CTC Sentinel Welcomes Submissions

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Objective • Relevant • Rigorous | February 2018 • Volume 11, Issue 2 FEATURE ARTICLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE Al-Qaìda's Syrian Loss Neil Basu Senior National Coordinator for How al-Qaìda lost its afliate in Syria Counterterrorism Policing in the Charles Lister United Kingdom FEATURE ARTICLE Editor in Chief 1 How al-Qaìda Lost Control of its Syrian Afliate: The Inside Story Charles Lister Paul Cruickshank Managing Editor INTERVIEW Kristina Hummel 10 A View from the CT Foxhole: Neil Basu, Senior National Coordinator for Counterterrorism Policing in the United Kingdom EDITORIAL BOARD Raffaello Pantucci Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. Department Head ANALYSIS Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) 15 Can the UAE and its Security Forces Avoid a Wrong Turn in Yemen? Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Price, Ph.D. Michael Horton Director, CTC 20 Letters from Home: Hezbollah Mothers and the Culture of Martyrdom Kendall Bianchi Brian Dodwell Deputy Director, CTC 25 Beyond the Conflict Zone: U.S. HSI Cooperation with Europol Miles Hidalgo CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is proud to mark its 15th year anniversary this month. In this issue’s feature article, Charles Lister tells the U.S. Military Academy inside story of how al-Qaìda lost control of its Syrian afliate, drawing on the 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall public statements of several key protagonists as well as interviews with Islamist sources in Syria. In the West Point, NY 10996 summer of 2016, al-Qaìda’s Syrian afliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, announced it was uncoupling from al-Qaìda and rebranding itself. Al-Qaìda’s deputy leader at the time, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, released a message Phone: (845) 938-8495 endorsing the move, which even included a previously unheard audio clip of Ayman al-Zawahiri stressing Email: [email protected] that organizational links should be sacrificed if necessary for unity, creating the impression that al-Qaìda’s Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ paramount leader had also sanctioned the decision. What appeared to be a carefully choreographed set of announcements made many analysts conclude the split was nothing more than a PR exercise, designed to advance the local aims of al-Qaìda in Syria by improving al-Nusra’s standing among Syrian rebel groups SUBSMISSIONS and insulating it from international pressure. But this interpretation was challenged by a bombshell mes- The CTC Sentinel welcomes submissions. sage released by al-Zawahiri on November 28, 2017. Al-Qaìda’s leader publicly revealed that not only had he not endorsed the split, but he regarded it as a “a violation of the covenant.” Please contact us at [email protected]. “Al-Zawahiri’s interjection was a watershed moment,” Lister writes, “making clear to the wider global jihadi movement that a real split had taken place between al-Qaìda and its Syrian afliate.” One function The views expressed in this report are of the split has been the beginnings of a tense modus vivendi between hardcore al-Qaìda loyalists in Syria those of the authors and not of the U.S. and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (the latest rebrand of al-Nusra). The result, Lister argues, is “a complex counterterrorism threat, in which a locally focused jihadi outfit with a sizable 12,000 fighters continues to control Military Academy, the Department of the territory, govern people, and maintain sources of local finance, while accepting—even grudgingly—a deeply Army, or any other agency of the U.S. dangerous, small, tight-knit clique of al-Qaìda terrorists committed to attacking the West. That image Government. looks eerily similar to the Taliban-al-Qaìda relationship in Afghanistan in 2000-2001, the consequences of which are well known to all.” Our interview this month is with Deputy Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, the Senior National Co- Cover: Image captured from an Hayat ordinator for Counterterrorism Policing in the United Kingdom. Michael Horton examines the challenges Tahrir al-Sham video entitled "The Battle to faced by the UAE in its counterinsurgency campaign against al-Qaìda in Yemen. Kendall Bianchi looks at Liberate al-Mushirfa and Abu Dali Villages," how Hezbollah has used the mothers of fighters killed in Syria to promote martyrdom. Miles Hidalgo, one of the CTC’s Downing Scholars, provides a first-hand account of the cooperation between Europol and U.S. which was produced by "Amjad Foundation Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) at Europol’s headquarters in The Hague. for Video Production" and released in Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief December 2017 FEBRUARY 2018 CTC SENTINEL 1 How al-Qaìda Lost Control of its Syrian Affiliate: Te Inside Story By Charles Lister Jabhat al-Nusra’s successor, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), on the The Syrian jihad presented invaluable opportunities for one side against al-Qaìda and its loyalists in Syria on the other, al-Qaìda to establish what it had always sought: a pop- mediation eforts energized by prominent al-Qaìda ideologues and ular, broadly representative jihadi resistance movement Shura Council members managed to secure three days of détente in that could support the creation of an Islamic government January 2018—though that soon crumbled. presiding over an expanse of important territory. Jabhat In fact, the al-Qaìda statement’s clear acknowledgement of two al-Nusra assumed the mantle of responsibility in seeking distinct factions of fighters—the soldiers of al-Qaìda in the Levant (junud qa’edat al-jihad fi’l Sham) and the sincere mujahid brothers to achieve this grand goal. And it did remarkably well, up (al-mujahideen al-sadiqin)—was the group’s first public admission to a point. As conflict dynamics evolved, however, the goal that al-Qaìda and HTS had become two separate entities.a That of transforming into a mass movement with social and po- admission underlined how divisive Jabhat al-Nusra’s recent evo- litical popularity became an increasingly distant objective. lution had been, significant enough to catalyze the formation of an In its determination to aggressively achieve its grand goals, entirely separate al-Qaìda loyalist entity. Jabhat al-Nusra prioritized localism over globalism, which It is undoubtedly true that al-Qaìda’s reversal of fortunes in as time passed, pushed its relationship with al-Qaìda to Syria was, in part, a consequence of shifting conflict dynamics, as the breaking point. Russia’s September 2015 intervention turned the tide of regime losses and secured a series of consequential military victories, in- cluding in Aleppo. That reality, coupled with the West’s tunnel-like o confront … blatant aggression and brutal occupation, fixation on combating the Islamic State and increasing political it is absolutely vital to unite on the basis of Tawhid, fatigue with backing the anti-Assad efort, had combined through [to] organize our ranks to fight in the way of Allah, 2016-2017 to create conditions in which al-Qaìda could no lon- and [to] transcend our disagreements and disputes … ger benefit from intense levels of conflict (which had given it its We must understand that we are in for a long war, a best chance to acquire credibility) and a viable, potent revolution- Tbattle of creed and awareness before weapons and combat; a battle ary opposition (which it had embedded into and partnered with to for the sake of upright conduct, inculcating ethics and abstinence consolidate its credibility). from this world … So let us cooperate, come closer, join ranks, correct It was facing these far less favorable conditions that had prompt- mistakes and fill the gaps. ed an internal discussion around a need to use additional meth- This is a clear-cut order from me to our brotherly soldiers of ods to secure popular acceptance and support. After all, as Jabhat Al-Qaeda in the Levant, to cooperate with your sincere Mujahid al-Nusra had repeatedly explained,2 achieving its ultimate objective brothers—those who agree with you as well as those who disagree of establishing an Islamic state in Syria would only ever be feasi- with you—for the sake of Jihad and fighting the Baathists, Safavid ble if it could acquire a sufciently large and broad spread of sup- Rawafidh, Crusaders and the Khawarij.1 port from those living in its midst. The primacy of military conflict Those were the words of al-Qaìda’s General Leadership, is- through 2012-2015 may have allowed for Jabhat al-Nusra’s rise to sued within a stern directive on January 7, 2018, and intended for prominence and acquisition of some popularity, but shifting dy- a jihadi audience in Syria. There, al-Qaìda’s prospects for success namics in 2016 meant additional methods were needed to sustain have faced existential challenges in recent years. Now, al-Qaìda’s and grow existing support. claim to command any Syrian afliate stands on the thinnest of Central within this challenge was one issue: could a self-identi- foundations, if any at all. Instead, the once-dominant al-Qaìda fied al-Qaìda afliate broaden its support base to the extent nec- afliate Jabhat al-Nusra embarked on a series of rebrands through essary not only to negotiate a broad-spectrum merger (not alliance) 2016-2017 that although intended to further its long-term objec- with Syria’s armed opposition but to secure widespread support for tives, served only to engender crippling internal divisions and a de a jihadi government? Making use of information released publicly facto break from al-Qaìda. After a months-long public feud pitting by involved jihadis as well as deeper insight provided to this author by individuals directly and indirectly involved in Jabhat al-Nusra’s Charles Lister is a senior fellow and Director of Extremism & Counter-Terrorism at the Middle East Institute.

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