Fighting the Islamic State By, With, and Through How Mattered As Much As What

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Fighting the Islamic State By, With, and Through How Mattered As Much As What Paratroopers with Charlie Battery, 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, rotate M777 155mm howitzer in preparation to engage militants with artillery fire in support of Iraqi and Peshmerga fighters in Mosul (U.S. Army/Christopher Bigelow) Fighting the Islamic State By, With, and Through How Mattered as Much as What By J. Patrick Work n January 2017, the 2nd Brigade a simple framework: help the ISF and and approach—how we advised—offer Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Divi- hurt IS every day. Naturally, we had useful examples and angles for leaders I sion, deployed to bolster the Iraqi missteps, but our team also served ISF to ponder as we consider future excur- Security Forces (ISF) in the campaign and coalition commanders well on sions with this style of high-intensity to annihilate the so-called Islamic some terribly uncertain days. Specifi- security force assistance.1 State (IS). Task Force Falcon joined cally, how we advised ISF commanders the coalition advise-and-assist (A&A) was as important as what we advised Organizing Principles effort with 2 weeks remaining during them to do in order to win. We mixed Our mission under Operation Inherent the 100-day offensive to retake east innovative concepts and straightfor- Resolve (OIR) proved infinitely different Mosul. For the next 8 months, we ward tactics to attack IS by, with, and than the exhausting, firsthand combat wrestled a complex environment with through the ISF, yet the entire effort that many of us experienced in Iraq always centered on our partners’ lead- from 2003 to 2008. For example, a ership and ownership of exceptionally typical American Soldier’s experience Colonel J. Patrick Work, USA, is Commander of the nasty ground combat operations. during Operation Iraqi Freedom’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division. Several of our perspectives on mindset “troop surge,” whether battling Shia 56 Special Feature / Fighting the Islamic State: How Mattered as Much as What JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 militias or the Salafist forebears of IS, empowers our partners to defeat [IS] mil- throughout the formation. We certainly was that Americans did the deadliest itarily in order to help the government of defeated IS in Ninewah Province to- work, as Iraqis observed. Moreover, the Iraq establish sufficient local security and gether, but the fact remains that ISF ISF that we supported were also not set conditions that contribute to broader troops bore the weight of the violence the same broken groups that collapsed regional stability.” A key was remaining on some astonishingly brutal days. The during the IS rampage of 2014. Our goal-oriented when it was hard; our job human costs to the ISF were massive over OIR journey was dramatically different was simply to help the partners that we Mosul’s 9-month struggle to defeat our than both of these circumstances, and had dominate IS. nations’ common enemy. I sensed that we adjusted our mindset and approach Along these lines, our combat advisers our by-with-through ethos was on track accordingly. had little control over partner decision- once our teams began to consistently Admittedly, the initialism ISF may making, preparation for combat, or use terms such as them, they, and their carelessly overhomogenize our partners’ execution of operations. Importantly, our rather than us, we, and our. Our language capabilities; each of the three cohorts had commanders embraced being advisers mattered because how we spoke reflected its own distinct personality, and our ac- first, accepting that most meaningful how we thought about our partners’ count will bring some of this to life. This decisions and moves were clearly in the leadership and ownership of operations. collection of host-nation troops often hands of the Iraqi government. Indeed, Accomplishing our mission was obviously demonstrated tremendous willpower and senior ISF commanders required vast central, but it was not more important assumed the lion’s share of the physical support and encouragement at times, than how we accomplished our mission. risk no matter which uniform they wore: but they generally took full responsibility Iraqi army, Federal Police (FEDPOL), or for their operations. Our A&A teams, Lethal OCT Network: An Counterterrorism Services. Still, warfare logisticians, and artillery troops proved Imperfect Analogy by, with, and through the ISF was hard infinitely flexible; advisers could never Anyone who has experienced a combat work that highlighted three interrelated fall in love with ISF plans because they training center (CTC) rotation has a principles that can help inform how joint changed so frequently. Moreover, our useful model for comprehending Task leaders think about, resource, and lead two-star and three-star commanders’ Force Falcon’s core organizational and A&A operations: advisers do not get to flagship concepts saturated our approach. operational concepts. Fundamentally, choose their partners, advisers do not Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend the CTC’s observer-controller-trainer control their partners, and advisers must of CJTF-OIR was clear that we were to (OCT) network wraps itself around a put their partners first. help the ISF fight. Stated another way, rotational unit with a parallel structure First, coalition combat advisers did our A&A teams did not close with or connected by dependable communi- not get to choose their partners. Each of take the ground from IS, but instead cations and disciplined information our A&A teams had cause for frustration navigated a fascinating quest of influ- flows. The network’s goal is to help at times, but some partnerships were encing ISF without any authority over unit commanders improve their warf- clearly more challenging than others. ISF. Additionally, Major General Joseph ighting craft, largely by helping them Indeed, some ISF were reluctant at times. Martin of Combined Joint Forces Land see the opposing force (OPFOR), the Some of their commanders demonstrated Component Command (CJFLCC)-OIR ill-structured environment, and them- inconsistent levels of know-how, and, championed “nested, multi-echelon en- selves. The OCT network may even feel on occasion, the cohorts’ agendas were gagement” to help the coalition optimize intrusive at times as its nodes maintain more competitive than cooperative. On its influence with our partners. Like any contact with the rotational unit at every the other hand, we found that IS rallied coalition warfare, the host-nation force echelon. Finally, assuming competence around cunning jihadists who exploited came first; however, our approach to is the network’s anchor point, many of Iraq’s sectarian politics and commanded fighting by, with, and through ampli- the same traits that make A&A teams an intoxicating Salafist narrative of mar- fied our Iraqi partners’ leadership and effective also distinguish the most useful tyrdom. In the end, despite being vastly ownership. OCTs. Empathy, humility, and patience outgunned, small, organized IS units Thus, Task Force Falcon upheld truly matter. continued fighting through the battle the ISF as the preeminent member of Perhaps most important, the OCT of Mosul’s final days in mid-July. Our the coalition against IS. We measured network is not embroiled in “fighting” mission statement not only reflected our our success only through our partners’ the OPFOR or the burden of external pursuit of Combined Joint Task Force– success. This mindset is worth empha- evaluation. Therefore, OCTs routinely OIR’s (CJTF-OIR) interests, but also sizing because, frankly, superbly capable achieve a level of shared understand- how we worked to steady the episodic teammates can lose sight of the partners’ ing that outstrips the rotational units’ imbalance of determination between our centrality at times. To condition our team understanding. Of course, they are not partners and the enemy: “Task Force to always consider the ISF’s goals first, all-knowing; plenty of conversations occur Falcon—by, with, and through ISF in our leaders openly discussed the impor- without OCT oversight, and they peri- everything it does—advises, assists, and tance of empathy, humility, and patience odically misread events, personalities, or JFQ 89, 2nd Quarter 2018 Work 57 trends. Still, the network is well-postured diverse, spanning divestitures of military people. And our people did not advise to provide vertically aligned insights, equipment and supplies for vetted part- ISF institutions—they advised other perspectives, and ideas that help the rota- ners, fires and counterfire, civil-military people. The fight to liberate Mosul was tional unit advance against the OPFOR in advice, and the deadly work of helping a decidedly human story of grit and an uncertain environment. An imperfect ISF liberate the people of Ninewah. willpower, and the key ISF characters analogy, for sure, but thus far we have Steering our decentralized, dynamic, in the story had their own personal only discussed similarities that attend to and diverse A&A enterprise called for an relationships, tensions, motivations, and the advise side of A&A operations. enduring set of guideposts that lined up fears. Uncomfortable discussions were As for the assist aspects, we should our decisionmaking and risk evaluation the natural order of things, and sturdy begin by picturing the same OCTs processes. As we entered the A&A fray relationships with our partners helped armed with enormous amounts of secure of Mosul in January, Task Force Falcon us get past them. Rule #1 for us was bandwidth, intelligence capacity, and organized around five big ideas: profoundly unassuming: “Listen.” And strike capabilities. Moreover, imagine Rule #2 was nearly as simple: “Maintain that this lethal OCT network’s mission, • Protect ourselves and our partners. contact.” Only by staying with key ISF or moral obligation, includes attacking • ISF are always the main effort.2 commanders much of the time, and the OPFOR relentlessly to ensure the • Attack IS. listening to them all of the time, did rotational unit wins.
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