Domestic Politics and the Bomb: the Influence of State Regime Type on Nuclear Deterrence
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Nishaan – Blue Star-II-2018
II/2018 NAGAARA Recalling Operation ‘Bluestar’ of 1984 Who, What, How and Why The Dramatis Personae “A scar too deep” “De-classify” ! The Fifth Annual Conference on the Sikh scripture, Guru Granth Sahib, jointly hosted by the Chardi Kalaa Foundation and the San Jose Gurdwara, took place on 19 August 2017 at San Jose in California, USA. One of the largest and arguably most beautiful gurdwaras in North America, the Gurdwara Sahib at San Jose was founded in San Jose, California, USA in 1985 by members of the then-rapidly growing Sikh community in the Santa Clara Valley Back Cover ContentsIssue II/2018 C Travails of Operation Bluestar for the 46 Editorial Sikh Soldier 2 HERE WE GO AGAIN: 34 Years after Operation Bluestar Lt Gen RS Sujlana Dr IJ Singh 49 Bluestar over Patiala 4 Khushwant Singh on Operation Bluestar Mallika Kaur “A Scar too deep” 22 Book Review 1984: Who, What, How and Why Jagmohan Singh 52 Recalling the attack on Muktsar Gurdwara Col (Dr) Dalvinder Singh Grewal 26 First Person Account KD Vasudeva recalls Operation Bluestar 55 “De-classify !” Knowing the extent of UK’s involvement in planning ‘Bluestar’ 58 Reformation of Sikh institutions? PPS Gill 9 Bluestar: the third ghallughara Pritam Singh 61 Closure ! The pain and politics of Bluestar 12 “Punjab was scorched 34 summers Jagtar Singh ago and… the burn still hurts” 34 Hamid Hussain, writes on Operation Bluestar 63 Resolution by The Sikh Forum Kanwar Sandhu and The Dramatis Personae Editorial Director Editorial Office II/2018 Dr IJ Singh D-43, Sujan Singh Park New Delhi 110 -
Group Identity and Civil-Military Relations in India and Pakistan By
Group identity and civil-military relations in India and Pakistan by Brent Scott Williams B.S., United States Military Academy, 2003 M.A., Kansas State University, 2010 M.M.A., Command and General Staff College, 2015 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2019 Abstract This dissertation asks why a military gives up power or never takes power when conditions favor a coup d’état in the cases of Pakistan and India. In most cases, civil-military relations literature focuses on civilian control in a democracy or the breakdown of that control. The focus of this research is the opposite: either the returning of civilian control or maintaining civilian control. Moreover, the approach taken in this dissertation is different because it assumes group identity, and the military’s inherent connection to society, determines the civil-military relationship. This dissertation provides a qualitative examination of two states, Pakistan and India, which have significant similarities, and attempts to discern if a group theory of civil-military relations helps to explain the actions of the militaries in both states. Both Pakistan and India inherited their military from the former British Raj. The British divided the British-Indian military into two militaries when Pakistan and India gained Independence. These events provide a solid foundation for a comparative study because both Pakistan’s and India’s militaries came from the same source. Second, the domestic events faced by both states are similar and range from famines to significant defeats in wars, ongoing insurgencies, and various other events. -
India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute Asian Studies Institute & Centre for Strategic Studies Rajat Ganguly ISSN: 11745991 ISBN: 0475110552
Asian Studies Institute Victoria University of Wellington 610 von Zedlitz Building Kelburn, Wellington 04 463 5098 [email protected] www.vuw.ac.nz/asianstudies India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute Asian Studies Institute & Centre for Strategic Studies Rajat Ganguly ISSN: 11745991 ISBN: 0475110552 Abstract The root cause of instability and hostility in South Asia stems from the unresolved nature of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. It has led to two major wars and several near misses in the past. Since the early 1990s, a 'proxy war' has developed between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The onset of the proxy war has brought bilateral relations between the two states to its nadir and contributed directly to the overt nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998. It has further undermined the prospects for regional integration and raised fears of a deadly IndoPakistan nuclear exchange in the future. Resolving the Kashmir dispute has thus never acquired more urgency than it has today. This paper analyses the origins of the Kashmir dispute, its influence on IndoPakistan relations, and the prospects for its resolution. Introduction The root cause of instability and hostility in South Asia stems from the unresolved nature of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. In the past fifty years, the two sides have fought three conventional wars (two directly over Kashmir) and came close to war on several occasions. For the past ten years, they have been locked in a 'proxy war' in Kashmir which shows little signs of abatement. It has already claimed over 10,000 lives and perhaps irreparably ruined the 'Paradise on Earth'. -
BALUSA Track II Photo Series Acknowledgement: Most of the Following Photographs Are Courtesy of Toufiq Siddiqi, Founding Member
BALUSA Track II Photo Series Acknowledgement: Most of the following photographs are courtesy of Toufiq Siddiqi, founding member of BALUSA. BALUSA I: Bellagio, Italy- June 19-23, 1996 Satish Nambiar (back); Mahmud Durrani; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Najam Sethi; Bharat Bhushan; Supi Kaul Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Bharat Bhushan; Supi Kaul; Shaharyar Khan Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul Shaharyar Khan; Satish Nambiar; Bharat Bhushan; Shirin Tahir- Kheli; Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul; Bridget Grimes; Shekhar Gupta; Najam Sethi Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul; Shaharyar Khan Satish Nambiar; Najam Sethi; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Supi Kaul; Mahmud Durrani Mahmud Durrani; Shirin Tahir-Kheli BALUSA III: Princeton, New Jersey- May 2-4, 1997 Girish Saxena; Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul Girish Saxena, Mahmud Durrani; V. Arunachalam; Supi Kaul; Shaharyar Khan; Shirin Tahir- Kheli; Syed Babar Ali Mahmud Durrani; Girish Saxena Shaharyar Khan; Girish Saxena; Shahid Javed Burki Pratap Kaul; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Shaharyar Khan; Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul; V. Arunachalam (back to camera) Supi Kaul; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Pratap Kaul Mahmud Durrani; Toufiq Siddiqi; Shaharyar Khan; Supi Kaul; V. Arunachalm; Syed Babar Ali BALUSA IV: Muscat, Oman- March 20-23, 1998 Mahmud Durrani; Shahid Khaqan Abbasi; Supi Kaul; Dr. Omar Zawawi (HOST); Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Shaharyar Khan; Girish Saxena; Pratap Kaul; Shah Mahmood Qureshi; Senior Omani official; Hilal Raza Kent Biringer; Shaharyar Khan; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Shahid Khaqan Abbasi Salman Haidar; Syed Babar Ali; Shaharyar Khan Girish Saxena; Mahmud Durrani; Pratap Kaul Al Bustan Palace Hotel (Venue for BALUSA) Supi Kaul; Shah Mahmood Qureshi; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Raja Mohan Dr. Omar Zawawi; Pratap Kaul; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Senior Omani official; Raja Mohan Dr. -
The Rise and Fall of Israel's Bilateral Aid Budget 1958-2008
A mere ten years after Israel gained its independence from British mandatory rule in 1948, it launched an official development cooperation program. At a time when Israel was itself still a developing country, it began a training and technical assistance program that expanded within a few short years to include the dispatch of hundreds of Israeli technical assistants to other developing countries and the training of thousands of Africans, Asians and Latin Americans annually. Driven by both political necessity and the moral vision of Israel’s leaders, the program rapidly grew in size and scope. At its height, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, MASHAV, the government body responsible for managing the aid program, was the largest department in Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Israel had, per capita, one of the most extensive technical assistance programs in the western world. Unfortunately, this vision of cooperation, at least as far as Africa was concerned, proved to be short-lived. Within 15 years of the establishment The Rise and of Israel’s official aid program, the "golden age" of Israel's development cooperation came to an abrupt end, as all but four African countries Fall severed relations with Israel in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Africa’s rejection of Israel dealt a deep blow to Israeli public and of Israel's political support for its aid program, marking a turning point from which Bilateral Aid Israel technical assistance has never recovered. The rupture of relations led to an immediate 50% drop in MASHAV’s operational budget and further Budget substantial budgetary cuts over the past 35 years. -
(C) Within Whose Jurisdiction the Plaintiff
25th Bihar Civil Judge (Pre.) Exam , 2000 (G.K. & Law) 109 (C) within whose jurisdiction the plaintiff (B) a party can amend its pleadings at any resides stage (D) within whose local limits ofjurisdiction (C) cannot allow amendment of pleadings the property is situated (D) can allow amendment ofitten statement 89. The principle of Res Judicata only (A) applies to criminalproceedings also (B) applies to suil only 96. The Court (C) applies to execution proceedings also (A) has no power to record admissions of (D) can be decided by the parties to the suit parties at any stage of the proceeding 90. Compensatory costs in respect of false or (B) has power to record admissions only vexatious claim or defence can be awarded on issues of law upto (C) has power to record admissions of (A) Rs.10,000/- (B) Rs. 1,000/- parties at any stage of the proceeding (C) Rs. 500/- (D) Rs. 3,000/- (D) cannot record admissions at all 91. Books of account 97. No one shall be ordered to attend the Court (A) are liable to attachment and sale in in person to give evidence execution of a decree (A) unless he resides within 50 kilometres (B) are not liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree from the Court (C) are no evidence in the eye of law (B) unless he resides within 100 kilometres (D) can be the sole evidence to decide a suit from the Court house 92. An appeal shall lie (C) unless he resides within 1000 kilometres (A) from all orders passed by the Court from the Court (B) only from such orders as provided In (D) unless he resides within 500 kilometres the Code of Civil Procedure from the Court house (C) from none of the orders passed by the 98. -
10 Pakistan's Nuclear Program
10 PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM Laying the groundwork for impunity C. Christine Fair Contemporary analysts of Pakistan’s nuclear program speciously assert that Pakistan began acquiring a nuclear weapons capability after the 1971 war with India in which Pakistan was vivisected. In this conventional account, India’s 1974 nuclear tests gave Pakistan further impetus for its program.1 In fact, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s first popularly elected prime minister, ini- tiated the program in the late 1960s despite considerable opposition from Pakistan’s first military dictator General Ayub Khan (henceforth Ayub). Bhutto presciently began arguing for a nuclear weapons program as early as 1964 when China detonated its nuclear devices at Lop Nor and secured its position as a permanent nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Considering China’s test and its defeat of India in the 1962 Sino–Indian war, Bhutto reasoned that India, too, would want to develop a nuclear weapon. He also knew that Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program was far behind India’s, which predated independence in 1947. Notwithstanding these arguments, Ayub opposed acquiring a nuclear weapon both because he believed it would be an expensive misadventure and because he worried that doing so would strain Pakistan’s western alliances, formalized through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Ayub also thought Pakistan would be able to buy a nuclear weapon “off the shelf” from one of its allies if India acquired one first.2 With the army opposition obstructing him, Bhutto was unable to make any significant nuclear headway until 1972, when Pakistan’s army lay in disgrace after losing East Pakistan in its 1971 war with India. -
Saif Ali Khan Property Worth
Saif Ali Khan Property Worth Snafu and epistolic Wye never downs his oasts! Swallow-tailed and fibrillar Voltaire chirre maritally and plots his peptizing heinously and phraseologically. Interior and supernumerary Kit never rig his Oldenburg! Three times like extravagant structure named as per reports and actress is an actress ruchika pandey, property worth of the Today I immediately talk of an. Sara Ali Khan Net Worth 2021 Income Cars brands & Luxury. The properties in main aim of india and writer in the notorious barbarian and her wealth? Saba ali khan age Kingsville Community Centre. As a result, it propelled her to higher heights. And as the saying goes, many great things start from modest beginnings. That has always stayed in my mind. Please his multiple awards, mumbai police arrested her money, saif says that has been submitted successfully. Parse the OS into an object. Who being the richest woman in Bollywood? Saif Ali Khan Net Worth biography quotes wiki assets cars. Nandini Sen and Gautam Berry are the parents of actress Tara Alisha Berry. We stream in challenging the status quo and issue a life bigger than there own. Who is unknown as the skills and enjoy the company, lifestyle of news to do you are set out! 'Royal Couple' Kareena Kapoor Khan And Saif Ali Khan's Combined Net there Will. He just one of property worth and assets and saif ali khan property worth so is a room which the. Is the years she is salman khan struggled a career in indian actor in ahmedabad, respectful and whose last samurai, my grandparents and. -
Israel-Pakistan Relations Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)
P. R. Kumaraswamy Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) The purpose of the Jaffee Center is, first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel's national security as well as Middle East regional and international secu- rity affairs. The Center also aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are - or should be - at the top of Israel's national security agenda. The Jaffee Center seeks to address the strategic community in Israel and abroad, Israeli policymakers and opinion-makers and the general public. The Center relates to the concept of strategy in its broadest meaning, namely the complex of processes involved in the identification, mobili- zation and application of resources in peace and war, in order to solidify and strengthen national and international security. To Jasjit Singh with affection and gratitude P. R. Kumaraswamy Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations Memorandum no. 55, March 2000 Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 6 P. R. Kumaraswamy Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Tel Aviv University Ramat Aviv, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel Tel. 972 3 640-9926 Fax 972 3 642-2404 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ ISBN: 965-459-041-7 © 2000 All rights reserved Graphic Design: Michal Semo Printed by: Kedem Ltd., Tel Aviv Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations 7 Contents Introduction .......................................................................................9 -
Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia
Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, editors Copyright © 2004 The Henry L. Stimson Center All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the Henry L. Stimson Center. Cover design by Design Army. ISBN 0-9747255-8-7 The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street NW Twelfth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org Table of Contents Preface ................................................................................................................. v Abbreviations..................................................................................................... vii Introduction......................................................................................................... ix 1. The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia Michael Krepon ............................................................................................ 1 2. Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors Rodney W. Jones......................................................................................... 25 3. India’s Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture Rajesh M. Basrur ........................................................................................ 56 4. Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia Feroz Hassan Khan ................................................................................... -
Persia & Iraq Command History & Personnel
2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND (HISTORY & PERSONNEL) A short history of the Persia and Iraq Command (also known as ‘PaiForce’), an operational command in the British Army between ??. In addition, known details of the key appointments held between 1930 and 1950 are included. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2020) 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] A Concise History of Persia & Iraq Command Version: 2_1 This edition dated: 5 August 2020 ISBN: Not yet allocated. All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means including; electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, scanning without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. (copyright held by author) Assisted by: Stephen HEAL Published privately by: The Author – Publishing as: www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk ©www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] Persia and Iraq Command Modern Iraq is a country born out the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the defeat of Turkey at the end of the Great War. A government for the new state of Iraq was formed in November 1920, with Emir Feisal being proclaimed King of Iraq on 23 August 1921. The United Kingdom signed a treaty with Iraq in October 1922 defining the relationship between the two sovereign states. This treaty imposed limits on the sovereignty of Iraq and maintained British interests in the country. In 1925, the area around Mosul, which was rich in oil deposits, was ceded to Iraq from Turkey. -
G.H.Q. India Adjutant-General's Branch
2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. A CONCISE HISTORY OF: ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S BRANCH G.H.Q. INDIA (HISTORY & PERSONNEL) A short history of General Headquarters India Command between 1938 and 1947, and details of the key appointments held in G.H.Q. India during that period. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2020)] 24 April 2020 [G.H.Q. INDIA HISTORY & PERSONNEL] A Concise Biography of Lieutenant General Sir William H. G. BAKER Version: 1_1 This edition dated: 28 April 2020 ISBN: Not yet allocated. All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means including; electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, scanning without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. (copyright held by author) Assisted by: Stephen HEAL Published privately by: The Author – Publishing as: www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk ©www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 24 April 2020 [G.H.Q. INDIA HISTORY & PERSONNEL] Headquarters Staff of the Army in India Headquarters of the Army in India was a pre-war command covering the entire country of British India. The headquarters consisted of four branches: • General Staff Branch, • Adjutant General’s Branch, • Quarter-Master-General’s Branch, • Master-General of the Ordnance Branch, • Engineer-in-Chief’s Branch. The Commander-in-Chief was a General in the Indian Army. This was usually a four-year posting. The C-in-C had a staff of five, an Assistant Military Secretary (Personal) (Lieutenant Colonel), three Aides- de-Camp (one Major and three Captains) and a personal surgeon (Major).