House of Lords Official Report
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Ethnic Diversity in Politics and Public Life
BRIEFING PAPER CBP 01156, 22 October 2020 By Elise Uberoi and Ethnic diversity in politics Rebecca Lees and public life Contents: 1. Ethnicity in the United Kingdom 2. Parliament 3. The Government and Cabinet 4. Other elected bodies in the UK 5. Public sector organisations www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 Ethnic diversity in politics and public life Contents Summary 3 1. Ethnicity in the United Kingdom 6 1.1 Categorising ethnicity 6 1.2 The population of the United Kingdom 7 2. Parliament 8 2.1 The House of Commons 8 Since the 1980s 9 Ethnic minority women in the House of Commons 13 2.2 The House of Lords 14 2.3 International comparisons 16 3. The Government and Cabinet 17 4. Other elected bodies in the UK 19 4.1 Devolved legislatures 19 4.2 Local government and the Greater London Authority 19 5. Public sector organisations 21 5.1 Armed forces 21 5.2 Civil Service 23 5.3 National Health Service 24 5.4 Police 26 5.4 Justice 27 5.5 Prison officers 28 5.6 Teachers 29 5.7 Fire and Rescue Service 30 5.8 Social workers 31 5.9 Ministerial and public appointments 33 Annex 1: Standard ethnic classifications used in the UK 34 Cover page image copyright UK Youth Parliament 2015 by UK Parliament. Licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0 / image cropped 3 Commons Library Briefing, 22 October 2020 Summary This report focuses on the proportion of people from ethnic minority backgrounds in a range of public positions across the UK. -
The Conduct of Lord Singh of Wimbledon
Report from the Commissioner for Standards The conduct of Lord Singh of Wimbledon Published 13 January 2021 Commissioner Report 2020–21/9 Code of Conduct for Members, Guide to the Code of Conduct and Code of Conduct for Members’ Staff The present Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords was agreed on 30 November 2009. Amendments to it were agreed by the House on 30 March 2010, 12 June 2014, 25 February 2016, 9 February 2017, 3 April 2017, 30 April 2019,18 July 2019, 16 March 2020 and 8 July 2020. The Guide to the Code of Conduct was proposed by the Committee for Privileges (2nd Report, Session 2009–10, HL Paper 81) and agreed by the House on 16 March 2010. The Guide was amended on 9 November 2011, 6 March 2014, 13 May 2014, 24 March 2015, 25 February 2016, 9 February 2017, 3 April 2017, 30 April 2019, 18 July 2019, 16 March 2020 and 8 July 2020. The Code of Conduct for House of Lords Members’ Staff was agreed on 13 May 2014. Amendments to it were agreed on 24 March 2015, 30 April 2019, 18 July 2019, 16 March 2020 and 8 July 2020. Review The Codes and Guide are kept under review by the Conduct Committee. Recommended changes are reported to the House and take effect when agreed by the House. The members of the Conduct Committee are: Baroness Anelay of St Johns Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Cindy Butts (lay member) Mark Castle (lay member) Andrea Coomber (lay member) Dr Vanessa Davies (lay member) Baroness Donaghy Baroness Hussein-Ece Lord Mance (Chairman) Advice The Registrar of Lords’ Interests advises members of the House and their staff on their obligations under the Codes of Conduct. -
In Defense of Cyberterrorism: an Argument for Anticipating Cyber-Attacks
IN DEFENSE OF CYBERTERRORISM: AN ARGUMENT FOR ANTICIPATING CYBER-ATTACKS Susan W. Brenner Marc D. Goodman The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States brought the notion of terrorism as a clear and present danger into the consciousness of the American people. In order to predict what might follow these shocking attacks, it is necessary to examine the ideologies and motives of their perpetrators, and the methodologies that terrorists utilize. The focus of this article is on how Al-Qa'ida and other Islamic fundamentalist groups can use cyberspace and technology to continue to wage war againstthe United States, its allies and its foreign interests. Contending that cyberspace will become an increasingly essential terrorist tool, the author examines four key issues surrounding cyberterrorism. The first is a survey of conventional methods of "physical" terrorism, and their inherent shortcomings. Next, a discussion of cyberspace reveals its potential advantages as a secure, borderless, anonymous, and structured delivery method for terrorism. Third, the author offers several cyberterrorism scenarios. Relating several examples of both actual and potential syntactic and semantic attacks, instigated individually or in combination, the author conveys their damagingpolitical and economic impact. Finally, the author addresses the inevitable inquiry into why cyberspace has not been used to its full potential by would-be terrorists. Separately considering foreign and domestic terrorists, it becomes evident that the aims of terrorists must shift from the gross infliction of panic, death and destruction to the crippling of key information systems before cyberattacks will take precedence over physical attacks. However, given that terrorist groups such as Al Qa'ida are highly intelligent, well-funded, and globally coordinated, the possibility of attacks via cyberspace should make America increasingly vigilant. -
National Policy Forum (NPF) Report 2018
REPORT 2018 @LabPolicyForum #NPFConsultation2018 National Policy Forum Report 2018 XX National Policy Forum Report 2018 Contents NPF Elected Officers ....................................................................................................................4 Foreword ........................................................................................................................................5 About this document ...................................................................................................................6 Policy Commission Annual Reports Early Years, Education and Skills ............................................................................................7 Economy, Business and Trade ............................................................................................. 25 Environment, Energy and Culture ....................................................................................... 39 Health and Social Care ........................................................................................................... 55 Housing, Local Government and Transport ..................................................................... 71 International ............................................................................................................................. 83 Justice and Home Affairs ....................................................................................................... 99 Work, Pensions and Equality ..............................................................................................119 -
Northern Ireland's Snap Assembly Elections: Outcome and Implications
CRS INSIGHT Northern Ireland's Snap Assembly Elections: Outcome and Implications March 7, 2017 (IN10663) | Related Author Kristin Archick | Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs ([email protected], 7-2668) On March 2, 2017, voters in Northern Ireland—which is one of four component "nations" of the United Kingdom (UK) —went to the polls in snap elections for Northern Ireland's Assembly, its regional legislature. The Assembly is a key institution in Northern Ireland's devolved government, in which specified powers have been transferred from London to Belfast, as set out in the 1998 peace agreement aimed at ending Northern Ireland's 30-year sectarian conflict (in which almost 3,500 people died). The peace accord mandated that power in the devolved government would be shared between Northern Ireland's two dominant communities: unionists, or Protestants who largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK, and nationalists, or Catholics who consider themselves Irish and may desire a united Ireland. (For more information, see CRS Report RS21333, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process.) Since 2007, Assembly elections have produced successive power-sharing governments led by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the nationalist all-Ireland political party Sinn Fein. Assembly elections determine the composition of Northern Ireland's Executive, comprised of ministers in charge of policy departments. Following the May 2016 Assembly elections, DUP leader Arlene Foster and Sinn Fein's northern leader Martin McGuiness returned to head the Executive as First Minister and Deputy First Minister, respectively. Despite a much-improved security situation in Northern Ireland and progress in implementing important aspects of the peace accord, significant divisions and distrust persist between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties. -
Democracy and European Emerging Values: the Right to Decide
DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN EMERGING VALUES: THE RIGHT TO DECIDE COORDINATED BY GERARD BONA LANGUAGE REVIEW BY EMYR GRUFFYDD CENTRE MAURITS COPPIETERS 2015 Contents Foreword 6 Introduction 8 LAKE OR RIVER 14 THE POLITICAL CARTOONING OF CORNISH SELF-DETERMINATION 22 SELF-DETERMINATION AND WALES 44 TOWARDS SOVEREIGN FAROE ISLANDS 54 ABOUT TRANSYLVANIA 62 THE UDBYOUTH : HOW TO BE YOUNG, BRETON AND LEFT-WING WITHOUT AUTONOMY? 72 THE AUTONOMY GENERATION 80 SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE SILESIAN ISSUE 84 THE VALENCIAN COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 96 LIBERTY FOR BAVARIA 106 SOVEREIGNTY TO BUILD A GALIZA WITH THE PROMISE OF WORK AND A FUTURE FOR OUR YOUNG PEOPLE 112 “UNTIL ECONOMIC POWER IS IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE, THEN THEIR CULTURE, GAELIC OR ENGLISH, WILL BE DESTROYED” 124 FLANDERS: ON THE ROAD TO BELGIAN STATE REFORM NUMBER 7 132 THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CATALAN COUNTRIES: 146 THE RIGHT TO DECIDE OF THREE COUNTRIES AND THEIR NATION This publication is financed with the support of the European Parliament (EP). THE MORAVIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 154 The EP is not responsible for any use made of the content of this publication. The editor of the publication is the sole person liable. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE SELF-DETERMINATION PROCESS OF ARTSAKH 164 This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. THE YOUTH, PIONEERS IN THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF SOUTH TYROL? 178 This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information CENTRE MAURITS COPPIETERS 188 contained therein. -
Eagrán 15, Eanáir 2000
An bhfanfaidh sí le RnaG? XSSN 1313-7SM3 | Oileáin Lofoten • Pápa Nua • Roadsigns • TG4 9 771393 724019 pobal forbairt teanga cultúr ag obair ar son phobal na Gaeltachta agus na Gaeilge Údarás na Gaeltachta Údarás na Gaeltachta Na Vorhacha, Gaillimh. Teil: (091) 503100 Facs: (091) 503101 Ríomhphost: [email protected] http:Hwww.udaras.ie Níor cl|p ¥ iifnaG riamh aon te<|ra lena mianta.. Leagí|mar béim ón tús , v ^ argÉhláracha den scoth.. ■' : Seo chugainn anois an saol úr digiteach. bhlóid Éabhlóid Revolution Evolution TG 4 Súil Eile http://www.tg4. ie San eagrán seo GLUAISEACHT? AN FHUINNEOG CÉN GHLUAISEACHT? Cuisle unearthes a diary of Tá sé in am tuairisc Uí summer skies in Lapland; Eithir ar staid na Gaeilge a Roadsigns point to Gaoth fhoilsiú, dar le hUinsionn B Dobhair; Seosamh Mac Mac Dubhghaill 6 Muirí makes a meal of Flahavans porridge oats, and internet censorship is CEANGAL NA gCUIG GALL this month's Cnámh CUISLE Cá bhfios nach fada go Spairne. 24 - 29 An tEastát Tionsclaíochta, mbeidh Alba agus an Casla, Bhreatain Bheag maraon Co na Gaillimhe le hÉirinn Aontaithe ina TG4 Teil: 091 572077 An Bóithrín Glas, DY2K, Facs: 091 572076 suí sa mBruiséil i measc Ríomhphost: cuisle@tinet.íe na náisiún? arsa Teaghlaigh, agus Ceol Seán Mag Uidhir 8-10 ó Theach na Céibhe 26 Eagarthóir: Diarmuid (ohnson TOGHCHÁN AN ÚDARÁIS EADRAINN Riarthóir: Líon na vótaí bosca ar Béarla ar RnaG; Fear Veronica Ní Ghríofa bhosca ó na cúigí ar gorm ina Phápa?; Dearadh: fad 12 Éamon O Cuív V Caomhán O Scolaí 091 572008 Bobby Molloy 32 C l ó c h u r : Jaycee -
June-July 2019
www.preetkaurgill.com Report back Dear {contact.rst_name} My team and I have been working hard over the past couple of months sending out surveys and delivering letters across the constituency – asking for constituents’ views on a number of local issues, as well as keeping constituents up to date with what I’ve been doing both locally and in Parliament. My ofce receives hundreds of casework emails and calls each month, and May and June were no exception. In the past two months alone, I have taken up over 1,000 cases and sent over 2,500 emails. In addition to casework, I have also received hundreds of emails from constituents on a diverse range of issues, with the most frequently occurring topics relating to the NHS, climate change, and of course, Brexit. In Parliament, I have contributed to a number of debates on a variety of issues such as inequality, school cuts, and mental health. Sadly, the underfunding of mental health services means that those most in need are now suffering most, in particular, our children and young people. You can watch my speech in Parliament where I call on the Government to do more for young people’s mental health here. On school cuts, out of the 371 schools in Birmingham a staggering 365 face cuts with an average loss of £350 per pupil. In Edgbaston, over 82% of the schools who responded to my survey have seen cuts to their budgets this academic year, and 88% feel pessimistic about funding for the next three years. I revealed the extent of local school funding cuts with the Schools Minister in Parliament, which you can watch here. -
C (1003-1005) D (1006-1011)
B Country code (1001-1002) EB81.3 B C our survey number (1003-1005) EB81.3 C D Interview number (1006-1011) EB81.3 D D11: NO "NO ANSWER" ALLOWED D11 How old are you? (1012-1013) EB81.3 D11 EB0817UKXTRA 1/44 3/06/2014 ASK THE WHOLE QUESTIONNAIRE ONLY IF LEGALLY ABLE TO VOTE (18+ EXCEPT 16+ IN AT) Q1: CODE 29 CANNOT BE THE ONLY ANSWER OTHERWISE CLOSE THE INTERVIEW Q1: CODE 30 IS EXCLUSIVE Q1: IF CODE 30 THEN CLOSE INTERVIEW Q1 What is your nationality? Please tell me the country(ies) that applies(y). (MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE) (1034-1063) Belgium 1, Denmark 2, Germany 3, Greece 4, Spain 5, France 6, Ireland 7, Italy 8, Luxembourg 9, Netherlands 10, Portugal 11, United Kingdom (Great Britain, Northern Ireland) 12, Austria 13, Sweden 14, Finland 15, Republic of Cyprus 16, Czech Republic 17, Estonia 18, Hungary 19, Latvia 20, Lithuania 21, Malta 22, Poland 23, Slovakia 24, Slovenia 25, Bulgaria 26, Romania 27, Croatia 28, Other countries 29, DK 30, EB81.3 Q1 EB0817UKXTRA 2/44 3/06/2014 QP1 The European Parliament elections were held on the 22nd May 2014. For one reason or another, some people in the UK did not vote in these elections. Did you vote in the recent European Parliament elections? (SHOW SCREEN - SINGLE CODE) (1064) Voted 1 Did not vote 2 DK 3 EB71.3 QK1 EB0817UKXTRA 3/44 3/06/2014 ASK QP2 TO QP5a IF "VOTED", CODE 1 IN QP1 – OTHERS GO TO QP3b QP2 Which party did you vote for in the European Parliament elections? (SHOW SCREEN – READ OUT – SINGLE CODE) (1065-1066) Sinn Féin (SF) 1 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 2 Ulster Unionist Party -
THE 422 Mps WHO BACKED the MOTION Conservative 1. Bim
THE 422 MPs WHO BACKED THE MOTION Conservative 1. Bim Afolami 2. Peter Aldous 3. Edward Argar 4. Victoria Atkins 5. Harriett Baldwin 6. Steve Barclay 7. Henry Bellingham 8. Guto Bebb 9. Richard Benyon 10. Paul Beresford 11. Peter Bottomley 12. Andrew Bowie 13. Karen Bradley 14. Steve Brine 15. James Brokenshire 16. Robert Buckland 17. Alex Burghart 18. Alistair Burt 19. Alun Cairns 20. James Cartlidge 21. Alex Chalk 22. Jo Churchill 23. Greg Clark 24. Colin Clark 25. Ken Clarke 26. James Cleverly 27. Thérèse Coffey 28. Alberto Costa 29. Glyn Davies 30. Jonathan Djanogly 31. Leo Docherty 32. Oliver Dowden 33. David Duguid 34. Alan Duncan 35. Philip Dunne 36. Michael Ellis 37. Tobias Ellwood 38. Mark Field 39. Vicky Ford 40. Kevin Foster 41. Lucy Frazer 42. George Freeman 43. Mike Freer 44. Mark Garnier 45. David Gauke 46. Nick Gibb 47. John Glen 48. Robert Goodwill 49. Michael Gove 50. Luke Graham 51. Richard Graham 52. Bill Grant 53. Helen Grant 54. Damian Green 55. Justine Greening 56. Dominic Grieve 57. Sam Gyimah 58. Kirstene Hair 59. Luke Hall 60. Philip Hammond 61. Stephen Hammond 62. Matt Hancock 63. Richard Harrington 64. Simon Hart 65. Oliver Heald 66. Peter Heaton-Jones 67. Damian Hinds 68. Simon Hoare 69. George Hollingbery 70. Kevin Hollinrake 71. Nigel Huddleston 72. Jeremy Hunt 73. Nick Hurd 74. Alister Jack (Teller) 75. Margot James 76. Sajid Javid 77. Robert Jenrick 78. Jo Johnson 79. Andrew Jones 80. Gillian Keegan 81. Seema Kennedy 82. Stephen Kerr 83. Mark Lancaster 84. -
Western Hemisphere Overview ______
Western Hemisphere Overview ___________________________________________________________________________ “We stand firm in the fight against terrorism and firm in our conviction that a sustained and permanent victory depends upon the success of each individual country in the struggle for social cohesion. In projecting our security policy to become an axiom of the State, we conceive it to be inexorably linked to the constant improvement of the social conditions of our people.” Álvaro Uribe Vélez, President of Colombia 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly September 17, 2005 ___________________________________________________________________________ Terrorism in the Western Hemisphere was primarily perpetrated in by narcoterrorist organizations based in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. With the exception of the United States and Canada, there are no known operational cells of Islamic terrorists in the hemisphere, although scattered pockets of ideological supporters and facilitators in South America and the Caribbean lent financial, logistical, and moral support to terrorist groups in the Middle East. Cuba remained a state sponsor of terrorism, while Venezuela virtually ceased its cooperation in the global war on terror, tolerating terrorists in its territory and seeking closer relations with Cuba and Iran, both state sponsors of terrorism. The threat of terrorist attack remained low in for most countries. Overall, governments took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and tighten border security, but corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lacking interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources limited the progress of many. Some countries, like Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Mexico, and El Salvador, made serious prevention and preparedness efforts. -
The Deal Between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Conservative Party
Supplying confidence or trouble? The deal between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Conservative Party Jon Tonge University of Liverpool Introduction The surprise 2017 General Election result saw one party’s difficulty equate to another’s gain. The outcome produced a dream scenario for the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in Northern Ireland. It offered the opportunity, as monopoly supplier of friends to the Conservatives, for the DUP to name its price for propping up a government stripped of its overall majority in the House of Commons. Support from the DUP’s ten MPs offered the Conservatives, on 318 seats, command of the Commons in key votes. Although 326 is the figure most often cited as the number of MPs required to command the 650-seat chamber, the actual figure for the current parliament is 321, when the non-voting status of ten members is taken into account; seven abstentionist Sinn Fein MPs, the Speaker and his two deputies. A deal between the Conservatives and the DUP was confirmed on 26th June, 18 days after the election. Improbably, within 48 hours of the contest, Downing Street had claimed a deal had been reached. This announcement was soon corrected as a ‘mistake’. The speed of that claimed agreement would have been at odds with all previous evidence regarding the DUP’s propensity to drive a hard bargain. When a genuine deal was finally reached, it was a ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement. Although there would be no formal coalition, the DUP agreed to support the Conservative government in key votes, such as the Queen’s Speech, Budget, Brexit and anti-terrorism legislation.