DOCSLIB.ORG

Domestic Politics and the Bomb: the Influence of State Regime Type on Nuclear Deterrence

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Domestic Politics and the Bomb: the Influence of State Regime Type on Nuclear Deterrence Domestic Politics and the Bomb: The Influence of State Regime Type on Nuclear Deterrence By Mark Haichin A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Affairs Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario ©2020 Mark Haichin Abstract Why are some nuclear weapon states attacked more than others? Reviewing attacks against them shows that nuclear-armed democracies are attacked more than non-democratic ones, indicating that state regime type may play a role in nuclear deterrence credibility. This is largely ignored in the nuclear deterrence literature despite many conceptual similarities to conventional armed conflict, which has numerous theories on regime type influencing state conflict behaviour. In this dissertation, I seek to explain the disparity in attacks on nuclear weapon states with a novel theory that state political accountability mechanisms influence nuclear deterrence threat credibility. I hypothesize that democratic states are more sensitive to the costs of fulfilling their nuclear deterrence threats in low-intensity conflict scenarios due to popular accountability. Non-democratic nuclear weapon states can make more credible threats due to being accountable to an elite audience instead of the general population, allowing them to engage in cost-insensitive behaviour. To accomplish this, I use process tracing within a broader comparative case study framework to study crises affecting four nuclear weapon states during the 1945-2018 period. For each of these four states (Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea), I study the makeup of their government, including their domestic audiences, their nuclear deterrence threats, and command and control structures. I then compare pre- and post-nuclear deterrent acquisition crises targeting them and evaluate the rationales of decision-makers for both the defending and challenging states, particularly how the latter perceived the former’s cost-sensitivity. The results indicate that, as anticipated, nuclear-armed democracies face greater difficulties in having their nuclear deterrence threats considered credible in low-intensity crises than their non-democratic counterparts. However, each case comes with notable caveats. Israel's nuclear opacity policy obscures whether government restraint is due to accountability or potential international reactions, while the Indian government often goes against popular sentiment in demonstrating restraint. While Pakistan and North Korea have both successfully deterred even low-intensity attacks against them due to the perception that they are sufficiently cost-insensitive to use nuclear weapons against any attack, the latter's aggression has led to it being considered sufficiently dangerous as to encourage potential pre-emptive strikes against it. ii Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without the support of numerous people. I first need to thank my supervisor, David Carment, who for the past few years provided plenty of useful advice and honest feedback throughout the research and writing process. His knowledge of regime types and associated theories was critical in fine-tuning the theory and critical points in the case studies (and occasionally finding points that needed some elaboration or correction). Dr. Carment also deserves thanks for having taken me on as a research assistant and co-author on several projects throughout my PhD studies, as well as having taught the qualitative methodologies that served as the backbone of my research. It is safe to say that my experiences with him have made me a better research, and I am grateful for it. I also need to thank my original supervisor, Jeremy ‘Jez’ Littlewood for guiding me in writing the original thesis proposal right up until his very last day at NPSIA. During that time, Dr. Littlewood’s guidance was critical in helping me flesh out what was originally a rough idea into a viable theory and research design. While it was sad to see him leave NPSIA, I owe him thanks for his feedback and encouragement in the early steps of the thesis process, which also helped me get my first academic publication. My advisors Elinor Sloan and Alex Wilner are both owed considerable thanks as well. Throughout the process of writing this thesis, they provided detailed and rapid feedback to my drafts (no mean feat, considering how long the chapters ended up being). Their extensive knowledge of deterrence theory and history helped keep me on the right track during the writing process, as well as pointing me towards sources that I likely would not have found otherwise. My internal and external examiners, Dr. Mira Sucharov and Dr. James Fergusson, also deserve thanks for their constructive feedback during my thesis defence. I’m also grateful to several others at NPSIA for their support throughout the process. Special thanks are owed in particular to David Long for his encouragement in the early stages of my PhD studies, as well as Stephen Saideman for having pointed out audience costs as a possible mechanism for my theory. And of course, the NPSIA administrative staff, particularly Patricia Lacroix and Coleen Kornelson, need to be thanked for helping me navigate the PhD program for the past 5+ years. Thanks are owed to NPSIA, Carleton University, and the Province of Ontario (Ontario Graduate Scholarship) for generously awarding funding that enabled me to concentrate full-time on my doctoral studies and to attend academic conferences during the past few years. iii I’m also grateful to Monika Thakur, who almost single-handedly convinced me to shift my career plans from law school to international relations during her Introduction to IR and International Security courses during my undergrad studies at Concordia University. Furthermore, she was the one who originally suggested that I apply to graduate programs in International Relations. It would not be an exaggeration for me to say that without her influence, my career path and life would have gone in a very different direction. Naturally, there are many friends to thank for having supported me along the way. Sam MacIsaac and Kala Pendakur have been especially supportive since we first met in my second year in the program, with Sam having been willing to give informal feedback on my writing (even if it meant wading through some meandering prose far from his own field of expertise). Sarah Jansen, Lance Hadley, and Dani Belo have also been steadfast friends throughout my PhD experience, providing many laughs as we exchanged stories while all being clustered in the offices (and when the COVID-19 pandemic struck, online as well). Amber Warnat, Bryan Bereziuk, Michael Fejes, and Marshall Palmer also deserve thanks here as well. Uri Marantz and Michael Shkolnik also need to be thanked for having set an example for myself and other NPSIA PhD students. Both of them have consistently provided friendly advice and support since the orientation session on my very first day at NPSIA. Finally, my family have undoubtedly been the greatest source of support throughout my academic career. My parents Rick and Guittel supported my interests from an early age, even as they veered far from their own careers in medicine and dentistry, and always took the time and energy to help me out with schoolwork (and to occasionally provide a necessary reminder to step away from the ever-growing book pile). Their interest in current events, including the ever-present collection of Time magazines lying around the house and my mom’s encouragement to apply to the IR program at LSE undoubtedly helped set my career path. Thank you both for having believed in me this whole time, even when I occasionally doubted what I was doing. I’m also profoundly grateful to my siblings Michael and Kate for their support. Despite studying pharmacology and medicine at the same time, you two have been supportive of your anxious older brother. Your hard work in your own fields has inspired me to keep on pushing ahead whenever I was tempted to take it easy or (somewhat more often) whenever I felt stuck. To my grandparents, Raphael, Georgette, and Martha, I can never thank you enough for supporting me, even if my research seemed somewhat esoteric to your own experiences. And to Shura, while I am sad that you aren’t here to read this, I can only hope that you would have been proud, and I can never thank you enough for supporting my intellectual pursuits and that of everyone else in our family. iv Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... iii List of Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................. x List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................... xi Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1: Are Some Nuclear Weapon States Better at Deterring Than Others? .......................... 1 1.2: Research Question and Argument .................................................................................... 5 1.3: Key Concepts......................................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Nishaan – Blue Star-II-2018
    II/2018 NAGAARA Recalling Operation ‘Bluestar’ of 1984 Who, What, How and Why The Dramatis Personae “A scar too deep” “De-classify” ! The Fifth Annual Conference on the Sikh scripture, Guru Granth Sahib, jointly hosted by the Chardi Kalaa Foundation and the San Jose Gurdwara, took place on 19 August 2017 at San Jose in California, USA. One of the largest and arguably most beautiful gurdwaras in North America, the Gurdwara Sahib at San Jose was founded in San Jose, California, USA in 1985 by members of the then-rapidly growing Sikh community in the Santa Clara Valley Back Cover ContentsIssue II/2018 C Travails of Operation Bluestar for the 46 Editorial Sikh Soldier 2 HERE WE GO AGAIN: 34 Years after Operation Bluestar Lt Gen RS Sujlana Dr IJ Singh 49 Bluestar over Patiala 4 Khushwant Singh on Operation Bluestar Mallika Kaur “A Scar too deep” 22 Book Review 1984: Who, What, How and Why Jagmohan Singh 52 Recalling the attack on Muktsar Gurdwara Col (Dr) Dalvinder Singh Grewal 26 First Person Account KD Vasudeva recalls Operation Bluestar 55 “De-classify !” Knowing the extent of UK’s involvement in planning ‘Bluestar’ 58 Reformation of Sikh institutions? PPS Gill 9 Bluestar: the third ghallughara Pritam Singh 61 Closure ! The pain and politics of Bluestar 12 “Punjab was scorched 34 summers Jagtar Singh ago and… the burn still hurts” 34 Hamid Hussain, writes on Operation Bluestar 63 Resolution by The Sikh Forum Kanwar Sandhu and The Dramatis Personae Editorial Director Editorial Office II/2018 Dr IJ Singh D-43, Sujan Singh Park New Delhi 110
    [Show full text]
  • Group Identity and Civil-Military Relations in India and Pakistan By
    Group identity and civil-military relations in India and Pakistan by Brent Scott Williams B.S., United States Military Academy, 2003 M.A., Kansas State University, 2010 M.M.A., Command and General Staff College, 2015 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2019 Abstract This dissertation asks why a military gives up power or never takes power when conditions favor a coup d’état in the cases of Pakistan and India. In most cases, civil-military relations literature focuses on civilian control in a democracy or the breakdown of that control. The focus of this research is the opposite: either the returning of civilian control or maintaining civilian control. Moreover, the approach taken in this dissertation is different because it assumes group identity, and the military’s inherent connection to society, determines the civil-military relationship. This dissertation provides a qualitative examination of two states, Pakistan and India, which have significant similarities, and attempts to discern if a group theory of civil-military relations helps to explain the actions of the militaries in both states. Both Pakistan and India inherited their military from the former British Raj. The British divided the British-Indian military into two militaries when Pakistan and India gained Independence. These events provide a solid foundation for a comparative study because both Pakistan’s and India’s militaries came from the same source. Second, the domestic events faced by both states are similar and range from famines to significant defeats in wars, ongoing insurgencies, and various other events.
    [Show full text]
  • India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute Asian Studies Institute & Centre for Strategic Studies Rajat Ganguly ISSN: 1174­5991 ISBN: 0­475­11055­2
    Asian Studies Institute Victoria University of Wellington 610 von Zedlitz Building Kelburn, Wellington 04 463 5098 [email protected] www.vuw.ac.nz/asianstudies India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute Asian Studies Institute & Centre for Strategic Studies Rajat Ganguly ISSN: 1174­5991 ISBN: 0­475­11055­2 Abstract The root cause of instability and hostility in South Asia stems from the unresolved nature of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. It has led to two major wars and several near misses in the past. Since the early 1990s, a 'proxy war' has developed between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The onset of the proxy war has brought bilateral relations between the two states to its nadir and contributed directly to the overt nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998. It has further undermined the prospects for regional integration and raised fears of a deadly Indo­Pakistan nuclear exchange in the future. Resolving the Kashmir dispute has thus never acquired more urgency than it has today. This paper analyses the origins of the Kashmir dispute, its influence on Indo­Pakistan relations, and the prospects for its resolution. Introduction The root cause of instability and hostility in South Asia stems from the unresolved nature of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. In the past fifty years, the two sides have fought three conventional wars (two directly over Kashmir) and came close to war on several occasions. For the past ten years, they have been locked in a 'proxy war' in Kashmir which shows little signs of abatement. It has already claimed over 10,000 lives and perhaps irreparably ruined the 'Paradise on Earth'.
    [Show full text]
  • BALUSA Track II Photo Series Acknowledgement: Most of the Following Photographs Are Courtesy of Toufiq Siddiqi, Founding Member
    BALUSA Track II Photo Series Acknowledgement: Most of the following photographs are courtesy of Toufiq Siddiqi, founding member of BALUSA. BALUSA I: Bellagio, Italy- June 19-23, 1996 Satish Nambiar (back); Mahmud Durrani; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Najam Sethi; Bharat Bhushan; Supi Kaul Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Bharat Bhushan; Supi Kaul; Shaharyar Khan Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul Shaharyar Khan; Satish Nambiar; Bharat Bhushan; Shirin Tahir- Kheli; Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul; Bridget Grimes; Shekhar Gupta; Najam Sethi Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul; Shaharyar Khan Satish Nambiar; Najam Sethi; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Supi Kaul; Mahmud Durrani Mahmud Durrani; Shirin Tahir-Kheli BALUSA III: Princeton, New Jersey- May 2-4, 1997 Girish Saxena; Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul Girish Saxena, Mahmud Durrani; V. Arunachalam; Supi Kaul; Shaharyar Khan; Shirin Tahir- Kheli; Syed Babar Ali Mahmud Durrani; Girish Saxena Shaharyar Khan; Girish Saxena; Shahid Javed Burki Pratap Kaul; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Shaharyar Khan; Mahmud Durrani; Supi Kaul; V. Arunachalam (back to camera) Supi Kaul; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Pratap Kaul Mahmud Durrani; Toufiq Siddiqi; Shaharyar Khan; Supi Kaul; V. Arunachalm; Syed Babar Ali BALUSA IV: Muscat, Oman- March 20-23, 1998 Mahmud Durrani; Shahid Khaqan Abbasi; Supi Kaul; Dr. Omar Zawawi (HOST); Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Shaharyar Khan; Girish Saxena; Pratap Kaul; Shah Mahmood Qureshi; Senior Omani official; Hilal Raza Kent Biringer; Shaharyar Khan; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Shahid Khaqan Abbasi Salman Haidar; Syed Babar Ali; Shaharyar Khan Girish Saxena; Mahmud Durrani; Pratap Kaul Al Bustan Palace Hotel (Venue for BALUSA) Supi Kaul; Shah Mahmood Qureshi; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Raja Mohan Dr. Omar Zawawi; Pratap Kaul; Shirin Tahir-Kheli; Senior Omani official; Raja Mohan Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of Israel's Bilateral Aid Budget 1958-2008
    A mere ten years after Israel gained its independence from British mandatory rule in 1948, it launched an official development cooperation program. At a time when Israel was itself still a developing country, it began a training and technical assistance program that expanded within a few short years to include the dispatch of hundreds of Israeli technical assistants to other developing countries and the training of thousands of Africans, Asians and Latin Americans annually. Driven by both political necessity and the moral vision of Israel’s leaders, the program rapidly grew in size and scope. At its height, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, MASHAV, the government body responsible for managing the aid program, was the largest department in Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Israel had, per capita, one of the most extensive technical assistance programs in the western world. Unfortunately, this vision of cooperation, at least as far as Africa was concerned, proved to be short-lived. Within 15 years of the establishment The Rise and of Israel’s official aid program, the "golden age" of Israel's development cooperation came to an abrupt end, as all but four African countries Fall severed relations with Israel in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Africa’s rejection of Israel dealt a deep blow to Israeli public and of Israel's political support for its aid program, marking a turning point from which Bilateral Aid Israel technical assistance has never recovered. The rupture of relations led to an immediate 50% drop in MASHAV’s operational budget and further Budget substantial budgetary cuts over the past 35 years.
    [Show full text]
  • (C) Within Whose Jurisdiction the Plaintiff
    25th Bihar Civil Judge (Pre.) Exam , 2000 (G.K. & Law) 109 (C) within whose jurisdiction the plaintiff (B) a party can amend its pleadings at any resides stage (D) within whose local limits ofjurisdiction (C) cannot allow amendment of pleadings the property is situated (D) can allow amendment ofitten statement 89. The principle of Res Judicata only (A) applies to criminalproceedings also (B) applies to suil only 96. The Court (C) applies to execution proceedings also (A) has no power to record admissions of (D) can be decided by the parties to the suit parties at any stage of the proceeding 90. Compensatory costs in respect of false or (B) has power to record admissions only vexatious claim or defence can be awarded on issues of law upto (C) has power to record admissions of (A) Rs.10,000/- (B) Rs. 1,000/- parties at any stage of the proceeding (C) Rs. 500/- (D) Rs. 3,000/- (D) cannot record admissions at all 91. Books of account 97. No one shall be ordered to attend the Court (A) are liable to attachment and sale in in person to give evidence execution of a decree (A) unless he resides within 50 kilometres (B) are not liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree from the Court (C) are no evidence in the eye of law (B) unless he resides within 100 kilometres (D) can be the sole evidence to decide a suit from the Court house 92. An appeal shall lie (C) unless he resides within 1000 kilometres (A) from all orders passed by the Court from the Court (B) only from such orders as provided In (D) unless he resides within 500 kilometres the Code of Civil Procedure from the Court house (C) from none of the orders passed by the 98.
    [Show full text]
  • 10 Pakistan's Nuclear Program
    10 PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM Laying the groundwork for impunity C. Christine Fair Contemporary analysts of Pakistan’s nuclear program speciously assert that Pakistan began acquiring a nuclear weapons capability after the 1971 war with India in which Pakistan was vivisected. In this conventional account, India’s 1974 nuclear tests gave Pakistan further impetus for its program.1 In fact, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s first popularly elected prime minister, ini- tiated the program in the late 1960s despite considerable opposition from Pakistan’s first military dictator General Ayub Khan (henceforth Ayub). Bhutto presciently began arguing for a nuclear weapons program as early as 1964 when China detonated its nuclear devices at Lop Nor and secured its position as a permanent nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Considering China’s test and its defeat of India in the 1962 Sino–Indian war, Bhutto reasoned that India, too, would want to develop a nuclear weapon. He also knew that Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program was far behind India’s, which predated independence in 1947. Notwithstanding these arguments, Ayub opposed acquiring a nuclear weapon both because he believed it would be an expensive misadventure and because he worried that doing so would strain Pakistan’s western alliances, formalized through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Ayub also thought Pakistan would be able to buy a nuclear weapon “off the shelf” from one of its allies if India acquired one first.2 With the army opposition obstructing him, Bhutto was unable to make any significant nuclear headway until 1972, when Pakistan’s army lay in disgrace after losing East Pakistan in its 1971 war with India.
    [Show full text]
  • Saif Ali Khan Property Worth
    Saif Ali Khan Property Worth Snafu and epistolic Wye never downs his oasts! Swallow-tailed and fibrillar Voltaire chirre maritally and plots his peptizing heinously and phraseologically. Interior and supernumerary Kit never rig his Oldenburg! Three times like extravagant structure named as per reports and actress is an actress ruchika pandey, property worth of the Today I immediately talk of an. Sara Ali Khan Net Worth 2021 Income Cars brands & Luxury. The properties in main aim of india and writer in the notorious barbarian and her wealth? Saba ali khan age Kingsville Community Centre. As a result, it propelled her to higher heights. And as the saying goes, many great things start from modest beginnings. That has always stayed in my mind. Please his multiple awards, mumbai police arrested her money, saif says that has been submitted successfully. Parse the OS into an object. Who being the richest woman in Bollywood? Saif Ali Khan Net Worth biography quotes wiki assets cars. Nandini Sen and Gautam Berry are the parents of actress Tara Alisha Berry. We stream in challenging the status quo and issue a life bigger than there own. Who is unknown as the skills and enjoy the company, lifestyle of news to do you are set out! 'Royal Couple' Kareena Kapoor Khan And Saif Ali Khan's Combined Net there Will. He just one of property worth and assets and saif ali khan property worth so is a room which the. Is the years she is salman khan struggled a career in indian actor in ahmedabad, respectful and whose last samurai, my grandparents and.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel-Pakistan Relations Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)
    P. R. Kumaraswamy Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) The purpose of the Jaffee Center is, first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel's national security as well as Middle East regional and international secu- rity affairs. The Center also aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are - or should be - at the top of Israel's national security agenda. The Jaffee Center seeks to address the strategic community in Israel and abroad, Israeli policymakers and opinion-makers and the general public. The Center relates to the concept of strategy in its broadest meaning, namely the complex of processes involved in the identification, mobili- zation and application of resources in peace and war, in order to solidify and strengthen national and international security. To Jasjit Singh with affection and gratitude P. R. Kumaraswamy Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations Memorandum no. 55, March 2000 Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies 6 P. R. Kumaraswamy Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Tel Aviv University Ramat Aviv, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel Tel. 972 3 640-9926 Fax 972 3 642-2404 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ ISBN: 965-459-041-7 © 2000 All rights reserved Graphic Design: Michal Semo Printed by: Kedem Ltd., Tel Aviv Beyond the Veil: Israel-Pakistan Relations 7 Contents Introduction .......................................................................................9
    [Show full text]
  • Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia
    Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, editors Copyright © 2004 The Henry L. Stimson Center All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the Henry L. Stimson Center. Cover design by Design Army. ISBN 0-9747255-8-7 The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street NW Twelfth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org Table of Contents Preface ................................................................................................................. v Abbreviations..................................................................................................... vii Introduction......................................................................................................... ix 1. The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia Michael Krepon ............................................................................................ 1 2. Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors Rodney W. Jones......................................................................................... 25 3. India’s Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture Rajesh M. Basrur ........................................................................................ 56 4. Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia Feroz Hassan Khan ...................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Persia & Iraq Command History & Personnel
    2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND (HISTORY & PERSONNEL) A short history of the Persia and Iraq Command (also known as ‘PaiForce’), an operational command in the British Army between ??. In addition, known details of the key appointments held between 1930 and 1950 are included. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2020) 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] A Concise History of Persia & Iraq Command Version: 2_1 This edition dated: 5 August 2020 ISBN: Not yet allocated. All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means including; electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, scanning without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. (copyright held by author) Assisted by: Stephen HEAL Published privately by: The Author – Publishing as: www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk ©www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 31 July 2020 [PERSIA & IRAQ COMMAND HISTORY & PERSONNEL] Persia and Iraq Command Modern Iraq is a country born out the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the defeat of Turkey at the end of the Great War. A government for the new state of Iraq was formed in November 1920, with Emir Feisal being proclaimed King of Iraq on 23 August 1921. The United Kingdom signed a treaty with Iraq in October 1922 defining the relationship between the two sovereign states. This treaty imposed limits on the sovereignty of Iraq and maintained British interests in the country. In 1925, the area around Mosul, which was rich in oil deposits, was ceded to Iraq from Turkey.
    [Show full text]
  • G.H.Q. India Adjutant-General's Branch
    2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. A CONCISE HISTORY OF: ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S BRANCH G.H.Q. INDIA (HISTORY & PERSONNEL) A short history of General Headquarters India Command between 1938 and 1947, and details of the key appointments held in G.H.Q. India during that period. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2020)] 24 April 2020 [G.H.Q. INDIA HISTORY & PERSONNEL] A Concise Biography of Lieutenant General Sir William H. G. BAKER Version: 1_1 This edition dated: 28 April 2020 ISBN: Not yet allocated. All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means including; electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, scanning without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. (copyright held by author) Assisted by: Stephen HEAL Published privately by: The Author – Publishing as: www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk ©www.BritishMilitaryH istory.co.uk Page 1 24 April 2020 [G.H.Q. INDIA HISTORY & PERSONNEL] Headquarters Staff of the Army in India Headquarters of the Army in India was a pre-war command covering the entire country of British India. The headquarters consisted of four branches: • General Staff Branch, • Adjutant General’s Branch, • Quarter-Master-General’s Branch, • Master-General of the Ordnance Branch, • Engineer-in-Chief’s Branch. The Commander-in-Chief was a General in the Indian Army. This was usually a four-year posting. The C-in-C had a staff of five, an Assistant Military Secretary (Personal) (Lieutenant Colonel), three Aides- de-Camp (one Major and three Captains) and a personal surgeon (Major).
    [Show full text]