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Al Qaeda's Struggling Campaign in Syria: Past, Present, and Future
COVER PHOTO FADI AL-HALABI/AFP/GETTY IMAGES APRIL 2018 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Al Qaeda’s Struggling Washington, DC 20036 202 887 0200 | www.csis.org Campaign in Syria Past, Present, and Future AUTHORS Seth G. Jones Charles Vallee Maxwell B. Markusen A Report of the CSIS TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT Blank APRIL 2018 Al Qaeda’s Struggling Campaign in Syria Past, Present, and Future AUTHORS Seth G. Jones Charles Vallee Maxwell B. Markusen A Report of the CSIS TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. -
Women in Islamic State Propaganda
Contents 1. Key findings ............................................................................................................... 3 2. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 5 3. Methodology ............................................................................................................. 6 4. Islamic State narratives and incentives ..................................................................... 7 4.1. The caliphate: a shield and safe haven for Sunni Muslims ....................................... 7 4.2. Hijra: a religious obligation ....................................................................................... 8 4.3. Finding roots in a jihadi feminism ........................................................................... 11 4.4. A new wave of jihadi torchbearers ......................................................................... 13 5. Life for women in the caliphate .............................................................................. 14 5.1. Well-defined parameters: rules and regulations .................................................... 14 5.2. Islamic State women: mothers first and foremost ................................................. 20 5.3. Patient and steadfast supporters ............................................................................ 21 5.4. Women in combat: the revival of the early Islamic mujahida ................................ 22 5.5. Women and education ........................................................................................... -
CTC Sentinel Welcomes Submissions
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Objective • Relevant • Rigorous | February 2018 • Volume 11, Issue 2 FEATURE ARTICLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE Al-Qa`ida's Syrian Loss Neil Basu Senior National Coordinator for How al-Qa`ida lost its afliate in Syria Counterterrorism Policing in the Charles Lister United Kingdom FEATURE ARTICLE Editor in Chief 1 How al-Qa`ida Lost Control of its Syrian Afliate: The Inside Story Charles Lister Paul Cruickshank Managing Editor INTERVIEW Kristina Hummel 10 A View from the CT Foxhole: Neil Basu, Senior National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Policing in the United Kingdom EDITORIAL BOARD Raffaello Pantucci Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. Department Head ANALYSIS Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) 15 Can the UAE and its Security Forces Avoid a Wrong Turn in Yemen? Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Price, Ph.D. Michael Horton Director, CTC 20 Letters from Home: Hezbollah Mothers and the Culture of Martyrdom Kendall Bianchi Brian Dodwell Deputy Director, CTC 25 Beyond the Conflict Zone: U.S. HSI Cooperation with Europol Miles Hidalgo CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is proud to mark its 15th year anniversary this month. In this issue’s feature article, Charles Lister tells the U.S. Military Academy inside story of how al-Qa`ida lost control of its Syrian afliate, drawing on the 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall public statements of several key protagonists as well as interviews with Islamist sources in Syria. In the West Point, NY 10996 summer of 2016, al-Qa`ida’s Syrian afliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, announced it was uncoupling from al-Qa`ida and rebranding itself. -
How Al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,And the Islamic State
How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,and the Islamic State THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT THREAT Aaron Y. Zelin, Editor “Al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations never stopped being a primary terrorism concern for me, for the U.S. intelligence community, and for the broader counterter- rorism community. Not a day has gone by in my entire tenure at NCTC where our emphasis on al-Qaeda has been anything less than a top priority. That’s the beauty of working on terrorism issues. You get the privilege of having multiple top priorities.” —Nicholas Rasmussen Director, National Counterterrorism Center, comments at The Washington Institute March 1, 2017 How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,and the Islamic State THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT THREAT Aaron Y. Zelin EDITOR THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY www.washingtoninstitute.org The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Policy Focus 153 First publication June 2017 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2017 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 11111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org Design: 1000colors Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | v ABOUT THE WORKSHOP | vi CONTRIBUTORS | viii KEY AL-QAEDA-RELATED EVENTS, 2009–17 | xii ■ OVERALL THREAT Introduction AARON Y. -
2 April 2020 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
Res. 1267/1989/2253 List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1267/1989/2253 Generated on: 2 April 2020 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals QDi.400 Name: 1: IYAD 2: NAZMI 3: SALIH 4: KHALIL إﻳﺎد ﻧﻈﻤﻲ ﺻﺎﻟﺢ ﺧﻠﻴﻞ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1974 POB: Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ayyad Nazmi Salih Khalil b) Eyad Nazmi Saleh Khalil Low quality a.k.a.: a) Iyad al-Toubasi b) Iyad al-Tubasi c) Abu al-Darda' d) Abu-Julaybib al-Urduni e) Abu-Julaybib Nationality: Jordan Passport no: a) Jordan 654781 (approximately issued in 2009) b) Jordan 286062 (issued on 5 April 1999 at Zarqa, Jordan, expired on 4 April 2004) National identification no: na Address: Syrian Arab Republic (Coastal area of. Location as of April 2016) Listed on: 22 Feb. 2017 Other information: Leader of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) for coastal area of Syrian Arab Republic since March 2016. -
Abu Al-Layth Al-Libi
Abu al-Layth al-Libi Jihadi Bios Project Author: Kévin Jackson Editor: Nelly Lahoud Abu al-Layth al-Libi By Kévin Jackson The views expressed in this report are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Combating Terrorism Center, the US Military Academy, the Department of Defense or the US government. Introduction In the tradition of post-9/11 senior Arab militant figures operating in Khurasan (the Afghanistan-Pakistan region), there is little doubt as to the standing of Libyan jihadi commander Abu al-Layth al-Libi. If Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri came to be the most prominent Arab-Afghan leaders in the wake of the so-called “War on Terror,” these two were largely absent from the field command in Afghanistan and Pakistan, instead confining their role to strategic guidance by defining the parameters of the global jihad. When it came to leading combat on the front lines, it was al-Libi, a longtime leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), who rapidly established himself as the champion of the Arab-Afghan milieu after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Just like the Saudi jihadi commander Khattab (Samir al-Suwaylim) in Chechnya, al-Libi became the public face of the Arab field command in Afghanistan, personally training and directing his fighters on the battlefield. Coupled with his pioneering role in publicizing the activities of the insurgency, his strong dedication and involvement in the day-to-day armed jihad in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region earned him popularity and respect in jihadi circles. -
Durham E-Theses
Durham E-Theses Recalibrating Youth Bulge Theory Saudi Arabia's Youth and the Threat to Security SAYCE, TERENCE,RICHARD How to cite: SAYCE, TERENCE,RICHARD (2016) Recalibrating Youth Bulge Theory Saudi Arabia's Youth and the Threat to Security , Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11483/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 Abstract This thesis addresses the question of whether Saudi Arabia’s youth bulge presents a threat to domestic and international security. Youth bulge theory informs us that if countries are home to large youth populations whilst experiencing high levels of unemployment they are susceptible to civil unrest, terrorism or civil war. It is irrefutable that Saudi Arabia has a youth bulge, high unemployment and -- in spite of its perceived prosperity -- it has experienced both domestic and global terrorism, with 15 of the hijackers on September 11, 2001 coming from the Kingdom. -
Volume XI, Issue 6 December 2017 PERSPECTIVES on TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 6
ISSN 2334-3745 Volume XI, Issue 6 December 2017 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 6 Table of Contents Welcome from the Editors..................................................................................................................................3 Articles Thirty Years after its Foundation - Where is al-Qaida Going?.............................................5 by Anne Stenersen Revisiting al-Qaida’s Foundation and Early History.............................................................17 by Leah Farrall Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions about the Pre-2001 Period............................................................................................................38 by Don Rassler The Jihadi Social Movement (JSM): Between Factional Hegemonic Drive, National Realities, and Transnational Ambitions................................................................55 by Jerome Drevon Jihadi Competition and Political Preferences........................................................................63 by Tore Hammin The Spread of its Message: Studying the Prominence of al-Qaida Materials in UK Terrorism Investigations..................................................................................................89 by Donald Holbrook Islamic State and Technology – a Literature Review...........................................................101 by Truls Tønnessen Islamic State and Al-Nusra: Exploring Determinants of Chemical Weapons Usage Patterns............................................................................................................................................112 -
B M246 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27
02002R0881 — EN — 13.10.2020 — 120.001 — 1 This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document ►B ►M246 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida organisations ◄ (OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2002 of 3 June 2002 L 145 14 4.6.2002 ►M2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2002 of 4 September 2002 L 237 3 5.9.2002 ►M3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1644/2002 of 13 September 2002 L 247 25 14.9.2002 ►M4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1754/2002 of 1 October 2002 L 264 23 2.10.2002 ►M5 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1823/2002 of 11 October 2002 L 276 26 12.10.2002 ►M6 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1893/2002 of 23 October 2002 L 286 19 24.10.2002 ►M7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1935/2002 of 29 October 2002 L 295 11 30.10.2002 ►M8 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2083/2002 of 22 November 2002 L 319 22 23.11.2002 ►M9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 145/2003 of 27 January 2003 L 23 22 28.1.2003 ►M10 Commission Regulation (EC) No 215/2003 of 3 February 2003 L 28 41 4.2.2003 ►M11 Commission Regulation -
26 August 2019 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
Res. 1267/1989/2253 List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1267/1989/2253 Generated on: 26 August 2019 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals QDi.400 Name: 1: IYAD 2: NAZMI 3: SALIH 4: KHALIL إﻳﺎد ﻧﻈﻤﻲ ﺻﺎﻟﺢ ﺧﻠﻴﻞ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1974 POB: Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ayyad Nazmi Salih Khalil b) Eyad Nazmi Saleh Khalil Low quality a.k.a.: a) Iyad al-Toubasi b) Iyad al-Tubasi c) Abu al-Darda' d) Abu-Julaybib al-Urduni e) Abu-Julaybib Nationality: Jordan Passport no: a) Jordan 654781 (approximately issued in 2009) b) Jordan 286062 (issued on 5 April 1999 at Zarqa, Jordan, expired on 4 April 2004) National identification no: na Address: Syrian Arab Republic (Coastal area of. Location as of April 2016) Listed on: 22 Feb. 2017 Other information: Leader of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) for coastal area of Syrian Arab Republic since March 2016. -
The Way of Compassion and Unity in The
THE WAY OF COMPASSION AND UNITY IN THE APPLICATION OF THE SUNNAH OF THE PROPHET ( MAY GOD BLESS HIM AND GRANT HIM PEACE ) IN PAYING ATTENTION AND INSPECTING PJAEE, 17(7) (2020) THE WAY OF COMPASSION AND UNITY IN THE APPLICATION OF THE SUNNAH OF THE PROPHET (MAY GOD BLESS HIM AND GRANT HIM PEACE) IN PAYING ATTENTION AND INSPECTING Ass. Prof. Dr. Salah Naji Abdul Zahra Al-Asadi Department of Quran Sciences, College of Education for Humanities, Al-Muthanna University, Iraq. Ass. Prof. Dr. Salah Naji Abdul Zahra Al-Asadi , The Way Of Compassion And Unity In The Application Of The Sunnah Of The Prophet (May God Bless Him And Grant Him Peace) In Paying Attention And Inspecting , Palarch’s Journal Of Archaeology Of Egypt/Egyptology 17(7). ISSN 1567-214x. Keywords: The path of familiarity, inspection, consoles us with little and much, lose the sad. Abstract: The research aims to identify the size of the great effort that was exerted by our Noble Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace), the times he dedicates to sowing the seeds of love and brotherhood among people.Uprooting the roots of envy and animosity so that his nation may be a strong, cohesive, fraternal and loving nation. This research included an introduction in which mentioned the meaning of inspection linguistically and idiomatically, mentioned a number of the attitudes of our Noble Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) in caring for people and examining their affairs, eleven positions, they were not exclusive, but rather they were examples of the fragrant biography and the purified Sunnah, which should refer to in our time to patch up what has been torn from our social fabric, and heal what cracked from our brotherly composition. -
Yaqeen Hadith 32
Chapter 32 ! !1 Chapter 32: Racism, Supremacism & True Patriotism بسم ال الرحمن الرحيم َع ْن أَ ِبي ُه َريْ َرةَ، َقا َل َقا َل َر ُسو ُل الَِ :said (ﷺ) Abu Hurairah (ra) reported: The Prophet صلى ال عليه وسلم " إِ َن الََ َعزَ Allah, Most High, has removed from you the pride of َو َج َل َق ْد أَ ْذ َه َب َعنْ ُك ْم ُعبِيَ َة ا ْل َجا ِهلِيَ ِة .the pre-Islamic period and its boasting in ancestors ِ ِ ِ ِ َو َف ْخ َر َها ِبالبَاء ُم ْؤم ٌن َتقيٌ َو َفا ِج ٌر َشقيٌ One is only a pious believer or a miserable sinner. You ِ are sons of Adam, and Adam came from dust. Let the أَ ْنتُ ْم بَنُو آ َد َم َوآ َد ُم م ْن ُت َرا ٍب َليَ َد َع َن ِ people cease to boast about their ancestors. They are ِر َجا ٌل َف ْخ َر ُه ْم ِبأَ ْق َوامٍ إِ َن َما ُه ْم َف ْح ٌم م ْن merely fuel in Jahannam; or they will certainly be of less َف ْحمِ َج َهنَ َم أَ ْو َليَ ُكو ُن َن أَ ْه َو َن َع َلى الَِ account with Allah than the beetle which rolls dung with " ِم َن ا ْلجِ ْع َل ِن ا َل ِتي َت ْد َفعُ ِبأَ ْن ِف َها النَ ْ َت its nose. [سن أبي داود] [Sunan Abi Dawud] Introduction - Last week we discussed immigration and refugees. One of the main factors in how refugees are treated is racism and nationalism.