The Arab-Islamic Empire and the Western Empire
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How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State's West Africa
HOW BOKO HARAM BECAME THE ISLAMIC STATE’S WEST AFRICA PROVINCE J. Peter Pham ven before it burst into the headlines with its brazen April 2014 abduction of nearly three hundred schoolgirls from the town of Chibok in Nigeria’s northeast- Eern Borno State, sparking an unprecedented amount of social media communica- tion in the process, the Nigerian militant group Boko Haram had already distinguished itself as one of the fastest evolving of its kind, undergoing several major transformations in just over half a decade. In a very short period of time, the group went from being a small militant band focused on localized concerns and using relatively low levels of violence to a significant terrorist organization with a clearer jihadist ideology to a major insurgency seizing and holding large swathes of territory that was dubbed “the most deadly terrorist group in the world” by the Institute for Economics and Peace, based on the sheer number of deaths it caused in 2014.1 More recently, Boko Haram underwent another evolution with its early 2015 pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and its subsequent rebranding as the “Islamic State West Africa Province” (ISWAP). The ideological, rhetorical, and operational choices made by Boko shifted consider- ably in each of these iterations, as did its tactics. Indeed the nexus between these three elements—ideology, rhetoric, and operations—is the key to correctly interpreting Boko Haram’s strategic objectives at each stage in its evolution, and to eventually countering its pursuit of these goals. Boko Haram 1.0 The emergence of the militant group that would become known as Boko Haram cannot be understood without reference to the social, religious, economic, and political milieu of J. -
«An Overview of Syrian Crisis - the Establishment of Islamic State- UN’S Response»
Master’s Degree in International Public Administration «An overview of Syrian Crisis - The establishment of Islamic State- UN’s response». Post Graduate Student: Michail Konstantoudis Supervisor: Assistant Professor Kalliopi Chainoglou April 2019 1 Abstract The dissertation deals with the civil war in Syria, which has been raging in the country in recent years. A civil war, which has a catalytic effect on the wider region of the Middle East, and wants to take up this issue, which is very important by itself. During the dissertation, information was collected about the Syrian state in general, its relations with neighboring countries, and in particular how we came to this civil war and the aspirations of the country's president through this ongoing conflict. The data were collected from the international articles in official journals, newspapers and various other websites, evaluated and processed and we came up with what is considered the most important and will be the main body of the conclusions. The dissertation also analyzes the establishment of ISIS during this conflict and the impact this caliphate had to the region. Lastly, the response of United Nations and the efforts that were made to resolve the crisis is highlighted. 2 Table of Contents Pages Introduction 4-5 Purpose 6 Chapter 1: The crisis Road to crisis 6-13 External drivers of Syrian Conflict 13-26 Internal drivers of Syrian Conflict 27-29 Chapter 2: The Islamic State The rise of Islamic State 29-30 Ideology – general characteristics 30-33 The "schism" with al-Qaida 33-34 The allies of ISIS 34-35 The rise and fall of ISIS 35-37 Chapter 3: United Nations response The Security Council and World Peace 38-48 Peace talks 48-50 Efforts of UN bodies 50-56 Conclusions 56-57 Bibliography 58-63 3 Introduction SYRIA (HISTORY - GENERAL INFORMATION) Syria is a Middle East country that stretches between the Euphrates River, the Arab Desert and the Mediterranean Sea. -
Islam and Instability in China's Xinjiang
Report March 2014 Islam and instability in China’s Xinjiang By Nick Holdstock1 Executive summary On March 1st 2014 a knife-wielding group of ten people attacked passengers and passers-by in the railway station in Kunming, the capital of China’s south-western Yunnan province. Twenty-eight were killed and 113 injured. By the following day the government was describing the incident as a “separatist” attack perpetrated by “terrorists from Xinjiang”. The attack in Kunming is the latest in a series of violent incidents in China that the government attributes to radical Islamist organisations that aim to promote what it calls the “Three Evils” of “terrorism, separatism and religious extremism”. These acts have predominantly occurred in China’s far western Xinjiang region, most recently in January and February 2014. Incidents in other parts of China have been attributed to the same forces. However, a number of accounts from academic and non-Chinese media sources, as well as human rights organisations, have questioned the official explanation of many such incidents. Critics accuse the government of lacking transparency and failing to offer reliable evidence, and claim that it is failing to acknowledge the widespread and diverse grievances of people in Xinjiang. This report aims to reconcile these different narratives of dissent in a region of growing significance for China’s economy and energy security. Background who are geographically concentrated in Xinjiang. There are Xinjiang is China’s largest administrative region, but owing also significant cross-border Uyghur populations in to its mountainous and desert geography, is comparatively Kazakhstan (220,000), Uzbekistan (55,000) and Kyrgyzstan sparsely populated. -
Sectarian Conflict and Sunni Islamic Radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY Sectarian conflict and Sunni Islamic radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon Ana Maria Luca A thesis Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In International Affairs School of Arts and Sciences August 2015 ©2015 Ana Maria Luca All rights reserved ii iii iv Dedication To my husband, Joe, and my son, Gaby v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project would not have been possible without the incredible support of my advisor, Dr. Makram Ouaiss, who guided me through the research, encouraged me and carefully read every word of this thesis. Also, many thanks to my committee members: Dr. Marwan Rowayheb, who constantly motivated and guided me, and Dr. Sami Baroudi, who shared with me his expertise. And finally, special thanks to my friends Nadine Elali, who guided me through the complex political scene in Tripoli, and Myra Abdallah, who helped with translation. And last, but not least, to my colleagues at NOW English. vi Sectarian conflict and Sunni Islamic radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon Ana Maria Luca ABSTRACT Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in early 2011, Lebanon has seen a drastic deterioration in security: domestic supporters and opponents of the Syrian government have confronted each other in armed clashes and Lebanese groups also got involved in the war in Syria. The extremist groups that emerged in Syria also found supporters in Lebanon and a series of suicide bombings rocked civilian areas. Violent conflict affected several regions in Lebanon, but Tripoli, in particular, was called “little Syria” because it seemed to mirror the hostilities in the neighboring country. -
2020 in Haram Boko
Boko Haram in 2020 Vera Bohm, ICT Instructor: Dr. Liram-Koblentz-Stenzler August 2020 I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 4 II. BOKO HARAM .......................................................................................................... 4 1. Overview and Background ................................................................................................ 4 2. Ideology ............................................................................................................................. 5 3. Geographic Region of Operations ..................................................................................... 7 4. Organizational Structure ................................................................................................... 8 Shekau – The Persona................................................................................................... 9 ISWAP and Boko Haram ............................................................................................. 12 5. Recruitment ..................................................................................................................... 12 Reasons to Join Boko Haram ...................................................................................... 12 The Almajiri ................................................................................................................. 14 Ethnicity and Tribes within Boko Haram ................................................................... -
ISIS Type of Organization
ISIS Name: ISIS Type of Organization: Insurgent territory-controlling religious terrorist violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Islamist jihadist pan-Islamist Salafist takfiri Place of Origin: Iraq Year of Origin: Al-Qaeda in Iraq: 2004; ISIS: 2013 Founder(s): Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; ISIS: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Places of Operation: ISIS has declared wilayas (provinces) in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Central Africa, Mali, Niger, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and the North Caucasus. Beyond this, the terror group has waged attacks in Lebanon, France, Belgium, Bangladesh, Morocco, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia, and Kuwait. Overview Also known as: ISIS Al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq1 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers40 Al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers2 Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers41 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)3 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq42 Al-Qa’ida in Iraq – Zarqawi4 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM)5 Two Rivers43 Al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers6 Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers Al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers7 44 Al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers8 Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers45 Al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria (QSIS)9 Southern Province46 Al-Tawhid10 Tanzeem Qa'idat al -
Islamists with Direct Ties to Terrorists Lobby Congress Cynthia Farahat
Islamists with Direct Ties to Terrorists Lobby Congress Cynthia Farahat meforum.org Introduction For the past three years, Islamists with ties to terrorist operatives have been meeting with members of Congress. Every spring since 2015, the U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations (USCMO), a coalition of national and local Islamist organizations, has hosted1 an annual lobbying2 event titled “Muslim Advocacy Day” in Congress, at the Capitol Visitor Center’s Auditorium. Over the course of several days, Islamists from across the United States visit congressional offices to lobby for their national and international agendas. The next Muslim Advocacy is scheduled3 to take place on May 7-8, 2018. The annual event is a serious lobbying effort. The 2017 lobby day, hosted by the USCMO and Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), connected national, regional and state Islamist organizations and community members with their elected representatives in Congress. CAIR reported4 that 400 delegates from 30 states had met with some 230 elected officials and congressional staff. Among the delegates at the 2017 Muslim Advocacy Day were many Muslim Brotherhood leaders directly linked to violent Islamists. USCMO’s own leadership includes an Islamist once accused by the U.S. government of funding terrorism conducted by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Several leaders in the delegation have elsewhere hosted Muslim Brotherhood operatives convicted of terrorism by a U.S. ally. The Muslim Brotherhood in America clearly defined its goals in a 1991 document titled “The Explanatory Memorandum,”5 which outlined the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategic goals in North America. Federal prosecutors introduced this memorandum as evidence during the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) terror financing trial in 2008—the largest terror financing case in U.S. -
Ecri Report on Azerbaijan
CRI(2016)17 ECRI REPORT ON AZERBAIJAN (fifth monitoring cycle) Adopted on 17 March 2016 Published on 7 June 2016 ECRI Secretariat Directorate General II - Democracy Council of Europe F-67075 STRASBOURG Cedex Tel.: + 33 (0) 3 90 21 46 62 E-mail: [email protected] www.coe.int/ecri ECRI REPORT ON AZERBAIJAN (fifth monitoring cycle) Adopted on 17 March 2016 Published on 7 June 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ................................................................................................................ 7 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................... 9 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................... 11 I. COMMON TOPICS ................................................................................. 11 1. LEGISLATION AGAINST RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ........................ 11 - PROTOCOL NO. 12 TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR) .................................................................................................... 11 - CRIMINAL LAW ........................................................................................... 11 - CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ................................................................. 12 - SPECIALISED NATIONAL BODIES .................................................................. 14 2. HATE SPEECH ........................................................................................... 15 - EXTENT OF THE PHENOMENON .................................................................. -
ROBERT BRETT LALLY, Being Duly Sworn, Deposes and Says That He Is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and Charges As Follows
Approved: ____________________________________________________ SAM ADELSBERG / SIDHARDHA KAMARAJU / MATTHEW HELLMAN Assistant United States Attorneys Before: THE HONORABLE ONA T. WANG United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York 21 MAG 639 ------------------------------------ X : : SEALED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : COMPLAINT : - v. – : Violations of : 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B, COLE JAMES BRIDGES, : 1114, and 2 a/k/a “Cole Gonzales,” : : COUNTY OF OFFENSE: Defendant. : NEW YORK : : ------------------------------------ X SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss.: ROBERT BRETT LALLY, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and charges as follows: COUNT ONE (Attempted Provision of Material Support to a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) 1. From at least in or about August 2020, up to and including in or about January 2021, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, COLE JAMES BRIDGES, a/k/a “Cole Gonzales,” the defendant, knowingly attempted to provide “material support or resources,” as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339A(b), to a foreign terrorist organization, to wit, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (“ISIS”), which at all relevant times has been designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization, pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and is currently designated as such as of the date of the filing of this Complaint, including, among other things, training, services, and personnel, knowing that ISIS was a designated foreign terrorist organization (as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B(g)(6)), that ISIS engages and has engaged in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA), and that ISIS engages and has engaged in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989). -
Identities in the Multiple Proxy Wars in Syria
’What is in a Name?’: the role of (different) identities in the multiple proxy wars in Syria Christopher Phillips Reader in International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London e-mail: [email protected] & Morten Valbjørn Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University e-mail: [email protected] Keywords Syrian conflict, proxy wars, identity politics, Middle East, Arab uprisings Abstract ABSTRACT Post-uprisings Middle East politics is frequently described as a ‘regional cold war’ involving proxy warfare that emphasises the role of shared identities linking external and local actors. But does the ‘content’ of identities impact proxy war dynamics? This article considers the present ‘battle for Syria’, a local con ict that became a theatre for multiple proxy wars involving actors emphasising identities on various levels, most notably national, religious/ sect and ethnic. It suggests that identity content does matter, with global powers more reluctant than regional players to back groups identifying at sub-national level, while foreign non-state actors are enthusiastic backers of sub-national identity. 0 “What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet" Juliet in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet In Shakespeare’s classic Romeo and Juliet the young girl from the Capulets family rhetorically asks if it would make any difference if her beloved ‘rose’, Romeo from the Montegues family, had had another name. Are names – or identities - just empty labels, so that Romeo would still be the man Juliet loves if he had another name? While she believes so, as ’that which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet‘, the tragic ending of the famous love story does on the other hand suggest that names - and identities - sometimes make a difference. -
Dignity and Dawn: Libya's Escalating Civil
Dignity and Dawn: Libya’s Escalating Civil War Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Nathaniel Barr ICCT Research Paper February 2015 This report provides a detailed examination of the armed conflict in Libya between the Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn military coalitions. The conflict erupted in May 2014, when Dignity leader Khalifa Hifter announced the launch of his campaign, which was aimed at ridding eastern Libya of Islamist militias, beginning with Benghazi. This offensive shattered a fragile status quo. Revolutionary forces concentrated in the city of Misrata and Islamist politicians perceived Hifter’s offensive as a direct affront and, following parliamentary elections that these factions lost, the Misrata-Islamist bloc announced the launch of the Libya Dawn offensive, aimed at driving pro-Dignity forces out of Tripoli. More broadly, the Dawn offensive was an effort to change facts on the ground in order to ensure that the Misrata-Islamist bloc retained political influence. The Dignity and Dawn offensives have contributed to the continuing political and geographic fragmentation of Libya. Libya now has two separate parliaments and governments, while much of the country has been carved into spheres of influence by warring factions. The Dignity-Dawn conflict has also caused a deterioration of security, which has played into the hands of a variety of violent non-state actors, including al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates that have capitalised on Libya’s security vacuum to establish bases of operation. This report provides a blow-by-blow account of the military conflict between Dignity and Dawn forces, then assesses the implications of the Libyan civil war on regional security and potential policy options for Western states. -
Iraq - Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on Thursday 16 March 2017
Iraq - Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on Thursday 16 March 2017 Information on the current security situation in Mosul; A report issued in March 2017 by IRIN News states: “After almost three years of terror under IS, four months of living on the verge of starvation since the fight for Mosul began, and three weeks of intense fighting as the Iraqi Army and its allies advanced into west Mosul, the humanitarian situation inside the city has become so dire that families have little choice but to risk their lives by walking through the front lines of the conflict just to try and survive” (IRIN News (9 March 2017) Barefoot flight from Mosul: The long road to safety). This document also notes that: “That residents are willing to risk the treacherous flight out of IS-controlled west Mosul betrays just how terrible conditions are inside the city, with food, drinking water and medication in extremely short supply. Residents have for months been forbidden to leave by IS. Those caught trying are harshly punished or executed in public” (ibid). A document issued in March 2017 by BBC News notes that: “Iraqi security forces taking part in a military offensive to reclaim the northern city of Mosul from the so-called Islamic State (IS) are continuing to advance into the western half of the city” (BBC News (10 March 2017) Battle for Mosul: The story so far). Voice of America in March 2017 points out that: “Iraqi government forces dislodged IS fighters from eastern Mosul in January, and on February 19 launched an offensive to retake districts west of the Tigris River.