Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella : an Analysis of India's Cold Start Doctrine and Its Implications for Stability on the Subcontinent
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2010-06 Limited war under the nuclear umbrella : an analysis of India's Cold Start doctrine and its implications for stability on the subcontinent Rhodes, Quinn J. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5251 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT by Quinn J. Rhodes June 2010 Thesis Advisor: S. Paul Kapur Second Reader: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2010 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella: An 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Analysis of India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Its Implications for Stability on the Subcontinent 6. AUTHOR(S) Quinn Rhodes 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ________________. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In May 1998, both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices, adding new complications to an already volatile security environment. In the years since these tests, the Indian subcontinent has been the site of one war in 1999 and numerous other military confrontations, the biggest occurring in 2001 and 2002. The majority of these conflicts have risen from attacks in India and Kashmir carried out by non-state actors based in Pakistan. India thus faces a compellence problem in which it wants to force Pakistan to stop its perceived support of these actors, and yet it can only do so to a limited extent for fear of nuclear retaliation. India’s answer, following the 2001/2002 military standoff with Pakistan, is the Cold Start doctrine, a strategy of limited war under the nuclear umbrella. This thesis examines the efficacy of the Cold Start doctrine in the context of three major areas: Pakistan’s principal-agent dilemma, historical escalation problems on the subcontinent, and domestic Indian civil-military and inter-service rivalry issues. Based on the findings regarding these areas, this study will show that Cold Start is not the answer to India’s compellence problem. Rather, cooperation to combat a common foe is a more practical solution than mutual antagonism. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Cold Start, Principal-Agent Problem, Compellence, Civil-Military Relations, 15. NUMBER OF Inter-service Rivalry, Escalation: Deliberate and Inadvertent, Limited War, Nuclear Weapons PAGES 123 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution unlimited LIMITED WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S COLD START DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT Quinn J. Rhodes Lieutenant, United States Navy B.A., University of Rochester, 2002 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2010 Author: Quinn J. Rhodes Approved by: S. Paul Kapur, Ph.D. Thesis Advisor Douglas Porch, Ph.D. Second Reader Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D. Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT In May 1998, both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices, adding new complications to an already volatile security environment. In the years since these tests, the Indian subcontinent has been the site of one war in 1999 and numerous other military confrontations, the biggest occurring in 2001 and 2002. The majority of these conflicts have risen from attacks in India and Kashmir carried out by non-state actors based in Pakistan. India thus faces a compellence problem in which it wants to force Pakistan to stop its perceived support of these actors, and yet it can only do so to a limited extent for fear of nuclear retaliation. India’s answer, following the 2001/2002 military standoff with Pakistan, is the Cold Start doctrine, a strategy of limited war under the nuclear umbrella. This thesis examines the efficacy of the Cold Start doctrine in the context of three major areas: Pakistan’s principal-agent dilemma, historical escalation problems on the subcontinent, and domestic Indian civil-military and inter-service rivalry issues. Based on the findings regarding these areas, this study will show that Cold Start is not the answer to India’s compellence problem. Rather, cooperation to combat a common foe is a more practical solution than mutual antagonism. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................3 C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS ................................................................5 D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................8 E. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................14 F. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................16 II. INDIA’S COMPELLENCE CONCERN AND COLD START ............................19 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................20 B. THE COMPELLENCE DILEMMA............................................................21 C. THE COLD START DOCTRINE................................................................23 D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................29 III. PROBLEM 1: PAKISTAN’S PRINCIPAL-AGENT DILEMMA........................31 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................32 B. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY........................................................32 C. THE PRE-9/11 PERIOD ...............................................................................35 D. THE POST-9/11 ERA....................................................................................43 E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................52 IV. PROBLEM 2: ESCALATION ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT ................55 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................56 B. ESCALATION: DELIBERATE AND INADVERTENT ..........................57 C. EAST PAKISTAN AND BLITZKRIEG .....................................................59 D. MISPERCEPTION AND BRASSTACKS ..................................................64 E. KARGIL AND THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION.........................................67 F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................70 V. PROBLEM 3: THE LEGACIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY ..................................................................................73 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................74 B. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN MILITARY POLICY AND DOCTRINE....................................................................................................75 C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ...............................................................83 D. INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY ......................................................................87 E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................91 VI. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................93 A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................93