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Iraq - Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on Thursday 16 March 2017

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Iraq - Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on Thursday 16 March 2017 Iraq - Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on Thursday 16 March 2017 Information on the current security situation in Mosul; A report issued in March 2017 by IRIN News states: “After almost three years of terror under IS, four months of living on the verge of starvation since the fight for Mosul began, and three weeks of intense fighting as the Iraqi Army and its allies advanced into west Mosul, the humanitarian situation inside the city has become so dire that families have little choice but to risk their lives by walking through the front lines of the conflict just to try and survive” (IRIN News (9 March 2017) Barefoot flight from Mosul: The long road to safety). This document also notes that: “That residents are willing to risk the treacherous flight out of IS-controlled west Mosul betrays just how terrible conditions are inside the city, with food, drinking water and medication in extremely short supply. Residents have for months been forbidden to leave by IS. Those caught trying are harshly punished or executed in public” (ibid). A document issued in March 2017 by BBC News notes that: “Iraqi security forces taking part in a military offensive to reclaim the northern city of Mosul from the so-called Islamic State (IS) are continuing to advance into the western half of the city” (BBC News (10 March 2017) Battle for Mosul: The story so far). Voice of America in March 2017 points out that: “Iraqi government forces dislodged IS fighters from eastern Mosul in January, and on February 19 launched an offensive to retake districts west of the Tigris River. The offensive has displaced tens of thousands of civilians and has faced stiff IS resistance. Days of heavy rain also slowed the government advance. State television Friday said about half of western Mosul had been recaptured. It said the remaining jihadists were holed up in the center of Mosul's old city and in districts north of the city” (Voice of America (11 March 2017) Mass Grave Found Near Mosul After Islamic State Retreat). A document issued in March 2017 by BBC News states: “Mosul is the last major urban IS stronghold in Iraq. But Iraqi forces, backed by coalition air strikes and military advisers on the ground, have managed to retake large areas in the past five months. They now control all of Mosul's eastern side, and have driven IS militants from several western districts since mid-February” (BBC News (13 March 2017) IS fighters left in Mosul will die, says US envoy McGurk). In March 2017 the UNHCR states in a report that: “Three weeks into the military campaign to retake west Mosul, Iraqi security forces (ISF) control close to half of west Mosul’s 45 neighbourhoods .ISF is now moving deep into west Mosul, surrounding Old Mosul city on three sides. Over 80% of Mosul’s infrastructure is destroyed, according to government officials” (UNHCR (14 March 2017) Iraq Flash Update (as of 14 March 2017)). A document issued in March 2017 by the Agence France Presse points out that: “Nearly 100,000 people have poured out of west Mosul in less than three weeks as Iraqi forces fought to retake the area from jihadists, the International Organization for Migration said Wednesday. Iraqi security forces launched a major push last month to recapture west Mosul, which is the most populated urban area still held by the Islamic State group, with an estimated 750,000 residents when the battle began. Iraqi special forces units and police have made steady progress in the area, forcing IS out of a series of neighbourhoods and retaking important sites such as the airport, Mosul museum, train station and provincial government headquarters. But the battle for west Mosul -- which is smaller but more densely populated than the eastern side which Iraqi forces recaptured earlier this year -- has pushed a flood of people to flee their homes” (Agence France Presse (15 March 2017) Nearly 100,000 Iraqis flee battle for west Mosul). In March 2017 the Norwegian Refugee Council states in a report that: “100,000 people have so far fled violence in East Mosul as the offensive to re-take the city continues” (Norwegian Refugee Council (16 March 2017) Mosul: A dangerous escape). In March 2017 Reuters states: “Iraqi government forces besieged Islamic State militants around Mosul's Old City on Thursday, edging closer to the historic mosque from where the group's leader declared a caliphate nearly three years ago. The militants, holed up in houses and darting through alleyways, resisted with sniper fire, suicide attacks and car bombs. Though heavy rain hampered the advance, Federal Police and rapid response unit troops reached points about 500 m (yards) from the centuries-old al-Nuri Mosque by Thursday morning. The black jihadist flag was clearly visible draped from its famous leaning minaret. The government forces have made significant gains in recent days in a battle that started in October, seizing a main bridge over the Tigris river and closing in on the mosque” (Reuters (16 March 2017) Iraqi forces besiege Islamic State around Mosul Old City). Information on the current security situation in Iraq In December 2016 the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq notes in a report that: “Armed conflict between the Government of Iraq and armed groups operating in support of the Government of Iraq and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (‘ISIL’ or ‘Daesh’) continued to take a toll on civilians, causing deaths and injuries, displacement, the destruction of infrastructure, private property, and loss of livelihoods. Such attacks by terrorist and armed groups were often carried out in a manner that deliberately and directly targeted civilians with the aim of killing and wounding as many as possible, or were carried out indiscriminately heedless of the effects on civilians. From 1 January to 30 September 2016, a minimum of 13,833 civilian casualties resulted from the ongoing violence, including at least 4,446 persons killed and 9,387 wounded. Baghdad was the worst affected governorate, with a minimum of 9,521 civilian casualties (2,603 killed and 6,918 wounded). Anbar followed, with 1,498 civilian casualties (385 killed and 1,113 wounded), then Ninewa, with 908 (595 killed and 313 wounded)” (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (December 2016) Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 2016, summary). A report issued in January 2017 by the United Nations Security Council states that: “Armed conflict, terrorism and acts of violence continue to take a terrible toll in terms of loss of civilian lives and injuries” (United Nations Security Council (26 January 2017) Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016) (January 2017), point 34). In March 2017 the United Nations News Centre states in a report that: “More than 1,000 civilians were killed or injured last month in Iraq, the United Nations mission in the country has announced. According to the latest figures from the UN Assistance Mission in the country (UNAMI), at least 392 civilians were killed and another 613 were injured in acts of terrorism, violence and armed conflict” (United Nations News Centre (2 March 2017) Iraq: Civilian casualty figure for February tops 1,000 – UN reports). In March 2017 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs states in a report that: “Iraqi civilians in conflict areas are in extreme danger. Families in Mosul, Hawiga and Tel Afar, and other districts under the control of ISIL, face some of the gravest threats in the Middle East. Civilians risk being caught in cross-fire and are subjected to bombardment; they face execution, abduction, rape, looting, detention and expulsion. Thousands of people are already caught between the front lines of opposing forces and tens of thousands more may become trapped in the months ahead” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (8 March 2017) 2017 Needs Humanitarian Overview: Iraq [Part I: Summary; Part II - Protection, Health]). Reuters in March 2017 states: “Eight people were killed and more than 50 wounded when a car bomb exploded in a crowded street in the Iraqi city of Tikrit on Wednesday, a local official said” (Reuters (15 March 2017) Car bomb kills 8, wounds dozens in Iraq's Tikrit city). This report also notes that: “More than 20 people were killed on March 8 in a series of blasts that hit a wedding near Tikrit and targeted security forces at the scene shortly afterwards. The retreat of Islamic State's self-styled caliphate, which leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared from a mosque in Mosul's old city in 2014, has been accompanied by bomb attacks in areas outside the group's control, including Baghdad and cities in neighboring Syria” (ibid). References Agence France Presse (15 March 2017) Nearly 100,000 Iraqis flee battle for west Mosul http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=tr ue&risb=21_T25656262555&format=GNBFULL&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1 &resultsUrlKey=29_T25656262559&cisb=22_T25656262558&treeMax=true&tree Width=0&csi=10903&docNo=50 This is a subscription database Accessed Thursday 16 March 2017 BBC News (13 March 2017) IS fighters left in Mosul will die, says US envoy McGurk http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39251660 Accessed Thursday 16 March 2017 BBC News (10 March 2017) Battle for Mosul: The story so far http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37702442 Accessed Thursday 16 March 2017 IRIN News (9 March 2017) Barefoot flight from Mosul: The long road to safety
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