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L'état Islamique En Rd Congo

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L'état Islamique En Rd Congo L’ÉTAT ISLAMIQUE EN RD CONGO TARA CANDLAND, ADAM FINCK, HARORO J. INGRAM, LAREN POOLE, LORENZO VIDINO, CALEB WEISS Mars 2021 CANDLAND ET AL | PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM À propos du Programme sur l'extrémisme Le Programme sur l'extrémisme de l'Université George Washington fournit une analyse des problèmes liés à l'extrémisme violent et non-violent. Le Programme est le fer de lance d'une enquête académique innovante et réfléchie, produisant des travaux empiriques qui renforcent la recherche sur l'extrémisme en tant que domaine d'étude distinct. Le Programme vise à développer des solutions politiques pragmatiques qui entrent en résonnance avec les décideurs, les leaders de la société civile et le grand public. Ce rapport est le fruit d'une coopération entre le Programme sur l'extrémisme de l'Université George Washington et la Fondation Bridgeway. Les opinions exprimées dans ce document sont uniquement celles des auteurs, et pas nécessairement celles du Programme sur l'extrémisme ou de l'Université George Washington. « Il n'y a plus d'ADF. Selon la volonté d’Allah, les ADF ont cessé d'exister il y a longtemps. [...] Actuellement, nous sommes une province, la Province de l'Afrique centrale, qui est une province parmi les nombreuses provinces qui composent l'État islamique qui est sous le calife et le chef de tous les musulmans ... Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al- Quraishi. » - Musa Baluku, 1 Septembre 2020 1 Vidéo de Moudjahidine TV publiée le 18 septembre 2020. Archivée par les auteurs. 2 | Page CANDLAND ET AL | PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM Résumé Ce rapport examine systématiquement la façon dont les efforts de l'État islamique pour se développer à l'échelle mondiale et les aspirations des Forces démocratiques alliées (ADF) de Musa Baluku ont fusionné, dans une combinaison de facteurs d'incitation et d'attraction qui ont conduit les ADF à devenir la branche de l'État islamique dans la Province de l'Afrique centrale (ISCAP) en République démocratique du Congo (RDC). Basé en grande partie sur des sources primaires, notamment une collection unique de récits de transfuges et de sources locales, ce rapport suit l'évolution des ADF depuis leurs origines ougandaises jusqu'à ce qu’elles fassent partie d’une province officielle de l'État islamique, révélant des informations uniques sur le fonctionnement interne du groupe et ses efforts pour construire des réseaux transnationaux afin de soutenir ses opérations. Les principales conclusions du rapport sont les suivantes : ● Les liens entre les ADF et l'État islamique ont peut-être commencé dès 2017. En 2018, l'ISCAP a été reconnue comme une province officielle de l'État islamique et, en avril 2019, les attaques de l'ISCAP en RDC ont été officiellement revendiquées par les unités médiatiques centrales de l'État islamique. Le débat ne devrait plus porter sur la question de savoir si les ADF ont une relation formelle avec l'État islamique, mais plutôt se concentrer sur la nature de cette relation. ● Bien qu'il n'y ait actuellement aucune preuve d'ordres de commandement et de contrôle directs de l'État islamique sur les ADF, l'évolution des activités opérationnelles et stratégiques des ADF sous la direction de Baluku suggère que le groupe cherche à mettre en œuvre l'aqeeda (croyance) et le manhaj (méthode) de l'État islamique. Cela est particulièrement notable dans la production, le contenu et le langage de la propagande des ADF qui reflètent l'influence de l'État islamique sur le groupe. ● Il existe de plus en plus de preuves suggérant que les ADF ont établi des liens de communication avec l'État islamique, comme en témoignent les éléments de l'ISCAP basés en RDC figurant dans les messages de ses unités médiatiques centrales depuis 2019 (bien que revendiquant rétroactivement une attaque en 2018). Les rapports de sources humaines suggèrent également que des liens financiers ont été établis entre des entités de l'État islamique et les ADF. Les ADF ont une histoire de sensibilisation à l'étranger et continuent de tirer parti de leurs réseaux transnationaux pour le financement, le recrutement et la logistique. ● Étant donné la fréquence à laquelle les activités des ADF en RDC sont apparues dans les messages médiatiques de l'État islamique depuis 2019, il est évident que l'État islamique tire parti de ces activités pour démontrer qu'il reste un mouvement pertinent et actif ayant une large portée transnationale, malgré sa perte de contrôle territorial en Syrie et en Irak. Avec des affiliés officiels de l'État islamique et des groupes pro-État islamique disséminés à travers l'Afrique, le potentiel de collaboration transnationale et la migration d'un nombre accru de combattants étrangers régionaux peuvent menacer la stabilité régionale. Si ce rapport cherche à combler certaines lacunes cruciales dans le domaine de la recherche, il vise également à attirer l’attention stratégique des politiques sur les problèmes urgents de sécurité et humanitaires en RDC qui sont exacerbés par l’influence de l’État islamique. 3 | Page CANDLAND ET AL | PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM Introduction Le 20 octobre 2020, l'État islamique a officiellement revendiqué une attaque contre la prison centrale de Kangbayi, en République démocratique du Congo (RDC), qui a libéré plus de 1 300 prisonniers et que les responsables gouvernementaux ont attribué aux Forces démocratiques alliées (ADF).2 Ce n'était que l'une des dernières d'une dizaine d'attaques des ADF en RDC qui ont été revendiquées par l'État islamique depuis qu'il a officiellement reconnu en 2019 que ses « soldats du califat » étaient présents dans le pays en conflit. Si les ADF sont l'un des groupes armés les plus anciens et les plus résilients de la RDC, le groupe est resté largement enveloppé de mystère, en partie en raison de son isolement géographique et des pratiques secrètes qui ont caractérisé une grande partie de son histoire. À certains moments, différents acteurs armés congolais ont été complices de la violence des ADF ou ont commis leurs propres massacres dans la région, ajoutant à la confusion entourant l'identité des auteurs et le rôle des ADF dans la violence régionale. Par conséquent, la nature de la menace ADF est fortement contestée dans les domaines de la recherche et de la politique stratégique. Historiquement, les forces de l'ONU et les acteurs gouvernementaux régionaux ont souvent dépeint les ADF comme un groupe djihadiste transnational unidimensionnel, responsable de la plupart des violences sur le territoire de Beni. Plusieurs journalistes et chercheurs familiers avec la dynamique dans l’est de la RD Congo n’ont pas tardé à rejeter cette version, et ils soulignent au contraire l’importance du rôle des ADF en tant qu’acteur localement ancré dans le milieu des groupes armés congolais motivés par la politique et le profit économique.3 Pour certains dans ce dernier camp, la description des ADF comme un groupe affilié de l'État islamique semble contredire d'une certaine manière les décennies d'actions motivées localement, ainsi que les moteurs historiques du conflit menaçant la protection des civils en ne parvenant pas à identifier avec précision le problème fondamental.4 En outre, l'idée des ADF comme branche de l'État islamique en RD Congo contredit les récentes conclusions du Groupe d'experts de l'ONU (GoE), ainsi que d'autres groupes internationaux et locaux qui, aussi récemment qu'en juin 2020, ont déclaré n’avoir trouvé aucun lien direct entre les ADF et l'État islamique.5 Le manque de preuves émanant de la RDC peut s'expliquer, en partie, par la nature extrêmement isolée des ADF, notamment une longue histoire de rares communications externes. En effet, compte tenu du calendrier et des informations limitées dont disposent le GoE et d'autres chercheurs, les arguments en faveur d'une présence de l'État islamique en RD Congo peuvent avoir semblé fantaisistes, et leurs conclusions ont à juste titre remis 2 « Armed fighters free over 1,300 prisoners from DR Congo jail », Al Jazeera, (20 octobre 2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/20/suspected-rebels-free-900-prisoners-from-east-congo-jail 3 Kristof Titeca, « Jihadis in Congo? Probably not », The Washington Post, (27 septembre 2016). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/27/heres-why-its-a-problem-that- congos-u-n-peacekeeping-force-is-blaming-international-jihadis-for-these-killings-and-attacks/. 4 Daniel Fahey et Judith Verweijen, « A closer look at Congo’s Islamist rebels », The Washington Post, (30 septembre 2020). https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/30/closer-look-congos-islamic- rebels/. 5 Rapport final du Groupe d’experts sur la République démocratique du Congo, Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (2 juin 2020) http://www.undocs.org//fr/S/2020/482. 4 | Page CANDLAND ET AL | PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM en question des années de récits qui ont trop souvent exagéré à la fois l'impact des ADF et leur liens terroristes.6 Si des spécialistes régionaux et nationaux ont analysé les développements récents de l'insurrection des ADF, les chercheurs universitaires sur l'État islamique, à quelques exceptions notables près, ont largement ignoré l'ISCAP en RDC comme étude de cas.7 Pourtant, l'ISCAP en RDC offre une étude de cas fascinante, à la fois des forces de « poussée » descendantes alors que l'État islamique cherche à accroître sa portée mondiale et des forces « d'attraction »' ascendantes générées localement, tandis que les groupes locaux existants recherchent la reconnaissance et le soutien de l'État islamique. Le but de ce rapport est d’explorer ces dynamiques en suivant l’évolution du groupe des ADF pour devenir la branche RDC de l’ISCAP, de le positionner dans le contexte des autres provinces transnationales de l’État islamique et d’envisager ses implications pour la RDC et la région plus largement.
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