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Sectarian Conflict and Sunni Islamic Radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon

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Sectarian Conflict and Sunni Islamic Radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY Sectarian conflict and Sunni Islamic radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon Ana Maria Luca A thesis Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In International Affairs School of Arts and Sciences August 2015 ©2015 Ana Maria Luca All rights reserved ii iii iv Dedication To my husband, Joe, and my son, Gaby v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project would not have been possible without the incredible support of my advisor, Dr. Makram Ouaiss, who guided me through the research, encouraged me and carefully read every word of this thesis. Also, many thanks to my committee members: Dr. Marwan Rowayheb, who constantly motivated and guided me, and Dr. Sami Baroudi, who shared with me his expertise. And finally, special thanks to my friends Nadine Elali, who guided me through the complex political scene in Tripoli, and Myra Abdallah, who helped with translation. And last, but not least, to my colleagues at NOW English. vi Sectarian conflict and Sunni Islamic radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon Ana Maria Luca ABSTRACT Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in early 2011, Lebanon has seen a drastic deterioration in security: domestic supporters and opponents of the Syrian government have confronted each other in armed clashes and Lebanese groups also got involved in the war in Syria. The extremist groups that emerged in Syria also found supporters in Lebanon and a series of suicide bombings rocked civilian areas. Violent conflict affected several regions in Lebanon, but Tripoli, in particular, was called “little Syria” because it seemed to mirror the hostilities in the neighboring country. Many authors have pointed at the Syrian crisis spillover in order to explain the conflict in Tripoli. The thesis aims at explaining the mechanisms that led to polarization and radicalization in the Sunni community in Tripoli. It looks at the conflict through the lens of sectarian identity, explaining how the already existing political polarization turned to sectarian conflict in the presence of the catalysts provided by the Syrian crisis. Keywords: Islamism, Radicalism, Extremism, Causes, Sectarian, Conflict, Tripoli, Lebanon, Syria, Crisis vii Contents Introduction .....................................................................................................................1 Theoretical framework: Sectarian conflict and Sunni Islamic radicalism ...............9 1.1. Identity, ethnicity and religion ................................................................................ 9 1.1.1. Definitions..................................................................................................... 9 1.1.2. Sectarian conflict in Lebanon and Sunni-Shiite polarization after 2005 ............ 13 1.2. Introduction to Sunni Islamic fundamentalism and its currents ............................... 18 1.2.2. Salafism ............................................................................................................ 21 1.2.3. Sunni Islamic fundamentalism in Lebanon .......................................................... 26 The Lebanese Sunnis after the Cedar Revolution ......................................................39 2.1. Political polarization in Lebanon after 2005 ............................................................... 39 2.1.1. The Cedar Revolution ........................................................................................ 39 2.1.2. Political polarization: March 8 and March 14 ...................................................... 41 2.1.3 Hezbollah’s weapons .......................................................................................... 44 2.1.4 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon........................................................................ 46 2.1.5. The war on Fatah al Islam .................................................................................. 49 2.1.6. Salafism and political representation in Tripoli .................................................... 51 2.2 The Syrian crisis spillover to Lebanon........................................................................ 56 2.2.1 The Syrian uprising ............................................................................................ 56 2.2.2. Lebanon’s policy of disassociation...................................................................... 61 2.2.3 Lebanese support for refugees and dissidents........................................................ 64 2.2.4 Involvement of Lebanese factions in the Syrian crisis ........................................... 67 2.2.5. Sectarian spillover and security threats ................................................................ 72 2.2.6. Cross-border fighting in the Bekaa Valley ........................................................... 74 2.2.7. The rise of the Salafism as a political force .......................................................... 75 Roots of radicalization and catalysts of conflict in Tripoli ........................................79 3.1. Conflict in Tripoli during the Syrian crisis ................................................................. 79 3.2. Catalysts for Sunni mobilization in Tripoli ................................................................ 82 3.2.1. Internal mass-level factors: inside the Sunni community in Tripoli........................ 83 viii 3.2.2. Internal elite-level factors: lack of legitimate moderate leadership and the rise of Salafi sectarian populism ........................................................................................... 100 3.2.3 External mass-level factors: refugees, Syrian political activism and smuggling fighters..................................................................................................................... 111 3.2.4. External elite-level factors: the Syrian leadership, Hezbollah and the regional Sunni- Shiite power struggle ................................................................................................ 119 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................125 4.1. A matter of perception............................................................................................ 125 4.2 Roots for radicalization and catalysts for sectarian conflict ........................................ 128 Bibliography.................................................................................................................141 Appendix 1 ..................................................................................................................170 Appendix 2 ...................................................................................................................172 Questions for the conservative community leaders in Tripoli ........................................... 172 Appendix 3 ...................................................................................................................174 Questions for the Sunni community leaders in Tripoli ..................................................... 174 ix Introduction Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in early 2011, Lebanon has seen a drastic deterioration in security: supporters and opponents of the Bashar al-Assad regime in the country have confronted each other in armed clashes in Tripoli and Bekaa Valley, assassinations of military and political leaders, rocket attacks along the border and some roadside bombings in Shiite areas in the Bekaa Valley (Rowell, 2014). Since October 2012, Lebanon has also witnessed deadly suicide bombings, many of which were claimed by jihadist groups with links to al-Qaeda, such as Jabhat al-Nusra in Lebanon and Abdullah Azzam Brigades, who have declared their intention to continue targeting Shiite civilian population centers until Lebanese Hezbollah fighters withdraw from Syria. The Northern Lebanese city of Tripoli also witnessed several waves of unrest and clashes, between the Alawite Jabal Mohsen and predominantly Sunni Bab al-Tabbaneh, which mirrored the Syrian conflict (Luca, 2012). The conflict was even dubbed “little Syria.” The Alawite fortress of Jabal Mohsen has been hosting armed supporters of pro- regime factions for years. Bab al-Tabbaneh is located down the hill and is separated from Jabal Mohsen by the aptly named Syria Street. The strife goes back to the Lebanese civil war. The Alawite Arab Democratic Party, based in Jabal Mohsen, fought alongside the Syrian army against the Sunni Islamist Tawhid Movement. The fighting peaked in 1986 when the party helped Syrian troops massacre most of the Sunni Islamist fighters. Since then, the fighting always came down to Syrian power in 1 Lebanon. The influx of mostly Sunni refugees and anti-Assad regime activists fleeing the regions of Homs and Idlib aggravated the skirmishes. Most of the refugees were sheltered in Bab al-Tabbaneh, where anti-Assad regime sentiment was already strong (Luca, 2012). The sparks of conflict also affected other regions of Lebanon like the Eastern border with Syria, where the refugee-filled Sunni enclave of Arsal was suddenly poised against the neighboring Shiite region of Hermel, which is controlled by Hezbollah (Luca, 2013). The situation worsened because of the porous border areas that allowed not only refugees, but also rebel fighters to cross into Lebanon and find a rather safe buffer zone. The situation worsened also due to Hezbollah’s involvement in fighting alongside the Syrian army against the Sunni rebel factions in Homs and Qalamoun regions
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