DOCSLIB.ORG

The Rhosus: Arrival in Beirut

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Rhosus: Arrival in Beirut HUMAN RIGHTS “They Killed Us from the Inside” An Investigation into the August 4 Beirut Blast WATCH “They Killed Us from the Inside” An Investigation into the August 4 Beirut Blast Copyright © 2021 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-931-5 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org AUGUST 2021 ISBN: 978-1-62313-931-5 “They Killed Us from the Inside” An Investigation into the August 4 Beirut Blast Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 9 Port of Beirut: A Case Study in Lebanese Authorities’ Mismanagement and Corruption ...... 11 The Rhosus: Arrival in Beirut ............................................................................................ 20 Beirut Port: An Ill Fated or Planned Destination? ...................................................................... 21 Excusing the Failure to Correctly Identify the Cargo ................................................................. 26 State Negligence or Malfeasance? February 2014-August 2020......................................... 31 Ministry of Public Works and Transport ................................................................................... 34 Failure to Investigate and Communicate the Danger .......................................................... 35 Failure to Store the Ammonium Nitrate in a Secure Manner ............................................... 41 Profit not Protection: Ministry Interventions Unduly Limited .............................................. 47 Judicial Charges for the August 4, 2020 Explosion ............................................................ 50 Ministry of Finance ................................................................................................................. 52 Repeated Warnings about Danger ..................................................................................... 52 Repeated Requests for Judicial Authorization to Sell or Reexport the Ammonium Nitrate ... 54 Judicial Charges for the August 4, 2020 Explosion ............................................................ 57 Lebanese Army ....................................................................................................................... 58 Knowledge of the Danger .................................................................................................. 59 Responsibility to act ........................................................................................................ 60 Failure to Act .................................................................................................................... 61 Judicial Charges for the August 4, 2020 Explosion ........................................................... 62 State Security ......................................................................................................................... 63 Investigation without Urgency: Delayed and Incomplete Warnings ................................... 64 Judicial Charges for the August 4, 2020 Explosion ............................................................ 70 Ministry of Interior and Municipalities ..................................................................................... 71 Knowledge of the Ammonium Nitrate ................................................................................ 72 Judicial Charges for the August 4, 2020 Explosion ............................................................ 76 Higher Defense Council .......................................................................................................... 78 Knowledge of the Danger .................................................................................................. 79 Failure to Act ................................................................................................................... 84 Judicial Charges for the August 4, 2020 Explosion ........................................................... 89 August 4, 2020 ................................................................................................................. 91 The Domestic Investigation ............................................................................................ 100 International Human Rights Law ...................................................................................... 113 Right to Life and Right to an Effective Remedy ........................................................................113 Independence of Judges ....................................................................................................... 116 Due Process and Fair Trial ..................................................................................................... 118 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 120 To the Lebanese Government ................................................................................................ 120 To the Lebanese Parliament .................................................................................................. 121 To the Judicial Investigator .................................................................................................... 124 To Lebanon’s International Partners and Donors ................................................................... 124 To the United States Government .......................................................................................... 124 To the French Government .................................................................................................... 125 To the UN Human Rights Council ........................................................................................... 125 To the Special Procedures Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council: .............................. 125 Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................... 126 Annex 1: Chronology of Events ........................................ Annex 2: Source Documents .................................................... Annex 3: Translations of Source Documents ........................... Annex 4: Letters to Officials, Companies, and Political Parties .. Annex 5: 3FTQPOTFTUP)VNBO3JHIUT8BUDI........................................ 690 Summary Following decades of government mismanagement and corruption at Beirut’s port, on August 4, 2020, one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history pulverized the port and damaged over half the city. The explosion resulted from the detonation of tonnes of ammonium nitrate, a combustible chemical compound commonly used in agriculture as a high nitrate fertilizer, but which can also be used to manufacture explosives. The cargo of ammonium nitrate had entered Beirut’s port on a Moldovan-flagged ship, the Rhosus, in November 2013, and had been offloaded into hangar 12 in Beirut’s port on October 23 and 24, 2014. The Beirut port explosion killed 218 people, including nationals of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Philippines, Pakistan, Palestine, the Netherlands, Canada, Germany, France, Australia, and the United States. It wounded 7,000 people, of whom at least 150 acquired a physical disability; caused untold psychological harm; and damaged 77,000 apartments, displacing over 300,000 people. At least three children between the ages of 2 and 15 lost their lives. Thirty-one children required hospitalization, 1,000 children were injured, and 80,000 children were left without a home. The explosion affected 163 public and private schools and rendered half of Beirut’s healthcare centers nonfunctional, and it impacted 56 percent of the private businesses in Beirut. There was extensive damage to infrastructure, including transport, energy, water supply and sanitation, and municipal services totaling US$390-475 million in losses. According to the World Bank, the explosion caused an estimated $3.8-4.6 billion in material damage. The explosion also resulted in ammonia gas and nitrogen oxides being released into the air, potentially with toxins from other materials that may have also ignited as a result of the explosion. Ammonia gas and nitrogen oxides are harmful to the environment as well as to the respiratory system. The destruction is estimated to have created up to 800,000 tonnes of construction and demolition waste that likely contains hazardous chemicals that can damage health through direct exposure, or soil and water contamination. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has estimated that the cost of cleaning up the environmental
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Lebanon: Vigil Insight Economic and Political Situation Alert 18 June 2021
    Lebanon: Vigil InSight Economic and Political Situation Alert 18 June 2021 Twenty nations agree to provide increased aid to “suffering and hungry” Lebanese army suggesting institutions are on the brink of collapse. KEY CONCERNS FOR AID AGENCIES WORKING IN LEBANON ● There is a SIGNIFICANT risk that continued public protests could evolve into food riots, and already rising crime will increase as low income groups struggle to feed themselves and many of the more powerful profit from the crisis. ● Traffic disruptions due to road closures have also been reported in Tripoli city. Road-blocking protests are LIKELY to continue in the near term and could escalate, especially after dark. Security forces may use tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds and reopen obstructed roads. (see also Aid Security Risk in Lebanon) OVERVIEW Incidents Jan-Mar 2021 The Lebanese Army is asking for international aid. A French organised UN donor conference for the Lebanese army, held on 17 June (the same day as a general strike), drew promises of food, fuel, medical supplies, and spare parts from Western and Arab donors including the US. This follows army chief General Joseph Aoun’s March public complaint that troops were “suffering and hungry”, reiterated in a speech on 15 June. Western states see the army – which is widely respected across the political and religious divides – as a bulwark against Iranian-backed Hezbollah. General Aoun also criticised the country’s political leaders this week, saying “we are forced to turn to allied states to secure aid and I am ready to go to the end of the world to procure assistance”.
    [Show full text]
  • The New Lebanese Government
    The New Lebanese Government Assessment Report by the Lebanese Information Center July 2011 www.licus.org cleared for public release /D1 Nearly five months after his appointment as Prime Minister, Najib Mikati finally formed the Lebanese Cabinet on June 13, 2011. The 30-member cabinet, in which Hezbollah and its allies hold a majority, was formed following arduous negotiations between the new majority, constituted of the March 8 parties, and their allies. The March 14 alliance had announced that it will not take part in the Mikati cabinet following the forced collapse of Hariri’s unity government. Furthermore, appointed Druze Minister of State, Talal Arslan, announced his immediate resignation from the government to protest not being given a portfolio. Despite clearly [and exclusively] representing the Pro-Syrian camp, Prime Minister Mikati announced that his government is “a government for all Lebanese, no matter what party they support, be it the majority or the opposition.” Contents The New Government – Statistics in Brief ..................................................................................................2 Cabinet Members .................................................................................................................................... 2 Composition by Party Affiliation ........................................................................................................... 3 Composition by Coalition ......................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Equatorial Guinea | Freedom House
    Equatorial Guinea | Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/equatorial-guinea A. ELECTORAL PROCESS: 0 / 12 A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Africa’s longest-serving head of state, has held power since 1979. He was awarded a new seven-year term in the April 2016 presidential election, reportedly winning 93.5 percent of the vote. The main opposition party at the time, Convergence for Social Democracy (CPDS), boycotted the election, and other factions faced police violence, detentions, and torture. One opposition figure who had been barred from running for president, Gabriel Nsé Obiang Obono, was put under house arrest during the election, and police used live ammunition against supporters gathered at his home. A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 The bicameral parliament consists of a 70-seat Senate and a 100-seat Chamber of Deputies, with members of both chambers serving five-year terms. Fifteen senators are appointed by the president, 55 are directly elected, and there can be several additional ex officio members. The Chamber of Deputies is directly elected. In the November 2017 legislative elections, the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE) and its subordinate allied parties won 99 seats in the lower house, all 55 of the elected seats in the Senate, and control of all municipal councils. The opposition CI, led by Nsé Obiang, took a single seat in the Chamber of Deputies and a seat on the capital’s city council.
    [Show full text]
  • Narendra Modi Takes Oath As Prime Minister of India for the Second Term
    # 1 Indian American Weekly: Since 2006 VOL 13 ISSUE 22 ● NEW YORK / DALLAS ● MAY 31 - JUNE 06, 2019 ● ENQUIRIES: 646-247-9458 www.theindianpanorama.news IAF chief Dhanoa is new chairman of chiefs Narendra Modi Takes Oath as Prime of staff committee Minister of India for the Second Term Amit Shah inducted into Cabinet 36 ministers sworn in for a second term 20 MPs take oath of office as cabinet ministers for the first time 24 cabinet ministers, ministers of state sworn in Nine sworn in as MoS (Independent charge) Air Chief Marshal B S Dhanoa on Wednesday , May 29, received the baton Smriti Irani, 5 other women in Modi government of Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee from outgoing Navy Chief Admiral Sunil NEW DELHI (TIP): Narendra Modi Lanba who retires on May 31. took oath of office and secrecy as the NEW DELHI (TIP): "Air Chief Prime Minister of India for a second Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa will consecutive term amid thunderous be the Chairman COSC with effect applause from a select gathering in the from May 31 consequent to sprawling forecourt of the Rashtrapati relinquishment of charge by Bhavan, May 30th evening. Admiral Sunil Lanba upon President Ram Nath Kovind superannuation," a Defense ministry administered the oath to Modi, 24 spokesperson said. Cabinet colleagues, nine Ministers of The Chairman of Chiefs of Staff State (Independent Charge) and 24 Committee is tasked with ensuring Ministers of State. The loudest cheer synergy among the three services was reserved for BJP chief Amit Shah, and evolve common strategy to deal whose induction means the party will with external security challenges have to elect a new president.
    [Show full text]
  • Protest and State–Society Relations in the Middle East and North Africa
    SIPRI Policy Paper PROTEST AND STATE– 56 SOCIETY RELATIONS IN October 2020 THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA dylan o’driscoll, amal bourhrous, meray maddah and shivan fazil STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra (Algeria) Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States) DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom) Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: + 46 8 655 9700 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org Protest and State– Society Relations in the Middle East and North Africa SIPRI Policy Paper No. 56 dylan o’driscoll, amal bourhrous, meray maddah and shivan fazil October 2020 © SIPRI 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law. Contents Preface v Acknowledgements vi Summary vii Abbreviations ix 1. Introduction 1 Figure 1.1. Classification of countries in the Middle East and North Africa by 2 protest intensity 2. State–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa 5 Mass protests 5 Sporadic protests 16 Scarce protests 31 Highly suppressed protests 37 Figure 2.1.
    [Show full text]
  • A Conversation with Raghida Dergham
    TM: Welcome everybody to this sixth installment in the Harvard Kennedy School American University in Cairo series of conversations with Arab thought leaders on the 2020 U.S. election and America's changing role in the Middle East. I’m going to turn this over to my co-pilot Karim Haggag to introduce our distinguished guest for today but let me Just remind everybody what it is we are doing here. Each weeK we've been meeting with leading Arabs from the worlds of policy practice and ideas to explore their perceptions of the current season of politics in the United States and to get their sense of where they thinK the United States, the world's sole superpower, is heading, and particularly, what all of this means for the Middle East. So far in this series, we've interviewed some really interesting and extraordinary people, including prime minister Ayad Allawi, the Emirati intellectual AbdulKhaleq Abdulla, the Iraqi-Emirati Journalist Mina al-Oraibi, and these conversations will soon be available on our website and on podcast streaming services. We also have one more conversation. This is the penultimate conversation before we break for the winter, one more conversation next weeK with the Saudi editor of the al-Arabiya English, Mohammed Alyahya, and we hope that you'll Join us for that. Let me now turn it over to my co-pilot in this endeavor, Karim Haggag of the American University in Cairo School of Global affairs and Public Policy. Karim. KH: ThanK you, TareK, and thanK you everyone for Joining us for this afternoon's discussion.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing Lebanon's Political Paralysis
    MENU Policy Analysis / Congressional Testimony Assessing Lebanon’s Political Paralysis, Economic Crisis, and Challenges for U.S. Policy by David Schenker Jul 29, 2021 Also published in House Foreign Affairs Committee ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Schenker David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Articles & Testimony A former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs diagnoses the country's incapacitated institutions and prescribes remedies for its entrenched corruption and Iranian/Hezbollah domination. he following testimony was prepared for a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the T Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism. The contours of Lebanon’s slow-motion economic collapse are by now well known. In the aftermath of the fifteen- year civil war, Lebanon borrowed huge amounts of money to rebuild, accumulating a mountain of debt that was funded by borrowing from local banks brimming with expatriate remittances. Even as the debt approached an unsustainable level of 150 percent of GDP, new money continued to flow into Lebanon, lured by obscene interest rates, particularly on Lebanese lira deposits—an expensive but effective tactic intended to encourage confidence in the shaky currency. Some early warning signs of impending trouble emerged following the outbreak of the 2011 Syrian civil war, yet the Ponzi scheme endured. Over time, however, the war took a toll on Lebanon’s already troubled economy, as exports decreased, a million refugees arrived, foreign remittances slowed, Gulf state funding dried up (as the Iranian-backed Shia militia Hezbollah increasingly dominated the state), and new funding became unattainable.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm
    LEBANON: MANAGING THE GATHERING STORM Middle East Report N°48 – 5 December 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. A SYSTEM BETWEEN OLD AND NEW.................................................................. 1 A. SETTING THE STAGE: THE ELECTORAL CONTEST..................................................................1 B. THE MEHLIS EFFECT.............................................................................................................5 II. SECTARIANISM AND INTERNATIONALISATION ............................................. 8 A. FROM SYRIAN TUTELAGE TO WESTERN UMBRELLA?............................................................8 B. SHIFTING ALLIANCES..........................................................................................................12 III. THE HIZBOLLAH QUESTION ................................................................................ 16 A. “A NEW PHASE OF CONFRONTATION” ................................................................................17 B. HIZBOLLAH AS THE SHIITE GUARDIAN?..............................................................................19 C. THE PARTY OF GOD TURNS PARTY OF GOVERNMENT.........................................................20 IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 22 A. A BROAD INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR A NARROW AGENDA .......................................22 B. A LEBANESE COURT ON FOREIGN
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon Unstable and Insecure | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2266 Lebanon Unstable and Insecure by David Schenker Jun 11, 2014 ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Schenker David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Brief Analysis Military coordination with Hezbollah may be providing a quick fix, but the country's long-term strength can only be achieved with a reconstituted March 14 coalition. uring his June 4 visit to Lebanon, Secretary of State John Kerry encouraged lawmakers to elect a new D president, pledged $51 million to help Beirut host Syrian refugees, and announced that the administration would seek additional funding for Lebanese security forces. "The bottom line," he said, "is that a secure and stable Lebanon is a prerequisite for a secure and stable region." Coming a day after the "reelection" of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and amidst a presidential vacuum in Beirut, Secretary Kerry's visit actually highlighted Lebanon's insecurity and instability. Regrettably, it is unclear if the administration's latest initiatives will do much to prevent a further deterioration. Presidential Vacuum O n May 25, Michel Suleiman completed his six-year term as president and vacated Baabda Palace. In accordance with the Lebanese constitution, the parliament should have elected a new president by that date, but the pro- Western March 14 bloc and the Hezbollah-led pro-Syrian March 8 coalition have been unable to agree on an acceptable candidate. In the absence of consensus, the political blocs have refused to attend parliamentary sessions since the initial balloting on April 23, preventing the quorum necessary for a vote.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon: Background and US Policy
    Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy name redacted Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs April 4, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R42816 Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy Summary Lebanon’s small geographic size and population belie the important role it has long played in the security, stability, and economy of the Levant and the broader Middle East. Congress and the executive branch have recognized Lebanon’s status as a venue for regional strategic competition and have engaged diplomatically, financially, and at times, militarily to influence events there. For most of its independent existence, Lebanon has been torn by periodic civil conflict and political battles between rival religious sects and ideological groups. External military intervention, occupation, and interference have exacerbated Lebanon’s political struggles in recent decades. Lebanon is an important factor in U.S. calculations regarding regional security, particularly regarding Israel and Iran. Congressional concerns have focused on the prominent role that Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shia Muslim militia, political party, and U.S.-designated terrorist organization, continues to play in Lebanon and beyond, including its recent armed intervention in Syria. Congress has appropriated more than $1 billion since the end of the brief Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 to support U.S. policies designed to extend Lebanese security forces’ control over the country and promote economic growth. The civil war in neighboring Syria is progressively destabilizing Lebanon. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 1 million predominantly Sunni Syrian refugees have fled to Lebanon, equivalent to close to one-quarter of Lebanon’s population.
    [Show full text]
  • Stable Instability: the Syrian Conflict and the Postponement of the 2013 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections
    This is a repository copy of Stable instability: the Syrian conflict and the postponement of the 2013 Lebanese parliamentary elections. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/88404/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Assi, AF and Worrall, JE orcid.org/0000-0001-5229-5152 (2015) Stable instability: the Syrian conflict and the postponement of the 2013 Lebanese parliamentary elections. Third World Quarterly, 36 (10). pp. 1944-1967. ISSN 0143-6597 https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1071661 Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Stable Instability: The Syrian Conflict and the Postponement of the 2013 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections Dr Abbas Assi Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut Dr James Worrall School of Politics & International Studies, University of Leeds 1 Stable Instability: The Syrian
    [Show full text]
  • UN Assistance Mission for Iraq ﺑﻌﺜﺔ اﻷﻣﻢ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة (UNAMI) ﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﻢ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻋﺪة
    ﺑﻌﺜﺔ اﻷﻣﻢ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة UN Assistance Mission for Iraq ﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﻢ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻋﺪة ﻟﻠﻌﺮاق (UNAMI) Human Rights Report 1 September– 31 October 2006 Summary 1. Despite the Government’s strong commitment to address growing human rights violations and lay the ground for institutional reform, violence reached alarming levels in many parts of the country affecting, particularly, the right to life and personal integrity. 2. The Iraqi Government, MNF-I and the international community must increase efforts to reassert the authority of the State and ensure respect for the rule of law by dismantling the growing influence of armed militias, by combating corruption and organized crime and by maintaining discipline within the security and armed forces. In this respect, it is encouraging that the Government, especially the Ministry of Human Rights, is engaged in the development of a national system based on the respect of human rights and the rule of law and is ready to address issues related to transitional justice so as to achieve national reconciliation and dialogue. 3. The preparation of the International Compact for Iraq, an agreement between the Government and the international community to achieve peace, stability and development based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, is perhaps a most significant development in the period. The objective of the Compact is to facilitate reconstruction and development while upholding human rights, the rule of law, and overcoming the legacy of the recent and distant past. 4. UNAMI Human Rights Office (HRO) received information about a large number of indiscriminate and targeted killings. Unidentified bodies continued to appear daily in Baghdad and other cities.
    [Show full text]