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Analysis of the Activity of ISIS's Branches in Congo and Mozambique Following the Imposition of US Sanctions March 25, 2021

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Analysis of the Activity of ISIS's Branches in Congo and Mozambique Following the Imposition of US Sanctions March 25, 2021 רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) רמה כרמ כ ז ז מל מה ו י תשר עד מל מה ו ד ו י ד ע י י ע ן י ן ו ל ( רט למ ו מ" ר ) כרמ ז מה י ד עד ע מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו ר Analysis of the activity of ISIS's branches in Congo and Mozambique following the imposition of US sanctions March 25, 2021 Overview Following the expansion of ISIS’s activity in the past year in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Mozambique, the US Department of State announced on March 10, 2021, the imposition of economic sanctions on ISIS’s branch in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its leader, Seka Musa Baluku, and ISIS’s branch in Mozambique and its leader, Abu Yasir Hassan (website of the US Department of State, March 10, 2021)1. Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are part of ISIS’s Central Africa Province, whose establishment was announced by ISIS in April 2019. In practice, there are two local organizations which pledged allegiance to ISIS: Ansar al-Sunna in Mozambique and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which also calls itself Madinat al-Tawheed wal Muwahideen, in Congo. These two organizations are apparently in contact with ISIS’s leadership in Syria. Right: ISIS operatives in Mozambique renewing their pledge of allegiance to ISIS’s leader. Left: ISIS operatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo renewing their pledge of allegiance to ISIS’s leader (Telegram, July 24, 2019) Both organizations have similar forms of action. ISIS’s main activity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is attacking military targets and local Christian residents. Its attacks are focused on the region of the city of Beni, in northeastern Congo, about 50 km from the border with Uganda, where most of the residents are Christian villagers. 1 For the US Department of State’s announcement, see: https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the- democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/ 049-21 2 In Mozambique, ISIS attacks similar targets, but it also operates against Western targets (such as gas reserves and tourist sites), especially Christian ones. It also demonstrates an ability to rule over populated regions. The epicenter of the organization’s activity is the Cabo Delgado Province in the northeast of the country, a region rich with natural gas, with tourist sites and a seaport. The US sanctions reflect the US administration’s concern about the expanding activity of these organizations and the feeling, which is also supported by up-to-date research on the part of the Pentagon, that the level of success of the US military aid, including in training local armies, is low. Characteristics of ISIS’s activity in Mozambique ISIS in Mozambique – Ansar al-Sunna The Ansar al-Sunna organization in Mozambique is referred to as “Al-Shabab” (i.e., the youth) and sometimes as “Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’ah” or “Harakat al-Sunna wal-Jama’ah.” It started in 2007 as a small group of Islamist youth who were active in the Cabo Delgado Province, in northeastern Mozambique. In time, the group increased in number, reaching about 1,000 jihadist insurgents whose background was mainly social and economic frustration. The group’s activity began in October 2017. They pledged allegiance to ISIS in early 2018. In the beginning, the group operatives, who apparently were reinforced by other fighters from around East Africa, attacked remote rural areas. As years went by, their actions became more and more complex.2 In 2020, the group carried out about 400 attacks, double the number of attacks carried out a year before. Three years after the organization started its attacks, more than 1,300 civilians were killed in Mozambique, hundreds of members of the security forces were killed or wounded, and about 670,000 civilians were forced to leave 2 Emilia Columbo, The Secret to the Northern Mozambique Insurgency's Success. War on the Rocks. Texas National Security Review, October 8, 2020: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-secret-to-the-northern-mozambique-insurgencys-success/ The author, Emilia Columbo, is a senior associate (non-resident) in the Africa Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a research institute based in Washington D.C. Prior to this position, she served as a senior analyst at the CIA, covering African and Latin American political- security issues. 049-21 3 their homes.3 In addition, the organization wreaked havoc on tourism and inflicted damage on the gas reserves, where much foreign funds have been invested. According to the US, the organization is headed by Abu Yasir Hassan. No further details have been provided on him, apart from his name (or codename). The organization operatives attract the locals by persuading them that the local authorities are impotent and corrupt and by supplying them with food and funds. The group members are aware of the limitations of the Mozambican security forces. Disgruntled soldiers who joined their ranks added to the organization’s capabilities as they possess operational skill and also represent sources of intelligence4. The group’s epicenter is the Cabo Delgado Province, especially the region of Mocímboa da Praia. The Cabo Delgado Province is one of the poorest regions in the country, despite the potential of wealth inherent in the reserves of natural resources. Although most of the Mozambicans are Christians, Cabo Delgado has a Muslim majority (about 54%), a considerable part of which feels neglected and underprivileged. Therefore, they represent a potential pool for collaborators and recruits to the organization. The largest ethnic group in the region is the Makonde tribe, whose people live along the border between Mozambique and Tanzania and in Kenya (Wikipedia). According to researcher Eleanor Beevor, the residents of the province were assimilated into criminal networks engaged in marine smuggling operations and were fertile ground for a wave of Islamist preachers who arrived in the region mainly from Tanzania, in 2014–2015, and found a sympathetic ear among local youth. These preachers not only inculcated their teenagers with radical Islamic ideology but also promised them loans to establish small businesses in return for loyalty to the group. The recruitment of the youth was even accelerated due to repressive measures against them by the army.5 3 Sam Peters, Islamic State Africa – an Inevitability?, The Organization for World Peace, 2 May 2020: https://theowp.org/islamic-state-africa-an-inevitability/ The Organization for World Peace (OWP) works to resolve violent conflicts by peaceful means, mainly by providing aid to the displaced persons. It publishes daily and monthly reports, as well as breaking news. https://www.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-isis-affiliates-and-leaders-in-the- democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-mozambique/ 4 Emilia Columbo, Ibid. 5 Eleanor Beevor, Who are Mozambique’s Jihadists? IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK), 25 March 2020: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/03/csdp-mozambique-jihadists 049-21 4 According to researcher Emilia Columbo, Ansar al-Sunna has economic capability based on drug smuggling and trading in illegal timber, ivory, and rubies. According to Columbo, this may adversely affect the support of the organization leaders, who do not approve of this illegal activity, however lucrative it is. She believes that as this activity continues, it may create a rift in the ranks of the organization.6 Mozambique (www.worldometers.info) Links with ISIS leadership in Syria and Iraq Except for the fact that the group members pledged allegiance to ISIS, the relationship between the organizations and the extent of control by ISIS in Syria and Iraq over their activity are unclear. On November 12, 2020, the Mozambican attorney general said that the law enforcement authorities had arrested 12 Iraqi citizens suspected of supporting the rebels in the Cabo Delgado region (allafrica.com, November 12, 2020; Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2020). It can be estimated that these were ISIS operatives who arrived from Iraq to establish ISIS’s presence in the region. 6 Emilia Columbo, Ibid. 049-21 5 Links with ISIS operatives in African countries The Democratic Republic of the Congo: According to Eleanor Beevor, limited coordination is maintained between ISIS’s operatives in Mozambique and the operatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ADF). She notes that Islamic operatives from Congo were arrested in Mozambique, which can indicate the presence of operatives from Congo in Mozambique and maybe also operatives from Mozambique operating in Congo.7 On August 12, 2018, Mozambican chief of police Bernardino Rafael noted that one of the leaders of terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado is Abdel Rahman Faisal, who has direct links to ADF and Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’ah. In addition, ADF recently released a propaganda video in which it expresses solidarity with Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'ah.8 Somalia: Tore Hamming noted in his recent article that ISIS’s Central Africa Province is administratively subordinate to Maktab al-Qarar (literally, “the Office of Decision”), which is based in Somalia and is responsible for ISIS’s branches outside Syria and Iraq. This may indicate that relations are maintained between ISIS operatives in Mozambique (as well as Congo) and ISIS operatives in Somalia.9 Control (at least partial) over territory ISIS operatives in Mozambique control several regions in the country, including (since August 12, 2020) the port city of Mocímboa da Praia, from which they apparently launch some of their attacks against the province of Cabo Delgado.
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