Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: an In-Depth Investigation Into the 1998 Bombings of the U.S
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Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An in-Depth Investigation Into the 1998 Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 2005-17 About the Matthew B. Ridgway Center The Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh is dedicated to producing original and impartial analysis that informs policymakers who must confront diverse challenges to international and human security. Center programs address a range of security concerns—from the spread of terrorism and technologies of mass destruction to genocide, failed states, and the abuse of human rights in repressive regimes. The Ridgway Center is affiliated with the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) and the University Center for International Studies (UCIS), both at the University of Pittsburgh. This working paper is one of several outcomes of Professor William W. Keller’s “Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack” Capstone course from the spring of 2005. Briefing ii iii Briefing iv Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack An In-Depth Investigation Into The 1998 Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania v Briefing vi Credits Project Coordinators Kevin Bernarding Matthew Schuster Lead Editor Becky Champagne Co-Editors Wayne B. Cobb II Sascha Kaplan Don Morrison Secondary Editors Zachary Beus William Strachan Analysts Juliana Bahus, Tanzania Background Zachary Beus, Kenya Background Don Morrison, Kenya Background David Grimes, al Qaeda Background and GIS Specialist Bryan Mazzolini, Chronology, Events of August 7th, 1998, and Conclusions Kevin Bernarding, The Bomb Factory and Executive Summary Joseph Gealy, Embassy Security Sascha Kaplan, Immediate Aftermath Tom Fitzgerald, U.S. Military Response Kate Worley, U.S. Military Response and Conclusions Matthew Schuster, Financing the Attacks and Executive Summary Sarah EnDyke, Signals and Warning Josh Levin, Signals and Warning and Conclusions Kevin Byrne, Post-event Investigation Wayne B. Cobb II, Criminal Investigation Becky Champagne, International Law and Policy Failures William Strachan, Independent Research vii Briefing Special Thanks We would like to thank: Beverly Brizzi Patricia Hermenault Kelly McDevitt Dr. Janne Nolan U.S. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell Michael Scheuer SA Donald Sachtleben, FBI Explosives Lab A special thanks to our professor: Dr. William W. Keller viii Table of Contents Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1 Key Findings on al-Qaeda Operations..................................................................................... 1 Key Findings on U.S. Policy Failures: .................................................................................... 2 Briefing........................................................................................................................................... 4 August 7th, 1998....................................................................................................................... 5 Anatomy of the 1998 Embassy Bombings .............................................................................. 6 The Al Qaeda Chronicle ..........................................................................................................6 U.S. Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Failure....................................................................... 16 Signals and Warnings—U.S. Intelligence Failure................................................................. 19 Emergency Response and the Immediate Aftermath............................................................. 21 The Investigations.................................................................................................................. 21 The United States Military Response .................................................................................... 23 Conclusions and Lessons Learned......................................................................................... 29 Appendices................................................................................................................................... 31 U.S. Foreign Policy................................................................................................................ 31 Horn of Africa as a Region.................................................................................................... 35 Conditions in Kenya that helped to precipitate the U.S. Embassy bombings ....................... 37 Conditions in Tanzania that helped to precipitate the U.S. Embassy bombings ................... 40 Al Qaeda Background............................................................................................................ 44 Orchestrating the Attack........................................................................................................ 52 Chronology of Events............................................................................................................ 63 Building A Bomb................................................................................................................... 68 Crime Scene Investigation..................................................................................................... 70 Financing and Costs of the 1998 United States Embassy Bombings in East Africa............. 71 The Investigation ................................................................................................................... 75 Criminal Charges................................................................................................................... 78 Intelligence Failures at the U.S. Embassies........................................................................... 82 Ambassador Bushnell ............................................................................................................ 83 Security and Readiness:......................................................................................................... 86 United States Policy Reaction ............................................................................................... 95 Operation Infinite Reach........................................................................................................ 96 Policy Failures and the Pathology of the State Department ................................................ 106 International Law and the UN’s Role in the Global Condemnation of Terror.................... 109 Endnotes..................................................................................................................................... 114 ix Briefing Table of Figures Figure 1: East Africa Map by David Grimes................................................................................. 4 Figure 2: Kenya Schema................................................................................................................ 5 Figure 3: Shifa Plant outlined by red box. ................................................................................... 24 Figure 4: Training camps in Afghanistan .................................................................................... 24 Figure 5: Positioning of American forces in Operation Infinite Reach........................................ 25 Figure 6: A Toyota Dyna similar to the vehicle used in the Nairobi, Kenya Bombing............... 68 Figure 7: A Nissan Atlas Refrigerator Truck similar to the vehicle used in the Dar es Salaam, Tanzania bombing........................................................................................................... 69 x Executive Summary On August 7, 1998 al-Qaeda orchestrated nearly simultaneous suicide bombings on the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Saalam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and wounding over 5,000. Many aspects of these attacks are integral to understanding al-Qaeda’s larger campaign against the United States. This document provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of the 1998 bombings. East Africa was an area where Muslims were predominately repressed. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda operations were able to capitalize on the lax border security in the region and found that they were able to carry out their missions effectively. Al-Qaeda began surveillance of the two embassies in early 1993. The information they obtained enabled them to organize and establish the logistics necessary to conduct both attacks. By the mid 1990s al-Qaeda had established an East African cell and the operation was well underway. U.S. foreign policy helped to create conditions favorable to al- Qaeda; Washington largely ignored East Africa and was insensitive to local and regional factors..As a result, al-Qaeda was able to operate virtually unhindered and undetected. Al-Qaeda built an extensive infrastructure of businesses and non-governmental organizations that worked to provide finances, documentation, and legitimate cover for its operations. By 1997, al-Qaeda planning cells were operating efficiently. These cells led the way for the attack unit to begin its systematic process for executing the dual bombings. None of this should have come as a surprise to Washington. U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Prudence Bushnell, sent cables in late 1997 and well into 1998 stressing the embassy’s vulnerability to attack. Washington largely ignored her warnings, insisting that the embassies were only medium priority threats, and more importantly, failed to recognize al-Qaeda as a determined and effective terrorist organization. There were