DOCSLIB.ORG

Taking Defensive Action

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Taking Defensive Action ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Armoured warfare is evolving, and vehicle protection suites are following suit with armies requiring multi-layered defences that incorporate soft- and hard-kill measures. TAKING (Photos: US Army) DEFENSIVE ACTION Fear of going toe-to-toe with the Russian military in a land battle has US Army leaders stepping up plans to field a much-delayed technology that could protect soldiers inside ground vehicles from incoming RPGs and ATGMs. By Ashley Roque fter nearly two decades of cat- that we had a need for [APS], and we the APS itself perform; does it hit the targets and-mouse games with various wanted to prioritise [that for] our first it is supposed to; does it work in the way it is A active protection systems (APS), responder units,’ army Chief of Staff Gen supposed to; is it mature; can it handle the the US Army is slated to finally move out Mark Milley told lawmakers during a Senate environment the US Army works in; will it and field its first such solution by 2020 – Appropriation Defense Subcommittee on work in the rain, the snow and in the combat the Israeli-built Trophy from Rafael 15 May. ‘So, we picked four brigades – heavy environment where it needs to perform; and Advanced Defense Systems. brigades – to purchase those systems for.’ is it in fact suitable for the platform it has ‘It is a priority for the service,’ Army He added that the ‘intent is to outfit the been integrated onto? Each platform has Secretary Mark Esper told Shephard. ‘We’ll entire heavy force – so all of our vehicles, different SWaP constraints, Dean added, procure any technology that delivers best all the ground vehicles, the Bradleys, the and an APS technology might be mature value, whether it’s US industry [or] foreign tanks, any future combat vehicles – with but simply not suited for the selected vehicle. industry. If the marines invent it, it doesn’t active protective systems, but also with The US Army has given the Trophy the matter. We need to get the best value for some aircraft; we haven’t worked out the green light to proceed and, in June, our soldiers.’ aircraft piece.’ Leonardo DRS (Rafael’s US-based partner) Trophy is one of three APS technologies announced that it had been awarded a that the service has evaluated under an Tristate of affairs $193 million contract to integrate the expedited initiative to meet soldiers’ urgent The three APS systems under consideration capability on Abrams tanks. requirements while it also develops future were Rafael’s Trophy on the Abrams, IMI With four brigades slated to receive capabilities. Multiple times before, though, Systems’ Iron Fist on the M2 Bradley and the system, Dean noted that the current army leaders evaluated the Israeli system Artis’ Iron Curtain on the Stryker. The US contract covers the first brigade and a half, before turning their backs on it. Army assessed the solutions for performance, and the hardware will be fielded by 2020. Now, as the Pentagon zeroes in on maturity and vehicle compatibility. To achieve this, the Trophy was set to potentially violent contingencies involving Col Glenn Dean, project manager for undergo final qualification testing in the Chinese and Russian militaries, service Stryker Brigade Combat Team and APS September 2018, and production has leaders say the time has come to move acquisition, told reporters in August that the begun to build the deployable assets. out and that they are committed to rapidly service sought answers to some key questions As for IMI’s Iron Fist, the technology was fielding APS to their soldiers. ‘We determined about all three technologies: how well does still participating in Phase I live-fire and 14 LAND WARFARE INTERNATIONAL OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2018 VOLUME 9 NUMBER 5 WWW.LANDWARFAREINTL.COM ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS automotive characterisation testing at the speculation, he confirmed in August that version of Rafael’s system, dubbed time of writing – an eight-month delay due in the AROC flew the red flag on Artis’ APS Trophy-VPS (Vehicle Protection System). part to funding gaps, inclement weather at technology. After completing the Phase I Aside from new options like Rheinmetall’s, the test range and integration challenges. evaluation in April, Dean said the AROC Dean said that modified versions of systems The M2 Bradley is a ‘very difficult platform to handed down its no-go decision five already under evaluation could be put forward install to’, Dean explained. ‘When we install months later. for the follow-on effort. ‘We are allowing these systems on a platform, they don’t ‘Although we observed that the system systems that are significantly different but come off the shelf ready to operate on an generally worked in concept and generally may share common features with existing Abrams tank and a Bradley Fighting Vehicle. was able to hit its targets, it was significantly systems to come in and demonstrate initially,’ ‘Even once you bolt everything on, it takes immature [and] would have required Dean told reporters. ‘I’m not going to confirm some time for the manufacturer of that significant time and investment to get it to a any of the participants; I’ll leave that up to system to get it dialled in to work for that maturity level where it was ready to rapidly industry for them to say whether they’re platform,’ he continued. ‘If they’re using field, none of which was in the scope of our participating or not.’ He did note, however, radar, they have got to make sure the radars programme,’ he explained. Dean declined that his office was sending team members are looking in the right direction and there to provide specific information about test to Israel in August to see a demonstration isn’t anything on the vehicle that is in the events and, at the time of writing, Artis had of the Trophy-VPS technology. way of the radar or providing a bad signal.’ not responded for comment. Regardless of which companies As of late August, IMI was about 50% participate in the forthcoming evaluation, through Phase I live-fire and automotive Short-term efforts though, it is expected that kinetic characterisation testing, and the findings As one system moves forward, one is cut and energy defeat capabilities will be included. are expected to be handed over to the Army one continues to move through testing, the ‘We’re looking to evaluate state-of-the-art Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) in Q1 US Army is also preparing to evaluate other [technology] and the ability to defeat tank- of FY2019 for a decision on how to proceed. near-term options after Congress allocated fired, long-rod, kinetic energy penetrators as Dean also revealed that the Iron Curtain $25 million for the testing of additional APS well,’ Dean said. The service is in the midst is now out of the running. After months of technologies. The lawmakers’ move could be of a technical maturity assessment to help an avenue to circumvent what is determine how the army should invest in the An M1A2 MBT assigned to 1st Battalion, 35th Armored known as an earmark ban by not capability and develop a proposed timeline. Regiment, breaches obstacles during Army Warfighting specifying an individual company, and Assessment 17.1 at Fort Bliss. now the service is forced to consider Time warp additional options. This is not the first time that lawmakers Although Dean declined to specify have waded into the APS arena. Back in potential contenders for the initial the mid-2000s, in fact, the US Army looked evaluation in November, he noted to field a system capable of shooting down that some companies that initially incoming RPGs – this was Trophy under the showed interest have backed out Full-Spectrum Effects Weapon Systems because they simply are not ready initiative (nicknamed Project Sheriff) and a to move forward so quickly. It is Raytheon option under the ill-fated Future envisioned that the evaluation will Combat System (FCS). be used to downselect systems to Helmed by the Pentagon’s Office of move into the Phase I testing phase Force Transformation, Project Sheriff on Stryker vehicles. was an initiative to equip Stryker vehicles In 2008, the US Army conducted an RPG defeat test for ‘We happen to have an excess with a variety of lethal and non-lethal the FCS APS for manned vehicles. of Stryker hulls that are residual capabilities. At the time, some military material from our double-V-hull leaders and Raytheon officials made a production,’ Dean explained, noting public push to block the service from that the platform had been selected fielding Trophy. before Iron Curtain was cut. ‘Now ‘Some programmes were very threatened, that we’ve made the decision to as we found out,’ recalled USMC Col (Ret) terminate the Iron Curtain activity, Wade Hall, who at the time led Project this gives us a starting point, and Sheriff. Hall is now a consultant backing we may look at an alternative Trophy. ‘The FCS programme in particular system for Stryker,’ he said. got very threatened by [Trophy] because here Two potential contenders for the we were demonstrating an active protection fourth APS test include a solution system on the move and they [had] just a from German company ADS (part of lot of PowerPoint slides,’ he explained to the Rheinmetall Group) and a light Shephard. ‘Time had a way of just proving WWW.LANDWARFAREINTL.COM VOLUME 9 NUMBER 5 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2018 LAND WARFARE INTERNATIONAL 15 ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Laser focus Aside from efforts to quickly field an APS technology, the US Army has also started work on three programmes to better protect combat vehicles – signature management, advanced reactive armour tiles and a laser warning system – with the goal of getting them into the field in the FY2020-2022 timeframe.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mp-Avt-108-56
    UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED Active Defense Systems (ADS) Program – Formerly Integrated Army Active Protection System Program (IAAPS) Mr. Charles Acir USA TARDEC AMSTA-TR-R MS211 6501 East 11 Mile Road (Building 200) Warren, Michigan 48397-5000 586 574-6737 [email protected] Mr. Mark Middione United Defense, Advanced Development Center 328 West Brokaw Road, MS M51 Santa Clara, California 95052 408 289-2626 [email protected] SUMMARY United Defense’s Advanced Development Center was selected as the prime contractor for a program currently known as the Integrated Army Active Protection System in 1997. Along with our teammates, BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman Space Technology, United Defense performed a series of technology investigations, conducted simulation-supported concept development and down-selected to a best value integrated survivability suite (ISS) consisting of an optimal mix of armor, electronic warfare sensors, processors and soft kill countermeasure, and hard kill active protection in November of 1998. At that point the program transitioned to a development and demonstration phase in which the United Defense led team designed and fabricated the selected survivability suite (ISS), integrated the ISS onto a customer-selected EMD version BFVA3 test-bed and conducted live threat defeat testing. Static testing against a wide array of live threats successfully concluded in September of 2002. By December of 02, the IAAPS team was back at the range with the test-bed reconfigured for on-the-move (OTM) testing. Successful OTM defeats were conducted with the soft kill countermeasure in January of 2003, with hard kill defeats conducted in February through May of 2003.
    [Show full text]
  • Avoiding Another War Between Israel and Hezbollah
    COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah By Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion “He who wishes to fight must first count the cost.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War ABOUT THE SCOWCROFT MIDDLE EAST SECURITY INITIATIVE The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region. Through all of the Council’s Middle East programming, we work with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region. You can read more about our programs at www.atlanticcouncil.org/ programs/middle-east-programs/. May 2020 ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-099-7 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. This report is made possible by general support to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................2
    [Show full text]
  • Armoured Fighting Vehicle Team Performance Prediction Against
    AFV DEFENCE: JUNE 29, 2021 1 Armoured Fighting Vehicle Team Performance Prediction against Missile Attacks with Directed Energy Weapons Graham V. Weinberg and Mitchell M. Kracman [email protected] Abstract A recent study has introduced a procedure to quantify the survivability of a team of armoured fighting vehicles when it is subjected to a single missile attack. In particular this study investigated the concept of collaborative active protection systems, focusing on the case where vehicle defence is provided by high power radio frequency directed energy weapons. The purpose of the current paper is to demonstrate how this analysis can be extended to account for more than one missile threat. This is achieved by introducing a jump stochastic process whose states represent the number of missiles defeated at a given time instant. Analysis proceeds through consideration of the sojourn times of this stochastic process, and it is shown how consideration of these jump times can be related to transition probabilities of the auxiliary stochastic process. The latter probabilities are then related to the probabilities of detection and disruption of missile threats. The sum of these sojourn times can then be used to quantify the survivability of the team at any given time instant. Due to the fact that there is much interest in the application of high energy lasers in the context of this paper, the numerical examples will thus focus on such directed energy weapons for armoured fighting vehicle team defence. I. INTRODUCTION Performance prediction of collaborative active defence systems for a team of armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) is of significant importance to defence forces investing in modern technology.
    [Show full text]
  • Trophy System As a Safeguard Against Atgms
    Schaub 5:00 R09 Disclaimer: This paper partially fulfills a writing requirement for first year (freshman) engineering students at the University of Pittsburgh Swanson School of Engineering. This paper is a student paper, not a professional paper. This paper is based on publicly available information and may not provide complete analyses of all relevant data. If this paper is used for any purpose other than this author’s partial fulfillment of a writing requirement for first year (freshman) engineering students at the University of Pittsburgh Swanson School of Engineering, users are doing so at their own risk. TROPHY SYSTEM AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST ATGMS Nicolas Obeso ([email protected]) A SERIOUS THREAT TO ARMORED increasing the chances of armor failure. This behavior FIGHTING VEHICLES of the explosive is known as the “Munroe Effect”. Due to the requirement of an empty space, shaped charges are able to deal more damage to armor with the bonus As the United States armed forces have found of requiring less explosives. Shaped charges are both themselves embroiled in more asymmetrical conflicts, more efficient and more effective than conventional the proliferation of small anti-tank weapons has explosives when taking out armor [2]. become a pressing issue. Even the latest main battle tanks such as the American M1A2 TUSK (Tank Urban YESTERDAY’S SOLUTIONS Survival Kit) are still vulnerable to attack from anti- tank guided missiles (ATGM) like the 9M133 Kornet Today’s munitions use tandem HEAT charges. and unguided rockets like the RPG 29 [1]. Kornets These tandem charges are designed to take out a tank’s require a team to operate but have a range of several secondary defenses while still having the killing power kilometers and can be guided to their targets.
    [Show full text]
  • The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017
    The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017 Kenneth S. Brower Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 150 THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 150 The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017 Kenneth S. Brower The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017 Kenneth S. Brower © The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 5290002 Israel Tel. 972-3-5318959 Fax. 972-3-5359195 [email protected] www.besacenter.org ISSN 0793-1042 May 2018 Cover image: Soldier from the elite Rimon Battalion participates in an all-night exercise in the Jordan Valley, photo by Staff Sergeant Alexi Rosenfeld, IDF Spokesperson’s Unit The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies is an independent, non-partisan think tank conducting policy-relevant research on Middle Eastern and global strategic affairs, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel and regional peace and stability. It is named in memory of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, whose efforts in pursuing peace laid the cornerstone for conflict resolution in the Middle East. Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author’s views or conclusions. Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy summarize the papers delivered at conferences and seminars held by the Center for the academic, military, official and general publics.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel
    U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel Updated November 16, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33222 SUMMARY RL33222 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel November 16, 2020 This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past aid programs, data on annual assistance, and analysis of current issues. For general information Jeremy M. Sharp on Israel, see Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti. Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. Successive Administrations, working with Congress, have provided Israel with significant assistance in light of robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in the Middle East; a mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. To date, the United States has provided Israel $146 billion (current, or noninflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. At present, almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance, although from 1971 to 2007, Israel also received significant economic assistance. In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid, covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional appropriation—$38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing grants plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations) to Israel.
    [Show full text]
  • Korean Assault
    Korean Assault Republic of Korea (ROK) Data and information on vehicles obtained from army-technology.com This is the fighting vehicle preview for the Korean Assault K1 Sometimes referred to as the Korean M1 (it was developed for Korea by General Dynamics Land Systems Division), the K1 or Type 88 (official title) entered service in 1985/86. The K1 is armed with the Abrams 105mm gun and fires the same ammunition. The K1 is outfitted with thermal imaging system and the gun is stabilized. K1A1 The K1A1 is an upgraded version of the K1 MBT. Its firing range is enhanced by a 120mm M256 smoothbore gun, together with an improved gun and turret drive system. The M256 gun is also installed on the US M1A1/2 main battle tanks and fires the same ammunition as the M1A1. The fire control system includes the Korean Commander's Panoramic Sight (KCPS) which includes a thermal imager, KGPS gunner's sight with thermal imager, laser rangefinder and dual field of view day TV camera and KBCS ballistic fire control computer. 1 K2 Black Panther The main armament of the K2 Black Panther is a 120mm L/55 smoothbore gun with automatic loader. The autoloader ensures the loading of projectiles on the move even when the vehicle moves on uneven surfaces. The 120mm gun can fire about 10 rounds per minute. The K2 Black Panther is equipped with auto target detection and tracking system, and hunter killer function. The gunner's primary sight (GPS) and commander's panoramic sight (CPS) are stabilized, and include a thermal imager and laser rangefinder enabling day / night observation.
    [Show full text]
  • Fighting Vehicle Technology
    Fighting Vehicle Technology 41496_DSTA 60-77#150Q.indd 1 5/6/10 12:44 AM ABSTRACT Armoured vehicle technology has evolved ever since the first tanks appeared in World War One. The traditional Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) design focuses on lethality, survivability and mobility. However, with the growing reliance on communications and command (C2) systems, there is an increased need for the AFV design to be integrated with the vehicle electronics, or vetronics. Vetronics has become a key component of the AFV’s effectiveness on the battlefield. An overview of the technology advances in these areas will be explored. In addition, the impact on the human aspect as a result of these C2 considerations will be covered. Tan Chuan-Yean Mok Shao Hong Vince Yew 41496_DSTA 60-77#150Q.indd 2 5/6/10 12:44 AM Fighting Vehicle Technology 62 and more advanced sub-systems will raise the INTRODUCTION question of how the modern crew is able to process and use the information effectively. On the modern battlefield, armies are moving towards Network-Centric Warfare TECHNOLOGIES IN AN (NCW). Forces no longer fight as individual entities but as part of a larger system. Each AFV entity becomes a node in a network where information can be shared, and firepower can Firepower be called upon request. AFVs are usually equipped with weapon Key to this network fighting capability is the stations for self-protection and the communications and command (C2) system. engagement of targets. Depending on By enabling each force to be plugged into the threat, some are equipped with pintle the C2 system, information can be shared mount systems for light weapons (e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare
    No. 109 JUNE 2016 The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare Michael B. Kim The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim The Institute of Land Warfare ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AN INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE PAPER The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of ILW’s editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues. LAND WARFARE PAPER No. 109, June 2016 The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare by Michael B. Kim Major Michael B. Kim currently serves as the Squadron Executive Officer for the 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division. Prior to his current position, he graduated from the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and completed the Art of War Scholars Program.
    [Show full text]
  • AUTONOMY in WEAPON SYSTEMS
    WORKING PAPER | FEBRUARY 2015 An Introduction to AUTONOMY in WEAPON SYSTEMS By: Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz ABOUT CNAS WORKING PAPERS: Working Papers are designed to enable CNAS analysts to either engage a broader community-of- interest by disseminating preliminary research findings and policy ideas in advance of a project’s final report, or to highlight the work of an ongoing project that has the potential to make an immediate impact on a critical and time-sensitive issue. PROJECT ON ETHICAL AUTONOMY | WORKING PAPER About the Authors Michael C. Horowitz is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at CNAS and an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Paul Scharre is a Fellow and Director of the 20YY Warfare Initiative at CNAS. The Ethical Autonomy project is a joint endeavor of CNAS’ Technology and National Security Program and the 20YY Warfare Initiative, and is made possible by the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. PREFACE Information technology is driving rapid increases in the autonomous capabilities of unmanned systems, from self-driving cars to factory robots, and increasingly autonomous unmanned systems will play a sig- nificant role in future conflicts as well. “Drones” have garnered headline attention because of the manner of their use, but drones are in fact remotely piloted by a human, with relatively little automation and with a person in control of any weapons use at all times. As future military systems incorporate greater autonomy, however, the way in which that autonomy is incorporated into weapon systems will raise challenging legal, moral, ethical, policy and strategic stability issues.
    [Show full text]
  • THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict Between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides Are Preparing for It
    ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Copyright © 2011 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford Table of Contents Executive Summary . iii Acknowledgements . vi The Authors . vii Introduction . 1 Potential Return to Arms . 3 Hizballah Prepares for War . 6 Israel Prepares for War . 14 Conclusion . 20 THE NEXT WAR The Saban Center at BROOKINGS ii Executive Summary ebanon and Israel have enjoyed a rare calm waged between them, and both sides have been in the five years since the August 14, 2006 feverishly preparing for the next war ever since the ceasefire that brought an end to that sum- last one ended. Lmer’s month-long war, the fiercest ever action waged between Hizballah and the Israel Defense Hizballah’s Posture Forces (IDF). Since the end of the 2006 war, Hizballah has under- Both sides drew sharp lessons from the 2006 conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • MAPPING the DEVELOPMENT of AUTONOMY in WEAPON SYSTEMS Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen
    MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS vincent boulanin and maaike verbruggen MAPPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS vincent boulanin and maaike verbruggen November 2017 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Dr Radha Kumar (India) The Director DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom) Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org © SIPRI 2017 Contents Acknowledgements v About the authors v Executive summary vii Abbreviations x 1. Introduction 1 I. Background and objective 1 II. Approach and methodology 1 III. Outline 2 Figure 1.1. A comprehensive approach to mapping the development of autonomy 2 in weapon systems 2. What are the technological foundations of autonomy? 5 I. Introduction 5 II. Searching for a definition: what is autonomy? 5 III. Unravelling the machinery 7 IV. Creating autonomy 12 V. Conclusions 18 Box 2.1. Existing definitions of autonomous weapon systems 8 Box 2.2. Machine-learning methods 16 Box 2.3. Deep learning 17 Figure 2.1. Anatomy of autonomy: reactive and deliberative systems 10 Figure 2.2.
    [Show full text]