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TROPHYTM ACTIVE PROTECTION AND HOSTILE FIRE TM DETECTION SYSTEM FOR ARMORED VEHICLES TROPHY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TROPHY HV TROPHY VPS Weight (kg) 820 480 Volume (m3) 0.69 0.29 Power Req’d (Avg/Peak) (W) 980 / 3750 Detection Method Radar (w/EO option) Defeat Method - Hard Kill MEFP Defeat Method - Soft Kill IRCM (option) Threats Addressed ATGM, RPG, Recoilless, Tank-fi red HEAT Situational Awareness Reports threat classifi cation and point of origin to crew and BMS ACTIVE PROTECTION AND HOSTILE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM FOR ARMORED VEHICLES TROPHY is a combined Hostile Fire Detection (HFD) and TROPHY neutralizes all standard shaped charge Active Protection System (APS) which is available in two anti-tank threats in fl ight through four stages of main confi gurations: TROPHY HV (Heavy Vehicle) and engagement: Threat Detection, Threat Tracking, TROPHY VPS (Vehicle Protection System). By proactively Countermeasure Activation, and Threat Neutralization. detecting, locating, and (if necessary) neutralizing Only those threats which pose a danger to the platform anti-armor threats, TROPHY dramatically increases are neutralized, thereby conserving ammunition and platform survivability, and creates a new paradigm of minimizing the chance of collateral damage. networked threat awareness for maneuver forces. 09-2019 Leonardo DRS Land Systems 201 Evans Lane, St. Louis, MO 63121 LeonardoDRS.com LeonardoDRS.com [email protected] TROPHYTM ACTIVE PROTECTION AND HOSTILE FIRE TM DETECTION SYSTEM FOR ARMORED VEHICLES TROPHY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TROPHY HV TROPHY VPS Weight (kg) 820 480 Volume (m3) 0.69 0.29 Power Req’d (Avg/Peak) (W) 980 / 3750 Detection Method Radar (w/EO option) Defeat Method - Hard Kill MEFP Defeat Method - Soft Kill IRCM (option) Threats Addressed ATGM, RPG, Recoilless, Tank-fi red HEAT Situational Awareness Reports threat classifi cation and point of origin to crew and BMS ACTIVE PROTECTION AND HOSTILE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM FOR ARMORED VEHICLES TROPHY is a combined Hostile Fire Detection (HFD) and TROPHY neutralizes all standard shaped charge Active Protection System (APS) which is available in two anti-tank threats in fl ight through four stages of main confi gurations: TROPHY HV (Heavy Vehicle) and engagement: Threat Detection, Threat Tracking, TROPHY VPS (Vehicle Protection System). By proactively Countermeasure Activation, and Threat Neutralization. detecting, locating, and (if necessary) neutralizing Only those threats which pose a danger to the platform anti-armor threats, TROPHY dramatically increases are neutralized, thereby conserving ammunition and platform survivability, and creates a new paradigm of minimizing the chance of collateral damage. networked threat awareness for maneuver forces. 09-2019 Leonardo DRS Land Systems 201 Evans Lane, St. Louis, MO 63121 LeonardoDRS.com LeonardoDRS.com [email protected] TROPHY™ BENEFITS TROPHY HV • Neutralizes a wide variety of anti- COMBAT-PROVEN SYSTEM FOR HEAVY AND BACKGROUND armor threats, from RPGs to the MEDIUM ARMORED VEHICLES most modern anti-tank guided The specter of advanced anti-armor missiles (ATGMs) TROPHY HV protects heavy and medium armored TROPHY HV off ers 360° azimuth protection and high- weapons on today’s asymmetric vehicles from threats ranging from rockets to ATGMs angle elevation coverage, while maintaining user-defi ned • Very high kill probability at battlefi elds continues to haunt and High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds. Extremely safety zones for friendly troops on the ground. distances that greatly reduce the modern armored forces. The power precise target acquisition and tracking, coupled chance of residual penetration TROPHY HV is fully tested, qualifi ed, and in serial and sophistication of these weapons with Multiple Explosively Formed Projectile (MEFP) production for the Israel Defense Forces armor force. have surpassed the ability of strictly • Engages threats only if they pose a countermeasure technology, ensures a high probability Deployed operationally by the IDF since August 2009, passive armor-equipped platforms to danger to the platform of threat neutralization (in most cases without threat TROPHY HV has proven itself in combat multiple times defeat them without unacceptable • Extremely low false alarm rate initiation) while minimizing the potential for collateral against advanced threats. sacrifi ces in the key areas of proven over years of developmental eff ects. weight and mobility. Integration of testing and operational employment “active protection” capability into a • Minimizes collateral damage platform’s survivability suite allows through kinetic (non-explosive) for improved protection against intercept these advanced threats without an • Immediately calculates and reports increased weight or mobility penalty. shooter location to the crew and/or Crew Shield Battle Management System Countermeasure • Neutralizes threats fi red at very short range, and multiple, simultaneous threats from the same or diff erent directions • User-defi ned protection zones optimize safety and fl exibility for diff ering employment scenarios HOW TROPHY™ WORKS Radar Antenna Launcher Auto-Loader Radar detects and classifi es incoming threat. TROPHY VPS LIGHTER WEIGHT SYSTEM FOR MEDIUM AND LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES By repackaging and re-engineering TROPHY’s technology into a smaller, lighter form factor, TROPHY System tracks threat, computes VPS retains all the performance intercept parameters, and advantages of its larger predecessor, transmits alert to crew and BMS. while enabling its further integration on both medium and lighter weight armored vehicles. TROPHY VPS also forms the foundation for additional protection technology insertion as it matures. TROPHY VPS is in the fi nal stages of development, and has been successfully fi eld-tested in Israel and If threat poses danger, system overseas. launches countermeasure to neutralize it away from the protected zone. TROPHY™ BENEFITS TROPHY HV • Neutralizes a wide variety of anti- COMBAT-PROVEN SYSTEM FOR HEAVY AND BACKGROUND armor threats, from RPGs to the MEDIUM ARMORED VEHICLES most modern anti-tank guided The specter of advanced anti-armor missiles (ATGMs) TROPHY HV protects heavy and medium armored TROPHY HV off ers 360° azimuth protection and high- weapons on today’s asymmetric vehicles from threats ranging from rockets to ATGMs angle elevation coverage, while maintaining user-defi ned • Very high kill probability at battlefi elds continues to haunt and High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds. Extremely safety zones for friendly troops on the ground. distances that greatly reduce the modern armored forces. The power precise target acquisition and tracking, coupled chance of residual penetration TROPHY HV is fully tested, qualifi ed, and in serial and sophistication of these weapons with Multiple Explosively Formed Projectile (MEFP) production for the Israel Defense Forces armor force. have surpassed the ability of strictly • Engages threats only if they pose a countermeasure technology, ensures a high probability Deployed operationally by the IDF since August 2009, passive armor-equipped platforms to danger to the platform of threat neutralization (in most cases without threat TROPHY HV has proven itself in combat multiple times defeat them without unacceptable • Extremely low false alarm rate initiation) while minimizing the potential for collateral against advanced threats. sacrifi ces in the key areas of proven over years of developmental eff ects. weight and mobility. Integration of testing and operational employment “active protection” capability into a • Minimizes collateral damage platform’s survivability suite allows through kinetic (non-explosive) for improved protection against intercept these advanced threats without an • Immediately calculates and reports increased weight or mobility penalty. shooter location to the crew and/or Crew Shield Battle Management System Countermeasure • Neutralizes threats fi red at very short range, and multiple, simultaneous threats from the same or diff erent directions • User-defi ned protection zones optimize safety and fl exibility for diff ering employment scenarios HOW TROPHY™ WORKS Radar Antenna Launcher Auto-Loader Radar detects and classifi es incoming threat. TROPHY VPS LIGHTER WEIGHT SYSTEM FOR MEDIUM AND LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES By repackaging and re-engineering TROPHY’s technology into a smaller, lighter form factor, TROPHY System tracks threat, computes VPS retains all the performance intercept parameters, and advantages of its larger predecessor, transmits alert to crew and BMS. while enabling its further integration on both medium and lighter weight armored vehicles. TROPHY VPS also forms the foundation for additional protection technology insertion as it matures. TROPHY VPS is in the fi nal stages of development, and has been successfully fi eld-tested in Israel and If threat poses danger, system overseas. launches countermeasure to neutralize it away from the protected zone..
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