How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State's West Africa

HOW BOKO HARAM BECAME THE ISLAMIC STATE’S WEST AFRICA PROVINCE J. Peter Pham ven before it burst into the headlines with its brazen April 2014 abduction of nearly three hundred schoolgirls from the town of Chibok in Nigeria’s northeast- Eern Borno State, sparking an unprecedented amount of social media communica- tion in the process, the Nigerian militant group Boko Haram had already distinguished itself as one of the fastest evolving of its kind, undergoing several major transformations in just over half a decade. In a very short period of time, the group went from being a small militant band focused on localized concerns and using relatively low levels of violence to a significant terrorist organization with a clearer jihadist ideology to a major insurgency seizing and holding large swathes of territory that was dubbed “the most deadly terrorist group in the world” by the Institute for Economics and Peace, based on the sheer number of deaths it caused in 2014.1 More recently, Boko Haram underwent another evolution with its early 2015 pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and its subsequent rebranding as the “Islamic State West Africa Province” (ISWAP). The ideological, rhetorical, and operational choices made by Boko shifted consider- ably in each of these iterations, as did its tactics. Indeed the nexus between these three elements—ideology, rhetoric, and operations—is the key to correctly interpreting Boko Haram’s strategic objectives at each stage in its evolution, and to eventually countering its pursuit of these goals. Boko Haram 1.0 The emergence of the militant group that would become known as Boko Haram cannot be understood without reference to the social, religious, economic, and political milieu of J. PETER PHAM is Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. He also serves as Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) and Editor-in-Chief of the peer-reviewed Journal of the Middle East and Africa. J. Peter Pham northern Nigeria.2 While it is murky, some Mohammed Yusuf was even able to accounts link the group’s origins back establish a mosque—tellingly named for to the Maitatsine uprisings of the early the thirteenth-century forefather of con- 1980s, which left thousands dead and cut temporary salafism Ibn Taymiyyah—as a path of destruction across five north- well as a school in Maiduguri, the capital eastern Nigerian states that, three decades of Borno State. later, would bear the brunt of Boko Haram As the group’s relations with state attacks. Certainly there are comparisons and local authorities soured after 2007, to be drawn between Boko Haram and what little regard it had for Nigeria’s tra- the earlier movement in terms of ideology, ditional Muslim hierarchy also declined. objectives, and modus operandi. The introduction of Islamic law (sharia) According to most accounts, the in the twelve northern Nigerian states name Boko Haram is itself derived from since 1999 was deemed insufficient by the combination of the Hausa word for Mohammed Yusuf and his followers, who “book” (as in “book learning”), boko, argued that the country’s ruling class as and the Arabic term haram, which des- a whole was marred by corruption and ignates those things that are ungodly or even Muslim northern leaders were irre- sinful. Thus “Boko Haram” is not only deemably tainted by “Western-style” the group’s common name,3 but also its ambitions. Instead, the followers of Boko slogan to the effect that “Western educa- Haram envisaged a “pure” shari’a state tion (and such product that arises from that would ostensibly be both more trans- it) is sacrilege.”4 The group’s founder, parent and just than the existing order. In Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, once described fact, as early as 2004, even as the group the cosmological view that resulted from was enjoying the favor of allies like the such an ideology in a 2009 interview newly ensconced governor of Borno, it with the BBC: “Western-style education was simultaneously withdrawing into is mixed with issues that run contrary to isolation, setting up a settlement near our beliefs in Islam. Like rain. We believe Kanamma, Yobe State, known locally as it is a creation of God rather than an “Afghanistan,” from whence its members evaporation caused by the sun that con- launched occasional “Taliban-like” sor- denses and becomes rain. Like saying ties against those local (largely Muslim) the world is a sphere. If it runs contrary elites whom they viewed as corrupt. to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We During this period, the group also reject the theory of Darwinism.”5 launched small-scale attacks against Notwithstanding these rather eccen- people engaged in activities viewed as tric beliefs, the group proved a useful haram, including gambling, drinking instrument for the worldly ambitions of alcohol, and prostitution. The assaults certain politicians in northeastern Nige- were fairly simple operations, with the ria, including Ali Modu Sheriff, who attackers often arriving on motorcycles availed himself of the support of the or even local three-wheel taxis, shooting group’s leaders and their organization in their targets or tossing bombs at them his successful 2003 bid for the governor- before quickly driving away. ship of Borno State. A victorious Sher- Nevertheless, an uneasy truce— iff subsequently appointed a prominent punctured by occasional skirmishes with Boko Haram member, Alhaji Buji Foi, to police and other local authorities with his cabinet as state commissioner of reli- which Boko Haram was increasingly at gious affairs during his first term, thus odds—prevailed until June 2009, when giving the sect access to not inconsider- an altercation during a funeral procession able public resources. During this period, quickly escalated into a full-fledged riot 18 THE JOURNAL OF INTERNAtiONAL SECURitY AFFAIRS How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province during which more than a dozen people Shortly afterward, however, were injured.6 A month later, a police raid Mohammed Yusuf’s former deputy, on a Boko Haram safe house in neighbor- Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau, ing Bauchi State led to reprisal attacks on who was thought to have been killed police and five days of subsequent riot- during the 2009 uprising, surfaced in a ing. Escalating clashes then spread from video that might be described as “clas- Bauchi to other northern states, includ- sic al-Qaeda.” Wearing a headdress and ing Kano, Yobe, and Borno. In response, framed by an AK-47 and a stack of reli- security forces besieged and stormed the gious books, Shekau proclaimed him- group’s mosque compound in Maiduguri. self the new head of Boko Haram and The violence finally petered out after promised vengeance: “Do not think jihad Mohammed Yusuf was captured, beaten, is over. Rather jihad has just begun.”9 interrogated, and finally shot—suppos- Significantly, he threatened attacks not edly while attempting to escape—but not only against the Nigerian state, but also before more than 700 people were killed against “outposts of Western culture.” In and numerous public buildings, includ- a published manifesto, Shekau linked the ing government offices, police stations, jihad being fought by Boko Haram with schools, and churches, were destroyed. jihadist efforts globally, especially those With most of its leaders as well as several of “the soldiers of Allah in the Islamic prominent adherents, including Buji Foi, State of Iraq.” the former Borno State religious affairs Two months later, in September commissioner, dead, the group receded 2010, Boko Haram fighters dramatically from public view, leading many to con- broke into a federal prison in Bauchi State clude that it was hopelessly fractured, if and freed more than one hundred of their not altogether finished. fellow members who had been awaiting trial since the previous year’s uprising. Boko Haram 2.0 During the course of the assault, which Far from being dead, however, the involved bombs and automatic weapons, group underwent a dramatic transfor- the militants also set free more than 750 mation. The first sign of this change, in other prisoners and scattered leaflets hindsight, was a June 2010 Al Jazeera warning of further violence. interview with Abu Musab Abdel The latter was not long in coming. Wadoud, a.k.a. Abdelmalek Drouk- On Christmas Eve 2010, the group set del, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic off a string of seven improvised explo- Maghreb (AQIM). The head of al-Qaeda’s sive devices (IEDs) in Jos, Plateau State. North African franchise stated that his The bombings, which targeted the town’s group would provide Boko Haram with Christian communities, left 80 dead and weapons, training, and other support in scores of others wounded. The group order to expand its own reach into sub- subsequently carried out a number Saharan Africa as a way of gaining of other attacks—mainly small IEDs “strategic depth,” “defend[ing] Muslims thrown from moving vehicles or planted in Nigeria and stop[ping] the advance of near targets in Maiduguri and Bauchi— a minority of Crusaders.”7 At the time, aimed primarily at candidates in the 2011 this claim was widely dismissed, both elections it had denounced. because Droukdel was known for his Those elections, now considered by outsized ambitions and because he was Boko Haram’s leadership to be a forbid- known to be having internal difficulties den “innovation” (bid’ah) imposed by the with the more dynamic southern com- West, were already contentious in that manders within AQIM itself.8 a significant number of Muslims, espe- THE JOURNAL OF INTERNAtiONAL SECURitY AFFAIRS 19 J. Peter Pham cially in the country’s Northeast, deeply the UN offices in Abuja.

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