DOCSLIB.ORG

The Syrian Opposition's Leadership Problem

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Syrian Opposition's Leadership Problem THE SYriaN OPPOSITION’S LEADERSHip PROBLEM Yezid Sayigh APRIL 2013 THE SYRIAN OPPOSITIOn’S LEADERSHIP PROBLEM Yezid Sayigh APRIL 2013 © 2013 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. The Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Please direct inquiries to: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications Department 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: +1 202-483-7600 Fax: +1 202-483-1840 www.CarnegieEndowment.org Carnegie Middle East Center Lazarieh Tower, 5th floor Bldg. No. 2026 1210, Emir Bechir Street P.O. Box 11-1061 Riad El Solh Beirut Lebanon www.Carnegie-Mec.org This publication can be downloaded at no cost at www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs. CMEC 39 Contents Summary 1 The Opposition’s Missing Leadership 3 An Overview 4 Thrust Into the Spotlight 5 The Syrian National Council 7 The National Coalition: A Brief Interlude? 14 Meeting the Challenges 16 Humanitarian Relief 19 Alternative Leadership on the Ground? 22 The Necessary Shift Inside Syria 27 What Comes After the National Coalition? 29 Notes 33 About the Author 37 Carnegie Middle East Center 38 Summary Syria’s opposition still lacks political leadership two years after the start of the country’s uprising. In exile, the Syrian National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (National Coalition) professes to provide a representa- tive framework for diverse civilian councils and rebel groups operating within Syria’s borders, but it does not lead them. It must empower the grassroots structures to become the opposition’s real political leadership inside Syria and shift its focus to frankly engage key political constituencies and state institu- tions to split them from the regime if it hopes to bring about lasting, demo- cratic change. Key Themes • The opposition’s first representative framework in exile, the Syrian National Council (SNC), reacted to diplomatic initiatives rather than shaping them, espoused militarization without being able to direct or sup- port it, and failed to incorporate local leaders inside Syria. • Expecting funding and political recognition from the international com- munity, opposition figures and factions in exile competed for status and resources rather than uniting under a common banner. • The National Coalition, which has supplanted the SNC, has proved no more effective in providing strategic political leadership, empowering local civil administration, asserting credible authority over armed rebels, delivering humanitarian relief, and devising a political strategy to split the regime. The resignation of National Coalition Chairman Moaz al-Khatib on March 24, 2013, placed its future in doubt. • Local civilian and military councils inside Syria cannot assert effective authority on the ground in the absence of credible political leadership. • Competing rebel groups and Islamist militants have filled the void, addressing growing needs for security, dispute resolution, food and fuel supply, and shelter. Recommendations for the National Coalition Exercise political leadership of military operations. The National Coalition must stake out a clear position on the conduct of major combat operations in Syria’s cities, especially the looming battle for Damascus, in order to assert political direction and authority over military decisionmaking. 1 2 | The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem Govern the liberated areas and empower local political leadership. The coalition should empower the provisional government it has announced in lib- erated areas to make strategic policy decisions. Otherwise the government will fail to deliver effective administration, services, and humanitarian assistance or to assert civilian control over the armed rebels. Devise a political strategy and prepare for negotiations. The coalition leadership should propose a concrete framework that offers principal political and institutional actors currently supporting the regime, other than President Bashar al-Assad and his inner core, the opportunity to play a direct, formal role in negotiating Syria’s democratic transition. The Opposition’s Missing Leadership Two years after the start of the Syrian uprising, the opposition still lacks effec- tive political leadership. The principal opposition umbrella frameworks, the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (National Coalition), enjoy considerable domestic legitimacy and widespread international recognition. But they represent rather than lead. They have articulated the political ethos and goals of the uprising authentically, but neither has effectively set the uprising’s agenda, determined strategy on the ground, or taken decisions on critically important issues of war and peace. They remain based in exile and lack an organizational base inside Syria—a serious additional obstacle. The lack of leadership has impeded the consolidation of initiatives under- taken by “insiders”—civilian activists and rebel officers inside Syria. It has dashed hopes of replicating successful models of organization throughout the country, leaving functioning structures localized, vulnerable, and even revers- ible. And it has enhanced the role of de facto or “traditional” social construc- tions—based on ethnicity, confession, and tribe or clan—that in turn bear heavily on political agendas and modes of action, at times dominating them. The potential for a significant shift in dynamics appeared on March 18, 2013, when the National Coalition appointed U.S.-based information tech- nology expert and activist Ghassan Hitto to head a provisional government located primarily in liberated areas of Syria. The government faces the task of binding local grassroots structures into an effective governing system and of asserting meaningful authority over a majority of the rebel groups on the ground. To do so, it must be empowered to take strategic policy decisions, rather than act solely as an administrative adjunct to the National Coalition. Should it succeed, the provisional government will become the opposition’s de facto political leadership. This would be a major success, but its potential as a contender for political leadership is exactly what the National Coalition fears. The coalition, which only announced the provisional government with great reluctance after com- ing under severe pressure from its Arab backers to do so, went to great lengths to stress its “technocratic” nature. The ten candidates competing for the post of prime minister had lived in exile for many years, almost as many had been engaged in nonpolitical white-collar professions until the 2011 uprising, and the government’s central task was defined narrowly as overseeing services in liberated areas. By enfeebling the provisional government politically, the National Coalition placed both its administrative role and its moral authority 3 4 | The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem at risk, complicating the challenges facing the grassroots movement and tak- ing the opposition back to square one. The vista is not open-ended. Consolidation of the grassroots structures has been partial and hesitating, amid competing trends toward greater fragmenta- tion, sectarian polarization, and routinization of violence. The provisional gov- ernment could transform the picture, but it was hobbled from birth. Although he later retracted it, the resignation of National Coalition Chairman Moaz al- Khatib on March 24, 2013, placed the coalition’s own future in serious doubt. It may limp on, but unless the opposition resolves its leadership problem in the course of 2013, the rebellion may fragment into rival armed cantons and the deeper revolutionary transformation now under way in Syrian society could stall. An Overview The opposition’s problems run deep. Decades of authoritarian rule had all but eliminated autonomous political and social activity in Syria by 2011. Opponents of President Bashar al-Assad were thus denied the preexisting organizational networks and a ready pool of experienced members able to seize the revolutionary moment created by the spontaneous uprising in March 2011 and build on it rapidly. As a result, the coalition of disparate opposition groups, independent figures, and grassroots activists who formed the SNC in October 2011 could not gain traction on the ground, pushing it into a reactive stance from the outset. The SNC took up whatever positions seemed to have popular support among demonstrators and activists inside Syria and did not provide political leadership. The SNC failed repeatedly over the next year to anticipate developments on the ground in Syria as well as in the diplomatic domain, let alone influence their direction. It moreover struggled to assert its author- ity over the constantly proliferating rebel brigades, bat- The SNC missed every opportunity to talions, and military councils that emerged as the armed develop and incorporate local leaders rebellion gained momentum in the course of 2012. And inside Syria into its fold, making the it missed every opportunity to develop and incorporate local leaders inside Syria into its fold, making the oppo- opposition’s internal struggles over status sition’s internal struggles over status and representation
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Women and Participation in the Arab Uprisings: a Struggle for Justice
    Distr. LIMITED E/ESCWA/SDD/2013/Technical Paper.13 26 December 2013 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA) WOMEN AND PARTICIPATION IN THE ARAB UPRISINGS: A STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE New York, 2013 13-0381 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This paper constitutes part of the research conducted by the Social Participatory Development Section within the Social Development Division to advocate the principles of social justice, participation and citizenship. Specifically, the paper discusses the pivotal role of women in the democratic movements that swept the region three years ago and the challenges they faced in the process. The paper argues that the increased participation of women and their commendable struggle against gender-based injustices have not yet translated into greater freedoms or increased political participation. More critically, in a region dominated by a patriarchal mindset, violence against women has become a means to an end and a tool to exercise control over society. If the demands for bread, freedom and social justice are not linked to discourses aimed at achieving gender justice, the goals of the Arab revolutions will remain elusive. This paper was co-authored by Ms. Dina Tannir, Social Affairs Officer, and Ms. Vivienne Badaan, Research Assistant, and has benefited from the overall guidance and comments of Ms. Maha Yahya, Chief, Social Participatory Development Section. iii iv CONTENTS Page Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... iii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. GENDERING ARAB REVOLUTIONS: WHAT WOMEN WANT ......................... 2 A. The centrality of gender to Arab revolutions............................................................ 2 B. Participation par excellence: Activism among Arab women.................................... 3 III. CHANGING LANES: THE STRUGGLE OVER WOMEN’S BODIES .................
    [Show full text]
  • Country of Origin Information Report Syria June 2021
    Country of origin information report Syria June 2021 Page 1 of 102 Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021 Publication details City The Hague Assembled by Country of Origin Information Reports Section (DAF/AB) Disclaimer: The Dutch version of this report is leading. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands cannot be held accountable for misinterpretations based on the English version of the report. Page 2 of 102 Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021 Table of contents Publication details ............................................................................................2 Table of contents ..........................................................................................3 Introduction ....................................................................................................5 1 Political and security situation .................................................................... 6 1.1 Political and administrative developments ...........................................................6 1.1.1 Government-held areas ....................................................................................6 1.1.2 Areas not under government control. ............................................................... 11 1.1.3 COVID-19 ..................................................................................................... 13 1.2 Armed groups ............................................................................................... 13 1.2.1 Government forces .......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Key Actors and Abbreviations
    Key actors and abbreviations The Assad regime and its allies ‘The regime’ Bashar al-Assad, Syrian President 2000– Hafez al-Assad, Syrian President 1971–2000 Asma al-Assad (née Akhras), Syria’s First Lady 2000– Maher al-Assad, brother of Bashar al-Assad, Commander of Republican Guard and 4th Armoured Division Anisa Makhlouf, mother of Bashar al-Assad Assif Shawkat, brother-in-law of Bashar al-Assad, head of military intelligence 2005–9, deputy minister of defence 2011–12 Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Bashar al-Assad, wealthy businessman Manaf Tlass, Republican Guard General, defected 2012 Farouk al-Sharaa, First Vice President of Syria 2006– Walid al-Muallem, Foreign Minister 2006– Bouthaina Shabaan, political and media adviser to the Syrian President 2008– Ba’ath – Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the ruling party of Syria since 1963 Mukhabarat – Set of notorious regime intelligence agencies Shabiha – Gangs of irregular pro-regime thugs NDF – National Defence Force, formed 2013 Russia Vladimir Putin, Russian President 2000–8, 2012–, Russian Prime Minister 2008–12 Dmitri Medvedev, Russian President 2008–12, Russian Prime Minister 2012–20 Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister 2004– Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Foreign Minister 2011– Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran 1989– xii 5146.indd xii 19/06/20 5:00 PM KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS xiii Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranian President 2005–13 Hassan Rouhani, Iranian President 2013– Ali Akbar Salehi, Foreign Minister 2010–13 Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister 2013– Qassem Suleimani, Commander
    [Show full text]
  • The Syrian National Council: a Victorious Opposition?
    THE INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES IMES CAPSTONE PAPER SERIES THE SYRIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL: A VICTORIOUS OPPOSITION? JARED MARKLAND KRITTIKA LALWANEY MAY 2012 THE INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT OF THE AUTHOR(S), 2012 THE SYRIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL: A VICTORIOUS OPPOSITION? Jared Markland & Krittika Lalwaney Introduction The Syrian National Council (SNC) emerged as an opposition movement representing the democratic uprisings in Syria calling for regime change. The Assad regime’s forceful measures against Syrians have delegitimized the government and empowered the revolution. The success of the revolution, in overthrowing the regime hinges on the Syrian opposition’s ability to overcome its deficiencies. This paper analyzes the performance of the SNC by determining SNC success or failure to launch a successful opposition movement against the regime. The SNC’s probability of success in the overthrow of the regime is contingent on its ability to unify internally, obtain financial capacity, establish international recognition, and build internal popular support. Methodology The methods used to examine the prospects for success of the SNC as a viable opposition movement consist of comparative case studies and qualitative field research. We examined four case studies, including Nicaragua, Libya, El Salvador and Guatemala. These cases establish a set of core factors necessary for an opposition movement to succeed. The utilization of these factors allows us to create a comparative assessment of the overall performance of the SNC. Our qualitative fieldwork entailed a total of 32 interviews with current SNC members, Syrian activists, refugees, Free Syrian Army members, academic experts, and government officials.
    [Show full text]
  • PRISM Syrian Supplemental
    PRISM syria A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS About PRISM PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners Vol. 4, Syria Supplement on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; 2014 relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development Editor Michael Miklaucic Communications Contributing Editors Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct Alexa Courtney communications to: David Kilcullen Nate Rosenblatt Editor, PRISM 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Copy Editors Fort Lesley J. McNair Dale Erikson Washington, DC 20319 Rebecca Harper Sara Thannhauser Lesley Warner Telephone: Nathan White (202) 685-3442 FAX: (202) 685-3581 Editorial Assistant Email: [email protected] Ava Cacciolfi Production Supervisor Carib Mendez Contributions PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Advisory Board and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States Dr. Gordon Adams and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to prism@ Dr. Pauline H. Baker ndu.edu with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Ambassador Rick Barton Professor Alain Bauer This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Ambassador James F. Dobbins without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content.
    [Show full text]
  • What Does the Syrian Opposition Believe? | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds What Does the Syrian Opposition Believe? by David Pollock May 30, 2012 ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Pollock David Pollock is the Bernstein Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on regional political dynamics and related issues. Articles & Testimony here are increasing calls for international intervention in Syria after this weekend's massacre in Houla, where T Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces murdered more than 100 civilians. Obstacles to intervention remain, however, especially concern that the opposition to Assad's regime is dominated by religious fundamentalists. Until recently, for example, the Syrian National Council, a group of exiled opponents of the regime, was led by Burhan Ghalioun, whose unwillingness to counter the Muslim Brotherhood was widely viewed in the West as a troubling sign of Islamist influence. But a confidential survey of opposition activists living in Syria reveals that Islamists are only a minority among them. Domestic opponents of Assad, the survey indicates, look to Turkey as a model for Syrian governance -- and even widely admire the United States. Pechter Polls, which conducts opinion surveys in tough spots in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, completed the Syria opposition poll in December 2011. Respondents were contacted over a secure Skype connection by someone they could trust -- all native Syrians -- who asked them to fill out a short questionnaire anonymously in Arabic. Interviewers were selected from different social and political groups to ensure that respondents reflected a rough cross-section of overall opposition attitudes. To ensure confidentiality, the online survey could be accessed only through a series of proxy servers, bypassing the regime-controlled Internet.
    [Show full text]
  • Europe, Not the United States, Pays the Price of Failure in Syria Europe
    Jadal ! ! ! October 2015 Europe, not the United States, pays the price of failure in Syria Bassma Kodmani* Russian President Putin has decided that Syria is part of Russia’s near abroad, no less than Ukraine it seems, a territory where some vital national interests are at stake. He has predicted the fecklessness of Western powers well. Whether he is deploying his arsenal in Syria to fight Daesh or to bolster Assad, by moving massive military presence into Syria he has made himself the one player that counts and has put himself in a position to call the shots. He does not have a strategy to end the conflict. But he has one that he thinks will guarantee Russia’s influence in this pivotal country while the West !has no strategy to confront him. Europeans have been waiting for American leadership on Syria for the last four years. Some were ready to move against Assad after he used chemical weapons against civilians. The French were most committed to Obama’s red line, but Kerry and Lavrov found a way out with the agreement on Assad’s chemical arsenal, which was welcomed by all as a relief. The fact that Assad was saved and his ability to continue striking remained intact was deemed regrettable, but European countries thought they could live with the problem. Daesh was a minor concern back then which a few brave fighters from the Free Syrian Army could deal with. But this inaction had consequences, which are now felt acutely across Europe. ! The debate in Europe has since revolved around all the “good reasons” for keeping Assad in place and containing the conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • The Free Syrian Army Vs. the Syrian National Council -- Which Should We Support? by David Schenker
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds The Free Syrian Army vs. the Syrian National Council -- Which Should We Support? by David Schenker Apr 2, 2012 ABOUT THE AUTHORS David Schenker David Schenker is the Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Articles & Testimony year into the Syrian uprising against Bashar Al-Assad, the dysfunctional nature of Syrian opposition politics A isn't exactly news. But the resignation last month of Syrian dissident Kamal Labwani from the Syrian National Council (SNC) -- which he accused not only of being "undemocratic" and incompetent, but intent on undermining the secular basis of the revolution -- is an especially troubling indictment of the opposition's hapless government in exile. The Obama administration should heed Labwani's testimony, and reassess its diplomacy accordingly. Indeed, taking a cue from Labwani's experience, Washington should refocus its attention away from the SNC, in favor of providing more active support for the less centralized, but potentially more effective Free Syrian Army (FSA). I can personally attest to the depth of Labwani's commitment to a free Syria. I first met him in 2005, when he was in Washington for meetings with Bush administration officials. During a meeting at the Pentagon that I attended, Labwani, a medical doctor who was a prominent member of the "Damascus Spring" reform movement in 2001, did not ask for U.S. assistance in toppling Syria's Assad regime. Instead, he spoke eloquently about the need for political reform in his country. When I asked him whether he feared being jailed on his return, he said he knew he would be arrested, but nonetheless believed it was important for U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Syrian Foreign Policy and the United States: from Bush to Obama
    SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES: FROM BUSH TO OBAMA By Raymond Hinnebusch, Marwan Kabalan, Bassma Kodmani and David Lesch St Andrews papers on Contemporary Syria, 2010 1 2 Syrian Foreign Policy Foreword Raymond Hinnebusch These four analyses look at Syrian foreign policy, and particularly the ups and downs in Syria’s relationship with the US since Bashar al-Asad and George W. Bush nearly simultaneously came to power. One of the most striking and puzzling aspects of this relation is why a Syrian leader keen to improve relations with the West was soon the object of a concerted attempt to demonize and isolate him. Arguably this had more to do with the American politics than with Syria and had Kerry won the 2000 US election US-Syrian relations would almost certainly have taken a much different tangent and the history of the Middle East would have turned out very differently. The focus of the analyses is however on what makes Syria tick and how this explains its strategies in dealing with the hostile, aggressive and powerful US under Bush. The analysis by Hinnebusch looks particularly at the continuities from the Hafiz period, showing how Syria was in the late nineties on course for a peace settlement with Israel under US auspices. The failure of the peace negotiations set entrain a series of moves and countermoves that contributed to a crisis in Syrian- US relations, with Iraq and Lebanon the foci of their clashing agendas. The article finishes with a look at the fresh start between the two states at the beginning of the Obama administration.
    [Show full text]
  • In Defence of Humanity: WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS and the STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENCING in Defence of Humanity in Defence of Humanity
    In Defence of Humanity: WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SILENCING In Defence of Humanity In Defence of Humanity The lack of access to justice and resources, together with the failure of states to provide protection for Executive summary WHRDs, affects the work of WHRDs around the world. Accordingly, WHRDs need appropriate protection that is flexible to their needs. However, very little is done to respond to threats that WHRDs receive, In recent years, combined with existing threats, the rise of right-wing and nationalist populism across the and often, as Front Line Defenders reports, killings are preceded by receipt of a threat.1 This means that world has led to an increasing number of governments implementing repressive measures against the protection mechanisms need to focus too on prevention of harm by perpetrators to ensure that the right to space for civil society (civic space), particularly affecting women human rights defenders (WHRDs). The life is upheld for WHRDs and take seriously the threats that they receive. Despite efforts to implement the increasingly restricted space for WHRDs presents an urgent threat, not only to women-led organisations, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the United Nations but to all efforts campaigning for women’s rights, gender equality and the rights of all people. In spite of (UN) Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and the Maputo Protocol - which calls for “corrective and these restrictions, WHRDs have campaigned boldly in the face of mounting opposition: movements such positive” actions where women continue to face discrimination - WHRDs still operate in dangerous contexts as #MeToo #MenAreTrash, #FreeSaudiWomen, #NiUnaMenos, #NotYourAsianSideKick and #AbortoLegalYa and are at risk of being targeted or killed.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamism Within a Civil War: the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's Struggle For
    RETHINKING POLITICAL ISLAM SERIES August 2015 Islamism within a civil war: The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s struggle for survival WORKING PAPER Raphaël Lefèvre, Carnegie Middle East Center SUMMARY: After 30 years in exile outside of Syria, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has become an important component of the western-backed Syrian opposition. Despite its influence, the expansion and radicalization of the Islamist scene in Syria challenges the legitimacy of the Brotherhood’s gradualist approach and constrains its presence on the ground. About this Series: The Rethinking Political Islam series is an innovative effort to understand how the developments following the Arab uprisings have shaped—and in some cases altered—the strategies, agendas, and self-conceptions of Islamist movements throughout the Muslim world. The project engages scholars of political Islam through in-depth research and dialogue to provide a systematic, cross-country comparison of the trajectory of political Islam in 12 key countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Pakistan, as well as Malaysia and Indonesia. This is accomplished through three stages: A working paper for each country, produced by an author who has conducted on-the-ground research and engaged with the relevant Islamist actors. A reaction essay in which authors reflect on and respond to the other country cases. A final draft incorporating the insights gleaned from the months of dialogue and discussion. The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public.
    [Show full text]
  • Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Still a Crucial Actor. Inclusivity the Order of the Day in Dealings with Syria's Opposition
    Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Co Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Still a Crucial Actor WP S Inclusivity the Order of the Day in Dealings with Syria’s Opposition Petra Becker Summer 2013 brought severe setbacks for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Firstly, one of its most important regional supporters, Qatar lost its leading role in the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, the alliance of states and organisations backing Syria’s opposition, to Saudi Arabia. Secondly, the Brotherhood has been hit by stinging criti- cism of the Egyptian MB’s performance in government and the media witch-hunt against political Islam following the ouster of Mohammed Morsi. In the face of these events the Syrian Brotherhood – to date still a religious and social movement – post- poned the founding of a political party planned for late June. Thirdly, the Brotherhood – like its partners in the National Coalition which opposes the Syrian regime – bet on an American-backed military intervention in August/September. This intervention did not occur due to the American-Russian brokered agreement providing for Syria to join the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. As a result, the National Coalition and its Supreme Military Command have faced defections of major rebel forces, which may lead to a major shift towards Jihadi Salafism and the marginalization of moderate forces on the ground. Yet the Brother- hood remains the best-organised political force within the Syrian opposition alliances and still sees itself becoming the leading force in post-revolutionary Syria. Germany and Europe should encourage moderate forces whatever their political colours and foster the implementation of democratic concepts.
    [Show full text]