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Edit Master Title Style UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 D E P A R T Iraq Weekly M E N T Status Report O F June 27, 2007 S T Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs A US Department of State T E 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 Table of Contents This report provides weekly updates in the eight key areas identified as pillars D of U.S. government policy for victory in Iraq. E SECTION SLIDE P Highlights 3 A 1. Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgents R 5 T 2. Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance 6 M 3. Help Iraqis to Forge a National Compact for Democratic 8 E Government N T 4. Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential 10 Services O 5. Help Iraq Strengthen Its Economy F 13 6. Help Iraq Strengthen the Rule of Law and Promote Civil Rights 21 S 7. Increase International Support for Iraq 22 T 8. Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and A 25 T Public Isolation of the Insurgents E Sources and Contact Information 26 Notes and Source Citations 27 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 Highlights 1. Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgents D Coalition and Iraqi forces launched Operation Arrowhead Ripper June 19, a large-scale effort to E eliminate al-Qaida in Diyala province. As of June 21, at least 51 al-Qaida operatives have been P killed, 20 detained, 7 weapon caches discovered, 21 improvised explosive devices destroyed, and 9 booby-trapped structures destroyed. The newly formed Diyala Operations Center is playing a key A role, integrating the activities of the local Iraqi police, the Iraqi Army, and Coalition forces. R Approximately 10,000 soldiers, with a full complement of combined arms, are taking part in the T operation. M 2. Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance E Iraqi Police from surrounding areas held a recruiting drive in the city of Lutifiyah, south of Baghdad, June 17. The Iraqi-planned recruiting event resulted in a strong turnout with over 100 men applying N for Iraqi Police training. T 3. Help Iraqis to Forge a National Compact for Democratic Government Iraq's Council of Representatives (CoR) voted to extend its activities through the month of July to O finalize draft laws that have yet to be fully debated or voted upon. Iraqi CoR member Wa’il Abd al- F Latif stated that the parliament's decision came after voting over a proposal by the speakership board to finalize approximately 50 draft laws, including the postponement of the constitutional review committee's work and the draft law on oil. S 4. Help Iraq Build Government Capacity and Provide Essential Services T Up to 24,000 residents of Abu Fillis will receive clean potable water from the completed, U.S.-funded A Rural Water Supply Abu Fillis (G5) project, in Ramadi, al-Anbar province. T E 3 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 Highlights 5. Help Iraq Strengthen Its Economy D Chinese Commerce Minister Bo Xilai and three Iraqi ministers signed a deal June 21 to cancel Iraq’s approximately $2.85 million in sovereign debt to China’s government. No details were given on the E debt relief and state media reported only that Premier Wen Jiabao told visiting Iraqi President Jalal P Talabani that China would help train Iraqi personnel to upgrade Iraq’s medical and educational A capacities. R 6. Help Iraq Strengthen the Rule of Law T On June 24, Iraqi Judge Muhammad Oraibi al-Khalifa sentenced Saddam Hussein's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid and two other former regime officials to death by hanging for their roles in a 1980s M campaign that led to the deaths of 180,000 Kurds. Known as “Chemical Ali”, al-Majid earned his E nickname for his alleged use of chemical weapons against the ethnic minority during efforts to crush a N rebellion in the north." The court convicted al-Majid of genocide, crimes against humanity and war T crimes for ordering army and security services to use chemical weapons in a large-scale offensive that killed or maimed thousands. 7. International Support for Iraq O Gordon Brown assumed leadership of Britain's Labor Party June 24, paving the way for him to take F over as prime minister later in the week. Brown did not confirm any plans for additional withdrawals of UK forces, but did commit that Britain would “learn lessons that need to be learned” from Iraq. S 8. Strengthen Public Understanding of Coalition Efforts and Public Isolation of the Insurgents T The United Nations Children’s Fund denounced the neglect and abuse of children in a Baghdad orphanage as “totally unacceptable” June 22 and urged the Iraqi government to carry out a review of A all children’s care homes as soon as possible. T E 4 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 [1.] Defeat the Terrorists and Neutralize the Insurgency Start of ‘Arrowhead Ripper’ Highlights Iraq Operations: D E • Coalition and Iraqi forces launched Operation Arrowhead Ripper June 19 as a large scale P effort to eliminate al-Qaida in Diyala province. A • Approximately 10,000 soldiers, with a full complement of combined arms, are taking part R in the operation. The newly formed Diyala Operations Center is playing a key role, T integrating the activities of the local Iraqi police, the Iraqi Army, and Coalition forces. M • As of June 21, at least 51 al-Qaida operatives have been killed, 20 detained, 7 weapon E caches discovered, 21 improvised explosive devices destroyed, and 9 booby-trapped N structures destroyed. T O F S T A T E 5 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 [2.] Transition to Security Self-Reliance – Iraqi Security Forces Iraqis Join Ranks of Lutifiyah's Police Force D E • Iraqi Police from surrounding areas held a recruiting drive in the city of Lutifiyah, south of P Baghdad, June 17. The Iraqi-planned recruiting event resulted in a strong turnout with A over 100 men applying for Iraqi Police training. R T M E N T O F S T A T E 6 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 [2.] Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance – Iraqi Security Forces D Ministry of Interior Forces Ministry of Defense Forces E TRAINED & COMPONENT P EQUIPPED COMPONENT OPERATIONAL A POLICE ~135,000 R ARMY ~156,900*** NATIONAL ~ 26,300 T POLICE AIR FORCE ~900 M OTHER MOI NAVY ~1,100 ~32,900 E FORCES TOTAL ~158,900** N TOTAL ~194,200* T Total Trained & Equipped ISF: O F ~353,100**** S * Ministry of Interior Forces: Unauthorized absence personnel are included in these numbers T ** Ministry of Defense Forces: Unauthorized absence personnel are not included in these numbers A *** Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces T **** Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 E ministries 7 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 [3.] Help Iraqis to Forge a National Compact for Democratic Government Iraqi Parliament Delays Summer Recess D • Iraq's Council of Representatives (CoR) voted to extend activities for the month of July to E finalize draft laws that have yet to be fully debated or voted upon. Iraqi CoR member P Wa’il Abd al-Latif stated that the parliament's decision came after voting over a proposal A by the speakership board to finalize approximately 50 draft laws including the R postponement of the constitutional review committee's work and the draft law on oil. T M PM Maliki Amends Comments on Arming Sunni Tribes E • Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki insisted that he supports the U.S. tactic of arming Sunni Arab N tribes to battle insurgents in Iraq. The statement given by his office differed from T comments published last week, however, Maliki expanded on his earlier statements by noting, “The (Iraqi) government does not fear the arming of tribes but fears the O appearance of new militias. It is essential that all these activities are under Iraqi control F and done with government supervision.” S T A T E 8 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED June 27, 2007 [3.] Help Iraqis to Forge a National Compact for Democratic Government - Iraqi National Unity Government President D Deputy President Jalal Talabani Deputy President (F) = Female E Tariq al-Hashimi ‘Adil ‘Abd al-Mahdi * Vacant P Prime Minister A Deputy Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki Deputy Prime Minister R Barham Salih Salam al-Zawba’i T Minister of Displacement Minister of Minister of Minister of Minister of Culture Minister of Defense M Agriculture Communications & Migration Electricity Muhammad Tawfiq Abdul Qadir Muhammed Abd al-Samad Rahman * * Karim Wahid E Allawi Jasim Sultan Minister of Minister of Minister of Higher N Minister of Finance Minister* of Foreign Minister of Health Education Environment Affairs Education TKhudayyir al-Khuza’i Narmin ‘Uthman (F) Bayan Jabr Hoshyar Zebari * Abd Dhiyab al-Ajili Minister of Human Minister of Industry Minister of Minister of Housing & Minister of Labor & Minister of Justice O Rights & Minerals Interior Construction Social Affairs Mahmud Muhammad Wijdan Mikha’il (F) F Fawzi al-Hariri Jawad al-Bulani Safa al Safi (acting) Bayan Daza’I (F) Jawad al-Radi Minister of Minister of Science & Minister of Municipalities Minister of Minister of Oil Minister of Trade S Planning Technology & Public Works Transportation Husayn al- Abd al-Falah al- Ali Baban Ra’id Fahmi Jahid Riyad Ghurayyib * T Shahristani Sudani A Minister of Water Minister of Youth & Minister of State for Minister of State for Minister of State for National T Resources Sports Civil Society National Dialogue Affairs Security Affairs E ‘Abd al-Latif Rashid Jasim Muhammad Ja’far Wijdan Mikha’il (acting) Akram al-Hakim Shirwan al-Waili Minister of State for Minister of State for Minister of State for Minister of State for Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Governorates Affairs Tourism
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