Farnese and the Clementia Principis a Reassessment of His ‘Method of Clemency’ (1578-1585)

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Violet SOEN KUL, Aspirant Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek - Vlaanderen

Alexander Farnese and the clementia principis A Reassessment of his ‘Method of Clemency’ (1578-1585).

During the early reconciliation negotiations between the city of Antwerp and Alexander Farnese in 1584, the city deputies thanked the Prince of Parma for his clemency. They claimed that this clemency was ‘the most recommendable virtue one could find, even among the greatest princes and monarchs’. 1 Obviously the city diplomats pointed at Farnese’s leniency in warfare. However, it is striking that the phrasing was in terms of a general appraisal of the princely virtue of clemency. Not only contemporaries, but also Farnese’s biographer Léon Van der Essen pointed at the clemency of the Prince of Parma. He argued that Parma ‘knew how to make use of clemency in the interest of peace’. According to Van der Essen, Farnese’s leniency ‘was as effective to break the enemy alliance as his military interventions, for it incited most rebels to repel William of Orange and to reconcile with their King’. 2 References to the virtue of clemency occur abundantly in records relating to the Low Countries’ governorship of Alexander Farnese. Upon further consideration, this copious allusion to leniency is the result of Parma’s own deliberate attempt to act as a clement governor towards the Low Countries. In several printed letters to beleaguered cities, Farnese portrayed himself as the mediator of Philip’s royal clemency. 3 In spite of the manslaughter in

1 City of Antwerp to Alexander Farnese, Antwerp, 13 November 1584: Archives Générales du Royaume (Bruxelles), Papiers de l’État et de l’Audience (henceforth AGR Aud) 586 fol. 5-7, edited by L.P. Gachard in Bulletin de la Commission royale d’Histoire de Belgique (henceforth BCRH) série III , 12 (1871), pp. 193-198 (nr. III), p. 195: ‘qu’ayant faict preuve, par-dessus les autres gouverneurs, ses prédécesseurs, de sa vertu et générosité au faict d’armes, elle nous offre si bénignement de la accompagner de douceur et de clémence, vertu certes la plus recommandable que l’on puisse trouver, mesmes aux plus grands princes et monarques’. 2 Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, p. 6: ‘sachant faire usage de clémence dans l’intérêt de la paix. Cette clémence fut tout aussi efficace que la voie des armes pour rompre le front que lui opposèrent ses adversaires et, au moment psychologique, incita la plupart des rebelles à abandonner le Taciturne et à se reconcilier avec le Roi’. 3 Lettres de Monseigneur le Prince de Parme, .... Adressantes aux Bourgemaistres, Eschevins, etc. ... et habitans de la Ville de Bruxelles: Par lesquelles son Excellence leur presente la grace de sa Maiesté: moyennant leur reconciliation , 6 November 1580, Bergen, Rutger Velpius, -8°, 16 blz. (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 547); Lettre envoyee par le Prince de Parme aux Bourgmaistres, Eschevins et Magistrat de la ville d’Anvers, ensemble et au grand conseil, dit, den Breeden Raedt, et aux Confreries d’icelle Avec la Responce desditz Srs Bourgmaistres... , 13 November 1584, Antwerpen, Gillis vanden Rade, -4°, 16 blz. (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 710, in Dutch nr. 711; other Dutch editions nr. 712 and nr. 713), also edited by L.P. Gachard, BCRH série III , 12 (1871), pp. 189-192 (nr. CCCXIV).

1 the little town of Sichem and in the city of Maastricht 4, the prince of Parma continuously underlined his balmy attitude and actions towards rebellious noblemen, soldiers, repentant heretics, cities, provinces and institutions. This paper reconsiders why and how Farnese referred to clemency. Alexander Farnese’s ‘method of clemency’, a careful combination of discourse and achievements, was both more and less original than suggested until now. It was less original than Van der Essen hinted 5, as the reference to clemency was wide-spread in the sixteenth-century political thought and political decision-making. Since the start of the Dutch Revolt, the aptness of clemency as a strategy to pacify the uprising was highly debated. On the other hand, it was more original than Michel de Waele suggested while comparing the ‘methods of clemency’ of Alba and Farnese. According to this author, Farnese proved successful because he applied his clemency to the local and the personal level, thereby enhancing the personal contact between the vassals and their sovereign. 6 However, Farnese’s ‘method of clemency’ had more distinctive features than its limited geographical scope.

Clemency as a princely virtue in sixteenth-century political thought In Western history, the virtue of clemency never figured as prominently in philosophical, political or religious debate as the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance) or the three theological virtues (faith, hope and charity). If all these virtues have been associated to Farnese’s personality, linking him with clemency reflects a sixteenth- century fascination. Part of this interest related to the renewed popularity of Lucius Annaeus Seneca’s De Clementia , a treatise which had been virtually unknown during the high Middle Ages 7 and influenced sixteenth-century political thought to a great extent. Seneca wrote this treatise for his pupil Nero as an incitement for the young emperor to be clement, in order to imitate the Gods and to be their true vice-regent. 8 The text was a mixture between a mirror of princes, a moral treatise on a virtue and political propaganda for Nero’s reign. The philosopher aimed to illustrate how nature and ratio implied that clemency was specifically adept for kings.9 Seneca claimed that clemency assured a prince of a good

4 Sack of Sichem: Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, chp. XII, pp. 223-233; Sack of Maastricht: Van der Essen 1933- 1937, III, chp. V, pp. 160-195. 5 Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, p. 6. 6 De Waele 1996b, pp. 31-32; repeated in De Waele 2000, pp. 121-122. 7 Baraz 1998, p. 196. Interesting biographies of Seneca with special interest in his De Clementia : Griffin 1976 and Veyne 2003. Most recent edition of the text: Malaspina 2002. 8 Fears 1975, pp. 486-496. 9 In fact, for Seneca it was conscious propaganda to use rex instead of princeps . Griffin 1976, p. 170. Meanwhile he challenged arguments against clemency which claimed that forgiveness supported the culpable and thus

2 reputation and of the true affection and love of his subjects. Leniency was not only a political guideline but also a rule of war: a military victory had to be handled with moderatio (moderation), in order not to harm the conquered people. In wartime, clemency towards the own soldiers prevented desertion. In the second book of De Clementia , Seneca narrowed the focus of clemency to the practice of a King as Judex .10 In the judicial sphere, clemency was both the ‘inclination of the mind to leniency in punishments’ as its result, the pardon or ‘the moderation that remits something from the punishment that is deserved and due’. 11 Because clemency was necessary in politics, warfare and justice, Seneca developed his arguments referring to the moral, military and juridical jargon.12 Still Seneca’s treatise was not a one-sided plea in favour of clemency: too much clemency could result in misericordia, which was not desirable for a stoic way of life. Too much clemency could also deteriorate the position of the King if his enemies exploited it as a sign of weakness. Furthermore, pardoning everybody was as cruel as refusing any pardon. 13 So Seneca set out a basic framework for associations to clemency in the sixteenth century: clemency was a princely virtue, closely associated to kingship and opposed to tyranny. Clemency could be vital in politics, warfare and justice: a clement attitude towards subjects and conquered people increased political stability, while clemency in punishing increased justice. However, De Clementia could never gain reputation in the sixteenth century without its hermeneutical relationship with changing realities.14 Renaissance revived the debate on the art of government (and adored the clementia Caesaris 15 ) while the Reformation questioned

constituted a vice. The Old Stoic School had developed this kinds of arguments, so Seneca was venturing onto thin ice. Seneca, De Clementia , Book II, I, 1: ‘Esse autem aliquos scio, qui clementia pessimum quemque putent sustineri, quoniam nisi post crimen supervacua est et sola haec virtus inter innocentes cessat’. There is still discussion whether Seneca spoke out against other (or older) stoicists or not. Stoics based on Aristotle to define justice, in their view punishments couldn’t be remitted. In any case, Seneca moved away from this Aristotelian view in seeing the King as a Judge using clemency, basing on Roman jurisdiction. Griffin 1976, pp. 155-158. 10 Adam 1970 defended that Seneca’s treatise only hold a description of the ‘King as Princeps Judex’, but this statement was firmly attacked by Griffin 1976, 150. 11 ‘Inclinatio animi ad lenitatem in poena exigenda’ ( De Clementia , liber II, 3.1); ‘clementiam esse moderationem aliquid ex merita ac debita poena remittentem’ ( De Clementia , liber II, 3.2); the translations are from Griffin 1976, pp. 154-155. 12 Mortureux 1973, p. 17. However, he was somehow confused in the synonyms listed for clementia. In his first book misericordia, venia and ignoscere were synonyms for clemency where in the second book they are distinct. Griffin 1976, 152-154. In any case, for Seneca clemency could not be the opposite of the virtue of severity, because two virtues could not possibly contradict each other. Clemency avoided the cruelty of being too severe. Motto 2001, pp. 122-126. 13 Seneca, De Clementia , Book II, I, 2. 14 Solimano 1984, p. 399, De Waele 1996a, pp. 5-6. 15 Renaissance gave a new impetus to the discussion of the ‘art of government’ on the basis of ancient Greek and Roman texts. The direct contact with Antiquity revived old topoi like clemency: Renaissance adored Julius Caesar as a clement Emperor (for the Clementia Caesaris see Rochlitz 1993 and Lossau 1975).

3 forgiveness towards ‘heretics’. 16 The enlarged importance of warfare 17 also increased the importance of the ethics of leniency in a context where cruelty was predominant. 18 This background made that after the editio princeps of De Clementia in 1475, other editions soon appeared in 1478, 1480, 1492, 1496, 1503. 19 More importantly, influential thinkers as Desiderius Erasmus, John Calvin and Justus Lipsius edited the text. For Desiderius Erasmus this edition was more a literary and philological exercise 20 , although in his Institutio principis christiani he insisted clemency was the virtue for which princes were mostly honoured 21 and that sincere clemency could assure the affection of his subjects. 22 Even if for Calvin the edition and a commentary on De Clementia was mainly an attempt to acquire recognition as a humanist, he chose this text to comment on the important theme of the character of the sovereign. 23 Lipsius considered justice and clemency to be the two most important of all princely virtues and consequently he addressed a whole chapter of his Politica to the subject.24 The leading neostoicist even meant that De Clementia should be read by all rulers.25 Consequently, he commented the text at the Louvain university in presence of the Archdukes Albert and Isabella.26 However, when Lipsius was still in Leiden, Farnese’s ‘penchant for a strategy of clemency seems to have become a by-word among Lipsius’s close friends’.27

Clemency in the sixteenth-century juridical and political discourse Sixteenth-century reflection on clemency evolved dialectically with the extensive development of the sovereign right to pardon, the concrete exponent of royal clemency. Although the praxis was based on Roman Law, the right to pardon only grew substantially

16 For the discussion around leniency for heretics: Goosens 1996; De Schepper 1998, Vrolijk 2004, pp. 284ff., De Schepper 2005, Soen 2005. 17 Geoffrey Parkers so-called ‘military revolution’: Parker 1995, Parker 1996 (revised edition). 18 Baraz 1998, p. 189. 19 A survey on sixteenth-century editions of De Clementia can be found in: Calvin 1969, 74*. 20 Papy 2002, p. 10-36. 21 Erasmus 1974, p. 142 (206-208). 22 Erasmus 1974, p. 181 (481). 23 Calvin 1969, p. 74*. 24 Justus Lipsius 2004; Papy 2003, pp. 155-173; Waszink 1999, p. 248. 25 Papy 2002, p. 26, Marin 1988, pp. 119-126. 26 Lipsius even commented the text in presence of the archdukes Albert and Isabella: Van Houdt 1998, Grafton 1991, pp. 9-10. 27 I owe this reference to James Tracy’s paper: ‘Tyranny, Turbae, and Auctoritas: Justus Lipsius as a Commentor on the Events of the Dutch Revolt, 1578 – 1591’, presented in Los Angeles, 7th of October 2005, citing following letter: Janus Dousa from London to Lipsius in Leiden, 6 th November 1585, Letter 442:8-10 in , Nauwelaerts 1983, II, p. 237: although Dousa has not been able to write for four months, ‘tu lenior, qui amico manifesta in noxia haerenti de caussae dictione gratiam feceris, reoque ante preces necdem confitenti ignoveris, Parmae opino principis exemplo, cui novum imperium inchoanti utilis clementiae fama’.

4 during the late Middle Ages 28 in order to acquire crucial importance in the context of state building in early modern times.29 A pardon re-established symbolically the loyalty between King and subject after a crime de lèse-majesté .30 According to the legal doctrine, a pardon was a one-dimensional act from King to vassal 31 , but law historians have proven that the development of the right of pardon responded to an existing demand of subjects to have juridical security. 32 In the judicial sphere, ‘the other face of the struggle against violence’ was ‘peace and order by clemency’. 33 This right of pardon also intertwined with political thought and decision-making. In settling down conflicts with city authorities for example, the King used his right to pardon at city level, exploiting the images of Clement King and Forgiving Father. Maximilian of Austria partially solved the city rebellions in this way.34 Also Charles V paid considerable attention to this reputation as a Clement King after resolving the Comuneros or the Ghent revolt.35 ‘The other face of the struggle against rebellion’ was thus ‘peace and order by clemency’. 36 Clemency was a demand of most ‘moderate’ counsellors searching for compromise.37 Leniency could label all kind of aspirations in order to temper harsh repression of dissidents or rebels. But in this way, the debate was still focussed on the increase of royal authority while pacifying conflicts. In addition, clemency had a strong emotional connotation, as it was thought to increase the love between the subjects and their fatherly King. 38 On the other hand, ‘hawks’ defended the view that a military intervention could settle down conflicts in a quicker and more definite way, which certainly increased royal power. Hawks considered clemency to be dangerous: it could give a perception of weakness towards enemies. Only if justice was done, mercy was appropriate: compassion could not precede justice. 39

28 De Schepper and Cauchies 1997, Mertens de Wilmars and Rousseaux 1999, Vrolijk 1999, Vrolijk 2004, Vrolijk and De Schepper 2004. 29 Hoareau-Dodinau and Texier 1999, Texier 1999, pp. 14-16. Next to this attempt to reinforce royal authority, humanist jurists defended the use of pardon to express more human nuances in the jurisprudence. Viglius of Aytta, Head of the Secret Council, believed that every crime could be handled with mercy. Cited in Vrolijk and de Schepper 2004, p. 280. 30 Davis 1988, Gauvard 1984, Hoareau-Dodinau 1984. 31 De Waele 2002, p. 69. 32 De Schepper and Cauchies 1997, p. 268. 33 Title of Vrolijk and De Schepper 2004. 34 Boone 1999, p. 365. 35 Boone 2001, p. 47. 36 Paraphrasing Vrolijk and De Schepper 2004. 37 Louthan 1997, Woltjer 1976, pp. 229-321. 38 De Waele 1993, De Waele 1998. 39 Soen 2004, p. 323.

5 But even if war was a (financially feasible) option, captains faced the same dilemma during sieges. Clemency towards conquered enemies could reduce revenge actions, but a firm treatment of the subjugated could make others surrender out of fear. 40 In warfare, clemency was above all seen as a virtue for the victor towards the defeated: victoria was a precondition for clementia . Military victory easily swept away the argument that clemency could harm royal authority. The attitude of colonels during sieges was sometimes crucial for the overall politics. In 1585 Philip II advised Farnese not always to take into account the advice of military commanders, who normally opted for rigor. In politics, ‘mildness’ could produce more healthy effects. 41

The debate on clemency during the Dutch Revolt According to sixteenth-century political thought and practice, both in warfare and in politics, clemency could increase and decrease royal authority. 42 If all political decision-making had to take stance in this impasse, Farnese had to face this dilemma in the particularly troubled times of the Dutch Revolt. Since the beginning of this Revolt, after the Compromise of the Nobles in 1565 and the iconoclastic fury in 1566, political decision-making struggled with the conception of clemency to reconcile rebellious vassals with the Crown. Several counsellors suggested clemency and pardon would avoid military conflicts and produce a symbolic reconciliation between the King and his vassals; as usual, others feared this would give a weak impression to the King. 43 In the path of David Lagomarsino’s influential but unpublished PhD, some scholars have suggested that these political ideas related respectively to the affiliation with the factions of the prince of Eboli or of the duke of Alba at the royal Spanish Court.44 Nonetheless political opinions of most counsellors shifted then much more rapidly than their patronage networks. Also in the Low Countries the ‘loyalist opposition’ may have shared their ‘moderation’45 , but they had very different views on the most desirable solution to the conflict and not all of them supported leniency. In any case, the discussions on clemency during the French Wars of Religion had more or less the same format between

40 Parker 2002a, p. 146, Charles 1965, pp. 288-302, Waxman 1997, 339-340. 41 Philip II to Alexander Farnese, 7 March 1585: AGR Aud 193 fol. 23-25, Lefèvre 1940-1960, III, pp. 16-19 (nr. 35). 42 De Waele 1996. 43 Soen 2004, pp. 309-328. 44 Lagomarsino 1974, Ezquerra Revilla 2001. 45 Janssens 1989, pp. 186-204.

6 supporters and opponents of clemency 46 , which suggests that the political debate can not fully be reduced to patronage or affiliations. Margaret of Parma alternated moderation with repression in her attempt to pacify the growing discontentment.47 According to Woltjer, the ‘moderates’ obtained a victory until the iconoclastic fury discredited their solution. Afterwards, Margaret opted for a more rigorous policy towards dissidents. 48 Under the pressure of the provincial governors and some members of the Council of State, she considered granting a general pardon, but until her resignation she kept on insisting on the validity of the counter-arguments.49 In Parker’s hypothetical model, her moderate policy could even have marked the end of the Dutch Revolt. 50 Alba’s repression made the plea for clemency even stronger. His Council of Troubles openly denied all access to royal clemency, most dramatically in the case of Egmont and Hornes. During warfare, Alba never really acted clemently towards the defeated. Although some towns received a mild city pardon, most of them were violently sacked in order to convince others to capitulate.51 His successor, don Luis de Requesens seemed to enter as a ‘peace dove’, but he was more inclined to continue battles than to open peace negotiations. 52 This overall debate on clemency in politics and warfare was closely intertwined with the juridical implications of clemency: royal clemency needed to result in pardoning the rebels. After some minor settlements, Philip II allowed a general pardon for the Low Countries in 1570, 1572 and 1574 in the hope to pacify the conflict. 53 These general pardons were laws based on the sovereign right to pardon. Anyone who was prepared to reconcile with the Catholic Church, could get remission of his crimes of heresy and lèse-majesté .54 However, the general pardon of 1570 and 1572 excluded traitors, leaders of the religious riots and reformed ministers, while in 1574 it was for some individuals intentionally forbidden to solicit a pardon. These general pardons failed for complex reasons, but a very substantial part of royal counsellors and loyalists in the Low Countries kept on believing in the potential of

46 Christin, 1999, pp. 201-214. 47 Woltjer 1976, p. 300 and 306. 48 Woltjer 1976, p. 300. 49 Soen 2004, p. 322 and 328. 50 Parker 2002b, p. 270. 51 Soen (forthcoming), chapter III-VI, De Waele 1996, p. 32, De Waele 2002, p. 65. 52 Hortal Muñoz 2004, 78. I thank dr. J.E. Hortal Muñoz for making his PhD available to me. 53 Soen (forthcoming). 54 Soen 2005; for the theological G. Janssens , ‘Superexcellat autem misericordia iudicium. The homily of François Richardot on the occasion of the solemn announcement of the General Pardon in the Netherlands (Antwerp, 16 July 1570)’, Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands. Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke (forthcoming). My special thanks to prof. Gustaaf Janssens for making his manuscript available to me.

7 showing clemency, whether or not by means of granting pardon. This clemency strategy based on the recognition of royal authority differed of peace negotiations which implied to negotiate with the rebels on an equal basis. 55

Impetuses for clemency during Farnese’s governorship Farnese was confronted with the debate on clemency when arriving in the Low Countries to assist the military operations of his uncle Don Juan. Philip II repeatedly accused Don Juan of not acting with ‘enough clemency’ towards the flamencos . Of course, part of this accusation related to the intrigues of the secretary of State Antonio Pérez. But Philip and his counsellors also feared that the determined attitude and military actions of Don Juan would cause greater damage than taking a conciliatory attitude towards the States-General. Therefore Philip sent John of Noircarmes, baron of Selles to the Low Countries to act as a mediator between both parties. Again, one of the components of this peace mission consisted of granting pardon to anyone who was prepared to reconcile with the Catholic Church and the King.56 Under pressure of the imminent arrival of Selles, Don Juan published a general pardon before attacking Gembloux, in order to accomplish the royal orders formally.57 Whoever surrendered without violence would be ‘embraced in clemency’. Don Juan described his and Farnese’s tactics as proceeding ‘con las armas en la una mano, y la clemencia de Vuestra Magestad en la otra publicandola y mostrandola con las óbras’. 58 Parma praised his uncle for this strategically important move, which reinforced the victory at Gembloux. 59 But soon after, the lieutenant Farnese opted for the inverse strategy. The violent attitude towards the garrison of the little town Sichem ensured the capitulation of Diest and Zoutleeuw (Léau), though it gave Farnese deep troubled feelings. Accordingly Farnese gave much more clement concessions to the capitulated garrison in Diest. 60 Van der Essen saw this generous act as the

55 De Schepper 2002, p. 327. 56 Soen (forthcoming in BCRH). 57 Verclaeringhe vande meynunghe des... Heeren Don Johan Van Oistenrycke... al voor ende eer te trecken over die Maeze ende te versuecken den wech van wapenen, Verweckende alle die ondersaeten om hun te bekeeren tot Godt ende Conincklycker Maiesteyt. Met een Ordinantie ende Reghel, hoe het volck van oirloghe syns Maiesteyts hun sullen houden ende reguleren.... , Marche-en-Famenne, 25 January 1578, Luxembourg (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 330). 58 Don Juan to Philip II, 7 February 1578: Archivo General de Simancas, Secretaria de Estado, Negociación de Flandes (henceforth AGS E) 576 f° 16: ‘y assi yremos el Principe y yo adelante con las armas en la una mano, y la clemencia de Vuestra Magestad en la otra publicandola y mostrandola con las óbras, como hasta aqui se ha procurado hazer’. See my forthcoming edition of this letter in BCRH. 59 Alexander Farnese to Philip II, 7 February 1578: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, p. 221 (nr. 341); cf. Van der Essen 1933-1937, I, p. 219. 60 Charles 1965, p. 298.

8 origin of Parma’s determination to pursue ‘une politique de clémence’.61 The experience with the manslaughter in Sichem can have been a trigger to Farnese’s ‘method of clemency’, though there were other more stringent reasons to act so.

The first one was that Philip II urged for clemency when he appointed Alexander Farnese as successor to Don Juan. 62 Philip II insisted so much on clemency that the famous 19 th century state archivist Louis Prosper Gachard claimed that Philip II ‘turned into a mild and understanding King’ in the period of 1578-1581.63 This could be overlapping with Philip’s particularistic considerations during his stay in Portugal 64 , but it was also a reaction to the stubborn politic of Don Juan that had polarized the rebellion. When Cardinal Granvelle arrived in Spain in 1579, the plea for clemency was even reinforced at the Court. Since Alba’s governorship, Granvelle always called for moderation but he often presented this claim under the banner of royal clemency. 65 His opinion was that the ‘humeurs’ of the ‘flamencos’ required a mild policy. Granvelle immediately supported Farnese’s moderation, hoping that he could pacify the conflict. 66 Through the influence of Granvelle, Farnese’s policy had the support of the King and the Consejo Real , but later on, Parma’s connection with the Eboli-faction gradually turned against him at the Spanish Court.67 Farnese’s main competitor for granting pardon was possibly his mother. The idea of sending Margaret of Parma in 1577 was conceived as a means to show clemency towards the Low Countries. Philip was prepared to delegate her the right to pardon so that she could act as a mediator between all parties. Margaret immediately announced this permission to pardon to her contacts in the Low Countries. Finally, Don Juan vetoed this plan by arguing clemency could not come before justice 68 but he could not prevent the peace mission of Selles, who had the permission to promise pardon. When Margaret of Parma finally arrived in the Low Countries to replace her son, she still was seen as the peace dove who would embrace rebels

61 Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, pp. 234-238. 62 Instruction for Farnese, 13 October 1578: AGR Aud 1222/2 fol. 43. 63 Gachard 1852, p. 376: ‘tout à fait revenu de ses anciennes idées sur les Pays-Bas. Qu’il voulait les régir avec douceur, en respectant leurs privileges, en ayant égard à leurs voeux et à leurs besoins, enfin qu’il était franchement, sincèrement résolu à mettre en oubli le passé. Sur un seul point, celui du maintien exclusif de la religion catholique, ses déterminations étaient restées inébranlables’. 64 Parker 2002c, p. 25. 65 Van Durme 1953, pp. 276-280 and p. 292; For the preceeding period: Janssens 2005, pp. 135-156. 66 Van Durme 1953, p. 282. 67 Hortal Muñoz 2004, pp. 90-93. 68 Repetto Alvarez 1972 412-414, Soen (forthcoming BCRH) ; Margaret of Parma to Philip of Croÿ, 19 November 1577: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, p. 123 (nr. 203); Don Juan to Philip II, 30 November 1577: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, pp. 136-138 (nr. 219); Philip II to Margaret of Parma, 23 December 1577: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, p. 168 (nr. 267); Juan de Zuñiga to Margaret of Parma, 27 October 1579: Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, pp. 702-703 (nr. 1224).

9 with mercy and grant them pardon. 69 Between Farnese and his mother, there are no letters conserved concerning the right of pardon, but it almost certainly caused additional tension in the already troublesome relation between them.70 However, not only royal guidelines inspired Farnese to adopt a clement attitude in politics and warfare. His closest collaborators supported mildness in line with their long ‘loyal opposition’ and ‘peace-making’, although most of them were staunch followers of Farnese’s military interventions. The political swift of the letrado and councillor of State Christopher d’Assonleville was exemplary for this evolution. In 1578 he believed in clemency and peace negotiations, because ‘weapons’ did not bring peace. However, already in 1579 he did not oppose to the siege of Maastricht. 71 The loyal Peter-Ernst of Mansfelt had always been a ‘soldier’ opting for military solutions; yet he also argued that the clement settlement with the Walloon provinces was too important to break. 72 After the Treaty of Mons of September 1579, two thirds of the members of the collateral councils were individuals who had experienced royal clemency by getting a pardon for their rebel past. 73 They were keen on suggesting clemency for affiliated rebel noblemen or for cities in which their families had strongholds. Even the political thought of the rebel side stressed the importance of clemency. Several pamphlets called for a ‘virtuous prince’ to replace the ‘Spanish Tyrant’. The pamphlets addressed to the duke of Anjou or even the duke of Leicester called for clemency. 74 Of course, this may have been the convention or a simple reaction to the harsh repression of Alba.

Farnese’s ‘Method of Clemency’ Even if his ‘method of clemency’ consisted of an amalgam of different aspirations of the Spanish Court and the Dutch counsellors, Farnese still had a decisive role in this policy. His

69 Le Retour de la concorde aux Pays Bas par le retour de Madame , 1580, Mons, -8°, 40p. (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 543). 70 De Schepper 2003, p. 130-131. 71 Van der Essen 1953, p. 185 and 196. Christophe d’Assonleville (1528-1607): doctor in laws, council of State (1574), diplomate Cologne peace negotiations (1579), see De Schepper 1972, I, pp. 67-85; Britz 1866. 72 Advis du comte de Mansfeldt sur les articles accordez par les deputez du duc de Parme aux estatz de Arthoys..., 20 June 1579: AGR Aud 581, fol. 298-302. Peter-Ernst of Mansfelt (1517-1604): governeur Luxembourg (1547), loyalist, governor in 1593, See Janssens 2004. 73 De Schepper 2003, p. 132. 74 Lettre contenant leclaircissement des actions et deportement de Monsieur filz et frere de Roy Duc d’Anjou, d’Alençon tant pour le regard des choses qui sont avenues es guerres civiles de la France, comme en ce qui concerne le faict et deffence des pays bas contre les Espagnols , 1578, Rouen (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 360).

10 lenient attitude may have been the result of his care for reputation 75 , but it was also an important political strategy which differed from Alba’s tactics. Farnese achieved this by intentionally exploiting the vocabulary and gestures associated with the virtue of clemency. Moreover he used his ‘method of clemency’ consistently at the political, juridical and military level, which none of his predecessors had done before. That did not imply that he was a peace dove. Farnese did not approve of the Cologne peace negotiations out of fear that they would prevent royal victories in war. 76 He also made perfectly use of the arguments against clemency if Madrid clemency guidelines held the decision to diminish military expenses in the Low Countries. In a letter of the 2 nd of July 1580 for example, Farnese cried out his despair over Philip’s cut-down on the military budget for the Low Countries. Farnese used the arguments against clemency in the same way Alba had done 77 : the rebels had interpreted the royal clemency as signs of weakness and had radicalised their actions. So, Farnese argued, money and soldiers were necessary to win the war. 78 But Farnese only adopted that discourse ‘behind the screens’.

Use of the language of clemency The discourse of clemency served Farnese well to challenge two main conceptions of the rebel political thought. Since the governorship of Alba, the theme of the innate cruelty of the Spanish nation, rather than the myth of the Spanish Inquisition, was a recurrent theme in all pamphlets. 79 But as clemency was the antonym of ‘cruelty’, Farnese’s discourse took distance of Alba’s repression. Moreover, because ‘clemency’ was an innate virtue of the ‘Good King’, Farnese tried to avoid identification with the rebel claim of ‘Spanish tyranny’. It is no surprise that Farnese mostly exploited the discourse of clemency in warfare. His successful military operations brought him great reputation and credibility which prevented that his clemency gave an impression of weakness towards enemies (although Farnese always remained concerned about this). 80 Francesco Fiammelli appraised Alexander Farnese later on for his ‘moderate exploit of the victories’ and his ‘gran benignita’ towards

75 Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, p. 233. 76 Janssens 1993, p. 272, Alexander Farnese to Philip II, 12 April 1579: AGS E 580 f°82, cf. Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, pp. 556-557 (nr. 971). 77 De Waele 1996, pp. 21-25, Soen 2004, pp. 325-328. 78 Alexander Farnese to Philips II, 2 July 1580: AGR Aud 192 fol. 214v, cf. Lefèvre 1940-1960, II, p. 45 (nr. 86). 79 Swart 1975, pp. 36-57. 80 De Waele 1993, pp. 51-60

11 enemies 81 , although some Spanish advisors thought that his clemency in warfare had prevented a rapid overall Spanish victory. 82 Probably the relationship between victoria and clementia dialectically increased in Farnese’s strategy. Especially after 1580, when it was clear that overall peace negotiations failed, Farnese developed propaganda about the reconciliation of cities with the King, in which the discourse of grace and pardon was predominant. So before attacking a (bigger) city, Parma invited it by published letters to surrender under conditions which showed royal clemency. 83 After conquering a city, Farnese stressed again his clement attitude, mostly by referring to his renouncement to execute severe rules of war. In a letter to colonel Christoffel of Mondragon concerning the capitulation of Oudenaarde, Farnese argued that because of the fortifications of the city and their hypocrisy afterwards, he could have chosen for rigor. Instead, he wanted ‘once again’ to show royal clemency. Moreover, keeping cities intact was better for royal dignity and authority. 84 On another occasion, he repeated this view to Philip II as well. 85 Of course, this language of clemency during warfare could only have some effect if it matched similar deeds. According to the ‘laws of war’, Farnese mostly acted clemently. 86 Also as captain-general, Farnese insisted on being clement towards all soldiers, whether or not belonging to the enemy camp. In settling down mutinies in the royal army, he referred to his mercy in explaining his verdicts. 87 The capitulation acts for defeated companies referred to Farnese’s motivation to forsake rigidity (to show doulceur rather than force ). For the most part, the soldiers could leave the city, sometimes even with luggage, ensigns and weapons, as in the following capitulation act for the Dendermonde garrison in August 1584:

‘Son Altèze, ayant veu les articles proposez par le seigneur de Mortaigne, capitaines, officiers et soldatz estans en garnison en la ville de Denremonde, et après quelques communications verbales tenues d’une et d’aultre, désirant monstrer toute doulceur plustost

81 Giovanni Francesco Fiammelli 1606, pp. 116-118. My special thanks to dr. Bruno Boute to consult this volume in the Biblioteca nazionale centrale Vittorio Emanuele II in Rome . 82 Van der Essen 1933-1937, I, p. 104. 83 Alexander Farnese to the rebel cities, 22 May 1585: AGR Aud 1756/2, cf. Lefèvre 1940-1960, III, p. 31 (nr. 70). Cf. note 1. 84 Alexander Farnese to Mondragon, 17/7/1582: AGR Aud 1751/2, cf. Lefèvre 1940-1960, II, p. 318 (nr. 645). 85 Alexander Farnese to Philip II, 26/9/1583: AGR Aud 187 fol. 185, cf. Lefèvre 1940-1960, II, pp. 409-411 (nr. 867). 86 Charles 1965, pp. 299-300. 87 Parker 1973, pp. 38-52.

12 qu’employer sa force, est contente qu’ilz puissent sortir et se retirer librement la part que bon leur semblera, portans, quant à eulx seulement, espées et dagues’ .88

Of course, Farnese’s propaganda during warfare asked for a reaction of the rebel side. A pamphlet of May 1583 tried to denounce Farnese’s and Philip’s ‘soeticheit’ (sweetness, mildness). According to the pamphleteer, Philip tried to hide his own cruelty by invoking God’s mercy. Philip’s clemency was showing off, in reality the King was inclined to war. So the pamphleteer urged the people not to trust the clement words of Farnese. 89

In politics Farnese aimed at the same reputation of clemency. It is striking how the reconciliation treaties of conquered cities consciously refer to Farnese’s clemency as an exponent of Philip’s clemency. The wording of the Ypres reconciliation treaty of the 7th of April 1584 balances carefully between the wide-ranging royal clemency and the clemency of the governor Farnese.

‘Sa Majesté… néantmoins préférant tousjours la clémence à rigueur, ne désire riens plus que de réduire son peuple en bon et seur repos. A raison de quoy Son Altèze, au nom de Sa Majesté, consent et accorde que tous offenses…. leur seront entièrement pardonnez.’ (…) ‘Si seront traictez avecq toute doulceur et clémence, comme Son Altèze a jusques ores usé, conforme à la volunté de Sa Majesté, envers tous ceulx qui se sont renduz à son obéyssance.’90

The reconciliation treaty starts with the commonplace that Philip prefers ‘clemency above rigor’, and therefore Farnese pardons the Ypres citizens in name of his majesty. The text states further that Farnese will treat the citizens with mildness and clemency, just like he had always acted to whom returned in royal obedience, in accordance to royal willpower. Farnese

88 Capitulations accordées par le prince de Parme à la garnison ainsi qu’aux magistrat et bourgeois de la ville de Termonde , 17 August 1584: AGR Aud 591 fol. 94v, cf. BCRH série III (1872) 13, pp. 99- 100 (nr. CCCXXXVII), p. 99. 89 M.P.v.B., Copie des Briefs gesonden door den Coninc van Spanien in dese onse Nederlanden aen den Prince van Parma gheschreven, hem ghebiedende zijn wterste beste te doene met alder neersticheyt ende diligenitie (sic) zijn af ghevallen Landen ende Steden...., wederom te brengen onder die Jurisdixsie van zijn Conincklijcke Mayesteyt hem belovende grote giften ende gaven beminde lesers hier sult ghy des Conincx sin ende meyninge verstaen hoe ende in wat manieren dat hy meent met soeticheyt zijn landen ende steden wederom in te crijgen ende hoe hy naemaels noch denckt met ons te handelen ende te leeven , 10/5/1583, Brussels, -4°, 8 pages (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 664). 90 Traité de réduction de la ville d’Ypre à l’obéissance de Philippe II , 7 April 1584: AGR Aud 591, fol. 99, cf. in: BCRH Série III (1872) 13, pp. 80-82 (nr. CCCXXXII).

13 was turning the royal clemency into a kind of personal propaganda. Similar formulations are found in the reconciliation treaty of Diksmuide and Oudenaarde. ‘Au regard de ceulx de la ville, est contente Sadicte Altèze oublier et pardonner, au nom de Sa Majesté, tout ce que jusques present s’est passé: promectant, en foy de prince, de non recercher ny souffrir este recherché aucun pour quelque cause passée que ce soit.’91

‘Et quand ausdicts du magistrates, bourgeois, manans et inhabitans qui vouldront demeurer, Son Altèze leur pardonne généralement toutes les faultes et offences, quelles qu’elles puissent ester, sans que à l’advenir, à cause d’icelles, personne puist ester pour les choses passes recherché en corps ny en biens. Et seront d’ores en avant traictez par sa Majesté comme d’ung bon, clement et béning prince.’92

Still, these reconciliation treaties were drafted by Farnese’s diplomats, letrados anxious to enhance the power of the governor-general. In the royal ratification of the reconciliation treaties, such as that of Courtrai, the balance shifted again towards the royal power, although there was some formal recognition for Farnese’s influence.: ‘toutesfois veullans plustost user de nostre clémence accoustumée et préférer grace et miséricorde à rigeur de justice, nous avons, à grand, meur advis de conseil et par la deliberation de nostre très-chier et três-amé bon nepveur le prince de Parma et de Plaisance, lieutenant, gouverneur et capitaine général de noz pays de par deçà, pardonné, quicté et remiz, pardonnons, quictons et remettons généralement et particulièrment, par ces pr”sentes, au corps et communaulté de ladicte ville et chastèlenie de Courtray, bourgeois, manans et habitans d’icelle, de quelque sexe, qualité ou condition qu’ilz soient, tous les crimes, offences et excès dessus mentionnez, ensemble toutes peines corporelles, criminèles et excès dessus mentionnez, ensemble toutes peines corporelles, criminnèles et civiles èsquelles à cause de ce ilz sont tombez, les recevant en grace et restituant à leurs bons noms, fame et biens non confisquez (…)’.93

The clemency propaganda of Farnese towards cities did not pass unnoticed. When Lieven Van der Schelden received the commission to orchestrate the Entry of Farnese in Ghent, he recycled the triumph arch used for the Entry of Anjou. Significantly, he changed the old

91 Capitulation accordée par le prince de Parme aux gouverneur, magistrat, gens de guerre et bourgeois de la ville d’Audenarde , 5 July 1582: AGR Aud 591 fol. 37v-39, cf. BCRH Série III 13, pp. 75 -77(nr. CCCXXIX), p. 76. 92 Points et articles accordées par le prince de Parme aux officiers et soldats ainsi qu’aux magistrat, bourgeois, manants et habitants de la ville de Dixmude , 31 July 1583: AGR Aud 591 fol. 46v-47, cf. BCRH série III (1871) 13, pp. 79-80 (nr. CCCXXXI). 93 Royal ratification of the reconciliation treaty of Courtrai , February 1581: BCRH série III , 13 (1871), 65-68 (nr.CCCXXVII), p. 66.

14 fronton into a figure of the clementia principis .94 The devise praised the royal clemency which tempered the ‘arts de la guerre’. The Entry never took place, as Farnese was again on the battlefield to coerce Antwerp. Nonetheless, the preserved aquarel of Lieven Van der Schelden show how the globe and the balance of Justice were prominent in the iconography of clemency (see figure).

At the juridical level too, Farnese avoided acquiring a reputation for being repressive. Farnese faced the same situation as Alba, when he had to bring William of Hornes, lord of Hèze to trial. Hèze had joined again the ranks of the States-General after his reconciliation with the King and therefore, he had overtly committed an act of lèse-majesté . Farnese deliberate kept away from final verdicts in this case, so as not to damage his reputation as a clement governor. First he confined the case to the Council of Artois, before appointing to a special commission to make up the final verdict. The commission consisted of ‘naturels’ (‘Netherlanders’) in order to raise the acceptance of the death sentence, in order not to repeat the scenario of the Egmont and Hornes case. Alexander admitted to his father that he did not want to be associated to the death sentence of that important nobleman.95

Use of the means of clemency: Pardon and ‘oubliance du passé’ Most of all, Parma increased his reputation as a clement governor by granting grace and pardon. After 1585, he even offended the Secret Council by usurping the right of pardon in his name. Alexander Farnese gave pardon at all levels, not hoping to pacify the conflict at once by a ‘general pardon’.96 This related to the overall political strategy for ‘une réconciliation particulière’ 97 , but it is significant that Parma never issued a general pardon for the Low Countries. Granting pardon was to some extent a respond to an existing demand. In the political sphere, the pardon was never a top-down act but a negotiated event.98 For example, the Walloon provinces immediately inserted a clause of pardon in their draft for a reconciliation treaty stating ‘une oubliance perpétuelle des deux costez’. 99 Parma’s envoys answered that the

94 Waterschoot 1984, p. 123; Von Sprang 1999, p. 88. 95 Cf. Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, pp. 292-293. Alexander Farnese to Philip II, 14 June 1580: AGR Aud 192 fol. 194, Lefèvre 1940-1960, II, p. 35-36 (nr. 67). Poinctz et Articles des charges proposées Contre Guillaume de Hornes, Seigneur de Heze. Avecqve La sentence Criminelle, et Capitale sur icelles rendue (gedr. 21 oct) , 21 October 1580, Mons, -8°, 32p. (Knuttel 1890-1920, nr. 548). 96 De Waele 1996, pp. 31-32. 97 Janssens 1993, pp. 251-254; cf. De Waele 2000, p. 121-123. 98 De Waele 2002, p. 69. 99 Bussemaker 1896, p. 472.

15 governor had already spontaneously offered his pardon.100 Michel de Waele even argued that the reconciliation treaties of Farnese could be considered as ‘contrats de fidélité’, in which the reciprocal pardon was crucial. 101 However, Farnese’s pardon was that of a victor and the city had to solicit it. 102 The Ghent magistrate implored Farnese’s pardon in a poem which accompanied a ‘tableau vivant’ for the planned Entry: Le fort caillou sur le dur l'on ne brise/ Mais le posant sur le coussinet mol/ Frappant hardiment, il rompra le dol/ Voyla qui meult ce prince Haulte/ Qui se perdre dans ses dures furis/ Par la douceur doit les mettre à mépris .103 .

All conquered cities received a full pardon for their rebel past. 104 This view was not generally accepted by the King or the royal counsellors. Alexander Farnese asked the King for example to write letters to convince the rebel cities, but Philip sent letters with the word ‘réduction’. Farnese insisted on using the term of reconciliation in diplomacy.105 Nevertheless Farnese also used reduction as synonym for reconciliation 106 , but wisely enough never in the public sphere. Through the reconciliation treaty, the citizens enjoyed of a pardon on an individual level, without formal conditions. To quote the Ypres reconciliation treaty again: ‘All citizens are fully pardoned, without the possibility that they can be pursued later’. 107 Also fugitives who returned had a very high chance to be accepted within the city walls. Those persons had to go through a procedure before the city magistrate and the governor, but their reconciliation letters prove that the governor was very keen on giving pardon. 108 Besides the pardon, their crimes were forgotten because of oubliance du passé . This clause appears much more frequent than in similar documents by Alba, Requesens or Don Juan. It was an intentional move to forget the past and redefine collective memory towards a firm reconciliation. 109 Some reconciliation treaties for bigger cities as Bruges, Gent and Antwerp did not force immediate reconciliation with the Catholic Church of the citizens. That was a big difference with the pardons of Alba, Requesens and Don Juan which were not valid without a

100 Bussemaker 1896, p. 473. 101 De Waele 2000, p. 122. 102 Cf. Cassan 2004, p. 161 and pp. 166-167. 103 Van Sprang 1990, p. 87. 104 Alba for example had forbidden a pardon for the city of Haarlem as a whole: De Waele 2002, p. 65. 105 ‘d’autant qu’ilz ne veuillent entendre d’avoir failly, et que l’on use du mot de réduction’, Alexander Farnese to Philip II, 21 February 1579: AGR Aud 192 fol.135, cf. BCRH Série III (1864) 4, 436-437; De Waele 2002, p. 57. 106 De Waele 2002, p. 57. 107 Traité de réduction de la ville d’Ypre à l’obéissance de Philippe II , 7 April 1584: AGR Aud 591 fol. 99, cf. BCRH Série III , 13 (1871), 80-82 (nr. CCCXXXII). 108 A substantial series of such acts after 1586 is conserved in AGR Aud 2673/2. 109 De Waele 1996, p. 31-32.

16 prior explicit reconciliation with the parish priests. 110 The periods for reconciliation with the Catholic Church were differently defined in each reconciliation treaty. This clause was not present in the first reconciliation treaties, but along the victories the importance increased. It certainly increased the acceptance of the city reconciliations. Nevertheless, those who reconciled individually (noblemen, clerics or returned fugitives) had to prove their ‘catholic faith’. 111 Moreover, when Farnese felt that this ‘reconciliation clause’ was not necessary, he was delighted to leave it out.112

Farnese pursued Don Juan’s politics of giving pardon to rebellious noblemen. Don Juan’s agents had reached the reconciliation of Valentin de Pardieu, lord of La Motte 113 who was the first major rebel to reconcile with the King. His reconciliation with the King was in many views crucial, as he went on to persuade other nobles. Farnese ensured him he could promise royal grace (and a lot of material advantages) to all noblemen who returned into royal obedience.114 Noblemen who declared loyalty got a formal pardon letter, which symbolically reconciled them with their King, in addition to the material restitutions. The fact that serval noblemen wanted to influence both Farnese and Philip in the drafting of this letter, proves that it was very important.115 The ‘reconciliations’ of noblemen with Philip II were mainly centred around the patronage networks of the Artois and Hainaut prominent noblemen. Remarkably until 1579 there were also efforts to reconcile William of Orange during the peace negotiations in Cologne, promising again ‘pardon’. 116 But already in 1572, Orange had become an ‘irreconcilable opponent’ of the Spanish Crown, not only because of his political evolution but also because of the confiscations of his lands and the kidnapping of his son. 117 Also the diplomats in Cologne feared that a reconciliation of Orange could bring financial problems, as

110 Marnef 2004, pp. 49-64. Soen 2005, pp. 355-357. 111 Cf. reconciliation acts in ARA Aud 2673/2. 112 Alexander Farnese to Philip II, 26 September 1583: AGR Aud 187 fol. 185-191 (minute), cf. Lefèvre 1940- 1960, II, pp. 409-411 (nr. 867). 113 Valentin de Pardieu, lord of La Motte (1529-1595): ally of Matthias of Austria (1577), bij staatse leger in Gembloers (1578), reconciliation with Philip II (8/04/1577), see Diegerick 1857. 114 Alexander Farnese to Valentin de Pardieu, 18 October 1578: cf. Bussemaker 1895-1896, II, p.352 (nr. 9). Later on, La Motte tried to have the right to pardon on his own, but Philip was very reluctant to delegate his royal prerogative. Andres de Ayala to Philip II, December 1578: AGS E 578 fol. 102, cf. Bussemaker 1895- 1896, II, 394 (nr. 22). 115 Alexander Farnese to Philip II, 2 July 1580: Lefèvre 1940-1960, II, pp. 45-46 (nr. 87). 116 Van der Essen 1933-1937, II, 268; Swart 2003, pp. 178-179. 117 Duke 2003, p. 20.

17 Spain was unable to pay for Orange’s debts. 118 Soon afterwards, this reconciliation diplomacy towards Orange was abandoned in order to banish him, although Farnese was reluctant to carry out this order.119

Reassessing Farnese’s ‘Method of Clemency’ Farnese undoubtedly played a highly original role within the debate on clemency during the Dutch Revolt. First, Farnese carefully used the language and the means of clemency in order to display himself consciously as a clement captain-general and governor. Secondly, Farnese was conscious that his ‘method of clemency’ could only succeed if he used it consistently at the political, military and juridical level, which none of his predecessors had done before. His consistency of clement attitudes, especially after the defeat of the Cologne peace negotiations 1579, increased his credibility and caused great worries in the rebellious camp. That is a reason why the States of Holland tried to denounce Farnese’s virtues as the behaviour of a Machiavellian prince.120 His military successes made him undoubtedly a representative of firm royal authority, which offered a precondition for a productive pardon. Victoria and clementia were dialectically intertwined in his political strategy. At the same time, as Michel de Waele noticed already, Farnese tried to pacify in a much more moderate way than his predecessors by opting for city and province pardons and personal pardons for nobles or clerics. Hence, he facilitated a personal contact with the sovereign. Accordingly, Farnese extended the simple use of a pardon to oubliance in order to redefine collective memory.

History has strange rules for making or breaking one’s reputation. Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alba, and Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma were both governor-generals in the Low Countries during the Dutch Revolt. In order to pacify this uprising, both ordered cruel city sacks as well as clemency measures for rebels and heretics. But their similar deeds had highly different repercussions: times gone by, Alba turned into the incarnation of cruelty whereas Farnese became the personification of leniency and clemency (at least in the ‘Southern Netherlands’). This different appraisal reflects not only their actual

118 The Duke of Terranova to Philip II, 13 May 1579: AGS E 2244 f° 584, cf. Lefèvre 1940-1960, I, p. 584 (nr. 1011). 119 Van der Essen II, pp. 268-271. 120 Van Gelderen 2002, p. 281 (cf. the paper of Hans Cools in these conference proceedings).

18 accomplishments but also the way they thought about and referred to the virtue of clemency in their political discourses. Alba dreaded the word ‘clemency’. In line with a widespread political commonplace, he feared that showing (too much) clemency would give the impression of weakness and therefore increase the audacity of his opponents. Moreover, he saw his task as governor to set severe examples before the King would return to the Netherlands and then show his royal clemency. Thus, only after trialling political opponents and after a military victory upon William of Orange, the Duke of Alba agreed to issue a ‘general pardon’ for heretics and rebels. In his view this general pardon was a temporary measure, having no implications on his political discourse. On the other hand, Farnese deliberately used the reference to clemency in the military, juridical and political context. He shared the other existing common opinion that clemency, if shown appropriately, would increase the love of vassals towards their King. Thus all reconciliation negotiations between the prince of Parma and rebels thus explicitly mentioned the governor’s clemency. But these references to clemency did not imply that Farnese stayed away from military sieges, committing similar ‘cruel’ sacks as Alba. Both governors thu had different opinions on clemency, both valid according to contemporary political and moral treatises. Their view on clemency not only influenced their deeds, but also the way they justified their actions. Farnese’s copious references to this virtue of clemency, and Alba’s conscious abstinence of it, certainly contributed to their reputation.

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Solimano, G., ‘Per la fortuna del De Clementia nel Cinquecento, La Cleopatra di G.B. Giraldi Cinzio’, Rassegna della Letteratura Italiana, 88 (1984), pp. 399-419.

Waterschoot, Werner, ‘Vorstelijke intochten’, in Het eind van een rebelse droom. Opstellen over het calvinistisch bewind te Gent (1577-1584) en de terugkeer van de stad onder de gehoorzaamheid van de koning van Spanje (17 september 1584) , Johan Decavele, D. Coigneau, Herman Vanderlinden, Werner Waterschoot (Gent, 1984), pp. 113-124.

1988 Davis, Nathalie Zemon, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon tales and their tellers in sixteenth- century France (Cambridge, 1988).

Marin, Maxim, ‘L’influence de Sénèque sur Juste Lipse’, in: A. Gerlo, Juste Lipse (1547- 1606) (Brussels, 1988), pp. 119-126.

1989 Janssens, Gustaaf, Brabant in het verweer. Loyale oppositie tegen Spanje’s bewind in de Nederlanden van Alva tot Farnese 1567-1578 (Kortrijk/Heule, 1989).

1990 Van Sprang, Sabine, ‘Les décors des Joyeuses Entrées Gantoises du XVIe siècle’, Annales d’Histoire de l’Art et d’Archéologie, Publication annuelle de la section d’Histoire de l’Art et d’Archéologie de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles , 12 (1990), pp. 73-89.

1991 Grafton, Anthony, ‘Humanism and political theory’, in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700 , eds. J. H. Burns and Marc Goldie (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 9-65.

1993 Janssens, Gustaaf, ‘Pacification générale ou réconciliation particulière? Problèmes de guerre et de paix aux pays-Bas au début du gouvernement d’Alexandre Farnèse (1578-1579)’, Bulletin de l’Institut historique belge de Rome , 63 (1993), pp. 251-278.

Rochlitz, Sabine, The image of Caesar in Cicero ‘Orationes Caesarianae’, Studies on Clementia and Sapientia Caesaris (Frankfurt am Main, 1993).

Waele, Michel de, ‘Image de force, perception de faiblesse: La clémence d’Henri IV’, Renaissance and Reformation, 17 (1993), pp. 51-60.

1995

22 Parker, Geoffrey, ‘In Defense of The Military Revolution’, in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe , ed. C.J. Rogers (Oxford, 1995), pp. 337-367.

1996 Goosens, Aline, ‘Les grâces et rémissions de peine pour hérésie et transgression des ordonnances accordées par Charles-Qui nt et Philippe II dans les Pays-Bas mériodionaux, 1521-1598’, Cahiers d’histoire, la Revue du Département d’Histoire de l’Université de Montréal , 16 (1996), pp. 8-20.

Parker, Geoffrey The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500- 1800 (Cambridge, 1996) (revised edition).

Waele, Michel de, ‘Clémence, oubliance et pardon en Europe, 1520-1650’, Cahiers d’histoire, la Revue du Département d’Histoire de l’Université de Montréal , 16 ( 1996a , numéro spécial), pp. 5-8.

Waele, Michel de, ‘Un modèle de clémence: Le Duc d’Albe lieutenant-gouverneur des Pays- Bas, 1567-1573’, Cahiers d’histoire. La Revue du Département d’histoire de l’université de Montréal , 16 (1996b), pp.21-32.

1997 Louthan, Howard, The Quest for Compromise: Peacemakers in Counter-reformation Vienna (Cambridge, 1997).

Waxman, Matthew C., ‘Strategic Terror: Philip II and Sixteenth-Century Warfare’, War in History, 4 (1997), pp. 339-347.

Schepper, Hugo de, Cauchies, Jean-Marie, ‘Legal Tools of the Public Power in the Netherlands, 1200-1600’, in: Legislation and Justice , eds. A. Padoa-Schioppa (Clarendon, 1997), pp. 229-268.

1998 Baraz, Daniel, ‘Seneca, Ethics, and the Body: The Treatment of Cruelty in Medieval Thought’, Journal of the History of Ideas , 59 (1998), pp. 195-215

Houdt, Toon van, ‘Justus Lipsius and the Archdukes Albert and Isabella’, M. Laureys (ed), The world of Justus Lipsius: A contribution towards his intellectual biography , ed. Marc Laureys (Rome, 1998), pp. 405-432.

Schepper, Hugo de, ‘Repressie of clementie in de Nederlanden onder Karel V en Filips II’ in Een rijk gerecht: opstellen aangeboden aan P.L. Nève , eds. B. C. M. Jacobs, E. C. Coppens, and P. L. Nève (Nijmegen, 1998) pp. 341-364.

Waele, Michel de, ‘Clémence royale et fidélités françaises à la fin des guerres de Religion’, Historical Reflections/Réflexions historiques , 24 (1998), pp. 231-252.

1999

23 Boone, Marc, ‘Civitas mori potest si authoritate superioris damnetur. Politieke motieven voor het bewust verwoesten van steden (14de-16de eeuw)’, in Verwoesting en wederopbouw van steden van de middeleeuwen tot heden (Brussels, 1999), pp. 339-368.

Christin, Olivier ‘From Repression to Pacification: French Royal Policy in the Face of Protestantism’, in Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands 1555- 1585 , eds. Philip Benedict, Guido Marnef, Henk F. K. Van Nierop, Marc Venard, (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 201-214.

Hoareau-Dodinau, Jacqueline, ‘Les injures au roi dans les lettres de rémission’, in Le pardon , eds. Xavier Rousseaux, Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, Pascal Texier (Limoges, 1999), pp. 223-240.

Hoareau-Dodinau, Jacqueline, Texier, Pascal, ‘Aspects juridiques, institutionnels et culturels du pardon’, in Le pardon , eds. Xavier Rousseaux, Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, Pascal Texier (Limoges, 1999), pp. 11-13.;

Mertens de Wilmars, Elise, Rousseaux, Xavier, ‘ Concurrences du pardon et politiques de la répression dans les Pays-Bas espagnols au 16e siècle. Autour de l’affaire Charlet, 1541’, in Le pardon , eds. Xavier Rousseaux, Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, Pascal Texier (Limoges, 1999), pp. 385-417.

Texier, Pascal, ‘Rémission et évolutions institutionnelles’, in Le pardon , eds. Xavier Rousseaux, Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, Pascal Texier (Limoges, 1999a), pp. 341-352.;

Texier, Pascal, ‘Rigueur du juge et miséricorde du père: le pardon dans l’état moderne’, in Le pardon , eds. Xavier Rousseaux, Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, Pascal Texier (Limoges, 1999b), pp. 14-16.

Vrolijk, Marjan, ‘Les avis au prince des juges locaux sur les lettres de rémission dans les provinces de Flandre, Hollande et Zélande (1531-1567)’, in Le pardon , eds. Xavier Rousseaux, Jacqueline Hoareau-Dodinau, Pascal Texier (Limoges, 1999), pp. 373-384.

Waszink, Jan, ‘Virtuous deception: the Politica and the Wars in the Low Countries and France, 1559-1589’, in Iustus Lipsius. Europae lumen et columen. Proceedings of the International Colloquium Leuven 17-19 September 1997 , eds. Gilbert Tournoy, Jeanine de Landtsheer, Jan Papy, (Leuven, 1999), pp. 248-267.

2000 Janssens, Gustaaf, ‘Cardinal Granvelle and the Revolt in the Netherlands. The evolution of his thought on a desirable political approach to the problem, 1567-1578’, in Les Granvelle et les anciens Pays-Bas. Liber doctori Mauricio Van Durme dedicatus , eds. Krista De Jonge and Gustaaf Janssens (Leuven, 2000), pp. 135-156.

Waele, Michel de, ‘Henri IV, politicien monarchomaque? Les contrats de fidélité entre le roi et les Français’, in Le traité de Vervins , eds. Jean-François Labourdette, Jean-Pierre Poussou, Marie-Catherine Vignal (Paris, 2000), pp. 117-134.

2001

24 Boone, Marc, ‘Le dict mal s’est espandu comme peste fatale. Karel V en Gent, stedelijke identiteit en staatsgeweld’, Handelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent , 55 (2001), pp. 31-63.

Ezquerra Revilla, Ignacio, El consejo real de Castilla bajo Felipe II. Grupos de poder y luchas faccionales (Madrid, 2001).

Motto, Anna Lydia, ‘Seneca on Cruelty’, in Further Essays on Seneca , ed. Anna Lydia Motto (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), pp. 122-126.

2002 Schepper, Hugo de, ‘Los Países Bajos y la Monarquía Hispánica. Intentos de reconciliación hasta la Tregua de los Doce Anos (1574-1609)’, España y las 17 provincias de los Países Bajos. Una revisión historiografica (XVI-XVIII) , eds. Ana Crespo Solana and Manuel Herrero Sánchez (Cordoba, 2002), pp. 325-354.

Waele, Michel de, ‘Entre concorde et intolérance: Alexandre Farnèse et la Pacification des Pays-Bas’, De Michel de L’Hospital à l’édit de Nantes. Politique et religion face aux Eglises , ed. Thierry Wanegfellen (Paris, 2002), pp. 51-70.

Gelderen, Martin van, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590 (Cambridge, 2002).

Papy, Jan, ‘Erasmus’ and Lipsius’ editions of Seneca: A Complementary Project?’, Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook , 22 (2002), pp. 10-36.

Parker, Geoffrey, ‘1567: The End of the Dutch Revolt?’, España y las 17 provincias de los Países Bajos. Una revisión historiografica (XVI-XVIII) , Ana Crespo Solana and Manuel Herrero Sánchez (Cordoba, 2002b), pp. 269-290.

Parker, Geoffrey, ‘David or Goliath? Philip II and his World in the 1580s’, in Empire, War and Faith in Early Modern Europe , ed. Geoffrey Parker (Allen Lane, 2002b), pp. 16-39.

Parker, Geoffrey, ‘The Etiquette of Atrocity: The Laws of War in Early Modern Europe’, in Empire, War and Faith in Early Modern Europe , ed. Geoffrey Parker (Allen Lane, 2002c), pp. 144-168.

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus, De clementia libri duo , ed. Ermanno Malaspina (Alessandria, 2002).

2003 Duke, Alastair C., ‘From ‘Loyal Servant’ tot ‘Irreconcilable Opponent’ of Spain: Koenraad Swart’s Interpretation of William of Orange, 1533-1572’, in Koenraad Walter Swart, William of Orange and the Revolt of the Netherlands 1572-1584 , ed. Henk F. K. Van Nierop, Nicolette Mout, Raymond Fagel (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 8-27.

2003 Papy, Jan, ‘Justus Lipsius über Frieden und Krieg: Humanismus und Neustoizismus zwischen Gelehrtheit und Engagement’, in Suche nach Frieden: politische Ethik in der Fruhen Neuzeit III , eds. Markus Riedenauer and Norbert Brieskorn (Stuttgart, 2003), pp. 155-173

25 Schepper, Hugo de, ‘Le voyage difficile de Marguerite de Parma en Franche-Comté et en Flandre 1580-1583’, in Margherita d’Austria. Costruzioni politiche e diplomazia, tra corte Farnese e Monarchia spagnola , ed. Silvia Mantini (Roma, 2003), pp. 127-140.

Veyne, Paul, Seneca: the Life of a Stoic (New York, 2003).

2004 Hortal Muñoz, José Eloy, El manejo de los asuntos de Flandes, 1585-1598 (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, PhD).

Cassan, Michel, ‘La réduction des villes ligueuses à l’obéissance’, Nouvelle revue du seizième siècle, 22 (2004), pp. 159-174.

2004 Janssens, Gustaaf, ‘Le comte Pierre-Ernest de Mansfeld, loyal serviteur de Charles-Quint et de Philippe II et la guerre aux Pays-Bas. Une esquisse biographique’, Hémecht, Revue d’histoire Luxembourgeoise , 56 (2004), pp. 379-388.

Justus Lipsius, Politica. Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction , ed. Jan Waszink, (Amsterdam, 2004).

Marnef, Guido, ‘Protestant Conversions in an Age of Catholic Reformation: the Case of Sixteenth-Century Antwerp’, in The Low Countries as a crossroads of religious beliefs , eds. Arie-Jan Gelderblom, Jan L. de Jong, and Marc van Vaeck (Leiden, 2004), pp. 49-64.

Soen, Violet, ‘C’estoit comme songe et mocquerie de parler de pardon. Obstructie bij een pacificatiemaatregel (1566-1567)’, Bijdragen en Medelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden , 119 (2004), pp. 309-328.

Vrolijk, Marjan, De Schepper, Hugo, ‘The other face of struggle against violence: Peace or order by clemency in the Netherlands, 1500-1650’, in Janus at the Millennium. Perspectives on Time in the Culture of the Netherlands, eds. T. F. Shannon and J. P. Snapper (Lanham MD., 2004), pp. 279-295.

Schepper, Hugo de, ‘Entre compromis et répression: Inquisition et clémence aux Pays-Bas sous Charles Quint’, Charles Quint face aux réformes. Colloque international organisé par le Centre d’histoire des Réformes et du protestantisme (11e colloque Jean Boisset) , eds. Guy Le Thiec and A. Tallon (Paris, 2005), pp. 159-177.

Vrolijk, Marjan, Recht door gratie. Gratie bij doodslagen en andere delicten in Vlaanderen, Holland en Zeeland (1531-1567) (Hilversum, 2004).

2005 Soen, Violet, ‘De reconciliatie van ‘ketters’ in de zestiende-eeuwse Nederlanden (1520- 1590)’, Trajecta , 14 (2005), pp. 337-362. forthcoming Janssens, Gustaaf, ‘Superexcellat autem misericordia iudicium. The homily of François Richardot on the occasion of the solemn announcement of the General Pardon in the

26 Netherlands (Antwerp, 16 July 1570)’, Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Netherlands. Essays in Honour of Alastair Duke (forthcoming).

Soen, Violet, Geen pardon zonder paus! Studie over de complementariteit van het koninklijk en pauselijk generaal pardon (1570-1574) en inquisiteur-generaal Michael Baius (1560- 1576) (forthcoming as Verhandeling van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten), chapter III-VI.

Soen, Violet, ‘Een vredesgezant worstelt met de Pacificatie van Gent. De vreemde wendingen van de vredesmissie in de Nederlanden van Jan van Noircarmes, baron van Selles (1577- 1580).’ (BCRH)