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Chivalric solidarity or royal supremacy? The symbolic revival of the Order of the Golden Fleece (15661598)

Reference: Thiry Steven.- Chivalric solidarity or royal supremacy? The symbolic revival of the Order of the Golden Fleece (15661598) Dutch crossing : a journal of low countries studies - ISSN 0309-6564 - 43:1(2019), p. 27-46 Full text (Publisher's DOI): https://doi.org/10.1080/03096564.2018.1559505 To cite this reference: https://hdl.handle.net/10067/1566180151162165141

Institutional repository IRUA Chivalric Solidarity or Royal Supremacy? The Symbolic Revival of the Order of the Golden Fleece (1566-1598)

STEVEN THIRY University of / Research Foundation Flanders

Founded in 1430, the Order of the Golden Fleece was perhaps the most iconic dynastic institution in the Low Countries. It bound together a selective group of high nobles, promoting shared values and loyalty, and was an inexhaustible storehouse of political imagery. The seriously disrupted this venerable company. Its officers became estranged, the numbers of knights rapidly declined, and original objectives were questioned. Nevertheless, the Order’s Burgundian heritage and its enduring material memory retained a strong political potential. This article explores how both royalists and dissidents exploited the signs and codes of old to criticize − and even redress − royal policy. As such the (sometimes contradictory) use of the Order’s symbolism ensured the ’ status as ritualistic nerve centre.

KEYWORDS Order of the Golden Fleece, Memory, Ab Aytta, symbolic persistence, Dutch Revolt

Introduction In late November 1565 fourteen knights of the Order of the Golden Fleece gathered in the palace to celebrate the annual feast of their patron saint, St Andrew. Scheduled after the lavish wedding of the son of the Habsburg governess with a Portuguese princess, the assembly attracted many spectators and foreign dignitaries.1 As protocol demanded, solemnities began with a vigil. The knights, parading their golden collars, proceeded towards the court chapel where they took seats according to the date of their admission into the Order. The next day, they again attended Mass in their traditional red garments. A banquet concluded the feast in the grand hall of the palace, which specially for the occasion was decorated with an old tapestry series depicting the biblical story of Gideon – one of the Order’s leitmotifs.2 Despite the festive mood, the event was fraught with tension. After the grand master, King Philip II, had departed for Spain in 1559, some of the companions had criticized royal governance and religious repression. These concerns now surfaced in a speech of Chancellor Viglius ab Aytta,

1 explaining the Golden Fleece’s ‘signs and title’. He asserted that St Andrew and the cross on which the apostle had been martyred were appropriate symbols because the saint’s writings proved the Catholic doctrine of ‘the true body of Our Lord in the Holy Sacrifice of the Altar’.3 The knights present, however, did not unanimously approve this indirect rebuttal of Protestant views on the Eucharist. The Marquis of Bergen, who was in favour of moderating the persecution of heresy, indignantly asked where the chancellor had read such things. Nicolas de Hames, the Order’s king of arms, in his turn accused Viglius of telling ‘a dream’ of the saint.4 This controversy demonstrates that, against the backdrop of the sixteenth-century civil conflict, the Order’s shared imagery could be disputed, as well as become a channel for criticism. As much as its symbolic profile promoted corporate identity, it likewise underpinned opposed aspirations. Rituals and signs embodying a communal sense of purpose prompted alternative meanings but, at the same time, could also accommodate new compromises about an institution’s functioning within changed political circumstances. Since its foundation in 1430, the Order of the Golden Fleece formed an exclusive brotherhood of high nobles. Formal meetings in the shape of so-called chapters and the feasts of St Andrew turned these individual members into a single body with an exalted mission.5 Assembled in chapters, the knights kept each other’s conduct in check – including princely policies − and mutually elected new members. After each chapter, the preservation in public churches of panels with the knights’ armorial bearings embedded their reciprocal bond within the civic society of the Netherlands.6 Yet, the first decades of the Dutch Revolt disrupted the Order’s formal organization: political and religious discontent estranged its officers, caused a critical decline in membership, and cast doubt on the ‘original’ foundations, bringing the noble company on the verge of institutional extinction. After a period of inactivity, Philip II supposedly ‘revived’ it in 1581 as an instrument of royal favour and reward. Historians have long disregarded these kinds of chivalric fraternities because of their ostentation and exclusivity. Recent scholarship, nevertheless, has revealed the rational objectives that motivated them, and highlighted the late medieval rites of, among others, the Golden Fleece as a mainstay of princely state formation.7 The operation of such orders of knighthood within patronage networks and governmental structures also served noble interests. It provided a channel for influencing decisions and made the representation of princely authority dependent on the recognition of family pretences.8 Furthermore, new associations were introduced when older bonds lost their appeal. For instance, in 1578 King Henry III founded a new ‘Order of the Holy Spirit’ to reconcile Catholic nobles with the French crown during the religious wars, compensating the reduced prestige of the older Order of St Michael.9

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For the early modern period, it is often presumed that an introspective, high-aristocratic logic thereby gradually evolved into individual distinctions.10 In this article, on the contrary, I will argue that such group dynamics extended beyond noble membership. In particular, the symbolic features of the Golden Fleece in the second half of the sixteenth century were reminders of the political agreement between the ruler and high nobles, who were in their turn agents of local bonds and rights. As such, the commemorative function of symbolism still perpetuated a corporate and constitutional ideal, even in times of institutional decline. As an archetypal model of a chivalric society, the Burgundian Golden Fleece did not escape the revisionary trend, and has been interpreted from the vantage point of territorial unification, social disciplining,11 and (dynastic) conflict management.12 This contrasts sharply with the limited attention paid to the period after the (last) chapter of 1559. Gert Melville, among others, claimed that the once vital ritual life disappeared under the ‘absolute monarchy’.13 Others make it a textbook example of a fraternity turning into a mere dignity that was integrated into the Spanish honours system.14 Recently, however, Violet Soen has pointed out the Order’s instrumentality in the wider context of the Dutch Revolt. Its prestigious membership status still impelled discontented nobles to act as mediators between opposite parties and to directly present their grievances to the king. But, royal intransigence would soon silence this collective forum by punishing noble initiatives after the protest of 1566.15 One could ask whether Viglius’ controversial sermon already foreshadowed the Order’s failure as a political forum in the Low Countries, and whether the its subsequent revival was nothing more than a shrewd manoeuvre of Philip II. However, a different picture appears when one focuses on the multifaceted legacy of the Golden Fleece during the Revolt. Both local initiatives and the subsequent ritual reception of new nominees in the demonstrate that the ‘corporate’ function was preserved, cherished and exploited to curb political discontent. By referring to former traditions and symbolic remnants, moderate stakeholders stressed the mutual obligation of prince and elite to maintain the integrity of the Netherlandish provinces. They advocated a ‘Burgundian’ reinterpretation of the Order’s mission that dovetailed with public memories construed around its widespread heritage. Although no ‘Burgundian’ chapter would ever be celebrated again, the corporate memory of former meetings toned down the notion of royal favour, recasting the Order’s foundation as a constitutional agreement. That is why the former traces of chivalric solidarity facilitated an institutional reinvention in the original heartland despite a formal standstill. It explains why the noble company retained its political relevance in the and continued to nurture the public representation of

3 rule, even after the Cession of the Netherlands in 1598 disconnected the Burgundian patrimony from the grand master.16

Institutional Breakdown? In January 1430, Duke Philip the Good instituted the Order of the Golden Fleece on the occasion of his marriage with Isabella of Portugal. This foundation had not been a spur-of-the-moment decision. The gradual introduction of ritual procedures tested the institution’s capacity to foster princely loyalty, while a set of statutes specified the duties of its companions. Adopted as late as December 1431, the statutes saw a number of revisions in the following decades. At first, the duke planned for a solemn assembly or chapter of the knights to take place every three years in either the duchy of Burgundy or the county of Flanders to coordinate noble behaviour and fill vacant places. Yet, Philip the Good soon abandoned his plan for irregularly timed assemblies that kept pace with the expansion of the Burgundian state. Moreover, as early as 1433, he raised the number of admitted knights from twenty-four to thirty. In the reign of Charles V (1506- 1555), the available places were to increase further to fifty-one, the ‘Head and Sovereign’ included.17 At the same time, the geographical scope of recruitment widened. Still, families with possessions in the former Burgundian lands remained dominantly represented. Of the twenty-eight knights elected in the last chapters of 1556 and 1559, over half still had a ‘Netherlandish’ connection.18 Recent studies have unmasked such seemingly rigid organizations as, in fact, a combination of flexible practices. Their continuity and structure existed through a changing web of ceremonial gestures, metaphors and signs.19 In a lucid article on its medieval outlook, Gert Melville has argued that the Order’s formal membership and the mystical aura created through rites and symbols were not opposites. On the contrary, chivalric display and the public festivities accompanying the chapters transformed a loose group of individuals into a single corporation that endorsed the same values, and promoted these ideals to the outside world.20 On a more daily basis, symbols and images also exemplified the Order’s communal existence. Most visible was the golden collar with the fleece pendant. The statutes required the companions to wear it all the time as token of the affection that existed between the knights (after 1516, they were allowed to suspend the pendant on a silk ribbon). Because these ornaments remained property of the Order, they perpetuated the virtuousness of past generations of knights in newly elected members.21 The collar’s chain consisted of links in the shape of firesteels and flints (fusils) − Philip the Good’s personal device − and thus equated the Order’s zeal with the ducal ambitions.22 The same marks adorned the ceremonial robes worn

4 during chapters. Instead of structuring a hierarchy, these symbolic expressions enacted an egalitarian body of peers that supported their sovereign. Up to the , the knights were even formally enlisted as extraordinary members of the Low Countries’ Council of State and, in that capacity, could be consulted collectively on important political issues.23 The outbreak of the Revolt would thwart the manifestation of this supportive body of likeminded confreres. Growing religious unrest had already prompted Philip II to once more modify the statutes during the 1559 Ghent chapter. Henceforth no ‘sectarian or someone suspect of heresy’ could be elected. The knights, as well as the officers, were encouraged to defend the constitution of the Holy Church among their own vassals and tenants. In fact, in the face of growing unrest, the governess of the Netherlands, Margaret of , still called on them to address the problems she was confronted with. Violet Soen has drawn our attention to special meetings that she convened in early 1565 and again during the troubled events of 1566, where the knights deliberated on the moderation of religious repression and possible concessions to appease dissent.24 These commitments could not prevent some members of the Order openly disagreeing with royal policy and criticizing their loss of political influence after Philip’s departure for Spain.25 At the same time, precisely because of their participation in the political discussion, rumours began to circulate that some knights also actively objected against religious persecutions.26 Although largely unfounded, it did reflect an (indirect) involvement of some of the Order’s associates in the public protest against royal intransigence. In December 1565, a number of lesser nobles gathered in the house of Nicolas de Hames, the Order’s king of arms who had Protestant sympathies, to discuss the erection of a ‘ligue et confederation’ against the so-called − the famous ‘Compromise of Nobles’ − and drafted a petition with complaints addressed to Governess .27 Subsequently, de Hames toured the Low Countries with this petition, using his credentials as an officer of the Fleece to recruit signatories.28 On 24 August 1566, in the heat of the Iconoclastic Fury, he arrived in Antwerp where he proclaimed that Reformed sermons were henceforth allowed in the Nyeuwstadt quarter, giving the impression that ‘some lords of the Order were doing the same’.29 Though Margaret of Parma certainly realized the danger that a dissident officer posed for royal authority, she was confronted with a recurring obstacle: according to the statutes, only the sovereign together with the confreres in a chapter could impose a punishment. The problem solved itself when de Hames left for Germany, resigned and finally perished in the service of the rebel troops.30

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Although dissociating themselves from the protest of the lesser nobility, the knights did refer to the obligations symbolized in their corporate ensigns to claim a role as political mediator.31 In April 1566, the Count of Hornes and the Prince of Orange even threatened to return their collars in a bid to enforce the dynastic imperative of their political involvement, though the statutes proved unsupportive of such an act at the end of the day. Acting as such, they projected the deliberations that had characterized former chapters onto daily politics.32 Ironically, this adherence to group loyalty, forced upon Philip II in his capacity as both sovereign and confrere, were the very thing that discredited high noble behaviour in the king’s eyes. Knights later accused of supporting the insurgents fell back on the same argument of solidarity, albeit in vain.33 The outcome is well known: the Counts of Egmont and Hornes, both arrested in September 1567 by the king’s new governor, the Duke of Alba, asserted that only the grand master ánd an assembly of the Order could − ‘in all sovereignty’ – act against confreres accused of ‘bad behaviour’.34 The Count of Hoogstraten and the Baron of Montigny, both tried in absentia for treason by Alba’s , also invoked their privileges as knights of the Golden Fleece to denounce the legal proceedings. Group identity, as supported by ancient text and tradition, had to support their case.35 Despite their appeals, Egmont and Hornes were publicly beheaded in June 1568. The extraordinary trials affected the ideal of unity. Most other companions in the Netherlands disapproved of the executions and reminded the king of his statutory restrictions.36 One account imagined how three other knights of the Fleece were charged with removing the collars of the accused in prison on the eve of the execution − a task which they did, as the author stressed, with sad faces.37 Although such a visit probably never took place as the convicts had not been officially excluded from the Order, the anecdote does suggest the overt disapproval of the other companions. They were, however, too divided in opinion to make a stand as a single body.

Burgundy’s Finest Apparel The convicts’ defence implied that Philip and Alba broke their own oath by sidestepping the corporate prerogatives of the Golden Fleece. Historians have mostly followed this line of reasoning, suggesting that the trials trampled the Order’s privileges as incompatible with Philips II’s own view of centralized rule. This is not completely justified. Efforts were made to reconcile the unprecedented trials with tradition, thereby respecting the Order’s dignity. Alba advised Philip to first deprive the accused of their collar in a meeting of Spanish knights. The king properly replied that this was impossible since the statutes required the approval of at least six companions, ‘which we do not have over here’.38 Alba then used his mandate as eldest

6 knight representing his sovereign to convict Egmont and Hornes without a formal degradation. He instructed Chancellor Viglius to search for legal precedents, and the latter discovered that the turbulent chapters of 1468, 1473 and 1481 had only ousted treacherous aristocrats for matters touching their ‘honour’. Actual deeds of treason had to be punished by princely dictate alone.39 Alba then presented this evidence before a meeting of the Netherlandish knights. It is therefore unlikely that any formal degradation took place before the execution of Egmont and Hornes. Similarly, the king allowed the convicted Baron of Montigny to keep wearing his chivalric insignia before having him secretly strangled.40 No official exclusion of the Prince of Orange, who fled to his German possessions, followed. When Alba discussed the removal of their arms from the churches of past chapters, he concluded that this could not be done without the consent of such an assembly.41 Not the privileges of the knights, but the extent of the Order’s corporate jurisdiction was questioned. Despite royal sensitivity to tradition, the executions of 1568 had a detrimental impact. The institution rapidly disintegrated: the following fifteen years, no new officers and only one new knight were appointed. The membership list paints an even more dramatic picture. Between the Ghent chapter of 1559 and 1573, no less than twenty-nine companions died (the Prince of Orange counted as repudiated). Most living members of the ‘Burgundian’ fraternity now resided abroad. No more than three and a half knights were left in the original heartland − the Count of Mansfeld was considered a naturalized German. With the death of the treasurer Charles de Tisnacq in April 1573, only Chancellor Viglius still represented the Order’s institutional interests.42 Royal instructions praised the remaining knights for their loyalty, yet their political influence as an advisory body was curtailed.43 Did the breakdown mean that the once so prominent institution lost all political relevance? Not really: its ideals were not lost from sight. Symbolic artefacts and the memory of past chapters allowed for a perpetuation and rethinking of its dynastic mission. Although interpretations varied, the fifteenth-century legacy encouraged an organizational reinvention that was not only driven by royal initiative. Once the storm subsided, the remaining nobles and Chancellor Viglius petitioned the king about the deplorable state of the fraternity. Viglius, a jurist and humanist of Frisian origin who had made a spectacular career in the Habsburg administration, became the driving force behind a revival. His loyalty to the Habsburg cause was unquestioned. During the troubles of the mid-1560s, he had supported Margaret of Parma and had admonished the high nobles for their discontent.44 As a historian and archivist, he attached great importance to the preservation of original documents and memorabilia, which

7 explains his role in historically justifying the indictment of Golden Fleece knights.45 Yet, at the same time, Viglius advocated a moderate critique of royal policy. This critique informed his historical reading of the Order’s symbolism. For him, the solution to political discord was a return to the polity’s dynastic roots. In this, the Order had to play an important role. Because the Golden Fleece ranked as ‘the finest apparel [parement] of the house of Burgundy’, it constituted a great source of reputation for both the sovereign and the elite. Harmony among the knights, embodied in trappings and traditions, reflected the concord of the Burgundian state at large. Therefore, Philip II – as both titular ‘Duke of Burgundy’ and confrere − could restore such concord by respecting the authentic Netherlandish heritage of the fraternity.46 Viglius’s proposed return to the fifteenth century actually boiled down to a historical revision, which he pursued in both speech and action. His controversial sermon of 1565 had already explicated the motives behind the late medieval foundation by means of a symbolic analysis. Orations on the external signs of chivalry had been, in fact, a fixed ingredient of chapters and the feasts of St Andrew.47 But Viglius departed from tradition in several respects. First, he dismissed the multiple allegorical associations, focusing instead on the founder’s intentions. The original fleece, so he claimed, was that which the Theban prince Phrixus had brought to Colchis, and which Jason and his band of heroes later reconquered.48 This ancient myth had inspired Duke Philip the Good because of the protagonists’ ‘antiquity, bravery and virtue’, values which had to be instilled into those wearing the fleece. Second, Viglius renounced the then popular explanation that the Order had been created to counter the Turkish threat. Instead, he asserted that Philip the Good had specifically aimed at the expansion and unification of his Burgundian lands; a venture for which the cooperation of his noble confreres had been crucial. The affection existing between the duke’s successors and generations of knights had always safeguarded the public good and, together, they turned the Netherlands into the ‘most rich and renowned [lands] of ’.49 In a later oration, dated after 1566, Viglius applied his ‘Burgundian’ reading to the famous collar. Consisting of interlaced firesteels, it symbolized the cohesion between the knights as the solid ‘rock’ upon which the entire Burgundian edifice rested. On the one hand, the collar encouraged the princely loyalty of noblemen. On the other hand, it exemplified the royal duty to accept noble support in ensuring the welfare of the dynastic patrimony. Philip II could thus restore the integrity of the Netherlands by conserving and perpetuating the privileged fraternity. Only then would he emulate the ‘vraye thoison d’or’.50 Letting the Order disintegrate broke the king’s oath and would ruin the ‘house of Burgundy’.51 Once the commotion passed, petitions sent to the king outlined the steps to be taken. The organizational structure first needed to be

8 restored within the fold of the administration of the Low Countries. New officers were to be recruited among councillors with a native background and moderate opinion.52 Thereafter, a new ‘general’ chapter had to take place as originally instituted. It was preferably to be presided over by Philip II in person or by a suitable commissioner of royal blood. The remaining companions could then restore unity by conceding new collars while a retrospective proces d’honneur would pacify frayed relations.53 Viglius’s historical motivation went beyond words: in the early 1570s, he repeatedly counselled the king on the practical necessities of a chapter. An appropriate venue had to be found, with a choir large enough to accommodate a series of armorial tableaux, which was a sensitive choice in the tense atmosphere. Moreover, few men remembered how to stage such rites, nor did the historical records provide much support.54 Nicolaus Grudius (aka Nicolaus Nicolai), the registrar responsible for the Order’s archive, had run off to Venice in 1561 after embezzling tax revenues from Brabant.55 Chancellor Viglius, himself an old schoolmate of Grudius, managed to recover various papers that the corrupt officer had taken along. Yet, the registers of the most recent chapters turned out to be incomplete.56 Another batch of documents had passed into the hands of Alba’s administration, compromising the Order’s secrecy.57 It took Viglius and his servants more than a year to reconstruct the archive with relevant bits of information.58 The care with which they handled these documents reinforced the demand that only an assembly in the Netherlands could do justice to tradition. Therefore, the chancellor also committed himself to preserving the material proof of group identity. In 1571, in consultation with the remaining knights, he commissioned fourteen panels depicting the martyrdom of St Andrew to adorn the stalls of the 1559 meeting in the Ghent church of St Bavo.59 These paintings were installed jointly with the older armorial panels. The tableaux of the 1445 chapter celebrated there, which had already received a ‘restoration’ seven years earlier, were again restored at his expenses.60

An Instrument of Empire In short, the loyalist group surrounding the chancellor aimed to recreate the ‘Burgundian’ foundations of the endangered Order. Its fifteenth-century origins revealed a horizontal body of equals rooted in the constitution of the Low Countries and serving the public weal in dialogue with the grand master. Therefore, it was thought the mutual obligations embodied in the heirlooms would be able to salvage a rule based on noble consultation. Most urgent for them was the organization of a new chapter that would reinscribe the ideals in their original, public context. The radicalization of the conflict left these plans hanging. Up to the late 1570s,

9 moderate councillors promoted such a recovery as part of a general pacification of the Netherlands, but no concrete measures were taken. Philip II assured them that ‘his affection’ for the fraternity was as great as ever and admitted that its old dynastic esteem could be instrumental in winning fickle nobles over to the royal cause.61 In reality, a conventional revival seemed unrealistic to him. The Madrid administration therefore tested some alternatives. One idea voiced as early as 1568 was to erect a new, more inclusive order of knighthood for trusted supporters, equally dedicated to St Andrew and using the (yields of) confiscated goods of rebels as emoluments. The plan was never pursued.62 Later on, the king considered the establishment of a chivalric association dedicated to another apostle, St Philip – Philip II’s namesake – with no fewer than seventy vacant places for knights, but this did not materialize either.63 Given its historical record, the royal administration still considered the Golden Fleece as a useful, political tool. After all, its field of recruitment comprised both loyal and ‘disobedient’ regions, while the Burgundian character sidestepped the discredited policy of recent years. In theory, however, only a chapter could induct new members. Philip II did acknowledge his personal incapacity in this matter. In October 1577 he secretly approached the pope and obtained a papal brief which authorized him to elect new knights for the vacant seats outside of a chapter.64 Three years later, when taking possession of Portugal, the king finally decided to resurrect the ‘honourable compagnie’, which – as he admitted – was ‘reduced to little’.65 From May 1581 onwards, he filled all vacant offices. The experienced councillor Christophe d’Assonleville, who had assisted the late Viglius in classifying the Order’s papers, became the new treasurer in Brussels, and the administrator François le Vasseur was singled out as titular registrar.66 So much for Philip’s attempt to meet the previous recommendations. In tandem, however, he created a substitute registrar at his side in Spain and promoted Jean Fonck, a member of the Spanish Council of State, to the post of chancellor. Residency at the Spanish court would be a requirement for all of this latter’s successors to that office, thus entrusting the actual business of the Order to the Spanish bureaucracy.67 This prospect of arbitrary nominations was not favourably received in the Netherlands.68 The decision neglected the corporate character along with the historical connection to the Low Countries’ urban scene as defended by Viglius and his friends. When the brand-new treasurer objected that these novelties contradicted the statutes, one of Philip II’s advisors replied that ‘this is precisely the intention of his majesty’.69 In a solemnity staged on the feast day of St Philip (3 May 1581), the king personally inducted the Portuguese Duke of Braganza as the first nomination irrespective of the prior approval of the companions.70 The following years saw a growing interest in the Golden Fleece at the Spanish court. Philip bestowed a series of collars

10 behind closed doors, and whereas past chapters had emphasized horizontal solidarity, these appointments now turned the monarch into the sole source of honour. A list of individual beneficiaries replaced the cyclic sense of knightly adoption.71 Despite this royal takeover, the Burgundian vision did not lose its appeal in the war-torn Netherlands. After royal troops conquered the rebel strongholds, the Order’s corporate memory became one of the means to reconcile with dynastic authority. Local actors accordingly ‘reinvented’ their own view of the Order, interpreting royal instructions in a way that asserted group obligations and a sense of local attachment. Though Chancellor Viglius had died in the meantime, in his wake councillors and nobles drew on the echoes of the Burgundian glory days to promote a contractual affection between king, aristocracy and community. Meanwhile, the widow of the late treasurer had hidden the treasure of the Order, with its collars, robes and books, out of fear that it might fall into the hands of the rebels. The new officers in the Netherlands now recuperated these objects and continued Viglius’s reconstruction of the archive.72 Even former dissidents were able to find a measure of agreement through these Burgundian mementos. Such adjustments appear in the public reception of nominations that Philip II undertook to reconcile the high nobility with the royal cause. One example is the investiture of Governor Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, with the collar on 11 August 1585, in reward for his military successes. Farnese’s candidacy had already been announced in 1581, but due to the war the induction itself was postponed. It finally occurred before the besieged city of Antwerp. First, the prince was knighted behind closed doors, after which he proceeded underneath improvised arches to the fortification of Saint Philip. There, the Count of Mansfelt, the most senior knight standing proxy for Philip II, placed the collar around Farnese’s neck.73 The act visually linked the Order’s revival to the return of royal authority: six days later, Antwerp surrendered. When during the subsequent entry on 27 August a young virgin offered him the keys to the city, Farnese attached them to his brand new collar. This gesture counted as a humbling act of submission. Yet, as Margit Thøfner has argued, the historical unity symbolized by the collar also evoked a dynastic authority based on respect for civic rights (which formed the main theme of the entry’s decorations).74 The city of Ghent cast the Golden Fleece in a similar light when preparing an entry for Farnese after having surrendered in September 1584. The actual ceremony never occurred due to the war, but sometime in 1586, the painter who had been in charge of designing the entry presented the city fathers with drawings of what the decorations should have looked like.75 One of these depicts an arch dedicated to Consocatio or ‘Solidarity’ – in the sense of a contractual

11 political association that sustained civil life. The arch prominently featured the (royal?) figure of a Golden Fleece knight alongside Burgundian crosses, firesteels and clear allusions to the Fleece. The choice of these signs extended the dynastic covenant between the knights to the need of a wider communal consent.76 As conclusion to the projected entry, another arch portrayed Farnese as a knight of the Order, dressed in the traditional robes only used at solemn assemblies. Such portrayal is surprising given that the entry was planned to take place before the prince’s investiture. Presumably, this image was designed to remind of the solidarity of the chapters of old − two of which had taken place in Ghent − imploring the return to a more harmonious situation of yore. Similar assumptions seem to have surrounded the material memories of former chapters that had survived successive waves of iconoclasm.77 As part of the reconciliation, several heraldic ensembles of the Golden Fleece in churches that had hosted previous assemblies were again restored in the 1580s.78

The ‘Holy Order of the Fleece’ The existence of such public memorials proved the centrality of the Netherlands for the Order’s communal existence. It explains why the knights in these lands again made public appearances as a group from the late sixteenth century onwards. Their corporate life contrasts with the more secluded and irregular observance of Golden Fleece ceremonial at the Spanish court.79 The Burgundian origins justified the organization of solemnities such as the feast of St Andrew, independent from the actual grand master.80 This semi-autonomous functioning of the Netherlandish knights as an interest group also accounts for the continuing influence of the Brussels court in new royal nominations after the Habsburg Netherlands became more independent from Madrid with the cession of sovereignty to the archdukes in 1598.81 For all these efforts at ‘reparation’ and ‘restoration’, the result was not a simple return to the fifteenth century. Nor did it realize the Burgundian programme proposed in the 1570s. As much as the royal revival redefined the Order, the local recovery of fleece imagery also ‘reinvented’ its collective mission. While still stressing mutual obligations, a militant Catholicism now began to infiltrate, as can be inferred from the way in which the nominations from Madrid were received and framed. Group identity took on a more solid shape when Philip II singled out no less than eight noblemen for their support of the royal cause in the Netherlands or for recently changing sides. Again, the investiture was carefully timed. On 27 April 1586, only months after the city’s reconciliation, Farnese handed the collar to six of them in the Brussels palace: the Marquis of Varambon and the Counts of East-Frisia, Arenberg, Berlaymont, Lalaing and Egmont (the son

12 of the convicted count).82 After these novices had sworn their oath and embraces were exchanged, they walked with the two remaining senior knights, the officers present and a group of courtiers in a public procession from the palace to the collegial church of St Gudula. What followed came close to the atmosphere of former chapters. The urban sanctuary was once more decorated with the old Gideon tapestries, which had been a fixed feature of the original meetings since the mid-fifteenth century. Moreover, the preserved armorial series in the church’s choir would have invoked the memory of the gatherings celebrated at the same location in 1435 and 1516.83 During Mass, the knights once again took their seats in the order of their appointment, after which the officiant addressed them with an oration.84 Invoking the ‘original’ mission once more, he drew a direct connection between recent events and the original foundation. The period in between, as the sermon stated, had seen ‘no alteration, change or reduction of [the Order’s] authority and excellence’. It thus ignored the institutional breakdown after the trials of 1568, the defections, and the revival through royal initiative. The officiant then again used the metaphor of the collar to hammer home the necessity of chivalric solidarity. It recalled that the members were joined into one body, as if by a ‘sacrament’. Underneath this surface of continuity, a different meaning nevertheless prevailed. In contrast to former interpretations, the 1586 sermon rejected the adventures of Jason as a fantasy. The true background of the – in its words – ‘Holy Order of the Golden Fleece’ was solely to be found in that other Burgundian patron: the Biblical Gideon, opponent of heresy. This was the only ‘vraÿe histoire’ of the Order.85 Duke Philip the Good had founded the brotherhood in his image to protect the ‘only true and pure … Catholic religion’ in times of ‘civil war’ and heresy. Firesteel and flames blazing from the knights’ collar exemplified Gideon’s ardent devotion, as well as God’s rage against heresy and enemies of the state. The new companions, whose chests were now adorned with this collar, were expected to do the same.86 Fleece and firesteel enjoined them to be guiding lights in those troubled times.

Conclusion After almost thirty years of apparent stagnation, the Brussels investiture presented a ceremonial watershed; not only for the favoured aristocrats, but also for the reconciled community at large. Looking at only formal membership or royal directives does not suffice to assess the Golden Fleece’s political relevance during the Dutch Revolt. Not only did the ritual of chapters and the ideologies expressed in tangible signs support the dynastic affection of the group, their public character disseminated the ideals of loyalty and noble influence on a much larger scale.

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Firesteel, fleece and the memory of chapters could therefore be instrumentalized outside of the restricted company. Seeing them as representations of a consultative model of rule, different stakeholders drew on the symbolic legacy of the Golden Fleece to stress the unique position of the former Burgundian Netherlands in the Habsburg patrimony. This case demonstrates that the study of such elite associations as orders of knighthood can shed new light on the socio-political dynamics of conflicts. They should thus not be approached from the isolated perspective of aristocratic favours, nor dismissed for their exclusivity. The fleeting allusions in which they are shrouded often say more about their functions than statutes or formal membership. Hence, a more complex picture arises than just the failure of an initiative on the part of the higher nobility. Admittedly, ritual and signs became the subject of disputes, contested significations and were ascribed different values. Yet, the persistence of these symbolic forms, even in times of institutional decline, made it possible to overcome a breakdown of membership and purpose. Their adaptive capacities safeguarded the group dynamic of the Order within the context of the Low Countries. For the remaining knights and moderate councillors such as Viglius, as well as for civic stakeholders, the fifteenth-century rites and traditions bore witness to the importance of noble solidarity in preserving the public good. King Philip II’s duties as grandmaster obliged him to honour a harmonious form of rule that came along with this corporate integrity. When the king revived the Golden Fleece in 1581 as a Spanish-based, courtly mechanism of royal patronage, this political ideal was not discarded in the Netherlands. The recuperation of the relics and regulations of old enabled the companions to retain a communal life, independent of the sovereign. They paired the reinterpretation of the Burgundian affinity between the confreres with a new sense of Catholic orthodoxy. In other words, the public dimension of the Burgundian legacy facilitated an institutional reinvention. It made a strong claim for the continued prominence of what had once been the focal point of this valiant company.

Notes

1 Giuseppe Bertini. Le nozze di Alessandro Farnese: feste alle corti di Lisbona e Bruxelles. Milan: Skira, 1997; Auguste Castan. Les noces d’Alexandre Farnèse et de Marie de Portugal. Narration faite au cardinal de Granvelle par son cousin germain Pierre Bordey. Brussels: F. Hayez, 1888. 2 Francisco de Marchi. Narratione particolare del capitan Francesco de’ Marchi da Bologna, delle gran feste, e trionfi fatti in Portogallo, et in Fiandra nello sposalitio dell’illustrissimo sig. Alessandro Farnese e la serenissima donna Maria di Portogallo. Bologna: appresso Alessandro Benacci, 1566. 3 Brussels, Algemeen Rijksarchief (hereafter: ARA), Handschriftenverzameling (hereafter: Hs), 273B, fol. 167r−v: sermon of Viglius at the 1565 feast of St Andrew (copy).

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4 Alphonse Wauters, ed. Mémoires de Viglius et d’Hopperus sur le commencement des troubles des Pays-Bas avec notices et annotations. Brussels: La Société de l’Histoire de Belgique, 1858, 179−81; Pontus Heuterus. Opera historica omnia, burgundica, austriaca, belgica. Leuven: Judocus Coppens, 1651, 394−6; Edzo Hendrik Waterbolk. “Viglius van Aytta, steunpilaar van het geheugen.” In Beleid en bestuur in de oude Nederlanden. Liber amicorum prof. dr. M. Baelde, edited by Hugo Soly and René Vermeir. Ghent: Vakgroep Nieuwe Geschiedenis Universiteit Gent, 1993, 502−4. 5 Gert Melville. “Rituelle Ostentation und pragmatische Inquisition. Zur Institutionalität des Ordens vom Goldenen Vliess.” In Im Spannungsveld von Recht und Ritual. Soziale Kommunikation im Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit, edited by Heinz Duchhardt and Gert Melville. Cologne: Böhlau-Verlag, 1997, 215−71. 6 Sonja Dünnebeil. “Innen und Außen. Die Feste des Ordens vom Goldenen Vlies unter den Herzögen von Burgund.” In Virtuelle Räume. Raumwahrnehmung und Raumvorstellung im Mittelalter, edited by Elisabeth Vavra. Berlin: Akademie Verlag GmbH, 2005, 239−57; Christiane Van den Bergen-Pantens. “Chapitres de la Toison d’or au XVe siècle. Souvenirs de quelques ensembles héraldiques peints dans les Pays-Bas bourguignons.” In L’ordre de la Toison d’or, de Philippe le Bon à Philippe le Beau (1430-1505): idéal ou reflet d’une société?, edited by Pierre Cockshaw and Christiane Van den Bergen-Pantens. Brepols: Turnhout, 1996, 223−5. See also the article of Anne-Laure van Bruaene in this volume. 7 Cf. Jacques Paviot. “Les ordres de chevalerie à la fin du Moyen Âge.” Bulletin de la Société Nationale des Antiquaires de France 2001 (2006), 195−205; Antti Matikkala. The Orders of Knighthood and the Formation of the British Honours System 1660-1760. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008. 8 Laurent Bourquin. “Les fidèles des Guises parmi les chevaliers de l’Ordre de Saint-Michel sous les derniers Valois.” In Le mécénat et l’influence des Guises. Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 1997, 95−112. 9 Jacqueline Boucher. “L’ordre du Saint-Esprit dans la pensée politique et religieuse de Henri III.” Cahiers d’histoire 18 (1973), 129−42; Nicolas le Roux. La faveur du roi. Mignons et courtisans au temps des derniers Valois (vers 1547 – vers 1589). Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2000, 201−4. 10 Mattikala, Orders of Knighthood. 11 Bernhard Sterchi. “Rendre compte de leur honneur. Der Einfluss des Ordens auf das Verhalten seiner Mitglieder.” In Das Haus Österreich und der Orden vom Goldenen Vlies, edited by Leopold Auer et al. Leopold Stocker Verlag: Graz, 2007, 137−60. 12 Sonja Dünnebeil. “The Order of the Golden Fleece in the Year 1478: Continuity or Recommencement?” In Staging the Court of Burgundy, edited by Anne van Oosterwijk et al. Brepols: Turnhout, 2011, 59−8. 13 Melville, “Rituelle Ostentation.” 14 D’Arcy Jonathan Dacre Boulton. The Knights of the Crown. The Monarchical Orders of Knighthood in Later Medieval Europe 1325-1520. Woodbridge: The Boydel Press, 1987; Joaquín Azcárraga Servert. La insigne orden del toisón de oro. Madrid: UNED, 2001; Alfonso Ceballos de Escalera y Gila. La insigne orden del toison de oro. Madrid: Real Soc. Economica Segoviana, 2000; Lothar Höbelt. “Der Orden vom Goldenen Vlies als Klammer eines Weltreiches.” In Auer et al., Das Haus Österreich, 37−52. For the Order at the Spanish Habsburg court, see Friedrich Johannes Kalff. “Funktion und Bedeutung des Ordens vom Goldenen Vlies in Spanien vom XVI. bis zum XX. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur allgemeinen Ordensgeschichte.” PhD diss., Bonn, 1963. 15 Violet Soen. Vredehandel: Adellijke en Habsburgse verzoeningspogingen tijdens de Nederlandse Opstand (1564-1581). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012, esp. chapter 3. 16 Alicia Esteban Estríngana. “El collar del Toisón y la grandeza de España. Su gestión en Flandres durante el gobierno de los Archiduques (1599-1621).” In El legado de Borgoña. Fiesta y Ceremonia Cortesana en la Europa de los Austrias (1454-1648), edited by Krista De Jonge et al. Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2010, 503−57. 17 Jacques Paviot. “Du nouveau sur la création de l’ordre de la toison d’or.” Journal des Savants (2002), 279−98; Frédéric (baron de) Reiffenberg. Histoire de l’ordre de la Toison d’Or depuis son institution jusqu’à la cessation des chapitres généraux. Brussels: Fonderie et imprimerie normales, 1830, 304, 321−2. 15

18 Kalff, “Funktion und Bedeutung”; “Liste nominale des chevaliers de l’ordre illustre de la Toison d’Or depuis son institution jusqu‘ à nos jours.” In Auer et al., Das Haus Österreich, 161−98. 19 Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger. “The Impact of Communication Theory on the Analysis of the Early Modern Statebuilding Processes.” In Empowering Interactions. Political Cultures and the Emergence of the State in Europe 1300-1900, edited by Wim Blockmans, André Holenstein and Jon Mathieu. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009, 313−8. 20 Melville, “Rituelle Ostentation.” 21 Gilles Docquier. “D’or et d’émail: les colliers des chevaliers de la Toison d’or durant la période burgundo- habsbourgeoise (XVe et première moitié du XVIe siècle).” In Fondation et rayonnement de l’Ordre de la Toison d’or, edited by Martine Chauney-Bouillot. Dijon, 2008, 37−48. 22 Simona Slanicka. Krieg der Zeichen. Die visuelle Politik Johanns ohne Furcht und der armagnakisch- burgundische Bürgerkrieg. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht Verlag, 2002. 23 Michel Baelde. De collaterale raden onder Karel V en Filips II (1531-1578): bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van de centrale instellingen in de zestiende eeuw. Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 1965, 67-68, 73, 81-83. 24 Soen, Vredehandel, 45, 60−2; Jozef Scheerder, Het Wonderjaar te Gent 1566-1567, edited by Johan Decavele and Gustaaf Janssens. Ghent: Academia Press, 2016, 35. Only as late as 1595, the knights of the Golden Fleece were again collectively consulted as ‘extraordinary’ councillors by a governor-general. 25 de Reiffenberg, Histoire de l’ordre. 26 Soen, Vredehandel. 27 Edmond Poulet and Charles Piot, ed. Correspondence du cardinal de Granvelle (1565-1585) (hereafter: CCG). 12 vols. Brussel: Académie Royale de Belgique, 1877-1896, 1:653−5 (appendix). 28 Louis Prosper Gachard, ed. Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas (hereafter: CPh). 5 vols. Brussels: Librairie ancienne et moderne, 1848-1879, 1:399−400, Margaret of Parma to Philip II, March 1566. 29 “Justificatie van het Magistraat, Antwerpen.” Antwerpsch Archievenblad 10 (1889), 141−2. 30 CPh, 1:463; CCG, 3:356, 381−2; Paul Henrard. “de Hames, Nicolas de.” In Biographie Nationale. Vol. 8. Brussels: Bruylant-Christophe, 1884−1885, 665−9. 31 Soen, Vredehandel; Liesbeth Geevers. De integratie van Oranje, Egmont en Horn in de Spaans-Habsburgse monarchie (1559—1567). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008. 32 Reinier Cornelis Bakhuizen van den Brink. Cartons voor de geschiedenis van den Nederlandschen vrijheidsoorlog. Vol. 1. Arnhem: Nijhoff en Zoon, 1898, 12; CPh, 1:406−7: Margaret of Parma to Philip II, 3 April 1566. 33 Joaquín Azcárraga Servert. “Felipe: el Toisón de Oro y los sucesos de Flandes.” Cuadernos de Historia del derecho 6 (1999), 475−90; Soen, Vredehandel; Geevers, Gevallen vazallen. 34 Proces criminels des comtes d’Egmont, du prince de Horne, et autres seigneurs Flamands, faits par le Duc d’Albe, de l’ordre de Philippe II. Roi d’Espagne. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Pierre Michielz, 1753, 226−7. 35 La Défense de Messire Antoine de Lalaing, comte de Hocstrate…contre les fausses et appostées accusations des cas contenus ès Lettres patentes d’adjournement personnel (1568), edited by the Société des bibliophiles de Mons. Mons: de Hoyois-Derely, 1838. 36 CPh, 1:577−8, 607, 614; Gustaaf Janssens. Brabant in het verweer. Loyale oppositie tegen Spanje’s bewind in de Nederlanden van Alva tot Farnese 1567-1578. Kortrijk: Heule, 1989, 292−314. 37 Marcus Van Vaernewijck. Van die beroerlicke tijden in die Nederlanden en voornamelijk in Ghendt 1566- 1568. Edited by Ferdinand Vanderhaeghen. Vol. 4. Ghent: C. Annoot-Braeckman, 1876, cap. XXIII. 38 CPh, 1:612. 39 Folkert Postma. “Viglius van Aytta en Joachim Hopperus tegenover de Nederlandse Opstand.” Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis van de Nederlanden 102 (1987), 37; Duque de Berwick y de Alba, ed.

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Epistolario del III Duque de Alba, Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo. Vol. 2. Madrid: Diana, 1952, 12−6: Alba to Philip II, 19 January 1568. 40 Johan Brouwer. Montigny, afgezant der Nederlanden bij Philips II. Amsterdam: J. M. Meulenhoff, 1949, 73−4, 146, 161, 169, 198. 41 CPh, 2:93: Alba to Philip II, 1 June 1569; Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España (hereafter: CODOIN). Vol. 38. Madrid: Viuda de Calero, 1861, 115. 42 ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 179v−83r: Viglius to Philip II (1573?); Figures based on “liste nominale.” A substitute ‘Toison d’or king of arms’ was appointed in succession to Nicolas de Hames, but later turned out to be a double agent of the rebels, see Henri Simonneau. “Antoine Olivier, officier d’armes et agent double au sein de la Toison d’Or (1567-1573).” Publication du Centre européen d’études bourguignonnes (XIVe-XVIe s.) 48 (2008), 292−9. 43 Brussels, Koninklijke Bibliotheek (hereafter KBR), Ms 20852, fol. 206v−7r: Chevalier F. J. de Bors d’Overen. Histoire chronologique de la Toison d’Or. 18th century (copy of letter of Philip II to Alba, 14 April 1570); Baelde. De collaterale raden, 198−200. 44 Postma, “Viglius van Aytta.” 45 Waterbolk, “steunpilaar van het geheugen,” esp. 501. 46 ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 167r−72r: sermon of Viglius (1565); fol. 172r−5v: sermon of Viglius (after 1566). 47 Gilbert Tournoy. “De Orde van het Gulden Vlies in de Latijnse Literatuur (15de-17de eeuw).” In Cockshaw and Van den Bergen-Pantens, L’ordre de la Toison d’or, 141−50. 48 On the Order’s mythology, see Georges Doutrepont. “Jason et Gédéon, patrons de la Toison d’Or.” In Mélanges Godefroid Kurth. Recueil de mémoires relatifs à l’Histoire, à la Philologie et à l’Archéologie. II. Mémoires littéraires, philologiques et archéologiques. Liège: Vaillant-Carmanne, 1908, 191−208. 49 ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 167r−72r. 50 Ibid., fol. 172r−5v. 51 Ibid., fol. 180r: Viglius to Philip II, September 1573; CODOIN, 38:65: Zaya to Alba, 6 April 1569. 52 ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 179r−88r, 191r−6r. 53 Ibid., fol. 179r−83r: recommendations by Viglius, 18 September 1573; fol. 184r−v: Alba to Philip II, 20 October 1573. 54 Ibid., fol. 179r−v, 194v−6r: memorandum of Viglius about the Golden Fleece officers; fol. 234r−v. 55 Jan Pieter Guépin. De drie dichtende broers. Grudius, Marius en Secundus in brieven, reisverslagen en gedichten II. Groningen: Styx publications, 2000; Fortuné Koller. Au service de la Toison d’or (les officiers). Dison: G. Lelotte, 1971, 121−3; Pieter Gorissen. “De historiographie van het gulden vlies.” Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 6 (1951), 218−24. Despite all this, Grudius had never been officially fired. The former secretary of state, Josse de Courtewille (d.1572), took up the function of ‘substitute registrar’ in Grudius’s absence, and formally succeeded to the office after the latter’s death in 1570. 56 Grudius to Viglius, 4 February 1570, published in: Guépin, drie dichtende broers, 727−8; KBR, Ms 20857, fol. 8r−9r: Memoires dresses par Messire Viglius de Zuichem, 1570. 57 CCG, 4:317: Morillon to Granvelle, 16 July 1572; CODOIN 37:155: Philip II to Alba, 19 February 1568. 58 ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 186r−7r: Viglius to Alba (1573?); Lille, Archives départementales du Nord, B 2626, fol. 297v: payment to François le Vasseur for ordering the Order’s papers, 1574. 59 Edzo Hendrik Waterbolk. “Viglius van Aytta, maecenas van St.-Baafs te Gent.” Handelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent 28 (1974), 59−76. 60 Ghent, Rijksarchief Gent (State Archives), Archive of St Bavo, B 4813: Cornelis Breydel to Viglius, 16 March 1571 and 9 April 1571; B 4814, Viglius to Breydel, 11 September 1571 and 11 April 1571. 61 Joseph Lefèvre, ed. Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas. Deuxième partie. Vol. 1. Brussels: Académie royale de Belgique, 1940-1960, 457−8: Philip II to Farnese, 14 December 1578. See also: CCG, 7:496−8: Granvelle to Philip II, 13 November 1579; Frédéric (baron) de Reiffenberg. Correspondance de Marguerite d’Autriche, duchesse de Parme, avec Philippe II, suivie des interrogatoires du comte d’Egmont. 17

Brussels: Société des Bibliophiles de Belgique, 1842, 292−3: Philip II to Farnese, 30 November 1579; Besançon, Bibliothèque Municipale, fonds Chiflet (hereafter: BMB, CC), 89, fol. 203r−4r: Jules Chifflet, Histoire de l’ordre de la Toison d’or, 17th century (accessed 14 November 2018. http://memoirevive.besancon.fr/ark:/485 65/a011319392109HrMjL6/1/1). 62 CCG, 2:134: advise of dr. Velasco and Hopperus, 17 June 1570; José Eloy Hortal Muñoz. “La concesión de mercedes en los Países Bajos durante el gobierno del duque de Alba: la importancia del control del gobierno de las ciudades y de las provincias.” In Actas del congreso internacional Espacios de poder: Cortes, ciudades y villas. Vol. 1. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma, 2002, 189−90, 191; Soen, Vredehandel, 85, 201 n43. 63 CPh, 3:36: Luis de Requesens to Philip II, 10 March 1574. According to BMB, CC, 89, fol. 187r, this plan was also proposed by Hopperus. 64 Kalff, “Funktion und Bedeutung,” 34, 157−8; de Escalera y Gila, Toison de oro, 141. 65 BMB, CC, 89, fol. 205r−v; ARA, Audiëntie, 891, fol. 29r−v: Philip II to Farnese, 1 May 1580. 66 ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 198v−9r; Koller, Au service, 33−34, 87−90, 126−7, 150−1. 67 Kalff, “Funktion und Bedeutung,” 37. The herald Claude Marion was promoted to the position of Toison d’Or king of arms, no less than fourteen years after the ignominious flight of the previous king of arms. Both Fonck and Marion took their solemn vows in the hands of Philip II. On the precedence disputes between the ‘Spanish’ officers of the Order, see René Vermeir. “‘A latere principis.’ Le Conseil Suprême des Pays-Bas et de Bourgogne sous Philippe II, 1588−1598.” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 88 (2010), 1100−1. 68 CPh, 2:307: Requesens to Philip II, 8 April 1575; CPh, 4:19, 251: Council of State to Philip II, 31 March and 15 July 1576. E.g., the Duke of Aarschot feared an inflation of the honour of the Golden Fleece, as had happened with the French Order of St Michel: CPh, 2:171: Granvelle to Philip II, 9 March 1571. For protest on the ‘hispanization’ of the Order, see de Escalera y Gila, Toison de oro, 135−6. 69 CCG, 8:103−4. 70 BMB, CC, 89, fol. 212r−4v. 71 Kalff, “Funktion und Bedeutung,” 89−95; Christina Hofmann-Randall. Das spanische Hofzeremoniell 1500— 1700. 2e ed. Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2012, 171−7. 72 ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 232v, 234r−v, 236v; ARA, Audiëntie, 891, fol. 27r−v. 73 KBR, Ms 20852, fol. 236r−7v; ARA, Audiëntie, 891, fol. 184r−5v; Jan de Pottre. Dagboek van Jan de Pottre, 1549-1602. Ghent: C. Annoot-Braeckman, 1861, 170−1; Leon van der Essen. Alexandre Farnèse, prince de Parme, gouverneur général des Pays-Bas (1545—1592). Vol 4. Brussels: Librairie nationale d’art et d’histoire, 1933-1937, 130−2, 139−40. 74 Margit Thøfner. A Common Art. Urban Ceremonial in Antwerp and Brussels During and After the Dutch Revolt. Zwolle: Waanders Publishers, 2007, 152. 75 Werner Waterschoot. “Vorstelijke intochten 1577-1584.” In Het eind van een rebelse droom. Opstellen over het Calvinistische bewind te Gent (1577—1584) en de terugkeer van de stad onder de gehoorzaamheid van de koning van Spanje (17 september 1584), edited by Johan Decavele. Ghent: Stadsbestuur, 1984, 122−4. 76 This symbolization of consocatio through Burgundian symbols actually presented a dynastic refashioning of a popular theme in Calvinist political thought, see Martin van Gelderen. “Aristotelians, Monarchomachs and Republicans: Sovereignty and respublica mixta in Dutch and German Political Thought, 1580-1650.” In Republicanism. A Shared European Heritage. Volume 1: Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, edited by Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 205−6. 77 Peter Arnade. Beggars, Iconoclasts & Civic Patriots. The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008, 118−20. 78 ARA, Audiëntie, 194, fol. 49r: Treasurer Assonleville to Philip II, 26 March 1588, and Philip II to the same, May 1588. At Ghent, for instance, the armorial panels were restored in 1585, see Philippe Kervyn de 18

Volkaersbeke. Les églises de Gand: Eglise cathédrale de Saint-Bavon. Ghent: Hebbelynck, 1857, 124 n2: memorandum of Breydel. 79 Kalff, “Funktion und Bedeutung,” 89−92. 80 Luc Duerloo. “Pietas Albertina. Dynastieke vroomheid en herbouw van het vorstelijke gezag.” Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden 112 (1997), 8. 81 Esteban Estríngana, “El collar del Toisón.” 82 Jules Borgnet, ed. Mémoires sur le marquis de Varembon avec notice & annotations. Brussels: C. Muquardt, 1873, 68; ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 209v. Robert de Melun, Marquis of Roubaix perished in April 1585, during the siege of Antwerp, before receiving the collar. The Count of Champlite, governor of the Free-County of Burgundy, was also inducted into the Order, yet the military situation prevented him from attending the Brussels investiture. 83 CCG, 11:233. An account of the Brussels investiture of 1586 in: ARA, Aud, 891, fol. 201r−2r. 84 Sermon of the Archbishop of (?) at the 1586 investiture, see ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 209v−15r. 85 Cf. the interpretation of the Augustinian friar Jerónimo Román, cited in: Esteban Estríngana, “El collar del Toison,” 505. 86 ARA, Hs, 273B, fol. 209v−15r.

Notes on Contributor

Steven Thiry (1987) is a postdoctoral fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), affiliated to the University of Antwerp. His PhD dissertation on royal heraldry was published as Matter(s) of State. Heraldic Display and Discourse in the Early Modern Monarchy (c. 1480- 1650). Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2018. His ongoing research focuses on the political culture of the Habsburg Netherlands and the impact of state intervention on noble display.

Correspondence to: Steven Thiry, Sint-Jacobsmarkt 13, Het Brantijser, S.SJ. 114 / 2000 Antwerp, Belgium. Email: [email protected]

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