Accelerating Military Innovation Lessons from China and Israel
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Simulated small boat threats pass by high-speed experimental boat Stiletto so Sailors assigned to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command can observe new technologies in relevant maritime environment, Atlantic Ocean, January 16, 2013 (U.S. Navy) Accelerating Military Innovation Lessons from China and Israel By George M. Dougherty he U.S. military’s technological to address capability gaps in existing ern-generation military systems prior to advantage is under threat. Since systems and warfighting concepts. 2000.3 Nonetheless, it has modernized T the end of the Cold War, the As a result, many of today’s frontline so rapidly that in 2018 the Vice Chair- military has been largely occupied systems are upgraded versions of those man of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff with relatively low-tech counterterror- used in the Gulf War almost 30 years warned that China could achieve its ism and counterinsurgency conflicts ago.1 Meanwhile, Great Power compet- goal of equaling U.S. military techno- against non-peer adversaries. Much itors including China and Russia have logical prowess by 2020 and surpass it U.S. defense research and development worked to quickly close the technology by the 2030s if Washington does not (R&D) during that time focused on gap with the United States.2 China, in react quickly.4 delivering incremental innovations particular, possessed almost no mod- Department of Defense (DOD) and military Service leaders are making strate- gic-level changes to accelerate innovation. Examples include the establishment of Colonel George M. Dougherty, USAF, Ph.D., is the Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering, Office of the Assistant the Office of the Under Secretary of Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and Logistics, Washington, DC. Defense for Research and Engineering, 10 Forum / Accelerating Military Innovation JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 within the Office of the Secretary of While not a peer in terms of size, Israel technology-enabled methodology Defense; the creation of the U.S. Army is also a free-market democracy with a for cross-enterprise design and deci- Futures Command; and the publication private-sector defense innovation base sionmaking, and the systematic use of of an ambitious new Air Force Science and a commitment to military techno- full-scale platforms for prototyping and and Technology Strategy.5 These changes logical superiority. Practices that enable experimentation. feature a renewed emphasis on promot- its efficiency in military innovation could Synchronized Hierarchical Strategic ing disruptive innovations that can deliver be highly transferable to the U.S. defense Planning. China’s military acquisition leap-ahead advances in military capability, sector. activities are guided by a hierarchical se- changing the character of military opera- The United States is neither a sin- quence of formal plans that are published tions and providing sustained advantage gle-party authoritarian state nor a small on a regular schedule. The Weapons for U.S. forces. DOD and the Services country with universal military service. and Equipment Development Strategy are seeking to identify and implement the Many Chinese and Israeli practices may (WEDS) is the top-level acquisition strat- supporting acquisition practices that can not be relevant in the U.S. context. egy document. It starts with an analysis accelerate disruptive innovation.6 In both cases, this analysis focuses on of China’s national security environment, The United States has been in similar transferable best practices that could be identifies military strategic capability situations before. When Japanese com- adapted within the context of the U.S. needs for future conflicts, assesses panies made competitive gains against system by leaders in the U.S. defense strengths and gaps in existing armaments, U.S. industrial firms in the 1980s and establishment. and establishes R&D priorities.15 It 1990s, the United States reacted in part equates roughly to a combination of the by identifying and adapting the key prac- China: Effectively Managing U.S. National Defense Strategy, studies tices, such as Kaizen and Total Quality Complex Military-Technical by the DOD Office of Net Assessment, Management, that were enabling the Transformation and a DOD-wide acquisition strategy. outperformance of Japanese industry. The Chinese defense-industrial system The WEDS covers a planning horizon of Are similar practices helping to enable was built in a national system governed 20 years, with a new WEDS published at the most successful U.S. global peers in by centralized top-down planning. the start of every decade.16 military innovation? Could some of these Due partly to this legacy, it exhibits The Long-Term Weapons and practices be adapted within the U.S. de- several structural weaknesses that inhibit Equipment Construction Plan (LWECP) fense establishment? innovation, including corruption,9 the defines the acquisition strategies across Two national case studies are par- entrenched monopoly power of state- the entire defense establishment to ad- ticularly relevant. First, China’s rapid owned defense firms,10 weak institu- dress the gaps identified in the WEDS.17 technological rise is the main impetus tions and management systems at the It covers a planning horizon of 10 years. behind the U.S. focus on military in- corporate or system integration level,11 Supporting medium- and short-term novation. It has achieved its remarkable and an immature and fragmented inno- plans are then created that describe the gains despite military budgets less than vative research ecosystem.12 Despite its resource allocations and programmatic half the size of those of the United rapid modernization, China has not yet aspects for the supporting defense acqui- States.7 Absorption, even theft, of foreign shown that its system can generate its sition programs. technologies has been part of its strategy, own disruptive military technological Defense science and technology but is only part of a much more complex innovations.13 However, it has shown (S&T) efforts, focused on longer term picture.8 As the most direct peer U.S. great effectiveness in translating new innovation, are guided by the Defense competitor, with a similarly large and technologies into military products and Medium- and Long-Term S&T complex defense enterprise, China’s prac- quickly fielding them across a large mili- Development Plan (MLDP). The MLDP tices could be applicable to U.S. defense tary enterprise, areas where the less cen- is published at the midpoint of each de- innovation. tralized U.S. system has sometimes had cade, 5 years following the WEDS, with Second, Israel is remarkable for its difficulty. China’s legacy of structured a planning horizon of 15 years.18 The re- ability to produce maximum military planning provides strengths, particularly lationship between the publication dates innovation with limited resources. Its in cross-sector coordination and the and planning horizons of the WEDS and defense budget is less than one-thirtieth ability to link China’s military strategy MLDP are illustrated in figure 1. The that of the United States. Nonetheless, with its supporting military R&D and LWECP and other plans synchronize the ability of the tiny “startup nation” to acquisition activities.14 within this same regular cycle. rapidly and affordably bring unique capa- Three transferable practices have been The MLDP is developed by the bilities to the field is leading the United important to the speed and effectiveness Science and Technology Committee States to import some of its novel defense of Chinese military modernization. (STC) via a collaborative effort among products, such as the Iron Dome missile These are the Chinese approaches to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), defense system and the Trophy active synchronized hierarchical strategic civilian defense industry officials, and defense system for armored vehicles. planning for defense R&D, a powerful S&T experts.19 The STC includes over JFQ 98, 3rd Quarter 2020 Dougherty 11 Figure 1. Publication and Planning Timelines for fourth or fifth generation, with the fifth Two Major Chinese Defense Acquisition Planning Documents generation defined by the incorporation of characteristic technologies such as Weapons and Equipment stealth and advanced sensor fusion and Development Strategy (n) data networking. Chinese planners apply a similar construct to define technological Medium- and Long-Term Science and generations for all categories of military Technology Development Plan (n) systems, from aircraft to ground vehicles to information systems.24 The expected Weapons and Equipment transitions to future generations are pro- Development Strategy (n+1) jected on timelines in the strategic plans, enabling different parts of the defense Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (n+1) enterprise to plan technology investments targeting those transition dates with confidence that the necessary funding, complementary technologies, and oper- . ational military transition activities have 2015 2025 2035 2010 2020 2030 2040 been aligned. A Powerful Technology-Enabled Methodology for Cross-Enterprise Design Figure 2. Structure of the Hall for Workshop for and Decisionmaking. Chinese R&D Meta-Synthetic Engineering Methodology strategic plans are developed with the help of a powerful problem-solving Hall for Workshop for Meta-Synthetic Engineering and design methodology. Solutions to large-scale,