COVER PHOTO FADI AL-HALABI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES APRIL 2018 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Al Qaeda’s Struggling Washington, DC 20036 202 887 0200 | www.csis.org Campaign in Syria Past, Present, and Future AUTHORS Seth G. Jones Charles Vallee Maxwell B. Markusen A Report of the CSIS TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT Blank APRIL 2018 Al Qaeda’s Struggling Campaign in Syria Past, Present, and Future AUTHORS Seth G. Jones Charles Vallee Maxwell B. Markusen A Report of the CSIS TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Acknowledgments This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship has contributed to its publication. © 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Center for Strategic & International Studies 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org Contents 1 Introduction 4 CHAPTER 1 | Al Qaeda’s Initial Foothold 8 CHAPTER 2 | More Fissures and Discord 10 CHAPTER 3 | The Creation of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham 12 CHAPTER 4 | Al Qaeda’s Challenges 15 CHAPTER 5 | Future Evolution 18 About the Authors | III Introduction As the Islamic State’s control of territory in Iraq, Syria, and other countries declines, al Qaeda has attempted to resurge and reposition itself at the center of global Salafi-jihadist activity.1 Syria has been perhaps its most important prize. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri argued that Syria is a cornerstone in establishing an Islamic government in the heart of the Middle East: “I warn our brothers and our people in Sham that their battle is very serious, for it is a battle in the heart of the Arab and Islamic world, and a battle right outside Jerusalem.”2 Some U.S. officials, such as former director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center Nicholas Rasmussen, warned that al Qaeda’s largest global presence could be in Syria: “In terms of raw numbers, al-Qaeda in Syria could well be the network’s largest affiliate, or at least its most capable in terms of the threat it ultimately represents to U.S. interests.”3 The importance of Syria for al Qaeda’s leadership raises several questions. How has al Qaeda fared in Syria? What have been its most significant challenges? What do answers to these questions suggest about al Qaeda’s future in Syria and the region? For some, al Qaeda’s cunning and concerted efforts in Syria and other countries highlight the group’s resilience and indicate its potential to resurge and rejuvenate.4 To allow this to happen, al Qaeda has moderated its brand, attempted to hide its ties to Syrian affiliates, limited violence against civilians, and established close relationships with local Syrian opposition groups to appear more locally focused and superficially unconcerned with a global agenda. Ayman al-Zawahiri is deliberately playing a steady “long game,” while Western militaries and intelligence agencies focus on the Islamic State.5 Al Qaeda’s approach, according to one account, suggests that it is “flying below the radar,” which has allowed the group “to be the strongest it has been since 9/11” and “the dominant military force in significant swaths of territory in Syria.”6 As former FBI supervisory special agent Ali Soufan noted: “In Syria, more than 20,000 militants . follow the banner” of an al Qaeda- affiliated group. This reality has helped the group transform “itself from a close-knit terrorist outfit 1 We define Salafi-jihadist based on two criteria. First, the individual or group emphasizes the importance of returning to a “pure” Islam, that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors. Second, the group believes that violent jihad is fard ‘ayn (a personal religious duty). 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “O Our Brothers in Sham, Reconcile Among Yourselves,” As-Sahab Media Foundation, released on February 20, 2018. See SITE Intelligence Group, “Al-Qaeda Leader Zawahiri Reiterates Call for Unity in Syria, Tells Fighters to Prepare for Decades-Long War,” February 20, 2018. 3 Bennet Seftel, “First Assad, Then the World: Al Qaeda’s Strategy in Syria,” The Cipher Brief, February 6, 2018. 4 See, for example, Joshua Geltzer, “ISIL, al-Qaeda, and What Goes Viral Next: Why Tomorrow’s Jihadist Movement Might Not Look So Different from Today’s,” in Stephen Tankel, R. Kim Cragin, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Joshua Geltzer, “Policy Roundtable: What Is the Future of the Jihadist Movement?” Texas National Security Review, March 20, 2018; Bruce Hoffman, “Al-Qaeda’s Resurrection,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 6, 2018; Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda’s Strengthening in the Shadows,” American Enterprise Institute, July 13, 2017; Jennifer Cafarella, “The Persistent Threat: Al Qaeda’s Evolution and Resilience,” Institute for the Study of War, July 13, 2017; Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda: Quietly and Patiently Rebuilding,” The Cipher Brief, December 30, 2016; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge,” Hudson Institute, March 1, 2017; and Ali Soufan, “The Resurgent Threat of al Qaeda,” Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2017. 5 Hoffman, “Al Qaeda: Quietly and Patiently Rebuilding”; Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda’s Strengthening in the Shadows”; Cafarella, “The Persistent Threat: Al Qaeda’s Evolution and Resilience.” 6 Gartenstein-Ross and Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge.” | 1 with a handful of struggling affiliates into a vast network of insurgent groups spread from Southeast Asia to northwest Africa.”7 Yet a growing body of evidence suggests that al Qaeda has largely failed to take advantage of the Syrian war.8 Al Qaeda’s evolution from Jabhat al-Nusrah to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and then Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has been characterized by substantial discord. Confusion and finger-pointing have been rampant as individuals have clashed over ideology, territorial control, personalities, loyalty to Ayman al-Zawahiri, and command-and-control relationships. Al Qaeda’s struggles in Syria have also highlighted al-Zawahiri’s deficiencies. The al Qaeda leader has had difficulty communicating with local groups in Syria, been slow to respond to debates in the field, and discovered that some Salafi-jihadist fighters have brazenly disobeyed his guidance. What’s more, Bashar al-Assad’s regime and local groups are slowly strangling al Qaeda fighters and allied organizations in northwestern Syria. As one Salafi-jihadist leader remarked, “The situation in Syria for the jihad is extremely dire.”9 Looking forward, the most significant challenge may be assessing what happens next in Syria and the region. There are still a substantial number of Salafi-jihadists from al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other organizations that exist in Syria, which operate more as fluid networks rather than as formal groups. These networks are likely to scatter to local sanctuaries in Syria, Turkey, and Iraq in the face of aggressive campaigns. Some may also leave for other battlefields like Libya and Yemen, attempt to return to their countries of origin, or head to regions like the Caucasus or the Balkans to conduct attacks or establish sanctuaries. Many will likely be battle-hardened, religiously zealous, and have improved skills in combat, bombmaking, and counterintelligence. The military campaign by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Russia in northwestern Syria may push additional extremists into Turkey, threatening its stability. Turkey’s aid to Salafi-jihadist groups operating in areas like Idlib, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, may also increase the possibility of blowback, as the Syrian regime discovered following its support to militants in Iraq after the U.S. invasion. 7 Soufan, “The Resurgent Threat of al Qaeda.” 8 On assessments that outline al Qaeda’s problems in Syria, see, for example, Daniel L. Byman, “An Al-Qa’ida Setback in Syria?,” Brookings Institution, December 8, 2017; Charles Lister, “How al-Qa’ida Lost Control of Its Syrian Affiliate: The Inside Story,” CTC Sentinel, February 2018, 1–8. 9 The remarks are by Abu al-Harith al-Masri from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. See Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “The Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham-al-Qaeda Dispute: Primary Texts (IV),” December 13, 2017, www.aymennjawad.org/2017/12/the-hayat- tahrir-al-sham-al-qaeda-dispute-primary-3. 2 | Al Qaeda’s Struggling Campaign in Syria Figure 1: Control of Terrain, Idlib Province, February 2018 Source: CSIS Transnational Threats Project and CSIS iDeas Lab. Adapted from CARTO and Mapbox. Data from Assistance Coordination Unit’s Information Management Unit.