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India-Pakistan Crises and the Evolving Dyadic Deterrence Model

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India-Pakistan Crises and the Evolving Dyadic Deterrence Model India-Pakistan Crises and the Evolving Dyadic Deterrence Model Dr Adil Sultan Muhammad* Abstract In 2019, India and Pakistan were once again embroiled in a military crisis that demonstrated the willingness of both sides to engage in a sub-conventional conflict while avoiding a major war. India attempted an aerial surgical strike across the Line of Control (LoC) into mainland Pakistan and claimed to have called its nuclear bluff. Pakistan, on the other hand, refused to indulge in nuclear brinkmanship despite the nuclearism behaviour from the other side, and responded with a proportionate surgical strike demonstrating its capacity to inflict sufficient pain to the adversary. The crisis eventually dissipated validating the significance of nuclear deterrence in maintaining strategic stability in South Asia, besides restoring the credibility of Pakistan’s conventional deterrence against an adversary that enjoys sufficient numerical advantage. In view of the lessons learnt from the Balakot crisis, where conventional and nuclear deterrence were both at play, it may be useful to analyse different deterrence models that have helped maintain strategic stability during the various crises since the nuclearisation of the region, including the most recent 2019 one, and whether these models will remain relevant in a future India-Pakistan crisis, especially when one side is continuously introducing innovative war-fighting concepts and new technologies to complicate the regional deterrence matrix. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Deterrence Types, Surgical Strikes, Emerging Technologies, Nuclear Dyad, India-Pakistan Crises. * The author is Director at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Pakistan; and Visiting Research Fellow, King’s College London, UK. He is the author of Universalizing Nuclear Non-proliferation Norms: A Regional Framework for South Asian Nuclear Weapon States. He can be contacted at: [email protected]. _____________________ @2020 by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute. IPRI Journal XX (1): 21-43. https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.200102. IPRI JOURNAL WINTER 2020 21 Adil Sultan Muhammad Introduction uclear deterrence has remained a contested social construct that continues to be debated amongst nuclear optimists and pessimists N with different conclusions drawn by either side. The Cold war nuclear lexicon, that remains a useful guide to understanding the nature of the deterrence relationship between nuclear-armed adversaries, has several inherent limitations, and may not necessarily have universal application due to the different nature and scope of military competition between India and Pakistan. It is, therefore, important to validate various deterrence models and concepts, in view of the lessons drawn from the past crises to understand the evolving deterrence relationship in South Asia. This article shall aim to define various constructs used to explain the nature of deterrence relationship between nuclear-armed adversaries, and how these could be interpreted in a dyadic deterrence equation between India and Pakistan, while contesting the notion of a triangular deterrence relationship, involving China. The lessons drawn from the past crises provide useful insight about how nuclear deterrence has been used differently by India and Pakistan to achieve their political objectives. This study will also analyse India’s contested Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) and Pakistan’s response in the form of Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) highlighting the implications for stability-instability, especially when India is signalling a review of its nuclear doctrine and engaged in the modernisation of its military hardware. Revisiting Deterrence: Its Need and Relevance to South Asia Deterrence is a coercive strategy used to persuade an adversary that it must not act in a way that could be considered detrimental to one’s own security interests. The word deter is ‘derived from the Latin word deterre which means to discourage or restrain the adversary from taking certain actions that are considered detrimental to own security.’1 Deterrence as a concept predates the advent of nuclear weapons but, in modern times, it has mostly been associated with the threat of use of nuclear weapons. 1 Lawrence Freedman, Nuclear Deterrence: A Ladybird Expert Book (United Kingdom: Penguin Random House, 2018), 4. 22 IPRI JOURNAL WINTER 2020 India-Pakistan Crises and the Evolving Dyadic Deterrence Model Nuclear deterrence also faces an inherent dilemma. If nuclear weapons are used in a conflict, deterrence may have already failed; and if a state continues to insist that these are mainly political weapons, and not to be used, these will stop deterring the adversary. Therefore, nuclear weapons only deter by the fact that they remain useable.2 Nuclear deterrence can be divided into two main categories – deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The former promises punitive retaliation to discourage and prevent the adversary from pursuing an undesired path; whereas the latter is aimed at complicating the cost- benefit calculus of the adversary by reducing the incentive for him to pursue an undesired path that would be detrimental to one’s security. There is yet another form of a coercive strategy known as compellence that can be used to convince the adversary to adopt a certain course of action under the fear of nuclear punishment, and could arguably be classified as deterrence, but most scholars do not agree with this characterisation and maintain distinction between the two. Denial strategies are more persuasive and easier to recognise, while the threat of punishment requires clarity of intent by the leadership and the willingness to use nuclear weapons if required. Since there is no absolute distinction between the two, it is quite possible that both strategies may also overlap.3 For instance, states may opt for a pre-emptive counterforce strike to degrade an adversary’s nuclear potential with the primary objective of denying him the option of retaliation, but it also increases the risk of a nuclear war while reducing the incentive to negotiate peace before the nuclear weapons have been used. It is, therefore, not unusual for most nuclear states to opt for deterrence by denial strategies by developing conventional responses besides keeping each other’s cities hostage to counter-value strikes. This could help raise the nuclear threshold and provide an incentive for bargaining but has its own shortcomings due to the nature of conventional deterrence that remains contestable, especially in an 2 Michael Quinlan, Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 30. 3 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment, Research Monograph No. 1 (Princeton, New Jersey: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1959), 1. IPRI JOURNAL WINTER 2020 23 Adil Sultan Muhammad asymmetric military equation, where the one with the military advantage decides to test the resolve of the other, who in turn may be forced to respond with nuclear weapons, thus, leading to a deterrence breakdown. This, nevertheless, does not mean that the contestable nature of conventional deterrence makes it less credible, or that nuclear threats are always uncontestable and more credible.4 For deterrence to remain credible, it is important to understand what deters and why, and under what circumstances. Some strategies may work under a peculiar environment but may not be useful under different circumstances. Capability alone, therefore, is not the only factor. Clarity of purpose and adversary’s pain threshold are also important determinants in identifying what strategies are likely to be effective in a deterrence relationship between countries like India and Pakistan, where every crisis has had its own dynamics requiring different deterrence models to achieve the desired objectives. Before analysing these models, it may be useful to understand the nature of security competition in South Asia, and whether the deterrence relationship is triangular, involving China, or a set of two asymmetric dyads between India-Pakistan and India-China. India-Pakistan, and China – Triangular or Dyadic Deterrence? India’s rise as a major power and a potential adversary to China has strengthened the commonly held perception that the ongoing nuclear competition in the region is triangular in nature involving China, India and Pakistan. Some have labelled it part of a ‘strategic chain’ linking the United States (US) with the three Asian nuclear-weapon states.5 This characterisation is driven primarily by political considerations and do not accurately reflect the regional deterrence dynamics keeping in view the fact 4 James J. Wirtz, “How Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence?” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (Winter 2018): 58, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue- 4/Wirtz.pdf. 5 Robert Einhorn and W.P.S. Sidhu, “The Strategic Chain: Linking Pakistan, India, China and the United States” (paper, Brookings Institution, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2017/03/acnpi_201703_strategic_chain.pdf. 24 IPRI JOURNAL WINTER 2020 India-Pakistan Crises and the Evolving Dyadic Deterrence Model that all three states acquired nuclear capabilities for distinctly different reasons and view its utility differently. China China embarked upon its nuclear weapons programme to prevent nuclear blackmail from
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