Moëz Sinaoui: a first-hand witness of the democratic transition alongside Béji Caïd Essebsi Interview with Moëz SINAOUI Fifty-year-old Moëz Sinaoui is a diplomat. On 28 February 2011, when Béji Caïd Essebsi was appointed as transitional prime minister in place of Mohamed Ghannouchi, who had been forced to resign by the Kasbah II movement, he was working in Barcelona, at the headquarters of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). He decided to take a break from the role and to join the office of the new Head of Government, whom he hardly knew, as communications officer. As a first-hand witness of the events of the period, he gives an emotional account of his experience alongside Mr Caïd Essebsi during the nine months prior to the establishment of the Troïka government in November 2011, following Ennahdha's victory in the elections of 23 October 2011 and the formation of a majority with the CPR (Congress for the Republic) and Ettakatol (the Democratic Front for Work and Freedoms). Once the elections had taken place and Mr Caïd Essebsi's period at the head of the transitional government was over, Mr Sinaoui returned to his job with the UfM, before once again joining Mr Caïd Essebsi's office in December 2014 after he was elected President of the Republic. The relationship between Tunisia's current President and his communications adviser is one between men from successive generations, one a travelling companion of President Bourguiba from the earliest days of his rule, the other born under the long presidency of the father of Tunisian independence and an ever-present collaborator of the person entrusted with the delicate task of successfully completing the first stage in the democratic transition of post-revolutionary Tunisia. The two men did not know each other initially, but they came to trust each other, and have stayed together ever since. Today, Mr Sinaoui's admiration for the incumbent President of Tunisia, with whom he has worked very closely and continues to work today, is clear to see. He credits the President with playing the most decisive role in making a success of the democratic transition that led Tunisia to its first free elections, and sees him as not only the "Father", but also the "Grandfather of Tunisia". This is far from a disrespectful allusion to his mentor's advanced age. Rather, it is a reflection of his respect for a great statesman and his gratitude for the work he has done. This is his story... It all began in the Kasbah, against the backdrop of unstinting protests that had taken a tragic turn, with the death of several demonstrators in late February 2011. Before President Zine El Abidine ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, the popular uprising, from Sidi Bouzid to the capital, cost 69 Tunisians their lives. After 14 January 2011, 269 people were killed, according to the report of the national investigation commission chaired by Taoufik Bouderbala. There was a great deal of anger directed against the "old system", and the political status quo was shaken. A general movement of young people from several towns in the country's southern and inland regions headed for the seat of the government in the Medina of Tunis: the Kasbah. From January to March, the main demands were the collapse of the system and the establishment of a National Constituent Assembly. On 27 February 2011, with tensions running high, the new Prime Minister, aged 85, and his new adviser, aged 45, met at Carthage Palace, and not on Kasbah Square, where the demonstrators had been camped without interruption for over a month and a half, refusing to bring their movement to an end. The demonstrators did manage to secure the departure of the Prime Minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, who was rejected for having held the same position for eleven years under the deposed dictator. The new Prime Minister's task was thus threefold: to defuse the crisis, to restore security, and to guide the country towards elections. His communications adviser, meanwhile, was charged with the role of conveying the Prime Minister's message to a population who were at boiling point and feared having their Revolution "stolen" from them. Mr Sinaoui was particularly struck by Mr Caïd Essebsi's determination, and the way in which he set the tempo for those ministers who served under the outgoing Prime Minister that he was prepared to keep in his government, by giving them a clear roadmap with three priorities: a return to calm, the restoration of security, and the holding of elections. The new Prime Minister would only make one change of his own accord, a change he deemed essential. That was the appointment of Mr Habib Essid as head of the Ministry of the Interior, probably the most sensitive portfolio given the uncertain security situation and the ministry's record under the former regime. Mr Essid, who, following the 2014 elections and the twin victories of Nidaa Tounès in the legislative elections and Mr Caïd Essebsi in the presidential election, would become Mr Caïd Essebsi's Head of Government, was deemed to have "the experience necessary for the position". A senior civil servant with a "detailed knowledge of the administration" and "government experience", Mr Essid had, above all, served as chief of staff to the Minister of the Interior, albeit during a dark period in the 1990s marred by persecution of the political class and of civil society. But apart from the objectives he set for the ministers from the Ghannouchi government as prerequisites to remain in his government, Mr Caïd Essebsi made one non-negotiable demand. He demanded that the ministers in his government abstain from standing in the upcoming elections so as to show greater impartiality and neutrality, vital to maintain the trust of the various political parties. That demand saw two acrimonious resignations from two leading figures in the opposition to Ben Ali: Mr Ahmed Brahim, Minister of Higher Education and Secretary-General of Ettajdid, and Mr Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, Minister for Regional Development and Secretary-General of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP). A few months later, Yassine Brahim, Minister for Infrastructure, decided to leave the Béji Caïd Essebsi (BCE) government in order to concentrate on forming the liberal party he had just created, Afek Tounès. However, he honoured the commitment he made when joining the BCE government and did not stand in the National Constituent Assembly elections. For Mr Sinaoui, Mr Béji Caïd Essebsi's attitude when forming his government illustrates the pragmatism of the man: he was sufficiently open to agree to work with ministers from the outgoing government, even though, apparently, he did not know most of them, but was also very firm about the conditions they must abide by to work with him. His politics were based on two core convictions. It was necessary to restore confidence in the State among the political parties and the public, but it was also necessary to appoint an experienced man to the position deemed the most sensitive, the Interior Ministry. He maintained those stances despite the fact that the appointment of a Ben Ali establishment figure, Mr Habib Essid, was likely to meet with a hostile reception from the public and from the main political parties with a strong base in the street, who were determined to rid the political scene of all those who had held positions of power under the old regime. Mr Sinaoui reminds us that Mr Caïd Essebsi was indeed accused of trying to facilitate the return of figures from the old regime. He dismisses such accusations, reminding us of the path followed by his mentor, a former "Bourguiba loyalist". He exonerates Caïd Essebsi of any rapprochement with Ben Ali's authoritarian regime, pointing out that he only held important responsibilities under Ben Ali's presidency for a year, and that those responsibilities were as President of the Chamber of Deputies. He then resigned and withdrew from political life at the age of 66, an age at which, in politics, many still harbour ambitions for a good few years yet. In the early days of Mr Sinaoui's collaboration with the new transitional Prime Minister, the freedom to demonstrate was brand new, as prior to 14 January, demonstrations by political parties were non-existent due to repression and the single-party system, which excluded multi-party democracy and freedom of political expression. An historic event was taking place in the Kasbah. In addition to the demonstrators occupying Government Square, parties formerly banned from existing and operating were finally occupying the public space, a highly significant moment for the political transition in progress. Among them were the Ennahdha party, finally legalised on 1 March 2011, and the Communist Party of Tunisian Workers (PCOT), led by Mr Hamma Hammami, legalised on 18 March of the same year. The new Essebsi government had to handle an unprecedented situation after decades of political vacuum in which opponents to the regime were not allowed to meet, express their views or even exist. The occupation of the public space in the Kasbah, a place synonymous with power, was highly symbolic. The national anthem was belted out by demonstrators all day long, and assumed a new significance. A battle was framed between the "traitors" of the nation and the "glorious" who had died for their country. "Let no man live in Tunisia who has betrayed her. Let no man live in Tunisia who does not serve in her ranks! We live and die loyal to our country, A life of dignity and a death of glory! ” Mr Sinaoui reveals that he was particularly impressed by the determination of the new transitional Prime Minister when he told the members of his government and his office, who were forced to meet at the presidential palace in Carthage, since they could not get to the Prime Minister's office in the Kasbah, that, if he did not manage to access the Kasbah within a week, he would consider his position untenable, having failed to stamp his authority.