How Became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province J. Peter Pham

ven before it burst into the headlines with its brazen April 2014 abduction of nearly three hundred schoolgirls from the town of in ’s northeast- Eern , sparking an unprecedented amount of social media communica- tion in the process, the Nigerian militant group Boko Haram had already distinguished itself as one of the fastest evolving of its kind, undergoing several major transformations in just over half a decade. In a very short period of time, the group went from being a small militant band focused on localized concerns and using relatively low levels of violence to a significant terrorist organization with a clearer jihadist ideology to a major insurgency seizing and holding large swathes of territory that was dubbed “the most deadly terrorist group in the world” by the Institute for Economics and Peace, based on the sheer number of deaths it caused in 2014.1 More recently, Boko Haram underwent another evolution with its early 2015 pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and its subsequent rebranding as the “Islamic State West Africa Province” (ISWAP).

The ideological, rhetorical, and operational choices made by Boko shifted consider- ably in each of these iterations, as did its tactics. Indeed the nexus between these three elements—ideology, rhetoric, and operations—is the key to correctly interpreting Boko Haram’s strategic objectives at each stage in its evolution, and to eventually countering its pursuit of these goals.

Boko Haram 1.0 The emergence of the militant group that would become known as Boko Haram cannot be understood without reference to the social, religious, economic, and political milieu of

J. Peter Pham is Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council. He also serves as Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) and Editor-in-Chief of the peer-reviewed Journal of the Middle East and Africa. J. Peter Pham

northern Nigeria.2 While it is murky, some Mohammed Yusuf was even able to accounts link the group’s origins back establish a —tellingly named for to the Maitatsine uprisings of the early the thirteenth-century forefather of con- 1980s, which left thousands dead and cut temporary salafism Ibn Taymiyyah—as a path of destruction across five north- well as a school in , the capital eastern Nigerian states that, three decades of Borno State. later, would bear the brunt of Boko Haram As the group’s relations with state attacks. Certainly there are comparisons and local authorities soured after 2007, to be drawn between Boko Haram and what little regard it had for Nigeria’s tra- the earlier movement in terms of ideology, ditional Muslim hierarchy also declined. objectives, and modus operandi. The introduction of Islamic law () According to most accounts, the in the twelve northern Nigerian states name Boko Haram is itself derived from since 1999 was deemed insufficient by the combination of the Hausa word for Mohammed Yusuf and his followers, who “book” (as in “book learning”), boko, argued that the country’s ruling class as and the Arabic term haram, which des- a whole was marred by corruption and ignates those things that are ungodly or even Muslim northern leaders were irre- sinful. Thus “Boko Haram” is not only deemably tainted by “Western-style” the group’s common name,3 but also its ambitions. Instead, the followers of Boko slogan to the effect that “Western educa- Haram envisaged a “pure” shari’a state tion (and such product that arises from that would ostensibly be both more trans- it) is sacrilege.”4 The group’s founder, parent and just than the existing order. In Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, once described fact, as early as 2004, even as the group the cosmological view that resulted from was enjoying the favor of allies like the such an ideology in a 2009 interview newly ensconced governor of Borno, it with the BBC: “Western-style education was simultaneously withdrawing into is mixed with issues that run contrary to isolation, setting up a settlement near our beliefs in . Like rain. We believe Kanamma, Yobe State, known locally as it is a creation of God rather than an “Afghanistan,” from whence its members evaporation caused by the sun that con- launched occasional “-like” sor- denses and becomes rain. Like saying ties against those local (largely Muslim) the world is a sphere. If it runs contrary elites whom they viewed as corrupt. to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We During this period, the group also reject the theory of Darwinism.”5 launched small-scale attacks against Notwithstanding these rather eccen- people engaged in activities viewed as tric beliefs, the group proved a useful haram, including gambling, drinking instrument for the worldly ambitions of alcohol, and prostitution. The assaults certain politicians in northeastern Nige- were fairly simple operations, with the ria, including Ali Modu Sheriff, who attackers often arriving on motorcycles availed himself of the support of the or even local three-wheel taxis, shooting group’s leaders and their organization in their targets or tossing bombs at them his successful 2003 bid for the governor- before quickly driving away. ship of Borno State. A victorious Sher- Nevertheless, an uneasy truce— iff subsequently appointed a prominent punctured by occasional skirmishes with Boko Haram member, Alhaji Buji Foi, to police and other local authorities with his cabinet as state commissioner of reli- which Boko Haram was increasingly at gious affairs during his first term, thus odds—prevailed until June 2009, when giving the sect access to not inconsider- an altercation during a funeral procession able public resources. During this period, quickly escalated into a full-fledged riot

18 The Journal of International Security Affairs How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province during which more than a dozen people Shortly afterward, however, were injured.6 A month later, a police raid Mohammed Yusuf’s former deputy, on a Boko Haram safe house in neighbor- Abubakar bin Shekau, ing Bauchi State led to reprisal attacks on who was thought to have been killed police and five days of subsequent riot- during the 2009 uprising, surfaced in a ing. Escalating clashes then spread from video that might be described as “clas- Bauchi to other northern states, includ- sic al-Qaeda.” Wearing a headdress and ing Kano, Yobe, and Borno. In response, framed by an AK-47 and a stack of reli- security forces besieged and stormed the gious books, Shekau proclaimed him- group’s mosque compound in Maiduguri. self the new head of Boko Haram and The violence finally petered out after promised vengeance: “Do not think Mohammed Yusuf was captured, beaten, is over. Rather jihad has just begun.”9 interrogated, and finally shot—suppos- Significantly, he threatened attacks not edly while attempting to escape—but not only against the Nigerian state, but also before more than 700 people were killed against “outposts of Western culture.” In and numerous public buildings, includ- a published manifesto, Shekau linked the ing government offices, police stations, jihad being fought by Boko Haram with schools, and churches, were destroyed. jihadist efforts globally, especially those With most of its leaders as well as several of “the soldiers of Allah in the Islamic prominent adherents, including Buji Foi, State of Iraq.” the former Borno State religious affairs Two months later, in September commissioner, dead, the group receded 2010, Boko Haram fighters dramatically from public view, leading many to con- broke into a federal prison in Bauchi State clude that it was hopelessly fractured, if and freed more than one hundred of their not altogether finished. fellow members who had been awaiting trial since the previous year’s uprising. Boko Haram 2.0 During the course of the assault, which Far from being dead, however, the involved bombs and automatic weapons, group underwent a dramatic transfor- the militants also set free more than 750 mation. The first sign of this change, in other prisoners and scattered leaflets hindsight, was a June 2010 Al Jazeera warning of further violence. interview with Abu Musab Abdel The latter was not long in coming. Wadoud, a.k.a. Abdelmalek Drouk- On Christmas Eve 2010, the group set del, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic off a string of seven improvised explo- Maghreb (AQIM). The head of al-Qaeda’s sive devices (IEDs) in Jos, Plateau State. North African franchise stated that his The bombings, which targeted the town’s group would provide Boko Haram with Christian communities, left 80 dead and weapons, training, and other support in scores of others wounded. The group order to expand its own reach into sub- subsequently carried out a number Saharan Africa as a way of gaining of other attacks—mainly small IEDs “strategic depth,” “defend[ing] Muslims thrown from moving vehicles or planted in Nigeria and stop[ping] the advance of near targets in Maiduguri and Bauchi— a minority of Crusaders.”7 At the time, aimed primarily at candidates in the 2011 this claim was widely dismissed, both elections it had denounced. because Droukdel was known for his Those elections, now considered by outsized ambitions and because he was Boko Haram’s leadership to be a forbid- known to be having internal difficulties den “innovation” (bid’ah) imposed by the with the more dynamic southern com- West, were already contentious in that manders within AQIM itself.8 a significant number of Muslims, espe-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 19 J. Peter Pham

cially in the country’s Northeast, deeply the UN offices in Abuja. Twenty-five resented the candidacy of President people were killed and at least 80 were Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian. wounded in the attack, the first by the Jonathan had succeeded President Umaru group against an international target. Musa Yar’Adua, a northern Muslim, after The group subsequently released a the latter’s unexpected death in 2010, and video of the bomber offering praise to his decision to seek a full term upset the slain al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden informal compact within the ruling Peo- and referring to the UN as a “forum of ple’s Democratic Party (PDP), whereby all global evil,”11 putting it squarely in the presidency alternated every eight the ranks of terrorists who have specifi- years between Christians, who make up cally targeted UN agencies in Afghani- the overwhelming majority of the popula- stan, Iraq, and Algeria. tion in the southern part of the country, In the wake of the UN attack, there and Muslims, who traditionally dominate was little letup in the violence. Boko the North. Haram carried out a number of complex On June 16, 2011, Boko Haram dem- operations, including: the November 4, onstrated a very significant and ominous 2011, assault on Damaturu, capital of tactical and operational upgrade in its Yobe State, involving suicide attacks capabilities when it launched a suicide on various police stations followed by a attack using a vehicle-borne improvised massacre in the Christian quarter of the explosive device (VBIED). Believed to city, which left 150 people dead; the 2011 be the first to take place Christmas morning bombing outside the in Nigeria, the operation targeted the Catholic church in Madalla, near Abuja, Inspector-General of the Nigerian Police which killed at least 32 people as they Force (NPF) in an attack that killed exited Mass, and the four other explo- two and destroyed several dozen police sions that went off that day across Nige- vehicles. It showed that, far from being ria; and the coordinated January 20, 2012, a spent force, Boko Haram had adopted attacks in Kano, Nigeria’s second-largest one of the deadliest instruments in the metropolis and the Muslim North’s eco- jihadist arsenal. Moreover, it also dem- nomic, political, and cultural hub, which onstrated that the militant group was left more than 185 people dead. The capable of carrying out attacks far from attacks in Damaturu and Madalla were its usual areas of operation. Interestingly, consistent with the ultimatum the group just two days prior, the group had issued had issued demanding that Christians a statement in which it boasted ominously leave northern Nigeria. for the first time of ties to jihadists in Somalia. “Very soon,” the statement said, Boko Haram 3.0 “we will wage jihad... Our jihadists have The year 2012 proved to be another arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where significant milestone in Boko Haram’s they received real training on warfare ongoing evolution. While foreign links from our brethren who made that coun- were a critical part of Boko Haram’s ideo- try ungovernable.”10 logical and operational shift from “ver- Two months later, on August 26— sion 1.0” to the far more lethal “version after more than a half-dozen smaller 2.0,” the takeover of northern Mali by attacks on government officials, estab- various AQIM-linked Islamist militant lishments that serve alcohol, and groups at the end of March 2012 pro- churches—Boko Haram carried out vided a whole new set of opportunities, another major attack, sending a suicide as well as the impetus for the emergence bomber in an explosives-laden car into of “version 3.0.”

20 The Journal of International Security Affairs How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province

In fact, evidence has emerged that schoolgirls from Chibok, but, previously, during the nearly ten months in which a French family of seven (subsequently AQIM and its various allies—including freed after the payment of a reported Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity $3 million ransom and the release from and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)— Cameroonian prisons of some sixteen held sway over northern Mali, Boko Boko Haram members)13; a French priest, Haram was able to set up a number of two Italian priests, and a Canadian nun, bases in the territory where hundreds of all of whom have likewise been freed; its recruits received ideological instruc- and ten Chinese citizens abducted from tion, weapons and other training. This a worksite in northern Cameroon in May cadre subsequently raised the tactical 2014 and likewise subsequently freed sophistication and operational tempo upon payment of ransom.14 of Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, But kidnappings for ransom—not elevating the group to the level of a only of higher-profile foreign nationals, full-fledged insurgency. Following the but of hundreds, if not thousands, of French-led Operation Serval intervention Nigerians whose families have had to in Mali, the Nigerian militants, possibly offer more modest payments, with most accompanied by a few foreign nationals, on the order of $10,000 to $20,000—rep- returned to northern Nigeria not only resented only a part of the group’s rather with training and some combat experi- diverse funding stream. As previously ence in desert warfare, but also with noted, Boko Haram enjoyed a partner- vehicles and heavy weapons, including ship with state and local politicians as shoulder-fired missiles. Within weeks, recently as six or seven years ago and, Boko Haram fighters were raiding mili- thanks to well-placed members, appears tary barracks for even more weapons, to have benefited from public resources. staging increasingly bold prison breaks, There is reason to believe that, even destroying numerous schools, hospitals, after the uprising and suppression of and other government buildings, engag- the group in 2009, some political actors ing the Nigerian military in pitched open funneled resources to it. Some cells have battles, and, in some cases, totally over- also been accused of carrying out bank running border towns. By the middle of robberies and other crimes, although 2013, the militants had effectively evicted exactly how pervasive this activity has Nigerian government troops and officials been is the subject of some debate. Two from at least ten local government areas key aspects to bear in mind are that along the borders of Niger, Chad, and Boko Haram developed a very diversi- Cameroon and set themselves up as the fied and resilient model of supporting de facto authority in the region, replac- itself and that, as it increasingly took on ing Nigerian flags with their own banner, the character of an insurgency, it was taxing and otherwise ordering citizens able to essentially “live off the land” about, and creating a large area within with very modest additional resources which they could operate with even required. Both factors have rendered greater impunity.12 efforts to cut off its funding challenging. The influence of foreign elements, On the other hand, in a region where especially AQIM, has also been witnessed more than two-thirds of the population in the proliferation of kidnappings-for- lives on less than one U.S. dollar a day, ransom in Nigeria—the abductions being the funding, no matter how modest, can almost a signature of AQIM over the go very far. For example, it is widely years. The catalogue of kidnapping vic- known that Boko Haram leaders pay al- tims has now come to include not only the majiri youth15 literally pennies a day to

The Journal of International Security Affairs 21 J. Peter Pham track and report on troop movements as gents were beheading men who refused well as to transport weapons and other to convert to Islam and forcing their supplies for the militants. widows to convert and marry militants.17 In any event, it was clear that, by According to a tally by Open Doors, a mid-2014, Boko Haram had more than Netherlands-based non-denominational sufficient resources to go on the offen- international organization that advocates sive. On August 6, fighters captured for Christian victims of religious per- the town of , on Nigeria’s border secution, more than 178 churches were with Cameroon. On August 25, having destroyed by Boko Haram in the month of destroyed the bridge linking the town August 2014 alone.18 Muslims who do not to the Borno State capital of Maiduguri share Boko Haram’s extremist ideology some 120 kilometers to the southwest, were likewise targeted: in May 2014, the the group attacked and destroyed army Emir of Gwoza, Shehu Mustapha Idrissa barracks in the town of , just south Timta, was killed by Boko Haram a few of Lake Chad, and then proceeded to take weeks after he gave a speech denouncing the town of , a few kilometers the group’s methods, while in early Sep- away. The seizure of the twin towns gave tember the Islamists executed the most Boko Haram control of a local govern- senior Muslim cleric in Gamboru Ngala ment area with a population of roughly a shortly after overrunning the district.19 quarter of a million people. A week later, As troubling as the humanitarian on September 1, Boko Haram fighters challenge was, even more ominous were swung clockwise to overrun their biggest the growing ambitions of Boko Haram’s prize yet: Bama, a city with a popula- leader, Abubakar Shekau, who pro- tion of nearly 300,000 just 60 kilometers claimed a “” in northern Nigeria southeast of Maiduguri. in an hour-long video released on August While Boko Haram never seemed to 24. “Thanks be to Allah who gave vic- have the wherewithal to seize Maiduguri, tory to our brethren in Gwoza and made an urban sprawl with more than a million it part of the Islamic caliphate,” the state- inhabitants and almost as many inter- ment said. “We did not do it on our own. nally displaced persons (IDPs), territory Allah used us to captured Gwoza; Allah it did hold formed a pincer around the is going to use Islam to rule Gwoza, city and positioned the group to launch Nigeria and the whole world. ” In report- regular probing attacks that added to ing the rambling message, Al Jazeera the misery of those caught inside. Mean- noted that while the Boko Haram chief while, militant forces went on the offen- had previously voiced support for ISIS sive beyond long-suffering Borno State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, there was to take over towns and local government no indication in the new video that the areas in neighboring regions. former was still associating himself with Wherever it took control, Boko the latter and “as such, it was not clear Haram, like the so-called Islamic State if Shekau was declaring himself to be a in the territories it has captured in Syria part of Baghdadi’s call or if he was refer- and Iraq, raised the black jihadist flag ring to a separate Nigerian caliphate.”20 over public buildings and brutalized At least, not yet. those who failed to adhere to its extremist Islamist strictures. In Yobe State, people Boko Haram 4.0 caught smoking cigarettes were summar- Throughout the last months of 2014, ily executed.16 In Borno State, the spokes- evidence emerged of an increasing con- man for the Roman Catholic Diocese of vergence between the Nigerian militants Maiduguri told journalists that the insur- and their ISIL counterparts, not only in

22 The Journal of International Security Affairs How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province terms of symbolism and ideology but Boko Haram stormed Baga on the shores also in insurgency doctrine. Boko Haram of Lake Chad, one of the last urban cen- leader Abubakar Shekau first expressed ters in the region remaining in govern- “support” for the Islamic State’s caliph, ment hands. Even more importantly, the Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi, earlier in the year, town was supposed host the multina- but the pace of at least virtual exchange tional joint task force set up by Nigeria between the two groups quickened over and its neighbors—Cameroon, Chad, the months that followed. Boko Haram and Niger—to combat the militants. The began adding the jihadist black banner other African forces had not yet arrived (rayat al-uqab) to its previous crossed- on post when Boko Haram overwhelmed guns-and-Koran logo, and including the the Nigerian troops, many of whom Islamic State’s de facto anthem, “My reportedly threw down their weapons Umma, Dawn has Arrived,” in the musi- and fled, and took control of the military cal repertoire on its videos. In one video base that was to serve as the command released in November, Shekau was even center for the regional effort to combat shown appearing in a mosque to declare the insurgency. The death toll from the that he was establishing his own “Islamic attack was reported to be as high as Caliphate” and sending his greetings to 2,000 people, while thousands of others the “brothers” in Afghanistan, Pakistan, were forced to flee to other parts of Nige- Somalia, and Yemen, as well as to “the ria or into Chad. And, as satellite images Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.” In case subsequently released by Amnesty Inter- anyone missed the intended parallelism national so graphically illustrated, the of the messaging, the high-quality video insurgents literally wiped large portions cuts to a clip of al-Bagdadi proclaiming of Baga and several nearby towns off the his own caliphate in Mosul in June. face of the map, burning homes, schools, Meanwhile, ISIL’s official English- businesses, and clinics.22 language magazine, Dabiq, cited Boko While a major assault on Mai- Haram’s kidnapping of the Chibok duguri by Boko Haram on January 25 schoolgirls as precedent for its enslave- was repulsed,23 it appears the strategic ment and sexual abuse of Yazidi women objective of that attack was as much to and girls in Iraq. In turn, Boko Haram storm the city as to underscore a politi- apparently took a cue from ISIL and cal message, given that it came the day began to stoke sectarian conflict between after the Nigerian president campaigned Muslims in Nigeria with its attacks on there amid heavy security and sought the country’s small minority of adherents to reassure citizens that the insurgency to Shi’a Islam. Both groups shed their would be defeated. On the other hand, previous hit-and-run guerrilla tactics the group’s simultaneous attack on Mon- in favor of seizing and holding increas- guno, about 135 kilometers away near ingly large chunks of territory. As one of the borders with Chad and Cameroon, the most astute observers of the region, was successful, resulting in the capture former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria of the city with its population of more John Campbell, noted at the time, “Boko than 110,000, as well as the overrunning Haram’s focus appears now to be on the of a large military base nearby. The sei- acquisition of territory… It also appears zure of , which sits at the inter- to be moving in the direction of provid- section of three major roads, removed one ing services, especially security for the of the key buffers protecting Maiduguri residents in the territories it controls.”21 and the two million people who reside or At the beginning of 2015, in a stun- have taken refuge there from complete ning humiliation to the Nigerian army, encirclement by Boko Haram forces.

The Journal of International Security Affairs 23 J. Peter Pham

Moreover, Boko Haram took to using the Ties that bind territory it held or cleared as a base from Boko Haram’s merger with the so- which to launch a campaign of terrorist called Islamic State does not appear have attacks reaching other Nigerian states much immediate impact on the battle- as well as into neighboring countries— field. The different social and political some of which, like Niger, are already contexts in which each operates and under pressure from militants linked the vast geographical distance separat- to al-Qaeda’s North African affiliate, as ing the two groups meant that each will well as the spillover of the continuing have to face its foes with little more than disintegration of Libya. Niger’s President moral support from the other, notwith- Mahamadou Issoufou was subsequently standing some evidence of collaboration quoted as lamenting that “the Islamic in cyberspace and in terms of media pro- State is at our door.”24 duction. In fact, in the two weeks after In fact, exactly two months after the it was accepted into the Islamic State’s Nigerian head of state’s comments were fold, Boko Haram, or “Islamic State West published, an audio recording purport- Africa Province” (ISWAP), as it has edly from Boko Haram’s leader, Abuba- started to style itself, lost control of most kar Shekau, hailed Islamic State leader of the towns and other areas that it was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as “caliph” and holding in the face of pressure from Nige- declared: “We announce our allegiance rian troops.28 to the Caliph... and will hear and obey Still, Boko Haram’s affiliation with in times of difficulty and prosperity.”25 the Islamic State is strategically signifi- The oath of fealty (bay’ah) was quickly cant, insofar as it could lead to the inter- accepted by the group within days.26 nationalization of a threat that has up to The timing was not without its strategic now largely been confined geographi- logic; notwithstanding its string of victo- cally. There is a risk that fighters from ries through the beginning of 2015, Boko North Africa and other areas, finding it Haram subsequently suffered a series of harder to migrate to the self-proclaimed military defeats at the hands of the Nige- caliphate’s territory in the Levant, could rian armed forces, apparently reinforced well choose to move to the Boko Haram by military contractors from South emirate instead. IS spokesman Abu Africa and other countries,27 as well as Mohammad al-Adnani, in his commu- a multinational force from neighboring niqué accepting the Nigerian group’s countries (including Niger, Chad, and allegiance on behalf of his leader, said Cameroon). For the first time since the as much, telling Muslims who could not insurgents began seizing territory nearly get to Syria or Iraq that “a new door for two years earlier, the Nigerian govern- you to migrate to the land of Islam and ment and its regional allies began push- fight” had opened in Africa.29 Moreover, ing back and systematically retaking support for the multinational African towns. Likewise, the Islamic State had anti-Boko Haram force from the United seen its rampage through Syria and Iraq States, which in October 2015 announced stall, and the group was increasingly put the deployment of about three hundred on the defensive by operations like the soldiers to Cameroon to provide intelli- massive Iranian-backed Iraqi offensive to gence and other assistance,30 could render retake Tikrit. The formal link-up between the Nigerian militants’ fight all the more the two jihadist groups thus gave both a attractive to aspiring foreign jihadists. much-needed propaganda fillip. On the other hand, Boko Haram’s suc- cess as a local movement could be diluted if it becomes merely another “province”

24 The Journal of International Security Affairs How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province of a far-flung “Islamic State” focused on a broader jihadist agenda. 1. See Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring Another possible course of evolution and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, for Boko Haram has also been hinted at 2015), http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/ by the Islamic State’s Dabiq publication. default/files/2015%20Global%20Terrorism%20 In its special issue heralding the alle- Index%20Report_0_0.pdf. According to the giance of the Nigerian group, the jour- data sets compiled by the report’s authors, Boko Haram caused 6,644 deaths in 2014, while the nal highlighted that “Christians” were Islamic State was responsible for 6,073 deaths. being “terrorized” and “captured and 2. See J. Peter Pham, Boko Haram’s Evolving enslaved” by Boko Haram and allega- Threat, African Security Brief 20 (Washington: tions that Nigeria’s “large population of Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2012). hostile crusaders” had “not shied away 3. The group’s formal name is Jama’atu Ahlis from massacring the Muslims of West Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (“Congregation of Africa”31—rhetoric aimed at stoking con- the People of the Tradition [of the Prophet] for flict along sectarian lines and promising Proselytism and Jihad”). See Freedom C. Onuoha, “The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram stepped-up terrorist attacks, ostensibly in Crisis Explained,” African Security Review 19, reprisal. It certainly points to a possible no. 1 (2010), 54-67. new operational emphasis for a militarily 4. Abimbola Adesoji, “The Boko Haram Uprising weakened but still operationally effective and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria,” African Spectrum 45, no. 2 (2010), 100. militant group—an interpretation that 5. Joe Boyle, “Nigeria’s ‘Taliban’ Enigma,” BBC, finds confirmation in a string of attacks July 31, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ that the group has carried out in subse- africa/8172270.stm quent months across Chad, Niger, and 6. See Uri Friedman, “The Bike-Helmet Law That Helped Trigger an Insurgency in Nigeria,” Cameroon, as well as Nigeria. Atlantic, May 22, 2014, http://www.theatlantic. It remains to be seen whether the com/international/archive/2014/05/the-bike- potential benefits of affiliation with helmet-law-that-triggered-an-insurgency-in-nige- the Islamic State—including possible ria/371301/ 7. “Al Qaida Makes Move on Troubled Nigeria,” new streams of recruits, funding, and UPI, June 17, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Top_ media and other support—and the ideo- News/Special/2010/06/17/Al-Qaida-makes-a- logical and operational evolution that move-on-troubled-Nigeria/79021276792262/ comes with the link-up will offset Boko 8. J. Peter Pham, “Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: The Ongoing Evolution of al-Qaeda Haram’s early 2015 battlefield losses or in the Islamic Maghreb,” Orbis 55, no. 2 (Spring outweigh the damage that it will incur 2011), 240-254. See also J. Peter Pham, “The Dan- as a result. What is clear, however, is gerous ‘Pragmatism’ of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic that Boko Haram has shown once again Maghreb,” Journal of the Middle East and Africa 2, no. 1 (January-June 2011), 15-29. that it remains one of the fastest-evolv- 9. Nick Tattersall and William Maclean, “Nige- ing jihadist groups, and one that bears rian Sect Leader Praises al-Qaeda, Warns U.S.,” close watching not only for its challenge Reuters, July 13, 2010, accessed November 1, to the security of Africa’s most popu- 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/13/ us-nigeria-sect-idUSTRE66C5PK20100713 lous country and its biggest economy, 10. “Nigerian Islamists Vow ‘Fiercer’ Attacks,” but also for its not insignificant threat Agence France-Presse, June 15, 2011, accessed to the wider region. November 1, 2015, http://www.modernghana. com/news/334668/1/nigerian-islamists-vow- fiercer-attacks.html 11. “Nigeria UN Bomb: Video of ‘Boko Haram Bomber’ Released,” BBC, September 18, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- africa-14964554 12. See Yusuf Alli, “Tension as Boko Haram Grounds 10 LGs in Borno,” Nation, April 20, 2013, http://thenationonlineng.net/new/tension-

The Journal of International Security Affairs 25 J. Peter Pham

as-boko-haram-grounds-10-lgs-in-borno-2/. The 26, 2015, A6. ten local government areas overrun at the time of 24. François Soudan, “Mahamadou Issoufou: ‘L’état this writing—Marte, , , , islamique est à nos portes,’” Jeune Afrique, , , , Kaga, , January 7, 2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/ and Monguno—have a combined area of nearly Article/JA2816p038-044.xml0/ 33,500 square kilometers, slightly larger than 25. See Julia Payne, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Pledges that of Belgium and Luxembourg combined, and Allegiance to Islamic State—Audio Clip,” a population of some 1.5 million people. Reuters, March 7, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/ 13. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram ‘Got $3m Ransom’ to article/2015/03/07/uk-nigeria-boko-haram- Free Hostages,” BBC, April 26, 2013, http://www. caliphate-idUKKBN0M30TA20150307 bbc.com/news/world-africa-22320077 26. See Ali Abdelaty and Mariam Karouny, “Islamic 14. Another favorite AQIM tactic—one which the State Leader Accepts Allegiance of Nige- North African group’s kata’ib have used to ria’s Boko Haram,” Reuters, March 12, 2015, deadly effect for years in Nigeria—is to dress http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/12/ up in stolen or purchased military uniforms us-nigeria-violence-islamicstate-idUSK- and slaughter civilians. Boko Haram militants BN0M82M620150312 apparently used the tactic in several attacks 27. See Adam Nossiter, “Mercenaries Join Fight in the Gwoza district of Borno State last week, Against Boko Haram,” New York Times, March which resulted in a death toll as high as 400 to 13, 2015, A9. 500 people. 28. See “Boko Haram HQ Gwoza in Nigeria 15. Derived from the Arabic for “migrants,” the term Retaken,” BBC, March 27, 2015, http://www.bbc. refers millions of boys in northern Nigeria who com/news/world-africa-32087211. The victory beg alms for their Islamic teachers in return for came too late for embattled Nigerian President shelter and Quranic lessons. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who lost his bid for 16. See “Boko Haram Seizes Another Nigerian another term the following day to onetime mili- Town,” Al Jazeera (Doha), August 21, 2015, tary ruler Muhammadu Buhari, who criticized http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/08/ the government’s inability to end the insurgency boko-haram-seizes-another-nigerian- and campaigned promising a quick and decisive town-2014821151552714624.html campaign against Boko Haram. 17. See Taiwo George, “Boko Haram ‘Beheading 29. Quoted in Abdelaty and Karouny, “Islamic State Christians’ in Gwoza,” Cable (Nigeria), August Leader Accepts Allegiance of Nigeria’s Boko 28, 2014, http://www.thecable.ng/boko-haram- Haram.” beheading-christians-in-gwoza 30. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 18. Open Doors, “Nigeria: Boko Haram Capture Fur- “Letter from the President—War Powers ther Towns Amid ‘Caliphate’ Claim,” August 27, Resolution Regarding Cameroon,” October 14, 2014, http://www.opendoorsuk.org/news/stories/ 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- nigeria_140826.php office/2015/10/14/letter-from-president-war-pow- 19. See Aderogba Obisesan, “Nigeria’s Christians ers-resolution-cameroon Fear Persecution from Boko Haram Rampage,” 31. “The Bay’ah from West Africa,” Dabiq 8 (Jumada Agence France-Presse, September 7, 2014, http:// al-Akhirah 1436 [March/April 2014]), 14, 16. news.yahoo.com/nigerias-christians-fear-perse- cution-boko-haram-rampage-131841750.html 20. “Nigeria Rejects Boko Haram ‘Caliphate’ Claim,” Al Jazeera (Doha), August 25, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/08/ nigeria-rejects-boko-haram-caliphate- claim-20148251062176395.html 21. John Campbell, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Moving Toward Governance?,” Africa in Transition, November 7, 2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/camp- bell/2014/11/07/nigerias-boko-haram-moving- toward-governance/ 22. Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Satellite Images Show Horrific Scale of Boko Haram Attack on Baga,” January 15, 2015, https://www. amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/01/nigeria- satellite-images-show-horrific-scale-boko- haram-attack-baga/ 23. See Adam Nossiter and Michael R. Gordon, “In Bold Push Forward, Islamist Militants Attack a Major Nigerian City,” New York Times, January

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