interest rates, 1986 Unprecedented budget deficits, 1994 Unprecedented increase of interest rates up to 400%, 2000 Rapid increase in overvaluation of Turkish Lira, 2001 Bankruptcy of commercial banks, 2008 Global economic crisis initiated by U.S. mortgage rate. 4. Demographic surveys Threshold era (1959-1963) Four pioneering surveys,( with their understandable limitations), (1959) Infant and Child Mortality in Rural Areas of Western And Central Turkey; (1962) Some Demographic Information About the Province of Yozgat; (1962-1963) Deaths and Births in the Kazan Rural Health Region; (1963) Birth and Death Rates in Turkey n=9701 CBR=41.3 CDR=18.9; 1963 IMR=278; 1968TDS=171 5. Three stages of population services under Ottoman Administration as referenced by Adnan Çimen 1) Founding stages till 1831; 2) 1831-1882 98 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TURKEY: LANDING ON TO CIVILIZATION ONCE UPON A TIME

Ad Hoc population registrars; 3) 1882-1923 Genral purpose population registrars which include Ceride-i Nüfus Nezareti (Ministry of Population Registration; 1884 Nüfusu Umumiye Müdüriyeti (General Directorate of Population); 1889 Sicili Nüfusu Ahali İdare-i Umumiyesi (General Administration of testament population records); 1914 Nüfus Müdüriyeti Umumiyesi (Population Directorate General) 6. 1963 National Survey on Population carried out by Ministry of Health and Social Assistance School of Public Health should also be considered in this family of surveys. 7. Kemal Madenoğlu 8. The methodology, or rather the main approach is “completing the gaps rather than criticizing the deficiencies”. 9. HUIPS chart is based on various surveys mainly conducted by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies. 10. When necessary, the following hierarchy is used during estimations: a. Estimate NI from the HUIPS Chart by multiplying r with an adjustment factor of 0,9 b. Make timewise interpolations to estimate death rates for late transition phases (death rates do not fluctuate in late transition phases) c. Make timewise interpolations to estimate birth rates for early transition phases (birth rates do not fluctuate in early transition phases) d. Fill the gap by using the equation NI=CBR-CDR e. Figures for 1920 and before estimated using the Toros graph in Genus (1995). 11. Estimated using interpolations based on TDHS and Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS). 12. A special recognition goes to T.Metiner, T.Tokgöz, U.Tuncer, G.Kanra, G.Bezirci, A.Akın, R.Köse, dedicated General Directors of Maternal and Child Care and Family Planning Centre (MCH/FP). 13. Demographic literature is a friendly host for attempts to classify societies, based on the dates of the onset of the demographic transition. One common classification is a) Pioneers (1900 or earlier); b) Close Followers (Around 1950); c) Followers (Around 1970); d) Late Comers (Around 1990), and e) Resistants (2000 or later).

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