Post-Saddam Governance and Security
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Order Code RL31339 Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security Updated June 4, 2008 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security Summary Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but during 2004-2007 much of Iraq was wracked by violence caused by Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq’s government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. At the same time, mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs — without clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq’s major communities — stimulated debate within the United States over whether the initial goals of the intervention — a stable, democratic Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terrorism — could ever be achieved, and, if so, at what cost. The Administration is claiming success in reversing the deterioration in security that had become acute by the end of 2006, attributing the gains to a “troop surge” strategy announced by President Bush on January 10, 2007 (“New Way Forward”). The centerpiece of the strategy was the deployment of an additional 28,500 U.S. forces to help stabilize Baghdad and to take advantage of growing tribal support for U.S. policy in Anbar Province. U.S. overall commander in Iraq General David Petraeus, said in testimony during April 8-9, 2008, that overall violence is down at least 60% since June 2007, to levels of spring 2005, but that the security situation in “certain areas” is “still unsatisfactory,” and that progress is “fragile and reversible.” This fragility was demonstrated in March-April 2008 by an outbreak of intense and widespread fighting between Shiite-dominated government forces and Shiite militias, although violence fell in May 2008 to the lowest levels since early 2004. The Administration argues that Iraqi legislative action in Iraq since the beginning of 2008 represents a substantial measure of the progress on political reconciliation that was envisioned by the surge, but critics differ with the degree of such political progress and say that security gains are tenuous. A delay in provincial council elections, planned for October 1, 2008, is now virtually certain. Going forward, the Administration believes that the current strategy — “conditions-based” gradual reductions in U.S. forces and continued building of Iraq’s security forces — is likely to produce a central government able to defend itself. Some in Congress believe that the progress is modest and unsustainable without high levels of U.S. forces, and that winding down U.S. combat involvement in Iraq would compel Iraqi leaders to reach needed political compromises. Partly because there is a perception that the troop surge is succeeding, there has not been the required level of support in Congress to mandate a troop withdrawal, a timetable for withdrawal, or a significant change in U.S. strategy, although there appears to be growing support for compelling Iraq to fund key functions now funded by the United States. This report is updated regularly. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by Curt Tarnoff; and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Christopher Blanchard. Contents Policy in the 1990s Emphasized Containment ...........................3 The Clinton Administration, the Iraq Liberation Act, and Major Anti-Saddam Factions......................................3 Post-September 11, 2001: Regime Change and War ......................7 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) ...................................9 Post-Saddam Transition and Governance ..............................10 Early Transition Process .......................................10 Occupation Period/Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ........10 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).......................11 Sovereignty Handover/Interim (Allawi) Government .............12 U.N. Involvement/Coalition Military Mandate/Status of U.S. Forces/Permanent Basing..............................12 U.N. Involvement in Governance Issues .......................15 Elections in 2005 .............................................16 Maliki Government, Political Reconciliation, and “Benchmarks” .......17 Iraqi Pledges and Status of Accomplishment ...................19 Regional and International Diplomatic Efforts to Promote Iraq Stability ............................................22 Human Rights and Rule of Law..............................23 Economic Reconstruction and U.S. Assistance......................24 Additional Funding Beyond the IRRF .........................25 Oil Revenues ............................................25 Lifting U.S. Sanctions .....................................27 Debt Relief/WTO Membership/IMF..........................28 Security Challenges and Responses ...................................28 Sunni Arab-Led Insurgency and Al Qaeda in Iraq ....................29 Sunni “Awakening” in 2007 ................................29 “Concerned Local Citizen” (CLC/”Sons of Iraq” Fighters) .........30 Sectarian Violence and Shiite Militias/Civil War? ...................33 Shiite-on-Shiite Violence/March 2008 Basra Battles .............35 Iranian Support ...........................................36 Iraq’s Northern Border.........................................37 U.S. Stabilization Strategy and “Troop Surge” ......................38 “Clear, Hold, and Build” Strategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams . 39 “Troop Surge”/Baghdad Security Plan/“Fardh Qanoon” ...........39 Surge Assessments........................................40 Building Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ..............................42 ISF Weaponry ...........................................44 Coalition-Building and Maintenance .............................47 Iraq Study Group Report, Legislative Proposals, and Other Options .........49 Iraq Study Group Report .......................................49 Further Options: Altering Troop Levels or Mission ..................50 Further Troop Increase .....................................51 Immediate and Complete Withdrawal.........................51 Withdrawal Timetable.....................................51 Troop Mission Change .....................................52 Planning for Withdrawal...................................53 Requiring More Time Between Deployments...................53 Stepped Up International and Regional Diplomacy...................53 Political Reconciliation, Reorganization, and “Federalism” ............54 Reorganize the Existing Power Structure ......................54 Support the Dominant Factions ..............................54 “Federalism”/Decentralization/Break-Up Options ...............55 “Coup” or “Strongman” Option ..............................57 Economic Measures...........................................57 List of Figures Figure 1. Map of Iraq..............................................66 List of Tables Table 1. Iraq Basic Facts ............................................2 Table 2. Selected Key Indicators.....................................27 Table 3. Key Security/Violence Indicators .............................32 Table 4. ISF Funding ..............................................44 Table 5. Ministry of Defense Forces ..................................45 Table 6. Ministry of Interior Forces...................................46 Table 7. Major Factions in Iraq......................................59 Table 8. Iraq’s Government ........................................63 Table 9. U.S. Aid (ESF) to Iraq’s Saddam-Era Opposition .................65 Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security Iraq has not previously had experience with a democratic form of government, although parliamentary elections were held during the period of British rule under a League of Nations mandate (from 1920 until Iraq’s independence in 1932), and the monarchy of the Sunni Muslim Hashemite dynasty (1921-1958). The territory that is now Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman empire after British forces defeated the Ottomans in World War I and took control of the territory in 1918. Britain had tried to take Iraq from the Ottomans earlier in World War I but were defeated at Al Kut in 1916. Britain’s presence in Iraq, which relied on Sunni Muslim Iraqis (as did the Ottoman administration), ran into repeated resistance, facing a major Shiite-led revolt in 1920 and a major anti-British uprising in 1941, during World War II. Iraq’s first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca who, advised by British officer T.E Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”), led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi, who was killed in a car accident in 1939. Ghazi was succeeded by his young son, Faysal II. A major figure under the British mandate and the monarchy was Nuri As-Said, a pro-British, pro-Hashemite Sunni Muslim who served as prime minister 14 times during 1930-1958. Faysal II, with the help of his pro-British Prime Minister Nuri al- Sa’id who had also served under his predecessors, ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim on July 14, 1958. Qasim was ousted in February 1963 by a Baath Party-military alliance. Since that same year, the Baath Party has ruled in Syria, although there was rivalry between the