Relevant Issues Not Considered Revision 2.2 (Prepared for a Legal Challenge to Mr Garrett’S Decision to Approve the Project.)

Appendix A

Relevant Issues Not Considered Revision 2.2 (Prepared for a legal challenge to Mr Garrett’s decision to approve the project.)

Grounds for a successful Court challenge need to be; (a) directly related to a Commonwealth matter, (b) of sufficient significance to justify halting the dredging with all the associated expenses, and (c) involve matters that can’t be easily resolved i.e. take years to resolve so the dredging contract will be cancelled and the government will focus on all the flaws in the project.

Preliminary matter

It would appear the original Controlled Action notice issued in 2002 needs to be challenged on the basis it is defective as it omits: (a) the Ramsar sites in Western Port, and (b) Commonwealth marine area (s24) It appears this is necessary as s136(1)(a) of the EPBC Act stipulates that the matters that must be considered are matters relevant to the controlling provisions and the above extra provisions are affected in the following relevant considerations.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT ISSUES (detailed supporting information starts on page 7

The following relevant issues were not considered by the Minister. These should achieve the three basic requirements listed above.

Oil Spills

1. Oil spills were, on the direction of the POMC, not considered in the risk analysis even though they are arguably the most significant risk.

This is crucial as it is the only issue that significantly affects a Commonwealth matter and a number of other significant issues flow on from it.

The “Exercise GEORGE BASS” in 1996, a simulation of an oil spill at The Heads, showed that the oil would pollute Swan Bay and Mud Island and although not officially recorded it is understood oil would also pollute the Ramsar sites in Western Port. This would be expected as the currents are normally west to east.

A second scenario is that a ship starts leaking bunker or crude oil caused by a grounding or collision and has to go far out to sea into Commonwealth waters so as to avoid polluting the coastline.

A third scenario is a containership that has its bunkers in the side walls of the ship, the norm for modern containerships, has the bunker wall punctured by a collision while at the dock. Such a spill would flow down the river to the Grayling’s habitat.

2. Besides the oil spill omission, the risk analysis was defective in that it: (a) failed to consider the electronic tracking data that the POMC has recorded since about 2002 which accurately plotted the course of all large ships straying outside the channel while transiting The Heads, (b) failed to consider the new conditions that would exist at The Heads in particular the need not to stray outside the Great Ship Channel, (c) failed to consider the consequences of the risk, an essential component of the analysis, on the direction of the POMC.

These omissions down play the perceived risk.

3. No independent review of the channel design at The Heads was carried out.

This omission allowed the many flaws in the channel design to be covered up. These flaws cannot be included as grounds as they were in dispute and to introduce them would go to the merits of the Panel’s recommendations. The flaws increase the risk of an oil spill.

4. Now deleted

5. The Panel and the Minister failed to consider the hazards that ships would be subject to when they transit The Heads.

6. The SEES, the Panel and the Minister failed to consider the “Deep Draft Transit Plan” survey measuring the vertical movement of ships transiting The Heads or that it was aborted before completion allegedly because it was recording excessive vertical movements that questioned the safety of the existing channel.

2 While this ground adds to the risk its main value is that it will take probably 1 ½ - 2 years to resolve and the dredge contract will have to be cancelled.

Extra Grounds

It is assumed the forgoing grounds will provide a winnable case. The following ones are aimed at illustrating what a sham the SEES process was in the belief the government will wish to reach an out of court settlement (on our terms) to avoid an embarrassing judgement against them.

Stability of Mud Island and the Great Sands and to a lesser extent Swan Island

Recommendation 55 of the 2004 Panel was: “As was stated by peer reviewer Dr. Black, it appears that the sediment modelling has not excluded the potential for large changes to banks and channels throughout most of the Sands region, increases in sedimentation to the north of the shipping channel, major changes off Queenscliff and against the coast at headlands on the south side of the bay. As a precaution to limit such effects, changes at The Heads should be minimised.” (My emphasis)

Grounds 3, 5 & 6 previously outlined have the potential to increase this change materially. Further factors are:

7. The POMC, its consultants, the IEG and the Panel failed to consider the bore logs and the accompanying geological analysis when determining that the scour would be halted by a supposed hard layer at -22 m.

This depth would double the increase in flows in an out of the Bay from the level predicted for the 2004 EES.

The details that follow show there is substantial uncertainty in this issue and arguably the scour could continue indefinitely. Far more research is needed before embarking on this dredging.

8. Neither the SEES nor the Panel Report addressed the issue of sand jetting out from The Heads as required by section 6.1 of the Guidelines.

This has the potential to further denude Mud Island and the Great Sands

3 9. The Minister failed to consider the Panel’s Report that the SEES sediment transport modelling of existing conditions were not in accordance with long- term observations of the sand bars and channels in the Great Sands region and the dynamic equilibrium of existing patterns of currents. And the model did not reproduce actual

sediment transport rates and indicated extremely large fluxes of sand moving through cross-sections which are not consistent with observations and the geomorphology analyses. The model responses to the project do not provide a useful basis for impact assessment.

Put simply it cannot predict the outcome.

10. The channel was designed using the Regina Maersk. This ship has a static draught of 14.5 m so the channel will need to be deepened 0.5 m to meet its design requirements. This further deepening will increase the erosion of the Great Sands and possibly Mud Island.

11. The SEES noted the likelihood of increased maintenance dredging with the increased channel depth and the possible need to replenish the Great Sands. No such plan has been outlined.

This would be difficult as a small Trailer Suction Hopper Dredge draughts about 6-7 m but the Sands are only around 2-3 m so the dredged sand could not easily be put where it is needed.

Orange-bellied Parrot (OBP)

12. The Minister failed to consider that the OBP habitat has not been precisely defined in that there are marked differences in the number of sightings of the OBP from year to year especially at the Spit and Swan Island.

As the OBP is critically endangered a very careful assessment of the habitat is required. The cause of the above variation is currently being researched and needs to be ascertained.

13. The Minister failed to consider the OBP also habitats Mud Island.

4 Turbidity Model

14. The Turbidity Model used to predict the sediment plume is fundamentally flawed.

The supporting information shows when the model is considered over the whole dredging campaign it predicts that 60% of the sand that is dredged will fall back into the dredged channel!!

Sediments Overflowing the Dredge

15. Two thirds of the Consolidated Sediments in the northern channel will overflow the dredge and disperse around the Bay including inundating the area of the Grayling’s habitat.

Although none of the POMC, its consultants, the IEG or anyone else took issue on this claim or the associated calculations the Panel ignored this significant deficiency.

Was a wide exclusion zone declared so these sediments could not be seen, that is until they flow up on the beaches?

Proposed Monitoring

16. The Minister has stipulated that certain functions be monitored without setting trigger points when dredging must cease.

Without these trigger points the monitoring is worthless

Economic Considerations

These are included to negate the POMC’s claim that immediate dredging is imperative and should encourage the judge to support Blue Wedge’s case. It also provides a sound economic base for deferring dredging while all the remaining problems are resolved and possibly building the port at Hastings.

17. Containership companies don’t try to fill their ships to capacity. They prefer to offer a regular and guaranteed service and as such only a small percentage of ships will be full or near full and the claim that 40% of ships are now draught affected is spurious.

5 A regular and guaranteed service is essential with most businesses working on a ‘just in time’ inventory management system and a missed shipment could cause them some distress.

18. Because only a small percentage of the time will ships have maximum draught the costs of entering and leaving the port can be higher and take longer on these occasions than for normal transits.

19. The claim that to wait up to 12 hours (average 6 hours) for a high tide is unacceptable is blunted by the Commonwealth Government’s own statistics (Waterline) which shows the average time in port is 31 hours but for 5% of the time it is an extra 31 hours or more. (July- Dec 2006)

20. Only a depth of 12.5 m is needed now and for the next few years. This can be achieved by sailing on the high tide (nominal depth 12.1 m) and travelling at 6 knots along the shallow sections of the channels thus reducing the squat by 0.4 m.

For a small capital outlay the allowable draught can be increased to 13.0 m. Such a depth would allow dredging to be deferred for about 10 years

21. Failed to acknowledge that a $111 million project management fee is to be paid to the POMC or its executives or why such a massive fee is to be paid.

While the document recording this fee does not state who is being paid this fee the SEES records the POMC as the project manager

With all the design, planning and approvals having been completed why is anything other than a normal management fee necessary. It is also noted on top of this fee are allowances for future engineering and environmental issues.

Who at the POMC is to share in this fee?

This large fee must be particularly galling to the various small businesses that will suffer from dredging and the POMC has offered no compensation.

With both the State and Commonwealth governments making contributions this largess is effectively being paid for out of the public purse.

6 SUPPORTING INFORMATION

The supporting information is aimed at being complete in every respect and it is up to counsel to decide what if any should be used in an Order for Review application.

Oil Spills

1. Oil spills were, on the direction of the POMC, not considered in the risk analysis even though they are arguably the most significant risk.

Supporting Information Mr. Atkins confirmed in his Expert Witness Statement, p5 that the POMC directed that this omission was to occur.

Potential Risk at The Heads Large tankers draughting 14m must stay in The Great Ship Channel and not stray into the outer channels.

The effect of such a straying was graphically illustrated when the Desh Rakshak, draught 11.6 m, ran aground at The Heads on the 4 January 2006. The hard capping rock ripped through the outer hull of this double hulled tanker. The tear was 400mm long and 250mm wide with large pieces of rock ending up in the water ballast tank, the tank between the two hulls. The bulkhead was also buckled. The plate and the frame of three other tanks were buckled. (Independent Investigation into the Grounding of the Indian Registered Oil Tanker, Desh Rakshak, Australian Transport Safety Bureau, August 2007).

The tanker’s crew were oblivious it had grounded. If the draught of the tanker was 14m, the maximum draught for the new channel, there would have been a high energy grounding. “In a high energy grounding, both inner and outer bottom platings will be torn and cargo oils will spill out.” (Damage and Residual Strength of Double-Hull Tankers in Grounding, J.K. Paik and T.K. Lee, Int. J Offshore & Polar Eng., Dec.1995)

Vulnerability of various ships Doubled hull tankers in theory should substantially reduce oil spills. However as the space between the two hulls is filled with sea water when ballast is required these inner steel surfaces are subjected to the same corrosive conditions as the outer surface. The space between these two hulls is only about 0.75 m and may be further congested with frames etc. making inspection and the application of any corrosion protection difficult.

Furthermore the trade literature refers to numerous cases of scurrilous operators gaining seaworthy certification for ships that are clearly defective. As an example of these problems is the following, (Sea Views, Vol 10, No 12, December 2000):

7 “THERE is one thing worse than sailing the seven seas in a run down, decrepit tanker. That is when the Master and his crew, in the presence of surveyors and inspector, try to conceal information about leaks and shell deficiencies of their ship.

The Americans last month displayed particular interest in a 16 years old Greek-owned tanker, Neptune Dorado, when it showed up in San Francisco Bay with an oil cargo from Australia (possibly Bass Strait crude oil from Williamstown or Western Port). Inspectors noticed a strong smell of fumes when they boarded.

It was established that cargo was leaking into a ballast tank, but the Greek master was alleged to have instructed crew to make forged entries in the ship’s log, and to deny that there was any deficiency in structure. The tanker, through neglect, suffered numerous problems including 12 diesel breakdowns in the course of a month long haul. The voyage should have been completed in 25 days.

The 54 years old Master was arrested for not disclosing the leakage of cargo which could have caused an explosion and fire involving a cargo of 50 000 tons. The Master denied any offence, but because he could speak only Greek there was difficulty obtaining a statement without an interpreter. In terms of International rules, however, the Master should have been qualified to conduct business in English. He risked a jail sentence and a fine of $250 000 for trying to conceal existence of leakage of oil cargo. Until a Court hearing, the Master was released on $500 000 bail.”

Were the Australian port authorities lax in not intervening prior to the ship sailing to America?

For oil to have leaked into the ballast tank indicates the corrosion of the inner hull must have penetrated through the hull, a disturbing prognosis for all double hull tankers considering the Neptune Dorado was only 16 years old. However it is possible the leak could be due to a cracked weld or some other cause.

Tankers squat to the bow so damage is likely to be confined to the bow region and if in good order they are unlikely to release oil unless there is a high energy grounding. However these double-hulled tankers are relatively new and few have reached the end of their economic life. It seems only a matter of time until an aging doubled hull tanker runs aground and both hulls collapse through their reduced strength caused by corrosion resulting in an oil spill.

A further risk is that single hulled tankers may arrive over the next few years prior to them being phased out. They are due to be phased out in 2010 although there is provision for tankers less than 25 years old and in good condition to remain in service until 2015.

Cargo ships have traditionally carried their bunker fuel oil in the double bottom space and thus are at risk of spilling this oil if they ground and pierce the hull.

8 Most of the bulk carriers including Panamax size which can draught up to 14 m store their bunker oil in this manner. This size bulk carrier can carry 60,000-80,000 tonnes which is substantially bigger than the maximum size load envisaged of 40,000 tonnes. However it may be taken as a part load in conjunction with other bulk commodities. If one of these ships had followed the path of the Desh Rakshak it would have been substantially damage and likely to have released its bunker fuel.

It is understood older smaller containerships have adopted this practice but most of the newer and deeper draughting ones store their bunker oil in the side walls or tanks raised up from the bottom of the ship. These requirements only became mandatory in 2007.

While containerships are less likely to be directly involved in an oil spill from grounding they are vulnerable in that they squat to the stern and thus more likely to ground and be damaged at the stern. If such damaged is substantial enough the ship could be disabled if the propeller or rudder is damaged or if the engine room was to be flooded. Such a disabled ship at The Heads would almost certainly run aground in the shallower waters away from the Great Ship Channel. If the seas are rough, the ship could incur substantial damage with a likely release of bunker fuel.

Also containerships with wing wall bunker tanks are vulnerable in the event of collisions that may occur in congested areas like the docks.

As an example in November 1997 the 195-metre bulk carrier Kure contacted the pier while shifting berth at the Louisiana Pacific Dock in Humbolt Bay. Damage to the hull consisted of a 350mm hole about 3 metres above the waterline in way of a forward bunker tank. About 17.2 m3 (4537 gallons) of IFO 180 was discharged into the bay before the hole could be plugged. The local wetlands and shoreline were heavily impacted by the oil spill. Double hull protection would certainly have prevented the spill from this minor and very localized puncture through the hull. Source: Cargo Ship Bunker Tanks: Designing to Mitigate Oil Spillage, Keith Michel, President, Herbert Engineering Corp., Thomas S. Winslow, PE, Consultant, Oakland, CA

Procedure in the event of a Grounding at The Heads If a grounding at The Heads ruptured a tank and it began releasing oil, the ship would have three options. One run up the Bay to Williamstown releasing oil along the way, two go to the nearest port capable of handling 14m draught tankers which is Sydney or three go far out from shore and into Commonwealth waters to minimize the environmental damage awaiting transfer of the residual oil or what ever action is needed.

If the discharge is substantial the logical one is to go far out to sea. This would be relatively simple if the tanker is exiting the Bay. However if it occurs on the way in the tanker would have to continue entering and turn into South Channel and anchor. If there is a flood tide the tanker will swing around and can quickly exit the Bay. If there is an ebb tide the tanker will have to wait about three hours for a tug to arrive or wait for the tide to change and swing the tanker around. The saving grace of this ebb tide scenario is that the tide would flush most of the oil spill out into the ocean.

9 Also tankers exiting the Bay need to be considered as they may have multiple destinations and thus still have significant quantities of oil remaining. In the case of the Desh Rakshak it had previously unloaded some of its oil in Sydney but still had 80,000 tonnes when it grounded entering the Bay. Also it is understood refined products are to be shipped out from Williamstown.

Consequences of an Oil Spill at The Heads The consequences of oil spills need to be considered. The Exxon Valdez disaster which resulted in 35,000 tonnes of oil being released cost Exxon $A12 billion due to the environmental damage it caused.

As an interesting anecdote Midnight Oil staged a Manhattan concert in front of Exxon’s headquarters at the time of the Valdez disaster. (Wikipedia, Exxon Valdez) Will Mr. Garrett show the same concern for oil spills in and adjacent to our Bay?

If an oil spill occurs at The Heads some at least is likely to pollute the shore line at the old Quarantine Station, Mud Island (OBP and migratory birds), possibly Swan Island, Swan Bay (OBP) and the Ramsar sites in Port Phillip Bay, all Commonwealth matters. The Grayling habitat at the mouth of the Yarra River would also be affected if the discharge was small and the Harbour Master directed that the tanker proceed to the Gellibrand terminal and unload.

Also the normal west to east current will cause the spill to flow into Western Port and around Phillip Island. It is reasonable to expect that Phillip Island penguins will be oiled and many are likely to die.

Evidence in support of this is that penguins are the birds most affected in the Southern Hemisphere form oil spills (Dan and Jessop1991; Adams1994; Gandini et al 1994).

Penguins are more susceptible because they spend considerably longer in the water than flying birds, are possibly less able to detect oil at sea, and even small amounts of oil on the plumage causes waterlogging, reducing insulation and buoyancy (Goldworthy et al 2000).

Considering these facts, an oil spill at The Heads is likely to have a marked effect on one of Victoria’s premier tourist attractions, the coming home each night of the penguins at Philip Island.

Conclusion Notwithstanding these potential groundings and the potential for disastrous consequences from an oil spill, the POMC directed the risk analysis carried out by Royal Haskoning was not to include oil spills so this potential disaster remains unquantified and no doubt the POMC is poorly prepared for such a disaster

10 2. Besides the oil spill omission, the risk analysis was defective in that it: (a) failed to consider the electronic tracking data that the POMC has recorded since about 2002 which accurately plotted the course of all large ships straying outside the channel while transiting The Heads, (b) failed to consider the new conditions that would exist at The Heads in particular the need not to stray outside the Great Ship Channel, (c) failed to consider the consequences of the risk, an essential component of the analysis, on the direction of the POMC.

Recommendation 18 of the 2004 EES Panel states: “For the purpose of validating channel design safety at The Heads, the proponent should define the nature of a ‘near miss’ and an ‘incident’, in respect to vessels leaving the channels, grounding etc. Vessel tracking data should be collected. The data should inform a review of shipping incident risk as an input into channel design.”

Notwithstanding this recommendation the POMC withheld the data from Royal Haskoning.

Had the oil tanker, Desh Rakshak, that ran aground at The Heads in 2006 been a 14m draughting tankers it would have incurred a high energy grounding. This grounding would probably have ripped open the outer and inner hulls resulting in a significant oil spill and an environmental disaster.

The consequences of a risk are essential as it quantifies the risk. In the case of a major oil spill the consequences can be enormous. As noted above the Exxon Valdez disaster which resulted in 35,000 tonnes of oil being released, cost Exxon $A12 billion due to the environmental damage it caused.

Including these consequences would also inevitably highlight the weaknesses in the channel design at The Heads.

3. No independent review of the channel design at The Heads was carried out.

Supporting Information The opening sentence of section 5 of the Guidelines entitled PROPOSED DESIGN AND ALTERNATIVES states “this section guides the focus of the SEES investigations regarding the Proposal and Alternatives to the Proposal, which is derived in large measure from the relevant Inquiry recommendations, including 2, 6, 9, 15, 16, 17, 26, 27, and 37.” Recommendation 2 in part states “Before the assessment of environment effects, the proponent should be required to complete its evaluation of design and operational criteria for the Great Ship Channel in the Heads. An independent channel design expert should validate these.” While recommendation

11 15 in part states “the simulation study should be peer-reviewed by an independent simulation expert.”

Notwithstanding these specific recommendations the guidelines substantially watered down these recommendations. Section 5.1 entitled Project design merely states: “The SEES should document a review of design and operational criteria for the Great Ship Channel at The Heads, undertaken as part of the process for confirming the project design. In this context, it will be necessary to: State clearly, with external peer review, whether the design performance specification requires a deepening or widening of the channel, significantly in addition to (or less than) that described in the EES.” This last part suggests a review is only necessary if there is a significant departure from the previous design a far cry from a total review by an independent expert.

And further on the Guidelines state: “The SEES should address the following aspects of design and operational safety, drawing upon appropriate advice (e.g. from Marine Safety Victoria (MSV): 1) The adequacy of the simulation study conducted as part of the EES, especially with respect to different larger vessel types (oil tankers, container vessels and bulk carriers);” Again this is not a peer review by an independent expert.

Taken together it would seem reasonable an independent review was necessary. SKM carried out such a review but they carried out the peer review in the 2004 EES and could not be considered independent and another review is necessary.

The advantage of including this issue is that it means that all the issues at The Heads would need to be investigated and acted upon. It also strengthens the need for the Inward Deep Draft Transit Plan and an oil spill risk analysis.

Issues that cannot be reviews because they go to the merit of the decision include the width and depth of the channel and the state of the tide. The opposing view to the POMC is that the channel should be up to 500m wide if access is to be at all tides or the proposed 245 m wide channel if access is confined to ½ - 1 hour at slack water which occurs about every 6 hours. The depth of the channel may also need to be up to 3m deeper if access is to be at all tides.

4. Now deleted

5. The Panel and the Minister failed to consider the hazards that ships with a 14 m draught would be subject to when they transit The Heads.

12 Supporting Information The following are the hazards that must be combated (a) Ships must stay in the 245m wide Great Ship Channel, (b) they can be subject to crabbing, i.e. turn side on, of up to 30 degrees when there is a strong cross current, (c) the cross current varies and is not entirely predictable, (d) there are very large side forces on the ships due to the cross currents, (e) the sea can be abnormally rough especially during the ebb tide, (f) piloting can occur at any hour of the day or night, (f) normal human error, (g) the new Pell navigation lights have not been trialled and will be less effective when crabbing occurs, (h) communication problems if the helmsman does not speak English which invariably is the case, (i) the particular characteristics of each ship is different making piloting difficult, (j) the poor manoeuvrability especially of tankers.

Inward Deep Draft Transit Plan

6. The SEES document and the Panel failed to consider the “Deep Draft Transit Plan” survey measuring the vertical movement of ships transiting The Heads or that it was aborted before sufficient data was recorded allegedly because it was recording excessive vertical movements that questioned the safety of the existing channel.

Supporting Information The completion of this Plan, which was being carried out by the pilots, is essential because of the paucity of accurate design data. With recent developments in GPS technology it is possible to accurately locate a position both horizontally and vertically to within a few centimetres so very accurate data should be obtained.

The proposed channel has been designed with a vertical motion allowance of 3 m.

Capt. Beevers gave evidence that large container ships squat over 2 metres when travelling at the proposed 15 knots through shallow waters. A similar figure is arrived at using the nomogram, figure 5.7 on page 18 of the Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (PIANC) Report of Working Group11-30.

To this, the effect of wave action needs to be added. Briggs MJ et al, CADET: A Tool For Predicting Underkeel Clearance In Deep-Draft Entrance Channels, ASCE, Civil Engineering in the Oceans VI stated, p 435, “For the vertical wave-induced motions component, EM 1110-2-1613 (1995) recommends a value equal to 1.2 times the incident wave height, whereas the Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (1997) recommends a value up to 0.4 times the ships draft. Typical harbours operate with this wave motion component between 1.2 m (4 ft) and 2.4 m (8 ft), regardless of ship draft and wave height.” This is an unacceptably wide range. PIANC has recognised this uncertainty by setting up a committee, MarCom –

13 Working Group 54, to provide improved predictions but this committee is yet to report.

A wave height of 2 m has been used in the design so the wave allowance using the above formulas is either 1.2 x 2.0 = 2.4 m or up to 0.4 x 14 = 5.6 m.

Compounding this uncertainty is the unique environment at The Heads, particularly during ebb tides with water flowing out meeting waves coming in and which can cause abnormal wave action. The significant wave height at peak ebb tide is 2.8 m (Appendix, fig.5.27) compared to slack water and peak flood tides of 1.8 & 1.6 m respectively (fig. 5.26 & 5.27). Thus the 2 m used probably under estimates the conditions during ebb tides.

Supporting this contention is the Desh Rakshak report noted the ship was rolling 5 degrees while transiting the Heads and it was calculated this rolling alone increased the draught 1.8 metres. To this must be added the pitching due to wave action.

Combining all these factors suggests a figure far in excess of the 3m used in the design and makes it imperative that the Pilot’s Inward Deep Draft Transit Plan is carried through to completion and that the measurements be fully analysed and collated into a working formula for more accurately predicting the depth requirements.

Without an accurate estimate for underkeel clearance the risk of grounding of a ship and a subsequent oil spill is increased.

If one assumes the measurements are made over the 4 seasons of the year and allowing for analysis of data and reworking the design it should provide 1½-2 years deferment of any decision to dredge. Hopefully such a delay will cause the government to look at all the other flaws in the project and correct these too.

Scouring at The Heads

Supporting Information The addition of this ground is valuable as it is highly significant, easy to establish and will be hard to resolve.

The basis for scouring halting once it reaches -22 m is almost solely due to one paragraph in SKM’s report prepared by Don Raisbeck entitled Scour Assessment Report dated July 2007. This paragraph on page 20 states: “The existing GSC (Great Ship Channel) on Rip Bank has a low level on the crest of the canyon of RL -19m and there is a hard band in the canyon walls

14 which averages RL -22m CD. Nepean Bank also has a hard band at RL -22m CD surrounding the three sides of the plateau. It was indicated from the scour hole analyses that this level also represents a worse case scenario for scour affects in the GSC on Rip Bank and Nepean Bank. It is therefore concluded that RL -22m CD is a reasonable and conservative level to adopt for a hydrodynamic analyses of the consequences of long term scour.”

Against this, no reference was made in the report to the Coffey bore holes which are attached to the report or to the analyses of the bores by Holdgate and Wallace entitled “Geological Review of the Rip Drilling, Southern Port Phillip” also attached.

Holdgate at page 4 states: “The marine cements are most abundant in the uppermost 0.2 m of the core and within gravel fragments on the sea floor. Marine cements may be present in samples at a greater depth, but the very thin nature of cement crusts below 0.2 m makes it difficult to ascertain their origin with any certainty.”

The hard capping on the rock is a unique feature with Holdgate stating: “This is the first instance of modern marine cements having been recorded from Southern Australia. The unusual environment at The Rip (shallow high energy, with a huge amount of tide- induced water movement) may account for the extensive marine cementation.”

This capping process could also be capping the walls of the canyon and may account for the observed stronger rock on these faces.

Holdgate further states: “At greater depths in the cores, some intervals are cemented by clear equigranular calcite cements that are probably of freshwater origin. These freshwater cements are likely to be of pre-Holocene age and related to glacial low stands in sea level.” Thus they bear no relationship to the capping rock.

If the lower hard layers were to be of marine origin the sea levels would needed to have been similar to today’s levels. If they were 20m lower the volume of the Bay would have been substantially less with resultant lower flows in and out of The Heads and less capping. If the current interglacial period has not had significant rises and falls in sea levels the Bridgewater Formation, being of an aeolianite (wind blown) origin, could not have built up and lower hard caps could not have been produced in the manner the current capping has been. Lower hard layers could conceivably have been formed in a previous interglacial period but this would have been at least 100,000 years ago and conflicts with Holdgate’s dating of this Formation of 17,000 to 57,000 years ago. The summation of these geological facts is that it is unlikely that hard caps of a marine origin similar to the existing caps would form lower down the sequence.

An inspection of the bores supports Holdgate’s analyses with no evidence of a hard layer at -22 m or at any other level. The distribution between hard and soft rock as

15 determined by the “estimated strength” or the “drilling rate” recorded down the bores is purely random.

Furthermore the bore logs record the beds inclined at 5 -15 degrees and there is no reference to the few hard layers not coinciding with this inclination. Furthermore the thin hard layers in the surrounding cliffs also of Bridgewater Formation are parallel to the bedding. The observed apparent hard rock capping around the canyon wall is spread out over 100’s of metres such that a 10 degree dip would result in a hard layer varying in vertical depth by over 50 m and the hard layer would certainly not be horizontal.

Also confusing the picture is the petrology which indicates a number of the cements are of a freshwater origin including the hard cap on bore BHR6.

The weak nature of this rock can be gauged from like rock that forms the cliffs above sea level around The Heads and displayed in figure A.2(1). The scouring out of the weak layers by wind and rain is clearly evident.

No evidence can be found that the POMC, their consultants or the IEG considered these facts. Furthermore no reference can be found in the Panel’s Report to these matters.

Also no evidence is provided in the report that the claim of a -22m hard layer was based on a systematic survey. It appears to be based on nothing more than cursory visual observations.

On the south east corner of the Nepean Bank there is absolutely no evidence of a hard layer, the slope being relatively flat, figure 7.1. As noted before, such hard layers could probably be formed on the side walls near the top of the canyon where similar flows exist to that across the Rip Bank floor.

Raisbeck, page 13 provides calculations that due to the very high currents, slabs as thick as 250mm can be flipped over. The diver’s photographs, Appendix C.4, of a scour hole show substantial delamination of the rock under the cap. This delamination should provide sites for the fast flowing waters to lift up and flip over new scour material that will then move across the channel floor until abraded away but in the process causing further scouring of the floor. Furthermore the side batters will eventually fall in bringing down the adjacent capping material which will abrade much slower and cause proportionally greater scour. The few hard layers encountered will also, when penetrated, provide longer lasting scour media compared to the softer rock.

Raisbeck also notes there are three existing scour holes that have developed no doubt due to historical blasting. These holes have reached depths of -24 to -25 m. It is also noted two of the bores, BHR 4 & 5, show no capping and the surface is at depths of - 18.2 and -18.5 m respectively. These holes are in the area where blasting occurred a number of decades ago and which aimed to reduce the level to -12 m. It is assumed the capping was removed during blasting and these areas have scoured down another 6 m. even though scouring would be inhibited by the surrounding areas still having their capping.

With the capping totally removed during dredging there will be little resistance to the scouring and the process could go on indefinitely.

Against this there apparently is little loose rock on the channel floor away from the trial dredging site. This would suggest that Raisbeck’s uplifting theory may not be occurring in practice as there is little loose material to cause any more scouring.

To arrest this scouring with a manmade cap could prove technically challenging and very expensive in this hostile and environmentally sensitive region of the Rip and Nepean Banks. No dredging should be undertaken until such cap has been carefully designed and costed.

Needless to say the proposed dredging plan must be reconsidered.

Associated with this was the denial of procedural fairness in that the POMC knew about the problem before releasing the SEES but chose to keep it secret thus avoiding the full scrutiny of the SEES process. Furthermore the Panel allowed the POMC to submit significant new documents six weeks after refusing to accept submissions from Blue Wedge and Terry Croft and not allowing public comment on them shows the Panel’s bias in favour of the POMC and the Government.

Needless to say this scouring down of the Rip and Nepean Banks could affect the whole Bay and the increased flows could materially change Mud Island, the habitat of migratory birds and the Orange-bellied Parrot, and the surrounding Great Sands.

Also the POMC having deceived everyone with this -22 m hard layer theory, will find it difficult to convince the government and the general public that scouring won’t continue. This could result in a considerable delay.

Sand jetting out from The Heads

8. Neither the SEES nor the Panel Report addressed the issue of sand jetting out from The Heads as required by section 6.1 of the Guidelines

Supporting Information Section 6.1 of the SEES Guidelines state: “The SEES will also need to assess the potential for medium to long-term changes to sediment movement and the stability in the southern areas of the Bay, as a result of modifying channels in or near The Heads, specifically in relation to: Sediment transport in and out of the Bay;”

The Rip Bank and Nepean Bank act as weirs controlling the flow in and out of the Bay. Dr. Provis in his Expert Witness Statement (p9) notes the reduction in cross sectional area of these weirs due to the proposed dredging will be approximately 1%.

The expected change in tidal levels in the Bay using the above 1% increase has been shown to be negligible but there might be changes to the shoreline near the Heads and more particularly the Great Sands around Mud Island.

These sands are considered to be in a state of dynamic equilibrium such that any change in surrounding currents caused by dredging of the Rip and Nepean Banks could have a significant effect on their stability.

Dr Terry Healy, an expert on these systems has prepared a report on the effect of dredging on these systems, Appendix 46. He comments on the overall effects of dredging but makes no reference to the effects that dredging the Heads will have. He does however comment on the effect of the dredging in the South Channel.

Figure 11 on p26 of his report shows the “difference (dredging minus existing) in current driven sediment transport vectors, representing the impact solely of the dredging”. There are significant current vector through sections of the Great Sands, which could alter these sections of the Great Sands after dredging. More significant is a vector exiting The Heads. On page 25 of his report he specifically refers to this vector noting the “impact of dredging is ….enhanced sediment jetting out of the Entrance and dispersion. This could induce southward migration of the existing vestigial terminal lobe of the ebb tidal delta”. In theory a net outflow of sediment from the Bay will eventually denude the region around The Heads of sediments resulting in a change in the environment. May be this is insignificant but it should have been commented on by Dr. Healy.

Again in his Expert Witness Statement he is silent on the effect of dredging the Rip and Nepean Banks but again discusses the impact of the South Channel dredging.

One submitter the Australian Conservation Foundation, (s159) directly addressed this issue when it stated: “The now semi-enclosed bay is characterised by limited water exchange with the ocean, but if the channel deepening proposal proceeds, the bay opening will increase. Port Phillip Bay will have a higher flush rate should the Channel Deepening Project proceed. ACF is concerned that it will be impossible to predict the effects on temperature, salinity, bathymetry, ecosystems and sedimentation patterns in and around the bay.” Notwithstanding the concern was specifically to do with the dredging at The Heads, he again avoided addressing this issue. He replied to this and three other submissions stating the submissions “express concern, inter alia, about the adequacy of the sediment transport modelling within the Great Sands and I address that issue in my report”.

In his peer review of the scour problem dated the 14th September 2007 and given to the Panel by the POMC on the 18th September 2007 he again failed to comment on this issue.

If there was no residual effect due to dredging The Heads why didn’t Dr Healy say so, especially when a submitter raised the issue and the SEES requires a statement?

18 This continual refusal to allude to the effect of dredging at The Heads is alarming and I assume he is deliberately avoiding addressing the issue. The question is why?

Considering the foregoing how could Dr.Healy state in the final paragraph of his Expert Witness Statement “I have made all the inquiries that I believe are desirable and appropriate and no matters of significance which I regard as relevant have to my knowledge been withheld from the Panel”?

Modelling of Sediment Movement around the Great Sands

9. The Minister failed to consider the Panel’s Report that the SEES sediment transport modelling of existing conditions were not in accordance with long- term observations of the sand bars and channels in the Great Sands region and the dynamic equilibrium of existing patterns of currents. And the model did not reproduce actual sediment transport rates and indicated extremely large fluxes of sand moving through cross-sections which are not consistent with observations and the geomorphology analyses. The model responses to the project do not provide a useful basis for impact assessment.

Supporting Information The IEG expressed considerable concern about the accuracy of the modelling around these Sands claiming it did not come close to matching the observed factors, IEG Report, 1 May 2007, p 25-27 ( a must read!!). As an example: “The SEES sediment transport modelling results of existing conditions showed unexpectedly high rates of net sediment transport and inferred erosion and deposition around the Great Sands which are not in accordance with long–term observations of the sand bars and channels in the Sands. In relation to the sediment modelling of the dynamic Great Sands region, described in Appendix 45, the IEG notes that: The model was not reproducing actual sediment transport rates; The modelling indicates extremely large fluxes of sand moving through cross-sections (figure 7.30, Appendix 45), which are not consistent with observations and the geomorphology analyses; and, The model was not calibrated against observations or measurements.

The Great Sands region is understood to be approximately in dynamic equilibrium with existing patterns of tide and wind forced currents. In contrast, the model indicates large departures from dynamic equilibrium.

……In the view of the IEG, given such large errors in current model predictions, the modelled responses to the project do not provide a useful basis for impact assessment.”

19 They also claimed “the witness statements have not advance this matter”, IEG Report, 27 July 2007, Question 5

This uncertainty can be added to the uncertainty of sands jetting out of the Heads as noted in ground (d)

Supporting Information There is no extra information for this ground

11. The SEES noted the likelihood of increased maintenance dredging with the increased channel depth and the possible need to replenish the Great Sands. No such plan has been outlined.

Supporting Information There is no extra information for this ground

Orange-bellied Parrot (OBP) – a Critically Endangered Species

12. The Minister failed to consider that the OBP habitat has not been precisely defined in that there are marked unexplained sightings of the OBP from year to year especially around Swan Bay.

13. The Minister failed to consider the OBP also habitats Mud Island

Supporting Information With only 140 birds remaining, barely, if enough genetic diversity to survive, it is imperative no birds are lost.

With the Precautionary Principle applying it is up to the POMC to provide this proof. In reality they provided just three quarters of a page in the SEES discussing the bird and providing some features of the habitat, Appendix 55 p167. The Panel Report said nothing more than to name it. This can be compared to the POMC having to spend $300,000 on Graylings which are only listed as vulnerable.

The SEES relied on 1999 data which fails to account for the large variation of sightings from year to year suggesting there is some unknown factor also in play. To determine this, Birds Australia were awarded in 2005 a grant to research this issue. (Orange-bellied Parrot, Western Melbourne- Bellarine Peninsula Workshop Manual, p 19-20)

Turbidity Model

14. Notwithstanding a key priority of the SEES Guidelines was to improve the reliability, the Turbidity Model used to predict the sediment plume is fundamentally flawed.

Supporting Information The SEES Guidelines state: “A key priority for the SEES is to refine and extend the computer modelling of turbidity, as well as improve its reliability as a foundation element of the environmental effect assessment.”

The IEG expressed concerns about the Turbidity Model when they stated: “The SEES acknowledges the importance of turbidity in sufficient detail. The impacts of turbidity plumes are associated with reduced light, and the consequent reduction in visibility and in light available to phytoplankton in the water column, as well as to benthic plants (seagrass, macroalgae and microphytobenthos). Sedimentation may also smother benthic flora and fauna. Potential flow-on effects include impacts on nutrient cycling and food chains dependent on affected primary producers.

The IEG notes the importance of having good predictions of turbidity induced by dredging. Primarily, the cumulative exposure over time scales of days to weeks or longer determines the benthic ecological impact. Thus, for the purposes of impact assessment, turbidity models need not necessarily predict the exact distribution of the plume at any point in time, but they should generate realistic or conservative cumulative spatial statistics.” IEG Advice, 1 May 2007, p19.

The light attenuation is predominantly dependent on the amount of -10 micron particles and more so 1 micron particles (i.e. fully dispersed clay particles). The attenuation is approximately proportional to the reciprocal of the diameter of the particles. Notwithstanding this, the only particle size data in the SEES was ‘a percentage finer than 63 microns’ for a number of sediment samples. Such information assists in determining the likely proportion of the sediments in the dredge overflow but is of no use in determining the light attenuation of the plume. That the SEES would be so deficient in this vital parameter is untenable and shows the POMC lacks the understanding of this fundamental requirement.

Terry Croft in his submission to the Inquiry provided evidence of the fundamental flaws in the model. None of the POMC, its consultants, the IEG or anyone else disputed these claims. The details are set out in the following paragraphs.

21 Sedimentation Theory

Particles settle at a rate proportional to the square of the particle diameter, Stokes Law.

In the case of a Trailer Suction Hopper Dredge (TSHD) there are two other principal factors that need to be considered turbulence and the time available for the suspended solids to settle out. Turbulence will stir up the waters and distort this settling process. In the case of the settling time this will vary substantially during the cycle. When the dredge first starts the hopper will be empty and the large volume of water will ensure maximum settling time. As the hopper fills there is less contained water and in turn a reduced settling time. As the hopper nears its maximum capacity this effect becomes marked with an ever increasing size of particle overflowing the dredge.

The d50 for the TSHD is the particle size where 50% of this size flows out the overflow and 50% remains in the hopper. This is a crucial factor but no where in the SEES documentation is such a factor alluded to.

As noted above it will be constantly increasing during the cycle. However it should be known as it is a vital parameter and should be used to determine when dredging should cease. This is not clear cut as the minimum cost of dredging will dictate dredging continue after the maximum acceptable overflow for environmental reasons has been reached.

It also poses an interesting question. Will Boskalis dredge for longer than during the trial dredging and thus increase the plume? Without the suggested standard it will be hard to set an end point. Did Royal Boskalis draw this to the attention of their partner, PoMC?

It is my estimate that the d50 will be around 70 microns. In keeping with Stokes Law 10 micron particles, a predominant size of the Yarra River sediments, will settle at a rate 1/49th of the d50. Where as fine sand at 150 micron will settle at 4 times the rate of the d50. Thus Stokes Law causes a reasonably precise cut.

It should also be noted that should the particles be 1-2 micron clay particles they will settle substantially slower again. A one micron particle will settle at a maximum rate of 0.001 mm/s compared to 0.02mm/s for the slowest settling particle in the model. Particles of this size may or may not be present in significant amounts as explained in the following section. Should there be significant amounts of fully dispersed clays, the model would need to be refined.

The minus 10 micron particles are crucially important as not only do they settle at the slowest rate and thus are in suspension the longest, they will also cause the greatest light attenuation. Light attenuation is roughly inversely proportional to the size. Sediments are substantially opaque so that a one micron particle being one micron thick will attenuate the light nearly the same amount as a 150 micron particle which is 150 microns thick.

22 Model Errors

Source Strength of the Turbidity Model

The turbidity model is fundamentally flawed in having a single value source strength. As should be evident from the theoretical explanation before, the particle size distribution (PSD) of the material being dredged is of vital importance in determining this source strength yet it is not included in the turbidity model. This is a fundamental flaw and the model must be modified to incorporate this.

Not surprisingly there is no detailed information in the SEES on the PSD of the sediments to be dredged. This is a further flaw in the SEES.

As an example of how significant this is, can be gauged from a dredging project in Hong Kong recently using a TSHD. The central core of the plume, three km by one km had turbidity greater than 100,000 mg/l or more than 1000 times the density of the plume estimated for this project, Germano 2004. The current model could not predict such a plume.

Overall Model

The basic parameters of the Port of Melbourne Corporation’s (PoMC’s) Turbidity Model is set out in Appendix 40, p3 namely: “The amount of material in the overflow of a jumbo trailer suction hopper dredge such as the Queen of Netherlands is approximately 1500 kg/s. Only a percentage (12%) of this total material causes a turbid plume, and this has been measured as 200 kg/s and used to calibrate the turbidity models”.

That such a large amount of the overflow sediment was falling back into the channel didn’t appear right to me so I calculated the totals for the whole campaign. I used the following figures and assumptions: ¾ The latest dredging campaign indicates a large dredge (Q of N) will be used for 52 weeks and a mid size dredge, the Cornelia Zanen, for 81 weeks; ¾ Both dredges work around the clock operating for an average of 140 hours per week; ¾ The mid size dredge has a production rate of one third of a large TSHD; ¾ The dredges, on average, dredge for 50% of the time. The percentage will be greater when dredging the large volume of sand in the South Channel but substantially less when dredging the much smaller amounts of contaminated silts in non-overflow mode. The weighted mean would be in the order of the 50% used; ¾ The density of the sand insitu is 1800 kg/m3.

Using these figures I calculate the total amount overflowing the dredge will be 17 million m3 or about 70% of the 24.5 million m3 dredged.

23 Equally disconcerting is the 1300 kg/s overflowing the dredge but falling back into the channel. As this amounts to 14 million m3, the channel is being substantially backfilled.

There are three possible causes of this unsatisfactory result, my assumptions are significantly in error, the model needs further refining or a TSHD is a very ineffective form of dredging.

The settling rates used in the plume model indicate the plume is composed of the slow settling 5-25 micron particles. The particles settling out in the dredged channel would be those in the 25-120 micron range with nearly all the plus 120 micron size being collected in the hopper.

For the foregoing to be true the PSD of the feed must have a very high percentage of 25-120 micron size. While there are no PSD for the bores recorded in this SEES there are in the original EES 2004 (Vol. 2, Ap. L). Figures 1 & 2 are representative examples of these sediments. The PSD for both the river silts and the South Channel sands show they are virtually devoid of this relevant fraction and there could not possibly be1300 kg/s in this fraction. If the Source Strength is 200kg/s the larger fraction overflowing for the river silts would be around 100-150kg/s and around 50- 100 kg/s for the South Channel sands.

Concluding Remarks

After more than three years of development the turbidity model is still substantially flawed and needs substantial reworking.

The question that needs answering is why did none of the PoMC’s employees, consultants and Royal Boskalis pick up these weaknesses?

One group that didn’t was the Independent Expert Group (IEG).

There are four members of this group namely Dr. Graham Mitchell (Chair), Victorian Government Chief Scientist Dr. Kerry Black expert on hydrodynamic and coastal processes Mr. Nick Bray, expert on dredging technology Professor Mick Keough, expert on Marine ecology Dr. John Parslow, expert on ecology modelling

On page 21 of their advice they state: “Overflow dredging tends to retain coarse particles in the hopper, while fine particles are disproportionately released overboard. The vast bulk of the material released overboard settles rapidly to the bed as a density current. The source term for the plume is based on measurements at some distance from the dredge, and represents only a fraction of the overflow. For example, the overflow rate has been estimated at 1500kg/s, while the plume source term is 200kg/s (Appendix 41, 45.) A substantial fraction of the overflow can be expected to remain within the dredged channel”

24 If experts can not detect flaws of this magnitude who do we rely on?

Furthermore page 8 of the IEG Advise notes Drs. Black and Mitchell attended two PoMC Hydrodynamic and Turbidity Modelling Technical Workshops in March and May 2006. Again did no one at these workshops pick up these flaws? Having attended these workshops I would have thought such discussions would have caused Drs. Black and Mitchell to focus on this model. Again why did they not question it?

This is even more significant, as noted before, that “a key priority for the SEES is to refine and extend the computer modelling of turbidity, as well as improve its reliability”.

Royal Boskalis should be fully aware of these weaknesses if they are as expert as they are supposed to be and should have alerted PoMC their partner to the weaknesses.

Sediments Overflowing the Dredge

15. Two thirds of the Consolidated Sediments in the northern channel will overflow the dredge and disperse around the Bay including inundating the area of the Grayling’s habitat.

Supporting Information Croft produced evidence based on the particle size distribution that two thirds of the Consolidated Sediments, those below the contaminated sediments in the northern channel, would overflow the Trailer Suction Hopper Dredge (TSHD). These could arguably affect the Graylings habitat (and the northern beaches in general

Although none of the POMC, its consultants, the IEG or anyone else took issue on this claim or the associated calculations the Panel ignored this significant deficiency.

There is a dearth of detailed information on the PSD of these fine sediments even though they are fine enough to be swept out the overflow and dispersed around the Bay. This is a fundamental failing of the SEES. The only particle size data I could find in the SEES was a percentage finer than 63 microns. Such information assists in determining the likely proportion of the sediments in the overflow but is of no use in determining the light attenuation of the plume.

In the 2004 EES, complete particle size analysis was made of a number of samples of these sediments (Appendix vol.1, sec. 2). A number of samples have had two PSDs determined. One is carried out with the standard PSD analysis technique. The other is a modified test intended to simulate the “as dredged” behaviour of the material and uses seawater and no dispersing agent. Examples of the PSD determined by these two tests and representative of these sediments are figures 3 and 4 respectively.

There are two features of these PSD worth noting. The PSD of the “as dredged” has nearly 40% around 10 microns all of which can be expected to flow out the overflow. Accepting a d50 for the overflow of about 70 microns around 2/3rds of these

25 sediments can be expected to flow out the overflow and disperse around the Bay. Needless to say this is totally unacceptable.

This prediction is in keeping with the comments of the EPA in their “Guidelines for Dredging” where they state, p 44: “Overflow is of greatest environmental concern where fine sediments are dredged as they create the largest plume. Consequently, overflow of fine sediments is not usually permitted by environmental agencies. When fine sediments are dredged (for example, Yarra River shipping channels), there is also no economic advantage to overflowing these sediments as there is negligible settlement in the hopper, so the sediment concentration in the intake and the overflow are similar”. In other words zero recovery.

The second feature is that nearly 50% of these sediments are actually clays but their natural cohesion holds the particles together to give the “as dredged” PSD. No further details are given in the report so it is not possible to determine how realistic this PSD is. If these sediments were to substantially disperse into individual one micron particles during dredging there would be substantial light attenuation over a large area for an extended period of time. At a settling rate of 0.001 mm/s it would take over 100 days to settle 10 m. Needless to say it is imperative to do the minimum amount work to these sediments to prevent them dispersing into their individual particles.

Irrespective of what the PSD is in practice, it is obvious the percentage of these sediments overflowing the dredge is excessive and non-overflow must be used.

Why did Royal Boskalis, the PoMC’s partner, not alert them to this unsatisfactory situation?

Proposed Monitoring

16. The Minister has stipulated that certain functions be monitored without setting trigger points when dredging must cease.

Supporting Information Without these trigger points the monitoring is worthless

Economic Considerations

26 Supporting Information None

18. Because only a small percentage of the time will ships have maximum draught the costs of entering and leaving the port can be higher and take longer on these occasions than for normal transits.

Supporting Information None

Supporting Information The significance of this one modification to the port operations can be gauged by Meyricks own statement (in Meyrick’s reply to Croft’s question, 12th July 2007) namely: “We do not have any difficulty with the proposition that if ships with a draught of 12.5m were able to enter and leave the port without the channel being deepened, the level of benefits that would flow to container shipping would be significantly reduced, particularly during the early years of the evaluation period”.

For more detailed information refer to chapter 10 of Terry Croft’s submission entitled HOW DID THEY GET IT SO WRONG

21. Failed to acknowledge that a $111 million project management fee is to be paid to the POMC or its executives or why such a massive fee is to be paid.

Supporting Information While the document recording this fee does not state who is being paid this fee the SEES records the POMC as the project manager.

Who at the POMC is to share in this fee?

This large fee must be particularly galling to the various small businesses that will suffer from dredging and the POMC has offered no compensation.

With both the State and Commonwealth governments making contributions this largess is effectively being paid for out of the public purse.